Commit Graph
6 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
abiba-bot 8f1e5eebc4 feat(security): commit-time secret guard that FAILS the build on a committed credential
PR Pipeline — Authorize → Validate → Review → Merge / auth (pull_request) Successful in 5s
PR Pipeline — Authorize → Validate → Review → Merge / validate (pull_request) Successful in 3s
PR Pipeline — Authorize → Validate → Review → Merge / lint (pull_request) Successful in 18s
PR Pipeline — Authorize → Validate → Review → Merge / ai-review (pull_request) Successful in 3s
PR Pipeline — Authorize → Validate → Review → Merge / gate (pull_request) Successful in 1s
The 2026-09-17 purge removed six live credentials that had sat in this repo
for weeks, several in .md prose. Nothing blocked that class of commit, so a
warning in a stream nobody reads was the only signal. This adds a guard that
fails the build instead of warning.

Guard
- scripts/secret-scan.sh: bash + coreutils + grep/sed/awk + git only (the Gitea
  Actions runner executes job steps inside the runner container — BusyBox grep,
  no node/python). Modes: --tree (git-tracked, default), --path DIR (no git),
  --staged (pre-commit), --diff REF. Exit 1 on a finding, 2 on config error.
- scripts/secret-patterns.tsv: checked-in pattern list — sk-, sk-or-v1-,
  sk_live_, literal Bearer tokens, PVEAPIToken=, raw Authorization values, PEM
  private-key blocks, prose credential lines, and password/api_key/secret/token
  assignments carrying a literal value. Prose is scanned exactly like code.
- scripts/secret-allowlist.tsv: one entry per deliberate synthetic example, each
  with a reason. A missing reason is a hard error (fail closed). The 2026-09-17
  purge's `«vault: ...»` placeholders are listed explicitly rather than filtered
  by a general "vault"/"synthetic" rule, so a new occurrence still needs a
  reviewed, reasoned entry.
- A small inert-value classifier drops env refs, paths, dotted code access,
  variable names and right-truncated redactions; it does not know the words
  "synthetic"/"example", so a fabrication is always an explicit exception.
- Findings are printed with the credential masked; a scan never echoes a full
  secret into the log.

Wiring
- .gitea/workflows/pr-pipeline.yaml lint job: explicit "Committed-credential
  scan" step plus the self-test. A finding fails the required
  `pr-pipeline / lint` context, which the merge gate depends on.
- scripts/prose-lint.sh (the local gate): a "Secret scan" section, so
  `bash scripts/prose-lint.sh` before pushing is equivalent to CI.

Tests
- tests/test_secret_scan.sh: 20 cases. Plants pattern-matching fixtures in temp
  trees (outside every allowlisted path) and asserts the guard FAILS, including
  the --staged commit-time path; asserts the tree is quiet; asserts allowlisted
  text at an unlisted path still fails (path-explicit, not word-based); asserts
  a reasonless allowlist entry exits 2.

Verified: guard run against 8245716^ (the pre-fix revision, before the purge)
fails on the real OpenRouter/LiteLLM/Zulip/Proxmox/Stirling credentials; guard
run over the current tree is clean.
2026-09-22 15:04:37 +00:00
root 6e612ce37b no-mistakes(document): Fix stale CT 111 node maps and CI range 2026-09-12 19:11:09 +00:00
root 79af0ae7a3 Merged PR #52: fix/tanko-runtime 2026-08-30 12:16:28 +00:00
root 1d027f71f6 feat(contracts): add infrastructure-maintenance contract
New responsibility contract consolidating host-level system maintenance
and Docker image lifecycle management, filling the gap left by
infrastructure-update (which owns cluster-wide apt waves).

Scope:
- OS package updates on primary host with pre-update snapshot/backup check
- Docker image pulls for LiteLLM, SearXNG, and other running containers
- Container restarts with per-stack health verification
- Post-update verification: LiteLLM, SearXNG, Zulip, Gitea, PM2, Hermes gateways
- Rollback on failure (image/apt/config restore) with circuit breaker

Owner: ops (firstmate secondmate). Trigger: weekly Sunday 2am ET.
Escalation: warning/critical->abiba+mumuni, fatal->abiba+mumuni+kwame.
circuit_breaker: max_retries 2, window 7200, trip_action escalate_to_fatal.
depends_on: infrastructure-monitoring (pre-update health baseline).

Registry:
- Add infrastructure-maintenance to by_category.maintenance, by_domain.infrastructure,
  by_owner.ops (new), by_trigger.scheduled, by_sensitivity.high
- Add 'ops' to owners list
- Move infrastructure-update owner abiba -> ops (in contracts entry + by_owner index)

Also adds '## Maintaining this file' section to AGENTS.md per fm-ensure-agents-md.
2026-07-18 22:02:45 +00:00
root 4eec96b851 docs: link authoring guide from AGENTS.md 2026-07-04 22:31:44 +00:00
root 57605c6f16 docs: add AGENTS.md + authorization enforcement gates
NEW: AGENTS.md — complete agent workflow documentation
- Step-by-step PR workflow for all agents
- Authorization matrix (who can change which contracts)
- Emergency bypass procedure
- Quick start commands

NEW: scripts/prose-auth-check.sh — authorization enforcement
- Blocks unauthorized agents from changing CRITICAL contracts
- infrastructure-control, proxmox-monitor: abiba only
- hermes-config-template: abiba, mumuni, tanko
- zulip-health: abiba, mumuni
- All scripts: abiba only
- Fails CI if unauthorized changes detected

UPDATED: .gitea/workflows/pr-pipeline.yaml
- Added Stage 0: auth check (runs first)
- Added gate job that confirms all 4 checks passed
- Expanded trigger paths to include scripts/*.sh

UPDATED: branch protection — now requires 4 contexts:
  pr-pipeline / auth, validate, lint, ai-review
2026-07-04 22:25:05 +00:00