.env.example

@@ -13,3 +13,14 @@ WHATSAPP_PHONE_NUMBER_ID=
 WHATSAPP_ACCESS_TOKEN=
 WHATSAPP_VERIFY_TOKEN=
 META_GRAPH_BASE=https://graph.facebook.com/v18.0
+
+# ── Webhook auth (P0) ──────────────────────────────────
+# Shared secret for inbound WhatsApp webhook POSTs (X-Webhook-Secret header).
+# FAIL-CLOSED: when unset/empty, every webhook message is rejected (403).
+# Generate with: openssl rand -hex 32
+WHATSAPP_WEBHOOK_SECRET=
+
+# ── Login rate limiting (P0) ────────────────────────────
+# ~5 failed login attempts per 15 minutes per IP+email → HTTP 429
+LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_MAX_ATTEMPTS=5
+LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS=900

AGENTS.md

@@ -47,14 +47,24 @@ Users, units, and categories are auto-seeded on first startup via lifespan hook:
 | Method | Path | Auth | Description |
 |--------|------|------|-------------|
 | GET | `/health` | No | Health check |
-| POST | `/api/auth/register` | No | Create user |
+| POST | `/api/auth/login` | No | Get JWT tokens (rate-limited ~5 fails/15min/IP+email → 429) |
-| POST | `/api/auth/login` | No | Get JWT tokens |
 | POST | `/api/auth/refresh` | Token | Refresh tokens |
 | GET | `/api/auth/me` | Bearer | Current user |
 | GET | `/api/auth/admin-only` | Admin/Jerome, Admin/Wahab | RBAC demo endpoint |
 | GET | `/api/auth/users` | Bearer | List users (id, name, role) for the assign-technician picker |
-| POST | `/api/whatsapp/mock` | No | Mock WhatsApp |
+| POST | `/api/auth/users` | Admin/Jerome, Admin/Wahab | Admin creates a user (forced canonical role; unknown roles → 422) |
-| GET | `/api/whatsapp/mock-log` | No | Recent mock submissions |
+| PATCH | `/api/auth/users/{id}` | Admin/Jerome, Admin/Wahab | Role change / deactivate (self-modification → 400) |
+| DELETE | `/api/auth/users/{id}` | Admin/Jerome, Admin/Wahab | Delete user (409 if referenced by tickets/timeline/escalations) |
+
+**Self-registration is removed** — `POST /api/auth/register` 404s and there is no
+sign-up UI; users are created/managed by admins only (P0 hardening batch).
+
+### WhatsApp
+| Method | Path | Auth | Description |
+|--------|------|------|-------------|
+| GET | `/api/whatsapp/webhook` | No | Meta handshake (`hub.verify_token`, constant-time; mismatch → 403) |
+| POST | `/api/whatsapp/webhook` | `X-Webhook-Secret` header | Inbound message → ticket + log. Fail-closed: 403 when `WHATSAPP_WEBHOOK_SECRET` is unset or the header doesn't match |
+| GET | `/api/whatsapp/mock-log` | Bearer | Recent webhook submissions (debug; auth required) |
 
 ### Pages (Sprint 3) — Jinja2 templates at `app/templates/`
 | Method | Path | Auth | Description |
@@ -73,7 +83,7 @@ Frontend: Alpine.js (CDN) + Tailwind CSS (CDN). Auth state in localStorage. Role
 | Method | Path | Auth | Description |
 |--------|------|------|-------------|
 | POST | `/api/tickets` | Bearer | Create ticket (auto-number PAV-YYYY-NNNNN) |
-| GET | `/api/tickets` | No | List tickets (filter: status, priority, property, building, unit_id, category_id, assigned_to, date_from, date_to) |
+| GET | `/api/tickets` | No | List tickets (filter: status, priority, property, building, unit_id, category_id, assigned_to, date_from, date_to; paginate with `page`/`page_size` or `limit` alias — hard cap 200, both given → 422) |
 | GET | `/api/tickets/{id}` | No | Get ticket detail with timeline, photos, SLA status, nested unit/category, phone |
 | GET | `/api/tickets/{id}/transitions` | No | Valid next statuses for the ticket's current status (drives the detail-page status picker) |
 | PATCH | `/api/tickets/{id}` | Bearer | Update ticket (validates status transitions; assigning a technician auto-advances New/Logged/Triage to Assigned) |
@@ -88,9 +98,22 @@ Frontend: Alpine.js (CDN) + Tailwind CSS (CDN). Auth state in localStorage. Role
 ## Auth
 
 - JWT access (30min) + refresh (7d) tokens
-- Roles: CS Rep, CS Manager, FM Dispatcher, Admin/Jerome, Admin/Wahab, Tech, CEO, Director
+- **Unified role model** lives in `app/core/roles.py` (`CANONICAL_ROLES`,
-- Use `require_roles("Admin/Jerome", "Admin/Wahab")` dependency for RBAC
+  `ADMIN_ROLES` = Admin/Jerome + Admin/Wahab, `ROLE_ALIASES` for legacy
-- `sub` claim holds string user ID
+  nickname roles like `technician`/`cs`/`fm`/`ceo`). Canonical stored roles:
+  CS Rep, CS Manager, FM Dispatcher, Admin/Jerome, Admin/Wahab, Tech, CEO, Director.
+- Role checks, admin user creation, login, and JWT validation all derive from the
+  role module; unknown/junk roles (e.g. lowercase `admin`/`superadmin` from the
+  old open register) fail closed at login/JWT and can never be recreated via the
+  API (422). Startup self-heals (lifespan in `app/main.py`, helpers in
+  `app/services/seed.py`) converge legacy rows: `normalize_legacy_user_roles`
+  maps unambiguous alias nicknames onto canonical roles, and
+  `normalize_legacy_user_emails` lowercases stored emails — login and the admin
+  create-user duplicate check both compare on the lowercased form, so pre-P0
+  mixed-case emails are never silently locked out.
+- Use `require_roles(*ADMIN_ROLES)` for admin gates; `sub` claim holds string user ID
+- Security headers middleware in `app/main.py`: X-Frame-Options DENY +
+  nosniff on everything, CSP on HTML pages, HSTS when `X-Forwarded-Proto: https`
 
 ## Ticket System (Sprint 2)
 

CLAUDE.md

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-AGENTS.md

CLAUDE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+<!-- Points Claude at AGENTS.md via import; edit AGENTS.md, not this file. -->
+@AGENTS.md

HARDENING.md

@@ -19,15 +19,18 @@
   legacy-schema self-heal. **32 pytest tests pass.**
 - **Live:** container `denya-onecare` on LXC `scottdenya` (192.168.68.75:8000),
   image built 2026-08-02, `restart: unless-stopped`.
-- **Known demo-only posture (must change):** `SECRET_KEY=change-me-in-production`,
+- **Demo-only posture resolved (PR #10 + P0 batch):** `SECRET_KEY` now fails
-  `CORS_ORIGINS=*`, open `/api/auth/register`, SQLite backend, WhatsApp webhook
+  closed without a real key, CORS is an explicit origin allow-list, and open
+  self-registration was removed — `POST /api/auth/register` → 404, users are
+  admin-managed only (see AGENTS.md).
+- **Known demo-only posture (must change):** SQLite backend; WhatsApp webhook
   code is present but **no real credentials wired**.
 
 ---
 
 ## 1. P0 — Security blockers (do these FIRST, before any real data)
 
-### P0.1 Hardcode-safe secrets; never ship the default key
+### P0.1 Hardcode-safe secrets; never ship the default key — **DONE (PR #10)**
 - **Files:** `docker-compose.yml`, `app/core/config.py`
 - Replace the hardcoded `SECRET_KEY=change-me-in-production` default with a
   fail-closed default: if `SECRET_KEY` is unset/empty or still the well-known
@@ -37,7 +40,7 @@
 - **Acceptance:** starting the app without a real key fails loudly; container env
   contains a strong random key (≥32 bytes, e.g. `openssl rand -hex 32`).
 
-### P0.2 Lock down CORS
+### P0.2 Lock down CORS — **DONE (PR #10)**
 - **Files:** `app/main.py`, `docker-compose.yml`
 - `CORS_ORIGINS=*` + `allow_credentials=True` is an invalid/unsafe combo
   (browsers reject `*` with credentials anyway). Replace with an explicit
@@ -47,18 +50,21 @@
 - **Acceptance:** `settings.CORS_ORIGINS` is a comma-separated explicit list; the
   middleware builds an allow-list, not `["*"]`.
 
-### P0.3 Gate user registration
+### P0.3 Gate user registration — **DONE (P0 batch, 2026-09)**
-- **File:** `app/routers/auth.py` (`POST /api/auth/register`)
+- Open `POST /api/auth/register` was removed entirely (404) — there is no sign-up UI.
-- Today anyone on the network can self-register. Decide the model:
+- Users are admin-managed: `POST /api/auth/users` (Admin/Jerome + Admin/Wahab only)
-  - **Recommended:** require an admin-issued invitation token, or restrict
+  creates users with a **forced canonical role** (unknown roles → 422);
-    registration to a seed/allowed list, or remove the open route and create
+  `PATCH /api/auth/users/{id}` changes role / deactivates (self-modification → 400);
-    users only via seed/admin.
+  `DELETE /api/auth/users/{id}` is guarded (users referenced by
-  - If a public self-service resident/tenant signup is genuinely required
+  tickets/timeline/escalations → 409); duplicate email → 409.
+- Emails are normalized (strip + lowercase) on every write path; a startup
+  self-heal lowercases legacy mixed-case rows so pre-P0 accounts can't be locked
+  out of login. Unified role model lives in `app/core/roles.py`.
+- **Regression tests:** `tests/test_p0_auth_admin_batch.py`.
+- If a public self-service resident/tenant signup is genuinely required later
   (Phase 2 QR/self-service), it must be a SEPARATE endpoint with a **role
   default of the least-privilege role** and rate-limiting — never able to mint
   admin/FM roles.
-- **Acceptance:** a raw, unauthenticated register call can no longer mint an
-  `Admin/*` or `Director` account.
 
 ### P0.4 Reconsider SQLite for the final product
 - **Files:** `docker-compose.yml`, `app/core/database.py`, `app/core/config.py`, PRD §16
@@ -71,21 +77,21 @@
 - **Acceptance:** `pytest` green against Postgres (tests param via conftest),
   Alembic applies cleanly on a fresh Postgres DB.
 
-### P0.5 WhatsApp webhook auth + hardening (finish wiring, then lock it)
+### P0.5 WhatsApp webhook auth + hardening — **PARTIAL (P0 batch, 2026-09)**
 - **File:** `app/routers/whatsapp.py`
-- The handler exists but no credentials are set. When wiring this week:
+- **Done:** the `GET` handshake validates `hub.verify_token` with a constant-time
-  - Verify the `hub.verify_token` check is constant-time (compare with
+  compare and returns **403 on mismatch**; inbound `POST`s are gated by the
-    `secrets.compare_digest`). **The GET verification path currently returns
+  `X-Webhook-Secret` header matching `WHATSAPP_WEBHOOK_SECRET` (fail-closed 403
-    `{"error": ...}` with HTTP 200** — flip to `403` on token mismatch.
+  when the env var is unset — see `.env.example`); the debug
-  - Validate **inbound messages only from Meta** — the webhook MUST authenticate
+  `GET /api/whatsapp/mock-log` now requires Bearer auth.
-    Meta's request signature (X-Hub-Signature-256 HMAC over the raw body with your
+- **Still open:** Meta request-signature validation (`X-Hub-Signature-256` HMAC
-    app secret) before processing, otherwise anyone who discovers the endpoint can
+  over the raw body with the app secret — the shared-secret header above is the
-    forge tickets. This is the single most important WhatsApp hardening item.
+  interim gate); per-sender rate limiting / dedupe idempotency keyed on
-  - Add per-sender rate limiting / dedupe on `wa_message_id` (webhook retries can
+  `wa_message_id` (retries can still double-create tickets); redacting the raw
-    double-create tickets). Create an idempotency guard keyed on `wa_message_id`.
+  access token in `send_whatsapp_reply` error paths.
-  - Never log the raw access token; redact in `send_whatsapp_reply` error paths.
+- **Acceptance (open items):** a forged POST without the Meta signature is
-- **Acceptance:** a forged POST without the Meta signature is rejected; duplicate
+  rejected; duplicate `wa_message_id` does not create a second ticket;
-  `wa_message_id` does not create a second ticket; verify-token mismatch returns 403.
+  verify-token mismatch returns 403 (done).
 
 ---
 
@@ -130,10 +136,13 @@
   `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`.
 
 ### P1.6 API hardening & rate limiting
-- Add rate limiting on `POST /api/auth/login` (brute-force) — per-IP/IP+account.
+- **Done (P0 batch):** `POST /api/auth/login` is rate-limited in-process —
-- Consider rate limits on ticket creation (spam / mass-creation).
+  ~5 failures / 15 min per IP+email → 429 (env-tunable `LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_*`,
-- Normalize/validate `page_size` (already capped `le=200`) and pagination
+  a successful login resets the window). **Open:** ticket-creation rate limiting
-  tie-breaker (`id DESC` present — good).
+  (spam / mass-creation).
+- **Done (P0 batch):** ticket-list pagination — `page`/`page_size` (default 50,
+  cap 200), `limit` alias for `page_size` also capped; passing both with
+  different values → 422. Tie-breaker `id DESC` present.
 
 ---
 
@@ -145,9 +154,9 @@ Assumes Denya provides: **phone number ID, access token, verify token, app secre
    `WHATSAPP_VERIFY_TOKEN`, `WHATSAPP_APP_SECRET`, `META_GRAPH_BASE`) to `.env`
    (git-ignored) and inject at runtime. Never commit.
 2. **Webhook handshake:** in Meta dashboard point the webhook URL at
-   `<domain>/api/whatsapp/webhook`. The GET verify path currently echoes
+   `<domain>/api/whatsapp/webhook`. The GET verify path echoes `hub.challenge`
-   `hub.challenge` when the verify token matches — confirm this works, then apply
+   when the verify token matches (constant-time compare; mismatch → 403). The
-   P0.5 (403 on mismatch, HMAC signature validation).
+   still-open P0.5 work is the Meta signature validation in step 3.
 3. **Verify incoming signature** (P0.5) — use `X-Hub-Signature-256` = HMAC-SHA256
    of the raw body with your app secret, compared with `compare_digest`.
 4. **Reply flow:** confirm `send_whatsapp_reply` posts correctly to
@@ -194,14 +203,18 @@ Assumes Denya provides: **phone number ID, access token, verify token, app secre
 
 ## 5. Definition of Done (production-ready)
 
-- [ ] No default `SECRET_KEY`; app fails closed without a real key
+- [x] No default `SECRET_KEY`; app fails closed without a real key (PR #10)
-- [ ] CORS is an explicit origin allow-list
+- [x] CORS is an explicit origin allow-list (PR #10)
-- [ ] Self-registration cannot mint privileged roles (or is admin-gated/removed)
+- [x] Self-registration removed (register → 404); users are admin-managed only
+      with forced canonical roles (P0 batch)
 - [ ] Postgres backend; Alembic applies cleanly on fresh DB; nightly backups
 - [ ] TLS-terminated reverse proxy with real domain; no raw :8000 on WAN
-- [ ] WhatsApp webhook: Meta signature validated, verify-token mismatch → 403,
+- [x] Webhook POST gated by `X-Webhook-Secret` (fail-closed); verify-token
-      idempotent on `wa_message_id`, real credentials injected at runtime
+      mismatch → 403; `mock-log` requires auth
-- [ ] Login/ticket rate limiting in place
+- [ ] WhatsApp webhook: Meta `X-Hub-Signature-256` HMAC validated; idempotent on
+      `wa_message_id`; real credentials injected at runtime
+- [x] Login rate limiting in place (~5 fails / 15 min per IP+email → 429)
+- [ ] Ticket-creation rate limiting in place
 - [ ] Photo uploads size-limited and content-sniffed
 - [ ] RBAC audited per-route; phone data access controlled
 - [ ] Expanded test suite (auth, WhatsApp, SLA boundary, uploads) — all green

app/core/config.py

@@ -36,6 +36,13 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
     WHATSAPP_ACCESS_TOKEN: str = ""
     WHATSAPP_VERIFY_TOKEN: str = ""
     META_GRAPH_BASE: str = "https://graph.facebook.com/v18.0"
+    # Shared secret for inbound webhook POSTs (header ``X-Webhook-Secret``).
+    # Fail-closed: when unset/empty the webhook rejects every message.
+    WHATSAPP_WEBHOOK_SECRET: str = ""
+
+    # ── Login rate limiting ──────────────────────────────────────────
+    LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_MAX_ATTEMPTS: int = 5
+    LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS: int = 15 * 60
 
     # ── Paths ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
     BASE_DIR: Path = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent.parent

app/core/ratelimit.py

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+"""Dependency-light login rate limiter.
+
+Brute-force protection for ``POST /api/auth/login``: a sliding window of
+failed attempts keyed by ``ip|email``.  Defaults to ~5 failures / 15 minutes
+(env-tunable via ``LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_MAX_ATTEMPTS`` /
+``LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS``).
+
+In-process storage is intentional: the app currently runs a single uvicorn
+worker, and keeping the limiter dependency-light avoids pulling slowapi in
+for one endpoint.  ``_now`` is a module-level hook so tests can fast-forward
+the clock.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import time
+from collections import defaultdict, deque
+
+from fastapi import HTTPException, status
+
+from app.core.config import settings
+
+
+def _now() -> float:
+    """Wall-clock epoch seconds; overridable in tests via monkeypatch."""
+    return time.time()
+
+
+class LoginRateLimiter:
+    """Sliding-window failure limiter keyed by ``ip|email``."""
+
+    def __init__(self, max_attempts: int = 5, window_seconds: int = 15 * 60) -> None:
+        self.max_attempts = max(max_attempts, 1)
+        self.window_seconds = max(window_seconds, 1)
+        self._failures: defaultdict[str, deque[float]] = defaultdict(deque)
+
+    def key(self, ip: str, email: str) -> str:
+        return f"{ip}|{email.strip().lower()}"
+
+    def _prune(self, key: str, now: float | None = None) -> None:
+        now = now if now is not None else _now()
+        window_start = now - self.window_seconds
+        bucket = self._failures.get(key)
+        if bucket is None:
+            return
+        while bucket and bucket[0] <= window_start:
+            bucket.popleft()
+        if not bucket:
+            self._failures.pop(key, None)
+
+    def failure_count(self, key: str) -> int:
+        self._prune(key)
+        return len(self._failures.get(key, ()))
+
+    def is_blocked(self, key: str) -> bool:
+        return self.failure_count(key) >= self.max_attempts
+
+    def record_failure(self, key: str) -> None:
+        self._failures[key].append(_now())
+        self._prune(key)
+
+    def clear(self, key: str) -> None:
+        self._failures.pop(key, None)
+
+    def reset(self) -> None:
+        self._failures.clear()
+
+    def check_or_raise(self, key: str) -> None:
+        """Raise HTTP 429 when the key has exhausted its attempts."""
+        if self.is_blocked(key):
+            raise HTTPException(
+                status_code=status.HTTP_429_TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
+                detail="Too many failed login attempts. Try again later.",
+            )
+
+
+# Shared instance — module import is safe because the app fails closed at
+# boot (app/core/config.py) before any request can reach the login route.
+login_rate_limiter = LoginRateLimiter(
+    max_attempts=settings.LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_MAX_ATTEMPTS,
+    window_seconds=settings.LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS,
+)

app/core/roles.py

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+"""Unified role model — single source of truth for user roles.
+
+HARDENING (P0 batch): every role string used by seeds, RBAC checks, admin
+user management, login, and JWT validation derives from this module so the
+system can never silently drift between role vocabularies.
+
+Canonical roles are the human-readable taxonomy the whole product already
+uses (PRD §4, ``app/services/seed.py``, the frontend nav in base.html):
+
+    Admin/Jerome, Admin/Wahab, CS Rep, CS Manager, FM Dispatcher,
+    Tech, CEO, Director
+
+Legacy databases created under the pre-P0 open-registration builds can carry
+lowercase/nickname role strings (``technician``, ``cs``, ``fm``, ``ceo``,
+``admin``, ``superadmin`` …).  ``ROLE_ALIASES`` maps the *unambiguous*
+nicknames onto a canonical role so startup normalization (see
+``app/services/seed.py::normalize_legacy_user_roles``) can converge the data.
+
+``admin`` / ``superadmin`` are deliberately NOT aliased: they are
+identity-ambiguous (they cannot be attributed to Jerome or Wahab) and were
+mintable by anyone during the open-registration window, so they are treated
+as unknown and fail closed — the operator must remediate those rows manually
+(role cleanup on the live DB is owned by the deployer).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+# ── Canonical taxonomy ────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Order is cosmetic; membership is what matters.
+CANONICAL_ROLES: tuple[str, ...] = (
+    "Admin/Jerome",
+    "Admin/Wahab",
+    "CS Rep",
+    "CS Manager",
+    "FM Dispatcher",
+    "Tech",
+    "CEO",
+    "Director",
+)
+
+# Roles that pass admin gates (ticket DELETE, user management, …).
+ADMIN_ROLES: tuple[str, ...] = ("Admin/Jerome", "Admin/Wahab")
+
+# Roles shown to the frontend nav/assignment helpers as "technician" pool.
+TECHNICIAN_ROLE = "Tech"
+
+# ── Legacy alias → canonical mapping (case-insensitive) ───────────────
+# Keys are lowercased. Unambiguous nicknames from legacy/early seeds and the
+# brief's role model ("technician/cs/fm/ceo") converge onto canonical roles.
+ROLE_ALIASES: dict[str, str] = {
+    "technician": TECHNICIAN_ROLE,
+    "tech": TECHNICIAN_ROLE,
+    "cs": "CS Rep",
+    "cs rep": "CS Rep",
+    "cs representative": "CS Rep",
+    "cs manager": "CS Manager",
+    "fm": "FM Dispatcher",
+    "fm dispatcher": "FM Dispatcher",
+    "ceo": "CEO",
+    "director": "Director",
+}
+
+# Aliases that are explicitly NOT auto-mapped (identity-ambiguous and/or
+# mintable by the old open register). They stay unknown → denied at login
+# and JWT validation until an operator remediates the row.
+_BLOCKED_LEGACY_ROLES = frozenset({"admin", "superadmin", "administrator"})
+
+
+def normalize_role(role: str | None) -> str | None:
+    """Return the canonical role for *role*, or ``None`` when unrecognised.
+
+    ``Admin/Jerome`` → ``Admin/Jerome``; ``technician`` → ``Tech``;
+    ``superadmin`` → ``None`` (unknown; caller must fail closed).
+    """
+    if not role:
+        return None
+    stripped = role.strip()
+    if stripped in CANONICAL_ROLES:
+        return stripped
+    return ROLE_ALIASES.get(stripped.lower())
+
+
+def is_known_role(role: str | None) -> bool:
+    """True when *role* is canonical or maps to a canonical role."""
+    return normalize_role(role) is not None
+
+
+def is_admin_role(role: str | None) -> bool:
+    """True when *role* is one of the canonical administrator roles."""
+    return normalize_role(role) in ADMIN_ROLES
+
+
+def is_blocked_legacy_role(role: str | None) -> bool:
+    """True for legacy ``admin``/``superadmin`` rows that need remediation.
+
+    Such rows are not canonical, are not auto-mapped, and must not pass any
+    authorization gate; an operator should reassign or remove them.
+    """
+    return bool(role) and role.strip().lower() in _BLOCKED_LEGACY_ROLES

app/core/security.py

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
 
 from app.core.config import settings
 from app.core.database import get_db
+from app.core.roles import is_known_role
 from app.models.user import User
 
 bearer_scheme = HTTPBearer(auto_error=False)
@@ -90,6 +91,14 @@ async def get_current_user(
     user = result.scalar_one_or_none()
     if user is None or not user.active:
         raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="User not found or inactive")
+    # Unified role model: reject rows whose stored role is not canonical or a
+    # known legacy alias. Legacy junk roles (e.g. lowercase ``admin``) must
+    # fail closed here so they can never ride an access token into the app.
+    if not is_known_role(user.role):
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
+            detail="Account role is not recognised; contact an administrator",
+        )
     return user
 
 

app/main.py

@@ -14,7 +14,13 @@ from sqlalchemy import text
 from app.core.config import settings
 from app.core.database import Base, async_session_factory, engine
 from app.routers import auth, health, pages, tickets, whatsapp
-from app.services.seed import seed_categories, seed_units, seed_users
+from app.services.seed import (
+    normalize_legacy_user_emails,
+    normalize_legacy_user_roles,
+    seed_categories,
+    seed_units,
+    seed_users,
+)
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
@@ -67,6 +73,10 @@ async def lifespan(app: FastAPI):
         await ensure_legacy_schema(conn)
     async with async_session_factory() as session:
         await seed_users(session)
+        # P0 role-model unification: converge legacy nickname roles (e.g.
+        # ``technician``/``cs``/``fm``) onto the canonical taxonomy at startup.
+        await normalize_legacy_user_roles(session)
+        await normalize_legacy_user_emails(session)
         await session.commit()
         await seed_units(session, json_path=str(settings.BASE_DIR / "apartment_mapping.json"))
         await session.commit()
@@ -83,6 +93,68 @@ app = FastAPI(
     lifespan=lifespan,
 )
 
+
+# ── Security headers (P0 batch) ──────────────────────────────────────
+class SecurityHeadersMiddleware:
+    """Set hardening headers on every HTTP response.
+
+    * ``X-Frame-Options: DENY`` and ``X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`` on
+      all responses;
+    * CSP on HTML pages (login + app pages; the Alpine.js/Tailwind CDNs need
+      the CDN hosts + inline script/style for this demo);
+    * ``Strict-Transport-Security`` only when TLS terminates (https scheme
+      or ``X-Forwarded-Proto: https`` from the reverse proxy).
+    """
+
+    HSTS = "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains"
+    CSP = (
+        "default-src 'self'; "
+        "script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://cdn.jsdelivr.net https://cdn.tailwindcss.com; "
+        "style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://cdn.jsdelivr.net https://cdn.tailwindcss.com; "
+        "img-src 'self' data: blob:; "
+        "font-src 'self' data:; "
+        "connect-src 'self'; "
+        "frame-ancestors 'none'; "
+        "base-uri 'self'; "
+        "form-action 'self'; "
+        "object-src 'none'"
+    )
+
+    def __init__(self, app):
+        self.app = app
+
+    async def __call__(self, scope, receive, send):
+        if scope["type"] != "http":
+            await self.app(scope, receive, send)
+            return
+
+        is_tls = scope.get("scheme") == "https"
+        for name, value in scope.get("headers") or []:
+            if name.lower() == b"x-forwarded-proto":
+                first = value.decode("latin-1").split(",", 1)[0].strip().lower()
+                if first == "https":
+                    is_tls = True
+
+        async def send_wrapper(message):
+            if message["type"] == "http.response.start":
+                headers = list(message.get("headers") or [])
+                content_type = next(
+                    (v for k, v in headers if k.lower() == b"content-type"), b""
+                )
+                if content_type.startswith(b"text/html"):
+                    headers.append((b"content-security-policy", self.CSP.encode()))
+                headers.append((b"x-frame-options", b"DENY"))
+                headers.append((b"x-content-type-options", b"nosniff"))
+                if is_tls:
+                    headers.append((b"strict-transport-security", self.HSTS.encode()))
+                message["headers"] = headers
+            await send(message)
+
+        await self.app(scope, receive, send_wrapper)
+
+
+app.add_middleware(SecurityHeadersMiddleware)
+
 # ── CORS (HARDENING.md P0.2 — explicit origin allow-list, never "*") ──
 _origins = [o.strip() for o in settings.CORS_ORIGINS.split(",") if o.strip()]
 if "*" in _origins or not _origins:

app/routers/auth.py

@@ -1,20 +1,27 @@
-"""Authentication router — register, login, refresh, me."""
+"""Authentication router — login, refresh, me, and admin user management.
+
+Self-registration was removed (P0 hardening): users are created/managed by
+admins only via ``POST/PATCH/DELETE /api/auth/users``.
+"""
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 from typing import Annotated
 
-from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Request, status
 from sqlalchemy import select
 from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
 
 from app.core.database import get_db
+from app.core.ratelimit import login_rate_limiter
+from app.core.roles import ADMIN_ROLES
 from app.core.security import get_current_user, require_roles
 from app.models.user import User
 from app.schemas.auth import (
+    AdminCreateUserRequest,
+    AdminUpdateUserRequest,
     LoginRequest,
     RefreshRequest,
-    RegisterRequest,
     TokenResponse,
     UserOut,
 )
@@ -22,36 +29,29 @@ from app.services import auth as auth_service
 
 router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/auth", tags=["auth"])
 
-
+_require_admin = require_roles(*ADMIN_ROLES)
-@router.get("/users", response_model=list[UserOut])
-async def list_users(
-    db: Annotated[AsyncSession, Depends(get_db)],
-    current_user: Annotated[User, Depends(get_current_user)],
-) -> list[User]:
-    """List users (id, name, role) for assignment pickers.
-
-    Previously the frontend hard-coded technician ids/names in detail.html;
-    this endpoint makes the assign dropdown data-driven so a seed change never
-    silently breaks technician assignment.
-    """
-    result = await db.execute(select(User).order_by(User.full_name))
-    return list(result.scalars().all())
-
-
-@router.post("/register", response_model=UserOut, status_code=201)
-async def register(
-    body: RegisterRequest,
-    db: Annotated[AsyncSession, Depends(get_db)],
-) -> User:
-    return await auth_service.register(db, body)
 
 
+# ── Public authN ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 @router.post("/login", response_model=TokenResponse)
 async def login(
+    request: Request,
     body: LoginRequest,
     db: Annotated[AsyncSession, Depends(get_db)],
 ) -> TokenResponse:
+    """Log in. Brute-force limited to ~5 failures / 15 min per IP+email (429)."""
+    client_ip = request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
+    key = login_rate_limiter.key(client_ip, body.email)
+    login_rate_limiter.check_or_raise(key)
+
+    try:
         access, refresh, _user = await auth_service.login(db, body.email, body.password)
+    except HTTPException as exc:
+        # Count only real auth failures toward the limit; success resets it.
+        if exc.status_code == status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED:
+            login_rate_limiter.record_failure(key)
+        raise
+    login_rate_limiter.clear(key)  # successful login resets the failure window
     return TokenResponse(access_token=access, refresh_token=refresh)
 
 
@@ -71,7 +71,54 @@ async def me(current_user: Annotated[User, Depends(get_current_user)]) -> User:
 
 @router.get("/admin-only", response_model=UserOut)
 async def admin_only(
-    current_user: Annotated[User, Depends(require_roles("Admin/Jerome", "Admin/Wahab"))],
+    current_user: Annotated[User, Depends(_require_admin)],
 ) -> User:
-    """Example RBAC-protected endpoint — only Admins can access."""
+    """Example RBAC-protected endpoint — only canonical Admins can access."""
     return current_user
+
+
+# ── User directory ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
+@router.get("/users", response_model=list[UserOut])
+async def list_users(
+    db: Annotated[AsyncSession, Depends(get_db)],
+    current_user: Annotated[User, Depends(get_current_user)],
+) -> list[User]:
+    """List users (id, name, role) for authenticated assignment pickers."""
+    result = await db.execute(select(User).order_by(User.full_name))
+    return list(result.scalars().all())
+
+
+# ── Admin user management ────────────────────────────────────────────
+@router.post("/users", response_model=UserOut, status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED)
+async def create_user(
+    body: AdminCreateUserRequest,
+    db: Annotated[AsyncSession, Depends(get_db)],
+    current_user: Annotated[User, Depends(_require_admin)],
+) -> User:
+    """Admin-only: create a user with a forced canonical role.
+
+    The client cannot self-register or pick an arbitrary role — unknown roles
+    (e.g. ``admin``, ``superadmin``) are rejected with 422.
+    """
+    return await auth_service.create_user(db, body)
+
+
+@router.patch("/users/{user_id}", response_model=UserOut)
+async def update_user(
+    user_id: int,
+    body: AdminUpdateUserRequest,
+    db: Annotated[AsyncSession, Depends(get_db)],
+    current_user: Annotated[User, Depends(_require_admin)],
+) -> User:
+    """Admin-only: change a user's role and/or deactivate the account."""
+    return await auth_service.update_user(db, current_user, user_id, body)
+
+
+@router.delete("/users/{user_id}", status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT)
+async def delete_user(
+    user_id: int,
+    db: Annotated[AsyncSession, Depends(get_db)],
+    current_user: Annotated[User, Depends(_require_admin)],
+) -> None:
+    """Admin-only: delete a user account (guarded; see auth_service)."""
+    await auth_service.delete_user(db, current_user, user_id)

app/routers/tickets.py

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ from sqlalchemy import select
 from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
 from app.core.config import settings
 from app.core.database import get_db
+from app.core.roles import ADMIN_ROLES
 from app.core.security import get_current_user, require_roles
 from app.models.category import Category
 from app.models.ticket import Ticket, TicketPhoto
@@ -37,6 +38,13 @@ logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
 router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/tickets", tags=["tickets"])
 
+_require_admin = require_roles(*ADMIN_ROLES)
+
+# Pagination contract: sane defaults and a hard page-size cap so list
+# responses never balloon into truncation territory (P0 batch).
+DEFAULT_PAGE_SIZE = 50
+MAX_PAGE_SIZE = 200
+
 # Ensure uploads directory exists
 UPLOADS_DIR = settings.BASE_DIR / "uploads"
 UPLOADS_DIR.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
@@ -197,7 +205,10 @@ async def create_ticket(
 async def list_tickets(
     db: Annotated[AsyncSession, Depends(get_db)],
     page: int = Query(1, ge=1),
-    page_size: int = Query(50, ge=1, le=200),
+    page_size: int | None = Query(None, ge=1, le=MAX_PAGE_SIZE),
+    limit: int | None = Query(
+        None, ge=1, le=MAX_PAGE_SIZE, description="Alias for page_size (also capped)"
+    ),
     status: str | None = Query(None),
     priority: str | None = Query(None),
     property: str | None = Query(None),
@@ -208,7 +219,17 @@ async def list_tickets(
     date_from: datetime | None = Query(None),
     date_to: datetime | None = Query(None),
 ) -> TicketListResponse:
-    """List tickets with optional filtering and pagination."""
+    """List tickets with optional filtering and pagination.
+
+    Both ``page_size`` and its alias ``limit`` are capped at MAX_PAGE_SIZE;
+    supplying both is an error. Neither defaults to DEFAULT_PAGE_SIZE.
+    """
+    if page_size is not None and limit is not None and page_size != limit:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=422,  # ``status`` query param shadows fastapi.status in this scope
+            detail="Provide either 'page_size' or 'limit', not both",
+        )
+    effective_page_size = page_size if page_size is not None else (limit or DEFAULT_PAGE_SIZE)
     tickets, total = await ticket_service.list_tickets(
         db,
         status_filter=status,
@@ -221,10 +242,10 @@ async def list_tickets(
         date_from=date_from,
         date_to=date_to,
         page=page,
-        page_size=page_size,
+        page_size=effective_page_size,
     )
     items = [TicketBrief.model_validate(t) for t in tickets]
-    return TicketListResponse(items=items, total=total, page=page, page_size=page_size)
+    return TicketListResponse(items=items, total=total, page=page, page_size=effective_page_size)
 
 
 @router.get("/{ticket_id}/transitions")
@@ -270,7 +291,7 @@ async def update_ticket(
 async def delete_ticket(
     ticket_id: int,
     db: Annotated[AsyncSession, Depends(get_db)],
-    current_user: Annotated[User, Depends(require_roles("Admin/Jerome", "Admin/Wahab"))],
+    current_user: Annotated[User, Depends(_require_admin)],
 ) -> None:
     """Delete a ticket and its children (timeline, photos, escalations).
 

app/routers/whatsapp.py

@@ -1,18 +1,31 @@
-"""WhatsApp webhook handler — Meta Graph API integration."""
+"""WhatsApp webhook handler — Meta Graph API integration.
+
+P0 hardening:
+* ``POST /api/whatsapp/webhook`` requires the ``X-Webhook-Secret`` header to
+  match ``WHATSAPP_WEBHOOK_SECRET``.  Fail-closed: when the env var is unset
+  every message is rejected (same posture as the SECRET_KEY guard).
+* ``GET /api/whatsapp/webhook`` (Meta handshake) validates ``hub.verify_token``
+  with a constant-time compare and returns 403 on mismatch.
+* ``GET /api/whatsapp/mock-log`` now requires authentication (was a public
+  debug endpoint that could 500 and leak stack traces without auth).
+"""
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 import logging
+import secrets
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
 from typing import Annotated
 
 import httpx
-from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, Query
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, Header, HTTPException, Query, status
 from sqlalchemy import select
 from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
 
 from app.core.config import settings
 from app.core.database import get_db
+from app.core.security import get_current_user
+from app.models.user import User
 from app.models.whatsapp_log import WhatsAppLog
 from app.schemas.whatsapp import (
     MetaWebhookRequest,
@@ -62,24 +75,55 @@ async def send_whatsapp_reply(
         return WhatsAppReplyResponse(success=False, message=str(exc))
 
 
+# ── Webhook auth (fail-closed) ──────────────────────────────────────
+async def require_webhook_secret(
+    x_webhook_secret: Annotated[str | None, Header(alias="X-Webhook-Secret")] = None,
+) -> None:
+    """Reject webhook messages unless X-Webhook-Secret matches the env secret.
+
+    Reads ``settings.WHATSAPP_WEBHOOK_SECRET`` at request time so the value
+    can be injected per-deployment.  Empty/unset env ⇒ reject everything.
+    """
+    expected = settings.WHATSAPP_WEBHOOK_SECRET
+    if not expected:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
+            detail="Webhook disabled: WHATSAPP_WEBHOOK_SECRET is not configured",
+        )
+    if not x_webhook_secret or not secrets.compare_digest(x_webhook_secret, expected):
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
+            detail="Invalid webhook secret",
+        )
+
+
 # ── Webhook endpoint ────────────────────────────────────────────────
-@router.post("/webhook")
+@router.get("/webhook")
-async def whatsapp_webhook(
+async def whatsapp_webhook_verify(
+    mode: str | None = Query(None, alias="hub.mode"),
+    verify_token: str | None = Query(None, alias="hub.verify_token"),
+    challenge: str | None = Query(None, alias="hub.challenge"),
+) -> WebhookVerificationResponse | dict:
+    """Meta webhook handshake (GET): echo the challenge when the token matches."""
+    if mode != "subscribe" or not challenge:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
+            detail="Missing hub.mode / hub.challenge",
+        )
+    expected = settings.WHATSAPP_VERIFY_TOKEN
+    if not expected or not secrets.compare_digest(verify_token or "", expected):
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
+            detail="Verify token mismatch",
+        )
+    return WebhookVerificationResponse(challenge=challenge)
+
+
+async def _process_entries(
     body: MetaWebhookRequest,
-    db: Annotated[AsyncSession, Depends(get_db)],
+    db: AsyncSession,
-    hub_verify_token: str | None = Query(None, alias="hub.verify_token"),
-    mode: str | None = Query(None),
-    hub_challenge: str | None = Query(None),
 ) -> dict:
-    """Handle incoming WhatsApp webhook from Meta."""
+    """Create tickets + logs for inbound messages. Shared by the POST handler."""
-
-    # ── Verification GET request (Meta sends this on webhook setup) ──
-    if mode and hub_challenge:
-        if hub_verify_token != settings.WHATSAPP_VERIFY_TOKEN:
-            return {"error": "Verify token mismatch"}
-        return WebhookVerificationResponse(challenge=hub_challenge).model_dump()
-
-    # ── Process inbound messages ────────────────────────────────────
     if not body.entry:
         return {"status": "no entry"}
 
@@ -153,13 +197,24 @@ async def whatsapp_webhook(
     return {"status": "no messages"}
 
 
-# ── Legacy debug endpoint ──────────────────────────────────────────
+@router.post("/webhook")
+async def whatsapp_webhook(
+    body: MetaWebhookRequest,
+    db: Annotated[AsyncSession, Depends(get_db)],
+    _auth: None = Depends(require_webhook_secret),
+) -> dict:
+    """Process an inbound WhatsApp message (Meta POST). Requires webhook secret."""
+    return await _process_entries(body, db)
+
+
+# ── Debug endpoint (auth required) ──────────────────────────────────
 @router.get("/mock-log", response_model=list[MockWhatsAppLogEntry])
 async def mock_whatsapp_log(
     db: Annotated[AsyncSession, Depends(get_db)],
-    limit: int = 50,
+    current_user: Annotated[User, Depends(get_current_user)],
+    limit: int = Query(50, ge=1, le=200),
 ) -> list[MockWhatsAppLogEntry]:
-    """Return recent WhatsApp webhook submissions for debugging."""
+    """Return recent WhatsApp webhook submissions (authenticated only)."""
     result = await db.execute(
         select(WhatsAppLog).order_by(WhatsAppLog.received_at.desc()).limit(limit)
     )

app/schemas/auth.py

@@ -2,18 +2,27 @@
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
-from pydantic import BaseModel
+from pydantic import BaseModel, Field, field_validator, model_validator
+
+from app.core.roles import CANONICAL_ROLES
 
 
-class RegisterRequest(BaseModel):
+def _validate_canonical_role(value: str | None) -> str | None:
-    email: str
+    """Reject any role that is not part of the unified canonical taxonomy.
-    password: str
+
-    full_name: str
+    The role vocabulary is closed: admin user-management must only ever mint
-    phone: str | None = None
+    canonical roles (see app/core/roles.py). Legacy/unknown strings
-    # HARDENING.md P0.3: role is NOT client-controllable. Self-registration
+    (``admin``, ``superadmin``, ``technician``, …) are rejected here so junk
-    # always creates the least-privilege role; privileged roles are assigned
+    roles can never be (re)created through the API.
-    # by an admin directly in the DB (or a future admin-gated endpoint).
+    """
-    role: str = "CS Rep"  # kept for backward compat; ignored by the service
+    if value is None:
+        return None
+    role = value.strip()
+    if role not in CANONICAL_ROLES:
+        raise ValueError(
+            f"Unknown role '{value}'. Allowed roles: {', '.join(CANONICAL_ROLES)}"
+        )
+    return role
 
 
 class LoginRequest(BaseModel):
@@ -40,3 +49,50 @@ class UserOut(BaseModel):
     active: bool
 
     model_config = {"from_attributes": True}
+
+
+# ── Admin user management (self-registration is removed) ──────────────
+class AdminCreateUserRequest(BaseModel):
+    """Admin-created user. The role is mandatory and must be canonical.
+
+    ``role`` is deliberately NOT optional and has no default — an admin must
+    state the intended role explicitly; the server never infers one.
+    """
+
+    email: str = Field(min_length=1)
+    password: str = Field(min_length=8, description="Minimum 8 characters")
+    full_name: str = Field(min_length=1)
+    phone: str | None = None
+    role: str
+
+    @field_validator("role")
+    @classmethod
+    def _role_canonical(cls, value: str) -> str:
+        return _validate_canonical_role(value)  # type: ignore[return-value]
+
+    @field_validator("email")
+    @classmethod
+    def _lower_email(cls, value: str) -> str:
+        return value.strip().lower()
+
+
+class AdminUpdateUserRequest(BaseModel):
+    """Admin edits to an existing user: role change and/or deactivation.
+
+    At least one field must be present. ``active=False`` deactivates the
+    account (login and token refresh then fail closed).
+    """
+
+    role: str | None = None
+    active: bool | None = None
+
+    @field_validator("role")
+    @classmethod
+    def _role_canonical(cls, value: str | None) -> str | None:
+        return _validate_canonical_role(value)
+
+    @model_validator(mode="after")
+    def _at_least_one_field(self) -> AdminUpdateUserRequest:
+        if self.role is None and self.active is None:
+            raise ValueError("Provide at least one of 'role' or 'active'")
+        return self

app/services/auth.py

@@ -1,11 +1,16 @@
-"""Authentication service — register, login, refresh."""
+"""Authentication service — login, refresh, and admin user management.
+
+Self-registration was removed (HARDENING/P0 batch): users are created and
+managed exclusively by admins through the admin user-management endpoints.
+"""
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 from fastapi import HTTPException, status
-from sqlalchemy import select
+from sqlalchemy import func, select
 from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
 
+from app.core.roles import is_known_role, normalize_role
 from app.core.security import (
     create_access_token,
     create_refresh_token,
@@ -13,47 +18,35 @@ from app.core.security import (
     hash_password,
     verify_password,
 )
+from app.models.ticket import Escalation, Ticket, TicketTimeline
 from app.models.user import User
-from app.schemas.auth import RegisterRequest
+from app.schemas.auth import AdminCreateUserRequest, AdminUpdateUserRequest
 
-# HARDENING.md P0.3 — least-privilege default for self-registered users.
+_UNAUTHORIZED = status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED
-_SELF_REGISTER_ROLE = "CS Rep"
-
-
-async def register(db: AsyncSession, body: RegisterRequest) -> User:
-    """Create a new user.  Raises 409 if email already exists.
-
-    HARDENING.md P0.3: unauthenticated self-registration must never mint a
-    privileged role. The client-supplied ``role`` field is IGNORED — new
-    self-registered users always land on the least-privilege role.
-    Admins assign elevated roles directly (DB seed / admin endpoint).
-    """
-    result = await db.execute(select(User).where(User.email == body.email))
-    if result.scalar_one_or_none():
-        raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_409_CONFLICT, detail="Email already registered")
-
-    user = User(
-        email=body.email,
-        password_hash=hash_password(body.password),
-        full_name=body.full_name,
-        phone=body.phone,
-        role=_SELF_REGISTER_ROLE,
-    )
-    db.add(user)
-    await db.flush()
-    await db.refresh(user)
-    return user
 
 
+# ── AuthN ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 async def login(db: AsyncSession, email: str, password: str) -> tuple[str, str, User]:
-    """Authenticate and return (access_token, refresh_token, user)."""
+    """Authenticate and return (access_token, refresh_token, user).
-    result = await db.execute(select(User).where(User.email == email))
-    user = result.scalar_one_or_none()
-    if user is None or not verify_password(password, user.password_hash):
-        raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Invalid email or password")
-    if not user.active:
-        raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Account is inactive")
 
+    Fails closed (401) for bad credentials, inactive accounts, and any user
+    whose stored role is not part of the unified role model.
+    """
+    result = await db.execute(
+        select(User)
+        .where(func.lower(User.email) == email.strip().lower())
+        .order_by(User.id)
+    )
+    user = result.scalars().first()
+    if user is None or not verify_password(password, user.password_hash):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Invalid email or password")
+    if not user.active:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Account is inactive")
+    if not is_known_role(user.role):
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=_UNAUTHORIZED,
+            detail="Account role is not recognised; contact an administrator",
+        )
     access_token = create_access_token({"sub": str(user.id)})
     refresh_token = create_refresh_token({"sub": str(user.id)})
     return access_token, refresh_token, user
@@ -64,18 +57,131 @@ async def refresh_access_token(db: AsyncSession, token: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
     try:
         payload = decode_token(token)
         if payload.get("type") != "refresh":
-            raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Invalid token type")
+            raise HTTPException(status_code=_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Invalid token type")
     except HTTPException:
         raise
     except Exception:
-        raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Invalid refresh token")
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Invalid refresh token")
 
     user_id: int = int(payload["sub"])
     result = await db.execute(select(User).where(User.id == user_id))
     user = result.scalar_one_or_none()
     if user is None or not user.active:
-        raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="User not found or inactive")
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="User not found or inactive")
+    if not is_known_role(user.role):
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=_UNAUTHORIZED,
+            detail="Account role is not recognised; contact an administrator",
+        )
 
     new_access = create_access_token({"sub": str(user.id)})
     new_refresh = create_refresh_token({"sub": str(user.id)})
     return new_access, new_refresh
+
+
+# ── Admin user management ────────────────────────────────────────────
+async def _get_user_or_404(db: AsyncSession, user_id: int) -> User:
+    result = await db.execute(select(User).where(User.id == user_id))
+    user = result.scalar_one_or_none()
+    if user is None:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND, detail="User not found")
+    return user
+
+
+async def create_user(db: AsyncSession, body: AdminCreateUserRequest) -> User:
+    """Admin-created user with an explicit, canonical role. 409 on duplicate email."""
+    email = body.email.strip().lower()
+    result = await db.execute(select(User).where(func.lower(User.email) == email))
+    if result.scalar_one_or_none():
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_409_CONFLICT, detail="Email already registered")
+
+    # Defense in depth: schema already guarantees a canonical role.
+    role = normalize_role(body.role)
+    if role is None:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST, detail="Unknown role")
+
+    user = User(
+        email=email,
+        password_hash=hash_password(body.password),
+        full_name=body.full_name.strip(),
+        phone=body.phone,
+        role=role,
+    )
+    db.add(user)
+    await db.flush()
+    await db.refresh(user)
+    return user
+
+
+async def update_user(
+    db: AsyncSession,
+    actor: User,
+    user_id: int,
+    body: AdminUpdateUserRequest,
+) -> User:
+    """Admin role-change / deactivation for an existing user.
+
+    Guards:
+    * an admin cannot modify their own account through the API (self-lockout);
+    * role changes are limited to the canonical taxonomy.
+
+    The ≥1-active-admin invariant holds structurally: only admins can demote
+    admins, and no admin can demote/deactivate themselves, so at least one
+    canonical admin always remains.
+    """
+    user = await _get_user_or_404(db, user_id)
+
+    if actor.id == user.id:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
+            detail="Admins cannot change their own role or active state through the API",
+        )
+
+    new_role = normalize_role(body.role) if body.role is not None else None
+    new_active = body.active
+
+    if new_role is not None:
+        user.role = new_role
+    if new_active is not None:
+        user.active = new_active
+    await db.flush()
+    await db.refresh(user)
+    return user
+
+
+async def delete_user(db: AsyncSession, actor: User, user_id: int) -> None:
+    """Admin deletes a user account (hard delete).
+
+    Guards:
+    * an admin cannot delete their own account (self-guard also keeps the
+      ≥1-active-admin invariant: admins can never remove themselves);
+    * users referenced by tickets / timeline / escalations are kept (409) so
+      historical data never dangles — reassign or deactivate instead.
+    """
+    user = await _get_user_or_404(db, user_id)
+
+    if actor.id == user.id:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
+            detail="Admins cannot delete their own account through the API",
+        )
+
+    referenced = False
+    for clause in (
+        select(func.count(Ticket.id)).where(Ticket.assigned_to == user_id),
+        select(func.count(TicketTimeline.id)).where(TicketTimeline.user_id == user_id),
+        select(func.count(Escalation.id)).where(Escalation.escalated_to == user_id),
+    ):
+        count = (await db.execute(clause)).scalar() or 0
+        if count:
+            referenced = True
+            break
+    if referenced:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_409_CONFLICT,
+            detail="User has related tickets, timeline entries, or escalations; "
+            "reassign or deactivate instead of deleting",
+        )
+
+    await db.delete(user)
+    await db.flush()

app/services/seed.py

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ from sqlalchemy import select
 from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
 
 from app.core.security import hash_password
+from app.core.roles import is_blocked_legacy_role, normalize_role
 from app.models.unit import Unit
 from app.models.user import User
 from app.models.category import Category
@@ -41,6 +42,88 @@ SEED_USERS_DATA = [
 ]
 
 
+async def normalize_legacy_user_roles(db: AsyncSession) -> int:
+    """Converge legacy role strings onto the unified canonical taxonomy.
+
+    Databases built before the P0 role-model batch can hold nickname roles
+    (``technician``, ``cs``, ``fm``, ``ceo`` …) minted by the old open
+    self-registration.  Unambiguous aliases are rewritten to their canonical
+    role so RBAC keeps working.  Ambiguous/unknown roles (e.g. lowercase
+    ``admin``/``superadmin``) are NOT auto-mapped — they fail closed at login
+    and JWT validation until an operator remediates the row.
+
+    Returns the number of rows rewritten. Idempotent.
+    """
+    result = await db.execute(select(User))
+    changed = 0
+    for user in result.scalars().all():
+        canonical = normalize_role(user.role)
+        if canonical and canonical != user.role:
+            logger.info("Normalizing legacy role %r → %r for %s", user.role, canonical, user.email)
+            user.role = canonical
+            changed += 1
+        elif canonical is None and not is_blocked_legacy_role(user.role):
+            logger.warning(
+                "User %s has unrecognized role %r; login will be denied until fixed",
+                user.email,
+                user.role,
+            )
+    if changed:
+        await db.flush()
+    return changed
+
+
+async def normalize_legacy_user_emails(db: AsyncSession) -> int:
+    """Lowercase stored user emails to match the normalized login lookup.
+
+    Databases built before the P0 batch can hold mixed-case emails (the old
+    open self-registration stored them verbatim) while login now compares on
+    the lowercase form, so such rows would otherwise be silently locked out.
+    Rewrites each stored email to its stripped/lowercase form.  When two rows
+    share an email that differs only in case, only the lowest-id row becomes
+    canonical (any others keep their stored value and are logged as a warning)
+    so the unique constraint is never violated.  Idempotent; returns the
+    number of rows rewritten.
+    """
+    result = await db.execute(select(User).order_by(User.id))
+    users = list(result.scalars().all())
+    groups: dict[str, list[User]] = {}
+    for user in users:
+        groups.setdefault(user.email.strip().lower(), []).append(user)
+
+    changed = 0
+    for normalized, members in groups.items():
+        if len(members) == 1:
+            user = members[0]
+            if user.email != normalized:
+                logger.info(
+                    "Normalizing legacy email %r → %r for user %d", user.email, normalized, user.id
+                )
+                user.email = normalized
+                changed += 1
+            continue
+        if any(user.email == normalized for user in members):
+            losers = [u for u in members if u.email != normalized]
+        else:
+            winner = members[0]
+            logger.info(
+                "Normalizing legacy email %r → %r for user %d", winner.email, normalized, winner.id
+            )
+            winner.email = normalized
+            changed += 1
+            losers = members[1:]
+        for loser in losers:
+            logger.warning(
+                "Cannot normalize email %r for user %d: another account already holds "
+                "that normalized email; keeping the stored value",
+                normalized,
+                loser.id,
+            )
+    if changed:
+        await db.flush()
+    return changed
+
+
 async def seed_users(db: AsyncSession, default_password: str = "denya123") -> list[User]:
     """Insert seed users if they don't already exist."""
     hashed = hash_password(default_password)

tests/conftest.py

@@ -17,17 +17,27 @@ os.environ["DATABASE_URL"] = f"sqlite+aiosqlite:///{_TMP_DIR}/test.db"
 os.environ.setdefault("SECRET_KEY", "test-secret-key-not-for-production-0123456789abcdef")
 os.environ.setdefault("CORS_ORIGINS", "http://test")
 
+import pytest  # noqa: E402
 import pytest_asyncio  # noqa: E402  (DATABASE_URL must be set before app imports)
 from httpx import ASGITransport, AsyncClient  # noqa: E402
 
 from app.core.database import Base, async_session_factory, engine  # noqa: E402
+from app.core.ratelimit import login_rate_limiter  # noqa: E402
 from app.main import app  # noqa: E402
 from app.models.ticket import Ticket  # noqa: E402
 from app.services.seed import seed_categories, seed_units, seed_users  # noqa: E402
 
 
+@pytest.fixture
+def _reset_login_rate_limiter():
+    """Isolate login rate-limit state between tests (shared in-process store)."""
+    login_rate_limiter.reset()
+    yield
+    login_rate_limiter.reset()
+
+
 @pytest_asyncio.fixture
-async def client():
+async def client(_reset_login_rate_limiter):
     """Async test client with a fresh, seeded database per test."""
     async with engine.begin() as conn:
         await conn.run_sync(Base.metadata.create_all)

tests/test_p0_auth_admin_batch.py

@@ -0,0 +1,610 @@
+"""P0 security batch — admin user management, unified role model, login rate
+limiting, WhatsApp webhook secret, mock-log auth, security headers, pagination.
+
+Each item in the P0 hardening batch has an executable behavioral test here
+(plus the register-removal tests living in test_p0_hardening.py).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import pytest
+from httpx import AsyncClient
+
+from app.core.config import settings
+from app.core.database import async_session_factory
+from app.core.security import hash_password
+from app.models.user import User
+from app.services.seed import normalize_legacy_user_emails, normalize_legacy_user_roles
+
+pytestmark = pytest.mark.asyncio
+
+
+# ── helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+async def _login(client, email="wahab@denya.com", password="denya123") -> str:
+    resp = await client.post("/api/auth/login", json={"email": email, "password": password})
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    return resp.json()["access_token"]
+
+
+def _auth(token: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    return {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"}
+
+
+async def _insert_user(email: str, role: str, *, active: bool = True) -> int:
+    """Insert a user row directly (bypasses API role validation) — used to
+    simulate legacy bootstrap/registration rows in the DB."""
+    async with async_session_factory() as session:
+        user = User(
+            email=email,
+            password_hash=hash_password("denya123"),
+            full_name=f"Legacy {email}",
+            role=role,
+            active=active,
+        )
+        session.add(user)
+        await session.commit()
+        return user.id
+
+
+async def _normalize_roles() -> None:
+    async with async_session_factory() as session:
+        await normalize_legacy_user_roles(session)
+        await session.commit()
+
+
+async def _normalize_emails() -> None:
+    async with async_session_factory() as session:
+        await normalize_legacy_user_emails(session)
+        await session.commit()
+
+
+async def _create_ticket(client, token: str, **overrides) -> dict:
+    payload = {
+        "unit_id": 2,
+        "category_id": 3,
+        "priority": "medium",
+        "reporter": "P0 Batch Test",
+        "reported_via": "walk-in",
+        "description": "p0 batch ticket",
+        **overrides,
+    }
+    resp = await client.post("/api/tickets", json=payload, headers=_auth(token))
+    assert resp.status_code == 201, resp.text
+    return resp.json()
+
+
+# ── Item 2/3: admin user management ───────────────────────────────────
+async def test_create_user_requires_admin(client: AsyncClient):
+    token = await _login(client, email="bella@denya.com")  # CS Rep
+    resp = await client.post(
+        "/api/auth/users",
+        json={"email": "x@example.com", "password": "password1", "full_name": "X", "role": "CS Rep"},
+        headers=_auth(token),
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 403
+
+
+async def test_create_user_requires_auth(client: AsyncClient):
+    resp = await client.post(
+        "/api/auth/users",
+        json={"email": "x@example.com", "password": "password1", "full_name": "X", "role": "CS Rep"},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 401
+
+
+async def test_admin_creates_user_with_forced_role(client: AsyncClient):
+    token = await _login(client)  # Admin/Wahab
+    resp = await client.post(
+        "/api/auth/users",
+        json={"email": "New.Tech@Example.com", "password": "password1", "full_name": "New Tech", "role": "Tech"},
+        headers=_auth(token),
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 201, resp.text
+    created = resp.json()
+    assert created["role"] == "Tech"
+    assert created["active"] is True
+    assert created["email"] == "new.tech@example.com"  # normalized lower-case
+
+    # The new user can actually log in with their forced role.
+    login = await client.post(
+        "/api/auth/login", json={"email": "new.tech@example.com", "password": "password1"}
+    )
+    assert login.status_code == 200
+    me = await client.get("/api/auth/me", headers=_auth(login.json()["access_token"]))
+    assert me.json()["role"] == "Tech"
+
+
+async def test_admin_create_user_rejects_unknown_roles(client: AsyncClient):
+    """Unified role model: junk/legacy roles cannot be minted at creation."""
+    token = await _login(client)
+    for role in ("admin", "superadmin", "technician", "root"):
+        resp = await client.post(
+            "/api/auth/users",
+            json={"email": f"{role.strip().lower()}@example.com", "password": "password1", "full_name": "X", "role": role},
+            headers=_auth(token),
+        )
+        assert resp.status_code == 422, (role, resp.text)
+
+
+async def test_admin_create_user_duplicate_email_conflict(client: AsyncClient):
+    token = await _login(client)
+    payload = {"email": "dupe2@example.com", "password": "password1", "full_name": "D", "role": "CS Rep"}
+    assert (await client.post("/api/auth/users", json=payload, headers=_auth(token))).status_code == 201
+    resp = await client.post("/api/auth/users", json=payload, headers=_auth(token))
+    assert resp.status_code == 409
+
+
+async def test_patch_user_role_change(client: AsyncClient):
+    token = await _login(client)
+    users = (await client.get("/api/auth/users", headers=_auth(token))).json()
+    tech = next(u for u in users if u["role"] == "Tech")
+    resp = await client.patch(
+        f"/api/auth/users/{tech['id']}",
+        json={"role": "CS Rep"},
+        headers=_auth(token),
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    assert resp.json()["role"] == "CS Rep"
+    assert resp.json()["active"] is True
+
+
+async def test_patch_user_rejects_unknown_role(client: AsyncClient):
+    token = await _login(client)
+    users = (await client.get("/api/auth/users", headers=_auth(token))).json()
+    tech = next(u for u in users if u["role"] == "Tech")
+    resp = await client.patch(
+        f"/api/auth/users/{tech['id']}",
+        json={"role": "superadmin"},
+        headers=_auth(token),
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 422, resp.text
+
+
+async def test_patch_deactivate_blocks_login(client: AsyncClient):
+    token = await _login(client)
+    users = (await client.get("/api/auth/users", headers=_auth(token))).json()
+    tech = next(u for u in users if u["role"] == "Tech")
+    resp = await client.patch(
+        f"/api/auth/users/{tech['id']}",
+        json={"active": False},
+        headers=_auth(token),
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    assert resp.json()["active"] is False
+
+    login = await client.post(
+        "/api/auth/login", json={"email": tech["email"], "password": "denya123"}
+    )
+    assert login.status_code == 401
+
+
+async def test_admin_cannot_modify_own_account(client: AsyncClient):
+    token = await _login(client)  # wahab
+    me = (await client.get("/api/auth/me", headers=_auth(token))).json()
+    resp = await client.patch(
+        f"/api/auth/users/{me['id']}", json={"active": False}, headers=_auth(token)
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 400
+
+
+async def test_admin_can_demote_other_admin_but_not_self(client: AsyncClient):
+    """An admin can manage the other admin seat, but self-removal stays blocked,
+    so at least one canonical admin always remains (structural invariant)."""
+    token = await _login(client)  # wahab
+    users = (await client.get("/api/auth/users", headers=_auth(token))).json()
+    jerome = next(u for u in users if u["role"] == "Admin/Jerome")
+    wahab = next(u for u in users if u["role"] == "Admin/Wahab")
+
+    # Demote the OTHER admin → allowed, wahab is still the acting admin.
+    resp = await client.patch(
+        f"/api/auth/users/{jerome['id']}", json={"role": "CEO"}, headers=_auth(token)
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+
+    # Demoting/deactivating yourself is always rejected.
+    resp = await client.patch(
+        f"/api/auth/users/{wahab['id']}", json={"active": False}, headers=_auth(token)
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 400
+
+
+async def test_delete_user_admin_only_and_works(client: AsyncClient):
+    admin_token = await _login(client)
+    users = (await client.get("/api/auth/users", headers=_auth(admin_token))).json()
+    tech = next(u for u in users if u["role"] == "Tech")
+
+    # Non-admin cannot delete.
+    cs_token = await _login(client, email="bella@denya.com")
+    resp = await client.delete(f"/api/auth/users/{tech['id']}", headers=_auth(cs_token))
+    assert resp.status_code == 403
+
+    # Admin deletes → 204, user gone, login fails.
+    resp = await client.delete(f"/api/auth/users/{tech['id']}", headers=_auth(admin_token))
+    assert resp.status_code == 204
+    login = await client.post(
+        "/api/auth/login", json={"email": tech["email"], "password": "denya123"}
+    )
+    assert login.status_code == 401
+
+
+async def test_delete_user_referenced_by_ticket_is_409(client: AsyncClient):
+    token = await _login(client)
+    users = (await client.get("/api/auth/users", headers=_auth(token))).json()
+    tech = next(u for u in users if u["role"] == "Tech")
+    ticket = await _create_ticket(client, token)
+    resp = await client.patch(
+        f"/api/tickets/{ticket['id']}",
+        json={"assigned_to": tech["id"]},
+        headers=_auth(token),
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+
+    resp = await client.delete(f"/api/auth/users/{tech['id']}", headers=_auth(token))
+    assert resp.status_code == 409
+    assert "related" in resp.json()["detail"].lower()
+
+
+async def test_admin_cannot_delete_self(client: AsyncClient):
+    token = await _login(client)
+    me = (await client.get("/api/auth/me", headers=_auth(token))).json()
+    resp = await client.delete(f"/api/auth/users/{me['id']}", headers=_auth(token))
+    assert resp.status_code == 400
+
+
+# ── Item 3: unified role model — legacy rows & JWT validation ─────────
+async def test_legacy_alias_role_normalized_at_startup(client: AsyncClient):
+    """A legacy 'technician' row is mapped onto canonical 'Tech' at startup."""
+    await _insert_user("legacy-tech@example.com", "technician")
+    await _normalize_roles()  # what lifespan does each boot
+
+    login = await client.post(
+        "/api/auth/login", json={"email": "legacy-tech@example.com", "password": "denya123"}
+    )
+    assert login.status_code == 200, login.text
+    me = await client.get("/api/auth/me", headers=_auth(login.json()["access_token"]))
+    assert me.json()["role"] == "Tech"
+
+
+async def test_login_rejects_unknown_legacy_role_fail_closed(client: AsyncClient):
+    """Lowercase 'superadmin' rows (mintable by the old open register) cannot
+    log in — fail closed, never granted admin powers."""
+    await _insert_user("legacy-admin@example.com", "superadmin")
+    # NOTE: no normalize call — the row is exactly what the live DB holds today.
+
+    login = await client.post(
+        "/api/auth/login", json={"email": "legacy-admin@example.com", "password": "denya123"}
+    )
+    assert login.status_code == 401
+    assert "role" in login.json()["detail"].lower()
+
+
+async def test_jwt_validation_rejects_unknown_role(client: AsyncClient):
+    """A token for a user whose row later becomes junk-role must fail closed."""
+    token = await _login(client)  # wahab is a canonical admin at token time
+    me = (await client.get("/api/auth/me", headers=_auth(token))).json()
+
+    # Simulate a legacy DB row flip to a non-canonical role.
+    async with async_session_factory() as session:
+        from sqlalchemy import select
+        user = (await session.execute(select(User).where(User.id == me["id"]))).scalar_one()
+        user.role = "admin"
+        await session.commit()
+
+    resp = await client.get("/api/auth/me", headers=_auth(token))
+    assert resp.status_code == 401
+
+
+async def test_normalize_does_not_map_ambiguous_admin_alias(client: AsyncClient):
+    """normalize_legacy_user_roles leaves identity-ambiguous 'admin' rows for
+    operator remediation instead of guessing a canonical admin."""
+    await _insert_user("legacy-admin2@example.com", "admin")
+    await _normalize_roles()
+
+    async with async_session_factory() as session:
+        from sqlalchemy import select
+        user = (
+            await session.execute(select(User).where(User.email == "legacy-admin2@example.com"))
+        ).scalar_one()
+    assert user.role == "admin"
+
+
+# ── P0 email normalization (legacy mixed-case rows) ───────────────────
+async def test_legacy_mixed_case_email_migrated_and_authenticates(client: AsyncClient):
+    """A legacy row whose email was stored verbatim in mixed case (the old open
+    register) is lowercased by the startup self-heal and still authenticates."""
+    await _insert_user("DemoUser@Example.com", "Tech")
+    await _normalize_emails()  # what lifespan does each boot
+
+    async with async_session_factory() as session:
+        from sqlalchemy import select
+        user = (
+            await session.execute(select(User).where(User.email == "demouser@example.com"))
+        ).scalar_one()
+    assert user.email == "demouser@example.com"
+
+    for variant in ("demouser@example.com", "DemoUser@Example.com"):
+        resp = await client.post(
+            "/api/auth/login", json={"email": variant, "password": "denya123"}
+        )
+        assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+
+
+async def test_login_matches_legacy_mixed_case_email_before_migration(client: AsyncClient):
+    """Login compares on the normalized form, so an un-migrated mixed-case row
+    is still matched by its lowercase login (no hard dependency on the
+    self-heal having run)."""
+    await _insert_user("DemoUser@Example.com", "Tech")
+    resp = await client.post(
+        "/api/auth/login", json={"email": "demouser@example.com", "password": "denya123"}
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+
+
+async def test_legacy_email_normalization_is_idempotent(client: AsyncClient):
+    """The startup self-heal rewrites once and no-ops on subsequent boots."""
+    await _insert_user("DemoUser@Example.com", "Tech")
+    async with async_session_factory() as session:
+        first = await normalize_legacy_user_emails(session)
+        await session.commit()
+    async with async_session_factory() as session:
+        second = await normalize_legacy_user_emails(session)
+        await session.commit()
+    assert first == 1
+    assert second == 0
+
+
+async def test_create_user_rejects_case_variant_of_legacy_email(client: AsyncClient):
+    """The admin create-user duplicate check compares on the normalized form:
+    creating a case-variant of a legacy mixed-case row returns 409, not 201."""
+    await _insert_user("DemoUser@Example.com", "Tech")
+    token = await _login(client)
+    resp = await client.post(
+        "/api/auth/users",
+        json={
+            "email": "demouser@example.com",
+            "password": "password1",
+            "full_name": "X",
+            "role": "Tech",
+        },
+        headers=_auth(token),
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 409, resp.text
+
+
+async def test_admin_only_rbac_gate(client: AsyncClient):
+    """Canonical admins pass /api/auth/admin-only; everyone else 403."""
+    wahab = await _login(client)
+    assert (await client.get("/api/auth/admin-only", headers=_auth(wahab))).status_code == 200
+
+    bella = await _login(client, email="bella@denya.com")
+    assert (await client.get("/api/auth/admin-only", headers=_auth(bella))).status_code == 403
+
+
+# ── Item 4: login rate limiting ───────────────────────────────────────
+async def test_login_rate_limited_after_five_failures(client: AsyncClient):
+    email, password = "rate-limited@example.com", "denya123"
+    # Make sure the account exists with a valid password.
+    token = await _login(client)
+    await client.post(
+        "/api/auth/users",
+        json={"email": email, "password": password, "full_name": "Rate", "role": "CS Rep"},
+        headers=_auth(token),
+    )
+
+    for _ in range(5):
+        resp = await client.post(
+            "/api/auth/login", json={"email": email, "password": "wrong-password"}
+        )
+        assert resp.status_code == 401
+
+    # 6th attempt — even with the CORRECT password — is throttled.
+    resp = await client.post(
+        "/api/auth/login", json={"email": email, "password": password}
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 429, resp.text
+
+
+async def test_rate_limit_is_per_email(client: AsyncClient):
+    """Failures for one account never lock out another account."""
+    token = await _login(client)
+    for email in ("victim@example.com", "other@example.com"):
+        await client.post(
+            "/api/auth/users",
+            json={"email": email, "password": "password1", "full_name": "U", "role": "CS Rep"},
+            headers=_auth(token),
+        )
+
+    for _ in range(6):
+        resp = await client.post(
+            "/api/auth/login", json={"email": "victim@example.com", "password": "bad"}
+        )
+        assert resp.status_code in (401, 429)
+
+    # Unaffected account still logs in fine.
+    resp = await client.post(
+        "/api/auth/login", json={"email": "other@example.com", "password": "password1"}
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+
+
+async def test_rate_limit_window_expires(client: AsyncClient, monkeypatch):
+    """After the 15-minute window passes, the account can log in again."""
+    import time as _time
+
+    import app.core.ratelimit as ratelimit_mod
+
+    email, password = "window@example.com", "password1"
+    token = await _login(client)
+    await client.post(
+        "/api/auth/users",
+        json={"email": email, "password": password, "full_name": "W", "role": "CS Rep"},
+        headers=_auth(token),
+    )
+
+    # Pin the limiter clock so the window can be fast-forwarded deterministically.
+    clock = {"now": _time.time()}
+    monkeypatch.setattr(ratelimit_mod, "_now", lambda: clock["now"])
+    for _ in range(5):
+        await client.post("/api/auth/login", json={"email": email, "password": "bad"})
+
+    blocked = await client.post("/api/auth/login", json={"email": email, "password": password})
+    assert blocked.status_code == 429, blocked.text
+
+    clock["now"] += settings.LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS + 1
+    resp = await client.post("/api/auth/login", json={"email": email, "password": password})
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+
+
+# ── Item 5: WhatsApp webhook secret (fail closed) ─────────────────────
+WEBHOOK_BODY = {
+    "object": "whatsapp_business_account",
+    "entry": [
+        {
+            "id": "1",
+            "changes": [
+                {
+                    "id": "wamid.1",
+                    "message": {"from": "+233000000000", "id": "wamid.1", "text": {"text": "AC leaking"}},
+                }
+            ],
+        }
+    ],
+}
+
+
+async def test_webhook_fail_closed_when_env_unset(client: AsyncClient):
+    """WHATSAPP_WEBHOOK_SECRET unset ⇒ every message rejected (403)."""
+    assert settings.WHATSAPP_WEBHOOK_SECRET == ""  # test env default is unset
+    resp = await client.post("/api/whatsapp/webhook", json=WEBHOOK_BODY)
+    assert resp.status_code == 403
+    assert "not configured" in resp.json()["detail"].lower()
+
+
+async def test_webhook_rejects_missing_or_wrong_secret(client: AsyncClient, monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "WHATSAPP_WEBHOOK_SECRET", "test-webhook-secret")
+    resp = await client.post("/api/whatsapp/webhook", json=WEBHOOK_BODY)
+    assert resp.status_code == 403
+
+    resp = await client.post(
+        "/api/whatsapp/webhook", json=WEBHOOK_BODY, headers={"X-Webhook-Secret": "wrong"}
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 403
+
+
+async def test_webhook_accepts_valid_secret_and_creates_ticket(client: AsyncClient, monkeypatch):
+    from app.routers import whatsapp as whatsapp_router
+
+    async def _fake_reply(to_phone: str, text: str):
+        from app.schemas.whatsapp import WhatsAppReplyResponse
+        return WhatsAppReplyResponse(success=True, message="sent")
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "WHATSAPP_WEBHOOK_SECRET", "test-webhook-secret")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(whatsapp_router, "send_whatsapp_reply", _fake_reply)
+
+    resp = await client.post(
+        "/api/whatsapp/webhook",
+        json=WEBHOOK_BODY,
+        headers={"X-Webhook-Secret": "test-webhook-secret"},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    data = resp.json()
+    assert data["status"] == "processed"
+    assert data["ticket_number"].startswith("PAV-")
+
+    # The message is logged and visible to an authenticated mock-log caller.
+    token = await _login(client)
+    log = await client.get("/api/whatsapp/mock-log", headers=_auth(token))
+    assert log.status_code == 200
+    assert len(log.json()) == 1
+    assert log.json()[0]["ticket_number"] == data["ticket_number"]
+
+
+async def test_webhook_verify_token_mismatch_403(client: AsyncClient, monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "WHATSAPP_VERIFY_TOKEN", "verify-me")
+    resp = await client.get(
+        "/api/whatsapp/webhook",
+        params={"hub.mode": "subscribe", "hub.verify_token": "nope", "hub.challenge": "1234"},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 403
+
+
+async def test_webhook_verify_token_match_returns_challenge(client: AsyncClient, monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "WHATSAPP_VERIFY_TOKEN", "verify-me")
+    resp = await client.get(
+        "/api/whatsapp/webhook",
+        params={"hub.mode": "subscribe", "hub.verify_token": "verify-me", "hub.challenge": "1234"},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    assert resp.json() == {"challenge": "1234"}
+
+
+# ── Item 6: mock-log requires auth ────────────────────────────────────
+async def test_mock_log_requires_auth(client: AsyncClient):
+    resp = await client.get("/api/whatsapp/mock-log")
+    assert resp.status_code == 401, resp.text
+
+    token = await _login(client)
+    resp = await client.get("/api/whatsapp/mock-log", headers=_auth(token))
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    assert resp.json() == []
+
+
+# ── Item 7: security headers ──────────────────────────────────────────
+async def test_security_headers_on_html_page(client: AsyncClient):
+    resp = await client.get("/login")
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    assert resp.headers["x-frame-options"] == "DENY"
+    assert resp.headers["x-content-type-options"] == "nosniff"
+    assert "content-security-policy" in resp.headers
+    assert "default-src 'self'" in resp.headers["content-security-policy"]
+
+
+async def test_csp_only_on_html_not_json_api(client: AsyncClient):
+    resp = await client.get("/api/tickets")
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    assert "content-type" in resp.headers and resp.headers["content-type"].startswith("application/json")
+    assert "content-security-policy" not in resp.headers
+    # Frame/type hardening headers apply everywhere.
+    assert resp.headers["x-frame-options"] == "DENY"
+    assert resp.headers["x-content-type-options"] == "nosniff"
+
+
+async def test_hsts_only_when_tls_terminates(client: AsyncClient):
+    plain = await client.get("/login")
+    assert "strict-transport-security" not in plain.headers
+
+    tls = await client.get("/login", headers={"X-Forwarded-Proto": "https"})
+    assert tls.headers["strict-transport-security"] == "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains"
+
+
+# ── Item 8: pagination (page/limit) and sane max page size ────────────
+async def test_limit_alias_over_cap_rejected(client: AsyncClient, seed_tickets):
+    await seed_tickets(10)
+    resp = await client.get("/api/tickets", params={"limit": 500})
+    assert resp.status_code == 422
+
+
+async def test_limit_alias_paginates(client: AsyncClient, seed_tickets):
+    await seed_tickets(14)
+    resp = await client.get("/api/tickets", params={"page": 2, "limit": 5})
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    data = resp.json()
+    assert data["total"] == 14
+    assert len(data["items"]) == 5
+    assert data["page_size"] == 5
+    assert data["page"] == 2
+
+
+async def test_page_beyond_last_returns_empty_with_total(client: AsyncClient, seed_tickets):
+    await seed_tickets(7)
+    resp = await client.get("/api/tickets", params={"page": 999, "page_size": 10})
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    data = resp.json()
+    assert data["items"] == []
+    assert data["total"] == 7
+
+
+async def test_page_size_and_limit_conflict_is_422(client: AsyncClient, seed_tickets):
+    await seed_tickets(3)
+    resp = await client.get("/api/tickets", params={"page_size": 10, "limit": 20})
+    assert resp.status_code == 422

tests/test_p0_hardening.py

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 """P0 hardening regression tests (HARDENING.md P0.1 / P0.2 / P0.3).
 
 Covers:
-- P0.3: self-registration CANNOT mint a privileged role (role field ignored)
+- P0.3: self-registration is REMOVED — POST /api/auth/register returns 404 and
-- P0.3: duplicate email still 409s
+  no public path can mint a user at all (users are admin-created only).
 - P0.1: app fails to import/boot with placeholder or missing SECRET_KEY
 - P0.2: app fails to boot with CORS_ORIGINS="*"
 """
@@ -15,18 +15,17 @@ import sys
 from pathlib import Path
 
 import pytest
-from httpx import ASGITransport, AsyncClient
+from httpx import AsyncClient
 
 REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
 
 pytestmark = pytest.mark.asyncio
 
 
+# ── P0.3: self-registration is removed entirely ───────────────────────
 
-# ── P0.3: registration role-escalation ────────────────────────────────
+async def test_register_endpoint_is_removed(client: AsyncClient):
-
+    """A raw unauthenticated register call must 404 — no public signup path."""
-async def test_register_cannot_mint_admin_role(client: AsyncClient):
-    """A raw unauthenticated register call must NOT be able to mint Admin/*."""
     resp = await client.post(
         "/api/auth/register",
         json={
@@ -36,41 +35,42 @@ async def test_register_cannot_mint_admin_role(client: AsyncClient):
             "role": "Admin/Jerome",
         },
     )
-    assert resp.status_code == 201, resp.text
+    assert resp.status_code == 404, resp.text
-    created = resp.json()
-    assert created["role"] == "CS Rep", (
-        f"self-registration minted privileged role: {created['role']}"
-    )
 
 
-async def test_register_role_wahab_also_blocked(client: AsyncClient):
+async def test_register_endpoint_removed_regardless_of_role(client: AsyncClient):
+    """Attempts to mint privileged (or any) roles via register all 404."""
+    for role in ("Admin/Jerome", "Admin/Wahab", "admin", "superadmin", "CS Rep"):
         resp = await client.post(
             "/api/auth/register",
             json={
-            "email": "attacker2@example.com",
+                "email": f"attacker-{role.lower().replace('/', '-')}@example.com",
                 "password": "Sup3rSecret!",
-            "full_name": "Attacker Two",
+                "full_name": "Attacker",
-            "role": "Admin/Wahab",
+                "role": role,
             },
         )
-    assert resp.status_code == 201
+        assert resp.status_code == 404, (role, resp.text)
-    assert resp.json()["role"] == "CS Rep"
 
 
-async def test_register_duplicate_email_conflict(client: AsyncClient):
+async def test_register_does_not_create_user(client: AsyncClient):
-    payload = {
+    """No user row is ever created through the removed register endpoint."""
-        "email": "dupe@example.com",
+    await client.post(
+        "/api/auth/register",
+        json={
+            "email": "ghost@example.com",
             "password": "Sup3rSecret!",
-        "full_name": "Dupe",
+            "full_name": "Ghost",
-    }
+        },
-    r1 = await client.post("/api/auth/register", json=payload)
+    )
-    assert r1.status_code == 201
+    # The ghost account must not be able to log in.
-    r2 = await client.post("/api/auth/register", json=payload)
+    resp = await client.post(
-    assert r2.status_code == 409
+        "/api/auth/login",
+        json={"email": "ghost@example.com", "password": "Sup3rSecret!"},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 401, resp.text
 
 
-# ── P0.1 / P0.2: fail-closed boot validation ──────────────────────────
-
 def _boot_with_env(env_overrides: dict[str, str]) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess:
     """Try importing app.main in a subprocess with the given env; the import
     must fail (non-zero) when fail-closed validation trips."""