Mumuni (Syslog Code Agent)
3ec09470ff
P0.1 — fail-closed secrets: - config.py: no default SECRET_KEY; refuses to boot when unset, a known placeholder, or <32 chars. Generate with: openssl rand -hex 32. - docker-compose.yml: literal secrets removed; runtime env now comes from a git-ignored .env via env_file. .env.example added as template. - .gitignore already covers .env (verified). P0.2 — locked CORS: - main.py: CORS_ORIGINS must be an explicit comma-separated allow-list. '*' or an empty value refuses to boot (was: silently ['*'] with allow_credentials=True). P0.3 — role-safe registration: - services/auth.py: client-supplied 'role' is IGNORED on POST /api/auth/register; self-registered users always get the least-privilege 'CS Rep' role. Unauthenticated callers can no longer mint Admin/Jerome, Admin/Wahab, or Director accounts. Tests: - conftest.py sets test SECRET_KEY/CORS_ORIGINS before app import. - New tests/test_p0_hardening.py (8 tests): role-escalation blocked for Admin/Jerome and Admin/Wahab, duplicate-email 409, and subprocess boot-validation for placeholder/short/missing secret + wildcard CORS. - Full suite: 44 passed. Redeploy note (per research): seed_units/seed_categories are insert-only, so the Aug-26 redeploy does NOT orphan historical tickets referencing units 103E/103W/105E/105W or the legacy 34-category tree. Pending Wahab: are 103E/103W/105E/105W real apartments dropped from the Excel regeneration? Optional follow-up: floor-number backfill for already- seeded units (mapping corrected floors; existing rows keep old values). Checks per HARDENING.md acceptance: - [x] starting without a real key fails loudly (subprocess-verified) - [x] compose carries no literal secret; secrets come from .env - [x] CORS_ORIGINS explicit allow-list, '*' rejected - [x] unauthenticated register cannot mint Admin/* or Director
82 lines
3.1 KiB
Python
82 lines
3.1 KiB
Python
"""Authentication service — register, login, refresh."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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from fastapi import HTTPException, status
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from sqlalchemy import select
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from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
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from app.core.security import (
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create_access_token,
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create_refresh_token,
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decode_token,
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hash_password,
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verify_password,
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)
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from app.models.user import User
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from app.schemas.auth import RegisterRequest
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# HARDENING.md P0.3 — least-privilege default for self-registered users.
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_SELF_REGISTER_ROLE = "CS Rep"
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async def register(db: AsyncSession, body: RegisterRequest) -> User:
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"""Create a new user. Raises 409 if email already exists.
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HARDENING.md P0.3: unauthenticated self-registration must never mint a
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privileged role. The client-supplied ``role`` field is IGNORED — new
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self-registered users always land on the least-privilege role.
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Admins assign elevated roles directly (DB seed / admin endpoint).
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"""
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result = await db.execute(select(User).where(User.email == body.email))
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if result.scalar_one_or_none():
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raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_409_CONFLICT, detail="Email already registered")
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user = User(
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email=body.email,
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password_hash=hash_password(body.password),
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full_name=body.full_name,
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phone=body.phone,
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role=_SELF_REGISTER_ROLE,
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)
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db.add(user)
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await db.flush()
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await db.refresh(user)
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return user
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async def login(db: AsyncSession, email: str, password: str) -> tuple[str, str, User]:
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"""Authenticate and return (access_token, refresh_token, user)."""
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result = await db.execute(select(User).where(User.email == email))
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user = result.scalar_one_or_none()
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if user is None or not verify_password(password, user.password_hash):
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raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Invalid email or password")
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if not user.active:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Account is inactive")
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access_token = create_access_token({"sub": str(user.id)})
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refresh_token = create_refresh_token({"sub": str(user.id)})
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return access_token, refresh_token, user
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async def refresh_access_token(db: AsyncSession, token: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
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"""Validate a refresh token and issue a new token pair."""
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try:
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payload = decode_token(token)
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if payload.get("type") != "refresh":
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raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Invalid token type")
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except HTTPException:
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raise
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except Exception:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Invalid refresh token")
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user_id: int = int(payload["sub"])
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result = await db.execute(select(User).where(User.id == user_id))
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user = result.scalar_one_or_none()
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if user is None or not user.active:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="User not found or inactive")
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new_access = create_access_token({"sub": str(user.id)})
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new_refresh = create_refresh_token({"sub": str(user.id)})
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return new_access, new_refresh
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