A volume alerts ONCE when it enters a higher band (GREEN->WARN, WARN->AMBER,
AMBER->RED) and ONCE when it drops back down (recovery notice). While it stays
in the same band, it is reported in the scan output only — no DM, no channel
alert. This stops the same 96% easystore2 from re-DMing the owner on every 6h
scan.
State lives in a small JSON state file (state/host-disk-bands.json), keyed by
host/volume -> last-seen band. The scanner reads the prior band, compares to the
current band, and DMs only on a transition; the state file is written after
every scan. Chosen over a periodic digest because the scan already runs every
6h and a transition is genuinely new, actionable state.
First-run behavior: when the state file does not yet exist, the current band of
every volume is recorded as baseline WITHOUT alerting — a first run would
otherwise DM every already-elevated volume at once.
Report-only restriction and volume-naming output kept exactly as-is.
Add separate threat bands for HOST filesystems (distinct from guest bands):
- HOST-WARN at 85%: name volume + % + absolute free space in scan output
- HOST-AMBER at 90%: flag for owner attention, Zulip DM
- HOST-RED at 95%: flag for immediate owner attention, Zulip DM + channel alert
Volume naming rule: every host line MUST name the volume and what lives on it.
Action classes by volume type:
- host-root: near full = real risk (backup staging, thin-pool metadata)
- media (/media/*): near full = capacity decision for owner, never auto-delete
- pbs-datastore (tank): near full = breaks Proxmox Backup Server
Report-only restriction: no automatic deletion of media or datastore content ever.
Justification (measured 2026-09-15): storepve /media/easystore2 at 96% was
reported but never banded or acted on. Two incidents this weekend showed the
host filesystem is the thing that breaks, not the guest's.
Added HOST-WARN/AMBER/RED alert templates.
Added report-only execution rule for host filesystems.
CT 111 (tdunna, 192.168.68.129) is Theo's box and is report-only per the captain
(2026-08-17, re-confirmed 2026-09-10). The contract defined AMBER as 'GC scheduled
for next run' and its Execution loop called gc-executor for EVERY threat with no
guest-level exclusion - so a single AMBER reading there would have scheduled apt
clean / journal vacuum / log+tmp deletion against someone else's box. The only
marker was frontmatter report_only_agents, which names an AGENT while the scan unit
is a GUEST.
- Gate the Execution loop on a guest/host-keyed report_only_guests block (guest id,
hostname and IP all match); an excluded guest is alerted and skipped, so no
gc-executor call is constructed for it at any level.
- Carry the ruling in the contract body next to the loop, not only in frontmatter.
- scripts/disk-gc-plan.py: executable planner that reads the contract's
authoritative exclusion block and emits the action plan; tests/ covers it.
- Correct the stale fleet map against pvesh /cluster/resources: CT 105 -> amdpve
(was minipve), CT 111 -> storepve (was amdpve), add guests 118/119/120, and fix
the '15 CTs' counts (20 guests: 17 LXC + 3 QEMU VMs).
- scripts/pct-run.sh: same stale map (105/111 wrong node, 120 missing) - this is
why pct-run 111/105 failed.
- Fold in disk-gc-ct100-probe-gap-20260911: CT 100 verifiably works through
pct-run now that the map is correct; documented that the scanner must probe it
like any other guest, never via a local-only path (the scanner runs inside CT 100).
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