diff --git a/cron-contracts/alpaca-trading-system.prose.md b/cron-contracts/alpaca-trading-system.prose.md
index 47c401b..260450b 100644
--- a/cron-contracts/alpaca-trading-system.prose.md
+++ b/cron-contracts/alpaca-trading-system.prose.md
@@ -864,6 +864,73 @@ with per-source coverage breadth trend.
   constrained; benchmark-matching net of costs is the honest achievable
   outcome, not "maximize growth."
 
+- **P-012 — Internal performance metrics are self-validating, self-healing,
+  and fail-closed against poisoning.** The `performance_snapshots` table feeds
+  the Optimization Success Score (P-009), which drives live parameter
+  adaptation (P-010). A poisoned snapshot therefore does not merely produce a
+  wrong number — it steers the system's parameter-adaptation loop AWAY from the
+  optimal state. The contract's North Star is that the system regresses to its
+  mean HEALTHY state on its own and stays on mission (capturing risk-adjusted
+  returns) without user intervention; this invariant is the mechanism that
+  guarantees it.
+
+  **Detection by positive re-derivation (not blocklist).** Every snapshot SHALL
+  be validated by re-deriving it against ground truth AT READ TIME, never
+  trusted merely because it was written or because it lacks a known-bad shape.
+  A snapshot is INVALID if any hold: (a) it is dated before the first realized
+  trade (`realized_trades.closed_at`, `unmatched=0`, `venue != 'alpaca_paper'`)
+  — such rows are pre-inception non-data and SHALL NEVER be reconstructed by
+  fabricating equity (zero-assumptions doctrine); (b) `start_equity` does not
+  equal the trade-attributed equity-curve inception anchor (the `sys_start`
+  deposit from the P-003 deposit schedule) within $1 — this catches raw-balance
+  leaks (the $100,383 and flat-$200 poisonings); (c) `|total_return_pct|`
+  exceeds the adaptive sanity bound, the looser of 40% absolute or 5× the
+  rolling standard deviation of clean returns — this catches the +249% deposit-
+  inflation and −99.8% raw-balance poisonings without false-positiving a
+  legitimately volatile week. Because validation is a pure function of the row
+  plus the current capital schedule, the SAME validator detects both current
+  and historical poisoning and self-corrects as the P-003 formula improves.
+
+  **Containment by quarantine, never deletion.** Invalid rows SHALL be flagged
+  (`quarantined=1`, `quarantine_reason`), preserved as an audit trail of the
+  bug, and EXCLUDED from every OSS input window (`compute_oss_from_snapshot`,
+  beta, trend). OSS SHALL be computed only from rows that pass validation this
+  cycle.
+
+  **Tiered, fail-closed health — defined relative to what is achievable.** The
+  adaptation controller SHALL read a health tier derived from clean-snapshot
+  availability, where the clean-snapshot floor `MIN_CLEAN` ramps with system
+  age (`clamp(age_days × 0.5, 3, 8)`) so a young or freshly-healed system is
+  never starved into permanent inaction:
+  - **HEALTHY** (clean ≥ `MIN_CLEAN`): full loop — propose AND commit to
+    `.env.prod`.
+  - **DEGRADED** (1 ≤ clean < `MIN_CLEAN`): evaluate + auto-unwind run
+    (bookkeeping / immune system), the proposal is computed and REPORTED, but
+    SHALL NOT be committed to `.env.prod`.
+  - **CRITICAL** (clean = 0): hold all adaptation; only bookkeeping runs; emit
+    a loud alert.
+
+  **Self-healing by natural refill.** Because poisoned history is quarantined
+  rather than resurrected, the OSS window refills with genuine post-inception
+  snapshots as they accrue (~1/day). A system that starts DEGRADED regresses to
+  HEALTHY unaided as clean rows accumulate — no user intervention required to
+  unblock adaptation. The evaluate/auto-unwind half of P-010 ALWAYS runs
+  regardless of tier, because reverting a proven-bad change is pure risk
+  reduction. Only the new-risk action (committing a new adaptation) is gated.
+
+  **Rationale:** On 2026-07-02, an audit found that 36 of 37 snapshots were
+  poisoned — 29 with a raw ~$100K paper-balance leak producing −99.8% returns,
+  and pre-inception rows dated before the first trade — while OSS was silently
+  computed from a mix of real and fabricated rows, driving live
+  `POSITION_SIZE_PCT` tightening against a phantom −2.35% drawdown. Quarantine
+  restored a truthful (if thin) window; the tier gate held the controller
+  report-only until real clean data accrues. Property-tested via
+  `tests/test_p010_metric_integrity.py` (detector correctness, tier gating,
+  regress-to-HEALTHY, quarantine-never-deletes). Detector:
+  `scripts/metric_integrity.py`; migration:
+  `scripts/migrate_p010_metric_integrity.py`; controller gate:
+  `scripts/apply_adaptations.py:main`.
+
 - The prime directive SHALL NOT be weakened by any contract update. Any change
   that would allow valid trades to be silently blocked is invalid.
 - Internal failures SHALL be distinguished from external failures. "Alpaca API