AGENTS.md

@@ -98,9 +98,15 @@ Frontend: Alpine.js + Tailwind CSS vendored same-origin (no CDN) — see
   `alpine-3.17.2.min.js`; the tailwind play file does not, e.g.
   `tailwind-3.4.17.js`), then bump the `<script src>` + the
   `VENDORED_SCRIPTS` tuple in the regression file `tests/test_frontend_vendoring.py`.
-- HTML pages ship `Cache-Control: no-cache` and CSP is self-only
+- HTML pages ship `Cache-Control: no-cache` and CSP allows no external host
-  (`script-src`/`style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'`, `connect-src 'self'`); no
+  (`script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval'`, `style-src 'self'
-  CDN host is allowed in CSP (`app/main.py::SecurityHeadersMiddleware`).
+  'unsafe-inline'`, `connect-src 'self'`); no CDN host is allowed in CSP
+  (`app/main.py::SecurityHeadersMiddleware`). `'unsafe-eval'` is required by
+  the Alpine 3.17.2 CDN build: its evaluator compiles every `x-*` expression
+  with `new Function()`, and without it CSP blocks Alpine entirely (stuck
+  loading overlay on every page) — covered by
+  `test_csp_script_src_allows_unsafe_eval_for_alpine` in
+  `tests/test_frontend_vendoring.py`.
 
 ### Tickets (Sprint 2)
 | Method | Path | Auth | Description |
@@ -139,7 +145,8 @@ Frontend: Alpine.js + Tailwind CSS vendored same-origin (no CDN) — see
 - Use `require_roles(*ADMIN_ROLES)` for admin gates; `sub` claim holds string user ID
 - Security headers middleware in `app/main.py`: X-Frame-Options DENY +
   nosniff on everything, CSP on HTML pages, HSTS when `X-Forwarded-Proto: https`
-  (CSP is self-only — frontend libs are vendored, see "Frontend assets")
+  (CSP allows no external host — frontend libs are vendored, see "Frontend
+  assets"; `script-src` carries `'unsafe-eval'` for the Alpine runtime)
 
 ## Ticket System (Sprint 2)
 

app/main.py

@@ -144,8 +144,12 @@ class SecurityHeadersMiddleware:
     * CSP on HTML pages (login + app pages). Alpine.js and Tailwind are
       vendored same-origin (``/static/vendor/``), so no external hosts are
       allowed and the page is fully self-contained — safe on LAN-only demo
-      clients. Inline scripts/styles stay enabled for the Alpine/tailwind
+      clients. ``script-src`` keeps ``'unsafe-inline'`` for the inline
-      runtime;
+      ``tailwind.config``/``app()`` blocks and ``'unsafe-eval'`` because
+      Alpine 3.17.2's expression evaluator compiles ``x-data``/``x-show``/
+      ``x-text`` etc. with ``new Function()`` — without ``'unsafe-eval'`` CSP
+      blocks every Alpine expression and the loading overlay never clears;
+      style-src keeps ``'unsafe-inline'`` for the Tailwind runtime;
     * ``Cache-Control: no-cache`` on HTML pages so templates always
       revalidate (the vendored assets themselves are cached immutably via
       versioned filenames);
@@ -156,7 +160,7 @@ class SecurityHeadersMiddleware:
     HSTS = "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains"
     CSP = (
         "default-src 'self'; "
-        "script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; "
+        "script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval'; "
         "style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; "
         "img-src 'self' data: blob:; "
         "font-src 'self' data:; "

tests/test_frontend_vendoring.py

@@ -72,3 +72,33 @@ async def test_csp_no_longer_allows_cdn_hosts(client: AsyncClient):
     assert "script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'" in csp
     assert "style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'" in csp
     assert "connect-src 'self'" in csp
+
+
+def _directive_sources(csp: str, directive: str) -> list[str]:
+    """Return the source list of one CSP directive (e.g. ``script-src``)."""
+    for part in csp.split(";"):
+        tokens = part.split()
+        if tokens and tokens[0].strip() == directive:
+            return [t.strip() for t in tokens[1:]]
+    return []
+
+
+async def test_csp_script_src_allows_unsafe_eval_for_alpine(client: AsyncClient):
+    """/login CSP must permit 'unsafe-eval' in script-src (Alpine 3.17.2 runtime).
+
+    Alpine's expression evaluator compiles every ``x-data``/``x-show``/``x-text``
+    expression with ``new Function()``. A strict CSP without ``'unsafe-eval'``
+    blocks each evaluation ("Refused to evaluate a string as JavaScript ..."),
+    Alpine never initializes, and the loading overlay (``x-show="loading"`` in
+    base.html) stays visible forever — regression shipped with the P0 CSP.
+    """
+    resp = await client.get("/login")
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    csp = resp.headers["content-security-policy"]
+    script_sources = _directive_sources(csp, "script-src")
+    assert script_sources, f"no script-src directive in CSP: {csp}"
+    assert "'unsafe-eval'" in script_sources, f"script-src missing 'unsafe-eval': {csp}"
+    # Everything else stays as hardened: still 'self'-only apart from the two
+    # Alpine-required relaxations, and connect-src remains 'self'.
+    assert "'self'" in script_sources
+    assert "connect-src 'self'" in csp