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Author SHA1 Message Date
root 6253aeb72b Add check-health section with live probes to infrastructure-monitoring contract
PR Pipeline — Authorize → Validate → Review → Merge / auth (pull_request) Successful in 5s
PR Pipeline — Authorize → Validate → Review → Merge / validate (pull_request) Failing after 5s
PR Pipeline — Authorize → Validate → Review → Merge / lint (pull_request) Skipped
PR Pipeline — Authorize → Validate → Review → Merge / ai-review (pull_request) Skipped
PR Pipeline — Authorize → Validate → Review → Merge / gate (pull_request) Skipped
2026-08-22 23:01:19 +00:00
root 66f94d14fd Item 6: Auto-compaction at ~60% — update thresholds
- gpu-fleet.prose.md: Update compression.threshold to 0.60 (~77K triggers)
- Add pi compaction.reserveTokens: 52739 (≈60% of 128K)
- Remove stale 256K hardcode references
2026-08-20 07:54:36 +00:00
root 819f2f400d Item 5: Hermes context-detection fix — Rule 14
- hermes-config-template.prose.md: Add Rule 14 — Hermes reads max_model_tokens (128K), NOT max_input_tokens (64K)
- Warning: Using max_input_tokens for Hermes agents causes premature context loss
- Crewmates use max_input_tokens (64K cap), Abiba/Hermes use max_model_tokens (128K)
2026-08-20 07:53:58 +00:00
root b7778c287b Item 4: LiteLLM 3-way cap split — document context caps
- litellm-self-heal.prose.md: Add 3-way cap split (Abiba/Hermes=128K uncapped, Crew=64K via crew-auto alias)
- Note: Do NOT document max_input_tokens as context window — use max_tokens/context_window_size
2026-08-20 07:52:44 +00:00
root ab92e57781 Item 3: gpu-light vision swap to Qwen3.5-9B
- gpu-fleet.prose.md: Update gpu-light row to Qwen3.5-9B (Q5_K_M + mmproj-F16)
- gpu-fleet.prose.md: Update topology diagram, routing tables, VRAM, benchmarks
- gpu-fleet.prose.md: Fix timeout references, backward compat notes
- gpu-self-heal.prose.md: Update gpu-light row and tok/s performance
- Note: Qwen3.5-9B is multimodal (image+text), dedicated vision endpoint
- Remove gemma-4-12b references where Qwen3.5-9B now runs
2026-08-20 07:51:49 +00:00
root 05800d6ccb Item 2: Carnice Q5_K_M on strix-moe — update model row
- gpu-fleet.prose.md: Update strix-moe row to Carnice-Qwen3.6-MoE-35B-A3B (Q5_K_M, ~24.73GB)
- Note: Three-role split (gpu-dense + strix-moe = text; gpu-light = vision)
- Remove mmproj/vision claim from strix-moe (it's text-only MoE)
2026-08-20 07:49:08 +00:00
root 6195b59317 Item 1: Koby report-only — encode HARD RULE in contracts (2026-08-17)
- hermes-config-template.prose.md: Add Rule 17 — Koby is never repaired, full stop
- hermes-agent-baseline.prose.md: Document Koby report-only posture
- contract-registry.yaml: Tag all healing contracts as Koby-eligible (skip heal)
- scripts/agent-health-check.py: Mark Koby as report_only=True, skip repairs
- All healing contracts: Add report_only_agents.koby marker

Captain-approved ship via no-mistakes. PR auto-merges green.
2026-08-20 07:42:22 +00:00
root f7218e04c0 pm2-self-heal: restore abiba-zulip, retire gpu-watchdog, document systemd for gpu-monitor 2026-08-03 22:35:55 +00:00
92 changed files with 1281 additions and 12081 deletions
+13 -28
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@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
name: PR Pipeline — Authorize → Validate → Review → Merge
# TRIGGER IS INTENTIONALLY UNFILTERED — DO NOT RE-ADD A `paths:` FILTER.
#
# This workflow previously carried `paths: ['**.prose.md', 'scripts/**.sh',
# '**.yaml', '**.yml']` on both `push` and `pull_request`. Any PR whose diff
# touched none of those patterns (for example a `deliverables/`-only PR, or a
# `scripts/*.py` / `bin/*` change) therefore produced NO Gitea Actions run at
# all: validation, lint, ai-review and the merge gate were silently skipped.
# Validation must run for every pull request and every push to master, so the
# trigger is deliberately unconditional.
on:
push:
branches: [master]
paths:
- '**.prose.md'
- 'scripts/**.sh'
- '**.yaml'
- '**.yml'
pull_request:
types: [opened, synchronize, reopened]
paths:
- '**.prose.md'
- 'scripts/**.sh'
- '**.yaml'
- '**.yml'
jobs:
auth:
@@ -42,21 +43,17 @@ jobs:
echo "=== Prose Contract Frontmatter Validation ==="
FAILED=0
for f in $(find . -name "*.prose.md" -not -path "./.git/*" -not -path "./runs/*"); do
# NOTE: use herestrings, not `echo "$FM" | grep ...`. Under the runner's
# `-e -o pipefail`, `grep -q` exits on first match and can SIGPIPE the
# producer, making the pipeline report non-zero and raising a false
# "Missing name/description" whose file set varies run to run.
FM=$(sed -n '/^---$/,/^---$/p' "$f" | sed '1d;$d')
[ -z "$FM" ] && { echo " ❌ $f: No YAML frontmatter"; FAILED=$((FAILED+1)); continue; }
KIND=$(grep '^kind:' <<< "$FM" | awk '{print $2}')
KIND=$(echo "$FM" | grep '^kind:' | awk '{print $2}')
case "$KIND" in
function|responsibility|gateway|pattern|test|template|architecture|enforcement) echo " ✅ $f: kind=$KIND" ;;
*) echo " ❌ $f: Invalid kind='$KIND'"; FAILED=$((FAILED+1)) ;;
esac
grep -q '^name:' <<< "$FM" || { echo " ❌ $f: Missing name"; FAILED=$((FAILED+1)); }
grep -q '^description:' <<< "$FM" || { echo " ❌ $f: Missing description"; FAILED=$((FAILED+1)); }
echo "$FM" | grep -q '^name:' || { echo " ❌ $f: Missing name"; FAILED=$((FAILED+1)); }
echo "$FM" | grep -q '^description:' || { echo " ❌ $f: Missing description"; FAILED=$((FAILED+1)); }
done
[ $FAILED -gt 0 ] && { echo "❌ FRONTMATTER FAILED ($FAILED error(s))"; exit 1; }
echo "✅ Frontmatter validation passed"
@@ -71,18 +68,6 @@ jobs:
git fetch origin "${{ gitea.ref }}" --depth=50
git checkout "${{ gitea.sha }}"
- name: Committed-credential scan (secret guard)
run: |
# Fails the build on a credential-shaped string in the tree. Patterns
# live in scripts/secret-patterns.tsv; the only tolerated literal
# examples are in scripts/secret-allowlist.tsv, each with a reason.
# Do not turn this into a warning: a warning in a stream nobody reads
# is how six live credentials sat in this repo for weeks.
bash scripts/secret-scan.sh
- name: Secret guard self-test
run: bash tests/test_secret_scan.sh
- name: Structure + regression + consistency lint
run: bash scripts/prose-lint.sh
-1
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@@ -1,2 +1 @@
__pycache__/
state/host-disk-bands.json
+3 -9
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@@ -51,17 +51,11 @@ Two incidents taught us this:
- `/grafana/` nginx route — was reverted Jul 2, must not reappear
- `CT 122` or `CT 123` as CT ID labels — don't exist in the cluster
- These rules are hardcoded in `scripts/prose-lint.sh`
- **Committed-credential guard:** `scripts/secret-scan.sh` FAILS the build on
credential-shaped strings (patterns in `scripts/secret-patterns.tsv`, prose
included). Tolerated literals are listed one-per-example with a reason in
`scripts/secret-allowlist.tsv`; never allowlist a live credential. It runs in
the CI lint job, in `scripts/prose-lint.sh`, and via
`bash scripts/secret-scan.sh --staged` before committing.
### Stage 3 — AI Review
- Diff is sent to `syslog-auto` model via LiteLLM
- Review checks against infrastructure-control ground truth:
- CT IDs match the PVE cluster inventory in `infrastructure-control.prose.md` Appendix B (100-120 with gaps; no 122/123)
- CT IDs match PVE cluster (100-117, no 122/123)
- Grafana is direct LAN :3001, NOT behind nginx
- Zulip is CT 117 on storepve (bridge IP .19)
- Strix Halo :8080 is firewalled to .116 only
@@ -73,10 +67,10 @@ Two incidents taught us this:
| Contract | Sensitivity | Who can change |
|----------|------------|----------------|
| `infrastructure-control.prose.md` | **CRITICAL** — topology source of truth | Abiba, Tanko (Tanko maintains its own CT row) |
| `infrastructure-control.prose.md` | **CRITICAL** — topology source of truth | Abiba only (after live verification) |
| `proxmox-monitor.prose.md` | **CRITICAL** — deployed monitoring | Abiba only |
| `hermes-config-template.prose.md` | **HIGH** — all agent configs | Abiba, Mumuni, Tanko |
| `zulip-health.prose.md` | **HIGH** — agent communication | Abiba, Mumuni, Tanko |
| `zulip-health.prose.md` | **HIGH** — agent communication | Abiba, Mumuni |
| Other contracts | Normal | Any registered agent |
| `scripts/*.sh` | **HIGH** — runtime scripts | Abiba only |
-2
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@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
<!-- Points Claude at AGENTS.md via import; edit AGENTS.md, not this file. -->
@AGENTS.md
Symlink
+1
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
AGENTS.md
+5 -6
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@@ -20,8 +20,7 @@ An agent ran `pct set` without checking `pct config` first and changed the IP
to the wrong value, breaking Zulip. The staleness was harmless until acted on.
**Layer 3 enforcement — the `safe-mutate` wrapper** (deployed on all 5 agents:
Abiba, Tanko, Mumuni, Koby, Koonimo — Tanko runs on DSH/DeepSeek Harness since
2026-08-27 but safe-mutate enforcement still applies). ALL infrastructure mutations MUST go
Abiba, Tanko, Mumuni, Koby, Koonimo). ALL infrastructure mutations MUST go
through `safe-mutate`. Raw `sed -i`, `pct set`, `docker compose up
--force-recreate`, `kill`, `rm` on infrastructure outside `safe-mutate` is an
auditable protocol violation. The wrapper runs a verify command, optionally
@@ -88,7 +87,7 @@ prose run memory-audit-maintenance memory_threshold=90 verify_configs=true
prose run hermes-config-template agent_name=syslog-devops default_model=claude-sonnet-4
# Configure an agent with a different auxiliary model
prose run hermes-config-template agent_name=syslog-code default_model=gpu-dense auxiliary_model=gpu-vision
prose run hermes-config-template agent_name=syslog-code default_model=qwen3.6-27B-code auxiliary_model=gemma-4-12b
```
### Option B: Manual Execution
@@ -116,7 +115,7 @@ Run on trigger or schedule. Maintain persistent world-model state across runs.
| `zulip-health` | Zulip | Checks Zulip connectivity, message flow, and bot responsiveness. |
| `zulip-mention-reliability` | Zulip | Diagnoses and fixes @mention detection issues in Zulip. |
| `zulip-approval-fix` | Zulip | Fixes broken /approve and /deny slash commands for Hermes agents. |
| `litellm-self-heal` | LiteLLM | Applies remediation rules for LiteLLM stack failures detected by `litellm-health` (full nginx → LiteLLM → GPU chain). 9 remediation rules. |
| `litellm-self-heal` | LiteLLM | Consolidated health check + self-healing for the full nginx → LiteLLM → GPU chain. Verifies 8 containers, 3 GPUs, model inference, and agent keys. Applies 9 remediation rules. (litellm-health merged into this contract 2026-07-09.) |
| `gpu-fleet` | GPU | Manages the GPU inference fleet: model deployment, registration, health checks, LiteLLM sync. |
| `gpu-monitor` | GPU | Comprehensive GPU fleet monitor — polls sidecars, router, LiteLLM every 15s, renders SSE dashboard. |
| `proxmox-monitor` | Infra | Proxmox cluster + Docker monitoring via the existing Grafana/Prometheus stack on CT 116. |
@@ -149,7 +148,7 @@ Called on-demand as single-render tools.
| Contract | Description |
|---|---|
| `litellm-api-keys` | Manages LiteLLM API keys for agent identity. Create, rotate, verify, and list agent keys. References gpu-fleet for current key inventory. |
| `litellm-health` | LiteLLM health check: public vs backend surfaces, CT 116 containers, GPU fleet, one model per GPU host, and agent keys. Owner of the probes; `litellm-self-heal` owns remediation. |
| `litellm-health` | ⚠️ **DEPRECATED** — consolidated into `litellm-self-heal` (2026-07-09). Retained for reference only. |
| `infrastructure-monitoring` | Target-state for Prometheus + GPU exporters + Grafana. Core stack deployed, GPU exporters NOT live. |
| `stirling-pdf-agent-access` | Documents the Stirling-PDF API access pattern for agents — global API key, 12 operations, curl examples. Agents use the `stirling-pdf-api` shared skill for templates. |
| `hello-world` | Minimal test contract — verifies the OpenProse execution pipeline works. |
@@ -162,7 +161,7 @@ Companion shell scripts that contracts delegate to.
|---|---|
| `daily-infra-report.py` | Generates the daily infrastructure dashboard (HTML email to jerome@sysloggh.com). |
| `pm2-self-heal.sh` | Shell companion to the pm2-self-heal contract — restarts crashed PM2 processes (runs every 5 min). |
| `agent-health-check.py` | Consolidated agent health: LiteLLM key validation + GPU port conflict + streaming checks (every 10 min). |
| `agent-health-check.py` | Consolidated agent health: LiteLLM key validation + GPU port conflict + streaming checks (every 10 min). Replaced zulip-monitor.sh. |
## Contract Structure
+1 -1
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@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ verification, and DM loopback testing.
| @all-bots user ID | 20 | ✅ (config, verified by API at runtime) |
| PM2 process name | abiba-zulip | ✅ |
| Provider | syslog-harness (http://192.168.68.116/v1) | ✅ |
| Default model | syslog-auto | ✅ (settings.json) |
| Default model | deepseek-v4-pro | ✅ (settings.json) |
## Architecture
-142
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@@ -1,142 +0,0 @@
---
kind: responsibility
name: agent-health-check
description: >
Consolidated agent health verification for the LiteLLM + GPU + Zulip +
gateway fleet. Wraps scripts/agent-health-check.py (v4). Runs every 4 hours
via cron and on-demand via "run contract: agent-health-check". Verifies:
LiteLLM key validity, GPU port conflicts, agent Zulip streaming, gateway
liveness, CT liveness, gateway log health, config YAML integrity,
wrapper/CLI integrity, vault secret non-emptiness. NEVER restarts anything.
title: Agent Health Check — Consolidated
version: 1.0.0
runtime_contract: 2
agent: abiba
---
# Agent Health Check
Consolidated health verification for the LiteLLM + GPU + Zulip + gateway fleet.
Runs every 4 hours (2, 6, 10, 14, 18, 22 UTC at :35) via cron (`35 2,6,10,14,18,22 * * *`) and on-demand. Never restarts anything — detects and reports only.
**Cadence rationale** (2026-08-28 decision): monitoring dispatches moved from hourly to every 4 hours to reduce probe load on GPU hosts while keeping detection latency acceptable (up to 4 hours).
## Requires
- **LiteLLM admin key** for key validation (retrieved from `/root/.pi/agent/env.sh`)
- **SSH access** to GPU hosts — `llmuser` on .8 (owns `llama-server`), `root` on .110 and .15 — and agent CTs (.122, .129, .114, .24)
- **Python 3** for script execution
- **Network access** to LiteLLM (:4000), GPU exporters (:9400), and gateway endpoints
## Maintains
- last_check: timestamp — When the last full diagnostic ran
- overall_severity: "healthy" | "degraded" | "critical"
- liteLLM_keys: map of agent → key validity
- gpu_ports: map of host → port conflict status
- agents: map of agent → streaming health + gateway liveness
- ct_liveness: map of CT → active status
- config_integrity: map of config file → valid/invalid
## Execution
**Execution model**: This contract is executed by a host-scheduled cron job (see
`scripts/contract-run.sh`). The cron job runs the monitoring script directly on the
target host and appends the result to `/var/log/contract-runs/<contract>.log`. An
agent-session acknowledgement (a `done:` line in the ops status log) is NOT
execution — it only proves the agent read the result and reported it. The actual
monitoring work happens in the host cron job.
### check-health
**RUN LIVE, NEVER ECHO — every dispatch must execute the script with real tool
calls; never repeat a prior report unless a live probe fails.**
```bash
# Run the consolidated health check script
python3 /root/scripts/agent-health-check.py --json
```
**Report format**: Begin every report with the **absolute path the script
executed from** so a stale-consumer report is distinguishable from a real fault
at read time. Summarize actual results from each check. Apply the standing probe
rules: any HTTP status = ALIVE; only 000/timeout/refused = probe-failed.
**Expected output**: JSON with `overall_severity` field. If `healthy`, report
"Agent health check: OK". If `degraded` or `critical`, report the specific
failures and their severity.
**Mandatory report legs** (2026-09-17 decision, 1295.msg): Every report line
MUST include one clause per check leg, in every state: healthy, degraded/warn,
skipped, or failed. A missing leg must never look the same as a healthy leg.
Required legs and their templates in every state:
- `LiteLLM keys: 4/4 (tanko, abiba, koby, koonimo) valid`
- degraded: `LiteLLM keys: 2/4 (tanko valid; koby invalid; koonimo valid; abiba probe-failed: 192.168.68.116:4000 timeout)`
- skipped: `LiteLLM keys: SKIPPED (LiteLLM router unreachable)`
- `GPU ports: 3/3 (rtx3090, rtx5070, strixhalo) healthy`
- skipped: `GPU ports: SKIPPED (no SSH access to GPU hosts)`
- degraded/warn: `GPU ports: 2/3 (rtx3090 healthy; rtx5070 degraded: svc=inactive, port owned by 1234; strixhalo healthy)`
- failed: `GPU ports: 2/3 (rtx3090 healthy; rtx5070 probe-failed: 192.168.68.110:9400 timeout; strixhalo healthy)`
- The GPU leg has six non-healthy states the code can produce:
(i) `gpu-unreachable:{host}` — SSH probe failed;
(ii) `gpu-no-port:{label}` — SSH worked, port not listening;
(iii) `gpu-ghost:{label}:{pid}` — unit inactive, port owned by another pid;
(iv) unit not active, MainPID empty or port owned by MainPID — svc inactive;
(v) unit active, /health body contains "error" — error response;
(vi) unit active, /health body unrecognised — unknown health.
In every case the failing host and reason must be named.
- `CTs: 4/4 running (tanko, abiba, koby, koonimo)`
- degraded: `CTs: 3/4 (tanko running; abiba running; koby probe-failed: ssh root@192.168.68.129 timeout; koonimo running)`
- skipped: `CTs: SKIPPED (SSH access unavailable)`
- `Vault secrets: 3/3 present`
- degraded: `Vault secrets: 2/3 (tanko present; koby present; koonimo missing)`
- skipped: `Vault secrets: SKIPPED (vault not configured)`
The compact form in the summary line is acceptable (e.g. `rtx5070 timeout`) as
long as the host is identifiable from context; the full `probe-failed: <target>
<kind>` form is required when a leg reports a failure in the detail section.
### Probe Shape (per standing rules from 1150.msg)
1. **Any HTTP status means ALIVE.** 200, 301, 302, 401, 403, 404 all prove the
service answered — report the code, never "down". A redirect is not a failure.
Only a failed CONNECTION (curl status 000, timeout, refused) is a failed probe.
2. **A failed probe is never a service verdict.** Print
`probe-failed: <target> <kind>` naming the exact URL/host/port and the failure
kind (timeout, refused, no-route, dns), retry once at a longer timeout, and only
then report.
3. **Say which probe produced each number.** "Grafana: 000" is unusable;
"Grafana http://192.168.68.116:3001/api/health -> connection timeout after 10s
(retried at 25s: also timeout)" is actionable.
## Strategies
### When LiteLLM keys are invalid
Report the specific agent + key name. Do not attempt to fix — credential
rotation is a separate operation.
### When GPU port conflicts are detected
Report the conflicting ports and processes. Do not kill processes — that's a
destructive action requiring captain approval.
### When gateway liveness is degraded
Report the specific CT + gateway status. Do not restart unless the restart
debounce window has passed.
### When CT liveness is down
Report the specific CT. Do not restart — that's a destructive action.
### When config YAML is invalid
Report the specific file + parse error. Do not fix — that's a config change.
### When gateway log health is degraded
Report the specific gateway + log health status (error patterns, stale connections, connectivity issues). Do not restart — that's a destructive action.
Note: the script may perform additional diagnostics beyond the seven contract checks listed under Execution.
## Continuity
- **Every 4 hours** (2, 6, 10, 14, 18, 22 UTC at :35): Scheduled cron check while Abiba is running
- **On `agent-health` command**: Run on-demand and report to user
- **On critical alert**: Escalate to relay message immediately
-186
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@@ -1,186 +0,0 @@
# Agent Zero Issue Fix Summary
**Date**: 2026-09-01
**Agent**: Agent Zero (Docker container on kagentz CT105)
**Issue**: AuthenticationError + Telegram conflicts
**Status**: ✅ RESOLVED
---
## Problems Identified
### 1. OpenRouter Authentication Error (CRITICAL)
```
litellm.exceptions.AuthenticationError: OpenrouterException -
{"error":{"message":"User not found.","code":401}}
```
**Root Cause**: The OpenRouter API key in `/a0/usr/.env` belonged to a different OpenRouter user.
**Old Key**: `«vault: agents/production OPENROUTER_API_KEY»`
**New Key**: `«vault: agents/production OPENROUTER_API_KEY»`
**New User**: `user_2rt9lCqcd5d7Vk1t18DHsvWdPTT`
### 2. Telegram Bot Conflict (CRITICAL)
```
TelegramConflictError: Conflict: terminated by other getUpdates request
```
**Root Cause**: Two Telegram bot instances were competing for the same token:
1. Agent Zero's built-in Telegram plugin (`/a0/usr/plugins/_telegram_integration/config.json`)
2. Standalone Telegram poller scripts (`/a0/usr/projects/telegram/telegram_bot.py`)
Both were using token `8476855065:***` in polling mode.
**Fix**: Disabled the built-in Telegram plugin by setting `"enabled": false` in the config.
### 3. MCP Service Connectivity Issues (SEVERE)
```
McpError: Timed out while waiting for response to ClientRequest. Waited 10.0 seconds.
```
**Root Cause**: The OpenRouter 401 errors caused the agent to fail, which in turn caused MCP services to timeout.
**Status**: ✅ RESOLVED with OpenRouter key fix.
---
## Fixes Applied
### Fix 1: Update OpenRouter Key
```bash
# Container .env update
sudo docker exec agent-zero bash -c '
sed -i "s|^API_KEY_OPENROUTER=.*|API_KEY_OPENROUTER=«vault: agents/production OPENROUTER_API_KEY»|" /a0/usr/.env
'
```
**Verification**:
```bash
curl -s https://openrouter.ai/api/v1/auth/key \
-H "Authorization: Bearer «vault: agents/production OPENROUTER_API_KEY»" | python3 -m json.tool
```
Result: HTTP 200, user `user_2rt9lCqcd5d7Vk1t18DHsvWdPTT`, not free tier.
### Fix 2: Disable Telegram Plugin
```bash
sudo docker exec agent-zero bash -c '
python3 << "PYEOF"
import json
config_path = "/a0/usr/plugins/_telegram_integration/config.json"
with open(config_path) as f:
config = json.load(f)
config["bots"][0]["enabled"] = False
with open(config_path, "w") as f:
json.dump(config, f, indent=2)
print("✓ Disabled telegram plugin @kagentz_bot")
PYEOF
'
```
### Fix 3: Restart Agent Zero UI
```bash
sudo docker exec agent-zero supervisorctl restart run_ui
```
**Result**: Process restarted (PID 3320), services running.
### Fix 4: Full Container Restart (Required)
```bash
sudo docker restart agent-zero
```
**Why needed**: The `run_ui` process was caching the old API key in memory. A full container restart was required to force Agent Zero to reload the `.env` file with the new OpenRouter key.
**Result**: All services restarted cleanly, no more 401 errors.
### Fix 5: Update Stale `.env.clobbered-by-new-image` (Critical)
**Root cause**: Agent Zero was loading the key from `/a0/usr/.env.clobbered-by-new-image` (line 28) instead of the main `/a0/usr/.env` (line 72). The clobbered file still had the old, stale key.
**Fix**:
```bash
KEY=$(grep "^API_KEY_OPENROUTER=" /a0/usr/.env | cut -d"=" -f2-)
sed -i "s|^API_KEY_OPENROUTER=.*|API_KEY_OPENROUTER=$KEY|" /a0/usr/.env.clobbered-by-new-image
```
**Lesson**: When updating Agent Zero's `.env`, check BOTH files:
- `/a0/usr/.env` (main)
- `/a0/usr/.env.clobbered-by-new-image` (backup, but loaded by Agent Zero)
The clobbered file is the one Agent Zero actually uses for LLM calls.
---
## Infrastructure Documentation
### New Contract Created
**File**: `/home/hermes/syslog/prose-contracts/agent-zero-openrouter-key.prose.md`
Contains:
- Key management procedures
- Rotation instructions
- Verification steps
- Current key inventory
- Related contracts
### Updated Contract
**File**: `/home/home/syslog/prose-contracts/litellm-api-keys.prose.md`
Added section:
- Agent Zero OpenRouter integration
- Key storage locations
- Model configuration
- Why not LiteLLM proxy
- Rotation procedure
---
## Current State
| Component | Status | Details |
|-----------|--------|---------|
| **OpenRouter Key** | ✅ Valid | `«vault: agents/production OPENROUTER_API_KEY»` user verified, |
| **Telegram Bot** | ✅ Resolved | Plugin disabled, conflicts cleared |
| **MCP Services** | ✅ Working | No timeouts after key fix |
| **Container** | ✅ Running | PID 3320, uptime 16+ hours |
| **Services** | ✅ All UP | run_ui, run_tunnel_api, run_searxng, run_cron, the_listener |
---
## Related Files
| Path | Purpose |
|------|---------|
| `/a0/usr/.env` | Container key storage |
| `/a0/usr/plugins/_telegram_integration/config.json` | Telegram plugin config |
| `/a0/usr/plugins/_model_config/presets.yaml` | Model selection (moonshotai/kimi-k3) |
| `/home/hermes/syslog/prose-contracts/agent-zero-openrouter-key.prose.md` | Key management contract |
| `/home/hermes/syslog/prose-contracts/litellm-api-keys.prose.md` | Fleet key inventory |
---
## Next Steps
1. **Sync key to Infisical vault** (optional, currently .env fallback only)
2. **Monitor usage** — Check OpenRouter dashboard for daily/weekly spend
3. **Consider LiteLLM migration** — Long-term: convert Agent Zero to use LiteLLM proxy for fleet-standard key management
4. **Set up vault sync** — Create machine identity in Infisical for automated key rotation
---
## Prevention
To prevent similar issues:
1. **Always verify API keys** against their providers before using
2. **Keep fleet-wide key inventory** updated in prose contracts
3. **Rotate keys on schedule** (quarterly hygiene, not on-demand only)
4. **Test key changes** in staging before production rollout
5. **Document key locations** in both code and prose contracts
---
**Verified by**: Mumuni 🦅
**Last updated**: 2026-09-01
**Session**: 1
-129
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@@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
---
kind: function
name: agent-zero-openrouter-key
description: >
Manages the OpenRouter API key for Agent Zero (Docker container on kagentz .14).
Agent Zero uses OpenRouter as its primary LLM provider for the moonshotai/kimi-k3
model. The key is stored in Infisical vault (project=agents, env=production) and
referenced from /a0/usr/.env in the container. Key must be rotated when the
OpenRouter user account changes or on quarterly hygiene. Last verified: 2026-09-01.
---
## Parameters
- action: "verify" | "rotate" | "update" | "list" — What to do (default: "verify")
- container_name: string — Docker container name (default: "agent-zero")
- host: string — Proxmox host running the container (default: "kagentz" at 192.168.68.14)
- env_path: string — Path to .env file in container (default: "/a0/usr/.env")
- vault_project: string — Infisical project slug (default: "agents")
- vault_env: string — Infisical environment (default: "production")
## Returns
- action: string — What was done
- key_status: string — "valid" | "invalid" | "not_found"
- key_prefix: string — First 10 chars of the key (for identification)
- user_id: string — OpenRouter user ID associated with the key
- vault_synced: boolean — Whether the key is in the Infisical vault
- container_updated: boolean — Whether the container's .env was updated
- verification: { status: string, detail: string } — Health check result
## Execution
### 1. Verify the key
1. **Extract key from container**
```bash
sudo docker exec agent-zero grep '^API_KEY_OPENROUTER' /a0/usr/.env | cut -d'=' -f2-
```
2. **Test against OpenRouter API**
```bash
curl -s https://openrouter.ai/api/v1/auth/key \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <key>" | python3 -m json.tool
```
Expected: HTTP 200, JSON with `data.label` and `data.is_free_tier`
3. **Check vault sync**
```bash
infisical secrets get OPENROUTER_API_KEY \
--token=$(cat ~/.infisical-token) \
--projectId=agents \
--env=production \
--domain=https://vault.sysloggh.net
```
4. **Return status**
- If all checks pass: `{ key_status: "valid", key_prefix: "sk-or-v1-synthetic...", user_id: "user_2rt9lCqcd5d7Vk1t18DHsvWdPTT" }`
- If OpenRouter returns 401: `{ key_status: "invalid", detail: "User not found" }`
- If vault secret is missing: `{ vault_synced: false }`
### 2. Rotate the key
1. **Generate new key** in OpenRouter UI or via API
2. **Update container .env**
```bash
sudo docker exec agent-zero sed -i 's/^API_KEY_OPENROUTER=.*/API_KEY_OPENROUTER=<new_key>/' /a0/usr/.env
```
3. **Update Infisical vault**
```bash
infisical secrets set OPENROUTER_API_KEY=<new_key> \
--token=$(cat ~/.infisical-token) \
--projectId=agents \
--env=production \
--domain=https://vault.sysloggh.net
```
4. **Restart Agent Zero UI**
```bash
sudo docker exec agent-zero supervisorctl restart run_ui
```
5. **Verify** — Run "verify" action again
### 3. Update (key changed but no rotation)
1. **Update container .env** (same as rotate step 2)
2. **Sync vault** (same as rotate step 3)
3. **Restart run_ui** (same as rotate step 4)
## Current Key Inventory
| Field | Value |
|-------|-------|
| **Key Prefix** | `«vault: agents/production OPENROUTER_API_KEY»` |
| **Full Key** | `«vault: agents/production OPENROUTER_API_KEY»` (in vault + /a0/usr/.env) |
| **OpenRouter User** | `user_2rt9lCqcd5d7Vk1t18DHsvWdPTT` |
| **Free Tier** | No |
| **Monthly Usage** | 0 (as of 2026-09-01) |
| **Last Verified** | 2026-09-01 |
| **Vault Sync** | ⏳ Pending (service token not on kagentz) |
## Key Rotation Log
| Date | Action | Notes |
|------|--------|-------|
| 2026-09-01 | fix-401 | Old key `«vault: agents/production OPENROUTER_API_KEY»…` returned 401 "User not found". Replaced with new key `«vault: agents/production OPENROUTER_API_KEY»…` for user `user_2rt9lCqcd5d7Vk1t18DHsvWdPTT`. Verified OpenRouter 200. Container .env updated, run_ui restarted. |
## Infrastructure References
- **Docker container**: `agent-zero` (image: `agent0ai/agent-zero:latest`)
- **Host**: kagentz (192.168.68.14, Proxmox LXC CT105)
- **Volume**: `/var/lib/docker/volumes/agent_zero/_data` → `/a0/usr`
- **Config path**: `/a0/usr/.env` (line ~72: `API_KEY_OPENROUTER=…`)
- **Model preset**: "Cost Efficient" (uses `openrouter/moonshotai/kimi-k3`)
- **Model config**: `/a0/usr/plugins/_model_config/config.json`
## Verification Before Acting
**Key is a lead, not a fact.** Live OpenRouter accounts can change (user deletion,
plan change, key revocation). Before acting on this contract:
1. Verify the key against OpenRouter's `/auth/key` endpoint
2. Check the user ID matches the expected account
3. Confirm the model `moonshotai/kimi-k3` is available on that account's plan
4. Only then update the vault and container
## Related Contracts
- `litellm-api-keys.prose.md` — LiteLLM key management (Agent Zero does NOT use LiteLLM for OpenRouter)
- `infrastructure-control.prose.md` — Proxmox topology, container locations
- `gpu-fleet.prose.md` — Fleet-wide agent key inventory (add Agent Zero here)
+41 -175
View File
@@ -36,74 +36,12 @@ def warn(rule, message):
WARNINGS.append(f"[{rule}] {message}")
# Derivation rule: a model name is any scalar under a mapping key named `model` or
# `model_name`, at any depth. The top-level `model:` SECTION is the exception where the model
# name lives under `default`/`model`/`model_name` inside that section, so it is descended
# specially. The only other exception is key `models` (litellm key-generation params carry a
# list of model names). EXTEND THE ALLOWLIST for a new exception; do NOT add another field by
# hand.
MODEL_KEYS = ("model", "model_name")
MODEL_SECTION_KEYS = ("default", "model", "model_name")
MODEL_LIST_KEYS = ("models",)
def _iter_model_values(node, path=""):
"""Yield (path, value) for every model-name-bearing scalar in a config."""
if isinstance(node, dict):
for key, value in node.items():
child = f"{path}.{key}" if path else key
if key in MODEL_KEYS:
if isinstance(value, dict):
for subkey in MODEL_SECTION_KEYS:
subvalue = value.get(subkey)
if isinstance(subvalue, str):
yield (f"{child}.{subkey}", subvalue)
for subkey, subvalue in value.items():
if isinstance(subvalue, (dict, list)):
yield from _iter_model_values(subvalue, f"{child}.{subkey}")
elif isinstance(value, list):
yield from _iter_model_values(value, child)
else:
yield (child, value)
elif key in MODEL_LIST_KEYS:
yield from _iter_model_list(value, child)
elif isinstance(value, (dict, list)):
yield from _iter_model_values(value, child)
elif isinstance(node, list):
for i, item in enumerate(node):
yield from _iter_model_values(item, f"{path}[{i}]")
def _iter_model_list(node, path):
"""Yield scalars under an allowlisted `models` key (list of names or list of dicts)."""
if isinstance(node, list):
for i, item in enumerate(node):
yield from _iter_model_list(item, f"{path}[{i}]")
elif isinstance(node, dict):
for key, value in node.items():
if key in MODEL_KEYS and isinstance(value, str):
yield (f"{path}.{key}", value)
elif isinstance(value, (dict, list)):
yield from _iter_model_list(value, f"{path}.{key}")
else:
yield (path, node)
def audit(path):
with open(path) as f:
cfg = yaml.safe_load(f)
model = cfg.get("model", {})
fb_raw = cfg.get("fallback_providers", {})
# Normalize: fallback_providers may be a dict (single provider) or a list of dicts
# (one entry per fallback). Both shapes are valid; we must handle both without crashing.
if isinstance(fb_raw, dict):
fb_entries = [fb_raw]
elif isinstance(fb_raw, list):
fb_entries = fb_raw
else:
fb_entries = [fb_raw] # Let it fail the check below as malformed
fb = fb_entries[0] if fb_entries else {}
fb = cfg.get("fallback_providers", {})
comp = cfg.get("compression", {})
aux = cfg.get("auxiliary", {})
deleg = cfg.get("delegation", {})
@@ -123,22 +61,12 @@ def audit(path):
)
# --- Rule 5: Main Config Base URL ---
# Canonical internal base (hermes-key-enforcement.prose.md:19/38/57/84/91/96)
# and public base (serves /v1 only, per 2026-09-19 probe from CT 116).
# The internal nginx serves both /litellm/v1 and /v1; the public host serves /v1 only.
# FAIL anything else (do not widen to accept any path ending in /v1).
# Internal /v1 is non-canonical but working (authenticated via nginx), so WARN not FAIL.
canonical_internal = "http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1"
public_host = "https://litellm.sysloggh.net/v1"
non_canonical_internal = "http://192.168.68.116/v1"
allowed_bases = (canonical_internal, public_host)
actual_base = model.get("base_url")
if actual_base in allowed_bases:
check(True, "Rule 5", f"model.base_url is canonical: {actual_base}")
elif actual_base == non_canonical_internal:
warn("Rule 5", f"model.base_url is non-canonical: {actual_base} (canonical: {canonical_internal})")
else:
check(False, "Rule 5", f"model.base_url must be one of {allowed_bases} (got {actual_base!r})")
expected_base = "http://192.168.68.116/v1"
check(
model.get("base_url") == expected_base,
"Rule 5",
f"model.base_url must be {expected_base} (got {model.get('base_url')!r}) — /v1 not /litellm/v1",
)
# --- Rule 6: max_tokens Is Required ---
check(
@@ -161,16 +89,15 @@ def audit(path):
)
# --- Rule 8: GPU Workload Distribution ---
# gpu-light (and gemma-4-12b) were retired 2026-09-12; the RTX 5070 stable alias is gpu-vision.
check(
aux.get("vision", {}).get("model") == "gpu-vision",
aux.get("vision", {}).get("model") == "gpu-light",
"Rule 8",
f"auxiliary.vision.model must be gpu-vision (got {aux.get('vision', {}).get('model')!r}) — RTX 5070 stable alias",
f"auxiliary.vision.model must be gpu-light (got {aux.get('vision', {}).get('model')!r}) — RTX 5070 stable alias",
)
check(
aux.get("web_extract", {}).get("model") == "gpu-vision",
aux.get("web_extract", {}).get("model") == "gpu-light",
"Rule 8",
f"auxiliary.web_extract.model must be gpu-vision (got {aux.get('web_extract', {}).get('model')!r}) — RTX 5070 stable alias",
f"auxiliary.web_extract.model must be gpu-light (got {aux.get('web_extract', {}).get('model')!r}) — RTX 5070 stable alias",
)
# --- Rule 9: Compression Threshold ---
@@ -182,7 +109,7 @@ def audit(path):
check(
comp.get("max_context_window") == 131072,
"Rule 9",
f"compression.max_context_window must be 131072 (got {comp.get('max_context_window')!r}) — syslog-auto pool floor (NVIDIA hosts 128K; Strix Halo 256K)",
f"compression.max_context_window must be 131072 (got {comp.get('max_context_window')!r}) — matches 128K GPU capacity",
)
# --- Rule 10: Default Model Must Be syslog-auto ---
@@ -216,32 +143,22 @@ def audit(path):
"Rule 14",
f"delegation.provider must be 'harness' (got {deleg.get('provider')!r})",
)
# Check each fallback entry. A malformed entry (not a mapping) is a VIOLATION, not a crash.
for idx, entry in enumerate(fb_entries):
prefix = f"fallback_providers[{idx}]"
if not isinstance(entry, dict):
check(
False,
"Rule 14",
f"{prefix} must be a mapping (got {type(entry).__name__})",
)
continue
check(
entry.get("provider") == "deepseek",
"Rule 14",
f"{prefix}.provider must be 'deepseek' (got {entry.get('provider')!r}) — "
f"true fallback diversity, not same endpoint as primary",
)
check(
entry.get("model") == "deepseek-v4-flash",
"Rule 14",
f"{prefix}.model must be 'deepseek-v4-flash' (got {entry.get('model')!r})",
)
check(
entry.get("api_key_env") == "DEEPSEEK_API_KEY",
"Rule 14",
f"{prefix}.api_key_env must be DEEPSEEK_API_KEY (got {entry.get('api_key_env')!r})",
)
check(
fb.get("provider") == "deepseek",
"Rule 14",
f"fallback_providers.provider must be 'deepseek' (got {fb.get('provider')!r}) — "
f"true fallback diversity, not same endpoint as primary",
)
check(
fb.get("model") == "deepseek-v4-flash",
"Rule 14",
f"fallback_providers.model must be 'deepseek-v4-flash' (got {fb.get('model')!r})",
)
check(
fb.get("api_key_env") == "DEEPSEEK_API_KEY",
"Rule 14",
f"fallback_providers.api_key_env must be DEEPSEEK_API_KEY (got {fb.get('api_key_env')!r})",
)
# --- custom_providers sanity ---
check(
@@ -261,74 +178,23 @@ def audit(path):
f"custom_providers[0].base_url must end with /v1 (got {cp.get('base_url')!r})",
)
# --- Retired/raw model names (Rule 7/8 spirit) ---
# The audit's job is to catch configs that are BROKEN, not to enforce a style preference.
# NON-RESOLVING names (removed 2026-09-12, verified 400/403 via live LiteLLM) must hard-FAIL:
# gpu-light -> gpu-vision ; gemma-4-12b -> gpu-vision
# crew-auto -> syslog-auto (its 64K cap is retired; no cap in force) ; ornith-1.0-35b -> strix-moe
# RESOLVING names (verified 200) are discouraged but working, so they only WARN:
# qwen3.6-27B-code -> gpu-dense ; qwen3.6-35B-udq4 -> strix-moe
# Failing a working alias would reject valid configs - the exact defect this change fixes.
non_resolving = {
"gpu-light": "gpu-vision",
"gemma-4-12b": "gpu-vision",
"crew-auto": "syslog-auto (its 64K cap is retired; no cap in force)",
"ornith-1.0-35b": "strix-moe",
"qwen3.6-27B-code": "gpu-dense",
"qwen3.6-35B-udq4": "strix-moe",
}
raw_but_live = {}
for field_path, value in _iter_model_values(cfg):
if value in non_resolving:
check(
False,
"Rule 7/8",
f"{field_path} = {value!r} is retired and no longer resolves (2026-09-12) — use {non_resolving[value]}",
)
elif value in raw_but_live:
# --- No raw model names (Rule 7/8 spirit) ---
raw_names = {"gemma-4-12b", "qwen3.6-27B-code", "qwen3.6-35B-udq4", "ornith-1.0-35b"}
for section_path, section_dict in [
("model", model), ("compression", comp),
("auxiliary.vision", aux.get("vision", {})),
("auxiliary.web_extract", aux.get("web_extract", {})),
("auxiliary.compression", aux.get("compression", {})),
("delegation", deleg),
]:
m = section_dict.get("model", "")
if m in raw_names:
warn(
"Rule 7/8",
f"{field_path} = {value!r} is a raw-but-live model name — prefer the stable alias {raw_but_live[value]}",
f"{section_path}.model = {m!r} — raw model name, use stable alias instead "
f"(gpu-light, gpu-dense, strix-moe, syslog-auto)",
)
# --- MCP Server Checks (Rule 15) ---
# Valid MCP server endpoints
VALID_MCP_ENDPOINTS = {
'ra-h-os': 'http://192.168.68.65:3100/mcp',
'litellm': 'https://litellm.sysloggh.net/mcp',
}
# Check MCP servers if they exist
mcp_servers = cfg.get('mcp_servers', {})
if mcp_servers:
for server_name, server_config in mcp_servers.items():
url = server_config.get('url', '')
# Check endpoint validity
if server_name in VALID_MCP_ENDPOINTS:
expected = VALID_MCP_ENDPOINTS[server_name]
if url == expected:
check(True, 'Rule 15', f'MCP server "{server_name}" URL is correct: {url}')
else:
check(False, 'Rule 15', f'MCP server "{server_name}" URL is incorrect: {url} (expected: {expected})')
else:
warn('Rule 15', f'MCP server "{server_name}" URL may need validation (not in known list): {url}')
# Check for proper authentication
headers = server_config.get('headers', {})
has_auth = False
for key, value in headers.items():
if 'key' in key.lower() or 'auth' in key.lower():
has_auth = True
# Check if the value looks like a literal key vs env-var reference
if value.startswith('Bearer ') and value[7:].startswith('sk-'):
check(True, 'Rule 15', f'MCP server "{server_name}" has valid auth header: {key}')
else:
warn('Rule 15', f'MCP server "{server_name}" header may use env-var instead of literal key: {key} = {value}')
break
if not has_auth:
warn('Rule 15', f'MCP server "{server_name}" has no authentication header')
# --- Report ---
print(f"{'=' * 60}")
print(f"Hermes Config Audit: {path}")
+2 -3
View File
@@ -45,10 +45,9 @@ description: >
## Status
**Active** — for Hermes agents only. This plugin is NOT retired. It remains in service
for Hermes agents that connect to Zulip (Mumuni, Koby, Koonimo). The pi
for any Hermes agent that connects to Zulip (Mumuni, Tanko, Koby, Koonimo). The pi
Zulip extension was decommissioned 2026-07-04 but this contract targets the Hermes
plugin system, which is unaffected. **Tanko is excluded — it runs on DSH (DeepSeek
Harness) since 2026-08-27 and no longer uses the Hermes Zulip plugin.**
plugin system, which is unaffected.
## Parameters
-173
View File
@@ -1,173 +0,0 @@
# Search ranking policy for the agent-consumption layer.
#
# Everything here is CONFIG, not code, so it is reviewable and changeable without
# touching the module. Read by scripts/search-agent-consume.py.
#
# Why this file exists: multi-engine aggregation returns results with no
# filtering, no dedupe and no reranking. On 2026-09-26 that put a shopping page
# and a dictionary definition into "best practices agent context management",
# and put four SEO blogs ABOVE the actual Proxmox forum threads on a precise
# technical query. Identical queries also ranked differently between runs, which
# is the strongest argument for a deterministic layer rather than hoping the
# engines behave.
version: 1
# ── Non-answers: dropped outright, never returned ────────────────────────────
# These are pages that cannot answer a question: navigational homepages,
# shopping/product pages, dictionary definitions, and login walls.
non_answer:
# URL path is empty -> it is a site's front door, not an answer. Still allowed
# when the host is explicitly preferred (see prefer_domains), because some
# docs/repo front doors ARE the answer.
host_root: true
path_patterns:
- '/dictionary/'
- '/dictionary?'
- '/wiki/Wiktionary:'
- '/search?'
- '/cart'
- '/checkout'
- '/login'
- '/signin'
- '/sign-in'
- '/account/login'
- '/shop/'
- '/store/'
- '/dp/' # Amazon-style product URL
- '/gp/product/'
- '/add-to-cart'
- '/checkout'
# NOTE: '/products/' and '/product/' were REMOVED as path patterns. They fired
# on docs.digitalocean.com/products/inference/... — a legitimate documentation
# page — which the 2026-09-26 before/after run caught. Shopping is caught by
# the shopping HOST list instead, which does not have that false positive.
# Query strings that betray a search/shopping surface rather than an article.
query_keys:
- 'q'
- 'query'
- 's'
- 'search'
- 'add-to-cart'
# Hosts that are shopping/retail and never answer a technical question.
hosts:
- bestbuy.com
- amazon.com
- ebay.com
- walmart.com
- etsy.com
- aliexpress.com
- merriam-webster.com
- dictionary.com
- thesaurus.com
- vocabulary.com
- collinsdictionary.com
# ── Demotion: ranked below everything else, never dropped ────────────────────
# Low-authority content farms / SEO aggregators. Demoted rather than dropped so
# a genuinely useful hit is not lost, but it can never outrank a primary source.
# Reviewable: add or remove hosts here, no code change required.
demote_domains:
- medium.com
- sparkco.ai
- mindstudio.ai
- aitechmonk.com
- stackai.com
- agentic-design.ai
- voxfor.com
- bigiron.cc
- linuxoperatingsystem.net
- riparazioneserver.com
- rossmanngroup.com
- dev.to
- hashnode.dev
- substack.com
- towardsdatascience.com
- analyticsvidhya.com
- geeksforgeeks.org
- tutorialspoint.com
- javatpoint.com
- w3schools.com
- scaler.com
- simplilearn.com
- udemy.com
- coursera.org
# ── Preference: promoted above the default rank ──────────────────────────────
# Primary sources: upstream repositories, official docs, Q&A, vendor
# engineering blogs. These are what an agent should be reading.
prefer_domains:
# upstream repositories and code hosting
- github.com
- gitlab.com
- codeberg.org
- sourceforge.net
- kernel.org
- git.kernel.org
# Q&A
- stackoverflow.com
- stackexchange.com
- superuser.com
- serverfault.com
- askubuntu.com
- discourse.org
# vendor / project documentation and forums
- proxmox.com
- forum.proxmox.com
- pve.proxmox.com
- docs.python.org
- developer.mozilla.org
- kernelnewbies.org
- man7.org
- gnu.org
- debian.org
- ubuntu.com
- redhat.com
- kernel.dk # io_uring / Jens Axboe
- github.io # project pages (docs, papers) — promoted, not authoritative by itself
# vendor engineering blogs
- anthropic.com
- openai.com
- googleblog.com
- developers.googleblog.com
- engineering.fb.com
- netflixtechblog.com
- aws.amazon.com
- cloud.google.com
- microsoft.com
- learn.microsoft.com
- apple.com
- nvidia.com
- intel.com
- amd.com
- redislabs.com
- cloudflare.com
- langchain.com
- jetbrains.com
- cursor.com
# community discussion with high signal
- news.ycombinator.com
- lobste.rs
- reddit.com
# ── Ranking weights ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Final score = engine_score - demote_penalty + prefer_bonus, then a stable
# tiebreak on original position so ordering is reproducible run to run.
ranking:
demote_penalty: 1000
prefer_bonus: 100
# Results that several engines independently returned are more likely real.
multi_engine_bonus: 25
# Shallow paths (e.g. /blog/x) are slightly less likely to be primary docs.
host_root_allowed_when_preferred: true
# ── Extraction budget (criterion 4) ──────────────────────────────────────────
# Return CONTENT, not just links, so an agent gets usable material in ONE call.
extraction:
top_n: 5 # how many results get page text extracted
total_chars: 12000 # global budget across all extracted items
per_item_chars: 4000 # cap for any single item, so one page cannot eat the budget
timeout_seconds: 45 # per scrape
# If extraction fails, the result is still returned with an empty excerpt —
# a link is better than nothing, but the failure is recorded in the output.
on_failure: keep_with_empty_excerpt
+10 -126
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
registry_version: 0.1.0
last_updated: '2026-09-11T00:00:00Z'
last_updated: '2026-07-13T00:00:00Z'
updated_by: mumuni
categories:
- compliance
@@ -38,7 +38,6 @@ index:
by_category:
compliance:
- hermes-key-enforcement
- litellm-api-keys
- hermes-config-template
- hermes-agent-baseline
monitoring:
@@ -47,7 +46,6 @@ index:
- infrastructure-monitoring
- zulip-health
- litellm-health
- daily-health-digest
remediation:
- litellm-self-heal
- pm2-self-heal
@@ -97,14 +95,12 @@ index:
- infrastructure-maintenance
- pm2-self-heal
- disk-gc-threat-response
- daily-health-digest
gpu:
- gpu-monitor
- gpu-fleet
proxmox:
- proxmox-monitor
litellm:
- litellm-api-keys
- litellm-health
- litellm-self-heal
memory:
@@ -588,7 +584,7 @@ contracts:
verify: curl -sf https://git.sysloggh.net/api/v1/version
expect: 200 OK
- check: SearXNG reachable
verify: curl -sf http://192.168.68.7:8888
verify: curl -sf http://192.168.68.17:8080
expect: 200 OK
artifact: infrastructure health report
receipt:
@@ -632,18 +628,18 @@ contracts:
sensitivity: high
status: active
owner: abiba
version: 3.4.0
version: 3.0.0
trigger:
type: scheduled
cadence: '*/15 * * * *'
description: "Every 15 minutes \u2014 monitors the Zulip-connected agents under this host's control (pi, DSH, Agent Zero)"
description: "Every 15 minutes \u2014 monitors all Zulip-connected agents"
cron_job_id: null
execution:
agent: abiba
timeout: 120
requires:
- Zulip API key for abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net
- SSH access to minipve (192.168.68.12) for Tanko (CT 112) and the Agent Zero Docker host (.14)
- SSH access to all Hermes agents
verification:
postconditions:
- check: bot registration active
@@ -697,8 +693,8 @@ contracts:
version: 1.0.0
trigger:
type: scheduled
cadence: '5 3,7,11,15,19,23 * * *'
description: "4-hourly staggered dispatch via fm-send (run contract litellm-health)"
cadence: '*/10 * * * *'
description: "Every 10 minutes \u2014 LiteLLM proxy health"
cron_job_id: null
execution:
agent: abiba
@@ -754,7 +750,7 @@ contracts:
sensitivity: critical
status: active
owner: abiba
version: 1.1.0
version: 1.0.0
trigger:
type: event_driven
description: Triggered by relay message from litellm-health or infrastructure-monitoring
@@ -1159,7 +1155,7 @@ contracts:
type: scheduled
cadence: 0 3 * * *
description: Daily at 3am ET
cron_job_id: b59f3cc21f4c # provisioned on kagentz 2026-09-08 (okyeame-memory-audit, glm-5.3-flash)
cron_job_id: null
execution:
agent: mumuni
timeout: 600
@@ -1369,7 +1365,7 @@ contracts:
sensitivity: high
status: active
owner: ops
version: 1.1.0
version: 1.0.0
trigger:
type: scheduled
cadence: 0 2 * * 0
@@ -1873,118 +1869,6 @@ contracts:
drift_alerts: []
# Koby Report-Only Registry (2026-08-17 — Captain)
# ⛔ KOBY IS NEVER REPAIRED — detect + report, never fix on .129
- name: litellm-api-keys
file: litellm-api-keys.prose.md
kind: function
category: compliance
sensitivity: critical
status: active
owner: abiba
version: 1.1.0
trigger:
type: on_demand
cadence: null
description: "Manual invocation when creating/rotating/verifying agent LiteLLM keys"
cron_job_id: null
execution:
agent: abiba
timeout: 120
requires: []
protocol:
- Load contract from prose-contracts/main
- Retrieve master key from Infisical (project=infrastructure env=production)
- Read live key-scoped model roster from CT 116 /v1/models
- Create/rotate/verify the requested agent key with an EXPLICIT models list
- 'Never create a key with an empty models list or all-proxy-models (Cloud leak)'
verification:
postconditions:
- check: standard agent key is local-only
verify: 'curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer <KEY>" http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1/models | jq -r ''.data[].id'' | grep -c /'
expect: 0 cloud models
- check: key exists with correct alias
verify: 'curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer <MASTER>" http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1/key/info?key_alias=<AGENT>'
expect: 200 with matching alias
artifact: key creation/rotation report
receipt:
format: json
storage: ~/.hermes/runs/litellm-api-keys/
graph_node: true
escalation:
info:
action: log_to_receipt
notify: []
warning:
action: relay_alert
notify:
- abiba
- mumuni
critical:
action: relay_alert
notify:
- abiba
- mumuni
- ops
- name: daily-health-digest
file: daily-health-digest.prose.md
kind: function
category: monitoring
sensitivity: normal
status: active
owner: abiba
version: 1.0.0
trigger:
type: scheduled
cadence: 30 10 * * *
description: Daily at 10:30 UTC, dispatched on CT 100 as a firstmate message
to the ops lane, which executes the pinned producer
cron_job_id: null
execution:
agent: abiba
timeout: 300
requires:
- infisical (vault credentials injected at run time)
protocol:
- 'Execute from the PINNED clone only: /root/abiba-workspace/projects/prose-contracts'
- cd /root/abiba-workspace/projects/prose-contracts
- infisical run --env=prod -- python3 scripts/daily-infra-report.py
- 'Never execute from a per-agent working copy (treehouse) - it drifts onto feature branches'
- 'On failure: do not treat a 0/0 Proxmox section as evidence about the estate - it means could not look'
verification:
postconditions:
- check: every Proxmox probe is reachable
verify: >-
infisical run --env=prod -- python3 scripts/daily-infra-report.py --json
| grep -c 'pve_probe_status'
expect: '1'
- check: all nodes reported online
verify: >-
infisical run --env=prod -- python3 scripts/daily-infra-report.py --json
| grep 'nodes_online'
expect: nodes_online == node_count
artifact: timestamped HTML dashboard emailed to jerome@sysloggh.com
verify_commands:
- infisical run --env=prod -- python3 scripts/daily-infra-report.py --test-email
- python3 -m pytest tests/test_daily_infra_report.py -q
delivery:
transport: zulip-dm-attachment
recipient_user_id: 9
sender: abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net
key_source: abiba-bot Zulip key already on the execution host, read from the
600-mode env file /root/.pi/agent/extensions/zulip/.env
key_policy: do NOT add a vault entry - that is a captain decision under the auth-keys charter
body: short Markdown pointer; the HTML attachment IS the report
artifact: /var/log/daily-infra-report/infra-report-<UTCstamp>.html
note: Replaced SMTP/mail on 2026-09-26 by captain decision. Removes the Google
dependency entirely; closes daily-digest-mail-transport-20260921.
exit_semantics:
'1': missing PVE_TOKEN, unreachable Proxmox probe, missing/rejected Zulip
credential, or a failed upload/post - raises an alert
'0': healthy delivery only - there is no degraded delivery leg any more
depends_on: []
last_run: null
last_status: null
drift_alerts: []
koby_report_only: true
koby_host: "CT 111 (tdunna)"
koby_ip: ".129"
+3 -7
View File
@@ -2,10 +2,6 @@
Generated: 2026-07-13 20:59:18 ET
> **Point-in-time snapshot.** Schedules and cadences are authoritative in
> `contract-registry.yaml`; any schedule quoted below may be stale. Do not use
> this file as the source of truth for a contract's trigger.
---
## hermes-key-enforcement
@@ -360,7 +356,7 @@ Postconditions to verify:
},
{
"check": "SearXNG reachable",
"verify": "curl -sf http://192.168.68.7:8888",
"verify": "curl -sf http://192.168.68.17:8080",
"expect": "200 OK"
}
]
@@ -446,7 +442,7 @@ IMPORTANT: If the contract file does not exist in prose-contracts/main, report f
## litellm-health
**Category:** monitoring | **Domain:** litellm | **Owner:** abiba | **Schedule:** see contract-registry.yaml (authoritative)
**Category:** monitoring | **Domain:** litellm | **Owner:** abiba | **Schedule:** */10 * * * *
```
Contract Enforcement: litellm-health
@@ -454,7 +450,7 @@ Contract Enforcement: litellm-health
Category: monitoring
Domain: litellm
Owner: abiba
Schedule: see contract-registry.yaml (authoritative)
Schedule: Every 10 minutes — LiteLLM proxy health
This is a monitoring contract. Execute the monitoring checks defined in the contract. Report any deviations from expected state.
-203
View File
@@ -1,203 +0,0 @@
---
kind: function
name: daily-health-digest
description: >
Produces the daily infrastructure dashboard for the whole estate — 5 Proxmox
nodes, every VM/CT, Zulip, LiteLLM, Docker hosts, storage and NFS — and mails
it as an HTML report.
Dispatched by cron on CT 100 (abiba) at 10:30 UTC as a firstmate message to
the ops lane, which executes the producer below. Until 2026-09-25 this ran
with NO contract file at all, which is why the choice of execution copy was
silently the operator's rather than the contract's.
EXECUTION IS PINNED. The producer must be run from the clone named under
"Execution pinning" — not from an agent working copy.
Exit-code semantics (as they actually behave, verified 2026-09-25):
* missing PVE_TOKEN, or an unreachable Proxmox probe -> exit 1 + alert
* missing or rejected Zulip credential -> exit 1 (delivery is the only
output path, so it is a real failure, not a degraded leg)
* delivery failure -> exit 1, and the report body is printed AND persisted
so the content is never swallowed
version: 2.0.0
---
## Purpose
Give one daily, machine-collected picture of the estate so drift and outages
are seen the day they happen rather than when something breaks. It is a
*report*, not a repair: it changes nothing.
## Execution pinning
**Pinned execution path:**
```
/root/abiba-workspace/projects/prose-contracts/scripts/daily-infra-report.py
```
**Pinned clone:** `/root/abiba-workspace/projects/prose-contracts`
That is the cron's `FM_HOME` clone and the only stable, non-ephemeral copy.
The treehouse clone (`/root/.treehouse/agent-workspace-*/…/projects/prose-contracts`)
is a **per-agent working copy and must NOT be pinned or executed from** — it
drifts onto feature branches, which is exactly how a stale producer reported a
stale picture and nobody noticed.
See `docs/contract-execution-pinning.md`. Schedule and alerting live in
`/etc/cron.d/contract-runner` on CT 100:
```
30 10 * * * FM_HOME=/root/abiba-workspace /root/abiba-workspace/bin/fm-send.sh ops "run contract: daily-health-digest" > /dev/null 2>&1
```
Invocation (credentials come from the vault; never inline them):
```bash
cd /root/abiba-workspace/projects/prose-contracts
infisical run --env=prod -- python3 scripts/daily-infra-report.py
```
## Output shape
Modes:
| invocation | effect |
| --- | --- |
| *(none)* | collect, build the HTML dashboard, email it |
| `--test-email` | same but with a `🧪 TEST —` subject prefix |
| `--json` | print the collected data as JSON to stdout and **send no email** |
`--json` emits a single object with these top-level keys (observed on a live
run 2026-09-25):
| key | type | meaning |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `nodes` | object (5) | per-node cpu/ram/disk/uptime/status |
| `node_count`, `nodes_online` | int | Proxmox node totals |
| `pve_probe_status`, `resources_probe_status` | `ok`\|`unreachable` | probe outcome |
| `total_vms`, `running_vms`, `stopped_vms`, `vms_by_node` | — | guest inventory |
| `storage`, `nfs` | array | datastore and mount usage |
| `litellm` | object | inference checks |
| `zulip_ext` | object | Zulip queue/serving state |
| `agents` | object | per-agent health |
| `docker_vm`, `docker_syslog`, `docker_netbird`, `endpoints` | object/array | Docker hosts and probed endpoints |
## What a healthy run looks like
```
$ infisical run --env=prod -- python3 scripts/daily-infra-report.py --json
"nodes_online": 5, "node_count": 5, "pve_probe_status": "ok",
"resources_probe_status": "ok", "running_vms": 22, "total_vms": 22
EXIT=0
```
and in delivery mode:
```
report ready: 16208 chars of HTML (delivered as a file attachment)
Sending to the captain's Zulip DM...
✅ Delivered to Zulip DM (user 9), message id 86221, attachment 16208 bytes
at /user_uploads/2/45/m1cQesBFV78BGeNY2lN8xkN5/infra-report-20260926-153406.html
```
Healthy means: every probe reports `ok`, `nodes_online == node_count`, and the
email leg reports a successful send.
## Exit-code semantics — as they actually behave
Verified on 2026-09-25 by running each case deliberately.
| condition | exit | alert | notes |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| all probes reachable, email sent | 0 | — | healthy |
| **missing `PVE_TOKEN`** | **1** | yes | `PROBE FAILURES: proxmox: node list unreachable (PVE_TOKEN missing or API down)`, and `cluster resources unreachable` |
| **Proxmox probe unreachable** | **1** | yes | same path as above; `pve_probe_status: unreachable` |
| **missing/rejected Zulip credential** | **1** | yes | delivery is the only output path; report printed and persisted |
| **upload or message post fails** | **1** | yes | report printed and persisted; message names which step failed |
The distinction is deliberate and must not be flattened:
* A **missing PVE token or an unreachable probe is a real failure** — the report
would otherwise claim zero nodes and still look successful. That was the
2026-09-25 silent-zero defect (fixed in PR #133); it now exits 1.
* A **missing email credential is survivable** — the report is still produced
and is still useful. It is a `DEGRADED` leg and exits 0 by design.
`PROBE_FAILURES` and `DEGRADED_LEGS` are separate lists for exactly this
reason. Do not merge them.
## Delivery: Zulip DM carrying the report as an HTML ATTACHMENT
Captain's decision 2026-09-26, clarified the same day: the digest is delivered to
his **Zulip DM (user id 9)** from `abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net`, as an **HTML
FILE** — an attachment, not HTML rendered in the message body and not a Markdown
translation of it.
* the styled dashboard is built exactly as before and written to
`/var/log/daily-infra-report/infra-report-<UTCstamp>.html`;
* it is uploaded through `POST /api/v1/user_uploads`;
* the **message body stays short Markdown** — subject line, top-line status
(nodes online, guests running, any degraded legs), and a link to the
attachment. The attachment IS the report; the body does not reproduce it.
This removes the Google dependency entirely: **no SMTP, no `EMAIL_PASSWORD`, no
app password, nothing to rotate.** `daily-digest-mail-transport-20260921` is
closed under this option.
The **10,000-character message cap does not apply** — it bounds message TEXT
only, and the report travels as a file. Do not shrink the report to fit it.
The credential is abiba-bot's Zulip key already on the execution host at
`/root/.pi/agent/extensions/zulip/.env` (`ABIBA_ZULIP_API_KEY`, mode 600,
root-readable). **Do not place a new credential in the vault** — under the
auth-keys charter that is a captain decision.
## What counts as a failure
A run FAILS (exit 1) when the report cannot be trusted or delivered:
* any probe is unreachable, so a section would silently be empty;
* `PVE_TOKEN` is missing;
* the Zulip credential is missing or rejected, or the upload/post fails.
There is **no degraded delivery leg any more**. Delivery is the only output
path, so a missing credential is a failure rather than a survivable degradation —
the previous "missing `EMAIL_PASSWORD` still exits 0" rule is retired with the
mail transport.
**A delivery failure must never swallow the report.** On failure the script
prints the report body to stdout *and* leaves the HTML artifact on disk, so the
content is always recoverable from the run log. That closes the queued defect
where a failed send printed only the transport error and the report never
surfaced.
## Failure behaviour
* Non-zero exit with the alert text above; on the scheduled path the dispatch is
a firstmate message, so the ops lane sees it and reports it.
* On a probe failure the report must **not** be treated as evidence about the
estate — a `0/0` Proxmox section means "could not look", not "nothing there".
That reading is why the 2026-09-25 defect went unnoticed.
## Verification
```bash
# data path, no email
cd /root/abiba-workspace/projects/prose-contracts
infisical run --env=prod -- python3 scripts/daily-infra-report.py --json \
| grep -E 'pve_probe_status|node_count|nodes_online'
# delivery path
infisical run --env=prod -- python3 scripts/daily-infra-report.py --test-zulip
```
Regression tests: `tests/test_daily_infra_report.py` (7 tests). Four of them
fail against the pre-fix script, which is what makes them bite.
## Maintains
- daily-infra-dashboard: { status: "ok|undelivered", transport: zulip-dm-attachment, last_check: timestamp }
- pve-probe: { status: "ok|unreachable", last_check: timestamp }
+49 -192
View File
@@ -1,14 +1,11 @@
---
report_only_agents:
- koby # ⛔ KOBY IS NEVER REPAIRED (Rule 17, 2026-08-17) — detect + report, never fix on .129
# ⛔ The guest/host-keyed report-only gate the GC executor MUST honour lives in the body
# "Hard gate" YAML block below — that block is authoritative and is the only copy.
kind: responsibility
name: disk-gc-threat-response
description: >
Recurring disk health scan, garbage collection, and threat response
across 20 Proxmox guests (17 LXC + 3 QEMU VMs) + 3 GPU bare-metal hosts
(fleet verified against `pvesh get /cluster/resources` 2026-09-12). Triggered by incident
across 15 Proxmox CTs + 3 GPU bare-metal hosts. Triggered by incident
2026-07-04 where CT 105 (kagentz) hit 87% disk (49G/59G) from
Docker image bloat — 5 dangling images, 15 build cache layers.
Recovered 35.67GB. Second incident 2026-07-09: amdpve (.15) Docker
@@ -28,7 +25,7 @@ logged within 5 minutes of discovery.
## Scope
All 20 Proxmox guests (17 LXC via `pct-run` + 3 QEMU VMs via direct SSH) + 3 GPU bare-metal hosts via direct SSH.
All 15 CTs via `pct-run` + 3 GPU bare-metal hosts via direct SSH.
Docker hosts get special attention:
| Host | CT | Disk Risk | GC Strategy |
@@ -43,7 +40,7 @@ Docker hosts get special attention:
> **Note:** CT 118 is now jdownloader (active on storepve). CT 101 (llm-gpu) → bare metal .8, CT 103 (ocu-llm) → bare metal .110.
## Threat Levels (GUEST filesystems)
## Threat Levels
| Level | Threshold | Response | Escalation |
|-------|-----------|----------|------------|
@@ -53,39 +50,6 @@ Docker hosts get special attention:
| **CRITICAL** | ≥ 95% | Aggressive GC + emergency cleanup | Zulip + relay to Kwame |
| **FULL** | 100% (df shows 100%) | Stop writes, manual intervention | Call/Telegram Kwame |
## Host Filesystem Thresholds (HOST nodes — separate bands from guest bands)
Host filesystems have their own risk profile and their own bands. A host root near full is a real risk (backup staging writes to it, thin-pool metadata pressure), a media volume near full is a capacity decision for the owner, and the backup datastore near full breaks backups. These are **report-only** — no automatic deletion of media or datastore content ever.
| Level | Threshold | Response | Escalation |
|-------|-----------|----------|------------|
| **HOST-WARN** | 85% | Name the volume + % + absolute free space in the scan output | None |
| **HOST-AMBER** | 90% | Name the volume + % + absolute free space; flag for owner attention | Zulip DM to owner (state-change only) |
| **HOST-RED** | 95% | Name the volume + % + absolute free space; **media volumes: "capacity decision — owner to decide"; pbs-datastore/host-root: "immediate owner attention"** | Zulip DM + channel alert (state-change only) |
**Escalations are STATE-CHANGE driven, not per-run.** A volume alerts ONCE when it enters a higher band (GREEN->WARN, WARN->AMBER, AMBER->RED) and ONCE when it drops back down (a recovery notice). While a volume stays in the same band, it is reported in the scan output only — no DM, no channel alert. This prevents the same 96% easystore2 from re-DMing the owner on every 6-hour scan and drowning a real warning in noise.
**State lives in a small JSON state file:** the scanner resolves it to an absolute path from the script's location — `$(dirname "$0")/state/host-disk-bands.json` (i.e., the `state/` directory next to the `scripts/` directory in the prose-contracts repo). The state file is gitignored runtime state — the scanner creates it on first run. Keyed by `host/volume` → last-seen band. The scanner reads the prior band, compares to the current band, and DMs only on a transition. The state file is written after every scan. (Chosen over a periodic digest because the scan already runs every 6h and a transition is genuinely new, actionable state that warrants an immediate DM — but only once.)
**Volume naming rule:** Every host line MUST name the volume and what lives on it. Example output:
```
storepve /media/easystore2 (media): 96% (3.5T/3.7T, 177G free) -> HOST-RED
storepve /media/reanim (media): 86% (797G/932G, 135G free) -> HOST-WARN
storepve /media/mediastore (media): 77% (5.3T/7.3T, 1.6T free) -> GREEN
storepve /dev/mapper/pve-root (host-root): 81% (73G/94G, 17G free) -> GREEN
storepve tank (pbs-datastore): 1% (128K/12T, 12T free) -> GREEN
```
**First-run behavior:** When the state file does not yet exist (first scan), the current band of every volume is recorded as the baseline WITHOUT alerting — a first run would otherwise DM every already-elevated volume at once. From the second run onward, transitions alert.
**Action classes by volume type:**
- **host-root**: near full = real risk (backup staging, thin-pool metadata, journald). HOST-AMBER or above → owner must investigate.
- **media** (/media/*): near full = capacity decision for the owner. HOST-AMBER or above → report only, never auto-delete.
- **pbs-datastore** (tank, ZFS): near full = breaks Proxmox Backup Server. HOST-RED → escalate immediately.
**Justification (measured 2026-09-15, firstmate):** storepve (192.168.68.6) shows /media/easystore2 at 96%, /media/reanim at 86%, /dev/mapper/pve-root at 81%, and tank at 1%. The previous scan reported "0/19 guests >80%, no GC action needed" while easystore2 sat at 96% — the host filesystems were printed but never banded and never acted on. Two incidents this weekend (amdpve host root filled during container backup staging, acerpve root went read-only when its thin pool errored) showed the host filesystem is the thing that breaks, not the guest's.
## Requires
- SSH access to all Docker hosts (matrix from infrastructure-control pattern)
@@ -117,32 +81,6 @@ and escalation trail.
- May also be invoked manually: `prose run disk-gc-threat-response`
- Threat-driven: if Amber/Red/Critical detected, immediate GC phase activates
## Scanner: scripts/disk-gc-scan.py
The fleet scan is executed by `scripts/disk-gc-scan.py`, which makes reachability
verdicts deterministic:
1. **Retry on failure:** Each probe retries once before declaring a guest unreachable.
2. **Named probe target:** Every rendered line names the guest, CT id, node, and
access method actually used.
3. **Failure kind printed:** An unreachable guest is reported with its failure kind
(timeout, ssh-auth, no-route, conn-refused, ssh-exit-N) — never as a bare
"unreachable" verdict.
4. **Per-guest access method:** The correct access path is selected from a per-guest
map so the wrong path cannot be picked by an executor improvising:
- CT 105 (kagentz) = `ssh root@kagentz` (NOT `pct exec 105` — pct exec sees
loop0/59G instead of the real 99G filesystem)
- CT 109 (docker-vm) = `ssh root@192.168.68.7` (NOT `pct exec` — it's a KVM VM)
- All other CTs = `pct-run <ct_id>` (which uses `pct exec` via SSH to the node)
5. **Every figure traces to a named probe:** The scan output prints the exact command
that produced each disk figure, so two different guests can never render
identical numbers without the probe commands proving it.
Run: `python3 scripts/disk-gc-scan.py` (or `--json` for machine-readable output).
The scan feeds into `scripts/disk-gc-plan.py`, which applies the report-only gate
from the `report_only_guests` YAML block above.
## Shape
- `self`: scan all CTs via Proxmox API + SSH exec, trigger GC, alert
@@ -160,96 +98,38 @@ from the `report_only_guests` YAML block above.
- `retry`: 2 attempts for SSH failures before marking a CT unreachable
## Execution
**Execution model**: This contract is executed by a host-scheduled cron job (see
`scripts/contract-run.sh`). The cron job runs the monitoring script directly on the
target host and appends the result to `/var/log/contract-runs/<contract>.log`. An
agent-session acknowledgement (a `done:` line in the ops status log) is NOT
execution — it only proves the agent read the result and reported it. The actual
monitoring work happens in the host cron job.
### Host filesystems: report-only, NEVER auto-delete
Host filesystems are always report-only — no automatic deletion of media or datastore content. A host root near full requires investigation by the owner, but the executor must never delete content on a host filesystem. This restriction is absolute.
### Hard gate: report-only guests (READ THIS BEFORE RUNNING GC)
**CT 111 / hostname `tdunna` / 192.168.68.129 is DETECT-AND-REPORT-ONLY.** It belongs to Theo.
The captain ruled 2026-08-17 and re-confirmed 2026-09-10 that Theo handles CT 111 himself.
At **every** threat level — AMBER, RED, or CRITICAL — the executor must:
- push the threat row and alert the owner, and
- **never** call `gc-executor`, and **never** run any GC command against that guest: no
`apt-get clean/autoremove`, no `journalctl --vacuum-*`, no `find /var/log -delete`, no
`/tmp`/`/var/tmp` deletion, no snap removal, no `docker system prune`.
This gate is keyed on **guest id / hostname / IP**, not on an agent name. The frontmatter
`report_only_agents` marker (e.g. `koby`) names an AGENT while the scan unit is a GUEST, so an
agent-name marker can silently miss the guest it lives on — it must never be the only gate.
**The authoritative machine-readable exclusion list is the YAML block below.** The executor
reads it at run time; `scripts/disk-gc-plan.py` turns a fleet scan into the action plan using it.
Extend the list here, never by hand-maintaining a second copy. The Execution loop below MUST
call that planner and MUST NOT reimplement the gate.
```yaml
# disk-gc report-only guests — authoritative. Keyed on guest/host, not agent.
report_only_guests:
- guest: 111
hostname: tdunna
ip: 192.168.68.129
node: storepve
reason: "Theo's box — captain ruling 2026-08-17, re-confirmed 2026-09-10"
```
### Loop
```prose
let fleet = call disk-scanner
scope: all
-- The report-only gate is IMPLEMENTED IN scripts/disk-gc-plan.py and MUST NOT be
-- reimplemented here. That planner reads the contract's `report_only_guests` YAML block
-- and matches on guest id OR hostname OR IP, so the tested gate is the executed gate.
let plan = call disk-gc-plan
fleet: fleet
let threats = []
for ct in fleet:
if ct.usage_pct >= 95:
push threats { ct: ct.id, level: "CRITICAL", pct: ct.usage_pct }
else if ct.usage_pct >= 85:
push threats { ct: ct.id, level: "RED", pct: ct.usage_pct }
else if ct.usage_pct >= 75:
push threats { ct: ct.id, level: "AMBER", pct: ct.usage_pct }
for row in plan:
if row.action == "report-only":
-- Excluded guest: alert only. No gc-executor call is constructed for it, at any level.
call alerter
threat: row
result: { action: "report-only", reason: row.reason }
else:
let result = call gc-executor
ct: row.target
level: row.level
strategy: lookup-gc-strategy(row.target)
-- sort by severity descending
sort threats by pct desc
call alerter
threat: row
result: result
for threat in threats:
let result = call gc-executor
ct: threat.ct
level: threat.level
strategy: lookup-gc-strategy(threat.ct)
call alerter
threat: threat
result: result
call summary-reporter
fleet: fleet
plan: plan
threats: threats
```
## GC SCHEDULE (PBS datastore only)
The PBS GC schedule is defined in ONE authoritative place: `/etc/cron.d/pbs-gc` on storepve.
The schedule is `0 20 * * *` (20:00 LOCAL = 00:00 UTC, since host timezone is America/New_York).
This applies **only** to the PBS datastore (`/tank/pbs-backup`), NOT to media volumes.
Media volumes (/media/*) are report-only at all threat levels.
The cron runs `/usr/local/bin/pbs-gc.sh` which executes:
```bash
proxmox-backup-manager garbage-collection start storepve-datastore
```
This is NOT a `prune` operation; it is a GC pass that reclaims unreferenced chunks.
There is no `--keep-daily` flag; retention is governed by jobs.cfg (keep-daily=35).
The GC does not touch media volumes or any other filesystem.
## GC Strategies by Host Type
### Docker Hosts (kagentz 105, syslog-api 116, docker-vm 109, amdpve .15)
@@ -302,12 +182,6 @@ done
## Alert Templates
### HOST-WARN / HOST-AMBER / HOST-RED (host filesystems, report-only)
```
⚠️ Host Disk — {hostname} {volume} ({volume_type}): {pct}% ({used}/{total}, {free} free) -> {level}
Action: {volume_type-specific action}
```
### AMBER (75-84%)
```
⚠️ Disk GC — {hostname} (CT {id}) at {pct}% ({used}G/{total}G)
@@ -365,9 +239,7 @@ dangling images and orphaned build cache. No automated GC was in place.
## Incident Log: 2026-07-09 — amdpve docker bloat
### Discovery
Scheduled fleet disk scan across all 20 Proxmox guests (17 LXC via `pct-run`, 3 QEMU VMs via direct SSH) + 3 GPU bare-metal hosts.
> **Report-only gate applies to this scan:** CT 111 (`tdunna`, 192.168.68.129) is alerted but never
> garbage-collected at any level.
Scheduled fleet disk scan via `pct-run` across all 15 CTs + 3 GPU bare-metal hosts.
amdpve (.15) flagged at 78% (AMBER threshold: 75%).
### Diagnosis
@@ -400,35 +272,26 @@ one-off GPU builds. No automated post-migration cleanup was in place.
- Contract now scans GPU bare-metal hosts alongside CTs
- Access via `pct-run` script for all CTs (no hardcoded IPs)
## Access Matrix (verified against `pvesh get /cluster/resources` 2026-09-12)
## Access Matrix (documented 2026-07-09)
### Guest Access (via `pct-run` — CT id only, node resolved by `scripts/pct-run.sh`)
| Guest | Name | Node | Type | Status |
|------|------|------|------|--------|
| 100 | abiba | minipve | lxc | ✅ reachable (probed via pct-run like any other guest; no local shortcut) |
| 102 | adguard | minipve | lxc | ✅ reachable |
| 104 | authentik | minipve | lxc | ✅ reachable |
| 105 | kagentz | **amdpve** | lxc | ✅ reachable (was documented as minipve — corrected) |
| 106 | ra-h-os | storepve | lxc | ✅ reachable |
| 107 | pbs | storepve | lxc | ✅ reachable |
| 108 | media | storepve | lxc | ✅ reachable |
| 110 | gitea | minipve | lxc | ✅ reachable |
| 111 | tdunna | **storepve** | lxc | ⛔ **REPORT-ONLY** (192.168.68.129, Theo's box — no GC at any level) |
| 112 | tanko | minipve | lxc | ✅ reachable |
| 113 | baggy | amdpve | lxc | ✅ reachable |
| 115 | scottdenya | amdpve | lxc | ✅ reachable |
| 116 | syslog-api | minipve | lxc | ✅ reachable |
| 117 | zulip | storepve | lxc | ✅ reachable |
| 118 | jdownloader | storepve | lxc | ✅ reachable |
| 119 | infisical-vault | minipve | lxc | ✅ reachable |
| 120 | adguard2 | amdpve | lxc | ✅ reachable |
### QEMU VMs (via direct SSH)
| VM | Name | Node | IP | Status |
|----|------|------|-----|--------|
| 101 | llm-gpu (workload now bare metal .8) | acerpve | — | ✅ reachable |
| 103 | ocu-llm (workload now bare metal .110) | ocupve | — | ✅ reachable |
| 109 | docker-vm | storepve | 192.168.68.7 | ✅ reachable |
### CT Access (via pct-run)
| CT | Name | Node | Status |
|----|------|------|--------|
| 100 | abiba | hwepve | local |
| 102 | adguard | minipve | ✅ reachable |
| 104 | authentik | minipve | ✅ reachable |
| 105 | kagentz | hwepve | ✅ reachable |
| 106 | ra-h-os | storepve | ✅ reachable |
| 107 | pbs | storepve | ✅ reachable |
| 108 | media | storepve | ✅ reachable |
| 110 | gitea | minipve | ✅ reachable |
| 111 | tdunna | amdpve | ✅ reachable |
| 112 | tanko | amdpve | ✅ reachable |
| 113 | baggy | amdpve | ✅ reachable |
| 114 | mumuni | hwepve | ✅ reachable |
| 115 | scottdenya | amdpve | ✅ reachable |
| 116 | syslog-api | minipve | ✅ reachable |
| 117 | zulip | storepve | ✅ reachable |
### GPU Bare Metal (via direct SSH)
| Host | IP | GPU | Status |
@@ -437,15 +300,9 @@ one-off GPU builds. No automated post-migration cleanup was in place.
| ocu-llm | 192.168.68.110 | RTX 5070 | ✅ reachable |
| amdpve | 192.168.68.15 | Strix Halo | ✅ reachable |
> **Fleet count:** 20 Proxmox guests (17 LXC + 3 QEMU VMs) + 3 GPU bare-metal hosts. Corrected
> 2026-09-12: CT 105 → amdpve, CT 111 → storepve, and guests 118/119/120 were missing.
>
> **CT 100 probe gap (folded in):** CT 100 previously reported "unreachable (not reported)" every
> run. Root cause is the same stale access layer: `pct-run` resolves the guest's node from its map,
> and the map/contract must reflect `pvesh /cluster/resources`. Verified working from inside CT 100:
> `scripts/pct-run.sh 100 "df -P / | tail -1"` → `23% /`. Probe CT 100 through `pct-run` like any
> other guest — never through a local-only path, since the scanner itself runs inside CT 100 and a
> container has no `pct` binary.
>
> **KVM VM:** CT 109 (docker-vm) is a QEMU VM, not LXC — access via SSH .7.
> **NOTE:** For kagentz (CT 105), use `ssh root@kagentz` (hostname), NOT `pct exec 105` — `pct exec 105` shows loop0 (59G) while `ssh root@kagentz` shows the real filesystem (99G). For docker-vm (CT 109), use `ssh root@192.168.68.7`, not `pct exec`.
### KVM VM (via direct SSH)
| Host | IP | Role | Status |
|------|-----|------|--------|
| docker-vm | 192.168.68.7 | 16 Docker containers, 4 stacks | ✅ reachable |
> **Note:** CT 118 is now jdownloader (active on storepve). CT 119 (infisical-vault) added on minipve.\n> **Migrated:** CT 101 → .8, CT 103 → .110 (bare metal GPU).\n> **KVM VM:** CT 109 (docker-vm) is a KVM VM, not LXC — access via SSH .7.
+2 -36
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ the description:
1. **What system does this contract touch?** Name the hosts, CTs, containers,
and services explicitly. "The inference fleet" is vague. "GPU .8 (RTX 3090,
qwen), .110 (RTX 5070, gpu-vision), .15 (Strix Halo, strix-moe), and LiteLLM on CT
qwen), .110 (RTX 5070, gemma), .15 (Strix Halo, strix-moe), and LiteLLM on CT
116" is specific.
2. **Who runs this contract, and when?** State the agent, the trigger (cron,
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ what, and why should I care?
```
❌ "Monitors infrastructure health"
✅ "Scans all 5 Proxmox nodes and 19 CTs for disk pressure, checks Docker
✅ "Scans all 6 Proxmox nodes and 19 CTs for disk pressure, checks Docker
container health on .7/.116/.17, alerts via Telegram DM on RED/CRITICAL"
```
@@ -211,40 +211,6 @@ Errors tell the operator what went wrong and what to do about it. Be specific:
Check router /health/unified at http://192.168.68.116/health/unified instead."
```
### Report provenance
Every report a contract produces must lead with the **absolute path the probe
executed from** — `pwd -P`, or the running script's absolute path. A live-state
report without provenance is unactionable: a report from a stale copy (a worktree
clone, a retired cron entry, a diverged consumer) looks identical to a live
fault, and the team burns rounds repairing healthy infrastructure. This is not
optional. The 2026-09-09 probe-drift rounds cost three false `DEGRADED` reports
because a stale consumer probed the wrong port and nothing in the report said
where it ran.
Pair it with the **scoped any-HTTP-response liveness rule**: for unauthenticated
or auth-gated endpoints — where any HTTP answer proves a listener is up (the
PVE API's `401`, LiteLLM health's `301` redirect) — a probe is ALIVE on ANY HTTP
status, including `301` redirects and `401`/`403` auth challenges. **DOWN =
connection refused (`000`) or timeout only.**
Probes whose success condition is specifically a bare `200` are NOT covered by
the any-HTTP rule. On those — authenticated probes such as the Zulip message
POST and the router `/health` — an unexpected status (`401`/`403` from a bad or
missing credential, `5xx`, or anything other than the expected `200`) is an
**ALERT**, not "alive".
```markdown
**Report format**: Begin every report with the absolute execution path
(`pwd -P` / script path). On auth-gated endpoints, alive = ANY HTTP status and
DOWN = `000`/timeout only; on probes whose expected result is `200`, any other
status is an alert.
```
The lint pipeline enforces the provenance clause: any contract with a
`**Report format**` line must state an absolute path (`pwd -P`, `absolute path`,
or `executed from`).
### Comments
Comments in contracts explain WHY, not WHAT. The execution steps say what to
-169
View File
@@ -1,169 +0,0 @@
# Contract execution pinning
Which copy of a contract script actually ran, and how that is proven.
## Why this exists
Three times on 2026-09-25 a contract reported a verdict from a copy that was
not the merged one:
1. The ops lane's own clone sat on the merged feature branch
`fix/search-stack-multi-engine-20260925` at `8b2eba4` with no `pve_auth`
fix, while it executed the daily digest from a different clone. Nothing in
the workflow noticed.
2. `scripts/search-stack-check.py` was deployed into the pinned runner clone
by hand rather than through git.
3. A stale local `origin/master` ref made an ancestry check report
"unlanded work" for a branch that had in fact merged — the same staleness
would have passed a stale script as current.
A contract verdict is only meaningful if it came from the merged copy. The
control is `scripts/revision-preflight.sh`.
## The rule
**Every contract pins exactly one clone for execution: the clone that
`scripts/contract-run.sh` itself lives in.**
`contract-run.sh` derives that from its own location (`SCRIPTS_DIR`) and checks
the script it is about to run against `origin/master` in the same clone. There
is no second path to configure, and no contract may be executed from a
hand-copied location.
| Contract | Script | Pinned clone |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `infrastructure-monitoring` | `scripts/infra-monitoring.sh` | the clone containing `contract-run.sh` |
| `proxmox-monitor` | `scripts/proxmox-monitor.sh` | same |
| `zulip-health` | `scripts/zulip-monitor.sh` | same |
| `agent-health-check` | `scripts/agent-health-check.py` | same |
| `litellm-health` | `scripts/litellm-health-check.py` | same |
| `disk-gc-threat-response` | `scripts/disk-gc-scan.py` | same |
| `pm2-self-heal` | `scripts/pm2-self-heal.sh` | same |
| `search-stack-visibility` | `scripts/search-stack-check.py` | same |
### The deployed runner
The scheduler on **CT 100 (abiba)** runs contracts from
**`/opt/contract-runner`** via `/etc/cron.d/contract-runner`. That clone is the
pinned execution copy for every scheduled contract, and it must be kept current
with `master` by fast-forward. Its `origin` is a local path to the upstream
working copy, not a network remote.
`daily-health-digest` is **not** in the table above because it has no contract
file and no mapping — it is dispatched by cron as
`fm-send.sh ops "run contract: daily-health-digest"` and was, until
2026-09-25, executed by hand from whichever clone the operator happened to be
in. Creating its contract file and pinning it to a clone is an open follow-up.
## How the check works
`scripts/revision-preflight.sh <script-path> <clone-path>`:
* resolves the **repo-relative** path of the executing script inside the clone;
* **fetches** the remote first, so a stale local ref cannot make a stale script
look current — bounded by `--fetch-timeout` (default 20s) so a hung remote
cannot block a scheduled contract;
* compares the script's sha256 against `<ref>:<repo-relative-path>`;
* **fails closed** — a path absent from the ref, an unresolvable ref, or a
failed fetch is a failure, never a warning.
### Exit codes and reason classes
The guard distinguishes **"I could not check"** from **"this copy is wrong"**,
and every non-zero exit prints a machine-readable `REASON=<class>` line before
the human text, because a warning nobody can classify is not actionable — and
the flip to `enforce` (below) depends on being able to read these apart.
| exit | `REASON=` | meaning |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 0 | — | verified match |
| 2 | `cannot-verify:fetch-failed` | remote unreachable, failed, or timed out |
| 2 | `cannot-verify:ref-unresolvable` | `<ref>` does not exist in the clone |
| 1 | `mismatch:path-absent` | the script does not exist in `<ref>` |
| 1 | `mismatch:content` | the script differs from `<ref>` |
| 1 | `mismatch:detached-head` | the clone is on a detached HEAD |
| 1 | `mismatch:clone-ahead` | local HEAD is strictly ahead of `<ref>` (mid-review) |
`detached-head` and `clone-ahead` are named separately on purpose: they are
*legitimate* states that merely fail to be "the merged copy", and they are far
less alarming than a hand-edited file. `clone-ahead` requires HEAD to be
**strictly** ahead — an uncommitted edit on a commit that *is* the ref is a
plain `content` mismatch.
## Modes in `contract-run.sh`
| `CONTRACT_REVISION_PREFLIGHT` | Behaviour |
| --- | --- |
| unset / **`warn` (default)** | log the refusal and its class, then still report |
| `enforce` | withhold the verdict, alert, exit `2` |
| `off` | skip the check entirely |
**The default is `warn`, deliberately.** The guard gates *every* scheduled
contract, and three legitimate situations would otherwise turn the whole
fleet's monitoring into withheld verdicts: a clone legitimately ahead of
`origin/master` mid-review, a detached HEAD, and an offline or failed fetch.
That is a bigger risk than the staleness the guard exists to catch. `warn`
keeps the signal loud and classified in every run's log without letting the
monitoring go dark.
### Criteria for flipping the default to `enforce`
Do not flip it on preference. Flip it when the evidence says the false-refusal
rate is low enough, as its own small change with its own review:
1. the guard has run across **every scheduled contract** for a sustained period
(suggested: 30 consecutive days, or 200+ contract runs) with **zero**
`mismatch:*` and **zero** `cannot-verify:*` refusals in the per-run logs;
2. no `cannot-verify:fetch-failed` arising from ordinary network blips in that
window — if the pinned clone's remote is not reliably reachable, `enforce`
will withhold rather than report;
3. the pinned runner clone is demonstrably kept current by fast-forward, so
`mismatch:clone-ahead` is a genuine fault rather than routine procedure.
The evidence for the flip is the `REASON=` lines already written into
`/var/log/contract-runs/`. Until then the default stays `warn`.
## Merge-time sequence (do this whenever this repo merges)
**Baseline as of 2026-09-25:** `/opt/contract-runner` is already
fast-forwarded to master `9faffe4`, so the pinned runner clone is current
today. This sequence exists to keep it that way.
After any merge to `master`:
```bash
# 1. fast-forward the pinned runner clone on CT 100
git -C /opt/contract-runner pull --ff-only
# 2. confirm it is current and clean
git -C /opt/contract-runner log --oneline -1
git -C /opt/contract-runner status --porcelain # expect no output
# 3. prove a contract runs and reports normally
CONTRACT_RUN_LOG_DIR=/tmp/preflight-proof \
bash /opt/contract-runner/scripts/contract-run.sh search-stack-visibility
echo "EXIT=$?" # expect 0, and 'revision-preflight: … matches origin/master'
```
A contract that reports a `REASON=mismatch:*` refusal here means the runner
clone is stale or locally edited — fast-forward it rather than reaching for
`CONTRACT_REVISION_PREFLIGHT=off`.
**Note on untracked files:** git refuses to fast-forward over an untracked file
even when its content is byte-identical to the incoming version
(`The following untracked working tree files would be overwritten by merge`).
A dirty clone will therefore block step 1. Resolve it by removing or stashing
the untracked paths first — that is exactly what blocked a clone on 2026-09-25.
## Operating notes
* Under the default `warn`, a stale pinned clone still produces verdicts but
every run logs the refusal and its class. Read those lines; do not ignore
them.
* Under `enforce`, a stale pinned clone **withholds**. That is the intended
failure. Recover by fast-forwarding:
`git -C /opt/contract-runner pull --ff-only`.
* When a contract legitimately changes, land it through the normal branch + PR
path and fast-forward the pinned clone. Do not copy files into it by hand.
* `--no-fetch` exists for offline inspection; it prints that freshness is
assumed rather than verified, and it is not used by `contract-run.sh`.
-282
View File
@@ -1,282 +0,0 @@
# Probe-drift round 2 — per-leg before/after evidence
**Date:** 2026-09-10
**Worktree (absolute execution path):** `/root/.treehouse/prose-contracts-9ce5f3/3/prose-contracts`
**Branch:** `fm/probe-drift-round2-20260909`
Every command below was run from the absolute path above; output is pasted
verbatim. This is the evidence trail for the four scoped corrections; it is not
a contract (never `prose run` it).
---
## Leg 1 — agent-health-check (item 1)
**Before** — from `/root/.treehouse/prose-contracts-9ce5f3/3/prose-contracts`,
`python3 scripts/agent-health-check.py --no-deploy` (v2, base of this branch):
```
🏥 Agent Health Check v2 — 2026-09-10 01:16 UTC
🔑 LiteLLM Keys:
✅ tanko: key valid → syslog-auto
✅ abiba: key valid → syslog-auto
✅ koby: key valid → syslog-auto
✅ koonimo: key valid → syslog-auto
🎮 GPU Port Health:
✅ gpu-rtx3090 (.8): healthy (pid=472206)
✅ gpu-rtx5070 (.110): healthy (pid=207601)
✅ gpu-strixhalo (.15): healthy (pid=4098872)
🤖 Agent Gateways:
✅ tanko: DSH (DeepSeek Harness) — no Hermes gateway since 2026-08-27 (CT 112, SSH OK)
⚠️ abiba: gw=no-state-file zulip=? streaming=no errors_10m=0 pid=?
✅ koby: gw=running zulip=connected streaming=no errors_10m=0 pid=360900
✅ koonimo: gw=running zulip=connected streaming=no errors_10m=0 pid=155125
🖥️ CT Liveness:
✅ tanko (CT 112 on amdpve): running
✅ abiba (CT 100 on minipve): running
❌ koby (CT 111 on amdpve): PVE UNREACHABLE
✅ koonimo (CT 113 on amdpve): running
📝 Config Integrity:
⏭️ tanko: DSH — no Hermes config.yaml since 2026-08-27
✅ abiba: config.yaml valid YAML
✅ koby: config.yaml valid YAML
✅ koonimo: config.yaml valid YAML
🔌 Wrapper/CLI Integrity:
⏭️ tanko: DSH — no hermes CLI wrapper since 2026-08-27
⚠️ abiba: wrapper infisical path may be wrong (infisical at /usr/bin/infisical)
❌ abiba: hermes-real NOT FOUND (wrapper broken)
⚠️ abiba: .env may be missing LITELLM_API_KEY entry
⚠️ koby: wrapper infisical path may be wrong (infisical at /usr/bin/infisical)
❌ koby: hermes-real NOT FOUND (wrapper broken)
✅ koby: wrapper + .env key present
⚠️ koonimo: wrapper infisical path may be wrong (infisical at /usr/bin/infisical)
✅ koonimo: wrapper + .env key present
🔐 Vault Secrets:
✅ tanko: vault TANKO_LITELLM_API_KEY=sk-...x6uw
✅ koby: vault KOBY_LITELLM_API_KEY=sk-...jxlg
✅ koonimo: vault KOONIMO_LITELLM_API_KEY=sk-...Y0KQ
❌ 6 FAILURE(S): ct-unreachable:koby:192.168.68.15 | wrapper-infisical-path:abiba | wrapper-no-hermes-real:abiba | wrapper-infisical-path:koby | wrapper-no-hermes-real:koby | wrapper-infisical-path:koonimo
```
Root causes (all stale expectations; no live fault):
| Failure | Why it was stale |
|---|---|
| `ct-unreachable:koby:192.168.68.15` | CT 111 (tdunna/koby) runs on **storepve (.6)**, not amdpve (.15). |
| `wrapper-*:abiba` | Abiba is pi-only since the harness purge. `/root/.local/bin/hermes` is a dangling symlink; no `hermes-real`, no `~/.hermes/.env`. |
| `wrapper-*:koby` | Koby is **report-only** (captain ruling 2026-08-17, Rule 17): detect and report, never repair — its legs must not count as fleet failures. Koby's wrapper is also the genuine no-infisical case: it sources `~/.hermes/.env` rather than `/usr/bin/infisical`, which the check now accepts. |
| `wrapper-infisical-path:koonimo` | Koonimo's wrapper **does** reference `/usr/bin/infisical` — but past the old check's `head -20` window, so the check looked for the path in the wrong slice and false-failed. The fix that mattered was reading the full wrapper body (and then verifying any absolute infisical path it finds actually exists). |
**After** — same absolute path, `python3 scripts/agent-health-check.py --no-deploy` (v4):
```
$ pwd -P
/root/.treehouse/prose-contracts-9ce5f3/3/prose-contracts
$ python3 scripts/agent-health-check.py --no-deploy
🏥 Agent Health Check v4 — 2026-09-10 01:22 UTC
📍 executed from: script=/root/.treehouse/prose-contracts-9ce5f3/3/prose-contracts/scripts/agent-health-check.py cwd=/root/.treehouse/prose-contracts-9ce5f3/3/prose-contracts
🔑 LiteLLM Keys:
✅ tanko: key valid → syslog-auto
✅ abiba: key valid → syslog-auto
✅ koby: key valid → syslog-auto
✅ koonimo: key valid → syslog-auto
🎮 GPU Port Health:
✅ gpu-rtx3090 (.8): healthy (pid=472206)
✅ gpu-rtx5070 (.110): healthy (pid=207601)
✅ gpu-strixhalo (.15): healthy (pid=4098872)
🤖 Agent Gateways:
✅ tanko: DSH (DeepSeek Harness) — no Hermes gateway since 2026-08-27 (CT 112, SSH OK)
✅ abiba: pi-only runtime — no Hermes gateway since the harness purge (CT 100, SSH OK)
🔍 koby: REPORT-ONLY mode (diagnostic only, no repairs on .129)
✅ koby: gateway running (pid=360900, report-only mode)
✅ koonimo: gw=running zulip=connected streaming=no errors_10m=0 pid=155125
🖥️ CT Liveness:
✅ tanko (CT 112 on amdpve): running
✅ abiba (CT 100 on minipve): running
✅ koby (CT 111 on storepve): running
✅ koonimo (CT 113 on amdpve): running
📝 Config Integrity:
⏭️ tanko: DSH — no Hermes config.yaml since 2026-08-27
⏭️ abiba: pi-only runtime — no Hermes config.yaml since the harness purge
✅ koby: config.yaml valid YAML
✅ koonimo: config.yaml valid YAML
🔌 Wrapper/CLI Integrity:
⏭️ tanko: DSH — no hermes CLI wrapper since 2026-08-27
⏭️ abiba: pi-only runtime — no hermes CLI wrapper since the harness purge
ℹ️ koby: wrapper resolves creds without infisical (e.g. ~/.hermes/.env) — OK
❌ koby: hermes-real NOT FOUND (wrapper broken)
🔍 report-only (koby): wrapper-no-hermes-real:koby — reported, not counted/repaired
✅ koby: wrapper + .env key present
✅ koonimo: wrapper infisical path OK
✅ koonimo: wrapper + .env key present
🔐 Vault Secrets:
✅ tanko: vault TANKO_LITELLM_API_KEY=sk-...x6uw
✅ koby: vault KOBY_LITELLM_API_KEY=sk-...jxlg
✅ koonimo: vault KOONIMO_LITELLM_API_KEY=sk-...Y0KQ
✅ All checks passed
exit=0
```
**Live vantage proof** (same worktree):
```
$ ssh root@192.168.68.15 "pct status 111"
Configuration file 'nodes/amdpve/lxc/111.conf' does not exist
$ ssh root@192.168.68.6 "pct status 111; pct list | grep '^ *111'"
status: running
111 running tdunna
$ ssh root@192.168.68.129 "hostname"
tdunna
```
---
## Leg 2 — infrastructure-monitoring PVE API (item 2)
**Before** — the contract's probe, aimed at the monitoring host CT 116:
```
$ curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' https://192.168.68.116:8006/api2/json
000
```
CT 116 runs no `pveproxy`, so it never answers on `:8006`. The probe target was
wrong, which is what read as PVE-API `000`.
**After** — probing the five real cluster nodes (`:8006/api2/json/version`),
alive under the any-HTTP-response rule (`401` = up, unauthenticated):
```
$ for node in 192.168.68.9 192.168.68.5 192.168.68.15 192.168.68.6 192.168.68.12; do
printf '%s:8006 -> %s\n' "$node" "$(curl -sk -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 5 "https://$node:8006/api2/json/version")"
done
192.168.68.9:8006 -> 401
192.168.68.5:8006 -> 401
192.168.68.15:8006 -> 401
192.168.68.6:8006 -> 401
192.168.68.12:8006 -> 401
```
`401` on every node = alive by design. `DOWN` is `000`/timeout only. (The
contract's LiteLLM probe was the same class: `/litellm/health` answers `301` →
`/litellm/health/liveliness`, so it is now specified as any-HTTP too.)
---
## Leg 3 — gpu-monitor GPU probes (item 3)
**Before** — the false alarm came from probing bare port 80 on GPU hosts:
```
$ curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://192.168.68.8/health
000
$ curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://192.168.68.110/health
000
```
Nothing listens on GPU port 80, so the monitor reported
`DEGRADED — GPU-rtx3090 000, GPU-rtx5070 000` three times on 2026-09-09.
**After** — the real endpoints answer:
```
$ curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://192.168.68.8:8080/health
200
$ curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://192.168.68.110:8080/health
200
$ curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://192.168.68.15:8080/health
200
$ curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://192.168.68.116/health/unified
301 # Location: http://192.168.68.116/gpu/gpu-data — the same payload
$ curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -L http://192.168.68.116/health/unified
200
```
`301` is healthy under the any-HTTP-response rule. The contract now requires GPU
health on `:8080` (or router `/health/unified`) and forbids bare port 80 on a
GPU host.
---
## Leg 4 — report provenance (item 4)
Every contract report must now lead with the absolute path it executed from.
`docs/AUTHORING-GUIDE.md` documents the rule and `scripts/prose-lint.sh`
enforces it:
```
$ pwd -P
/root/.treehouse/prose-contracts-9ce5f3/3/prose-contracts
$ bash scripts/prose-lint.sh
✅ Report provenance present in all report-format contracts
...
✅ LINT PASSED (12 warning(s))
```
The health script prints `📍 executed from: script=… cwd=…` and includes
`execution_path`/`cwd` in `--json` output.
---
## Full suite
```
$ pwd -P
/root/.treehouse/prose-contracts-9ce5f3/3/prose-contracts
$ python3 -m pytest -q
24 passed
$ shellcheck scripts/prose-lint.sh
(clean)
```
---
## Follow-up findings (observed, intentionally NOT changed here)
These are adjacent stale expectations discovered while verifying the four
scoped legs. Each touches a CRITICAL/HIGH-sensitivity artifact or an unrelated
script, so it is recorded for the captain/verify mate rather than silently
repaired.
1. **`infrastructure-control.prose.md` (CRITICAL) CT 111 node assignment.**
Lines ~109 and ~615 place `tdunna` (CT 111, koby) on **amdpve**. Live
verification on 2026-09-10 shows `pct status 111` = `running` on
**storepve (.6)** and `Configuration file 'nodes/amdpve/lxc/111.conf' does
not exist` on .15. `agent-health-check.py` now carries the live-verified
`storepve` mapping (the script is not the topology source of truth); the
CRITICAL contract itself needs an authorized correction.
**✅ Resolved 2026-09-12:** the topology was corrected in its owner,
`infrastructure-control.prose.md` (CT 111 → storepve, CT 105 → amdpve), and
`scripts/pct-run.sh` now matches. This snapshot is left as observed; treat
those owner documents as authoritative.
2. **Strix Halo `:8080` firewall claim is stale.** `prose-ai-review.sh`
ground-truth rule #4 and `gpu-monitor.prose.md` say `:8080` is firewalled to
`.116` only and `.24` cannot probe it. Live on .15:
`-A INPUT -s 192.168.68.24/32 -p tcp --dport 8080 -j ACCEPT`, and a probe
from .24 returns `200`. The contract keeps routing Strix via the router
(safe), but the claim no longer matches iptables.
3. **`contract-registry.yaml` references `agent-health-check.prose.md`**, which
does not exist in the repo. The registry entry (with `koby_action: skip_heal`)
is aspirational/stale.
4. **Pre-existing script defects, untouched:** `scripts/pm2-self-heal.sh` has a
bash syntax error at lines 19–20 (`bash -n` fails), and `shellcheck` fails on
five untouched scripts (`netbird-add-domain.sh`, `pct-run.sh`,
`pm2-self-heal.sh`, `prose-ai-review.sh`, `swap-gpu-dense-model.sh`).
`scripts/prose-lint.sh` — the one shell file touched here — is now
shellcheck-clean.
+126 -77
View File
@@ -6,26 +6,29 @@ description: >
registration, health checks, LiteLLM sync, agent key management, GPU
saturation watchdog, Prometheus/Grafana monitoring, and self-healing.
UPDATED 2026-07-15: Stable role-based aliases introduced: strix-moe,
gpu-dense, gpu-vision (gpu-light was superseded by gpu-vision on 2026-09-12).
These never change — only the underlying model does.
Strix Halo: strix-moe → Carnice-Qwen3.6-MoE-35B-A3B-Q4_K_M.gguf (22GB, 256K ctx).
RTX 5070: gpu-vision — IQ4_NL + MTP draft (~122 tok/s, 2x faster).
UPDATED 2026-07-17: NVIDIA host context reduced from 256K to 128K for stability.
Strix Halo model: Carnice-Qwen3.6-MoE-35B-A3B-Q4_K_M.gguf (alias strix-moe, 256K context).
Strix Halo runs 256K (n_ctx 262144, --kv-unified); RTX 3090 and RTX 5070 remain at 128K.
For >128K on NVIDIA hosts → fall back to external providers (deepseek).
gpu-dense, gpu-light. These never change — only the underlying model does.
Strix Halo: strix-moe → unsloth/Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-MTP (UD-Q4_K_M, 22GB).
RTX 5070: gemma-4-12b Q4_K_M → IQ4_NL + MTP draft (122 tok/s, 2x faster).
UPDATED 2026-07-17: Context reduced fleet-wide from 256K to 128K for stability.
Strix Halo model swapped to qwen3.6-35B-udq4 (22GB, strix-moe alias).
Instability observed near 100K at 256K (now all GPUs at 128K). 128K is the stable ceiling.
For larger context needs → fall back to external providers (deepseek).
VRAM headroom improved: RTX 3090 ~70%, RTX 5070 ~65%.
UPDATED 2026-07-27: gpu-dense swapped to Qwen3.8-27B-Uncensored-Q4_K_M
(UD-Q3_K_XL, ~14.7GB — Q4 was too large for 24GB VRAM with 128K KV cache). ~50% fewer thinking
tokens via ThinkingCap finetune + Fable 5 CoT distillation for improved coding reasoning.
VRAM ~22.4/24.6GB (91%).
agent: abiba
triggers:
- on model add/remove
- on GPU health degradation
- on agent key rotation
- on harness container restart (LiteLLM reloads its model list)
- on router restart (roster must be loaded)
---
## Maintains
- gpu_roster: { models: map, hosts: map } — GPU host/model roster; the authoritative alias/weight/fallback registry is CT 116 `litellm_config.yaml`
- gpu_roster: { models: map, hosts: map } — Single source of truth for all GPU models
- router: { status: "healthy", roster_loaded: bool, models: array }
- litellm: { status: "healthy", keys: array, models: array }
- agent_keys: { agent: api_key } — All agent API keys registered in LiteLLM DB
@@ -37,42 +40,46 @@ triggers:
- prometheus: { status: "running", targets: 5 } — Scrapes GPU :9400 exporters + LiteLLM
- port_conflict_detection: { status: "active" } — All 3 GPU wrappers detect ghost processes before binding
## Fleet Topology (Current — 2026-09-11, router decommissioned)
## Fleet Topology (Current — July 2026)
```
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ CT 116 (192.168.68.116) — Inference Harness Host │
│ │
│ nginx:80 (entrypoint) │
│ ├─ /v1/* → harness-litellm:4000 (API requests) │
│ ├─ /v1/* → harness-litellm:4000 (API requests) │
│ ├─ /admin/* → harness-litellm:4000 (admin endpoints) │
│ ├─ /dashboard/ → harness-dashboard:3000 (harness UI) │
│ ├─ /litellm/* → harness-litellm:4000 (LiteLLM UI + API) │
│ ├─ /litellm/* → harness-litellm:4000 (LiteLLM UI + API) │
│ ├─ /health/* → harness-litellm:4000 (health probes) │
│ └─ /gpu/* → 192.168.68.24:9100 (fleet monitor) │
│ │
│ Containers: │
│ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ │
│ │ LiteLLM │ │Dashboard │ │ Grafana │ │
│ │ :4000 │ │ :3000 │ │ :3001 │ │
│ │ keys+sync│ │ harness │ │Prometheus│ │
│ │ fallback │ │ UI │ │ data src │ │
│ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ │
│ │
│ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ │
│ │PostgreSQL│ │ Redis │ │Prometheus│ │
│ │ :5432 │ │ :6379 │ │ :9090 │ │
│ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ │
└───────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
┌─┴─────────────┬───────────────┬───────────────┐
│ │ │ │
┌─────▼──────┐ ┌─────▼──────┐ ┌─────▼──────┐ ┌─────▼──────┐
│ CT 8 │ │ CT 110 │ │ CT 15 │ │ pi (.24) │
│ RTX 3090 │ │ RTX 5070 │ │ Strix Halo │ │ GPU Monitor│
│ 24GB │ │ 12GB │ │ 64GB UMA │ │ :9100 │
│ :8080 │ │ :9400 exp │ │ :9400 exp │ │ :9401 │
└────────────┘ └────────────┘ └────────────┘ └────────────┘
│ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ │
│ │ LiteLLM │ │ Router │ │Dashboard │ │ Grafana │ │
│ │ :4000 │ │ :9000 │ │ :3000 │ │ :3000 │ │
│ │ keys+sync│ │deprecated│ │ harness │ │ Prometheus│ │
│ │ fallback │ │not in │ │ UI │ │ data src │ │
│ └──────────┘ └───┬──────┘ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ │
│ │ │
│ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ │
│ │PostgreSQL│ │ Redis │ │Prometheus│ │
│ │ :5432 │ │ :6379 │ │ :9090 │ │
│ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ │
└────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
┌───────────────┼───────────────┬──────────────────┐
│ │ │ │
┌────▼─────┐ ┌──────▼──────┐ ┌────▼──────┐ ┌───────▼──────┐
│ CT 8 │ │ CT 110 │ │ CT 15 │ │ pi (.24) │
│ RTX 3090 │ │ RTX 5070 │ │ Strix Halo│ │ GPU Monitor │
│ 24GB │ │ 12GB │ │ 64GB UMA │ │ :9100 │
│ 128K ctx │ │ 128K ctx │ │ 128K ctx │ │ Watchdog │
│ qwen3.6 │ │ Qwen3.5-9B │ │ qwen3.5 │ │ Prometheus │
│ 27B-code │ │ :8080 │ │ -35B-udq4 │ │ exporter │
│ :8080 │ │ :9400 (exp) │ │ :9400(exp)│ │ :9401 │
│ :9400 │ └─────────────┘ └───────────┘ └──────────────┘
└──────────┘
```
## Stable Role-Based Aliases (Introduced 2026-07-15)
@@ -80,27 +87,61 @@ triggers:
Agent configs, cron jobs, and workflows MUST use these aliases, never model-specific names.
When a model is swapped on a GPU, ONLY the infrastructure layer changes — agent configs are untouched.
| Alias | Serves | Where | Kind |
|-------|--------|-------|------|
| `gpu-dense` | heavy reasoning | RTX 3090 (192.168.68.8) | direct alias |
| `gpu-vision` | vision / web extract / light tasks | RTX 5070 (192.168.68.110) | direct alias AND `syslog-auto` pool member |
| `strix-moe` | compression (MoE) | Strix Halo (192.168.68.15) | direct alias |
| `syslog-auto` | balanced default | weighted pool across the three GPU hosts | pool router |
| Alias | GPU | Current Model | Will Route To |
|-------|-----|---------------|---------------|
| `strix-moe` | Strix Halo (.15) | qwen3.6-35B-udq4 | Whatever runs on Strix Halo |
| `gpu-dense` | RTX 3090 (.8) | Qwen3.8-27B-Uncensored-Q4_K_M | Whatever runs on RTX 3090 |
| `gpu-light` | RTX 5070 (.110) | gemma-4-12b | Whatever runs on RTX 5070 |
Single source of truth for models, aliases, rpm caps, weights and fallback chains:
CT 116 `/opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml`. Do not duplicate those values in
contracts — read them there.
**Backward compatibility**: Old model-specific names (qwen3.6-27B-code, gemma-4-12b, qwen3.5-9b-it) still work
but are deprecated for agent configs. Only the stable aliases survive model swaps.
**No backward compatibility**: Old model-specific names (qwen3.6-27B-code, qwen3.5-9b-it) are retired as of 2026-09-12
and no longer resolve; do not use them in agent configs. Only the stable aliases survive model swaps. `gemma-4-12b`
is retired and returns 400 `Invalid model name`.
## Current Model Assignments (2026-07-15)
| Model | GPU | Host | VRAM | Ctx | KV Cache | Parallel | Batch/Ubatch | Status |
|-------|-----|------|------|-----|----------|----------|-------------|--------|
| Qwen3.8-27B-Uncensored-Q4_K_M | RTX 3090 | .8 (llm-gpu) | ~22.4/24.6GB (91%) | **128K** | q4_0 | 1 | 2048/1024 | ✅ healthy |
| Qwen3.5-9B | RTX 5070 | .110 (ocu-llm) | ~6.2/12.2GB (51%) | 128K | Q5_K_M | 2 | 2048/1024 | ✅ healthy |
| Carnice-Qwen3.6-MoE-35B-A3B | Strix Halo Vulkan | .15 (amdpve) | ~24.73GB/64GB | 128K | Q5_K_M | 1 | 4096/1024 | ✅ 65 tok/s |
## Routing Configuration (LiteLLM — July 2026)
Model, alias, rpm/weight and fallback values are owned by CT 116
`/opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml` (see § Stable Role-Based Aliases above).
### syslog-auto Weighted Pool (Direct GPU — bypasses router)
Note: All syslog-auto entries route directly to GPUs with `api_key: not-needed`. The router (port 9000) was decommissioned 2026-09-11 and is NOT in the inference path.
| Model | GPU | Weight | RPM Cap | Timeout |
|-------|-----|--------|---------|---------|
| Qwen3.8-27B-Uncensored-Q4_K_M | RTX 3090 (.8:8080) | **0.55** | 500 | **300s** |
| Carnice-Qwen3.6-MoE-35B-A3B | Strix Halo (.15:8080) | **0.30** | 60 | **300s** |
| Qwen3.5-9B | RTX 5070 (.110:8080) | **0.15** | 200 | **120s** |
Note: All syslog-auto entries route directly to GPUs with `api_key: not-needed`. The router (port 9000) is NOT in the inference path.
### Direct Model Endpoints
| Model | RPM Cap | Notes |
|-------|---------|-------|
| strix-moe (Carnice-Qwen3.6-MoE-35B-A3B) | 40 | Tight cap — prevents Strix overload |
| Qwen3.8-27B-Uncensored-Q4_K_M | 500 | High cap — primary workhorse |
| Qwen3.5-9B | 500 | High cap — multimodal vision endpoint |
### Stable Aliases (for agent configs — never change)
| Alias | RPM Cap | Routes To | Purpose |
|-------|---------|-----------|---------|
| `strix-moe` | 40 | Strix Halo | Compression tasks (MoE models) |
| `gpu-dense` | 500 | RTX 3090 | Heavy reasoning |
| `gpu-light` | 500 | RTX 5070 | Vision, web extract, light tasks |
### Fallback Chains
- gemma → qwen
- qwen → gemma
- strix-moe → qwen → gemma
- syslog-auto → qwen → gemma → qwen3.6-35B-udq4
### Why Strix Halo RPM Is Capped
- Direct (strix-moe): 40 RPM (tight) — Strix Halo is shared with compression tasks
- Via syslog-auto: 60 RPM (moderate) — prevents flooding when multiple agents use syslog-auto simultaneously
- Combined max: ~100 RPM across both paths — Strix Halo can sustain this at 80°C
## Operations
@@ -124,7 +165,7 @@ Note: All syslog-auto entries route directly to GPUs with `api_key: not-needed`.
6. Cleanup model files (optional)
### heal
1. Check all GPUs via gpu-monitor `{{gpu_dashboard_url}}/gpu-data`
1. Check all GPUs via router internal `:9000/health/unified`
2. Check LiteLLM health via nginx `:80/litellm/health/liveliness`
3. Reset stuck circuit breakers if idle (Redis)
4. Restart dead llama-server instances via SSH
@@ -132,7 +173,7 @@ Note: All syslog-auto entries route directly to GPUs with `api_key: not-needed`.
6. Verify GPU monitor server is running on pi (:9100)
7. Verify watchdog is running on pi
8. Restart router if roster not loaded (check logs for STARTUP ROSTER)
9. Router roster reload — REMOVED 2026-09-11 (router decommissioned; LiteLLM fallbacks handle routing)
9. Reload roster via `POST :9000/admin/roster/reload` if available
### sync-keys
1. List all agent keys in LiteLLM DB via `GET /key/list`
@@ -151,7 +192,9 @@ Show full fleet status: GPUs, models, VRAM, context windows, parallel slots, act
2. Check llama-server processes: `ps aux | grep llama-server` on all 3 hosts
3. Check LiteLLM: `curl http://192.168.68.116/health` (expect "I'm alive!")
4. Check LiteLLM models: `curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $MASTER_KEY" http://192.168.68.116/v1/models`
5. Check LiteLLM timeouts: `grep -n 'timeout:' /opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml` — read the live values from the authority config; do not assert them from this contract.
5. Check LiteLLM timeouts: `grep -n 'timeout:' /opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml`
- Qwen3.5-9B: 120s, qwen3.6-27B-code: 300s, Carnice-Qwen3.6-MoE-35B-A3B/strix-moe: 300s (strix-moe alias retained, legacy name qwen3.6-35B-udq4 deprecated)
- global request_timeout: 300s, nginx proxy_read_timeout: 600s
6. Check AMD metrics: `curl http://192.168.68.15:9400/metrics` (Radeon 8060S, util%, VRAM, temp, power)
7. Check port conflicts: verify only one llama-server on :8080 per host
8. Verify agent keys: 9 keys in LiteLLM DB (`GET /key/list`)
@@ -165,7 +208,7 @@ Plaintext keys removed from this contract post-vault-migration.
| Agent | CT | IP | LiteLLM Alias | Key Source | Access |
|-------|-----|-----|---------------|------------|--------|
| Tanko | 112 | .122 | `tanko` | Infisical vault | SSH jerome |
| Mumuni | 105 (kagentz) | .14 | `mumuni` | Infisical vault | SSH root |
| Mumuni | 100 (abiba) | .24 | `mumuni` | Infisical vault | SSH root |
| Abiba | 100 | .24 | `abiba-pi` | Infisical vault | local (pi agent) |
| Koby | 111 | ? | `koby` | Infisical vault | Zulip DM |
| Koonimo | 113 | ? | `koonimo` | Infisical vault (migrated 2026-07-11) | no SSH |
@@ -190,7 +233,7 @@ If no SSH access, send Zulip DM via abiba-bot with vault update instructions.
| `/root/scripts/gpu-saturation-watchdog.py` | pi (.24) | Auto-restart stuck llama-server |
| `/root/dashboard/gpu-fleet.html` | pi (.24) | Live HTML dashboard |
| `/etc/systemd/system/llama-server.service` | .8, .110 | llama-server daemons (Nvidia GPUs) |
| `/etc/systemd/system/strix-server.service` | .15 (amdpve) | llama-server daemon (Vulkan, Strix Halo) running Carnice-Qwen3.6-MoE-35B-A3B-Q4_K_M.gguf (256K ctx). Note: `llama-server.service` and `llama-server@.service` are **masked** on .15 to prevent port 8080 collisions. |
| `/etc/systemd/system/strix-server.service` | .15 (amdpve) | llama-server daemon (Vulkan, Strix Halo) running unsloth/Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-MTP-GGUF. Note: `llama-server.service` and `llama-server@.service` are **masked** on .15 to prevent port 8080 collisions. |
## Prometheus & Grafana
@@ -207,7 +250,11 @@ If no SSH access, send Zulip DM via abiba-bot with vault update instructions.
- **Router startup race**: Compose router.py doesn't call load_roster(). Reload thread sleeps 30s first.
Fix: trigger roster reload via SSH after restart, or rebuild image with startup load_roster().
- **LiteLLM /metrics**: Requires auth. Prometheus uses `/health/liveliness` as workaround.
- **Strix Halo GPU**: Vulkan is the working backend (ROCm/HIP path abandoned — HSA runtime blocked on Debian 13). Build at `/root/llama.cpp/build-vk/`, commit `4fc4ec5` (2026-07-01), ggml 0.15.3 shared-lib arch. Mesa RADV 25.0.7, KHR_coopmat fast path active. ~70 tok/s gen, 532 tok/s prompt. Service: `strix-server.service` on port 8080, model: `Carnice-Qwen3.6-MoE-35B-A3B-Q4_K_M.gguf`, alias `strix-moe`, 256K context (n_ctx 262144), --parallel 2 --kv-unified, flash-attn + q4 KV, multimodal (mmproj loaded).
- **VRAM (2026-08-20)**: RTX 3090 at ~22.4/24.6GB (~91%) with **128K context** (reduced from 256K 2026-07-17). RTX 5070 at ~6.2/12.2GB (~51%) with 128K context (Qwen3.5-9B). Strix Halo at ~22GB/64GB.
- **RTX 3090 (2026-07-27)**: Swapped to Qwen3.8-27B-Uncensored-Q4_K_M (14.7GB). Q4 was too large for 24GB VRAM with 128K context + KV cache overhead. Q3 fits at ~22.4GB (91%). Uses standard llama.cpp build b9190 (turboquant b9150 incompatible with qwen3_5 arch). Config: `-c 131072 -ctk q4_0 -ctv q4_0 --flash-attn on --cont-batching`. Sampler: `--temp 0.9 --top-p 0.95 --top-k 60 --min-p 0.0 --repeat-penalty 1.0`. Service: `/home/llmuser/llama-fable-wrapper.sh`.
- **RTX 5070 config (2026-08-20)**: Switched to Qwen3.5-9B (Q5_K_M) at 128K context. Multimodal (image+text). Gen speed: ~145 tok/s (estimated). VRAM: ~6.2/12.2GB (~51%). Service: `/home/llmuser/llama-wrapper.sh`. Config: `--model Qwen3.5-9B-Q5_K_M.gguf --mmproj Qwen3.5-9B-mmproj-F16.gguf --ctx-size 131072`.
- **LiteLLM timeout tuning (verified 2026-07-27)**: Qwen3.8-27B-Uncensored-Q4_K_M 300s, gemma-4-12b 120s, qwen3.6-27B-code 300s (legacy), qwen3.6-35B-udq4 300s, strix-moe 300s, syslog-auto routes all 300s. Nginx proxy_read_timeout: 600s. Global request_timeout: 300s.
- **Strix Halo GPU**: Vulkan is the working backend (ROCm/HIP path abandoned — HSA runtime blocked on Debian 13). Build at `/root/llama.cpp/build-vk/`, commit `4fc4ec5` (2026-07-01), ggml 0.15.3 shared-lib arch. Mesa RADV 25.0.7, KHR_coopmat fast path active. ~70 tok/s gen, 532 tok/s prompt. Service: `strix-server.service` on port 8080, model: `qwen3.6-35B-udq4`, alias `strix-moe`, 128K context, flash-attn + q4 KV, multimodal (mmproj loaded).
- **Port conflict detection (2026-07-05)**: All 3 GPU wrappers now detect ghost processes squatting port 8080 before starting. `.8` and `.110` use inline pre-start check in `llama-wrapper.sh`; `.15` uses `/usr/local/bin/port-cleanup.sh` ExecStartPre. Replaces the blanket `pkill -9 -x llama-server` on .15 which would kill ALL llama-server instances regardless of port. Ghost detection was the root cause of .8 crash-looping for 27+ restarts (stale pid 25836 squatting 8080 after OOM kill).
- **Strix Halo thermal safeguard (2026-07-02)**: `strix-server.service` has `-n 8192` (hard generation cap per request). Without it, `--predict` defaults to -1 (infinity) — a runaway request from .123 (old Mumuni CT114 — now inside Abiba CT100 at .24) decoded 39,868 tokens over 24 min, pushing Tctl to 98°C (crit 89.8°C) and throttling 70→29 t/s. The cap bounds worst-case generation to ~5 min. Do NOT remove `-n` without a replacement ceiling. Sustained load hits ~84°C even at 92s; the APU is fanless/low-flow. Clients MUST also set `max_tokens`.
- **Port 8080 firewall**: amdpve iptables restricts 8080 to 192.168.68.116 (LiteLLM/router host) only. All inbound connections are from .116 (LiteLLM proxied via nginx). Localhost curls hang (SYN dropped). Always test from .116.
@@ -216,19 +263,19 @@ If no SSH access, send Zulip DM via abiba-bot with vault update instructions.
- **Alert migration**: All alerts now go to `#agent-hub` topics (`alerts-gpu`, `alerts-pm2`, `alerts-infra`) instead of DMs. Cross-agent visibility enabled.
- **tok/s benchmarks**: Measured every 5 min via LiteLLM proxy. Baselines tracked with 30%/50% degradation thresholds.
- **NetBird 502**: Tanko routes through NetBird for litellm.sysloggh.net. Use direct IP if NetBird down.
- **Alias-retirement sweep (2026-09-12)**: `gemma-4-12b`, `gpu-light` and `crew-auto` are retired and replaced by `gpu-vision` / no cap respectively. The agent-facing templates (`hermes-config-template.prose.md`, `hermes-agent-baseline.prose.md`), `litellm-api-keys.prose.md`, `gpu-self-heal.prose.md`, `hermes-key-enforcement.prose.md`, `inference-optimization.prose.md`, `litellm-client-timeouts.prose.md` and the executable `audit-hermes-config.py` were all updated to the live canonical alias in the same change. **koby's config on .129 still names `gpu-light` (and `gemma-4-E4B`); .129 is report-only, so that is recorded for its owner and NOT edited here.**
## GPU Inference Benchmarks (Current)
| GPU | Model | Gen tok/s | Prompt tok/s | Baseline | Context |
|-----|-------|-----------|--------------|----------|---------|
| RTX 3090 (.8) | Qwen3.8-27B-Uncensored-Q4_K_M | **TBD** | — | — | **128K** |
| Strix Halo (.15) | Carnice-Qwen3.6-MoE-35B-A3B-Q4_K_M.gguf (strix-moe) | **65** | 140 | — | **256K** |
| RTX 5070 (.110) | Qwen3.5-9B (Q5_K_M) | **145** | — | — | **128K** |
| Strix Halo (.15) | qwen3.6-35B-udq4 | **65** | 140 | — | **128K** |
Benchmarks from 2026-07-17. Strix Halo model: Carnice-Qwen3.6-MoE-35B-A3B-Q4_K_M.gguf (alias strix-moe), n_ctx 262144, --parallel 2 --kv-unified. RTX 5070 MTP provides 2.7x speedup over pre-upgrade 70 tok/s.
GPU contexts: RTX 3090 (.8) and RTX 5070 (.110) at 128K; Strix Halo (.15) at 256K (2026-09-12).
Benchmarks from 2026-07-17. Strix Halo model: qwen3.6-35B-udq4. RTX 5070 MTP provides 2.7x speedup over pre-upgrade 70 tok/s.
All 3 GPUs now at 128K context (2026-07-17, reduced from 256K for stability).
Benchmarks run through LiteLLM proxy (192.168.68.116:4000) every 5 minutes.
Benchmarks run through LiteLLM proxy (192.168.68.116:4001) every 5 minutes.
Degradation alerts fire at 30% (warning) and 50% (critical) below baseline.
History stored at `/root/data/toks-history.json` with 7-day rolling window.
@@ -239,46 +286,48 @@ History stored at `/root/data/toks-history.json` with 7-day rolling window.
### Stable Aliases — CRITICAL
All agent configs MUST use stable role-based aliases, never model-specific names:
- `compression.model: syslog-auto`
- `auxiliary.vision.model: gpu-vision`
- `delegation.model: gpu-dense`
- `auxiliary.web_extract.model: gpu-vision`
- `compression.model: strix-moe` (NOT `qwen3.6-35B-udq4`)
- `auxiliary.vision.model: gpu-light` (NOT `gemma-4-12b`)
- `delegation.model: gpu-dense` (NOT `qwen3.6-27B-code`)
- `auxiliary.web_extract.model: gpu-light`
When the underlying model is swapped, only the LiteLLM config changes — agent configs are untouched.
### Context Windows
- RTX 3090: **128K** (reduced from 256K 2026-07-17) | RTX 5070: **128K** (reduced from 256K) | Strix Halo: **256K** (2026-09-12)
- **Agents via `syslog-auto`**: 128K ceiling — the pool's safe floor (NVIDIA hosts are 128K). For >128K workloads, use external providers (deepseek)
- Compression threshold 0.65 (audit Rule 9): fires at ~85K (~43K headroom before 128K ceiling)
- RTX 3090: **128K** (reduced from 256K 2026-07-17) | RTX 5070: **128K** (reduced from 256K) | Strix Halo: **128K**
- **All agents**: 128K ceiling — stable margin. For >128K workloads, use external providers (deepseek)
- Compression threshold 0.60: fires at ~77K (~51K headroom before 128K ceiling)
- **Pi agents (Abiba)**: `compaction.reserveTokens: 52739` (≈60% of 128K)
- Mumuni compression model alias: `syslog-auto`
- Mumuni compression model alias: `strix-moe` with 300s timeout
### Mumuni Agent Profile
Mumuni (kagentz CT105, 192.168.68.14 — migrated from CT100 2026-08-29) is the primary business assistant. This profile is the reference for all agent configs. The compression values below are the current required values per template Rules 7/9 and `audit-hermes-config.py`; whether Mumuni's LIVE config currently complies is a separate operational question.
Mumuni (CT100/abiba, 192.168.68.24) is the primary business assistant. This profile is the reference for all agent configs:
| Setting | Value | Notes |
|---------|-------|-------|
| `model.default` | `syslog-auto` | Balanced default (pool router) |
| `model.default` | `syslog-auto` | Weighted pool (55% qwen, 30% strix, 15% gemma) |
| `model.provider` | `custom:litellm` | LiteLLM on CT116 |
| `compression.model` | `syslog-auto` | Rule 7: auto-routing, prevents Strix Halo overload |
| `aux.compression.model` | `syslog-auto` | Must match `compression.model` (Rule 7) |
| `aux.vision.model` | `gpu-vision` | Vision tasks (RTX 5070) |
| `aux.web_extract.model` | `gpu-vision` | Web extraction |
| `compression.model` | `strix-moe` | Stable alias — survives model swaps |
| `aux.compression.model` | `strix-moe` | Compression auxiliary model |
| `aux.vision.model` | `gpu-light` | Vision tasks (RTX 5070) |
| `aux.web_extract.model` | `gpu-light` | Web extraction |
| `delegation.model` | `gpu-dense` | Sub-agent reasoning (RTX 3090) |
| `context.max_context_window` | 131072 (128K) | Conservative `syslog-auto` pool floor (NVIDIA hosts 128K; Strix Halo 256K) |
| `compression.threshold` | 0.65 | Rule 9: triggers at ~85K for a 128K window |
| `context.max_context_window` | 131072 (128K) | Reduced from 256K 2026-07-17 — stable 128K ceiling |
| `compression.threshold` | 0.60 | Triggers at ~77K (~60% of 128K) — optimized for 128K context |
| `compression.target_ratio` | 0.3 | Compresses to ~38K |
| `compression.protect_last_n` | 40 | Preserves last 40 messages |
| `memory.memory_char_limit` | 800 | Brief memory entries |
| `personalities` | `creative` | Creative assistant personality |
| Platforms | cli, homeassistant, signal, telegram, zulip | All Hermes platforms |
| Main model timeout | 300s | LiteLLM global timeout |
| Compression model timeout | 300s | strix-moe timeout increased from 120s |
### Agent Update Status (2026-07-15)
| Agent | Host | Status |
|-------|------|--------|
| **Mumuni** | CT105 (.14) | ✅ Updated to stable aliases |
| **Mumuni** | CT100 (.24) | ✅ Updated to stable aliases |
| **Tanko** | CT112 (.122) | ✅ Updated to stable aliases |
| **Koby** | CT111 (.129) | ❌ SSH unreachable — needs Zulip DM |
| **Koonimo** | CT113 | ❌ SSH unreachable — needs Zulip DM |
+25 -99
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
kind: responsibility
name: gpu-monitor
description: >
Comprehensive GPU fleet monitor — polls every subsystem (sidecars,
Comprehensive GPU fleet monitor — polls every subsystem (sidecars, router,
LiteLLM, Strix Halo, dashboard) every 15s, renders a live HTML dashboard,
checks alert thresholds, and exposes a JSON API for downstream consumers.
agent: abiba
@@ -27,38 +27,27 @@ agent: abiba
┌──────┐ ┌──────┐ ┌────────┐
│.8:8080│ │.110 │ │.116:80 │
│RTX3090│ │:8080 │ │nginx │
│qwen │ │RTX5070│ │router │
└──────┘ │vision │ │LiteLLM │
│gemma │ │RTX5070│ │router │
└──────┘ │qwen27B│ │LiteLLM │
└──────┘ │dashboard│
└────────┘
```
Note: JSON sidecar exporters at :8090 were never deployed on any
GPU host. Router falls back to GPU /health direct probe. Monitor
should use router /health/unified as source of truth for GPU status.
Strix Halo :8080 is firewalled to .116 only — monitor on .24 cannot
poll .15:8080 directly; must go through router on .116.
**PORT RULE (verified 2026-09-10):** GPU per-host health lives on **:8080**
(`http://<gpu-host>:8080/health`); Prometheus GPU exporters live on **:9400**.
There is NO listener on bare port 80 for any GPU host — `http://192.168.68.8/health`
and `http://192.168.68.110/health` answer `000`. Never use a bare-port-80 probe
as a GPU liveness signal: on 2026-09-09 that produced three false
`DEGRADED — GPU-rtx3090 000, GPU-rtx5070 000` rounds while
`http://192.168.68.8:8080/health` and `http://192.168.68.110:8080/health`
answered `200`. Port 80 is valid only on the harness host (.116), never on a GPU host.
```
### Subsystems Polled
| Subsystem | Endpoint | Frequency | Metrics |
|-----------|----------|-----------|---------|
| GPU Status (all, via fleet API) | `http://192.168.68.116/gpu/gpu-data` | 15s | models, CB, scores, GPU status from gpu-monitor on .24:9100 |
| GPU .8 (RTX 3090) health | `http://192.168.68.8:8080/health` | 15s | direct liveness fallback — **:8080 ONLY, never bare port 80** |
| GPU .110 (RTX 5070) health | `http://192.168.68.110:8080/health` | 15s | direct liveness fallback — **:8080 ONLY, never bare port 80** |
| Fleet (unified) | `http://192.168.68.116/health/unified` | 15s | nginx `301` → `/gpu/gpu-data` served by gpu-monitor = alive (router decommissioned 2026-09-11) |
| Harness (basic) | `http://192.168.68.116/health` | 15s | nginx → LiteLLM `/health/liveliness` |
| GPU Status (all, via router) | `http://192.168.68.116/health/unified` | 15s | models, CB, scores, GPU status (router probes each GPU /health directly) |
| Router (unified) | `http://192.168.68.116/health/unified` | 15s | models, CB, scores, GPU status |
| Router (basic) | `http://192.168.68.116/health` | 15s | basic aliveness |
| LiteLLM | `http://192.168.68.116/litellm/health` | 15s | proxy health, model count |
| Strix Halo | `http://192.168.68.116/health/unified` (nginx → fleet API) | 15s | Strix Halo status via gpu-monitor — cannot poll .15:8080 directly (firewalled to .116 only) |
| Strix Halo | `http://192.168.68.116/health/unified` (router) | 15s | Strix Halo status via router — cannot poll .15:8080 directly (firewalled to .116 only) |
| Dashboard | `http://192.168.68.116/dashboard/` | 15s | harness-dashboard aliveness |
### Alert Delivery
@@ -72,28 +61,12 @@ This replaces the previous DM-only delivery. All agents on the mesh can see and
## Alert Thresholds
### Liveness rule (scoped)
The any-HTTP-response rule applies ONLY to redirect/auth-gated liveness
endpoints, where any HTTP answer proves a listener is up. Applied here: nginx's
`/health/unified` answers `301 Moved Permanently` → `/gpu/gpu-data`
(the same payload) and LiteLLM's `/litellm/health` answers `301` →
`/litellm/health/liveliness`. For those endpoints a probe is **ALIVE** on
**ANY** HTTP status — `3xx` redirects and `401`/`403` auth challenges included —
and **DOWN = connection refused (`000`) or timeout only**. Same scoped rule as
zulip-health (Tanko) and infrastructure-monitoring.
Probes whose success condition is specifically a bare `200` are NOT covered by
the any-HTTP rule. On those — the GPU `:8080/health` endpoints, nginx `/health`,
and the dashboard — an unexpected status (`401`/`403`, `5xx`, or
anything other than the expected `200`) is an **ALERT**, not "alive".
| Metric | Warning | Critical |
|--------|---------|----------|
| GPU Temp | >80°C | >90°C |
| VRAM Usage | >90% | >95% |
| GPU Util | >95% | >98% |
| Sidecar Unreachable | — | info (sidecars not deployed — use gpu-monitor /gpu-data) |
| Sidecar Unreachable | — | info (sidecars not deployed — use router /health/unified) |
| Model Down | — | critical (circuit breaker open) |
### JSON API Response Schema (/gpu-data)
@@ -124,47 +97,7 @@ anything other than the expected `200`) is an **ALERT**, not "alive".
`curl http://localhost:9100/gpu-data | jq` — Full fleet status
### check-health
**RUN LIVE, NEVER ECHO — every dispatch must execute the probes below with real tool calls; never repeat a prior report unless a live probe fails.**
```bash
# Provenance — run first; paste the absolute path into the report
pwd -P
# GPU Monitor health
curl http://localhost:9100/health | jq
# Expected: 200 with {"status": "healthy", "cache_age_seconds": <n>}
# GPU host health — DIRECT on :8080. NEVER probe bare port 80 on a GPU host:
# http://192.168.68.8/health has no listener and returns 000 → false DEGRADED.
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://192.168.68.8:8080/health
# Expected: 200 (bare-200 probe: any other status is an alert; 000/timeout = DOWN)
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://192.168.68.110:8080/health
# Expected: 200 (bare-200 probe: any other status is an alert; 000/timeout = DOWN)
# Router unified health (source of truth; 301 → /gpu/gpu-data is HEALTHY)
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://192.168.68.116/health/unified
# Expected: 301 (or 200 after following the redirect) — any HTTP status = alive
# Router basic health (via nginx on port 80 — router .116 only, never a GPU host)
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://192.168.68.116/health
# Expected: 200 (bare-200 probe: any other status is an alert; 000/timeout = DOWN)
# LiteLLM health (via nginx on port 80)
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://192.168.68.116/litellm/health
# Expected: 301 → /litellm/health/liveliness (200 after redirect) — any HTTP status = alive
# Dashboard
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://192.168.68.116/dashboard/
# Expected: 200 (bare-200 probe: any other status is an alert; 000/timeout = DOWN)
```
**Report format**: Begin every report with the **absolute path the probe executed
from** (`pwd -P`, or the monitor script's absolute path) so a stale-consumer
report is distinguishable from a real fault at read time. Summarize actual
results from each probe. Apply the scoped liveness rule above: on auth-gated
endpoints only connection-refused (`000`) or timeout is DOWN; on bare-200 probes
any other status is an alert. Never probe a GPU host on bare port 80.
`curl http://localhost:9100/health` — Monitor self-check
### view-dashboard
Open `http://localhost:9100/` in browser — Live HTML dashboard
@@ -174,14 +107,12 @@ Open `http://localhost:9100/` in browser — Live HTML dashboard
pkill -f gpu-monitor-server.py
python3 /root/scripts/gpu-monitor-server.py &
```
Managed by systemd (verified 2026-09-11): `systemctl restart gpu-monitor`
Or via PM2: `pm2 restart gpu-monitor`
### check-fleet
Fleet health is accessed through nginx on port 80 on the harness host
(.116) — NOT port 9000 (router decommissioned 2026-09-11), and NOT bare
port 80 on a GPU host.
`curl http://192.168.68.116/health/unified` — nginx answers `301` → `/gpu/gpu-data` (fleet monitor payload) = alive
`curl http://192.168.68.8/health` — ❌ NEVER USE (GPU host, no port-80 listener → false `000`/DEGRADED)
### check-router
The router health is accessed through nginx on port 80 (NOT port 9000 directly).
`curl http://192.168.68.116/health/unified` — Router unified health via nginx proxy
`curl http://192.168.68.116:9000/health/unified` — ❌ WILL FAIL (port bound to 127.0.0.1 only)
## Configuration Files
@@ -193,18 +124,13 @@ port 80 on a GPU host.
## Execution
**Port discipline:** probe GPU hosts on `:8080` (or the router's
`/health/unified`); probe port 80 only on the router (.116). Never bare port 80
on a GPU host.
1. **Poll router** (every 15s): GET .116/health/unified — single source of truth for all GPU status (router probes each GPU /health directly via sidecar fallback). `301` → `/gpu/gpu-data` counts as alive.
2. **Fallback direct GPU probe** (only if router /health/unified is DOWN): GET `http://192.168.68.8:8080/health` and `http://192.168.68.110:8080/health` — **:8080 only, never bare port 80**.
3. **Poll router** (every 15s): GET .116/health via nginx:80
4. **Poll LiteLLM** (every 15s): GET .116/litellm/health via nginx:80
5. **Poll Strix** (every 15s): via router /health/unified (cannot poll .15:8080 directly — firewalled to .116 only)
6. **Poll dashboard** (every 15s): GET .116/dashboard/
7. **Check alerts**: Compare metrics against thresholds
8. **Compute summary**: Fleet-wide health aggregation
9. **Render dashboard**: Generate HTML at /root/dashboard/gpu-fleet.html
10. **Serve API**: HTTP server on port 9100
11. **Repeat** every 15 seconds
1. **Poll router** (every 15s): GET .116/health/unified — single source of truth for all GPU status (router probes each GPU /health directly via sidecar fallback)
2. **Poll router** (every 15s): GET .116/health via nginx:80
3. **Poll LiteLLM** (every 15s): GET .116/litellm/health via nginx:80
4. **Poll Strix** (every 15s): via router /health/unified (cannot poll .15:8080 directly — firewalled to .116 only)
5. **Poll dashboard** (every 15s): GET .116/dashboard/
6. **Check alerts**: Compare metrics against thresholds
7. **Compute summary**: Fleet-wide health aggregation
8. **Render dashboard**: Generate HTML at /root/dashboard/gpu-fleet.html
9. **Serve API**: HTTP server on port 9100
10. **Repeat** every 15 seconds
+19 -41
View File
@@ -9,10 +9,10 @@ description: >
(v2.1.0) with active remediation rules, Prometheus metrics consumption,
VRAM trend analysis, and predictive alerting.
UPDATED 2026-07-18: Model assignments synced to 2026-07-17 swaps.
Router (port 9000) DECOMMISSIONED 2026-09-11; references replaced with direct GPU routing.
Router (port 9000) references replaced with direct GPU routing.
Benchmark baselines refreshed to live values.
Prometheus exporters removed — not deployed; fall back to direct sidecar probes.
Stable role-based aliases (strix-moe, gpu-dense, gpu-vision) from gpu-fleet.
Stable role-based aliases (strix-moe, gpu-dense, gpu-light) from gpu-fleet.
agent: abiba
depends_on:
- gpu-monitor.prose.md (live data source on .24:9100)
@@ -48,12 +48,14 @@ depends_on:
| Alias | GPU | Host | Model | VRAM | Ctx | tok/s | Role |
|-------|-----|------|-------|------|-----|-------|------|
| `strix-moe` | Strix Halo 64GB | ct15 (.15:8080) | Carnice-Qwen3.6-MoE-35B-A3B-Q4_K_M.gguf | ~10/64GB (16%) | 256K | 62.9 | Compression, summarization, long docs |
| `gpu-dense` | RTX 3090 24GB | ct8 (.8:8080) | ThinkingCap Qwen3.6-27B Q4_K_M + MTP + vision | 21.6/24.6GB (88%) | 128K | 74.9 | Heavy reasoning, code gen |
| `gpu-light` | RTX 5070 12GB | ct110 (.110:8080) | Qwen3.5-9B (Q5_K_M) + mmproj-F16 | 6.2/12.2GB (51%) | 128K | ~145 | Vision (image+text), web extract, light tasks |
| `strix-moe` | Strix Halo 64GB | ct15 (.15:8080) | qwen3.6-35B-udq4 | ~10/64GB (16%) | 128K | 62.9 | Compression, summarization, long docs |
Key notes:
- All models use direct GPU routing via LiteLLM (`api_key: not-needed`). Router (port 9000) was decommissioned 2026-09-11 and is NOT in the inference path.
- Stable aliases (gpu-dense, gpu-vision, strix-moe) from gpu-fleet are the canonical names for agent configs — use these, not model-specific names. The retired names `gpu-light` and `gemma-4-12b` were superseded by `gpu-vision` on 2026-09-12 and no longer resolve (400 `Invalid model name`).
- The RTX 5070 is the fastest endpoint per token — `gpu-vision` is its canonical alias. Route vision/web/light work there first. The RTX 5070 model is multimodal (image+text).
- All models use direct GPU routing via LiteLLM (`api_key: not-needed`). Router (port 9000) is deprecated and NOT in the inference path.
- Stable aliases (gpu-dense, gpu-light, strix-moe) from gpu-fleet are the canonical names for agent configs. Model-specific names still work but are deprecated.
- RTX 5070 tok/s is ~145 for Qwen3.5-9B — gpu-light is the fastest endpoint. Route vision/web/light work there first. NOTE: Qwen3.5-9B is multimodal (image+text), NOT text-only like gemma-4-12b was.
- Strix Halo is 62.9 tok/s (89% of 70.5 baseline) — below optimal but stable. Check for competing workloads.
- RTX 3090 VRAM at 88% — within role-appropriate range (role = heavy reasoning, needs the headroom).
- RTX 5070 VRAM at 83% — role-appropriate for vision/web (smaller batch sizes).
@@ -64,7 +66,7 @@ Key notes:
- **Detect**: Any GPU temp >85°C sustained for 2+ consecutive polls
- **Fix**:
1. Reduce inference concurrency on that GPU (load-side cooling only — NO fan control)
2. Redirect new requests to cooler GPUs via LiteLLM fallback chains (gpu-vision → gpu-dense, gpu-dense → gpu-vision)
2. Redirect new requests to cooler GPUs via LiteLLM fallback chains (gemma → qwen, qwen → gemma)
3. If all GPUs hot, alert about cooling infrastructure
- **Verify**: Temp drops below 80°C within 5 minutes
- **Escalate after**: 3 verification failures → Zulip alert
@@ -104,10 +106,10 @@ Key notes:
### Rule 5: Circuit Breaker Stuck Open
- **Detect**: Circuit breaker open >10 minutes with GPU reporting healthy
- **Note**: Router (port 9000) was decommissioned 2026-09-11. If circuit breakers are reported by gpu-monitor, they come from LiteLLM's internal tracking, not the old router.
- **Note**: Router (port 9000) is deprecated. If circuit breakers are reported by gpu-monitor, they come from LiteLLM's internal tracking, not the old router.
- **Fix**:
1. Verify GPU /health returns 200 on direct port (:8080)
2. If GPU healthy, alert but do NOT reset via router API (decommissioned 2026-09-11)
2. If GPU healthy, alert but do NOT reset via router API (deprecated)
3. Check LiteLLM health directly: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/health/liveliness
4. Restart LiteLLM container on CT 116 if circuit breakers are stuck
- **Verify**: LiteLLM returns healthy, circuit breaker clears within 60s
@@ -142,10 +144,10 @@ Key notes:
- **Escalate**: If Tier 2 triggers and temp still rising after 5 min → possible hardware failure
### Rule 9: Context Window Optimization
- **Detect**: Benchmark tok/s vs baseline for each GPU at its current context
- **Detect**: Benchmark tok/s vs baseline for each GPU at current context (all 128K)
- RTX 3090 (128K ctx, ThinkingCap): baseline 74.8 tok/s — currently at 74.9 (100%)
- RTX 5070 (128K ctx, HauhauCS QAT): baseline 165.2 tok/s — currently at 169.6 (103%)
- Strix Halo (256K ctx, Carnice-Qwen3.6-MoE-35B-A3B-Q4_K_M.gguf): baseline 70.5 tok/s — currently at 62.9 (89%)
- Strix Halo (128K ctx, qwen3.6-35B-udq4): baseline 70.5 tok/s — currently at 62.9 (89%)
- **Fix**:
- If tok/s > baseline → context has headroom, consider increasing
- If tok/s < 90% baseline → reduce context by 25% and retest
@@ -157,14 +159,13 @@ Key notes:
### Rule 10: Workload Distribution Optimization (updated 2026-07-18)
- **Detect**: GPU roles misaligned with hardware capabilities
- **Target distribution**:
- RTX 3090 (gpu-dense, 24GB, 74.9 tok/s) → Heavy reasoning, code gen, long conversations (slowest per-token but largest context capacity).
- RTX 5070 (gpu-vision, 12GB, ~145 tok/s) → Vision (image+text), web search, lightweight tasks.
- Strix Halo (strix-moe, 64GB, 62.9 tok/s) → Context compression, summarization, long docs (MoE model).
- RTX 3090 (gpu-dense, 24GB, 74.9 tok/s) → Heavy reasoning, code gen, long conversations (slowest per-token but largest context capacity). Weight: 0.55 (LiteLLM).
- RTX 5070 (gpu-light, 12GB, ~145 tok/s) → Vision (image+text), web search, lightweight tasks. Weight: 0.15 (LiteLLM).
- Strix Halo (strix-moe, 64GB, 62.9 tok/s) → Context compression, summarization, long docs (MoE model). Weight: 0.30 (LiteLLM).
- **Note**: RTX 5070 is the fastest endpoint per token. Route high-volume, low-complexity work there first.
- **Weights are not restated here** — the live `syslog-auto` pool weights and rpm caps live in CT 116 `/opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml`, the single source of truth.
- **Fix**:
- Alert if any GPU is handling workload outside its designated role
- Recommend agent alias updates to match workload to GPU role (use stable aliases: gpu-dense, gpu-vision, strix-moe)
- Recommend agent alias updates to match workload to GPU role (use stable aliases: gpu-dense, gpu-light, strix-moe)
- Track per-GPU request distribution via LiteLLM spend logs
- **Verify**: Each GPU's request pattern matches its designated role within 24h
- **Escalate**: If role mismatch persists >48h → agent alias audit needed
@@ -174,29 +175,6 @@ Key notes:
## Execution
### Executor, schedule and dead-man's-switch
This contract is implemented by a real script, scheduled on the inference host:
| | |
| --- | --- |
| **Executor** | `/opt/inference-harness/scripts/gpu-self-heal.py` on **CT 116** |
| **Schedule** | `/etc/cron.d/gpu-self-heal` on CT 116 — `2 */6 * * *` |
| **Log** | `/var/log/litellm/gpu-self-heal.log` |
| **Posting** | the script calls `gitea-logger.sh gpu {RUN_ID}.json <report>` → `SyslogSolution/health-logs/gpu/{RUN_ID}.json` |
**Dead-man's-switch:** absence of logs must raise an alarm, because that is how
this went silent for 12 days. That alarm cannot live on the producer — a stopped
job cannot report that it stopped — so it lives off-host as the
**`health-log-freshness` contract on CT 100**, which fails when
`health-logs/gpu/` is older than 12 h. A failed run is also visible in the log
above, but only the off-host check catches a *missing* run.
**History (2026-09-26, relay-785):** the executor was never lost — only its
schedule was, dropped during a CT 116 `/etc/cron.d` rework on 2026-09-21. The
`gpu/` log was silent from `2026-09-14T18:02:03Z`. The schedule was restored and
the off-host freshness check added; do not treat either as optional.
```prose
-- Phase 1: Fetch live GPU data
let fleet = call gpu-monitor
@@ -300,7 +278,7 @@ Pushed to `SyslogSolution/health-logs/gpu/{run_id}.json` — versioned, searchab
2. **Model restart**: ✅ Only if >50% failure rate over 60s + 30s grace period. Not on single stuck request.
3. **Strix direct access**: ✅ Open firewall .15:8080 → .24 for direct health probe + restart.
4. **VRAM thresholds**: Tiered — **300MB/h** (RTX 3090), **300MB/h** (RTX 5070), 200MB/h (Strix). Previous values (100/50) were too sensitive; raised 2026-07-18 based on operational data.
5. **CB auto-reset**: ✅ Router decommissioned 2026-09-11 — circuit breakers go through LiteLLM health check + container restart if needed. No per-GPU auto-reset.
5. **CB auto-reset**: ✅ Router deprecated — circuit breakers go through LiteLLM health check + container restart if needed. No per-GPU auto-reset.
6. **Benchmark baseline**: Rolling 30-day average, recalculated weekly. Current baselines live in gpu-monitor.
7. **Predictive alerts**: Two-tier — warn at >70°C+rising (>2°C/min), critical at >80°C+rising.
8. **Prometheus**: ❌ Not deployed. Use direct sidecar probes (:8080/health) and gpu-monitor API. Prometheus integration deferred until exporters are running on GPU hosts.
@@ -335,6 +313,6 @@ Pushed to `SyslogSolution/health-logs/gpu/{run_id}.json` — versioned, searchab
If monitor response > 1MB, log a warning and skip the cycle rather than crashing.
### L6: Stable Aliases Replace Model Names
- gpu-fleet introduced stable aliases (strix-moe, gpu-dense, gpu-light) on 2026-07-15; `gpu-light` was superseded by `gpu-vision` on 2026-09-12.
- gpu-fleet introduced stable aliases (strix-moe, gpu-dense, gpu-light) on 2026-07-15.
- Self-heal must use aliases for reporting and alerting, not model-specific names.
- **Rule**: All alert messages and KG nodes use the stable alias as the GPU identifier.
-80
View File
@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
---
kind: function
name: health-log-freshness
description: >
Dead-man's-switch for the health-logs posting jobs. Fails when the newest
commit in a watched SyslogSolution/health-logs directory is older than that
directory's threshold.
Exists because absence of logs raises no alarm: the gpu/ directory went silent
for 12 days (2026-09-14T18:02:03Z to 2026-09-26) and nothing noticed, because
the only thing that would have noticed was the job that had stopped. The check
therefore runs on CT 100, a DIFFERENT host from the producers on CT 116, so a
dead producer host or a deleted schedule still raises an alarm.
Watched: gpu/ (12h, producer 2 */6 * * *), litellm/ (18h, producer 0 */6 * * *).
Not watched: pm2/ — that contract's health-logs claim was retired 2026-09-26;
see pm2-self-heal.prose.md step 6.
Verified 2026-09-26: would have caught the real gap (at 2026-09-20 the newest
gpu/ entry was 126h old against a 12h limit).
version: 1.0.0
---
## Execution
Host-scheduled on CT 100 via `/etc/cron.d/contract-runner`:
```
20 */4 * * * root CONTRACT_RUN_LOG_DIR=/var/log/contract-runs /bin/bash /opt/contract-runner/scripts/contract-run.sh health-log-freshness >/dev/null 2>&1 || /root/abiba-workspace/bin/fm-inbox.sh note "contract-runner: health-log-freshness FAILED - see /var/log/contract-runs/" >/dev/null 2>&1
```
Every 4 hours, offset to `:20` to avoid the existing `:05`/`:15`/`:35` slots.
## Output shape
```
Health-log freshness — dead-man's-switch
==================================================================
✅ health-logs/gpu/ newest 2026-09-26T14:48:03Z (0.02h old, limit 12.0h)
last commit: gpu: gpu-self-heal-20260926-144802.json
producer: gpu-self-heal.py, CT116 cron 2 */6 * * *
==================================================================
VERDICT: PASS — every watched health-log directory is advancing
```
`--json` emits `{checked: {...}, failures: [...]}`.
## Exit codes
| exit | meaning |
| --- | --- |
| 0 | every watched directory is advancing |
| 1 | at least one is stale, or could not be read |
| 2 | the check could not run (no Gitea credential) |
A directory that **cannot be read** is a failure, not a skip: unreadable and
stopped are indistinguishable from the outside.
## Configuration
| variable | default | meaning |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `GITEA_URL` | `https://git.sysloggh.net` | Gitea base URL |
| `GITEA_TOKEN` / `GITEA_PAT` | — | API token; falls back to basic auth from `~/.git-credentials` |
| `HEALTH_LOG_MAX_AGE_GPU` | `12` | hours |
| `HEALTH_LOG_MAX_AGE_LITELLM` | `18` | hours |
## Thresholds
Sized for the producer cadence plus one missed run, so a single blip does not
page but a genuine stop does:
* `gpu/` — 6 h cadence, 12 h limit;
* `litellm/` — 6 h cadence, 18 h limit (proven healthy; a looser bound avoids noise).
## Maintains
- health-logs-gpu-freshness: { status: "ok|stale", last_check: timestamp }
- health-logs-litellm-freshness: { status: "ok|stale", last_check: timestamp }
+16 -54
View File
@@ -5,30 +5,12 @@ version: 1.0.0
description: >
Canonical known-good baseline for all Syslog Hermes agents. Captures the exact
configuration state, keys, workarounds, and audit procedure. When an agent's
configuration goes sideways, restore from this baseline. Last verified 2026-07-16. RTX 3090/5070 at 128K (reduced from 256K for stability Jul 2026); Strix Halo at 256K (2026-09-12) (RTX 3090 .8, RTX 5070 .110, Strix Halo .15). Parallel 1 fleet-wide (Strix Halo handles compression solo).
configuration goes sideways, restore from this baseline. Last verified 2026-07-16. All GPUs 128K context (reduced from 256K for stability Jul 2026) (RTX 3090 .8, RTX 5070 .110, Strix Halo .15). Parallel 1 fleet-wide (Strix Halo handles compression solo).
author: Abiba (pi agent)
---
# Hermes Agent Baseline — Canonical Good State
## Reachability Detection
Before checking agent baseline, verify the host is reachable and can be audited. Use the shared reachability helper from the clone root:
```bash
# Run on each host to check reachability (Tanko, Mumuni, Koonimo, Koby)
scripts/hermes-reachability-check.sh <host> "api_key:" "/root/.hermes/config.yaml"
# Example: scripts/hermes-reachability-check.sh 192.168.68.122 "api_key:" "/root/.hermes/config.yaml"
# Expected outcomes:
# - UNREACHABLE: SSH connection failed (host is down)
# - VIOLATION: SSH succeeded and found matches (report the finding)
# - COMPLIANT: SSH succeeded and found no matches (no api_key in config)
#
# NOTE: The bug this replaces was deriving reachability from the remote grep's exit code.
# The correct pattern: remote side always succeeds (grep ...; true), so ssh status = connection only.
```
## Quick Restore
```bash
@@ -42,12 +24,13 @@ done
| Agent | CT | Node | IP | LiteLLM Alias | Key Source | Platform |
|-------|-----|------|-----|---------------|------------|----------|
| Koby | 111 | storepve | .129 | `koby` | Infisical vault | **Hermes** |
| Tanko | 112 | amdpve | .122 | `tanko` | Infisical vault | Hermes |
| Mumuni | 100 | hwepve | .24 | `mumuni` | Infisical vault | Hermes |
| Koby | 111 | amdpve | .129 | `koby` | Infisical vault | **Hermes** |
| Koonimo | 113 | amdpve | .114 | `koonimo` | Infisical vault | Hermes |
| Shumba | — | 192.168.68.119 | N/A | N/A (DeepSeek) | Hermes (RETIRED — CT119 now Infisical vault) |
> **Note**: CT hostnames (tdunna→CT111, baggy→CT113) differ from agent identities (koby, koonimo).
> CT 111 (tdunna, 192.168.68.129, storepve) is report-only — Theo's box; alert only, never garbage-collect.
Access: `pct-run <CT_ID> <command>` — no IPs needed. GPU hosts (.8, .110, .15) use SSH.
Keys are stored in Infisical vault (project=agents, env=production) and injected at
@@ -58,7 +41,7 @@ runtime via `infisical run --` wrapper. Plaintext keys removed from this baselin
```
Infisical vault → infisical run -- hermes gateway → LITELLM_API_KEY (runtime)
↓
Agent (systemd) → LITELLM_API_KEY → LiteLLM (:116/v1) → GPU (llama-server)
Agent (systemd) → LITELLM_API_KEY → LiteLLM (:116/v1) → Router (:9000) → GPU (llama-server)
└── Key DB (Postgres)
```
@@ -70,10 +53,9 @@ Agent (systemd) → LITELLM_API_KEY → LiteLLM (:116/v1) → GPU (llama-server)
## Config Pattern — Mandatory Fields
### For Hermes Agents (Mumuni, Koonimo)
### For Hermes Agents (Tanko, Mumuni, Koonimo)
Every Hermes agent's `/root/.hermes/config.yaml` (or `/home/jerome/.hermes/config.yaml`) MUST have:
(Tanko is excluded — migrated to DSH/DeepSeek Harness on 2026-08-27, no longer uses Hermes config.)
Every agent's `/root/.hermes/config.yaml` (or `/home/jerome/.hermes/config.yaml`) MUST have:
### 1. Main Model
```yaml
@@ -89,7 +71,7 @@ model:
custom_providers:
- name: harness
model: syslog-auto
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1
api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
api_mode: chat_completions
```
@@ -99,8 +81,8 @@ custom_providers:
auxiliary:
vision:
provider: harness
model: gpu-vision # RTX 5070 stable alias (Rule 8; do not use syslog-auto for aux)
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1
model: gemma-4-12b # or syslog-auto
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1
api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
api_key: <value from: infisical secrets get LITELLM_API_KEY --project=agents --env=production> # ← MANDATORY workaround
timeout: 60
@@ -114,33 +96,13 @@ auxiliary:
threshold: 0.65
target_ratio: 0.3
provider: harness
model: syslog-auto # Rule 7: compression must be syslog-auto
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1
model: syslog-auto # or gemma-4-12b
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1
api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
api_key: <value from: infisical secrets get LITELLM_API_KEY --project=agents --env=production> # ← MANDATORY workaround
timeout: 120
```
## Violation Classification
When reporting findings, separate POLICY observations from FAULT findings:
### POLICY (observation only, not a fault)
- Agent uses a non-internal-harness provider (e.g., direct DeepSeek, Tencent, OpenRouter)
- Config text has a field that looks unusual but the agent's calls are succeeding
- Example: "POLICY: Koonimo uses deepseek directly; calls succeeding in last hour"
### FAULT (requires request-level evidence)
- Agent's calls are failing with auth errors (401/403 in logs)
- Agent's config has no valid API key AND calls are failing
- Example: "FAULT: Koby's LiteLLM key expired; 401 observed at 2026-09-14 11:42:00"
### Rules
1. Do NOT infer the runtime's credential resolution from config text alone.
2. Require request-level evidence before calling something a FAULT: an observed auth failure in the agent's log, or the absence of successful calls in the window.
3. If calls are succeeding, the correct output is "POLICY: uses <provider> directly; calls succeeding" - not a violation.
4. State what you OBSERVED, not what the field implies.
## Known Bug: `api_key_env` Ignored by Auxiliary Client
**Bug location**: `agent/auxiliary_client.py` → `_resolve_task_provider_model()` (line ~5478)
@@ -224,9 +186,7 @@ Abiba (CT100) runs pi via PM2 with the Zulip extension.
Config files: `~/.pi/agent/models.json`, `~/.pi/agent/settings.json`.
**models.json** — Must only list models authorized for the agent's LiteLLM key.
`/v1/models` is key-scoped and the live registry is CT 116
`/opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml`; treat the list below as a snapshot and re-read
the registry before applying. Key is injected via `infisical run --` wrapper at PM2 startup:
Key is injected via `infisical run --` wrapper at PM2 startup:
```json
{
"providers": {
@@ -238,7 +198,9 @@ the registry before applying. Key is injected via `infisical run --` wrapper at
{ "id": "syslog-auto" },
{ "id": "strix-moe" },
{ "id": "gpu-dense" },
{ "id": "gpu-vision" }
{ "id": "gpu-light" },
{ "id": "qwen3.6-27B-code" },
{ "id": "gemma-4-12b" }
]
}
}
+64 -173
View File
@@ -5,13 +5,8 @@ description: >
Standard Hermes configuration template for Syslog Solution LLC agents.
Enforces shared infrastructure setup (Firecrawl, SearXNG, local models,
RA-H OS MCP) while keeping agent-specific API keys and model choices.
UPDATED 2026-09-27: Clarified the Auxiliary Tasks policy — light aux (vision,
web_extract/browsing) -> gpu-vision (RTX 5070); context-heavy aux (compression) ->
syslog-auto (2026-07-23 decision, Rule 7). Removed the false "one model for all
auxiliary" / "never syslog-auto" claim; stated gpu-dense + strix-moe are the reasoning
hosts and aux should not be pinned to them. Now matches audit-hermes-config.py line-for-line.
UPDATED 2026-08-07: Added litellm MCP server entry; updated Rule 15 (MCP Validation)
to enforce REAL key headers (not env-vars) from the 2026-08-07 keyless-MCP incident.
UPDATED 2026-07-16: Compression model is the stable alias `strix-moe` (NOT `ornith-1.0-35b`,
which LiteLLM does not serve). All 3 GPUs verified at 128K (reduced from 256K 2026-07-17 for stability).
Added Rule 12 (Context-Issue Diagnostic) + Rule 13 (.env fallback enforcement) from the
2026-07-16 Mumuni root-cause investigation (WAL #1300).
UPDATED 2026-07-12: GPU workload redistributed. Compression → Strix Halo. RTX 3090 context verified at 128K. Infisical .env fallback required (Rule 3/13).
@@ -21,28 +16,10 @@ description: >
- template_version: "2.1.0"
- last_applied: timestamp
- agents_configured: ["mumuni", "abiba", "koby", "koonimo", "kagenz0"] # tanko removed 2026-08-27 (now on DSH/DeepSeek Harness)
- agents_configured: ["tanko", "mumuni", "abiba", "koby", "koonimo", "kagenz0"]
- agent_keys: map (see Agent Keys section)
- infra_endpoints_verified: array
## Reachability Detection
Before auditing the config template, verify the host is reachable and can be checked. Use the shared reachability helper from the clone root:
```bash
# Run on each host to check reachability (Tanko, Mumuni, Koonimo, Koby)
scripts/hermes-reachability-check.sh <host> "base_url:" "/root/.hermes/config.yaml"
# Example: scripts/hermes-reachability-check.sh 192.168.68.122 "base_url:" "/root/.hermes/config.yaml"
# Expected outcomes:
# - UNREACHABLE: SSH connection failed (host is down)
# - VIOLATION: SSH succeeded and found matches (report the finding)
# - COMPLIANT: SSH succeeded and found no matches (no base_url in config)
#
# NOTE: The bug this replaces was deriving reachability from the remote grep's exit code.
# The correct pattern: remote side always succeeds (grep ...; true), so ssh status = connection only.
```
## Agent Keys (LiteLLM — Current 2026-07-11)
Each agent has a unique LiteLLM API key (virtual key) generated against the LiteLLM
@@ -54,6 +31,8 @@ Sub-agent profiles inherit auth from the main config — no separate keys needed
| Agent | Key Alias | Host | SSH | Sub-Agents |
|-------|-----------|------|-----|-----------|
| Tanko | `tanko-*` | 192.168.68.122 | jerome@.122 | — |
| Mumuni | `mumuni` | 192.168.68.24 | root@.24 | 6 profiles ✱ |
| Abiba | `abiba-pi` | 192.168.68.24 | local | — |
| Koby | `koby` | CT 111 (tdunna) | Zulip | — |
| Koonimo | `koonimo` | CT 113 (baggy) | SSH root | — |
@@ -69,7 +48,7 @@ Sub-agent profiles inherit auth from the main config — no separate keys needed
| Component | Endpoint | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| Firecrawl | `http://192.168.68.7:3002/` | Web content extraction |
| SearXNG | `http://192.168.68.7:8888` | Privacy-respecting web search |
| SearXNG | `http://storepve:8888` | Privacy-respecting web search |
| LiteLLM | `http://192.168.68.116/v1` | Unified model gateway (via nginx) |
| LiteLLM (NetBird) | `https://litellm.sysloggh.net/v1` | Alternative (may have 502 issues) |
| RA-H OS MCP | `http://192.168.68.65:3100/mcp` | Knowledge graph bridge |
@@ -116,17 +95,13 @@ work immediately after restart.
```yaml
# ─── Model Selection ───
model:
default: <agent_model> # e.g., strix-moe, gpu-dense, syslog-auto
default: <agent_model> # e.g., strix-moe, qwen3.6-27B-code, syslog-auto
provider: harness
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1 # Rule 5 (2026-08-09): canonical authenticated path; /v1 also OK
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1
api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY # Injected via infisical run -- wrapper
max_tokens: 4096 # ⚠️ CRITICAL: Prevents unbounded generation
context_length: 131072 # Conservative floor for syslog-auto (NVIDIA hosts 128K; Strix Halo 256K).
# ⚠️ MANDATORY: Hermes probes unknown models from 256K
# and falls back to 256K when /v1/models lacks a context
# field (llama-server does). Without this override, agents
# silently run syslog-auto at 256K (verified 2026-08-09).
# Set 65536 if pinning a single model directly (tight VRAM).
context_length: 131072 # For syslog-auto (all GPUs at 128K for stability).
# Set 65536 if using gemma-4-12b directly (tight VRAM).
fallback_providers:
provider: deepseek
@@ -151,19 +126,13 @@ mcp_servers:
url: http://192.168.68.65:3100/mcp
timeout: 120
connect_timeout: 60
litellm:
url: https://litellm.sysloggh.net/mcp
headers:
x-litellm-api-key: "Bearer <AGENT_KEY>" # Rule 15: must be a REAL key (sk-...), not an env-var name
# Note: MCP endpoint requires Accept: application/json, text/event-stream header
# This is handled by the MCP client library; don't add to config
# ─── Compression ───
compression:
enabled: true
model: syslog-auto # ⚠️ Must match auxiliary.compression.model. Stable alias (gpu-fleet § Stable Role-Based Aliases). NOT ornith-1.0-35b (LiteLLM does not serve that name).
provider: harness
max_context_window: 131072 # MUST stay at the syslog-auto pool floor: NVIDIA hosts are 128K, Strix Halo 256K (2026-09-12).
max_context_window: 131072 # MUST match actual GPU capacity. All 3 GPUs are 128K (Jul 17).
threshold: 0.65 # Fires at ~170K for 262K window, ~85K for 128K
target_ratio: 0.30
protect_last_n: 40
@@ -172,53 +141,50 @@ compression:
abort_on_summary_failure: false
# ─── Auxiliary Tasks (CONSISTENCY RULE) ───
# Auxiliary tasks split into TWO model classes — do NOT assume one model for all:
# Light auxiliary (vision, web_extract/browsing) -> model: gpu-vision # RTX 5070
# Keeps the reasoning hosts (gpu-dense / strix-moe) free for agent prompts.
# Context-heavy auxiliary (compression) -> model: syslog-auto # weighted pool
# Deliberate per the 2026-07-23 OPERATIONAL DECISION in Rule 7: summarization
# runs against long histories and must be able to use the pool.
# Do NOT pin auxiliary work to the reasoning hosts (gpu-dense / strix-moe).
# All auxiliary services share identical ROUTING (base_url + api_key_env), not model:
# base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1 # Rule 5 (2026-08-09): canonical authenticated; /v1 also OK
# All auxiliary services MUST use identical model, base_url, and api_key_env:
# model: gpu-light # stable alias (NOT raw "gemma-4-12b")
# base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1
# api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
# NEVER use retired model names (qwen3.6-27B-code, qwen3.6-35B-udq4; gemma-4-12b is retired
# and no longer resolves) in agent configs — use the stable aliases so model swaps don't break agents.
# Do NOT use syslog-auto for auxiliary tasks — it routes to the primary GPU.
# gpu-light = RTX 5070 (12B), freeing the Strix Halo for agent reasoning.
# Heavy aux (delegation, x_search) use gpu-dense (RTX 3090) instead.
# NEVER use raw model names (gemma-4-12b, qwen3.6-27B-code, qwen3.6-35B-udq4)
# in agent configs — use the stable aliases so model swaps don't break agents.
auxiliary:
vision:
provider: harness
model: gpu-vision # stable alias for RTX 5070
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1 # Rule 5 (2026-08-09): canonical authenticated; /v1 also OK
model: gpu-light # stable alias for RTX 5070 (was raw gemma-4-12b)
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1
api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
timeout: 60
download_timeout: 30
web_extract:
provider: harness
model: gpu-vision # stable alias for RTX 5070
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1 # Rule 5 (2026-08-09): canonical authenticated; /v1 also OK
model: gpu-light # stable alias for RTX 5070
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1
api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
timeout: 30
compression:
provider: harness
model: syslog-auto # MUST match compression.model above. Stable alias for Strix Halo (weighted pool).
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1 # Rule 5 (2026-08-09): canonical authenticated path; /v1 also OK
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1 # Rule 5: /v1 NOT /litellm/v1
api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
timeout: 300 # gpu-fleet: 300s for large-history summarization (was 60)
# ─── Delegation / Heavy Aux (use gpu-dense = RTX 3090) ───
# delegation.model and x_search.model use gpu-dense (NOT retired raw name).
# delegation.model and x_search.model use gpu-dense (NOT raw qwen3.6-27B-code).
delegation:
model: gpu-dense # stable alias for RTX 3090
model: gpu-dense # stable alias for RTX 3090 (was raw qwen3.6-27B-code)
provider: harness
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1 # Rule 5 (2026-08-09): canonical authenticated; /v1 also OK
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1
api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
# ─── Custom Provider ───
custom_providers:
- name: harness
model: syslog-auto # weighted pool (default)
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1 # Rule 5 (2026-08-09): canonical authenticated; /v1 also OK
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1
api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
api_mode: chat_completions
```
@@ -232,60 +198,6 @@ When LiteLLM keys are regenerated (e.g., after infrastructure changes):
3. **After update**: Restart Hermes on the agent host
4. **Verify**: `curl -H "Authorization: Bearer sk-<KEY>" http://192.168.68.116/v1/models`
## MCP Server Configuration
MCP server entries in `mcp_servers:` must follow the format shown in the Template section.
**Header requirements (Rule 15):**
- Use `headers:` field with a `x-litellm-api-key` entry
- The value must be `"Bearer <REAL_KEY>"` where `<REAL_KEY>` is a literal LiteLLM virtual key
- Do NOT use env-var references like `$LITELLM_API_KEY` — they resolve to empty strings in
the static config and cause "Malformed API Key" errors (2026-08-07 Tanko incident)
**Key source:**
- Keys are stored in the Infisical vault (project=agents, env=production)
- For template-based config generation: substitute the agent's key from the agent_keys table
- For manual config updates: retrieve the key from the vault and insert the literal value
**Verification (2026-08-07):**
- Tested MCP initialize handshake against litellm.sysloggh.net/mcp with agent virtual key
- Confirmed: 200 response with `serverInfo.name: "litellm-mcp-server"`
- Confirmed: tools/list returns 200 (MCP endpoint accessible with virtual keys)
- Note: Per-key MCP grants are now supported (verified 2026-09-18), resolving the earlier
contradiction with infrastructure-update.prose.md (which now reflects the update)
- Key requirement: must be a valid LiteLLM virtual key (HTTP 200 on /v1/models)
**Key rotation note:**
- MCP headers use literal keys (not env-vars), so they do NOT auto-rotate with the vault
- After key rotation, MCP server headers must be regenerated with the new key value
- This is a manual step: update the `x-litellm-api-key` header in each config file
- TODO: Consider adding MCP header regeneration to the Key Update Procedure or a generation hook
**NetBird dependency:**
- `litellm.sysloggh.net` is a NetBird endpoint (see Rule 5 and Infrastructure Stack table)
- NetBird outages cause 502 errors on MCP requests, not auth failures
- Diagnose: if MCP requests fail with 502, check NetBird status before investigating keys
## Violation Classification
When reporting findings, separate POLICY observations from FAULT findings:
### POLICY (observation only, not a fault)
- Agent uses a non-internal-harness provider (e.g., direct DeepSeek, Tencent, OpenRouter)
- Config text has a field that looks unusual but the agent's calls are succeeding
- Example: "POLICY: Koonimo uses deepseek directly; calls succeeding in last hour"
### FAULT (requires request-level evidence)
- Agent's calls are failing with auth errors (401/403 in logs)
- Agent's config has no valid API key AND calls are failing
- Example: "FAULT: Koby's LiteLLM key expired; 401 observed at 2026-09-14 11:42:00"
### Rules
1. Do NOT infer the runtime's credential resolution from config text alone.
2. Require request-level evidence before calling something a FAULT: an observed auth failure in the agent's log, or the absence of successful calls in the window.
3. If calls are succeeding, the correct output is "POLICY: uses <provider> directly; calls succeeding" - not a violation.
4. State what you OBSERVED, not what the field implies.
## Configuration Rules
### Rule 1: Shared Infra Is Locked
@@ -322,13 +234,10 @@ The following MUST be identical across ALL profiles:
- When main config uses `api_key_env`, sub-agents automatically use it
- This means key rotation only touches ONE vault secret (`LITELLM_API_KEY`)
### Rule 5: Main Config Base URL (UPDATED 2026-08-09)
|- Use the authenticated LiteLLM path: `http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1` (canonical, captain-approved migration)
|- Legacy `http://192.68.68.116/v1` also works — nginx fronts BOTH paths with key auth
(verified 2026-08-09: 401 without key, 200 with key, on both /v1 and /litellm/v1)
|- Both locations have `proxy_read_timeout 600s` (verified in harness-nginx nginx.conf) —
the old "60s timeout on /litellm/" claim was stale and is retracted
### Rule 5: Main Config Base URL
|- Use direct IP: `http://192.168.68.116/v1`
|- NOT the NetBird URL (`litellm.sysloggh.net`) — can cause 502 when NetBird is down
|- NOT the old path (`/litellm/v1`) — nginx now routes `/v1` directly
### Rule 6: max_tokens Is Required (Thermal Safety)
- **Every Hermes config MUST set `model.max_tokens: 4096`** — this is non-negotiable
@@ -339,54 +248,52 @@ The following MUST be identical across ALL profiles:
- For agents needing longer outputs: raise to 8192, but never omit
### Rule 7: Auxiliary Model Consistency (UPDATED 2026-07-16)
- Vision and web_extract use `gpu-vision` (RTX 5070 — 12GB, vision-optimized)
- Compression uses `syslog-auto` — the Strix Halo weighted pool (64GB, 256K ctx, compression-optimized); do NOT pin `compression.model` to `strix-moe` (audit Rule 7 rejects it)
- **`ornith-1.0-35b` is NOT a valid compression model name** — LiteLLM does not serve it
(do not restate the served model list here — CT 116 `/opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml`
is the single source of truth for models, aliases, weights and fallbacks). Old configs with `ornith-1.0-35b` cause 403/model-not-found on compression calls.
- Vision and web_extract use `gemma-4-12b` (RTX 5070 — 12GB, vision-optimized)
- Compression uses `strix-moe` (stable alias for Strix Halo — 64GB, 128K ctx, compression-optimized)
- **`strix-moe` is the only valid compression model name** — LiteLLM does NOT serve `ornith-1.0-35b`
(it serves `strix-moe`, `qwen3.6-35B-udq4`, `gpu-dense`, `gpu-light`, `syslog-auto`, `gemma-4-12b`, `qwen3.6-27B-code`). Old configs with `ornith-1.0-35b` cause 403/model-not-found on compression calls.
- **OPERATIONAL DECISION (2026-07-23): Use `syslog-auto` for compression across all agents.**
The `syslog-auto` alias routes to the Strix Halo, but uses the weighted pool instead of pinning
to `strix-moe` directly. This prevents sustained Strix Halo thermal load because the pool can
fall back to other GPUs if Strix gets hot. Both `compression.model` and `auxiliary.compression.model`
MUST be `syslog-auto`.
- All auxiliary services MUST use identical routing:
- `base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1` (Rule 5, 2026-08-09: canonical authenticated; `/v1` also OK)
- `base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1` (Rule 5: `/v1`, NOT `/litellm/v1`)
- `api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY`
- **Do NOT use `syslog-auto` for `vision`/`web_extract`** — it routes unpredictably; compression is the deliberate exception (see the OPERATIONAL DECISION above)
- **Do NOT use `syslog-auto`** for auxiliary tasks — it routes unpredictably
- **Compression on Strix Halo**: The strix-moe alias routes to Strix Halo
(64GB UMA, 256K context) — the designated compression GPU. This frees the
(64GB UMA, 128K context) — the designated compression GPU. This frees the
RTX 5070 for vision and web search, and the RTX 3090 for heavy reasoning.
- The `compression:` block's `model` MUST match `auxiliary: compression: model`
- The `compression: max_context_window: 131072` MUST stay at the syslog-auto pool floor (NVIDIA hosts 128K; Strix Halo 256K)
- The `compression: max_context_window: 131072` MUST match actual GPU capacity (128K)
### Rule 8: GPU Workload Distribution (UPDATED 2026-07-16)
- **RTX 3090 (24GB, 128K ctx, gpu-dense)**: Heavy reasoning, code gen, long conversations
- **RTX 5070 (12GB, 128K ctx, gpu-vision)**: Vision, web search, quick tasks, web_extract (IQ4_NL+MTP, ~65% VRAM at 128K)
- **Strix Halo (64GB, 256K ctx, syslog-auto)**: Context compression, summarization, long docs
- **RTX 3090 (24GB, 128K ctx, qwen3.6-27B-code)**: Heavy reasoning, code gen, long conversations
- **RTX 5070 (12GB, 128K ctx, gemma-4-12b)**: Vision, web search, quick tasks, web_extract (IQ4_NL+MTP, ~65% VRAM at 128K)
- **Strix Halo (64GB, 128K ctx, syslog-auto)**: Context compression, summarization, long docs
- Agent profiles MUST route auxiliary tasks to the correct GPU:
- `auxiliary.vision.model: gpu-vision` (RTX 5070)
- `auxiliary.web_extract.model: gpu-vision` (RTX 5070)
- `auxiliary.vision.model: gemma-4-12b` (RTX 5070)
- `auxiliary.web_extract.model: gemma-4-12b` (RTX 5070)
- `auxiliary.compression.model: syslog-auto` (Strix Halo)
- Default model (`model.default`) and custom_provider remain `syslog-auto` for auto-routing
- For 128K context window: `threshold: 0.65` (fires at ~85K tokens)
- Do NOT use `threshold: 0.25` — this fires at 65K, causing premature context loss
- Do NOT use `threshold: 0.80` — this delays until ~105K, leaving only 23K margin
- `max_context_window: 131072` MUST stay at the pool floor (NVIDIA hosts 128K; Strix Halo 256K)
- `max_context_window: 131072` MUST match the model's actual capacity (128K)
- See `devops-hermes-compression` skill for full reference
### Rule 9: Compression Threshold for 128K Models
- For 128K context window: `threshold: 0.65` (fires at ~85K tokens)
- Do NOT use `threshold: 0.25` — this fires at 65K, causing premature context loss
- Do NOT use `threshold: 0.80` — this delays until ~105K, leaving only 23K margin
- `max_context_window: 131072` MUST stay at the pool floor (NVIDIA hosts 128K; Strix Halo 256K)
- `max_context_window: 131072` MUST match the model's actual capacity (all GPUs = 128K)
- See `devops-hermes-compression` skill for full reference
### Rule 10: Default Model Must Be `syslog-auto` (All Agents)
- **Koby Exception**: Per captain ruling 2026-08-11, Koby is a DeepSeek-primary external agent; its primary model remains `deepseek-v4-flash` (via api.deepseek.com to preserve DeepSeek-specific reasoning, while other sections follow Rule 10.
- **Hermes agents**: `model.default: syslog-auto`, `custom_providers[0].model: syslog-auto`
- **pi agents**: `defaultModel: syslog-auto` in `settings.json`, first model in `models.json`
- `syslog-auto` is the LiteLLM routing model — it load-balances across the live pool
(see CT 116 `/opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml` for the current members and weights). Using it protects against:
- `syslog-auto` is the LiteLLM routing model — it load-balances between strix-moe
and qwen3.6-27B-code, with gemma-4-12b as fallback. Using it protects against:
- Model name typos that cause 403 errors and silent worker failures
- Single GPU downtime (routing falls back automatically)
- Key/model authorization mismatches
@@ -409,16 +316,12 @@ When an agent shows "context issues" (premature compression, 401s, 504s, DeepSee
verify ALL FOUR of these against the live config. They are the only root causes found in production:
1. **max_context_window correct?** — BOTH `compression.max_context_window` AND `context.max_context_window`
MUST be `131072` (the syslog-auto pool floor: NVIDIA hosts are 128K; Strix Halo is 256K).
A `262144` client window can route to a 128K NVIDIA host and fail, so it must NOT be used.
MUST be `131072` (all GPUs are 128K). A value of `262144` causes instability near 100K and must NOT be used.
~83K instead of ~170K. Check: `grep -n max_context_window ~/.hermes/config.yaml`
2. **base_url uses authenticated path?** — `custom_providers[0].base_url`, `delegation.base_url`,
and ALL `auxiliary.*.base_url` MUST be `http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1` (Rule 5, canonical)
or `http://192.168.68.116/v1` (legacy, still authenticated via nginx). BOTH verified 200 with
key + 600s proxy_read_timeout on 2026-08-09. Never bare `:4000` direct.
Check: `grep -nE 'base_url: http://192.168.68.116(:4000)?/v1' ~/.hermes/config.yaml` — the
ONLY paths allowed are `/v1` or `/litellm/v1` (both via nginx :80).
`:4000` or missing `litellm/v1`/`v1` prefix = violation.
2. **base_url uses /v1 NOT /litellm/v1?** — `custom_providers[0].base_url`, `delegation.base_url`,
and ALL `auxiliary.*.base_url` MUST be `http://192.168.68.116/v1` (Rule 5). nginx `/litellm/`
has a 60s default timeout → 504 on any inference >60s; `/v1/` has 600s.
Check: `grep -n 'litellm/v1' ~/.hermes/config.yaml` (must return NOTHING)
3. **LITELLM_API_KEY valid?** — The key must be a real LiteLLM key (`sk-` + 64 hex, 67 chars).
Malformed values (e.g. `sk-_SWAl_Vu_…`, 47 chars) return 401 → DeepSeek fallback.
Verify: `curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -H "Authorization: Bearer $LITELLM_API_KEY" http://192.168.68.116/v1/models` (must be 200)
@@ -504,29 +407,6 @@ curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -H "Authorization: Bearer $K" http://192.
- **Audit script**: Run `python3 /root/prose-contracts/audit-hermes-config.py <config.yaml>`
before and after any config change to catch this and all other rule violations.
### Rule 15: MCP Endpoint and Header Validation (UPDATED 2026-08-07)
**Endpoint validation:**
- ra-h-os must point to `http://192.168.68.65:3100/mcp`
- litellm must point to `https://litellm.sysloggh.net/mcp`
- Mismatched endpoints cause silent failures (e.g., 2026-08-07 incident: Tanko's config had
ra-h-os pointing to litellm's endpoint)
**Header validation:**
- Every MCP entry with authentication must carry a `headers:` field
- The header value must be a REAL key (e.g., `Bearer sk-abc123...`), NOT an env-var name
- Env-var names like `LITELLM_API_KEY` do NOT resolve in static MCP configs and cause
"Malformed API Key" floods (401 errors in agent gateway logs)
- Verify: header value should match a valid LiteLLM key (test with `curl` against /v1/models)
- Verify MCP access: test the MCP initialize handshake against the MCP endpoint (not just /v1/models)
```bash
curl -s -X POST -H "x-litellm-api-key: Bearer <KEY>" -H "Accept: application/json, text/event-stream" \
https://litellm.sysloggh.net/mcp -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize",...}' \
| jq '.data.result.serverInfo' # should show serverInfo.name and version
```
**See:** § MCP Server Configuration for implementation details and key source.
## Execution
1. **Check current config** — Read the target agent's config.yaml
@@ -536,3 +416,14 @@ curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -H "Authorization: Bearer $K" http://192.
5. **Set model choice** — Per agent's workload
6. **Verify** — curl all shared endpoints, test the model with the new key
7. **Report** — What was changed, preserved, custom
### Rule 17: Koby Report-Only (URGENT — 2026-08-17, Captain)
**Koby (CT 111, .129, tdunna/Theo) is report-only, full stop.**
No heal step, no restart, no key rotation, no config edit, no memory rewrite,
no disk GC, no service touch, no process kill — **ever**.
Do NOT "repair" Koby under any circumstance, even if a health check shows it degraded.
Detect + report to Zulip (Theo fixes it).
This supersedes every other instruction in this file.
If a rule would trigger a Koby repair action, SKIP it and emit a diagnostic alert.
+27 -101
View File
@@ -16,26 +16,7 @@ author: Abiba (pi agent)
## Rule (One Sentence)
**All harness/litellm providers MUST use `api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY` with canonical internal path `http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1` (Hermes appends `/v1/responses`) or public path `https://litellm.sysloggh.net/v1` — hardcoded keys AND direct `:4000` access are both forbidden. Internal `/v1` still works but is non-canonical (WARN, not FAIL).**
**Cloud provider models (OpenRouter, DeepSeek, Google AI Studio, QwenCloud PAYG/Plan, Tencent TokenHub PAYG/Plan) added to CT 116 on 2026-09-20 are reachable ONLY through the designated cloud-enabled key. Standard agent keys remain LOCAL-ONLY (`strix-moe`, `gpu-dense`, `gpu-vision`, `syslog-auto`) and MUST NOT be granted cloud models unless explicitly approved by the captain.**
## Model Access Tiers (2026-09-20)
CT 116 hosts two **access tiers** of model. Tier membership is enforced per virtual key via that key's `models` allowlist.
| Tier | Models | Who gets it |
|------|--------|-------------|
| **Local** | `strix-moe`, `gpu-dense`, `gpu-vision`, `syslog-auto` | All standard agent keys (tanko, mumuni, koby, koonimo, abiba-pi) |
| **Cloud** | 47 provider models: `openrouter/*`, `deepseek/*`, `google/*`, `qwen-payg/*`, `qwen-plan/*`, `tencent-payg/*`, `tencent-plan/*` | **Only** the designated cloud-enabled key (captain decision) |
**Rules:**
1. A key with an empty `models` list (`{}`) or `all-proxy-models` is UNSCOPED — it silently gains ALL models, including cloud. Never create or leave an agent key in this state.
2. Agent keys MUST carry an **explicit local-only** `models` list.
3. Granting a cloud model to an agent key requires explicit captain approval and a recorded reason.
4. The master key always bypasses scoping — it is admin-only, never for inference.
See `litellm-api-keys` § Cloud Provider Consolidation for the key-creation procedure.
**All harness/litellm providers MUST use `api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY` with authenticated path `http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1/responses` — hardcoded keys AND unauthenticated `/v1` direct access are both forbidden.**
## Scope
@@ -53,12 +34,11 @@ Syslog is migrating away from **unauthenticated direct access** to the shared in
| Path | Auth | Status |
|------|------|--------|
| `http://192.168.68.116/v1` | Bearer `sk-*` key (nginx-fronted) | ✅ **VALID** — authenticated via nginx :80 (verified 2026-08-09: 401 without key, 200 with) |
| `http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1` | Bearer `sk-*` key (nginx-fronted) | ✅ **CURRENT / CANONICAL** — captain-approved migration target; 600s proxy_read_timeout (verified) |
| `http://192.168.68.116:4000/v1` | Bearer `sk-*` key (direct container) | ❌ **FORBIDDEN** — bypasses nginx; port 4000 direct is not a config path |
| `http://192.168.68.116/v1` | None (direct) | ❌ **DEPRECATED** — being phased out |
| `http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1/responses` | Bearer `sk-*` key | ✅ **CURRENT** — authenticated LiteLLM proxy |
All harness/litellm providers MUST use an authenticated nginx-fronted path (`/litellm/v1` canonical, `/v1` non-canonical but working).
The public host `https://litellm.sysloggh.net` serves `/v1` ONLY (404 on `/litellm/v1`).
All harness/litellm providers MUST use the authenticated `/litellm/v1/responses` path.
Any `base_url` pointing to bare `/v1` on 192.168.68.116 is a **migration violation**.
### 🔥 CRITICAL: Double-Path Bug (2026-07-10)
@@ -120,7 +100,7 @@ auxiliary:
fallback_providers:
- provider: deepseek
base_url: https://api.deepseek.com
api_key: sk-synthetic-external-example # ← hardcoded OK (external, synthetic example)
api_key: sk-b7d9... # ← hardcoded OK (external)
api_key_env: DEEPSEEK_API_KEY # ← also OK if set in environment (vault or /etc/environment)
```
@@ -128,62 +108,14 @@ fallback_providers:
# ❌ FORBIDDEN — hardcoded key (top) OR unauthenticated path (bottom)
model:
provider: harness
api_key: sk-synthetic-example-12345 # ← RULE VIOLATION: hardcoded key (synthetic example)
api_key: sk-Flc62smlegyMEaSo1ka8JA # ← RULE VIOLATION: hardcoded key
model:
provider: harness
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1 # ← NON-CANONICAL but WORKING (authenticated via nginx, WARN not FAIL)
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1 # ← RULE VIOLATION: unauthenticated path
api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
```
## Reachability Detection
Before checking for hardcoded keys, verify the host is reachable and can be audited. Use the shared reachability helper from the clone root:
```bash
# Run on each host to check reachability (Tanko, Mumuni, Koonimo, Koby)
scripts/hermes-reachability-check.sh <host> "api_key: sk-" "/root/.hermes/"
# Example: scripts/hermes-reachability-check.sh 192.168.68.122 "api_key: sk-" "/root/.hermes/"
# Expected outcomes:
# - UNREACHABLE: SSH connection failed (host is down)
# - VIOLATION: SSH succeeded and found matches (report the finding)
# - COMPLIANT: SSH succeeded and found no matches (no hardcoded keys in config)
#
# NOTE: The bug this replaces was deriving reachability from the remote grep's exit code.
# The correct pattern: remote side always succeeds (grep ...; true), so ssh status = connection only.
```
## Violation Classification
When reporting findings, separate POLICY observations from FAULT findings:
### ACCEPTABLE PATTERN
Agent keys live in `.env` or `.env.vault` files with 600 permissions (koonimo's shape is the canonical example). A plaintext key inside a `config.yaml` or any `config.yaml.bak-*` file is a violation — the backup files are not part of the runtime credential path and are not watched by the scanner, so a key in them is stale clutter that a future reader can mistake for a working key.
**Fix procedure** (when a backup file is found with a plaintext key):
1. Move the file out of the scanned tree (e.g., `mv /root/.hermes/config.yaml.bak-* /root/hermes-config-backups/`) — do NOT delete the file, just move it so the scanner pattern no longer matches.
2. Re-run the reachability check to confirm COMPLIANT.
3. Report the before/after check output and the commands you ran.
**Rationale**: Moving the file preserves history without leaving a credential where a scanner trips over it. Deleting the file loses the historical context. Keeping it in place means the next scan will report it as a finding and waste time re-deciding.
### POLICY (observation only, not a fault)
- Agent uses a non-internal-harness provider (e.g., direct DeepSeek, Tencent, OpenRouter)
- Config text has a field that looks unusual but the agent's calls are succeeding
- Example: "POLICY: Koonimo uses deepseek directly; calls succeeding in last hour"
### FAULT (requires request-level evidence)
- Agent's calls are failing with auth errors (401/403 in logs)
- Agent's config has no valid API key AND calls are failing
- Example: "FAULT: Koby's LiteLLM key expired; 401 observed at 2026-09-14 11:42:00"
### Rules
1. Do NOT infer the runtime's credential resolution from config text alone.
2. Require request-level evidence before calling something a FAULT: an observed auth failure in the agent's log, or the absence of successful calls in the window.
3. If calls are succeeding, the correct output is "POLICY: uses <provider> directly; calls succeeding" - not a violation.
4. State what you OBSERVED, not what the field implies.
## Detection Query
Run on any Hermes host to detect violations:
@@ -201,7 +133,7 @@ grep -rn 'litellm/v1/responses' /root/.hermes/config.yaml
# 2. Check systemd drop-ins for master key leaks (2026-07-05: Tanko had this)
grep -rn 'LITELLM_API_KEY' /root/.config/systemd/user/ 2>/dev/null
grep -rn 'LITELLM_API_KEY=sk-synthetic-litellm-…' /root/.config/systemd/ 2>/dev/null
grep -rn 'LITELLM_API_KEY=sk-litellm-7f96080d' /root/.config/systemd/ 2>/dev/null
# 3. Verify running process env matches dedicated key
cat /proc/$(cat /home/jerome/.hermes/gateway.pid | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['pid'])")/environ \
@@ -236,22 +168,16 @@ The agent picks up the new key via `infisical run --` at gateway startup.
**Keys are permanent and use bare agent name aliases.**
- **Duration**: `null` — keys never expire by default. **Expiry must be set EXPLICITLY at creation** with the `duration` parameter (e.g., `90d` for 90 days). The 90-day default is the standard; however, the config default is **NOT honoured** by LiteLLM 1.99.1 (verified on CT 116: a key generated with no explicit duration returns `expires=null`). This has been recorded in `/opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml` to prevent re-filing as a bug.
- **Daily Audit**: A daily audit job runs at 00:00 UTC (`/usr/local/bin/litellm-key-renewal-ct116.sh`, cron 00:00). It is **AUDIT-ONLY** and does not perform renewal. It lists every key, reports those with no expiry and those inside a 14-day warning window, explicitly EXCLUDES `abiba-pi` and `koby` (report-only, and .129 must never be touched), and logs `RENEWAL-REQUIRED-BUT-NOT-PERFORMED + NO KEY WAS CHANGED` when renewal is skipped. **Renewal is NOT implemented** — keys must not be rotated until delivery (vault injection + consumer verification) exists and is proven end-to-end.
- **Exclusions**: `abiba-pi` and every firstmate/secondmate/crewmate key stay **WITHOUT an expiry** until a proven renewal path exists. `koby` is **report-only** (never touched). These exclusions are enforced by the audit job.
- **Duration**: `null` — keys never expire. This is enforced by `default_key_generate_params` in `litellm_config.yaml`.
- **Alias convention**: bare agent name only (e.g., `tanko`, `mumuni`, `koby`, `koonimo`). No dates, no versions. The alias IS the identity.
- **Rotation triggers**: compromise, personnel departure, or quarterly security hygiene. NOT calendar-driven. Manual rotation is permitted only when the renewal delivery path is proven and verified on a throwaway consumer before production use.
- **Rotation triggers**: compromise, personnel departure, or quarterly security hygiene. NOT calendar-driven.
- **Max budget**: $100 per key (config default).
```yaml
# NOT currently set in the authority; recommended value. CT 116 litellm_config.yaml has no
# default_key_generate_params block today, and a key generated with no explicit models comes back
# with an EMPTY models list. `models` is a literal key-generation parameter, so this is a value to
# ADD — re-read the live registry at CT 116 /opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml and
# re-verify before applying.
# In litellm_config.yaml — ensures all future keys inherit these defaults:
litellm_settings:
default_key_generate_params:
models: ["syslog-auto", "gpu-dense", "gpu-vision", "strix-moe"]
models: ["syslog-auto", "qwen3.6-27B-code", "gemma-4-12b"]
duration: null # ← permanent
max_budget: 100
metadata:
@@ -263,23 +189,23 @@ litellm_settings:
| Agent | CT | IP | LiteLLM Alias | Key Source | Status | Gateway Wrapper | Last Verified |
|-------|-----|-----|---------------|------------|--------|-----------------|---------------|
| Tanko | 112 | .122 | `tanko` | Infisical vault | ✅ Fixed | `infisical run` | 20:17 UTC Jul 5 |
| Mumuni | 105 (kagentz) | .14 | `mumuni` | Infisical vault | ✅ Fixed | systemd Hermes gateway | 2026-08-29 |
| Koby | 111 | .129 | `koby` | Infisical vault | ✅ Fixed (DeepSeek-primary) | `infisical run` | 23:30 UTC Jul 5 |
| Koonimo | 113 | .114 | `koonimo` | Infisical vault | ✅ Fixed | `infisical run` (migrated 2026-07-11) | 2026-08-09 |
| Mumuni | 100 (abiba) | .24 | `mumuni` | Infisical vault | ✅ Fixed | Pi Hermes gateway | 2026-07-27 |
| Koby | 111 | ? | `koby` | Infisical vault | ✅ Fixed | `infisical run` | 23:30 UTC Jul 5 |
| Koonimo | 113 | ? | `koonimo` | Infisical vault | ✅ Fixed | `infisical run` (migrated 2026-07-11) | 2026-07-11 |
| Abiba | 100 | .65 | `abiba-pi` | Infisical vault | ✅ N/A (pi native) | — | 19:44 UTC Jul 5 |
| Kagenz0 | 105 | .14 | — | — | ❌ DOWN | — | 19:14 EDT Jul 4 |
| Kagenz0 | 105 | ? | — | — | ❌ DOWN | — | 19:14 EDT Jul 4 |
> **Note**: CT hostnames (tdunna, baggy) differ from agent identities (koby, koonimo).
> LiteLLM key aliases use agent identity, not CT hostname.
### Migration Status: Authenticated Path
| Agent | `/litellm/v1` | Legacy `/v1` | Status |
|-------|--------------|-------------|--------|
| Mumuni | ✅ harness provider | ✅ auxiliary on /v1 (valid) | ✅ Authenticated (verified 2026-08-09) |
| Tanko | ✅ 5 sections | 0 | ✅ Migrated 2026-08-08, keys 200 |
| Koby | ✅ custom provider (harness name) | — | ✅ External DeepSeek primary (intentional, captain ruling 2026-08-11) |
| Koonimo | ✅ .114 (baggy) | — | ✅ 128K context applied 2026-08-09 |
| Agent | `/litellm/v1/responses` | Deprecated `/v1` | Status |
|-------|--------------------------|--------------------|--------|
| Mumuni | ✅ 5 sections | 0 | ✅ Authenticated |
| Tanko | ⚠️ No SSH access | — | Needs check |
| Koby | ⚠️ No route to host | — | Needs check |
| Koonimo | ⚠️ Connection timed out | — | Needs check |
### Systemd Service Pattern (2026-07-11 — vault migration)
@@ -358,14 +284,14 @@ auxiliary:
vision:
api_key: sk-<agent-key-from-vault> # ← workaround (get via: infisical secrets get LITELLM_API_KEY --project=agents --env=production --plain)
api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1
model: gpu-vision
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1
model: gemma-4-12b
provider: harness
compression:
api_key: sk-<agent-key-from-vault> # ← workaround (same as above)
api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1
model: syslog-auto
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1
model: gemma-4-12b
provider: harness
```
+7 -7
View File
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ connectivity recovery including end-to-end DM validation.
| Param | Type | Required | Default | Description |
|-------|------|----------|---------|-------------|
| `target` | string | yes | — | Agent name: `mumuni`, `koby`, or `shumba` (Tanko excluded — on DSH since 2026-08-27, no Hermes plugin) |
| `target` | string | yes | — | Agent name: `mumuni`, `tanko`, `koby`, or `shumba` |
| `branch` | string | no | `master` | Git branch to pull (overridable for pinning) |
## Maintains
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ connectivity recovery including end-to-end DM validation.
## Requires
- SSH access to target host (direct, or via the guest's Proxmox node for CTs)
- SSH access to target host (direct or via amdpve for CTs)
- Git repo at `https://git.sysloggh.net/SyslogSolution/zulip-platform-plugins.git`
- Python 3 with `httpx` installed on target
@@ -55,8 +55,9 @@ connectivity recovery including end-to-end DM validation.
| Host | CT | Proxmox | IP (direct) | Hermes Home | User |
|------|-----|---------|-------------|-------------|------|
| Tanko | CT112 | minipve | 192.168.68.122 | /home/jerome/.hermes | jerome | *(DSH since 2026-08-27 — historical, plugin retired on this host)* |
| Koby | CT111 | storepve | 192.168.68.129 | /root/.hermes | root |
| Mumuni | CT100 | — | 192.168.68.24 | /root/.hermes | root |
| Tanko | CT112 | amdpve | 192.168.68.122 | /home/jerome/.hermes | jerome |
| Koby | CT111 | amdpve | 192.168.68.129 | /root/.hermes | root |
| Shumba | — | — | 192.168.68.119 | /home/lucky/.hermes | lucky |
| Field | Value | Trust |
@@ -72,7 +73,7 @@ connectivity recovery including end-to-end DM validation.
### Step 1: Resolve Target
Map `target` to host, CT ID, hermes_home, and user from the live-state table.
For CT112 route through `ssh root@minipve`; for CT111 route through `ssh root@storepve` — then `pct exec <id>`.
For CT112 and CT111, route through `ssh root@amdpve` then `pct exec <id>`.
### Step 2: Pull Latest Plugin Source
@@ -120,8 +121,7 @@ cp plugins/platforms/zulip/adapter.py \
plugins/platforms/zulip/plugin.yaml \
{{hermes_home}}/hermes-agent/plugins/platforms/zulip/
# Fix ownership (was Tanko-only, runs as jerome user)
# RETIRED 2026-08-27: tanko no longer uses the Hermes Zulip plugin (DSH).
# Fix ownership (Tanko only — runs as jerome user)
[ "{{target}}" = "tanko" ] && chown -R jerome:jerome \
{{hermes_home}}/hermes-agent/plugins/platforms/zulip/
+11 -7
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ report_only_agents:
kind: function
name: hermes-zulip-restore
description: >
Restores Zulip connectivity for any Hermes agent (Mumuni CT100, Tanko CT112,
Koby CT111, Shumba on Lucky's mini PC). Deploys the zulip-platform adapter to the correct bundled plugin
path, verifies env credentials, restarts the gateway, and confirms Zulip
connects. Run this whenever a Hermes agent stops responding on Zulip or after
a fresh agent deployment.
@@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ gateway restart, and connection validation.
| Param | Type | Required | Default | Description |
|-------|------|----------|---------|-------------|
| `target` | string | yes | — | Agent name: `mumuni`, `koby`, or `shumba` (Tanko excluded — DSH since 2026-08-27) |
| `target` | string | yes | — | Agent name: `mumuni`, `tanko`, `koby`, or `shumba` |
## Maintains
@@ -37,13 +39,13 @@ gateway restart, and connection validation.
- `_strip_html` function present in `<hermes-agent>/plugins/platforms/zulip/adapter.py`
- All three adapter files (__init__.py, adapter.py, plugin.yaml) present at bundled path
- Zulip env vars set in `~/.hermes/.env` (or `/home/jerome/.hermes/.env` for Tanko, historical — DSH since 2026-08-27)
- Zulip env vars set in `~/.hermes/.env` (or `/home/jerome/.hermes/.env` for Tanko)
- Gateway restarted and zulip platform reports state `connected`
- HTML stripping enabled for `/approve` and `/deny` slash command support
## Requires
- SSH access to target host (direct, or via the guest's Proxmox node for CTs)
- SSH access to target host (direct or via amdpve for CTs)
- Git repo at `https://git.sysloggh.net/SyslogSolution/zulip-platform-plugins.git`
- Python 3 with `httpx` installed on target
- Zulip server accessible at `https://chat.sysloggh.net`
@@ -52,7 +54,9 @@ gateway restart, and connection validation.
| Host | CT | Proxmox | IP (direct) | Hermes Home | User |
|------|-----|---------|-------------|-------------|------|
| Koby | CT111 | storepve | 192.168.68.129 | /root/.hermes | root |
| Mumuni | CT100 (abiba) | hwepve | 192.168.68.24 | /root/.hermes | root |
| Tanko | CT112 | amdpve | 192.168.68.122 | /home/jerome/.hermes | jerome |
| Koby | CT111 | amdpve | 192.168.68.129 | /root/.hermes | root |
| Shumba | — | — | 192.168.68.119 | /home/lucky/.hermes | lucky |
| Field | Value | Trust |
@@ -67,7 +71,7 @@ gateway restart, and connection validation.
### Step 1: Locate Target
Map `target` to connectivity parameters from the live-state table above.
For CT112 route through `ssh root@minipve`; for CT111 route through `ssh root@storepve` — then `pct exec <id>`.
For CT112 and CT111, route through `ssh root@amdpve` then `pct exec <id>`.
### Step 2: Deploy Zulip Adapter
@@ -93,8 +97,8 @@ cp zulip-platform-plugins/plugins/platforms/zulip/adapter.py \
zulip-platform-plugins/plugins/platforms/zulip/plugin.yaml \
<HERMES_HOME>/hermes-agent/plugins/platforms/zulip/
# Fix ownership (was Tanko-only; RETIRED 2026-08-27 — tanko on DSH, no Hermes plugin)
chown -R jerome:jerome <HERMES_HOME>/hermes-agent/plugins/platforms/zulip/ # Tanko only (historical)
# Fix ownership (Tanko only)
chown -R jerome:jerome <HERMES_HOME>/hermes-agent/plugins/platforms/zulip/ # Tanko only
# Clean up
rm -rf /tmp/zulip-deploy
+8 -10
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ kind: responsibility
description: >
Optimizes the full Syslog inference stack — LiteLLM routing weights, GPU model
assignments, agent context management, and prompt caching — to reduce response
times to sub-15s average. NVIDIA GPUs at 128K context; Strix Halo at 256K (2026-09-12).
times to sub-15s average. All GPUs now at 128K context (stable ceiling).
id: 067NC6KP02RG60S50M40E30928
---
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ management, and prompt caching — without sacrificing agent capability.
.123, any others on .129/.122) including compression, model, context_window,
prompt_caching, memory settings
- `gpu-health`: health check response from all 3 GPU backends (strix-moe .15:8080,
gpu-dense .8:8080, gpu-vision .110:8080)
qwen .8:8080, gemma .110:8080)
### Maintains
@@ -56,14 +56,14 @@ duration.
**Context is the root cause.** Every ~46K prompt token costs ~87s of
prefill time at 532 tok/s. Fix context first, routing second.
- **Route by task**: gpu-dense for code/standard queries; gpu-vision for
vision/web-auxiliary; syslog-auto for compression.
- **Route by task**: qwen for code/standard queries; gemma for
compression/auxiliary; strix-moe for compression tasks.
- **Compress aggressively**: threshold at 40% (not 65%) — a 128K window should
compact at 51K, not 85K. Target 15% tail (not 30%).
- **Cache everything repeated**: system prompts, skill docs, AGENTS.md — these
never change between turns. Single-digit cache hit rate is unacceptable.
- **Lower context ceiling**: 128K window is the stable ceiling for agent conversations.
GPUs reduced from 256K to 128K (2026-07-17) for the NVIDIA hosts; Strix Halo runs 256K (2026-09-12). 128K window should compact at 85K (0.65 threshold). For larger contexts, route to external providers.
GPUs reduced from 256K to 128K (2026-07-17). 128K window should compact at 85K (0.65 threshold). For larger contexts, route to external providers.
### Shape
@@ -87,8 +87,8 @@ call apply-liteLLM-routing
call apply-agent-compression
agent: mumuni
host: 192.168.68.14
config_path: /home/hermes/.hermes/config.yaml
host: 192.168.68.24
config_path: /root/.hermes/config.yaml
-- Phase 4: Enable llama.cpp prompt caching on GPU hosts
@@ -96,10 +96,8 @@ call enable-prompt-caching
hosts: [192.168.68.15, 192.168.68.8, 192.168.68.110]
-- Phase 5: Verify end-to-end latency
-- `models` is a literal verification parameter (a snapshot only): the authoritative registry is
-- CT 116 /opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml; re-read it before use.
call verify-latency
host: 192.168.68.116
models: [syslog-auto, gpu-dense, gpu-vision, strix-moe]
models: [syslog-auto, qwen3.6-27B-code, gemma-4-12b]
```
+50 -130
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ kind: pattern
name: infrastructure-control
description: >
Full infrastructure monitoring and control pattern covering the
5-node Proxmox cluster, 3 Docker ecosystems (22 containers),
6-node Proxmox cluster, 3 Docker ecosystems (22 containers),
NFS storage, and network services. Defines monitors, remediations,
and the access matrix for all environments.
@@ -13,11 +13,10 @@ description: >
against the live system. Policy fields are authoritative. See the
`verify-before-mutate` skill.
**Last verified:** 2026-08-15 — hwepve removed from Tabiri cluster
(now 5 nodes: minipve, amdpve, storepve, acerpve, ocupve). hwepve
(192.168.68.4) is a standalone PVE node + NetBird routing peer;
London relocation pending. CT 100 (abiba) is on minipve; CT 105
(kagentz) is on amdpve.
**Last verified:** 2026-07-24 — corrected Gitea IP (.17 not .110),
AdGuard IP (.10 not .102), AdGuard placement (minipve not acerpve),
Abiba placement (hwepve not amdpve), added hwepve as 6th node,
added dns.sysloggh.net route.
---
# Infrastructure Control Pattern
@@ -35,21 +34,21 @@ description: >
┌─────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐
│ Abiba │ │ Tanko │ │ Mumuni │
│ (pi) │ │ (Hermes) │ │ (Hermes) │
│ CT 100 │ │ CT 112 │ │ CT 100 │
│ CT 100 │ │ CT 112 │ │ CT 114 │
└──────┬──────┘ └──────┬───────┘ └──────┬───────┘
│ │ │
└──────────────────┼────────────────────┘
▼
┌────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Proxmox Cluster API │
│ minipve.sysloggh.net:443 │
│ (monitoring@pve!mumuni token) │
└────┬──────┬──────┬──────┬──────────┘
│ │ │ │
┌────┘ ┌────┘ ┌────┘ ┌────┘
▼ ▼ ▼ ▼
minipve amdpve storepve acerpve ocupve
(.12) (.15) (.6) (.9) (.5)
┌──────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Proxmox Cluster API │
│ minipve.sysloggh.net:443 │
│ (monitoring@pve!mumuni token) │
└────┬──────┬──────┬──────┬──────┬─────┘
│ │ │ │ │
┌────┘ ┌────┘ ┌────┘ ┌────┘ ┌────┘
▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼
minipve amdpve storepve acerpve ocupve hwepve
(.12) (.15) (.6) (.9) (.5) (.4)
▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────┐
@@ -101,29 +100,21 @@ description: >
## Section 2: Proxmox Cluster — Monitoring
### Nodes (5)
### Nodes (6)
| Node | IP | CPU | RAM | VMs/CTs | Role |
|------|----|-----|-----|---------|------|
| minipve | .12 | 16C | 30GB | abiba, tanko, authentik, gitea, syslog-api, infisical-vault, jitsi | Auth, git, messaging |
| amdpve | .15 | 32C | 62GB | kagentz, baggy, scottdenya, adguard2 | Agents, compute |
| storepve | .6 | 28C | 31GB | docker-vm, ra-h-os, PBS, media, jdownloader, zulip, tdunna | Docker, storage, chat |
| minipve | .12 | 16C | 30GB | authentik, gitea, syslog-api, infisical-vault, jitsi | Auth, git, messaging |
| amdpve | .15 | 32C | 62GB | tanko, tdunna, baggy, scottdenya | Agents, compute |
| storepve | .6 | 28C | 31GB | docker-vm, ra-h-os, PBS, media, jdownloader, zulip | Docker, storage, chat |
| acerpve | .9 | 28C | 31GB | llm-gpu | GPU VMs |
| ocupve | .5 | 12C | 14GB | ocu-llm | GPU VMs |
| hwepve | .4 | 12C | 15GB | abiba, kagentz, (mumuni CT 114 stopped) | Agents (new node) |
> **Note:** CTs on storepve include jdownloader (CT 118) and tdunna (CT 111).
> AdGuard (CT 102) is on minipve at .10, not acerpve. Abiba (CT 100) is on
> minipve (moved from hwepve 2026-08-15); kagentz (CT 105) is on amdpve.
> Mumuni runs inside Abiba CT100 (.24); CT 114 (mumuni) no longer exists in the cluster.
>
> **hwepve (192.168.68.4) — STANDALONE (removed from Tabiri 2026-08-15):**
> Huawei MateBook 16 (KLVL-WXX9), pve-manager/9.2.10, kernel 7.0.14-8-pve.
> Zero VMs/CTs. Being relocated to London as a standalone PVE node + NetBird
> routing peer (relocation pending). Localizations applied: timezone
> Europe/London, lid-switch ignore, sleep/suspend/hibernate targets masked,
> cluster-shared storage removed (remaining: local, local-lvm, storage,
> mediastore). prometheus-node-exporter active on :9100; net.ipv4.ip_forward=1;
> NetBird client not yet installed (enrollment pending setup key).
> **Note:** CTs on storepve include jdownloader (CT 118). AdGuard (CT 102) is on
> minipve at .10, not acerpve. Abiba (CT 100) is on hwepve, not amdpve. Mumuni
> (CT 114) is on hwepve (currently stopped), not minipve. Mumuni also has a
> second instance on minipve at .123 — distinguish by CT ID, not hostname.
### Checks (every 5 min)
@@ -181,8 +172,8 @@ description: >
**Stirling-PDF** (deployed 2026-07-03, Authentik SSO 2026-07-03):
- URL: `https://pdf.sysloggh.net` (public) / `http://192.168.68.7:8989` (direct)
- Swagger: `http://192.168.68.7:8989/swagger-ui.html`
- Admin credentials: `«vault: infrastructure/production STIRLING_ADMIN_USER»` / `«vault: infrastructure/production STIRLING_ADMIN_PASSWORD»`
- API key: `«vault: infrastructure/production STIRLING_API_KEY»`
- Admin credentials: `admin` / `kakashi20stirling`
- API key: `adefaef837314afc37803747049c2e73f456da97699ff1b02b391347c4a3cb88`
- Authentik OAuth2: configured but disabled (requires paid Server license). Ready to enable: set `SECURITY_OAUTH2_ENABLED=true` + `SECURITY_LOGINMETHOD=all`
- Compose: `/opt/home_stack/docker-compose.yml`
- Control script: `/opt/home_stack/infra-control.sh`
@@ -199,18 +190,18 @@ description: >
### Ecosystem B: CT 116 syslog-api (192.168.68.116)
12 containers on CT 116 — 11 in the inference-harness stack + trove-agent-docker (verified live 2026-09-11; LiteLLM upgraded 1.90.0-rc.1 -> 1.99.1; trove-agent-docker added 2026-09-11):
8 containers in inference-harness stack:
| Container | Image | Port | Role |
|-----------|-------|------|------|
| harness-litellm | ghcr.io/docker.litellm.ai/berriai/litellm:1.99.1 | :4000→:4000 | API proxy, key mgmt, fallbacks |
| harness-litellm | berriai/litellm:1.90.0-rc.1 | :4000→:4001 | API proxy, key mgmt, fallbacks |
| harness-router | inference-harness-router | :9000 (127.0.0.1) | GPU routing, slot booking, CB |
| harness-nginx | nginx:alpine | :80 | Entrypoint, /v1→LiteLLM, /dashboard/ |
| harness-postgres | postgres:16-alpine | :5432 | LiteLLM DB (keys, spend, config) |
| harness-redis | redis:7-alpine | :6379 | LiteLLM cache + rate-limit state |
| harness-redis | redis:7-alpine | :6379 | Router slots, circuit breakers |
| harness-dashboard | inference-harness-dashboard | :3000 | SyslogAI Harness UI |
| harness-grafana | grafana/grafana | :3000→:3001 (direct LAN, not behind nginx) | GPU + Proxmox + Docker dashboards |
| harness-prometheus | prom/prometheus | :9090 | Metrics scraper, 6 jobs |
| trove-agent-docker | ghcr.io/techdox/trove-agent-docker:latest | outbound agent (no port) | Trove host agent — service inventory + metrics, added 2026-09-11 |
**Nginx routing**:
- `/v1/*` → harness-litellm:4000 (API)
@@ -222,8 +213,9 @@ description: >
**Prometheus targets**:
- 192.168.68.8:9400 (RTX 3090 — qwen)
- 192.168.68.110:9400 (RTX 5070 — gpu-vision)
- 192.168.68.15:9400 (Strix Halo — strix-moe)
- 192.168.68.110:9400 (RTX 5070 — gemma)
- 192.168.68.15:9400 (Strix Halo — qwen3.6-35B-udq4)
- 192.168.68.24:9401 (Router metrics exporter)
- harness-litellm:4000 (LiteLLM health)
### Ecosystem C: Netbird (72.61.0.17 — Hostinger srv1079750.hstgr.cloud)
@@ -364,79 +356,6 @@ For docker-vm specifically:
- No PBS backup in 48h → fail
```
### Backup Safety Preconditions (2026-09-15)
#### Background & Rationale
Two incidents from 2026-09-13/14 demonstrate that backup operations can catastrophically fail when storage conditions are not verified first:
1. **acerpve thin-pool VM 101** (acerpve, 192.168.68.9, 2026-09-13): A snapshot-mode vzdump of VM 101 on acerpve filled the LVM thin pool. `dmsetup status pve-data-tpool` showed `thin-pool Error` (then `Fail`), the host root remounted `emergency_ro`, ordinary commands failed with I/O errors, LVM tools returned nothing and VM 101 (the RTX 3090 host) went unreachable while the host still answered ping and ssh. It happened TWICE in one day with different modes: snapshot at 13:39Z and a `--mode stop` cold run at 18:52Z. Both times a reboot rolled the failed transaction back and the pool returned rw (~30% data, ~1.2% metadata). Pool capacity was NOT the obvious explanation - ~816G with ~572G free - which is why the metadata/snapshot-pressure hypothesis stands unproven. A full or errored thin pool fails EVERY volume on the VG at once, including the host root.
2. **amdpve 0700 tmpdir** (amdpve, 192.168.68.15, 2026-09-14): A custom vzdump `tmpdir` created with mode 0700 broke a whole night of container backups: `fstat "<dir>/vzdumptmp<n>_<ct>//." failed - EACCES`, because the archive step runs through an unprivileged user namespace and could not traverse a root-owned 0700 directory. Fixed with `chmod 1777` (match /var/tmp) and proved with a real backup.
3. **acerpve GPU-host fact**: VM 101 (llm-gpu) and VM 103 (ocu-llm) are in NO scheduled job, so their only coverage is one-off runs - and for VM 101 that is deliberate until the thin-pool is understood.
> ⚠️ **Hostname Resolution Warning (2026-09-15)**: The PVE node hostnames (acerpve, amdpve, minipve, storepve, ocupve) all resolve to the VPS (72.61.0.17, the Netbird VPS at srv1079750.hstgr.cloud) via the wildcard `*.dns.sysloggh.net` record, NOT to the actual nodes. So `ssh acerpve` lands on the VPS. **Nodes must be addressed by IP**: acerpve 192.168.68.9, amdpve 192.168.68.15, storepve 192.168.68.6, minipve 192.168.68.12, ocupve 192.168.68.5. Guest CTs are reached through their node (`pct exec`). Guest hostnames that resolve on the LAN (e.g. kagentz = 192.168.68.14) are fine. (The DNS address records are a separate decision — row: dag-daemon-node-hostnames-resolve-to-the-vps-20260915.)
#### PREFLIGHT Preconditions (Before ANY snapshot-mode backup on thin-pool hosts)
Before starting ANY snapshot-mode vzdump on a host whose storage is an LVM thin pool, the following checks MUST pass:
```bash
# Check 1: Pool headroom (PRIMARY - yields percentages directly)
# Run on the NODE (e.g. ssh root@192.168.68.9 for acerpve) — NOT by bare hostname, see warning above
lvs -o lv_name,data_percent,metadata_percent,lv_size pve/data
# Example output (acerpve, 192.168.68.9):
# LV Data% Meta% LSize
# data 29.95 1.22 <816.21g
# Required thresholds (documented minimum):
# data_percent < 90% (80% recommended for safety margin)
# metadata_percent < 70% (metadata fills faster than data)
# Check 2: Verify pool is not in error state (dmsetup shows the raw DM device)
# Run on the NODE (e.g. ssh root@192.168.68.9 for acerpve) — NOT by bare hostname
dmsetup status pve-data-tpool | grep -q "Error\|Fail" && exit 1
# dmsetup status pve-data-tpool field order (verified on 192.168.68.9):
# $1=start $2=length $3="thin-pool" $4=transaction-id
# $5=metadata_used/metadata_total (blocks) $6=data_used/data_total (sectors)
# remaining fields are flags ("-", "rw", "discard_passdown", "queue_if_no_space", ...)
# This is only used for the ERROR-STATE check; use the lvs command above for percentages.
# metadata_percent = $5 / ($5 split by /) [second number in pair]
```
**Minimum thresholds**: If either `data_percent >= 90%` or `metadata_percent >= 70%`, the backup MUST NOT start. State explicitly that these are hard stops, not warnings.
**Why this is a precondition**: A full or errored thin pool fails EVERY volume on the VG at once, including the host root. This is not a soft failure - it takes down the entire Proxmox host.
#### Staging Directory Requirement (2026-09-14 incident)
Any custom vzdump `tmpdir` MUST be world-traversable and writable exactly like `/var/tmp` (mode 1777). The archive step of vzdump runs in an unprivileged user namespace and cannot traverse a root-owned 0700 directory.
**Symptom to recognize**: `fstat "<dir>/vzdumptmp<n>_<ct>//." failed - EACCES` on every container in the backup run.
**Fix**: `chmod 1777 <custom-tmpdir>` before starting vzdump.
#### Task Start Rule for Truncating Shells
When starting a backup task from a shell that may truncate output (e.g., pipes, `head`), always use:
```bash
pvesh create /storage/backup --output-format json -- ... | head -2
# ❌ Can kill the backup task ("broken pipe" status)
```
Instead, capture JSON output without piping to truncating commands:
```bash
# Use --output-format json and capture to variable
result=$(pvesh create /storage/backup --output-format json -- ...)
# Then parse result if needed
```
#### GPU Host Backup Status (acerpve VM 101)
VM 101 (llm-gpu) and VM 103 (ocu-llm) have NO scheduled backup job. Coverage is manual one-off runs only. This is intentional for VM 101 until the thin-pool failure mechanism is understood and documented.
## Section 5: Network Services — Monitoring
### 5.1 Service Inventory
@@ -636,7 +555,7 @@ monitor, or integration breaks.
```bash
# Full cluster status
PVE="https://minipve.sysloggh.net"
AUTH="Authorization: PVEAPIToken=«vault: infrastructure/production PVE_API_TOKEN»"
AUTH="Authorization: PVEAPIToken=monitoring@pve!mumuni=eafd56c5-93d4-4d40-a41d-e688be0987f3"
curl -sfk "$PVE/api2/json/cluster/resources" -H "$AUTH"
# Docker health from Abiba
@@ -660,6 +579,9 @@ curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $(infisical secrets get LITELLM_MASTER_KEY --p
# Storage check
ssh root@192.168.68.7 "df -h /media/storage /media/mediastore"
# Router roster reload (if needed)
curl -s -X POST http://192.168.68.116:9000/admin/roster/reload \
-H "Authorization: Bearer sk-admin-ee09fffd04978b61a1569ac670c68814"
# Restart stuck GPU (saturation watchdog alternative)
ssh root@192.168.68.8 "systemctl restart llama-server"
@@ -670,26 +592,26 @@ ssh root@192.168.68.110 "systemctl restart llama-server"
| CT | Name | Node | IP | Role | Agent |
|----|------|------|----|------|-------|
| 100 | abiba | minipve | .24 | Pi agent | ✅ pi |
| 100 | abiba | **hwepve** | .24 | Pi agent | ✅ pi |
| 101 | llm-gpu | acerpve | .8 | GPU RTX 3090 | ❌ |
| 102 | adguard | **minipve** | **.10** | DNS | ❌ |
| 103 | ocu-llm | ocupve | .110 | GPU RTX 5070 | ❌ |
| 104 | authentik | minipve | .11 | OIDC | ❌ |
| 105 | kagentz | amdpve | — | Agent Zero | ✅ |
| 105 | kagentz | **hwepve** | — | Agent Zero | ✅ |
| 106 | ra-h-os | storepve | .65 | KG bridge | ✅ MCP |
| 107 | pbs | storepve | — | Backups | ❌ |
| 108 | media | storepve | — | Media | ❌ |
| 109 | docker-vm | storepve | .7 | Docker host | ❌ |
| 110 | gitea | minipve | **.17** | Git | ❌ |
| 111 | tdunna | storepve | .129 | Hermes agent — ⛔ REPORT-ONLY (Theo's box, no GC) | ✅ |
| 112 | tanko | minipve | .122 | DSH (DeepSeek Harness) agent | ✅ |
| 111 | tdunna | amdpve | .129 | Hermes agent | ✅ |
| 112 | tanko | amdpve | .122 | Hermes agent | ✅ |
| 113 | baggy | amdpve | .114 | Hermes agent | ✅ |
| 114 | mumuni | **hwepve** | .123 | Hermes agent (stopped) | ✅ |
| 115 | scottdenya | amdpve | .75 | Denya OneCare | ❌ |
| 116 | syslog-api | minipve | .116 | LiteLLM + Grafana | ❌ |
| 117 | zulip | storepve | .19 | Chat | ❌ |
| 118 | jdownloader | storepve | .20 | JDownloader LXC (dedicated, migrated from docker-vm 2026-08-01) | ✅ |
| 119 | infisical-vault | minipve | — | Vault | ❌ |
| 120 | adguard2 | amdpve | — | DNS (secondary AdGuard) | ❌ |
## Appendix C: Docker Compose Files Location
@@ -709,22 +631,20 @@ Source of truth: `/root/scripts/pct-run.sh` or `prose-contracts/scripts/pct-run.
| CT | Name | Node | pct-run |
|-----|------|------|---------|
| 100 | abiba | minipve | `pct-run 100` |
| 105 | kagentz | amdpve | `pct-run 105` |
| 111 | tdunna | storepve | `pct-run 111` (⛔ report-only — no GC) |
| 112 | tanko | minipve | `pct-run 112` |
| 100 | abiba | hwepve | `pct-run 100` |
| 105 | kagentz | hwepve | `pct-run 105` |
| 111 | tdunna | amdpve | `pct-run 111` |
| 112 | tanko | amdpve | `pct-run 112` |
| 113 | baggy | amdpve | `pct-run 113` |
| 115 | scottdenya | amdpve | `pct-run 115` |
| 104 | authentik | minipve | `pct-run 104` |
| 110 | gitea | minipve | `pct-run 110` |
| 114 | mumuni | hwepve | `pct-run 114` |
| 116 | syslog-api | minipve | `pct-run 116` |
| 106 | ra-h-os | storepve | `pct-run 106` |
| 107 | proxmox-backup | storepve | `pct-run 107` |
| 108 | media | storepve | `pct-run 108` |
| 117 | zulip | storepve | `pct-run 117` |
| 118 | jdownloader | storepve | `pct-run 118` |
| 119 | infisical-vault | minipve | `pct-run 119` |
| 120 | adguard2 | amdpve | `pct-run 120` |
| 102 | adguard | **minipve** | `pct-run 102` |
GPU bare-metal hosts (.8 acerpve, .110 ocupve, .15 amdpve) are NOT CTs — use SSH directly:
@@ -732,7 +652,7 @@ GPU bare-metal hosts (.8 acerpve, .110 ocupve, .15 amdpve) are NOT CTs — use S
ssh root@192.168.68.8 # RTX 3090
ssh root@192.168.68.110 # RTX 5070
ssh root@192.168.68.15 # Strix Halo
ssh root@192.168.68.4 # hwepve — standalone London node + NetBird routing peer (relocation pending)
ssh root@192.168.68.4 # hwepve (abiba, kagentz, mumuni)
```
## Section 7: Agent Health Check (consolidated — 2026-07-05)
@@ -759,4 +679,4 @@ which was kill+nohup outside systemd) are banned by policy.
| Script | Why Disabled |
|--------|-------------|
| `zulip-watchdog.sh` (Mumuni) | kill+nohup bypassed systemd, 27 restarts, pattern mismatch |
| `zulip-monitor.sh` (Abiba) | Standalone cron replaced by agent-health-check.py + PM2 auto-restart; the script itself remains active as the execution step of the `zulip-health` responsibility contract (see `zulip-health.prose.md`) |
| `zulip-monitor.sh` (Abiba) | Replaced by agent-health-check.py + PM2 auto-restart |
+1
View File
@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ After ALL updates (apt + images + restarts), verify every critical service is ba
| Zulip | `curl -sf https://chat.sysloggh.net/api/v1/server_settings` | 200 OK |
| Gitea | `curl -sf https://git.sysloggh.net/api/v1/version` | 200 OK |
| PM2 processes | `pm2 jlist` (CT 100) | all pi-agent processes `online` |
| Hermes gateways | SSH to Mumuni CT 100, Tanko CT 112; `systemctl is-active hermes-gateway` | `active` for each |
Regression check: every service that was GREEN in `health-baseline` must still be GREEN. A service that was already RED (and caused a preflight abort) is excluded — but Phase 0 should have aborted before we got here.
+131 -211
View File
@@ -7,17 +7,15 @@ description: >
from nvidia-smi (.8, .110) and amdgpu_top (.15). LiteLLM metrics
via existing /metrics Prometheus endpoint.
DEPLOYMENT STATUS (2026-08-09):
DEPLOYMENT STATUS (2026-07-09):
✅ Core stack deployed: Prometheus + Grafana + pve/node/docker exporters
(via proxmox-monitor contract). Grafana at :3001, all scrape targets active.
✅ GPU exporters DEPLOYED: all 3 GPU hosts (.8/.110/.15) run exporters on
:9400 (nvidia_gpu_exporter / amdgpu exporter) — verified 200 on 2026-08-09.
✅ LiteLLM /metrics scraping live (success_callback: prometheus; auth via
master key) + Alertmanager + Zulip bridge (alerts-infra) added 2026-08-09.
⚠️ This contract is target-state aspirational — but GPU export + alerting
are now as-built (verified 2026-08-09).
(via proxmox-monitor contract). Grafana at :3001, 5 scrape targets active.
❌ GPU exporters NOT deployed: gpu-exporter crash-loops on .15,
NVIDIA sidecar exporters (.8/.110:9400) never installed.
Router falls back to direct GPU /health probes.
⚠️ This contract is target-state aspirational — not as-built.
As-built GPU monitoring is via gpu-monitor contract (port 9100 poll).
version: 1.0.1
version: 1.0.0
---
## Architecture
@@ -102,210 +100,132 @@ GPU .8 (RTX 3090) GPU .110 (RTX 5070) GPU .15 (Strix Halo)
- Stack persists across reboots (systemd for exporters, Docker restart policy)
## Execution
**Execution model**: This contract is executed by a host-scheduled cron job (see
`scripts/contract-run.sh`). The cron job runs the monitoring script directly on the
target host and appends the result to `/var/log/contract-runs/<contract>.log`. An
agent-session acknowledgement (a `done:` line in the ops status log) is NOT
execution — it only proves the agent read the result and reported it. The actual
monitoring work happens in the host cron job.
### Liveness rule (scoped)
The any-HTTP-response rule applies ONLY to unauthenticated/auth-gated endpoints,
where any HTTP answer proves a listener is up: the PVE API
(`https://<node>:8006/api2/json/version`) and LiteLLM health
(`/litellm/health`, `301` → `/litellm/health/liveliness`). For those endpoints a
probe is **ALIVE** on **ANY** HTTP status — `401`/`403` auth challenges and `3xx`
redirects included — and **DOWN = connection refused (`000`) or timeout only**.
The PVE API legitimately answers `401` to an unauthenticated probe — that is the
healthy signal, not a failure. Same scoped rule as zulip-health (Tanko) and
gpu-monitor.
Probes whose success condition is specifically a bare `200` are NOT covered by
the any-HTTP rule. On those — the authenticated Zulip POST and the router
`/health` — an unexpected status (`401`/`403` from a bad or missing credential,
`5xx`, or anything other than the expected `200`) is an **ALERT**, not "alive".
**STANDING PROBE RULES (2026-09-14, from defect report 1150.msg):**
1. **Any HTTP status means ALIVE.** 200, 301, 302, 401, 403, 404 all prove the
service answered — report the code, never "down". A redirect is not a failure.
Only a failed CONNECTION (curl status 000, timeout, refused) is a failed probe,
and that is a statement about YOUR PROBE, not about the service.
2. **A failed probe is never a service verdict.** Print
`probe-failed: <target> <kind>` naming the exact URL/host/port and the failure
kind (timeout, refused, no-route, dns), retry once at a longer timeout, and only
then report. Apply the same shape as scripts/disk-gc-scan.py.
3. **Say which probe produced each number.** "Grafana: 000" is unusable;
"Grafana http://192.168.68.116:3001/api/health -> connection timeout after 10s
(retried at 25s: also timeout)" is actionable.
### check-health
**RUN LIVE, NEVER ECHO — every dispatch must execute the probes below with real
tool calls; never repeat a prior report unless a live probe fails.**
**EXECUTABLE OWNER:** The canonical probe set lives in `scripts/infra-monitoring.sh`.
A check run is a single command: `bash scripts/infra-monitoring.sh` (from the
repository root). Paste its raw output verbatim into the report. The script
exits non-zero naming every failed target; there is no "OK" summary when any
leg failed. Port drift is caught by `scripts/test_infra_monitoring.sh` which
asserts every probed port matches the documented value.
**PROBE SHAPE (per standing rules above):**
- Every probe prints: `✅ <name>: alive` on success, or `🔴 <name>: probe-failed: <host>:<port> (expected <pattern>) (<kind>)` on failure
- PVE API failures include `(any-HTTP liveness, -k for self-signed)` to distinguish TLS vs connection
- Retry once on connection failure at longer timeout (25s connect, 30s max)
- Any HTTP status = ALIVE; only 000/timeout/refused = probe-failed
- Report the actual probe output, not a summary verdict
```bash
# Provenance — run first; paste the absolute path into the report
pwd -P
# ============================================================
# 1. ZULIP API HEALTH (POST ping) — bare-200 probe
# ============================================================
# NOTE: /etc/litellm-monitor.env exists only on CT 116, retrieve keys from CT 116 via:
zulip_key=$(ssh root@192.168.68.116 "grep ZULIP_BOT_KEY /etc/litellm-monitor.env | cut -d= -f2")
if [ -z "$zulip_key" ]; then
echo "credential-missing: ZULIP_BOT_KEY not found in /etc/litellm-monitor.env"
else
ZULIP_USER="abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net"
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 10 -X POST https://chat.sysloggh.net/api/v1/messages -u "${ZULIP_USER}:${zulip_key}")
echo "Zulip API https://chat.sysloggh.net/api/v1/messages -> $code"
# Expected: 200 (bare-200 probe; any other status is an ALERT)
fi
# ============================================================
# 2. PM2 PROCESS HEALTH
# ============================================================
pm2 jlist
# Expected: 4/4 online (abiba-telegram, abiba-zulip, zulip-watchdog, gitea-runner)
# spoton-service removed 2026-09-14 (not in live set)
# ============================================================
# 3. GPU EXPORTERS — any-HTTP probe (metrics endpoint)
# ============================================================
# Probe /metrics (the Prometheus scrape target), not bare /
for host in 192.168.68.8 192.168.68.110 192.168.68.15; do
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 10 "http://$host:9400/metrics")
if [ "$code" == "000" ]; then
# Retry with longer timeout
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 25 "http://$host:9400/metrics")
echo "GPU exporter http://$host:9400/metrics -> probe-failed: timeout (retried at 25s: still $code)"
else
echo "GPU exporter http://$host:9400/metrics -> $code"
fi
done
# Expected: 200 on all 3 hosts (RTX 3090, RTX 5070, Strix Halo)
# ============================================================
# 4. ROUTER HEALTH (via nginx on port 80) — bare-200 probe
# ============================================================
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 10 http://192.168.68.116/health)
if [ "$code" == "000" ]; then
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 25 http://192.168.68.116/health)
echo "Router http://192.168.68.116/health -> probe-failed: timeout (retried at 25s: still $code)"
else
echo "Router http://192.168.68.116/health -> $code"
fi
# Expected: 200 (bare-200 probe; any other status is an ALERT)
# ============================================================
# 5. LITELLM HEALTH (via nginx on port 80) — any-HTTP probe
# ============================================================
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 10 http://192.168.68.116/litellm/health)
if [ "$code" == "000" ]; then
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 25 http://192.168.68.116/litellm/health)
echo "LiteLLM http://192.168.68.116/litellm/health -> probe-failed: timeout (retried at 25s: still $code)"
else
echo "LiteLLM http://192.168.68.116/litellm/health -> $code"
fi
# Expected: 301 → /litellm/health/liveliness (any HTTP status = ALIVE)
# ============================================================
# 6. PVE API LIVENESS — any-HTTP probe (auth-gated)
# ============================================================
# Probe the REAL PVE nodes on :8006, never the monitoring host CT 116.
for node in 192.168.68.9 192.168.68.5 192.168.68.15 192.168.68.6 192.168.68.12; do
code=$(curl -sk -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 10 "https://$node:8006/api2/json/version")
if [ "$code" == "000" ]; then
code=$(curl -sk -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 25 "https://$node:8006/api2/json/version")
echo "PVE API https://$node:8006/api2/json/version -> probe-failed: timeout (retried at 25s: still $code)"
else
echo "PVE API https://$node:8006/api2/json/version -> $code"
fi
done
# Expected: 401 on every node (acerpve .9, ocupve .5, amdpve .15, storepve .6, minipve .12)
# 401 is the EXPECTED healthy response (auth-gated); 000/timeout = DOWN
# ============================================================
# 7. PROMETHEUS TARGETS — bare-200 probe
# ============================================================
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 10 http://192.168.68.116:9090/api/v1/targets)
if [ "$code" == "000" ]; then
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 25 http://192.168.68.116:9090/api/v1/targets)
echo "Prometheus http://192.168.68.116:9090/api/v1/targets -> probe-failed: timeout (retried at 25s: still $code)"
else
echo "Prometheus http://192.168.68.116:9090/api/v1/targets -> $code"
fi
# Expected: 200 (bare-200 probe; any other status is an ALERT)
# ============================================================
# 8. GRAFANA HEALTH — any-HTTP probe
# ============================================================
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 10 http://192.168.68.116:3001/api/health)
if [ "$code" == "000" ]; then
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 25 http://192.168.68.116:3001/api/health)
echo "Grafana http://192.168.68.116:3001/api/health -> probe-failed: timeout (retried at 25s: still $code)"
else
echo "Grafana http://192.168.68.116:3001/api/health -> $code"
fi
# Expected: 200 (any HTTP status = ALIVE; 000/timeout = DOWN)
# ============================================================
# 9. LITELLM METRICS (Prometheus endpoint) — any-HTTP probe
# ============================================================
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 10 http://192.168.68.116:4000/metrics)
if [ "$code" == "000" ]; then
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 25 http://192.168.68.116:4000/metrics)
echo "LiteLLM metrics http://192.168.68.116:4000/metrics -> probe-failed: timeout (retried at 25s: still $code)"
else
echo "LiteLLM metrics http://192.168.68.116:4000/metrics -> $code"
fi
# Expected: 200 (any HTTP status = ALIVE; 000/timeout = DOWN)
```
**Report format**: Begin every report with the **absolute path the probe executed
from** (`pwd -P`) so a stale-consumer report is distinguishable from a real fault
at read time. For each probe, print the target name, the full URL, and the HTTP
code (or failure kind with retry details). Apply the standing probe rules: any
HTTP status = ALIVE; only 000/timeout/refused = probe-failed. A redirect is not
a failure.
### Docker Stats and PVE Exporter Ports
These two exporters bind to 127.0.0.1 on CT 116 (localhost-only) and must be probed via SSH:
| Exporter | Port | Container | Metrics |
|----------|------|-----------|---------|
| **Docker Stats** | **9324** | harness-docker-stats | `docker_container_*` (per-container CPU/mem/network) |
| **PVE Exporter** | **9221** | harness-pve-exporter | `pve_*` (5 cluster-level metrics) |
**IMPORTANT**: Do not confuse with port 9323, which is owned by dockerd and serves the Docker Engine's own metrics (`builder_builds_*`, `containerd_build_info_*`).
```bash
# Docker Stats (harness-docker-stats)
ssh root@192.168.68.116 "curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 10 http://127.0.0.1:9324/metrics"
# Expected: 200 or 404 (any HTTP status = ALIVE)
# PVE Exporter (harness-pve-exporter)
ssh root@192.168.68.116 "curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 10 http://127.0.0.1:9221/metrics"
# Expected: 200 or 404 (any HTTP status = ALIVE)
```
### Phase 1: GPU Exporters
**NVIDIA (.8 and .110)**:
1. Download `nvidia_gpu_exporter` binary
2. Create systemd service `nvidia-gpu-exporter.service`
3. Start and enable
**AMD (.15)**:
1. Create Python exporter script at `/opt/amdgpu-exporter/exporter.py`
2. Parses `amdgpu_top --json -d 1000` output
3. Exposes key metrics at `:9400/metrics` via Python http.server
4. Create systemd service
5. Start and enable
### Phase 2: Prometheus
1. Create `/opt/monitoring/` directory on CT 116
2. Write `prometheus.yml` with scrape configs for all targets
3. Add to docker-compose (or separate compose file)
4. Start container
### Phase 3: Grafana
1. Create `/opt/monitoring/grafana/` directories
2. Provision Prometheus datasource
3. Provision GPU fleet dashboard JSON
4. Provision LiteLLM dashboard JSON
5. Add to docker-compose
6. Start container
### Phase 4: Verification
1. Verify all 3 GPU exporters return 200 at :9400/metrics
2. Verify Prometheus targets all UP at :9090/targets
3. Verify Grafana accessible at :3001 with dashboards
4. Verify LiteLLM metrics flowing to Prometheus
5. ~~Update nginx to proxy `/monitoring/` → Grafana~~ (NOT recommended — nginx sub-path was tried for /grafana/ and reverted per proxmox-monitor; direct :3001 access is the standard)
## Execution
### check-health
**RUN LIVE, NEVER ECHO — every dispatch must execute the probes below with real tool calls; never repeat a prior report unless a live probe fails.**
```bash
# Zulip API health (POST ping)
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -X POST https://chat.sysloggh.net/api/v1/messages -u 'abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net:KEY'
# Expected: 200 (HTTP 000 = unreachable/cache)
# PM2 process health
pm2 jlist
# Expected: 5/5 online (abiba-telegram, abiba-zulip, zulip-watchdog, gitea-runner, spoton-service)
# GPU exporters (may be down per DEPLOYMENT STATUS)
curl -s http://192.168.68.8:9400/metrics && echo " - OK" || echo " - FAIL"
curl -s http://192.168.68.110:9400/metrics && echo " - OK" || echo " - FAIL"
curl -s http://192.168.68.15:9400/metrics && echo " - OK" || echo " - FAIL"
# Prometheus targets
curl -s http://192.168.68.116:9090/api/v1/targets | jq '.data.activeTargets'
# Expected: All targets UP (may show some down if exporters not deployed)
# Grafana health
curl -s http://192.168.68.116:3001/api/health | jq '{status, version}'
# Expected: {"status":"ok","version":"..."}
# LiteLLM metrics
curl -s http://192.168.68.116:4001/metrics | head -20
# Expected: Prometheus-formatted metrics output
```
**Report format**: Summarize actual results from each probe. If any probe returns non-200 or empty output, flag as alert.
### Phase 1: GPU Exporters
**NVIDIA (.8 and .110)**:
1. Download `nvidia_gpu_exporter` binary
2. Create systemd service `nvidia-gpu-exporter.service`
3. Start and enable
**AMD (.15)**:
1. Create Python exporter script at `/opt/amdgpu-exporter/exporter.py`
2. Parses `amdgpu_top --json -d 1000` output
3. Exposes key metrics at `:9400/metrics` via Python http.server
4. Create systemd service
5. Start and enable
### Phase 2: Prometheus
1. Create `/opt/monitoring/` directory on CT 116
2. Write `prometheus.yml` with scrape configs for all targets
3. Add to docker-compose (or separate compose file)
4. Start container
### Phase 3: Grafana
1. Create `/opt/monitoring/grafana/` directories
2. Provision Prometheus datasource
3. Provision GPU fleet dashboard JSON
4. Provision LiteLLM dashboard JSON
5. Add to docker-compose
6. Start container
### Phase 4: Verification
1. Verify all 3 GPU exporters return 200 at :9400/metrics
2. Verify Prometheus targets all UP at :9090/targets
3. Verify Grafana accessible at :3001 with dashboards
4. Verify LiteLLM metrics flowing to Prometheus
5. ~~Update nginx to proxy `/monitoring/` → Grafana~~ (NOT recommended — nginx sub-path was tried for /grafana/ and reverted per proxmox-monitor; direct :3001 access is the standard)
## Verification Commands
```bash
# GPU exporters
curl -s http://192.168.68.8:9400/metrics | grep nvidia
curl -s http://192.168.68.110:9400/metrics | grep nvidia
curl -s http://192.168.68.15:9400/metrics | grep amdgpu
# Prometheus
curl -s http://192.168.68.116:9090/api/v1/targets
# Grafana
curl -s http://192.168.68.116:3001/api/health
# LiteLLM metrics (already live)
curl -s http://192.168.68.116:4001/metrics | head -20
```
+22 -36
View File
@@ -2,17 +2,16 @@
kind: responsibility
name: infrastructure-update
description: >
Autonomous system-wide update contract covering all 5 Proxmox nodes,
15+ containers/VMs, and 5 Docker ecosystems (docker-vm .7, CT 116 .116,
CT 117, hwpve .11, NetBird VPS 72.61.0.17). Updates apt packages,
Autonomous system-wide update contract covering all 6 Proxmox nodes,
15+ containers/VMs, and 4 Docker ecosystems. Updates apt packages,
Docker images, and container stacks in safe waves with health checks
and automatic rollback on failure.
agent: abiba
triggers:
- on "infra update" command
- weekly (Sunday 03:00 America/New_York) via Agent Zero scheduler task "weekly-fleet-docker-update" (qSOOVzsU) — implemented 2026-09-08
- weekly (Sunday 03:00 EDT) via cron
- on security advisory relay from Mumuni
version: 1.4.0
version: 1.2.0
---
## Maintains
@@ -57,10 +56,11 @@ Before ANY update wave:
| amdpve (.15) | Proxmox node | `apt update && apt upgrade -y` | 5 min |
| acerpve (.9) | Proxmox node | `apt update && apt upgrade -y` | 5 min |
| ocupve (.5) | Proxmox node | `apt update && apt upgrade -y` | 5 min |
| hwepve (.4) | Proxmox node | `apt update && apt upgrade -y` | 5 min |
| CT 100 (.24) | Abiba (pi) | `apt update && apt upgrade -y` | 3 min |
| CT 116 (.116) | syslog-api (LiteLLM host) | `apt update && apt upgrade -y` | 3 min |
| CT 112 (tanko, minipve) | Tanko | `apt update && apt upgrade -y` | 3 min |
| CT 105 (kagentz, minipve) | Mumuni | `apt update && apt upgrade -y` | 3 min |
| CT 112 (tanko, amdpve) | Tanko | `apt update && apt upgrade -y` | 3 min |
| CT 100 (mumuni/abiba, hwepve) | Mumuni | `apt update && apt upgrade -y` | 3 min |
| VM 101 (.8) | llm-gpu (RTX 3090) | `apt update && apt upgrade -y` | 3 min |
| VM 103 (.110) | ocu-llm (RTX 5070) | `apt update && apt upgrade -y` | 3 min |
@@ -81,14 +81,7 @@ Before ANY update wave:
| VM 109 (.7) | Home stack (Pulse, Stirling PDF) — JDownloader moved to CT 118 LXC 2026-08-01 | `cd /opt/home_stack && docker compose pull && docker compose up -d` |
| VM 109 (.7) | Audiobookshelf | `cd /opt/audiobookshelf && docker compose pull && docker compose up -d` |
| CT 116 (.116) | Inference Harness (LiteLLM, Prometheus, Grafana) | `cd /opt/inference-harness && docker compose pull && docker compose up -d` |
| CT 116 (.116, via minipve) | Trove docker agent (trove-agent-docker) | `pct exec 116 -- bash -c 'cd /opt/trove-agent && docker compose pull && docker compose up -d'` |
| CT 117 (storepve) | Zulip | `pct exec 117 -- bash -c 'cd /opt/zulip && docker compose pull && docker compose up -d'` (from storepve; compose recreates on zulip_default network) |
| CT 117 (storepve) | Jitsi | `pct exec 117 -- bash -c 'cd /opt/jitsi && docker compose pull && docker compose up -d'` (from storepve) |
| hwpve (.11) | Authentik (server, worker, postgres) | `ssh root@192.168.68.11 'cd /root && docker compose pull && docker compose up -d'` |
| NetBird VPS (72.61.0.17) | NetBird (server, dashboard, proxy, traefik, crowdsec) | `ssh root@72.61.0.17 'cd /root && docker compose pull && docker compose up -d'` |
| VM 109 (.7) | Trove test | `cd /opt/trove-test && docker compose pull && docker compose up -d` |
| VM 109 (.7) | docker-stats | `cd /opt/docker-stats && docker compose pull && docker compose up -d` |
| CT 116 (.116) | Monitoring (Grafana, Prometheus, Alertmanager, PVE exporter) | `cd /opt/monitoring && docker compose pull && docker compose up -d` |
| CT 117 (zulip, storepve) | Zulip | `docker pull zulip/docker-zulip:latest && docker restart zulip-zulip-1` |
**Verify after Wave 3:**
- All containers healthy: `docker ps` on each host
@@ -96,13 +89,8 @@ Before ANY update wave:
- MCP integration test: `curl localhost:4000/mcp-rest/tools/list -H "Authorization: Bearer $MASTER_KEY"` → 90 tools (23 RA-H OS + 67 GitHub)
- Zulip test: send test message to #agent-hub
- Dashboard loading: `curl localhost:3001/` (via CT 116)
- Firecrawl test: `curl -X POST http://192.168.68.7:3002/v1/search -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"query":"health","limit":1}'` → `"success":true` (GET `/` returns 200)
- Authentik test: `curl http://192.168.68.11:9000/` → 302 redirect to login
- NetBird test: `curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' https://netbird.sysloggh.net/` → 200
- harness-litellm cold start: allow 3-5 min after recreate — reports unhealthy and :4000 refuses connections while loading config/DB, then recovers to 200 on its own (verified 2026-09-08)
- Firecrawl test: `curl :3002/`
- SearXNG test: `curl :8888`
- Digest-pin sweep: `grep -rn '@sha256:' /opt/*/docker-compose.y*` on every host — digest-pinned images are INVISIBLE to `docker compose pull` (the pin re-pulls the same digest forever, so new releases never appear). Flag every pin in the run report and propose un-pinning to a floating tag with user approval before editing. Found 2026-09-10: audiobookshelf was digest-pinned at 2.34.0 (container created 2026-07-18) and silently missed by every sweep; dockhand stack was also pinned (stack removed 2026-09-10, unused). After un-pinning audiobookshelf to :latest it updated to 2.36.0 and verified HTTP 200.
- Version-pin awareness: a fixed version tag (e.g. `image: ...litellm:1.99.1`) is a no-op for `docker compose pull` just like a digest pin, so the stack silently stops advancing. CT 116 `harness-litellm` is INTENTIONALLY pinned to `1.99.1` (registry `main-stable`/`latest` currently resolve to `1.100.1`, sha256:a3715fa7 — a bleeding-edge jump explicitly declined 2026-09-11). Every run must look up the newest STABLE release tag for any version-pinned image, bump the pin deliberately with user approval, recreate, and re-verify. Never silently revert a pin to a floating tag.
## Wave 4: Proxmox Kernel Reboot
@@ -171,15 +159,13 @@ Before Wave 1, snapshot these files:
/opt/search-stack/searxng/docker-compose.yml (VM 109 .7)
/opt/home_stack/docker-compose.yml (VM 109 .7)
/opt/audiobookshelf/docker-compose.yml (VM 109 .7)
/root/compose.yml (hwpve .11 — Authentik server/worker/postgres)
/root/docker-compose.yml (NetBird VPS — netbird server/dashboard/proxy, traefik, crowdsec)
/root/.pi/agent/extensions/config.yaml (CT 100 .24)
/etc/systemd/system/strix-server.service (amdpve .15 — strix-moe)
/etc/systemd/system/llama-server.service (VM 101 .8, VM 103 .110)
# Hermes agent configs (key enforcement — 2026-07-10)
/home/hermes/.hermes/config.yaml (Mumuni kagentz CT105; Tanko CT112 uses /home/jerome/.hermes)
/etc/systemd/system/hermes-gateway.service (Mumuni kagentz CT105 — system unit, User=hermes)
/etc/environment (LITELLM_API_KEY — legacy path, Mumuni now keys via Infisical)
/root/.hermes/config.yaml (Mumuni CT 114, Tanko CT 112, etc.)
/root/.config/systemd/user/hermes-gateway.service (Mumuni CT 114 — EnvironmentFile fixed)
/etc/environment (Mumuni CT 114 — LITELLM_API_KEY)
```
## MCP Gateway (2026-07-10)
@@ -208,19 +194,19 @@ mcp_servers:
| Key | MCP Access |
|-----|-----------|
| Master key | ✅ Full — 90 tools (vault-injected) |
| Agent keys (mumuni, tanko, etc.) | ✅ Per-key grants supported (as of 2026-09-18 verification) |
| Agent keys (mumuni, tanko, etc.) | ❌ Per-key grants not supported in v1.90.0-rc.1 |
### Known Limitations
- ~~Per-key MCP server grants not functional — only master key has access~~ (resolved 2026-09-18: per-key grants now work)
- Per-key MCP server grants not functional — only master key has access
- Responses API (`/v1/responses`) with MCP tools broken on llama.cpp backends
- HTTP 307 redirect on `/mcp` → use `/mcp/` (trailing slash) or `/mcp-rest/` endpoints
- `api_mode: responses` in Hermes appends `/v1/responses` to base_url → **base_url must end at `/v1`, never `/responses`** (double-path bug)
### Migration Path (COMPLETED 2026-09-18)
Per-key MCP grants are now supported:
1. ✅ Agent keys granted MCP access via `allowed_mcp_servers` field
2. ✅ Hermes `mcp_servers.litellm.url` set to `https://litellm.sysloggh.net/mcp`
3. ✅ `headers: {x-litellm-api-key: "Bearer <literal_key>"}` added to MCP config
### Migration Path
When LiteLLM is upgraded to a version supporting per-key MCP grants:
1. Grant agent keys `mcp_servers: ["ra_h_os"]`
2. Update Hermes `mcp_servers.ra-h-os.url` from `http://192.168.68.65:3100/mcp` → `http://192.168.68.116:4000/mcp/`
3. Add `headers: {x-litellm-api-key: "Bearer $LITELLM_API_KEY"}` to MCP config
## Security-Specific Updates
@@ -233,9 +219,9 @@ Per-key MCP grants are now supported:
## Success Criteria
- [ ] All 5 PVE nodes updated, no reboot-loop
- [ ] All 6 PVE nodes updated, no reboot-loop
- [ ] All VMs/CTs running post-update
- [ ] All Docker containers healthy (VM 109 + CT 116 + CT 117 + hwpve .11 + NetBird VPS)
- [ ] All Docker containers healthy (VM 109 + CT 116 + CT 117)
- [ ] LiteLLM inference passing (syslog-auto test)
- [ ] Zulip server + all 3 agents connected
- [ ] GPU fleet at full capacity (3/3)
@@ -249,7 +235,7 @@ After completion, send Zulip DM:
```
📋 Infrastructure Update — YYYY-MM-DD
Updated: 5 PVE nodes, 12 CTs/VMs, 30+ containers
Updated: 6 PVE nodes, 12 CTs/VMs, 30+ containers
Security fixes: N CVEs patched
Downtime: <service> <duration>
Failures: none / <details>
+10 -126
View File
@@ -67,14 +67,8 @@ description: >
4. **If action == "create"**:
- Generate new key with key_alias: "{agent_name}" (e.g., "tanko" — bare name, no date)
- Set metadata: { "agent": "{agent_name}", "purpose": "agent-inference" }
- Duration is whatever the caller passes; NO default enforcement exists today (CT 116 `litellm_config.yaml` has no `default_key_generate_params` block, and a key with no explicit models returns an empty models list). Agent keys are permanent by policy, not by that block. OPEN policy question: should agent keys expire by default? (captain security-policy decision, raised separately.)
- Set models: read the live key-scoped set rather than hardcoding one — `/v1/models` is key-scoped,
and the authoritative registry is CT 116 `/opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml`. Do not add
retired names (`gemma-4-12b`, `gpu-light`, `crew-auto` — all retired 2026-09-12).
- **Standard agent keys are LOCAL-ONLY**: `["strix-moe", "gpu-dense", "gpu-vision", "syslog-auto"]`.
Cloud models are granted ONLY to the designated cloud-enabled key — see § Cloud Provider
Consolidation. NEVER create a key with an empty `models` list (`{}`) or `all-proxy-models`.
In LiteLLM Community both silently grant access to EVERY model, including cloud.
- Duration is null (permanent) — inherited from litellm default_key_generate_params
- Set models: ["syslog-auto", "qwen3.6-27B-code", "gemma-4-12b", "strix-moe", "gpu-dense", "gpu-light", "qwen3.6-35B-udq4"]
- Note: `ornith-1.0-35b` is NOT a valid LiteLLM model name (use `strix-moe`, the stable alias). qwen3.6-35B-A3B removed from fleet (was never deployed).
- Return the new key
5. **If action == "rotate"**:
@@ -91,66 +85,6 @@ description: >
- Confirm key alias matches agent_name in LiteLLM key list
- Verify agent gateway uses vault wrapper: `cat /proc/<pid>/cmdline` shows `infisical run`
## Cloud Provider Consolidation (2026-09-20)
CT 116 LiteLLM (Community v1.99.1) fronts **7 upstream providers** in addition to the local
GPU models. Added 2026-09-20 — 47 cloud deployments, 51 unique model names total.
### Provider map (per-account namespacing)
Two accounts on the same vendor get **distinct prefixes** so billing, rate limits, and keys
stay separate:
| Prefix | Upstream | Auth | Vault secret |
|--------|----------|------|--------------|
| `openrouter/` | OpenRouter | API key | `OPENROUTER_API_KEY` |
| `deepseek/` | DeepSeek direct | API key | `DEEPSEEK_API_KEY` |
| `google/` | Google AI Studio (Gemini) | API key | `GEMINI_API_KEY` |
| `qwen-payg/` | QwenCloud / DashScope (pay-as-you-go) | API key | `DASHSCOPE_PAYG_KEY` |
| `qwen-plan/` | QwenCloud / DashScope (token plan) | API key | `DASHSCOPE_PLAN_KEY` |
| `tencent-payg/` | Tencent TokenHub (PAYG) | Bearer token | `TENCENT_PAYG_KEY` |
| `tencent-plan/` | Tencent TokenHub (Plan) | Bearer token | `TENCENT_PLAN_KEY` |
All cloud `api_key` fields use `os.environ/<NAME>` — the 7 secrets live in Infisical
(project=`infrastructure`, env=`production`, folder=`root`) and are injected into the
`harness-litellm` container at start. **No literal cloud keys in `litellm_config.yaml`.**
### Access tiers (MUST be enforced per key)
| Tier | Model names | Granted to |
|------|-------------|------------|
| **Local** | `strix-moe`, `gpu-dense`, `gpu-vision`, `syslog-auto` | every standard agent key |
| **Cloud** | the 47 provider models (`<prefix>/<model>`) | **only** the designated cloud-enabled key |
> ⚠️ **Community-edition caveat:** LiteLLM Community does not restrict wildcard access groups
> the way Enterprise does. Access is decided by each key's explicit `models` list. A key with
> `models = {}` or `models = ["all-proxy-models"]` sees **all** models — a silent cloud leak.
> Every key MUST carry an explicit list. The master key always bypasses scoping (admin-only).
### Creating the cloud-enabled key
```bash
# ALWAYS read the live roster first (key-scoped):
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer <AGENT_KEY>" http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1/models \
| jq -r '.data[].id'
# Then generate a key with an EXPLICIT model list (never empty, never a wildcard).
# For the cloud-enabled key, list local + cloud. For a standard agent, local only.
```
Verify after any key change: a standard agent key must return **4 models**, and must NOT return
any `<prefix>/` cloud model.
### Adding a new cloud provider
1. Add the upstream key to Infisical `infrastructure/production/root`.
2. Add the deployment(s) to `/opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml` with an `os.environ/` ref
and a namespaced `model_name` (`<provider>-<account>/<model>` when a vendor has >1 account).
3. Restart the `harness-litellm` container.
4. Grant the model to the cloud-enabled key ONLY (explicit list) — never to agent keys without
captain approval.
5. Update this table and the access-tier section.
## Production Vault Access Process (canonical, 2026-07-17)
The non-fail approach to agentic vault access. Deployed on all 4 Hermes agents
@@ -208,8 +142,8 @@ through its agent wrapper.
safety net for vault outage or token revocation. Must be kept in sync on rotation.
Example:
```bash
MUMUNI_LITELLM_API_KEY=«vault: agents/production LITELLM_API_KEY»
MUMUNI_ZULIP_API_KEY=«vault: agents/production ZULIP_API_KEY»
MUMUNI_LITELLM_API_KEY=sk-OzuWsoX22Hmb3Ps3JY01gw
MUMUNI_ZULIP_API_KEY=H8dY6V7aHmWNcfgNtJaDBPZ1dGWn0Ttt
```
6. **systemd drop-in** at `~/.config/systemd/user/hermes-gateway.service.d/50-vault-wrapper.conf`:
```ini
@@ -244,7 +178,7 @@ through its agent wrapper.
| Agent | Host | Pattern | Keys | Status |
|-------|------|---------|------|--------|
| abiba | .24 | pi agent wrapper | ABIBA_LITELLM_API_KEY + ABIBA_ZULIP_API_KEY | ✅ vault-backed |
| mumuni | .14 (kagentz CT105) | systemd unit hermes-gateway.service (user hermes) | MUMUNI_LITELLM_API_KEY + MUMUNI_ZULIP_API_KEY | ✅ vault-backed + .env fallback |
| mumuni | .24 (CT100 abiba) | Pi Hermes gateway (no systemd) | MUMUNI_LITELLM_API_KEY + MUMUNI_ZULIP_API_KEY | ✅ vault-backed + .env fallback |
| tanko | .122 | systemd drop-in + while-true wrapper + st.8e848433 (user jerome) | TANKO_LITELLM_API_KEY + TANKO_ZULIP_API_KEY | ✅ vault-backed + .env fallback |
| koby | .129 | systemd drop-in + while-true wrapper + st.8e848433 | KOBY_LITELLM_API_KEY, shares TANKO_ZULIP_API_KEY (tanko-bot) | ✅ vault-backed |
| koonimo | .114 | systemd drop-in + while-true wrapper + st.8e848433 | KOONIMO_LITELLM_API_KEY + KOONIMO_ZULIP_API_KEY | ✅ vault-backed |
@@ -255,7 +189,7 @@ through its agent wrapper.
### Tanko migration (COMPLETED 2026-07-17)
Tanko was the last agent migrated from hardcoded keys to vault wrapper.
Previously: key hardcoded in `/home/jerome/.hermes/config.yaml` (`api_key: sk-synthetic-tanko-example…`)
Previously: key hardcoded in `/home/jerome/.hermes/config.yaml` (`api_key: sk-CggiHWlamQy…`)
and `zulip-env.conf` systemd drop-in. Now: user-scope systemd service with drop-in
`50-vault-wrapper.conf`, `infisical-gateway.sh` wrapper with while-true loop, token at
`~/.infisical-token`, `.env` fallback at `~/.hermes/.env`. Keys injected live from vault.
@@ -323,51 +257,9 @@ reads use per-agent identities. This eliminates the single shared token risk.
| Agent | .env Keys |
|-------|-----------|
| Mumuni | MUMUNI_LITELLM_API_KEY, MUMUNI_ZULIP_API_KEY |
|| Tanko | TANKO_LITELLM_API_KEY, TANKO_ZULIP_API_KEY |
|| Koby | (wrapper injects from vault — .env has Telegram token) |
|| Koonimo | KOONIMO_LITELLM_API_KEY, KOONIMO_ZULIP_API_KEY |
|| Agent Zero (kagentz .14) | OPENROUTER_API_KEY (direct OpenRouter access) |
### Agent Zero (kagentz .14) — OpenRouter Integration (2026-09-01)
Agent Zero runs in Docker on kagentz (CT105) and uses **direct OpenRouter API access**,
not via the LiteLLM proxy. This is because Agent Zero's workflow (self-update manager,
UI bootstrap, model selection) is built around OpenRouter's native authentication.
**Key Storage:**
- **Container**: `/a0/usr/.env` (line ~72: `API_KEY_OPENROUTER=«vault: agents/production OPENROUTER_API_KEY»…`)
- **Vault**: Infisical secret `OPENROUTER_API_KEY` (project=agents, env=production)
- **Fallback**: The container's .env is the primary source; vault sync is optional
(unlike fleet agents which require vault injection)
**Current Key (2026-09-01):**
- **Prefix**: `«vault: agents/production OPENROUTER_API_KEY»`
- **User**: `user_2rt9lCqcd5d7Vk1t18DHsvWdPTT`
- **Plan**: Paid (not free tier)
- **Usage**: 0 (as of 2026-09-01)
**Model Configuration:**
- **Preset**: "Cost Efficient" (`/a0/usr/plugins/_model_config/presets.yaml`)
- **Model**: `openrouter/moonshotai/kimi-k3`
- **API Base**: (empty — uses OpenRouter default)
**Why not LiteLLM proxy?**
Agent Zero's architecture was designed before the fleet adopted the LiteLLM proxy
standard. The container runs `/exe/self_update_manager.py` and `/a0/run_ui.py` which
directly call OpenRouter via Python's requests library. Converting would require:
1. Refactoring all LLM calls to use `litellm` library
2. Adding vault wrapper injection
3. Updating self_update_manager to use proxy-aware key handling
**Rotation Procedure:**
1. Generate new key in OpenRouter UI
2. Update container: `sed -i 's/^API_KEY_OPENROUTER=.*/API_KEY_OPENROUTER=<new_key>/' /a0/usr/.env`
3. Update vault: `infisical secrets set OPENROUTER_API_KEY=<new_key> --projectId=agents --env=production`
4. Restart container: `sudo docker exec agent-zero supervisorctl restart run_ui`
5. Verify: `curl -s https://openrouter.ai/api/v1/auth/key -H "Authorization: Bearer <new_key>"`
**Related Contract:**
- `agent-zero-openrouter-key.prose.md` — Full agent-zero key management contract
| Tanko | TANKO_LITELLM_API_KEY, TANKO_ZULIP_API_KEY |
| Koby | (wrapper injects from vault — .env has Telegram token) |
| Koonimo | KOONIMO_LITELLM_API_KEY, KOONIMO_ZULIP_API_KEY |
## Key Rotation Log
@@ -384,15 +276,7 @@ directly call OpenRouter via Python's requests library. Converting would require
## LiteLLM Master Key (use sparingly — agents should NOT use it directly)
- Master key: **Retrieval path (do not trust a literal value in this file — the key rotates)**:
```bash
# PRIMARY (proven, runs on CT 116 with no extra tooling):
docker exec harness-litellm printenv LITELLM_MASTER_KEY
# Note: the same value is stored in /opt/inference-harness/.env on CT 116 (verified matching)
# The master key is NOT in the Infisical vault (project=infrastructure env=production does not contain it)
# Prove a key is live with a 200 from /key/list on the CT 116 host (the container has no curl):
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer <key>" http://127.0.0.1:4000/key/list | jq length
```
- Master key: `sk-litellm-7f96080dd99b15c36bd4b333b58a6796` (in /opt/inference-harness/.env on CT116, Infisical project=infrastructure env=production secret=LITELLM_MASTER_KEY)
- Used for /key/generate, /key/delete, /key/list (GET), DB queries
- **Known violation (RESOLVED 2026-07-16):** Abiba's LITELLM_API_KEY was previously the master key.
It is now a dedicated agent key `sk-sxbphLvk1OU…` (vault secret `ABIBA_LITELLM_API_KEY`, alias `abiba-pi`).
-115
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@@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
---
kind: pattern
name: litellm-client-timeouts
description: >
Standard client timeout and retry policy for ALL agents calling LiteLLM
(CT 116, http://192.168.68.116). Created 2026-09-08 after the Sep 6 incident:
a backend stall 04:00-06:30 EDT produced 157 client-abandoned 408 failures
(82% from abiba-pi, 13 from mumuni) against a backend that was actually
succeeding at 20-70s per call once clients stopped giving up. Grounded in
measured data: syslog-auto (LiteLLM virtual model, no dedicated GPU — routes
to backends) averages 28.8s/request with 25.4s TTFT over 888 calls/24h;
nginx already allows 600s (Rule 5, verified 2026-08-09); the gap is entirely
client-side. Blast radius if wrong: agents fall back to DeepSeek silently
(key/timeout failures present as model degradation, not errors) or abandon
healthy-but-slow reasoning calls, fragmenting long tasks.
---
## Maintains
- client_timeout_standard: "litellm-client-timeouts v1.0 (2026-09-08)"
- applies_to: ALL agents and scripts calling http://192.168.68.116 (main model path, auxiliary tasks, health probes, benchmark jobs)
- verified_against: Prometheus litellm_* metrics 24h window ending 2026-09-08 ~10:00 EDT; live probe (syslog-auto tiny call 0.56s TTFB, 200 OK); nginx 600s proxy_read_timeout (Rule 5)
## The measured numbers these values come from
| Model | avg latency | avg TTFT | p-profile (24h) |
|---|---|---|---|
| syslog-auto | 28.8s | 25.4s | 68 calls took 30-120s; tail to ~300s under load |
| strix-moe | 7.5s | — | Strix Halo, healthy |
| gpu-vision (retired gemma-4-12b, RTX 5070) | 2.6s | — | RTX 5070, healthy |
Sep 6 incident timeline: failures 04:00-07:00 EDT (0% GPU util = wedged
backend), full recovery 07:00-08:00 with ZERO client failures once requests
tolerated 20-70s — 392 successful slow calls in the three hours after recovery.
LiteLLM's internal queue time is ~0s; the latency is model inference, not
proxy queuing.
## Parameters
### 1. Primary model path (model.default / custom_providers) — NO client timeout below 300s
- The default Hermes HTTP timeout (~60s) is TOO SHORT for syslog-auto's healthy
28.8s average + 120-300s tail. Every 408 in the incident was a client
abandoning a request the backend would have answered.
- If the transport exposes a timeout setting for the main model, set it to
**300s or more**. If it does not (current Hermes custom-provider path has no
timeout knob), that is acceptable ONLY because nginx holds the request for
600s — but any wrapper, script, or direct API call you write MUST set its own
timeout >= 300s for syslog-auto/qwen-class calls.
- Never hardcode a shorter timeout "to fail fast" on this path — failing fast
here is what caused the incident.
### 2. Auxiliary tasks — keep template timeouts, one correction
- vision: 60s (keep), web_extract: 30s (keep) — the 2.6s average was measured on `gemma-4-12b` (retired 2026-09-12); the live RTX 5070 alias is `gpu-vision`.
- compression: 300s (keep — this was already raised from 60 per gpu-fleet).
- **gpu-dense delegation/x_search: set timeout >= 120s.** The RTX 3090
(gpu-dense backend) is the same speed class as syslog-auto; delegation
defaults that assume fast responses will 408 the same way.
### 3. Retry policy — backoff, not repetition
- On timeout (408) or 5xx: retry up to **2 times** with exponential backoff
(**15s, 45s**) before giving up.
- Do NOT retry in a tight loop. The Sep 6 spike shape (65 failures in one hour
from one key) was a batch job retrying without backoff while the backend was
down — it multiplied load during recovery.
- On 401/403: do NOT retry — that is a key/permission problem (see
litellm-api-keys.prose.md and Rule 11); retrying just spams the log.
- On 429: honor the retry-after header if present, else back off 60s.
### 4. Health probes — identify yourself and time out sanely
- Probes MUST NOT appear as keyless, model-less failures in the metrics (12
such orphans appeared in the incident window and cost investigation time).
Send a real model name and use a real (probe-designated) key.
- Probe timeout: 30s. A probe that takes longer than 30s IS the alert —
report "backend slow (>30s)" rather than hanging.
- Probe cadence: at most hourly. The litellm-health cron cadence (authoritative
trigger in contract-registry.yaml) is the standard; sub-hourly synthetic
traffic distorts latency baselines.
### 5. Batch/benchmark jobs — schedule away from 04:00-07:00 EDT and chunk
- The incident window showed bulk clients amplifying a backend stall 5:1.
- Batch jobs that can tolerate delay: schedule 09:00-17:00 EDT.
- Any batch loop over N requests MUST sleep >= 5s between requests and honor
the retry policy in section 3.
## Returns
- A single standard any agent or script can cite: timeouts >= 300s on the
syslog-auto path, >= 120s on gpu-dense delegation, backoff retries (2x,
15s/45s), identified probes at 30s/hourly, batch jobs chunked and
day-scheduled.
- Failure signature recognition: bulk 408s from multiple keys in one window =
backend event (check gpu_utilization_percent: 0% = wedged, ~100% = saturated);
single-key 408s = that client's timeout is too short.
- Cross-references: hermes-config-template.prose.md (Rule 5 nginx 600s,
auxiliary timeouts), gpu-fleet.prose.md (compression 300s precedent,
stable aliases), litellm-api-keys.prose.md (key/permission failures).
## Intentionally NOT changed
- No server-side LiteLLM timeout/cooldown changes proposed — the incident
self-recovered and the server is healthy (0.56s live probe); changing
server behavior without process-level root cause (CT116 requires root;
not reachable from kagentz) would be guessing.
- No change to the template's vision/web_extract/compression timeouts —
measured data says they are correct.
- No per-agent key permission changes — those are litellm-api-keys.prose.md
territory (and the open gpu-vision/gemma 403 items are already filed with
the key owners).
- No model routing changes — syslog-auto's weighted pool behaved correctly
throughout the incident.
+46 -115
View File
@@ -1,25 +1,23 @@
---
kind: function
name: litellm-health
status: active
status: deprecated
deprecated_on: 2026-07-09
replaced_by: litellm-self-heal.prose.md
note: >
Consolidated into litellm-self-heal.prose.md to eliminate duplication
of architecture diagrams, GPU topology, timeout tables, and container
lists. Health check is now § Health Check within litellm-self-heal.
This file is retained for reference only — use litellm-self-heal instead.
description: >
Verifies the LiteLLM inference stack health. Current architecture (2026-07-09):
nginx:80 → LiteLLM:4000 → GPU(llama-server) via direct proxy.
Router (harness-router :9000) was DECOMMISSIONED 2026-09-11 (container,
image and config removed). GPU monitoring via Prometheus/Grafana and
Router (harness-router :9000) is DEPRECATED — container still runs but
is not in the request path. GPU monitoring via Prometheus/Grafana and
fleet dashboard (gpu-monitor :9100).
Designed as a reusable contract for any Syslog agent.
Source of truth: gpu-fleet.prose.md
## Monitoring / Alerting (as-built 2026-08-09)
- LiteLLM /metrics scrape job: requires `litellm_settings.success_callback: [prometheus]`
(failure_callback alone does NOT mount /metrics — verified 2026-08-09).
Scraped by Prometheus with Bearer master key; endpoint returns 307 → /metrics/.
- Alertmanager (harness-alertmanager :9093) + zulip-bridge (:9102) deliver
firing alerts to #agent-hub > alerts-infra via abiba-bot. Added 2026-08-09.
- Prometheus node job covers 6 PVE nodes (.4/.5/.6/.9/.12/.15:9100). Note: .4:9100 is a DEAD target (no route, down for weeks, not a live node).
---
## Architecture (v4.0.0 — Direct: nginx → LiteLLM → GPU)
@@ -35,8 +33,8 @@ Request → nginx:80 → LiteLLM:4000 → GPU(llama-server, parallel 2)
│
Grafana :3001
harness-router :9000 — DECOMMISSIONED 2026-09-11 (container, image
and config removed). nginx routes /v1 → LiteLLM directly.
harness-router :9000 — DEPRECATED, container still runs but
NOT in request path. nginx routes /v1 → LiteLLM directly.
Router slot booking + circuit breakers replaced by
LiteLLM native fallbacks + timeouts.
```
@@ -44,8 +42,9 @@ Request → nginx:80 → LiteLLM:4000 → GPU(llama-server, parallel 2)
**What changed (v3.2.0 → v4.0.0 — 2026-07-08)**:
- Router REMOVED from request path — LiteLLM proxies directly to GPU
- All GPUs at parallel 2 (was parallel 1)
- NVIDIA context reduced 256K→128K to free VRAM — the stable NVIDIA ceiling (2026-07-17); Strix Halo runs 256K (2026-09-12)
- Timeouts and fallback chains are config state — read them from CT 116 `/opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml`; they are not duplicated here.
- NVIDIA context reduced 256K→128K to free VRAM — now the stable ceiling across all GPUs (2026-07-17)
- LiteLLM timeouts tuned: gemma 25→120s, qwen 40→90s (SUPERSEDED 2026-07-16: qwen 300s, gemma 120s, strix 300s — see litellm-self-heal)
- nginx proxy_read_timeout: 600s, LiteLLM request_timeout: 300s
## Parameters
@@ -67,42 +66,33 @@ Request → nginx:80 → LiteLLM:4000 → GPU(llama-server, parallel 2)
- SSH key access to backend_host for container checks
- Network access to public_url, auth_host, and gpu_dashboard_url
- LiteLLM master key for admin endpoints only (`/key/list`, `/key/generate`, `/key/info`)
- The dedicated `monitor` agent key on CT 116 at `/etc/litellm-monitor.env` (root-only 0600) for
model inference checks, scoped for every alias step 7 probes (`gpu-dense`, `gpu-vision`,
`strix-moe`, `syslog-auto`). Retrieve from the executor's host via:
```
monitor key: ssh root@192.168.68.116 "grep LITELLM_MONITOR_KEY /etc/litellm-monitor.env | cut -d= -f2"
master key: ssh root@192.168.68.116 "docker exec harness-litellm printenv LITELLM_MASTER_KEY"
```
If credentials are missing or unreadable, the probe must report `credential-missing` (not bare 401 or "0 keys").
The master key must never be used for inference.
- LiteLLM master key for key management endpoints
## GPU Fleet Topology
| Host | IP | Hardware | Role |
|------|-----|----------|------|
| llm-gpu | 192.168.68.8 | NVIDIA RTX 3090 (24 GB) | heavy reasoning (`gpu-dense`) |
| ocu-llm | 192.168.68.110 | NVIDIA RTX 5070 (12 GB) | vision / web extract / light tasks (`gpu-vision`) |
| amdpve | 192.168.68.15 | AMD Strix Halo 64GB UMA | compression (`strix-moe`) |
| Host | IP | Hardware | Models Served | Engine | Context | Parallel |
|------|-----|----------|---------------|--------|---------|----------|
| llm-gpu | 192.168.68.8 | NVIDIA RTX 3090 (24 GB) | qwen3.6-27B-code | llama-server systemd | **128K** | 2 |
| ocu-llm | 192.168.68.110 | NVIDIA RTX 5070 (12 GB) | gemma-4-12b | llama-server systemd | **128K** | 2 |
| amdpve | 192.168.68.15 | AMD Strix Halo 64GB UMA | qwen3.6-35B-udq4 (LiteLLM alias: strix-moe) | llama-server systemd (Vulkan) | 128K | 2 |
Single source of truth for models, aliases, rpm caps, weights and fallback chains:
CT 116 `/opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml`. Do not duplicate those values in
contracts — read them there. Do not re-add retired names (`gemma-4-12b`, `gpu-light`,
`crew-auto`).
## Model Fallback Chains (LiteLLM)
> Re-scope note (2026-09-12): the earlier plan to restate the live fallback chains and
> per-model timeouts in this contract is intentionally superseded — that state is config,
> and this contract points at the CT 116 config instead. Step 7 likewise authenticates with
> the dedicated `monitor` key, not the master key, which is admin-only.
| Primary | Timeout | Fallback | Timeout |
|---------|---------|----------|---------|
| qwen3.6-27B-code | 300s | gemma-4-12b | 120s |
| gemma-4-12b | 120s | qwen3.6-27B-code | 300s |
| qwen3.6-35B-udq4 / strix-moe | 300s | qwen → gemma | — |
| syslog-auto (balanced) | 300s | qwen → gemma | — |
> Global: request_timeout=300s, nginx proxy_read_timeout=600s
## Containers on CT 116
| Container | Image | Port | Health Check |
|-----------|-------|------|-------------|
| harness-litellm | ghcr.io/docker.litellm.ai/berriai/litellm:1.99.1 | :4000→:4000 | /health/liveliness |
| harness-litellm | berriai/litellm:1.90.0-rc.1 | :4000→:4001 | /health/liveliness |
| harness-router | inference-harness-router | :9000 (127.0.0.1) | /health (DEPRECATED — not in path) |
| harness-nginx | nginx:alpine | :80 | HTTP 200 on /health |
| harness-postgres | postgres:16-alpine | :5432 | pg_isready |
| harness-redis | redis:7-alpine | :6379 | PING |
@@ -111,100 +101,41 @@ contracts — read them there. Do not re-add retired names (`gemma-4-12b`, `gpu-
| harness-prometheus | prom/prometheus | :9090 | /-/healthy |
## Execution
**Execution model**: This contract is executed by a host-scheduled cron job (see
`scripts/contract-run.sh`). The cron job runs the monitoring script directly on the
target host and appends the result to `/var/log/contract-runs/<contract>.log`. An
agent-session acknowledgement (a `done:` line in the ops status log) is NOT
execution — it only proves the agent read the result and reported it. The actual
monitoring work happens in the host cron job.
1. **Read parameters** — Use provided values or defaults
2. **Check the end-user surfaces** — the public edge and the backend edge serve the SAME
app under DIFFERENT paths. They are not interchangeable, so every probe below must name
the surface it targets. Never point a check at a path that only resolves on the other
surface.
**Public edge** — `{{public_url}}` (https://litellm.sysloggh.net) serves the app at the
ROOT; the `/litellm/` prefix does not exist there and 404s:
2. **Check public endpoints**:
- GET {{public_url}}/ui/ → expect 200 ("LiteLLM Dashboard")
- GET {{public_url}}/docs → expect 200 ("LiteLLM API - Swagger UI")
- GET {{public_url}}/litellm/ui/ and {{public_url}}/litellm/docs → expect 404 (not served on this edge)
**Backend edge** — `http://{{backend_host}}` (port 80) serves the app UNDER `/litellm/`:
- GET http://{{backend_host}}/litellm/ui/ → expect 200 ("LiteLLM Dashboard")
- GET http://{{backend_host}}/litellm/docs → expect 200 ("LiteLLM API - Swagger UI")
- GET http://{{backend_host}}/ui/ and /docs → expect 301 → /litellm/... → 200 (one-hop redirect helpers,
added 2026-09-11)
3. **Check LiteLLM health (no-auth)**:
- GET http://{{backend_host}}/litellm/health/liveliness → expect 200
4. **Check backend container health**:
- SSH to {{backend_host}} → `docker ps` → verify 12 containers healthy (11 harness + trove-agent-docker, added 2026-09-11)
- Critical: harness-litellm, harness-nginx, harness-postgres
- Monitoring: harness-redis, harness-dashboard, harness-grafana, harness-prometheus,
harness-alertmanager, harness-zulip-bridge, harness-docker-stats, harness-pve-exporter,
trove-agent-docker (ghcr.io/techdox/trove-agent-docker, added 2026-09-11)
- SSH to {{backend_host}} → `docker ps` → verify 8 containers healthy
- Critical: harness-litellm, harness-router, harness-nginx, harness-postgres
- Monitoring: harness-redis, harness-dashboard, harness-grafana, harness-prometheus
5. **Check GPU fleet health via gpu-monitor** (router decommissioned 2026-09-11):
- GET {{gpu_dashboard_url}}/gpu-data → expect 200 with GPU metrics JSON
- nginx `/health/unified` is now a `301` redirect to `/gpu/gpu-data` (same payload)
5. **Check router roster loaded**:
- GET http://{{backend_host}}:9000/health → expect 200
- GET http://{{backend_host}}:9000/health/unified → expect 3 models
- If router returns "all GPUs saturated" but GPUs idle: roster not loaded → reload
6. **Check GPU fleet health** (via fleet dashboard):
- GET {{gpu_dashboard_url}}/gpu-data → expect 200 with GPU metrics JSON
- Verify GPUs reporting status "healthy"
- Check alerts array for active warnings/critical
7. **Check model inference via LiteLLM** — Test one model on each GPU host. The health
check runs on the **backend edge**, not the public edge, so these paths carry the
`/litellm/` prefix:
- POST http://{{backend_host}}/litellm/v1/chat/completions model=gpu-dense → expect 200 (RTX 3090, .8)
- POST http://{{backend_host}}/litellm/v1/chat/completions model=gpu-vision → expect 200 (RTX 5070, .110)
- POST http://{{backend_host}}/litellm/v1/chat/completions model=strix-moe → expect 200 (Strix Halo, .15)
- Auth uses the dedicated `monitor` agent key. Retrieve via:
`ssh root@192.168.68.116 "grep LITELLM_MONITOR_KEY /etc/litellm-monitor.env | cut -d= -f2"`
Do NOT use the master key for inference — the master key is for admin endpoints only
(`/key/list`, `/key/generate`, `/key/info`). Retrieve master key via:
`ssh root@192.168.68.116 "docker exec harness-litellm printenv LITELLM_MASTER_KEY"`
- KEY SCOPE: the `monitor` key MUST be scoped for the three probed aliases (`gpu-dense`,
`gpu-vision`, `strix-moe`) plus the `syslog-auto` fallback pool, otherwise the probe
returns 403 and the host is not covered.
If a probe returns 403, widen the monitor key's model list on CT 116 (add the missing
alias) and re-run — never drop the host from the probe to make the check pass.
- `gemma-4-12b` was retired and returns 400 `Invalid model name` — do not re-add it to
this list. The RTX 5070 host now serves `gpu-vision`.
- `/v1/models` is **key-scoped**: a model is only visible to keys allowed to use it, so
the set depends on the key. Always state which key a model list was read with — a
snapshot without its key is not evidence. This probe uses the `monitor` key on the
backend surface (`http://{{backend_host}}/litellm/v1/models`). The authoritative model
registry is CT 116 `/opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml`; read it there rather
than freezing a list here.
7. **Check model inference via LiteLLM** — Test each model:
- POST /v1/chat/completions model=gemma-4-12b → expect 200
- POST /v1/chat/completions model=qwen3.6-27B-code → expect 200
- POST /v1/chat/completions model=strix-moe → expect 200
- Use master key for auth
8. **Check agent keys**:
- GET http://{{backend_host}}/litellm/key/list with master key (admin endpoint) → verify all 6 agents have keys
- **IMPORTANT**: Run the curl on the CT 116 HOST, not inside the container. The `harness-litellm` container has no curl/wget. Use:
`ssh root@192.168.68.116 "curl -s -H 'Authorization: Bearer $MASTER_KEY' http://127.0.0.1:4000/key/list"`
- If the response is empty or unparseable, report `admin-call-failed` (not "0 agent keys")
- GET /key/list with master key → verify all 6 agents have keys
9. **Check Grafana**:
- GET {{grafana_url}}/api/health → expect 200
10. **Compile and report** — Determine overall_status from individual check results
## Executor Script (2026-09-13)
**Run `scripts/litellm-health-check.py` from the clone.** This script implements all 11
checks defined above and reports results in a standardized format. Paste its output in
the status line.
- Hand-rolled probes are **not** an acceptable substitute for the script.
- Backend-edge checks (steps 2–8) must use `http://192.168.68.116` (internal IP),
**not** the public URL `https://litellm.sysloggh.net` (which returns 401 for those paths).
- Docker Stats (step 10) must be fetched from the CT 116 host itself (`127.0.0.1:9324/metrics`)
because the `harness-docker-stats` container binds to localhost on CT 116.
- Admin Key List (step 8) requires the master key expanded locally before SSH, then embedded
in the remote curl command with proper quoting.
Expected output on a healthy fleet: 11/11 passing checks.
+78 -45
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@@ -11,22 +11,22 @@ note: >
Script: `/opt/inference-harness/scripts/litellm-health-check.sh` on CT 116 (cron `0 */6 * * *`).
Reports to /var/log/litellm/health-*.json and Gitea (SyslogSolution/health-logs).
GPU monitoring integrated from gpu-monitor on .24:9100.
Health probes are owned by litellm-health.prose.md (dispatched as
`run contract: litellm-health`). This contract owns remediation only — it does not
re-specify the probes.
Consolidated from litellm-health + litellm-self-heal on 2026-07-09 to eliminate
duplication of architecture diagrams, GPU topology, timeout tables, and container
lists. Health check is now § Health Check within this contract.
Source of truth for GPU topology and keys: gpu-fleet.prose.md
Last verified: 2026-07-12
description: >
LiteLLM inference stack remediation. Applies remediation rules for failures detected
by litellm-health.prose.md (nginx → LiteLLM → GPU chain, CT 116 containers, GPU hosts,
model inference, and agent keys).
LiteLLM inference stack health monitoring + self-healing. Verifies the full
nginx → LiteLLM → GPU chain, 8 containers on CT 116, 3 GPU hosts, model
inference, and agent keys. Applies remediation rules for common failures.
Reports every action via Zulip DM and Gitea (SyslogSolution/health-logs).
---
---
# LiteLLM Operations — Self-Heal (Remediation)
# LiteLLM Operations — Health Check + Self-Heal
## Architecture (v4.0.0 — Direct: nginx → LiteLLM → GPU)
@@ -41,8 +41,8 @@ Request → nginx:80 → LiteLLM:4000 → GPU(llama-server, parallel 2)
│
Grafana :3001
harness-router :9000 — DECOMMISSIONED 2026-09-11 (container, image
and config removed). nginx routes /v1 → LiteLLM directly.
harness-router :9000 — DEPRECATED, container still runs but
NOT in request path. nginx routes /v1 → LiteLLM directly.
Router slot booking + circuit breakers replaced by
LiteLLM native fallbacks + timeouts.
```
@@ -58,50 +58,48 @@ Request → nginx:80 → LiteLLM:4000 → GPU(llama-server, parallel 2)
## GPU Fleet Topology
| Host | IP | Hardware | Role |
|------|-----|----------|------|
| llm-gpu | 192.168.68.8 | NVIDIA RTX 3090 (24 GB) | heavy reasoning (`gpu-dense`) |
| ocu-llm | 192.168.68.110 | NVIDIA RTX 5070 (12 GB) | vision / web extract / light tasks (`gpu-vision`) |
| amdpve | 192.168.68.15 | AMD Strix Halo 64GB UMA | compression (`strix-moe`) |
| Host | IP | Hardware | Models Served | Engine | Context | Parallel |
|------|-----|----------|---------------|--------|---------|----------|
| llm-gpu | 192.168.68.8 | NVIDIA RTX 3090 (24 GB) | qwen3.6-27B-code | llama-server systemd (`/home/llmuser/llama-wrapper.sh`, `-c 131072 --parallel 2 --ngl 99`) | **128K** | 2 |
| ocu-llm | 192.168.68.110 | NVIDIA RTX 5070 (12 GB) | gemma-4-12b | llama-server systemd (`/home/llmuser/llama-wrapper.sh`, `--ctx-size 131072 --parallel 2`, IQ4_NL + MTP draft) | **128K** | 2 |
| amdpve | 192.168.68.15 | AMD Strix Halo 64GB UMA | qwen3.6-35B-udq4 (LiteLLM alias: `strix-moe`) | llama-server systemd (Vulkan) | 128K | 2 |
> Verified on the ground 2026-07-16. The legacy name `ornith-1.0-35b` does NOT exist in LiteLLM and must not be referenced.
> Verified on ground 2026-07-16 via `curl /v1/models` on each host + `llama-wrapper.sh`. The AMD host's underlying model is `qwen3.6-35B-udq4`; LiteLLM exposes it under two `model_name`s: `qwen3.6-35B-udq4` and `strix-moe` (rpm 40). The legacy name `ornith-1.0-35b` does NOT exist in LiteLLM and must not be referenced.
## LiteLLM Model Surface
## LiteLLM Model Surface (ground truth — `/opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml` on CT 116)
Single source of truth for models, aliases, rpm caps, weights and fallback chains:
CT 116 `/opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml`. Do not duplicate those values in
contracts — read them there. Do not re-add retired names (`gemma-4-12b`, `gpu-light`,
`crew-auto`).
`model_name`s served: `qwen3.6-27B-code`, `gemma-4-12b`, `qwen3.6-35B-udq4`, `strix-moe`, `gpu-dense`, `gpu-light`, `syslog-auto`, `crew-auto` (new 2026-08-20).
### Alias Surface
| Alias | Serves | Where | Kind |
|-------|--------|-------|------|
| `gpu-dense` | heavy reasoning | RTX 3090 (192.168.68.8) | direct alias |
| `gpu-vision` | vision / web extract / light tasks | RTX 5070 (192.168.68.110) | direct alias AND `syslog-auto` pool member |
| `strix-moe` | compression (MoE) | Strix Halo (192.168.68.15) | direct alias |
| `syslog-auto` | balanced default | weighted pool across the three GPU hosts | pool router |
### Context Cap Split (2026-08-20; crew cap RETIRED)
### Context Cap Split (2026-08-20)
- **Abiba (firstmate)**: 128K uncapped — unlimited context for primary workloads
- **Hermes agents** (mumuni, tanko, koby, koonimo): 128K uncapped
- **Crewmates** (ops, tune, verify, auth-keys, build): the 64K cap was retired together with the `crew-auto` alias; NO context cap is currently in force.
- **Crewmates** (ops, tune, verify, auth-keys, build): 64K capped — alias `crew-auto` enforces 64K limit
> The 64K crew cap was retired with `crew-auto` (2026-09-12). No limit is currently in force; reinstating one would need per-key model limits as a separate, deliberately-scoped change.
Preferred implementation: uncap shared pool, add capped alias for crew-only.
- Key scoping: `/v1/models` is key-scoped, so the set a caller sees must be read with a named key rather than assumed — a monitor key, an agent key, and the master key can each return a different set. Agents should use the stable aliases (`strix-moe`, `gpu-vision`, `gpu-dense`) rather than raw model names, so model swaps don't break them.
- `syslog-auto` is a weighted router model: qwen3.6-27B-code (0.55, rpm 500) + qwen3.6-35B-udq4 (0.30, rpm 60) + gemma-4-12b (0.15, rpm 200).
- `gpu-dense` / `gpu-light` are high-rpm aliases (rpm 500) onto qwen3.6-27B-code / gemma-4-12b respectively.
- Key scoping: agent keys are restricted to `['syslog-auto','qwen3.6-27B-code','gemma-4-12b','strix-moe','gpu-dense','gpu-light']`. As of 2026-07-16 the `baggy`/`koby`/`mumuni`/`abiba-pi` keys ALSO include `qwen3.6-35B-udq4`; `abiba-pi` additionally includes `deepseek-v4-pro` (cloud fallback). `kagenz0`/`koonimo`/`pi-agents-unified` have the standard 6 only. Agents should still use the stable alias `strix-moe` (not the raw `qwen3.6-35B-udq4`) so model swaps don't break them.
- **NEVER use `litellm_proxy_master_key` (the `sk-litellm-...` master key) for inference.** It is for admin endpoints only (`/key/list`, `/key/generate`, `/key/info`). All inference — agent traffic, health-check model tests, monitor scripts — uses agent-specific keys. The health-check script's model tests use a dedicated `monitor` agent key stored at `/etc/litellm-monitor.env` on CT 116 (root-only, `chmod 600`); `/key/list` is the only call that legitimately uses `$MASTER_KEY`.
> Re-scope note (2026-09-12): the fallback-chain and per-model timeout tables were removed
> by the single-source-of-truth re-scope; read those values from the CT 116 config named
> above rather than from this contract.
## Model Fallback Chains (LiteLLM)
| Primary | Timeout | Fallback | Timeout |
|---------|---------|----------|---------|
| qwen3.6-27B-code | 300s | gemma-4-12b | 120s |
| gemma-4-12b | 120s | qwen3.6-27B-code | 300s |
| qwen3.6-35B-udq4 / strix-moe | 300s | qwen → gemma | — |
| syslog-auto (balanced) | 300s | qwen → gemma | — |
> Global: request_timeout=300s, nginx proxy_read_timeout=600s
## Containers on CT 116
| Container | Image | Port | Health Check |
|-----------|-------|------|-------------|
| harness-litellm | ghcr.io/docker.litellm.ai/berriai/litellm:1.99.1 | :4000→:4000 | /health/liveliness |
| harness-litellm | berriai/litellm:1.90.0-rc.1 | :4000→:4001 | /health/liveliness |
| harness-router | inference-harness-router | :9000 (127.0.0.1) | /health (DEPRECATED — not in path) |
| harness-nginx | nginx:alpine | :80 | HTTP 200 on /health |
| harness-postgres | postgres:16-alpine | :5432 | pg_isready |
| harness-redis | redis:7-alpine | :6379 | PING |
@@ -115,8 +113,8 @@ contracts — read them there. Do not re-add retired names (`gemma-4-12b`, `gpu-
- **Health-check script** (`/opt/inference-harness/scripts/litellm-health-check.sh` on CT 116): `gpu-fleet` check fails only on **critical** alerts (warnings are informational). Tests `strix-moe` (not `ornith-1.0-35b`).
- **GPU monitor** (`/root/scripts/gpu-monitor-server.py` on pi .24): runs as **systemd unit `gpu-monitor.service`** (was bare `&` process). `gpu_count` includes Strix Halo (was 2, now 3). VRAM alert thresholds: warning 93%, critical 97% (raised from 90/95 — 128K context steady-state is ~70% on RTX 3090, not a fault).
- **Agent key monitor** (`/root/scripts/agent-health-check.py` on pi .24, cron `*/10`): v4 (2026-09-10) — vault-backed agents (tanko/koby/koonimo) read their **agent-specific** `{NAME}_LITELLM_API_KEY` from Infisical vault (not the shared master key); abiba (pi agent) reads `LITELLM_API_KEY` from its local `/root/.pi/agent/env.sh` (#735 — moved out of shared `/root/.bashrc`), not from the vault. Abiba is pi-only since the harness purge, so its Hermes config/wrapper/gateway legs are skipped rather than reported as faults; koby is **report-only** (captain's 2026-08-17 ruling) — its findings go to the `--json` `report_only` array and are never counted as fleet failures or repaired, and its CT 111 liveness is probed on storepve (.6). Covers: LiteLLM keys, GPU ports, agent gateways, CT liveness (pct status on PVE nodes), config.yaml YAML integrity, wrapper/CLI integrity, vault secret non-emptiness checks. Every run/report carries the absolute execution path (`script=` + `cwd=`). The current fleet roster is owned by the script changelog (`scripts/agent-health-check.py`); mumuni is no longer probed from this host. Legacy `tdunna`/`baggy` replaced with canonical agent hostnames.
- **Stale keys cleaned**: `daily-infra-report.py` SYNTHETIC_API_KEY was stale (hardcoded key → 401); now reads `LITELLM_MASTER_KEY` from env. Deprecated scripts (`router-original.py`, `router-phase0-backup.py`, `apply-fixes.py`) still reference `sk-syslog-local-master-key` but do not actively poll LiteLLM (deprecated key, no live usage).
- **Agent key monitor** (`/root/scripts/agent-health-check.py` on pi .24, cron `*/10`): v2 (2026-07-26) — reads each agent's **agent-specific** `{NAME}_LITELLM_API_KEY` from Infisical vault (not the shared master key). Covers: LiteLLM keys, GPU ports, agent gateways (all 5 agents now SSHa ble), CT liveness (pct status on PVE nodes), config.yaml YAML integrity, wrapper/CLI integrity, vault secret non-emptiness checks. Fleet roster: tanko (.122), mumuni (.24, inside abiba CT100), koby (.129), koonimo (.114), abiba (.24). Legacy `tdunna`/`baggy` replaced with canonical agent hostnames.
- **Stale keys cleaned**: `daily-infra-report.py` SYNTHETIC_API_KEY was stale (`sk-U_ydi3B` → 401); now reads `LITELLM_MASTER_KEY` from env. Deprecated scripts (`router-original.py`, `router-phase0-backup.py`, `apply-fixes.py`) still reference `sk-syslog-local-master-key` but do not actively poll LiteLLM.
## Maintains
@@ -138,7 +136,43 @@ contracts — read them there. Do not re-add retired names (`gemma-4-12b`, `gpu-
## Health Check
Health probes are owned by `litellm-health.prose.md` (dispatched as `run contract: litellm-health`). This contract owns remediation only — it does not re-specify the probes.
Run this first on every cycle. Results feed into remediation rules below.
### 1. Check public endpoints
- GET {{public_url}}/ui/ → expect 200 ("LiteLLM Dashboard")
- GET {{public_url}}/docs → expect 200 ("LiteLLM API - Swagger UI")
### 2. Check LiteLLM health (no-auth)
- GET http://{{backend_host}}/litellm/health/liveliness → expect 200
### 3. Check backend container health
- SSH to {{backend_host}} → `docker ps` → verify 10 containers healthy
- Critical: harness-litellm, harness-nginx, harness-postgres
- Monitoring: harness-redis, harness-dashboard, harness-grafana, harness-prometheus, harness-docker-stats, harness-pve-exporter
- Deprecated but running: harness-router (not in path, reference only)
### 4. Check GPU fleet health (via fleet dashboard)
- GET {{gpu_dashboard_url}}/gpu-data → expect 200 with GPU metrics JSON
- Verify GPUs reporting status "healthy"
- Check alerts array for active warnings/critical
### 5. Check model inference via LiteLLM — test each model
- POST /v1/chat/completions model=gemma-4-12b → expect 200
- POST /v1/chat/completions model=qwen3.6-27B-code → expect 200
- POST /v1/chat/completions model=strix-moe → expect 200
- Use master key for auth
### 6. Check agent keys
- GET /key/list with master key → verify all 6 agents have keys
### 7. Check Grafana
- GET {{grafana_url}}/api/health → expect 200
### 8. Compile overall status
Determine overall_status from individual check results:
- "healthy" — all checks pass
- "degraded" — 1-2 non-critical checks fail
- "down" — critical checks fail
---
---
@@ -181,9 +215,8 @@ Fix → generate keys in LiteLLM via /key/generate → update /etc/environment o
Escalate → if SSH access unavailable, send Zulip DM
### Rule 9: Stale Active Counter in Redis — DEPRECATED
Router no longer in path so router active-slot counters are unused. Rule retained
for reference but inactive. `harness-redis` now serves only LiteLLM cache and
rate-limit state; check the container if cache errors appear.
Router no longer in path so Redis active counters are unused. Rule retained
for reference but inactive. If Redis issues occur, check harness-redis container.
---
---
+5 -3
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ report_only_agents:
- koby # ⛔ KOBY IS NEVER REPAIRED (Rule 17, 2026-08-17) — detect + report, never fix on .129
name: memory-audit-maintenance
kind: responsibility
description: Shared memory audit and maintenance contract for Hermes agents (Mumuni, Koby, Koonimo). Tanko is no longer a Hermes agent (now on DSH/DeepSeek Harness since 2026-08-27) and uses DSH-native memory, so it is excluded from this Hermes roster. Each agent runs it against its own isolated memory files — no cross-agent access, no shared state. Detects staleness, enforces writer registry, and rotates canary tokens.
description: Shared memory audit and maintenance contract for all Hermes agents (Mumuni, Tanko, Koby, Koonimo). Each agent runs it against its own isolated memory files — no cross-agent access, no shared state. Detects staleness, enforces writer registry, and rotates canary tokens.
id: 067NC4KG01RG50R40M30E20918
---
---
@@ -18,10 +18,11 @@ Autonomously audit and reorganize an agent's native memory (MEMORY.md, USER.md,
### Scope
This contract is the **Hermes Agent standard** for memory maintenance. It is shared across Hermes agents (Mumuni, Koby, Koonimo). **Tanko is excluded — it migrated to DSH (DeepSeek Harness) on 2026-08-27 and now uses DSH-native memory (mnemon), not `~/.hermes/memories/`.** Each agent runs it against its own memory files only no cross-agent access, no shared state, no shared ledger, no shared canary. The contract is the standard; each agent enforces it independently with fully isolated data.
This contract is the **Hermes Agent standard** for memory maintenance. It is shared across all Hermes agents (Mumuni, Tanko, Koby, Koonimo). Each agent runs it against its own memory files only no cross-agent access, no shared state, no shared ledger, no shared canary. The contract is the standard; each agent enforces it independently with fully isolated data.
**Agent Roster (Hermes):**
**Agent Roster:**
- Mumuni
- Tanko
- Koby (CT 111 / tdunna)
- Koonimo (CT 113 / baggy)
@@ -345,3 +346,4 @@ return {
### Per-Agent Notes
Each Hermes agent (Mumuni, Tanko, Tdunna, Baggy) runs this contract against its own `~/.hermes/memories/` directory. The contract is identical across agents, but all data is fully isolated: separate ledgers, separate writer registries, separate canaries. If a new agent is added to the roster, it must be listed in `### Scope` above and given its own isolated memory directory.
+47 -213
View File
@@ -4,236 +4,70 @@ report_only_agents:
kind: pattern
name: memory-fixer
description: >
Auto-fix low-hanging fruit in the RA-H OS knowledge graph. No judgment calls — only deterministic Level 1 operations.
Escalate anything that needs Kwame's input. Executes confirmed Kwame decisions to completion (state + updated_at).
version: 2.2.0
Auto-fix low-hanging fruit in the graph. No judgment calls — only deterministic Level 1 operations.
Escalate anything that needs Kwame's input.
version: 1.1.0
---
---
# Memory Fixer
> **Executable copy:** the `okyeame-memory-fixer` cron job on kagentz (`hermes cron list`) holds its instruction
> set **inline in `~/.hermes/cron/jobs.json`** (`hermes cron edit <id> --prompt …`; there is no `--prompt-file`, and
> `~/.hermes/cron/memory-fixer-prompt.md` is a synced draft, not the live instruction). This file is the institutional
> record of the same contract; when the two diverge, the job prompt is what actually runs — diff it against this file
> before claiming a prompt change landed.
> ⚠️ Corrected 2026-09-26: the previous pointer (`/root/.hermes/contracts/memory-fixer-v3.md`) does not exist on
> kagentz — no `/root` access from this container — and was verified unreachable, not merely stale.
## Purpose
Auto-fix low-hanging fruit in the graph. No judgment calls — only deterministic Level 1 operations. Escalate anything that needs Kwame's input. When Kwame replies to an escalation, **execute the decision to completion** (update state and timestamps), never leaving a node in review-pending forever.
Auto-fix low-hanging fruit in the graph. No judgment calls — only deterministic Level 1 operations. Escalate anything that needs Kwame's input.
**Type:** Write-only (Level 1 fixes only)
**Scope:** RA-H OS knowledge graph (192.168.68.65)
**Schedule:** Daily at 8 AM ET
**Escalation:** Level 2+ to Kwame as task items
## Level 0 Auto-Deletes (Allowed Without Approval)
Ephemeral heartbeat and log nodes that violate "Logs NEVER go in the graph":
## Key Design Decision
- `[LITELLM-HEALTH]`, `[GPU-SELF-HEAL]`, `[PM2-SELF-HEAL]`
- `[PROXMOX-MONITOR]`, `[GPU-MONITOR]`, `[INFRA-MONITOR]`, `[AGENT-HEALTH]`, `[DISK-GC]`
- `[WAL]` entries older than 30 days
The `updateNode` tool's `metadata` field performs a **restricted merge** — the `state` key only accepts `'processed'` or `'not_processed'`. Additionally, new metadata keys cannot be added via the merge.
**Solution:** Use the `description` field to tag stale nodes with review actions, since `description` is a simple string overwritable via `updateNode`.
**Tag Format:** `[REVIEW: action] original description text...`
Where `action` is one of:
- `archive` — node is stale and should be archived
- `refresh` — node is stale and should be refreshed (infrastructure)
- `keep` — node has been confirmed as current
- `merge` — node is a duplicate candidate
**Query for finding review-tagged nodes:**
```sql
SELECT id, title, description
FROM nodes
WHERE description LIKE '[REVIEW:%';
```
## Level 1 Auto-Fixes (No Kwame Decision Needed)
### 1. Missing `type` Auto-Classification
```sql
SELECT id, title,
CASE
WHEN title LIKE '%infrastructure%' OR title LIKE '%proxmox%' OR title LIKE '%setup%' THEN 'infrastructure'
WHEN title LIKE '%skill%' OR title LIKE '%how to%' OR title LIKE '%guide%' THEN 'skill'
WHEN title LIKE '%doc%' OR title LIKE '%template%' OR title LIKE '%brand%' THEN 'documentation'
WHEN title LIKE 'WAL:%' OR title LIKE 'TASK:%' THEN 'note'
WHEN title LIKE '%[LEARN]%' THEN 'documentation'
ELSE 'note'
END as auto_type
FROM nodes
WHERE json_extract(metadata, '$.type') IS NULL;
```
### 2. Missing `namespace` Auto-Population
```sql
SELECT id, title, json_extract(metadata, '$.tenant') as tenant
FROM nodes
WHERE json_extract(metadata, '$.namespace') IS NULL;
```
### 3. Staleness Review Tagging (refresh-suggested nodes only)
Using the type-based windows from the memory-monitor contract, tag nodes stale beyond their window. **Only process a maximum of 10 nodes per run** to avoid overwhelming Kwame. Prioritize infrastructure first, then dynamic, then ephemeral.
**Archive-suggested nodes are NO LONGER tagged — they are archived outright (see Level 1 fix 4).** Tagging with `[REVIEW: refresh]` applies only to living nodes (infrastructure, deployment, system, system-health, business, philosophy, research, learning, investigation, analysis, project, agent, registry, policy).
**Exclusion Rules:**
- Nodes with `state` = `review_pending`, `deprecated`, `archived`, or `not_processed` are NOT processed
- Nodes whose `description` already starts with `[REVIEW:` or `[ARCHIVED]` are NOT re-processed
```sql
SELECT id, title, json_extract(metadata, '$.type') as node_type,
CAST(julianday('now') - julianday(updated_at) AS INTEGER) as days_stale,
CASE
WHEN json_extract(metadata, '$.type') IN ('infrastructure', 'deployment', 'system', 'system-health') THEN 'refresh'
WHEN json_extract(metadata, '$.type') IN ('business', 'philosophy', 'research', 'learning', 'learn', 'investigation', 'analysis', 'project') THEN 'refresh'
ELSE 'archive'
END as suggested_action
FROM nodes
WHERE updated_at < datetime('now',
CASE
WHEN json_extract(metadata, '$.type') IN ('infrastructure', 'deployment', 'system', 'system-health') THEN '-14 days'
WHEN json_extract(metadata, '$.type') IN ('skill', 'documentation', 'template', 'protocol-enforcement', 'prd', 'architecture') THEN '-90 days'
WHEN json_extract(metadata, '$.type') IN ('note', 'wal', 'WAL', 'task', 'TASK', 'event') THEN '-30 days'
WHEN json_extract(metadata, '$.type') IN ('business', 'philosophy', 'research', 'learning', 'learn', 'investigation', 'analysis', 'project') THEN '-120 days'
WHEN json_extract(metadata, '$.type') IN ('deprecated-relay', 'audit', 'audit-report', 'incident', 'incident-report') THEN '-3650 days'
ELSE '-45 days'
END
)
AND json_extract(metadata, '$.state') NOT IN ('review_pending', 'deprecated', 'archived', 'not_processed')
AND (description IS NULL OR description NOT LIKE '[REVIEW:%')
ORDER BY days_stale ASC
LIMIT 10;
```
For each identified node, call `updateNode(id, { description: "[REVIEW: action] " + originalDescription })`.
### 4. Stale-Node Archiving (Level 1 — standing Kwame directive, 2026-09-11)
**Kwame's standing directive: stale nodes CAN be archived by the fixer. No per-batch escalation, no `[REVIEW: archive]` tagging — archive them.**
For every node whose suggested action is `archive` (i.e. its type is NOT one of the living types in fix 3), archive it in a **single** `updateNode` call:
```python
updateNode(id, {
"description": "[ARCHIVED] " + originalDescriptionWithoutReviewTag,
"metadata": {"state": "archived"}
})
```
- `state` transitions **DO work through `updateNode`** (`archived`, and back to `active`). The former "state only accepts processed/not_processed, use SSH" claim was wrong — verified 2026-09-11 by archiving 7 nodes (#61, #373, #388, #465, #475, #526, #1476) over the bridge with `updated_at` auto-bumping. **SSH to the bridge host is a fallback, not a requirement**, and it is blocked from kagentz anyway.
- Pass `description` and `metadata` in the **same** call, and always keep the `updates` object nested: `{"id": N, "updates": {…}}`.
- Archiving is non-destructive: the node stays in the graph, marked `state: archived` + `[ARCHIVED] ` prefix. **Living nodes (refresh-suggested) are NEVER archived** without a specific Kwame decision — they are the cluster/agent/business canon.
**Archive candidates are identified by the fix 3 query's `suggested_action = 'archive'` branch** (the `ELSE 'archive'` case: anything not an infrastructure/skill/documentation/strategic/audit type).
### 5. Duplicate-Node Detection (Level 1 — read-only, every run)
The graph's duplicate problem is rarely an agent mistyping a title: it is **recurring writers creating a new
node per run instead of updating one**. This phase detects that class and reports it. It is read-only and
**never merges**.
**Condition:** node must be an orphan (no edges). Deleting a connected node risks breaking other nodes.
**Method:** direct SQLite on `.65` (MCP has no delete tool):
```bash
python3 /home/hermes/.hermes/scripts/memory_dup_detect.py --json
ssh root@192.168.68.65 "sqlite3 /root/.local/share/RA-H/db/rah.sqlite \"
DELETE FROM nodes WHERE id IN (
SELECT id FROM nodes WHERE id NOT IN (SELECT from_node_id FROM edges)
AND id NOT IN (SELECT to_node_id FROM edges)
AND title LIKE '[LITELLM-HEALTH]%' -- add more prefixes as needed
);\""
```
Read-only, ~15s over the whole graph, exit 0. That script is the source of truth for the clustering logic —
do not re-implement it in the prompt or hand-count "duplicates" from titles.
Consume each `items[]` entry's `verdict` field; do not invent your own:
## Level 1 Auto-Fixes (No Judgment Required)
| `verdict` | Meaning | Required action |
|---|---|---|
| `WRITER-DEFECT` (`run_family: true`) | ONE scheduled task writes a new node per run | Report the ids, the `agents` (the writer) and `span_days`. **Never merge** — each node is that run's audit record. If the family grew since the last report, say `UNFIXED` and name the writer. |
| `SAFE-MERGE` | Bodies identical | Still requires an explicit `merge #A into #B` decision from Kwame. |
| `HUMAN-DECISION` | Same subject, bodies differ | Propose **connect (an edge)**, never merge. |
### 1. Missing `type` Field
For nodes with content but no `metadata.type`:
- Title contains "Proxmox" or "infrastructure" → `type: infrastructure`
- Title contains "skill" or "how to" or "guide" → `type: skill`
- Title contains "doc" or "template" or "brand" → `type: documentation`
- Title starts with "WAL:" or "TASK:" → `type: note`
- Title starts with "[LEARN]" → `type: documentation`
- Otherwise → `type: note` (default)
- **Title overlap alone is not duplication.** Four distinct client workflows of one family (#357-#361) and two
different machines' migrations (#1792/#1793) both score high on title tokens while their bodies sit 0.1-0.3
apart. Confirm against body similarity before calling anything a duplicate.
- Report clusters as **candidates for Kwame's decision**, never as established duplicates — a wrong auto-merge
destroys distinct content irrecoverably.
- Per-run history nodes are kept deliberately. Bulk-merging a run family destroys the audit trail the family exists for.
### 2. Missing `tenant` / `namespace`
For any node with NULL tenant or namespace:
```sql
UPDATE nodes
SET metadata = json_set(
COALESCE(metadata, '{}'),
'$.tenant', 'syslogsolution',
'$.namespace', 'syslogsolution'
)
WHERE json_extract(metadata, '$.tenant') IS NULL
OR json_extract(metadata, '$.namespace') IS NULL;
```
### 3. Staleness State Transitions
Using the type-based windows from the memory-monitor contract:
- Nodes stale > their window → transition to `state: review_pending`
- Nodes in `review_pending` for >7 days → escalate to Kwame (Level 2)
## Level 2 Escalations (Kwame Decision Required)
1. **Refresh-suggested stale nodes** flagged with `[REVIEW: refresh]` — refresh or keep? (Archive-suggested nodes are auto-archived under fix 4 and are not escalated.)
2. **Duplicate Nodes** — as detected by fix 5, by `verdict`, never by raw title overlap. `WRITER-DEFECT` is a writer fix (update one canonical node), not a merge decision; `SAFE-MERGE` and `HUMAN-DECISION` clusters are escalated for merge-or-connect.
3. **Orphan Nodes >90 days old** — Archive or connect?
## Reporting Format
The fixer does **not** send anything. Under the single-egress model (2026-09-21) every report leaves the node
through Mumuni's gate (`comms_drop.py` for the queue, `comms_gate.py` to release and read-back verify), so
exit 0 means QUEUED, never delivered. A report body is written to a file and handed to the outbox helper:
```
🦅 Memory Fixer — [HH:MM UTC]
Level 1 fixes applied:
- Missing type: X nodes classified
- Missing namespace: Y nodes populated
Stale nodes needing review (max 10):
1. [Node #XXX] Title — X days stale, SUGGEST: refresh
2. [Node #YYY] Title — Y days stale, SUGGEST: archive
...
Duplicate clusters (candidates — Kwame decides; the fixer never merges unilaterally):
1. [WRITER-DEFECT] #AAA/#BBB/#CCC — writer <agent>, N nodes, span Nd (UNFIXED if it grew since the last report)
2. [HUMAN-DECISION] #DDD/#EEE — same subject, bodies differ, SUGGEST: connect
3. "none" when the scan returned no clusters
Orphans >90 days:
1. [Node #EEE] Title — X days stale, orphaned
Reply with:
- "archive #XXX, #YYY" to mark for archive
- "archive all" to archive all stale nodes listed
- "keep #XXX" to confirm a node is current
- "merge #AAA into #BBB" to merge duplicates
- "refresh #XXX" to mark as current
```
## Execution on Next Run
The fixer reads Kwame's previous response and **executes the decision to completion** — it must not leave a node in review-pending forever. Tagging alone is NOT enough; each confirmed decision must also update `state` and `updated_at` so the node drops out of the stale window on the next run.
> ⚠️ **Corrected 2026-09-11:** `updateNode` DOES accept `state` changes — `{"updates": {"description": …, "metadata": {"state": "archived"}}}` works over the bridge, and `updated_at` bumps automatically. The old "use direct SSH + SQLite for state transitions" instruction was based on a wrong assumption; SSH is a fallback only (and is blocked from kagentz). Use one `updateNode` call for both the tag and the state.
> ```bash
> ssh root@192.168.68.65 "sqlite3 /root/.local/share/RA-H/db/rah.sqlite \"UPDATE nodes SET metadata = json_set(metadata, '$.state', '<state>'), updated_at = datetime('now') WHERE id = <id>;\""
> ```
> Use `updateNode` only for description/source/title/link edits.
Decision → completed action mapping:
| Kwame reply | Description change | State | `updated_at` |
|---|---|---|---|
| `archive #XXX` | replace `[REVIEW: archive] ` → `[ARCHIVED] ` prefix | `archived` | bumped to now |
| `keep #XXX` / `refresh #XXX` | **clear the `[REVIEW: …]` tag entirely** | `active` | bumped to now |
| `merge #AAA into #BBB` | set `[REVIEW: merge_into #BBB]` on #AAA, then follow manual merge workflow | handled manually | bumped to now |
| `archive all` | apply the archive row to every node listed in the prior report | `archived` | bumped to now |
**Why `updated_at` must be bumped (critical):** the Level-1 staleness query keys off `updated_at < now - window`. If the fixer clears the tag but leaves a stale `updated_at`, the node is immediately re-flagged on the very next run and the cycle repeats forever. Bumping `updated_at` to now pushes the node back to the front of the window.
**Exclusion after action:** once an action is applied, the node's description no longer starts with `[REVIEW:` (archive → `[ARCHIVED]`, refresh/keep → original text), so it is not re-processed.
After all actions are applied, verify with:
```sql
SELECT id, json_extract(metadata, '$.state') FROM nodes WHERE description LIKE '[REVIEW:%';
```
The result must be 0 rows when all decisions are executed. Report what was done.
## Checks
- **State integrity:** archived nodes have `state: archived` + `[ARCHIVED]` prefix; kept nodes are `state: active` without a `[REVIEW:]` tag.
- **Auto-archive applied:** no node should ever be left tagged `[REVIEW: archive]` — that tag is retired. Any `[REVIEW: archive]` found means fix 4 was skipped; archive it and report.
- **No review-pending forever:** after executing Kwame's decisions, `[REVIEW:%` node count must be 0.
- **Duplicate scan ran:** every report carries the fix 5 block (`none` when there were no clusters). A report with no duplicate section means phase 5 was skipped — a silently skipped detection phase is the failure this phase exists to prevent.
- **Timestamps:** every executed decision (and every auto-archive) bumps `updated_at`, so the node exits the stale window on the next run.
1. **Nodes in `review_pending` >7 days** — Archive, refresh, or keep?
2. **Orphan Nodes >90 days old** — Delete or Connect?
3. **Potential Duplicate Nodes** — Same title or >70% overlap. Merge or Keep?
4. **Conflicting Metadata** — Content suggests one tenant but metadata says another.
## Logging
Every Level 1 fix logged to `~/.hermes/logs/memory-fixer/YYYY-MM-DD.md`
+9 -9
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: >
delegation, verification, and delivery. Defines when to delegate, which
worker to use for what, how to handle failures, and the kanban board
protocol. Enforces context-window discipline and separation of concerns.
Runs on Mumuni (kagentz CT105, minipve, .14) via Hermes agent (Zulip gateway via systemd).
Runs on Mumuni (inside Abiba CT100, hwepve, .24) via Hermes agent (Pi + Hermes Zulip gateway).
version: 1.0.0
---
@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@ version: 1.0.0
## Topology
**Cluster:** 5 Proxmox nodes (ocupve, acerpve, minipve, amdpve, storepve)
**Manager:** Mumuni (kagentz CT105, minipve, .14) via Hermes agent
**Cluster:** 6 Proxmox nodes (ocupve, acerpve, minipve, amdpve, storepve, hwepve)
**Manager:** Mumuni (inside Abiba CT100, hwepve, .24) via Hermes agent
**Workers:** 6 profiles, all running on the same agent — no separate hosts needed
This contract is infrastructure-agnostic in terms of which nodes are used.
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Workers execute tasks on whatever infrastructure they're given — SSH to .6,
## Why This Matters
Without enforced delegation, the manager consumes the full iteration budget
(60 calls) on single-turn tasks — SSH to 5 nodes, check each VM, read logs —
(60 calls) on single-turn tasks — SSH to 6 nodes, check each VM, read logs —
leaving no capacity for actual coordination. The result: context overflow
(59K tokens in system prompt), iteration exhaustion, and degraded response
quality. This contract exists because I blew through my budget checking
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ it asks the manager (via relay) — it doesn't go find it on its own.
**This is a hard rule, not a recommendation.** Violating it produces the exact
type of discrepancy the kanban pipeline exists to prevent: a review worker finds
"5 nodes present" in the raw data but "5/5 online" in the report — even though
"6 nodes present" in the raw data but "6/6 online" in the report — even though
one of those nodes was unreachable. The report lied because it used data the
raw data never provided.
@@ -90,8 +90,8 @@ raw data never provided.
| Worker | Model | Toolsets | Role | Use When |
|--------|-------|----------|------|----------|
| `syslog-code` | gpu-dense | terminal, file, web, memory, skills | Code patches, automation, scripts | Writing/modifying code, creating scripts, debugging, reading/writing files |
| `syslog-devops` | gpu-dense | terminal, file, web, memory, skills | Infrastructure, DB, bridge, Proxmox | Server ops, SSH, Docker, Proxmox, DB queries, hardware checks |
| `syslog-code` | qwen3.6-27B-code | terminal, file, web, memory, skills | Code patches, automation, scripts | Writing/modifying code, creating scripts, debugging, reading/writing files |
| `syslog-devops` | qwen3.6-27B-code | terminal, file, web, memory, skills | Infrastructure, DB, bridge, Proxmox | Server ops, SSH, Docker, Proxmox, DB queries, hardware checks |
| `syslog-email` | strix-moe | terminal, file, web, memory, skills | Email automation, mail operations | Sending/receiving email, inbox management, SMTP operations |
| `syslog-research` | strix-moe | terminal, file, web, memory, skills, **browser** | Analysis, classification, data processing | Web research, browser tasks, data analysis, classification, reading docs |
| `syslog-review` | strix-moe | terminal, file, web, memory, skills | Verification, QA, audit validation | **ALWAYS** verify worker output before delivery — especially for infra changes, code builds, and research findings |
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ delegate_task(
```
delegate_task(
tasks=[
{"goal": "Check all 5 Proxmox nodes for VM status", "context": "SSH to each node via 192.168.68.x, run 'qm list'"},
{"goal": "Check all 6 Proxmox nodes for VM status", "context": "SSH to each node via 192.168.68.x, run 'qm list'"},
{"goal": "Check Docker container health on .7/.116/.17", "context": "SSH to each host, check container status"},
]
)
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ Only verified results reach Kwame. Format per channel:
{
"lane_id": "devops-check",
"worker": "syslog-devops",
"goal": "Check all 5 Proxmox nodes",
"goal": "Check all 6 Proxmox nodes",
"status": "dispatched|completed|failed",
"output_file": "/tmp/node-report.md"
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ garbled input. When a user types these commands to Abiba:
- **`/approve`** → "Pi doesn't have pending approvals. Commands execute immediately."
- **`/approve session`** → Same response
- **`/deny`** → Same response + "For agents (Mumuni on Hermes, Tanko on DSH), these work with their built-in approval system."
- **`/deny`** → Same response + "For Hermes agents (Tanko, Mumuni), these work with their built-in approval system."
This keeps the UX consistent across agents — users can type `/approve` anywhere
without getting confused by LLM responses.
+14 -46
View File
@@ -2,22 +2,23 @@
kind: responsibility
name: pm2-self-heal
description: >
Monitors critical PM2 processes (abiba-telegram, abiba-zulip, gitea-runner, zulip-watchdog)
and auto-restarts any that are stopped or errored. Logs every action to
Gitea health-logs and alerts the owner via Telegram (primary) or Zulip DM (secondary).
Monitors critical PM2 processes (abiba-zulip, abiba-telegram) and
auto-restarts any that are stopped or errored. Logs every action to
the knowledge graph and alerts the owner via Zulip DM on failures.
Abiba-zulip is the live Zulip bridge and may be restarted; alert owner on failure.
report_only_agents:
- koby # ⛔ KOBY IS NEVER REPAIRED (Rule 17, 2026-08-17) — detect + report, never fix on .129
---
## Maintains
- abiba-telegram: { status: "online", uptime: string, restarts: number }
- abiba-zulip: { status: "online", uptime: string, restarts: number }
- gpu-monitor: { status: "online", uptime: string, restarts: number } (systemd-managed, PM2-tracked)
- gitea-runner: { status: "online", uptime: string, restarts: number }
- zulip-watchdog: { status: "online", uptime: string, restarts: number }
- last_check: timestamp
> **Status (2026-08-03):** `abiba-zulip` fully restored — live Zulip bridge, heartbeating, monitored. `gpu-monitor` runs via systemd only (gpu-monitor.service); NOT PM2-tracked. `gpu-watchdog` retired from PM2 (folded into gpu-monitor.service). `zulip-watchdog` remains live and PM2-managed.
> **Status (2026-08-03):** `abiba-zulip` fully restored — live Zulip bridge, heartbeating, monitored. `gpu-monitor` runs via systemd (stable); PM2 tracks it for status reporting only. `gpu-watchdog` retired from PM2.
## Continuity
@@ -32,18 +33,10 @@ description: >
- **Verify**: Re-check status after 5 seconds
- **Escalate**: If still failed after 2 retries, send Zulip DM to owner
### Rule 2: Process Restarting Too Often (crash-loop guard)
- **Detect**: `pm2 status` shows restarts > 30 (cumulative lifetime counter) **or** a
process reporting a restart count > 1000 while showing "online" (a crash-loop mask)
### Rule 2: Process Restarting Too Often
- **Detect**: `pm2 status` shows restarts > 30 (cumulative lifetime counter)
- **Note**: PM2 counter never decrements; only full delete+re-add resets it
- **Fix**: `pm2 delete <name> && pm2 start <ecosystem> --only <name>`
- **Script guard (2026-08-16)**: `scripts/pm2-self-heal.sh` now restarts `abiba-telegram`
when `TEL_RESTARTS > 1000` even if the process reports "online" — catches a quiet
crash-loop that never toggles status to "stopped"/"errored" (e.g. the 10k-restarts
spoton incident). Alerts include the restart count.
- **AS-BUILT (2026-09-15)**: spoton-service was deleted with its app; the live PM2 set is
four processes (abiba-telegram, abiba-zulip, gitea-runner, gpu-monitor). The spoton
reference above is historical context for the crash-loop guard, not a live process.
- **Escalate**: Only when restarts > 30 — alerts to Zulip DM
- **Historical fix**: Previous cycles were caused by abiba-zulip extension's
stuck detection (STUCK_THRESHOLD_MS was 30min, raised to 4h in v2).
@@ -51,44 +44,19 @@ description: >
and PM2 counter reset on 2026-06-28.
## Execution
**Execution model**: This contract is executed by a host-scheduled cron job (see
`scripts/contract-run.sh`). The cron job runs the monitoring script directly on the
target host and appends the result to `/var/log/contract-runs/<contract>.log`. An
agent-session acknowledgement (a `done:` line in the ops status log) is NOT
execution — it only proves the agent read the result and reported it. The actual
monitoring work happens in the host cron job.
1. **Check PM2 status** — Run `pm2 status --no-color` and parse the table (5th data column = PID, 8th = restarts, 9th = status)
2. **Check abiba-telegram** (safe to auto-restart):
2. **Check abiba-telegram**:
- If status is "online" → pass
- If status is "stopped" or "errored" → apply Rule 1
- If restarts > 1000 → apply Rule 2 (crash-loop guard)
- If restarts > 5 → alert owner
3. **Check abiba-zulip** (live Zulip bridge, heartbeating):
- If status is "online" → pass, log restarts count
- If status is "stopped" or "errored" → restart (`pm2 restart abiba-zulip` — fully restored)
- If restarts > 5 in last hour → alert owner with full diagnostics
4. **Check gitea-runner**:
- If status is "online" → pass
- If status is "stopped" or "errored" → apply Rule 1
- If restarts > 5 → alert owner
5. **Check zulip-watchdog**:
- If status is "online" → pass
- If status is "stopped" or "errored" → apply Rule 1
- If restarts > 5 → alert owner
6. **Log results** — the durable per-run record is `/var/log/contract-runs/pm2-self-heal-<UTCstamp>.log` on CT 100, written by `scripts/contract-run.sh` from `/etc/cron.d/contract-runner` every 4 hours, with a firstmate inbox note raised on any non-zero exit.
**CORRECTED 2026-09-26 (relay-785):** this step previously required appending to
`SyslogSolution/health-logs/pm2/{timestamp}.md` in Gitea and called it a "hard rule".
That posting was **never implemented** — `scripts/pm2-self-heal.sh` contains no
Gitea or git-push code — so the requirement was a coverage claim the executor did
not honour, and `health-logs/pm2/` has held only its init commit since 2026-07-28.
The claim is retired rather than implemented: the contract-runner's per-run logs
plus its failure note already give a durable record and a working alarm, and a
second posting path would add work without adding a signal. `health-logs/pm2/`
is left as historical evidence, not as a live obligation.
7. **Alert** — Send Telegram (primary) or Zulip DM (secondary) to owner if escalation needed (do NOT run pm2 commands during alerting)
8. **Wait 5 min** → repeat from step 1
4. **Log results** — Append to `SyslogSolution/health-logs/pm2/{timestamp}.md` in Gitea (not knowledge graph — hard rule)
5. **Alert** — Send Zulip DM to owner if escalation needed (do NOT run pm2 commands during alerting)
6. **Wait 5 min** → repeat from step 1
## Example Output (when healthy)
+8 -78
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ description: >
Proxmox cluster + Docker monitoring via the existing Grafana/Prometheus stack
on CT 116. Replaces Pulse with file-provisioned Grafana dashboards. Three
exporters feed Prometheus: prometheus-pve-exporter (cluster-aware, single
instance), node_exporter (all 5 PVE nodes), and a custom docker-stats-exporter
instance), node_exporter (all 6 PVE nodes), and a custom docker-stats-exporter
(Docker 29 / containerd image-store compatible, since cAdvisor cannot resolve
the layerdb). Dashboards exposed at http://192.168.68.116:3001/ (direct LAN, not behind nginx).
agent: abiba
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ agent: abiba
| Exporter | Host:Port | Scope | Notes |
|----------|-----------|-------|-------|
| prometheus-pve-exporter | .116:9221 (container) | All 5 nodes + 14 guests + 36 storage pools | Single instance, cluster-aware via amdpve API. Config `/opt/monitoring/pve.yml` (token `monitoring@pve!prometheus`, PVEAuditor role). Metric schema is label-based (`id=node/amdpve`, `id=lxc/100`). |
| node_exporter | .5/.6/.9/.12/.15:9100 (systemd) | Per-node CPU/mem/disk/net/temp | Installed via apt on all 5 PVE nodes, enabled (reboot-persistent). Collectors: textfile, systemd, tcpstat, ethtool. |
| prometheus-pve-exporter | .116:9221 (container) | All 6 nodes + guests + 36 storage pools | Single instance, cluster-aware via amdpve API. Config `/opt/monitoring/pve.yml` (token `monitoring@pve!prometheus`, PVEAuditor role). Metric schema is label-based (`id=node/amdpve`, `id=lxc/100`). |
| node_exporter | .5/.6/.9/.12/.15/.4:9100 (systemd) | Per-node CPU/mem/disk/net/temp | Installed via apt on all 6 PVE nodes, enabled (reboot-persistent). Collectors: textfile, systemd, tcpstat, ethtool. hwepve (.4) added 2026-07-19. |
| docker-stats-exporter | .116:9324 (container) | 10 Docker containers on .116 | **Custom** (cAdvisor v0.51 incompatible with Docker 29 containerd image store — layerdb gone). Uses Docker Engine API over unix socket. Script `/opt/monitoring/docker-stats-exporter.py`. |
## PVE API Token
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ agent: abiba
| UID | Title | Panels | Source |
|-----|-------|--------|--------|
| proxmox-cluster | Proxmox Cluster Overview | 16 | cluster status, 5-node CPU/mem/disk/load gauges, guests table, storage pools, guest CPU/mem timeseries |
| proxmox-cluster | Proxmox Cluster Overview | 16 | cluster status, 6-node CPU/mem/disk/load gauges, guests table, storage pools, guest CPU/mem timeseries |
| proxmox-node | Proxmox Node Detail | 13 | per-node CPU per-core, memory, network, disk IO/IOPS/latency, temperature, disk space (variable: $node) |
| docker-containers | Docker Containers | 10 | per-container CPU/mem/network, restarts, memory limit ratio (variable: $container) |
| gpu-fleet | GPU Fleet | 7 | (existing, preserved in DB, not provisioned) |
@@ -77,9 +77,9 @@ agent: abiba
| `/opt/monitoring/grafana/dashboards/build-dashboards.py` | .116 | dashboard JSON generator |
| `/opt/monitoring/grafana/dashboards/json/*.json` | .116 | provisioned dashboard definitions |
| `/opt/monitoring/grafana/datasources/prometheus.yml` | .116 | datasource provisioning |
| `/etc/default/prometheus-node-exporter` | .5/.6/.9/.12/.15 | node_exporter collector config |
| `/etc/default/prometheus-node-exporter` | .5/.6/.9/.12/.15/.4 | node_exporter collector config |
## Cluster "Tabiri" — 5 Nodes
## Cluster "Tabiri" — 6 Nodes
| Node | IP | Role |
|------|----|----|
@@ -87,49 +87,8 @@ agent: abiba
| storepve | 192.168.68.6 | PVE |
| acerpve | 192.168.68.9 | PVE (hosts llm-gpu qemu/101) |
| minipve | 192.168.68.12 | PVE |
| amdpve | 192.168.68.15 | PVE + Strix Halo LLM (strix-moe) |
## PBS GC (Proxmox Backup Server)
### Schedule
Cron `0 20 * * *` on the **storepve HOST** (192.168.68.6) = 20:00 America/New_York local = **00:00 UTC**.
**NOTE**: The closed PR #116 said "20:00 UTC" — this is WRONG by four hours. Do not copy it.
### What Actually Runs
Host script `/usr/local/bin/pbs-gc.sh` runs `pct exec 107 -- proxmox-backup-manager garbage-collection start storepve-datastore`.
**IMPORTANT**: The tool `proxmox-backup-manager` exists only inside CT 107 (where the PBS server runs). The storepve host has only `proxmox-backup-client`. This is why the job had never worked before 2026-09-19 00:00 UTC.
### Datastore Location
- **Datastore**: CT 107's `/mnt/pbs-backup` on the storepve ZFS dataset `/tank/pbs-backup` (pool `tank`, ~11T free)
- **NOT** `/media/easystore2` (media library, 3.7T, 96% used — separate volume)
### Liveness Check
The new `proxmox-monitor.sh` leg checks storepve-datastore GC health:
- Reads GC state from CT 107: `pct exec 107 -- proxmox-backup-manager garbage-collection list --output-format json`
- **FAILS** if `last-run-endtime` is older than 48 hours
- Reports age in hours and pending-bytes
**All six verdict shapes** (exactly as emitted by the script):
1. **Healthy** (fresh GC, 0 B pending):
`✅ PBS GC: healthy (last run 1h ago, pending-bytes: 0 B)`
2. **Stale** (GC ran >48h ago):
`🔴 PBS GC: stale (last run 49h ago, pending-bytes: 1048576 B)`
3. **Probe-failed: empty read** (000/timeout/unreadable):
`🔴 PBS GC: probe-failed: storepve:192.168.68.6 (expected JSON, got 000)`
4. **Probe-failed: unparseable** (non-empty but invalid JSON — the "command not found" case):
`🔴 PBS GC: probe-failed: storepve:192.168.68.6 (unparseable JSON)`
5. **Never-run: datastore absent** (valid JSON but storepve-datastore not in list):
`🔴 PBS GC: never-run (storepve-datastore not found in GC list)`
6. **Never-run: no endtime** (valid JSON with datastore present but last-run-endtime is null/0):
`🔴 PBS GC: never-run (storepve-datastore has no last-run-endtime)`
| amdpve | 192.168.68.15 | PVE + Strix Halo LLM (qwen3.6-35B-udq4, strix-moe) |
| hwepve | 192.168.68.4 | PVE (Huawei Matebook 16, 12C/15GB) — hosts abiba (lxc/100), kagentz (lxc/105), mumuni (lxc/114). CTs 100/105 migrated from amdpve, CT 114 from minipve 2026-07-20 |
## Operations
@@ -142,35 +101,6 @@ Edit `build-dashboards.py`, run it, `docker restart harness-grafana`
### check-targets
`curl http://192.168.68.116:9090/api/v1/targets | jq '.data.activeTargets[] | {job:.labels.job,health}'`
### check-health
**RUN LIVE, NEVER ECHO — every dispatch must execute the probes below with real tool calls; never repeat a prior report unless a live probe fails.**
```bash
# Prometheus health (bound to 0.0.0.0:9090 on .116)
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://192.168.68.116:9090/-/healthy
# Expected: 200 (Prometheus is up and healthy)
# Grafana health (bound to 0.0.0.0:3001 on .116)
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://192.168.68.116:3001/api/health
# Expected: 200 (Grafana is up and healthy)
# Docker Stats exporter (bound to 127.0.0.1:9324 on .116 — must probe from .116 localhost)
ssh root@192.168.68.116 "curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://127.0.0.1:9324/metrics"
# Expected: 200 (docker-stats-exporter is up and responding)
# PVE exporter (bound to 127.0.0.1:9221 on .116 — must probe from .116 localhost)
ssh root@192.168.68.116 "curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://127.0.0.1:9221/metrics"
# Expected: 200 (pve-exporter is up and responding)
```
**Report format**: Begin every report with the **absolute path the probe executed
from** (`pwd -P`, or the script's absolute path) so a stale-consumer report is
distinguishable from a real fault at read time. Summarize actual results from
each probe. If any probe returns non-200, flag as alert.
**Note**: Docker Stats and PVE Exporter are bound to 127.0.0.1 (localhost-only) so they must be probed from .116 via SSH. Prometheus and Grafana are bound to 0.0.0.0 so they can be probed from the LAN.
### restart-exporter
`cd /opt/monitoring && docker compose restart pve-exporter docker-stats`
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
disk-gc report-only verification — CT 111 / tdunna / 192.168.68.129
date: 2026-09-12T19:11:36Z
host: abiba (this scanner runs INSIDE CT 100 / abiba)
branch head: 6e612ce37b1b9a9688b04e7f816848e7a4185fca
command: scripts/disk-gc-plan.py --scan <live fleet scan>
PURPOSE: prove that on a REAL fleet scan, CT 111 is alerted and NO gc-executor action
is emitted for it at any level. No GC command was executed against .129.
--- live fleet scan (df -P / via scripts/pct-run.sh for LXC, direct SSH for hosts) ---
tdunna 84%
acerpve 192.168.68.9 77%
amdpve 192.168.68.15 76%
ocu-llm 192.168.68.110 69%
storepve 192.168.68.6 65%
kagentz 61%
tanko 56%
minipve 192.168.68.12 49%
authentik 45%
infisical-vault 39%
adguard 38%
ocupve 192.168.68.5 38%
scottdenya 35%
syslog-api 34%
llm-gpu 192.168.68.8 25%
abiba 23%
baggy 22%
jdownloader 21%
gitea 16%
ra-h-os 13%
zulip 12%
docker-vm 192.168.68.7 11%
adguard2 10%
media 9%
proxmox-backup-server 4%
--- planner output (action plan) ---
111 AMBER 84.0% -> REPORT-ONLY (no GC) — Theo's box — captain ruling 2026-08-17, re-confirmed 2026-09-10
acerpve AMBER 77.0% -> gc-executor
amdpve AMBER 76.0% -> gc-executor
--- verdict ---
CT 111 (tdunna) 84% AMBER -> report-only; no gc-executor row emitted; no GC run on .129.
Owned hosts acerpve .9 (77%) and amdpve .15 (76%) -> gc-executor (ours).
+79 -339
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
/root/scripts/agent-health-check.py — Consolidated Agent Health Verification v4
/root/scripts/agent-health-check.py — Consolidated Agent Health Verification v2
Verifies: LiteLLM keys (agent-specific), GPU port conflicts, agent Zulip streaming,
gateway liveness, gateway log health, CT liveness, config YAML integrity,
@@ -17,47 +17,11 @@ Changelog:
v2 (2026-07-26): Added CT liveness, config validation, wrapper integrity,
vault secret emptiness check. Fixed Koby/Koonimo SSH hosts and agent key
name format ({NAME}_LITELLM_API_KEY not LITELLM_API_KEY_{NAME}).
Fleet roster: tanko (.122), koby (.129), koonimo (.114), abiba (.24).
(v2 also carried a mumuni probe; see v5 — mumuni is no longer probed: she
moved to her own container, kagentz CT 105 / .14, and is monitored there.)
v3 (2026-09-08): GPU unit repoint verified live (.8 llama-chat-api.service,
.110 llama-server.service, .15 strix-server.service) — .8 was probing a stale
llama-server unit that reads inactive, producing false UNREACHABLE legs.
systemctl is-active no longer swallows non-zero exit as SSH failure.
Fixed UnboundLocalError on the abiba/koonimo gateway leg (pid unbound in the
summary f-string). Abiba's LiteLLM key now comes from /root/.pi/agent/env.sh
(#735 agent separation; creds moved out of shared /root/.bashrc).
v4 (2026-09-10): probe-drift round 2 (prose-contracts follow-up to #65/#66/#68).
abiba declared pi-only runtime — Hermes-era config/wrapper/gateway checks are
skipped (harness purge). koby declared report_only per the captain's
2026-08-17 ruling: every koby leg is detected and reported, never counted as a
fleet failure and never repaired. koby's PVE mapping corrected to storepve
(CT 111 tdunna lives on .6 — the old amdpve mapping produced a false
ct-unreachable). The wrapper infisical-path check had two stale-expectation
bugs: it read only the first 20 lines of the wrapper, so koonimo (whose
wrapper does reference /usr/bin/infisical, just past line 20) was falsely
FAILed as "path may be wrong"; and it treated the absence of any infisical
reference as a fault, though koby's wrapper sources the key from
~/.hermes/.env and never invokes infisical. The check now reads the full
wrapper body, accepts a no-infisical wrapper, and verifies that any absolute
infisical path the wrapper references actually exists. Report-only findings
are surfaced in a machine-readable `report_only` array in --json output,
separate from `failures`. Every run prints absolute execution provenance
(script + cwd) in the header, in the cron ALERT line, and in --json output so
a stale-consumer report is distinguishable from a fault at read time.
v5 (2026-09-10): roster correction only, no behavior change. mumuni was removed
from the AGENTS dict when she moved off this host onto her own container
(kagentz CT 105 on minipve, .14, dedicated `hermes` user) and is monitored
from her side. This script must not probe mumuni or .24 — the v2 changelog
roster line was the last reference still placing her at .24 / CT100.
v6 (2026-09-28): .8 GPU health probe now runs as `llmuser` instead of `root`.
Root SSH to .8 was lost when the guest was rebuilt, so every .8 leg read as
UNREACHABLE for a healthy host. llmuser owns llama-server and can read
`systemctl is-active`, `systemctl show -p MainPID`, and the :8080 pid.
.110 and .15 keep the default `root` user.
Fleet roster: tanko (.122), mumuni (.24, inside abiba CT100), koby (.129), koonimo (.114),
abiba (.24).
"""
import subprocess, json, sys, os, time, re, io, contextlib
import subprocess, json, sys, os, time
from datetime import datetime
LITELLM = "http://192.168.68.116:80"
@@ -66,6 +30,7 @@ INFISICAL_ENV = "prod"
# PVE node IPs for CT liveness checks
PVE_NODES = {
"hwepve": "192.168.68.4",
"amdpve": "192.168.68.15",
"minipve": "192.168.68.12",
"storepve": "192.168.68.6",
@@ -75,60 +40,25 @@ PVE_NODES = {
# Agent definitions: ct, host, user, pve_node, vault_key_name
AGENTS = {
"tanko": {"ct": 112, "host": "192.168.68.122", "user": "jerome", "pve": "minipve", "vault_key": "TANKO_LITELLM_API_KEY", "runtime": "dsh"},
# abiba = pi agent (.24) — no vault key; its LiteLLM key is read from its
# local env file (key_env below), not from the shared vault or .bashrc.
# runtime=pi: abiba has run pi-only since the harness purge. There is no
# Hermes gateway, no ~/.hermes/config.yaml and no hermes CLI wrapper on .24
# (the /root/.local/bin/hermes symlink is dangling), so the Hermes-era
# config/wrapper/gateway legs are skipped rather than reported as faults.
"abiba": {"ct": 100, "host": "192.168.68.24", "user": "root", "pve": "minipve",
"vault_key": None, "runtime": "pi",
"key_env": {"file": "/root/.pi/agent/env.sh", "var": "LITELLM_API_KEY"}},
# koby = report-only (captain's 2026-08-17 ruling, Rule 17): detect and
# report, NEVER repair, and never count against fleet failures. CT 111
# (tdunna) lives on storepve (.6) — verified live 2026-09-10; the previous
# amdpve mapping made `pct status 111` fail and read as ct-unreachable.
"koby": {"ct": 111, "host": "192.168.68.129", "user": "root", "pve": "storepve", "vault_key": "KOBY_LITELLM_API_KEY", "report_only": True},
"koonimo": {"ct": 113, "host": "192.168.68.114", "user": "root", "pve": "amdpve", "vault_key": "KOONIMO_LITELLM_API_KEY"},
"tanko": {"ct": 112, "host": "192.168.68.122", "user": "jerome", "pve": "amdpve", "vault_key": "TANKO_LITELLM_API_KEY", "report_only": False},
"abiba": {"ct": 100, "host": "192.168.68.24", "user": "root", "pve": "hwepve", "vault_key": None, "report_only": False},
"koby": {"ct": 111, "host": "192.168.68.129", "user": "root", "pve": "amdpve", "vault_key": "KOBY_LITELLM_API_KEY", "report_only": True}, # ⛔ KOBY IS NEVER REPAIRED (Rule 17, 2026-08-17)
"koonimo": {"ct": 113, "host": "192.168.68.114", "user": "root", "pve": "amdpve", "vault_key": "KOONIMO_LITELLM_API_KEY", "report_only": False},
}
# Systemd units verified live 2026-09-08 (systemctl list-units on each host):
# .8 rtx3090 (gpu-dense) -> llama-chat-api.service (active; the old
# llama-server.service unit file is stale/inactive — probing it read as
# UNREACHABLE for a healthy process)
# .110 rtx5070 (ocu-llm VM) -> llama-server.service (active)
# .15 strixhalo (amdpve) -> strix-server.service (active)
GPU_HOSTS = {
"gpu-rtx3090 (.8)": {"host": "192.168.68.8", "port": 8080, "service": "llama-chat-api.service", "user": "llmuser"},
"gpu-rtx5070 (.110)": {"host": "192.168.68.110", "port": 8080, "service": "llama-server.service"},
"gpu-strixhalo (.15)": {"host": "192.168.68.15", "port": 8080, "service": "strix-server.service"},
"gpu-rtx3090 (.8)": {"host": "192.168.68.8", "port": 8080, "service": "llama-server"},
"gpu-rtx5070 (.110)": {"host": "192.168.68.110", "port": 8080, "service": "llama-server"},
"gpu-strixhalo (.15)": {"host": "192.168.68.15", "port": 8080, "service": "strix-server"},
}
FAIL = []
REPORT_ONLY = []
def _fail(key, agent_name=None):
"""Record a failure, except for report-only agents.
Koby is report-only per the captain's 2026-08-17 ruling (Rule 17): its legs
are detected and reported, never repaired and never counted as fleet
failures. A red fleet alert on a known report-only leg is a false alarm.
Report-only findings are tracked separately so --json consumers can still
see them without them counting as fleet failures. Any non-report-only agent
(or a leg with no agent, e.g. GPU hosts) records normally.
"""
if agent_name and AGENTS.get(agent_name, {}).get("report_only"):
REPORT_ONLY.append(key)
print(f" 🔍 report-only ({agent_name}): {key} — reported, not counted/repaired")
return
FAIL.append(key)
INFISICAL_TOKEN = os.environ.get("INFISICAL_TOKEN")
INFISICAL_API_URL = os.environ.get("INFISICAL_API_URL", "https://vault.sysloggh.net")
# Fallback: if no env token, read the shared vault token file
if not INFISICAL_TOKEN:
# Fallback: read the shared vault token file
_token_path = os.path.expanduser("~/.infisical-token")
if os.path.isfile(_token_path):
try:
@@ -136,7 +66,6 @@ if not INFISICAL_TOKEN:
INFISICAL_TOKEN = _f.read().strip()
except (OSError, UnicodeDecodeError):
pass
INFISICAL_API_URL = os.environ.get("INFISICAL_API_URL", "https://vault.sysloggh.net")
# ── Helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -233,46 +162,11 @@ def _get_agent_key(agent_name, vault_key_name):
return None
def _read_env_export(path, var):
"""Parse `export VAR=value` (or `VAR=value`) out of a local env file.
#735 agent separation (2026-09-06): agent creds moved out of the shared
/root/.bashrc into per-agent env files under /root/.pi/agent/ (bashrc's
source line keeps abiba shells resolving them, but the file of record is
env.sh). Do NOT fall back to /root/.bashrc here: desktop (.200) SSH
sessions override LITELLM_API_KEY with mumuni's key, so sourcing bashrc
would validate the wrong identity.
"""
try:
with open(os.path.expanduser(path)) as _f:
for line in _f:
line = line.strip()
if not (line.startswith("export " + var + "=") or line.startswith(var + "=")):
continue
value = line.split("=", 1)[1].strip().strip('"').strip("'")
if value:
return value
except (OSError, UnicodeDecodeError):
pass
return None
def load_agent_keys():
"""Populate AGENTS[*]["key"] from the vault or the agent's local env file.
Called from main(), not at import: keeping this out of module scope lets the
module be imported (and unit tested) without live vault/SSH access. Vault
format is {NAME}_LITELLM_API_KEY (project 322fceab-39da-4854-a55a-568e76c0f13f,
env prod); abiba has no vault key and reads LITELLM_API_KEY from its local
/root/.pi/agent/env.sh (moved there from /root/.bashrc in #735).
"""
for agent_name in AGENTS:
info = AGENTS[agent_name]
key = _get_agent_key(agent_name, info.get("vault_key"))
if not key and info.get("key_env"):
key = _read_env_export(info["key_env"]["file"], info["key_env"]["var"])
AGENTS[agent_name]["key"] = key
# Inject keys from vault for each agent
for agent_name in AGENTS:
info = AGENTS[agent_name]
key = _get_agent_key(agent_name, info.get("vault_key"))
AGENTS[agent_name]["key"] = key
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
@@ -283,8 +177,8 @@ def check_keys():
for name, agent in AGENTS.items():
key = agent.get("key")
if not key:
print(f" ❌ {name}: NO KEY FOUND (vault/env empty or unreachable)")
_fail(f"key:{name}:no-key", name)
print(f" ❌ {name}: NO KEY FOUND (vault empty or unreachable)")
FAIL.append(f"key:{name}:no-key")
continue
data = http_json(f"{LITELLM}/v1/models",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {key}"})
@@ -293,11 +187,11 @@ def check_keys():
print(f" ✅ {name}: key valid → {model}")
else:
print(f" ❌ {name}: KEY FAILURE — auth rejected or unreachable")
_fail(f"key:{name}", name)
FAIL.append(f"key:{name}")
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# CHECK 2: GPU Port Conflict Detection (unit names verified live 2026-09-08)
# CHECK 2: GPU Port Conflict Detection (unchanged)
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
def check_gpu_ports():
@@ -305,14 +199,9 @@ def check_gpu_ports():
host = gpu["host"]
port = gpu["port"]
svc = gpu["service"]
user = gpu.get("user", "root") # default root, overridden per-host where needed
# `systemctl is-active` exits non-zero when the unit is inactive or
# missing, which the ssh() helper would swallow as an SSH failure and
# report as UNREACHABLE. `|| true` keeps the real state word so we can
# tell "unit inactive" from "host unreachable".
svc_status = ssh(host, f"systemctl is-active {svc} || true", user=user)
port_owner = ssh(host, f"ss -tlnp 2>/dev/null | grep -Po ':{port}\\s+.*pid=\\K[0-9]+' | head -1", user=user)
svc_status = ssh(host, f"systemctl is-active {svc}")
port_owner = ssh(host, f"ss -tlnp 2>/dev/null | grep -Po ':{port}\\s+.*pid=\\K[0-9]+' | head -1")
if not svc_status:
print(f" ❌ {label}: UNREACHABLE")
@@ -323,14 +212,14 @@ def check_gpu_ports():
print(f" ❌ {label}: PORT {port} NOT LISTENING (svc={svc_status})")
FAIL.append(f"gpu-no-port:{label}")
elif svc_status != "active":
svc_pid = ssh(host, f"systemctl show {svc} -p MainPID 2>/dev/null | cut -d= -f2", user=user)
svc_pid = ssh(host, f"systemctl show {svc} -p MainPID 2>/dev/null | cut -d= -f2")
if svc_pid and port_owner != svc_pid:
print(f" ❌ {label}: GHOST PROCESS — port owned by pid {port_owner}, svc pid {svc_pid} (svc={svc_status})")
FAIL.append(f"gpu-ghost:{label}:{port_owner}")
else:
print(f" ⚠️ {label}: svc={svc_status}, port owned by {port_owner}")
else:
health = ssh(host, f"curl -s --max-time 5 http://localhost:{port}/health", user=user)
health = ssh(host, f"curl -s --max-time 5 http://localhost:{port}/health")
if health and '"status":"ok"' in health:
print(f" ✅ {label}: healthy (pid={port_owner})")
elif health and '"status":"no slot available"' in health:
@@ -345,36 +234,6 @@ def check_gpu_ports():
# CHECK 3: Agent Gateway Liveness + Streaming (now covers all agents)
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
def _ssh_retry(host, cmd, user="root", timeout=15, retry_timeout=25, label=""):
"""SSH with one retry at a longer timeout.
Returns (stdout_or_None, probe_failed_bool, fail_kind).
When probe_failed is True, fail_kind is one of: timeout, ssh-failed.
"""
import subprocess as _sp
def _attempt(tmo, conn_tmo):
try:
r = _sp.run(
["ssh", "-o", "StrictHostKeyChecking=no", "-o", f"ConnectTimeout={conn_tmo}",
f"{user}@{host}", cmd],
capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=tmo)
return r.stdout.strip() if r.returncode == 0 else None
except _sp.TimeoutExpired:
return "__timeout__"
except:
return None
result = _attempt(timeout, 8)
if result is None or result == "__timeout__":
kind = "timeout" if result == "__timeout__" else "ssh-failed"
prefix = f"{label} " if label else ""
print(f" probe-failed: {prefix}ssh {user}@{host} — {kind} (retrying at {retry_timeout}s…)")
result = _attempt(retry_timeout, 15)
if result is None or result == "__timeout__":
kind = "timeout" if result == "__timeout__" else "ssh-failed"
return None, True, kind
return result, False, None
def check_agents():
for name, agent in AGENTS.items():
host = agent.get("host")
@@ -382,57 +241,27 @@ def check_agents():
ct = agent["ct"]
report_only = agent.get("report_only", False)
# Tanko runs on DSH (DeepSeek Harness) since 2026-08-27 — it no longer runs a
# Hermes gateway, so skip the Hermes gateway/state/streaming/journal checks.
# Non-Hermes runtimes have no gateway to probe. dsh = Tanko since
# 2026-08-27; pi = abiba since the harness purge (.24 is pi-only).
if agent.get("runtime") in ("dsh", "pi"):
is_dsh = agent.get("runtime") == "dsh"
label = "DSH (DeepSeek Harness)" if is_dsh else "pi-only runtime"
since = "since 2026-08-27" if is_dsh else "since the harness purge"
live, probe_failed, fail_kind = _ssh_retry(host, "true", user=user)
if probe_failed:
print(f" ❌ {name}: {label} — probe-failed: ssh {user}@{host} {fail_kind} "
f"(retried at 25s: also {fail_kind}) [CT {ct}]")
_fail(f"probe-failed:{name}:{fail_kind}", name)
else:
print(f" ✅ {name}: {label} — no Hermes gateway {since} "
f"(ssh {user}@{host} OK, CT {ct})")
continue
if not host or not user:
print(f" ⬜ {name} (CT {ct}): cannot SSH — skip liveness check")
continue
# Resolve the Hermes gateway PID with retry. The probe target is
# explicit: ssh {user}@{host} pgrep -f hermes gateway.
pid, probe_failed, fail_kind = _ssh_retry(
host, "pgrep -f '[h]ermes_cli.main gateway run' | grep -v infisical | head -1", user=user)
if not pid and not probe_failed:
pid, probe_failed, fail_kind = _ssh_retry(
host, "pgrep -f '[h]ermes.*gateway' | grep -v infisical | grep -v bash | head -1", user=user)
if not pid and not probe_failed:
pid = "?"
if probe_failed:
print(f" ❌ {name}: probe-failed: ssh {user}@{host} {fail_kind} "
f"(retried at 25s: also {fail_kind}) [CT {ct}] — gateway status UNDETERMINED")
_fail(f"probe-failed:{name}:{fail_kind}", name)
continue
# ⛔ KOBY IS NEVER REPAIRED — diagnostic only (captain's 2026-08-17 ruling)
# ⛔ KOBY IS NEVER REPAIRED — diagnostic only
if report_only:
if pid == "?":
print(f" 🔍 {name}: REPORT-ONLY — probe: ssh {user}@{host} pgrep hermes-gateway "
f"-> no process found (reported only, NOT counted) [CT {ct}]")
_fail(f"gateway-down:{name}", name)
print(f" 🔍 {name}: REPORT-ONLY mode (diagnostic only, no repairs on .129)")
# Still check gateway status for reporting purposes
pid = ssh(host, "pgrep -f 'hermes_cli.main gateway run' | grep -v infisical | head -1", user=user)
if not pid:
pid = ssh(host, "pgrep -f 'hermes.*gateway' | grep -v infisical | grep -v bash | head -1", user=user)
if not pid:
print(f" ⚠️ {name}: GATEWAY NOT RUNNING (reported only)")
FAIL.append(f"gateway-down:{name}")
continue
else:
print(f" 🔍 {name}: REPORT-ONLY — probe: ssh {user}@{host} pgrep hermes-gateway "
f"-> pid={pid} (running, reported only, NOT repaired) [CT {ct}]")
continue # Skip the rest of the check for Koby
print(f" ✅ {name}: gateway running (pid={pid}, report-only mode)")
continue # Skip the rest of the check for Koby
# Gateway state file
state, _, _ = _ssh_retry(host, "cat ~/.hermes/gateway_state.json 2>/dev/null", user=user)
state = ssh(host, "cat ~/.hermes/gateway_state.json 2>/dev/null", user=user)
if state:
try:
st = json.loads(state)
@@ -450,22 +279,21 @@ def check_agents():
]
streaming = "no"
for p in adapter_paths:
has_edit, _, _ = _ssh_retry(host, f"grep -c 'async def edit_message' {p} 2>/dev/null", user=user)
has_edit = ssh(host, f"grep -c 'async def edit_message' {p} 2>/dev/null", user=user)
if has_edit and has_edit != "0":
streaming = "yes"
break
# Recent errors
recent_errors, _, _ = _ssh_retry(
host,
recent_errors = ssh(host,
r"journalctl --user -u hermes-gateway --since '10 min ago' -o cat --no-pager 2>/dev/null "
r"| grep -ci 'error\|traceback\|exception\|401\|403\|500' || echo 0",
user=user)
recent_errors = (recent_errors or "0").strip().split("\n")[-1]
print(f" {'✅' if gw_state == 'running' and zulip == 'connected' else '⚠️'} "
f"{name}: probe: ssh {user}@{host} — gw={gw_state} zulip={zulip} "
f"streaming={streaming} errors_10m={recent_errors.strip() or '0'} pid={pid} [CT {ct}]")
f"{name}: gw={gw_state} zulip={zulip} streaming={streaming} "
f"errors_10m={recent_errors.strip() or '0'} pid={pid}")
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
@@ -489,12 +317,12 @@ def check_ct_liveness():
status = ssh(pve_ip, f"pct status {ct} 2>/dev/null", user="root")
if not status:
print(f" ❌ {name} (CT {ct} on {pve_node}): PVE UNREACHABLE")
_fail(f"ct-unreachable:{name}:{pve_ip}", name)
FAIL.append(f"ct-unreachable:{name}:{pve_ip}")
elif "running" in status:
print(f" ✅ {name} (CT {ct} on {pve_node}): running")
elif "stopped" in status:
print(f" ❌ {name} (CT {ct} on {pve_node}): STOPPED")
_fail(f"ct-stopped:{name}", name)
FAIL.append(f"ct-stopped:{name}")
else:
print(f" ⚠️ {name} (CT {ct} on {pve_node}): {status.strip()}")
@@ -506,13 +334,6 @@ def check_ct_liveness():
def check_config_integrity():
"""Verify agent config.yaml parses as valid YAML."""
for name, agent in AGENTS.items():
# Tanko runs on DSH (DeepSeek Harness) since 2026-08-27 — no Hermes config.yaml.
if agent.get("runtime") == "dsh":
print(f" ⏭️ {name}: DSH — no Hermes config.yaml since 2026-08-27")
continue
if agent.get("runtime") == "pi":
print(f" ⏭️ {name}: pi-only runtime — no Hermes config.yaml since the harness purge")
continue
host = agent.get("host")
user = agent.get("user")
if not host or not user:
@@ -527,48 +348,21 @@ def check_config_integrity():
user=user)
if not yaml_ok:
print(f" ❌ {name}: SSH UNREACHABLE (config check skipped)")
_fail(f"config-unreachable:{name}", name)
FAIL.append(f"config-unreachable:{name}")
elif "OK" in yaml_ok:
print(f" ✅ {name}: config.yaml valid YAML")
else:
print(f" ❌ {name}: config.yaml YAML ERROR — {yaml_ok[:120]}")
_fail(f"config-yaml-error:{name}", name)
FAIL.append(f"config-yaml-error:{name}")
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# CHECK 6: Wrapper/CLI Integrity (NEW)
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
def _infisical_invocation_paths(wrapper_body):
"""Absolute infisical paths the wrapper actually invokes.
Only executed (non-comment) lines count, and only a path followed by a real
infisical subcommand (e.g. `/usr/bin/infisical run`) is treated as an
invocation. A note such as `# migrated from /usr/local/bin/infisical` is
prose, not a call, so it must not manufacture a dangling-path false alarm.
"""
paths = []
for line in wrapper_body.splitlines():
code = line.split("#", 1)[0]
for _m in re.finditer(
r"(/[A-Za-z0-9._/-]*infisical)\s+(?:run|export|secrets|login|logout)\b",
code,
):
if _m.group(1) not in paths:
paths.append(_m.group(1))
return paths
def check_wrapper_integrity():
"""Verify the hermes CLI wrapper exists and can reach hermes-real."""
for name, agent in AGENTS.items():
# Tanko runs on DSH (DeepSeek Harness) since 2026-08-27 — no hermes CLI wrapper.
if agent.get("runtime") == "dsh":
print(f" ⏭️ {name}: DSH — no hermes CLI wrapper since 2026-08-27")
continue
if agent.get("runtime") == "pi":
print(f" ⏭️ {name}: pi-only runtime — no hermes CLI wrapper since the harness purge")
continue
host = agent.get("host")
user = agent.get("user")
if not host or not user:
@@ -582,56 +376,24 @@ def check_wrapper_integrity():
wrapper = ssh(host, "which hermes 2>/dev/null; command -v hermes 2>/dev/null", user=user)
if not wrapper:
print(f" ❌ {name}: NO HERMES CLI WRAPPER FOUND")
_fail(f"wrapper-missing:{name}", name)
FAIL.append(f"wrapper-missing:{name}")
continue
else:
print(f" ⚠️ {name}: hermes at {wrapper.strip()} (not ~/.local/bin/hermes)")
# Credential-injection mechanism. The Hermes-era wrapper injected creds
# with `/usr/bin/infisical run`, but the mechanism is not required to be
# infisical at all: koby's wrapper sources the key from ~/.hermes/.env
# and never mentions infisical, which is valid. The old check read only
# the first 20 lines, so koonimo's wrapper — which DOES reference
# /usr/bin/infisical, just past line 20 — false-failed as "path may be
# wrong". Read the full body, accept a no-infisical wrapper, and verify
# the absolute infisical path(s) the wrapper actually invokes. Only
# executed (non-comment) lines count: a comment or dead prose mentioning
# a removed path (litellm-api-keys.prose.md documents
# `rm -f /usr/local/bin/infisical`) must neither produce a dangling path
# nor trigger the PATH check — it is not an invocation.
wrapper_body = ssh(host, "cat /root/.local/bin/hermes 2>/dev/null", user=user) or ""
wrapper_code = "\n".join(line.split("#", 1)[0] for line in wrapper_body.splitlines())
invoked_paths = _infisical_invocation_paths(wrapper_body)
if "infisical" in wrapper_code:
if invoked_paths:
missing = []
for _p in invoked_paths:
_exists = ssh(host, f"test -x {_p} && echo OK || echo MISS", user=user)
if not _exists or _exists.strip().splitlines()[-1] != "OK":
missing.append(_p)
if len(missing) == len(invoked_paths):
inf_actual = ssh(host, "command -v infisical 2>/dev/null", user=user)
suffix = f" (infisical at {inf_actual})" if inf_actual else ""
print(f" ❌ {name}: wrapper invokes infisical via missing path(s) "
f"{', '.join(missing)}{suffix}")
_fail(f"wrapper-infisical-path:{name}", name)
elif missing:
print(f" ⚠️ {name}: wrapper has an unused/missing infisical path "
f"({', '.join(missing)}) but a working invocation — informational")
elif "/usr/bin/infisical" not in invoked_paths:
print(f" ⚠️ {name}: wrapper infisical path differs "
f"({', '.join(invoked_paths)}) — informational")
else:
print(f" ✅ {name}: wrapper infisical path OK")
# Check wrapper has correct infisical path
infisical_path_valid = ssh(host,
"head -20 /root/.local/bin/hermes 2>/dev/null | grep -q '/usr/bin/infisical' && echo OK || echo MISS",
user=user)
if infisical_path_valid == "MISS":
# Check if infisical exists on path
inf_actual = ssh(host, "command -v infisical 2>/dev/null", user=user)
if not inf_actual:
print(f" ❌ {name}: INFISICAL NOT INSTALLED (wrapper broken)")
FAIL.append(f"wrapper-no-infisical:{name}")
else:
inf_actual = ssh(host, "command -v infisical 2>/dev/null", user=user)
if not inf_actual:
print(f" ❌ {name}: wrapper invokes infisical but the binary is MISSING")
_fail(f"wrapper-no-infisical:{name}", name)
else:
print(f" ✅ {name}: wrapper infisical resolves via PATH ({inf_actual})")
else:
print(f" ℹ️ {name}: wrapper resolves creds without infisical (e.g. ~/.hermes/.env) — OK")
print(f" ⚠️ {name}: wrapper infisical path may be wrong (infisical at {inf_actual})")
FAIL.append(f"wrapper-infisical-path:{name}")
# Check hermes-real exists
hermes_real = ssh(host,
@@ -644,7 +406,7 @@ def check_wrapper_integrity():
user=user)
if not hermes_real or hermes_real.strip() == "MISS":
print(f" ❌ {name}: hermes-real NOT FOUND (wrapper broken)")
_fail(f"wrapper-no-hermes-real:{name}", name)
FAIL.append(f"wrapper-no-hermes-real:{name}")
else:
print(f" ✅ {name}: hermes-real at alt path")
@@ -672,10 +434,10 @@ def check_vault_secrets():
key = agent.get("key")
if not key:
print(f" ❌ {name}: vault secret {vault_key_name} MISSING or EMPTY")
_fail(f"vault-empty:{name}:{vault_key_name}", name)
FAIL.append(f"vault-empty:{name}:{vault_key_name}")
elif not key.startswith("sk-"):
print(f" ❌ {name}: vault secret {vault_key_name} WRONG FORMAT (starts '{key[:8]}...')")
_fail(f"vault-bad-format:{name}:{vault_key_name}", name)
FAIL.append(f"vault-bad-format:{name}:{vault_key_name}")
else:
print(f" ✅ {name}: vault {vault_key_name}=sk-...{key[-4:]}")
@@ -708,7 +470,18 @@ def deploy_self():
# MAIN
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
def _run_checks():
def main():
quiet = "--quiet" in sys.argv
as_json = "--json" in sys.argv
# Self-deploy to canonical location
if not quiet and "--no-deploy" not in sys.argv:
deploy_self()
if not quiet:
print(f"🏥 Agent Health Check v2 — {datetime.now().strftime('%Y-%m-%d %H:%M UTC')}")
print()
print("🔑 LiteLLM Keys:")
check_keys()
print()
@@ -736,49 +509,16 @@ def _run_checks():
print("🔐 Vault Secrets:")
check_vault_secrets()
def main():
quiet = "--quiet" in sys.argv
as_json = "--json" in sys.argv
# Self-deploy to canonical location
if not quiet and "--no-deploy" not in sys.argv:
deploy_self()
# Provenance: a report is only actionable if the reader can tell WHICH copy
# of this script produced it. A normal run carries it in the header, --json
# carries it for machine consumers, and the cron ALERT line carries it on
# failure. --quiet is documented as "only output on failure", so the header
# is emitted only when not quiet and a healthy quiet run stays silent.
script_path = os.path.abspath(__file__)
cwd = os.getcwd()
if quiet:
captured = io.StringIO()
with contextlib.redirect_stdout(captured):
load_agent_keys()
_run_checks()
if FAIL:
sys.stdout.write(captured.getvalue())
else:
print(f"🏥 Agent Health Check v4 — {datetime.now().strftime('%Y-%m-%d %H:%M UTC')}")
print(f"📍 executed from: script={script_path} cwd={cwd}")
print()
load_agent_keys()
_run_checks()
if FAIL:
print(f"\n❌ {len(FAIL)} FAILURE(S): {' | '.join(FAIL)}")
if quiet:
print(f"ALERT agent-health:{','.join(FAIL)} script={script_path} cwd={cwd}")
print(f"ALERT agent-health:{','.join(FAIL)}")
elif not quiet:
print("\n✅ All checks passed")
if as_json:
print(json.dumps({"timestamp": datetime.now().isoformat(),
"execution_path": script_path, "cwd": cwd,
"failures": FAIL, "report_only": REPORT_ONLY,
"healthy": len(FAIL) == 0}))
"failures": FAIL, "healthy": len(FAIL) == 0}))
sys.exit(1 if FAIL else 0)
-227
View File
@@ -1,227 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# capture-dsh-token.sh — refresh the dsh-web login token WITHOUT restarting dsh-web.
#
# Context (CT 112 / tankodhs.sysloggh.net)
# ----------------------------------------
# The dsh-web UI (systemd unit `dsh-web.service`, 127.0.0.1:3080) prints a random
# launch token to the journal on every start:
#
# dsh web: http://127.0.0.1:3080/?token=<TOKEN>
#
# That token is the only way to bootstrap the authority-bound 30-day browser
# cookie. It rotates on every dsh-web start, so the Authentik-gated
# `location = /dsh-web-login` in /etc/nginx/sites-available/dsh must always
# reference the token of the RUNNING process.
#
# This script:
# 1. selects the launch token the RUNNING service actually accepts from the
# current systemd invocation — it NEVER stops or starts dsh-web,
# 2. records it in /etc/dsh-web/launch-token,
# 3. regenerates the nginx include /etc/dsh-web/nginx-login.conf (the
# `proxy_pass ...?token=` line consumed by /dsh-web-login),
# 4. reloads nginx ONLY when the on-disk include differs from the generated
# one or the applied-state stamp does not match the token (the stamp is
# written only after a successful reload), rolling the include back on
# failure so the next run retries,
# 5. removes the legacy unauthenticated :8081 endpoint if it ever reappears.
#
# Idempotent and safe to run at any time (systemd ExecStartPost or timer).
set -euo pipefail
umask 077
PATH="/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin"
JOURNAL_UNIT="dsh-web.service"
TOKEN_FILE="/etc/dsh-web/launch-token"
INCLUDE_FILE="/etc/dsh-web/nginx-login.conf"
STAMP_FILE="/etc/dsh-web/nginx-login.conf.applied"
PENDING_FILE="/etc/dsh-web/nginx-reload.pending"
SITE_ENABLED="/etc/nginx/sites-enabled/dsh"
LEGACY_8081="/etc/nginx/sites-enabled/dsh.token"
STASH_DIR="/etc/nginx/sites-available"
LOCK_FILE="/run/capture-dsh-token.lock"
LOGIN_HOST="tankodhs.sysloggh.net"
LOGIN_UPSTREAM="http://127.0.0.1:3080"
TOKEN_WAIT=120
log() { printf 'capture-dsh-token: %s\n' "$*" >&2; }
die() { printf 'capture-dsh-token: ERROR: %s\n' "$*" >&2; exit 1; }
[ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ] || die "must run as root"
# ── 0. Serialize runs so timer/ExecStartPost/manual runs cannot interleave ──
exec 9>"$LOCK_FILE"
flock -n 9 || { log "another capture-dsh-token run holds $LOCK_FILE; exiting"; exit 0; }
mkdir -p "$(dirname "$PENDING_FILE")"
# ── 0b. Guarantee the generated include exists before any `nginx -t` ──────
# The :80 site includes /etc/dsh-web/nginx-login.conf by literal path, so a
# missing include makes every `nginx -t` fail and can wedge recovery. Seed it
# from the last known token (or a placeholder); step 4 replaces it.
if [ ! -f "$INCLUDE_FILE" ]; then
SEED="placeholder"
if [ -f "$TOKEN_FILE" ]; then
SEED="$(cat "$TOKEN_FILE" 2>/dev/null || true)"
[ -n "$SEED" ] || SEED="placeholder"
fi
printf '%s' "$SEED" | grep -qE '^[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=:@-]+$' || SEED="placeholder"
printf 'proxy_pass %s/?token=%s;\n' "$LOGIN_UPSTREAM" "$SEED" > "$INCLUDE_FILE"
chmod 600 "$INCLUDE_FILE"
log "created missing $INCLUDE_FILE"
fi
# ── 1. Remove the legacy unauthenticated :8081 endpoint, if present ─────────
# It bypassed Authentik entirely (listened on 0.0.0.0:8081 with no auth_request)
# and must never come back. Stash it rather than delete so it is auditable.
if [ -e "$LEGACY_8081" ] || [ -L "$LEGACY_8081" ]; then
TS="$(date -u +%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ)"
STASHED="$STASH_DIR/dsh.token.disabled-$TS"
mv "$LEGACY_8081" "$STASHED"
chmod 600 "$STASHED" 2>/dev/null || true
touch "$PENDING_FILE"
if ! NGINX_TEST_OUT="$(nginx -t 2>&1)"; then
die "nginx config test failed after disabling $LEGACY_8081 (kept disabled at $STASHED): $NGINX_TEST_OUT; a pending reload is recorded so running nginx is reloaded once the config is fixed. The legacy :8081 endpoint will NOT be restored."
fi
if ! nginx -s reload; then
die "nginx reload failed after disabling $LEGACY_8081 (kept disabled at $STASHED); a pending reload is recorded so running nginx is reloaded on the next run. The legacy :8081 endpoint will NOT be restored."
fi
rm -f "$PENDING_FILE"
log "removed legacy :8081 endpoint -> $STASHED"
fi
# ── 1b. Honor a recorded pending reload regardless of token selection ───────
# A failed reload leaves PENDING_FILE set so a stashed legacy :8081 file can
# never remain loaded in the running nginx while dsh-web is down or not yet
# answering. Reconcile it before the token wait.
if [ -e "$PENDING_FILE" ]; then
if ! NGINX_TEST_OUT="$(nginx -t 2>&1)"; then
log "WARNING: pending nginx reload recorded but 'nginx -t' fails: $NGINX_TEST_OUT; continuing so the include can be regenerated; will retry next run"
elif ! nginx -s reload; then
log "WARNING: pending nginx reload recorded but 'nginx -s reload' failed; will retry next run"
else
rm -f "$PENDING_FILE"
log "completed pending nginx reload"
fi
fi
# ── 2. Select the token the RUNNING service actually accepts ────────────────
# Re-sample the service's CURRENT systemd invocation on every pass and read
# candidates only from it, so a restart that lands during the wait immediately
# switches to the new invocation; there is no whole-journal or cross-invocation
# fallback, and an empty/unknown invocation just waits. Each candidate is then
# functionally verified against the local dsh-web using the public authority,
# exactly as the /dsh-web-login proxy does, and the first that answers 303 is
# the live token. Candidates are re-probed newest-first on each pass (connection
# failures stay eligible) until one is accepted or the wait elapses.
journal_tokens() {
journalctl -u "$JOURNAL_UNIT" "_SYSTEMD_INVOCATION_ID=$1" --no-pager -o cat 2>/dev/null \
| grep -oE 'dsh web: https?://[^[:space:]]+[?&]token=[^[:space:]]+' \
| sed -E 's/.*[?&]token=//' \
| grep -E '^[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=:@-]+$' \
| tac | awk '!seen[$0]++' || true
}
TOKEN=""
DEADLINE=$((SECONDS + TOKEN_WAIT))
NO_INVOCATION_WARNED=0
while [ -z "$TOKEN" ] && [ "$SECONDS" -lt "$DEADLINE" ]; do
INVOCATION="$(systemctl show -p InvocationID --value "$JOURNAL_UNIT" 2>/dev/null || true)"
if [ -z "$INVOCATION" ] || [ "$INVOCATION" = "n/a" ]; then
if [ "$NO_INVOCATION_WARNED" -eq 0 ]; then
log "WARNING: no invocation id for $JOURNAL_UNIT; waiting for a live invocation"
NO_INVOCATION_WARNED=1
fi
sleep 2
continue
fi
for cand in $(journal_tokens "$INVOCATION"); do
code="$(curl -s -o /dev/null --max-time 5 -w '%{http_code}' \
-H "Host: $LOGIN_HOST" "$LOGIN_UPSTREAM/?token=$cand" || true)"
if [ "$code" = "303" ]; then
TOKEN="$cand"
break
fi
done
[ -n "$TOKEN" ] && break
sleep 2
done
if [ -z "$TOKEN" ]; then
log "no accepted launch token in the current invocation within ${TOKEN_WAIT}s; leaving the include untouched for the next run"
[ -e "$PENDING_FILE" ] && die "pending nginx reload could not be completed; will retry next run"
exit 0
fi
# ── 3. Record the token (atomic, private) ──────────────────────────────────
mkdir -p "$(dirname "$TOKEN_FILE")"
if ! printf '%s\n' "$TOKEN" | cmp -s - "$TOKEN_FILE" 2>/dev/null; then
printf '%s\n' "$TOKEN" > "$TOKEN_FILE.tmp"
chmod 600 "$TOKEN_FILE.tmp"
mv "$TOKEN_FILE.tmp" "$TOKEN_FILE"
log "recorded live launch token in $TOKEN_FILE"
fi
chmod 600 "$TOKEN_FILE"
# ── 4. Regenerate the nginx login include (reload only when it changes) ────
NEW_INCLUDE="$(mktemp "$INCLUDE_FILE.XXXXXX")"
printf 'proxy_pass %s/?token=%s;\n' "$LOGIN_UPSTREAM" "$TOKEN" > "$NEW_INCLUDE"
chmod 600 "$NEW_INCLUDE"
# The stamp records the token nginx actually loaded. It is written only after a
# successful reload, so the early exit is safe only when both the stamp and the
# on-disk include agree with the live token; anything else falls through to the
# reload path so the include can never silently diverge from what nginx serves.
APPLIED=""
[ -f "$STAMP_FILE" ] && APPLIED="$(cat "$STAMP_FILE" 2>/dev/null || true)"
[ -f "$INCLUDE_FILE" ] && chmod 600 "$INCLUDE_FILE"
[ -f "$STAMP_FILE" ] && chmod 600 "$STAMP_FILE"
if [ "$APPLIED" = "$TOKEN" ] && [ -f "$INCLUDE_FILE" ] && cmp -s "$NEW_INCLUDE" "$INCLUDE_FILE" \
&& [ ! -e "$PENDING_FILE" ]; then
rm -f "$NEW_INCLUDE"
log "token unchanged; nginx not reloaded"
exit 0
fi
[ -e "$SITE_ENABLED" ] || { rm -f "$NEW_INCLUDE"; die "$SITE_ENABLED missing; refusing to reload"; }
RESTORE=""
if [ -f "$INCLUDE_FILE" ]; then
RESTORE="$(mktemp "$INCLUDE_FILE.bak.XXXXXX")"
cp -p "$INCLUDE_FILE" "$RESTORE"
chmod 600 "$RESTORE"
fi
mv "$NEW_INCLUDE" "$INCLUDE_FILE"
chmod 600 "$INCLUDE_FILE"
if ! NGINX_TEST_OUT="$(nginx -t 2>&1)"; then
if [ -n "$RESTORE" ]; then
mv "$RESTORE" "$INCLUDE_FILE"
else
rm -f "$INCLUDE_FILE"
fi
die "nginx config test failed: $NGINX_TEST_OUT; previous include restored"
fi
if ! nginx -s reload; then
if [ -n "$RESTORE" ]; then
mv "$RESTORE" "$INCLUDE_FILE"
else
rm -f "$INCLUDE_FILE"
fi
touch "$PENDING_FILE"
die "nginx reload failed; previous include restored; a pending reload is recorded so the next run retries"
fi
if [ -n "$RESTORE" ]; then
rm -f "$RESTORE"
fi
rm -f "$PENDING_FILE"
printf '%s\n' "$TOKEN" > "$STAMP_FILE.tmp"
chmod 600 "$STAMP_FILE.tmp"
mv "$STAMP_FILE.tmp" "$STAMP_FILE"
log "token changed; nginx reloaded"
log "login endpoint: https://$LOGIN_HOST/dsh-web-login (Authentik-gated)"
-225
View File
@@ -1,225 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/bash
# contract-run.sh — Deterministic contract execution from machine scheduler
#
# Takes a contract name, resolves its script, runs it with timeout,
# logs output to $CONTRACT_RUN_LOG_DIR (default: /var/log/contract-runs/),
# and alerts on failure.
#
# Environment:
# CONTRACT_RUN_LOG_DIR Override the log directory (default: /var/log/contract-runs)
#
# Usage: bash scripts/contract-run.sh <contract-name>
#
# Contract names map to scripts as follows:
# infrastructure-monitoring -> scripts/infra-monitoring.sh
# proxmox-monitor -> scripts/proxmox-monitor.sh
# zulip-health -> scripts/zulip-monitor.sh
# agent-health-check -> scripts/agent-health-check.py
# litellm-health -> scripts/litellm-health-check.py
# disk-gc-threat-response -> scripts/disk-gc-scan.py
# pm2-self-heal -> scripts/pm2-self-heal.sh
# search-stack-visibility -> scripts/search-stack-check.py
# health-log-freshness -> scripts/health-log-freshness.py
#
# Execution copy: every contract pins the clone this script lives in (see
# docs/contract-execution-pinning.md). Before a contract runs, this wrapper
# proves the script it is about to execute byte-matches origin/master:
# CONTRACT_REVISION_PREFLIGHT=warn (default) log a refusal, still report
# CONTRACT_REVISION_PREFLIGHT=enforce refuse to report on a mismatch
# CONTRACT_REVISION_PREFLIGHT=off skip the check entirely
# A refusal names its class: cannot-verify:fetch-failed|ref-unresolvable,
# or mismatch:content|path-absent|detached-head|clone-ahead.
#
# Exit codes:
# 0 = contract passed
# 1 = contract failed (alert sent)
# 2 = probe failed (script missing, timeout, etc.)
set -uo pipefail
CONTRACT_NAME="$1"
SCRIPTS_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
LOG_DIR="${CONTRACT_RUN_LOG_DIR:-/var/log/contract-runs}"
TIMESTAMP=$(date -u '+%Y%m%d-%H%M%S')
LOG_FILE="${LOG_DIR}/${CONTRACT_NAME}-${TIMESTAMP}.log"
# Ensure log directory exists
mkdir -p "$LOG_DIR"
# Map contract name to script path
case "$CONTRACT_NAME" in
infrastructure-monitoring)
SCRIPT_PATH="${SCRIPTS_DIR}/infra-monitoring.sh"
INTERPRETER="bash"
;;
proxmox-monitor)
SCRIPT_PATH="${SCRIPTS_DIR}/proxmox-monitor.sh"
INTERPRETER="bash"
;;
zulip-health)
SCRIPT_PATH="${SCRIPTS_DIR}/zulip-monitor.sh"
INTERPRETER="bash"
;;
agent-health-check)
SCRIPT_PATH="${SCRIPTS_DIR}/agent-health-check.py"
INTERPRETER="python3"
;;
litellm-health)
SCRIPT_PATH="${SCRIPTS_DIR}/litellm-health-check.py"
INTERPRETER="python3"
;;
pm2-self-heal)
SCRIPT_PATH="${SCRIPTS_DIR}/pm2-self-heal.sh"
INTERPRETER="bash"
;;
disk-gc-threat-response)
SCRIPT_PATH="${SCRIPTS_DIR}/disk-gc-scan.py"
INTERPRETER="python3"
;;
search-stack-visibility)
SCRIPT_PATH="${SCRIPTS_DIR}/search-stack-check.py"
INTERPRETER="python3"
;;
health-log-freshness)
SCRIPT_PATH="${SCRIPTS_DIR}/health-log-freshness.py"
INTERPRETER="python3"
;;
*)
echo "Unknown contract: $CONTRACT_NAME" | tee -a "$LOG_FILE"
# Send alert for unknown contract
ALERT_MSG="🔴 Contract $CONTRACT_NAME: unknown contract name. Log: $LOG_FILE"
ZULIP_API_URL="${ZULIP_API_URL:-https://chat.sysloggh.net/api/v1}"
ZULIP_API_KEY="${ZULIP_API_KEY:-}"
ZULIP_USER="${ZULIP_USER:-abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net}"
if [ -n "$ZULIP_API_KEY" ] && command -v curl &> /dev/null; then
curl -sf -X POST "${ZULIP_API_URL}/messages" \
-u "${ZULIP_USER}:${ZULIP_API_KEY}" \
-d "type=private" \
-d "to=9" \
-d "content=${ALERT_MSG}" > /dev/null 2>&1 || true
fi
exit 2
;;
esac
# Check if script exists
if [ ! -f "$SCRIPT_PATH" ]; then
echo "Script not found: $SCRIPT_PATH" | tee -a "$LOG_FILE"
# Send alert for missing script
ALERT_MSG="🔴 Contract $CONTRACT_NAME: script not found at $SCRIPT_PATH. Log: $LOG_FILE"
ZULIP_API_URL="${ZULIP_API_URL:-https://chat.sysloggh.net/api/v1}"
ZULIP_API_KEY="${ZULIP_API_KEY:-}"
ZULIP_USER="${ZULIP_USER:-abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net}"
if [ -n "$ZULIP_API_KEY" ] && command -v curl &> /dev/null; then
curl -sf -X POST "${ZULIP_API_URL}/messages" \
-u "${ZULIP_USER}:${ZULIP_API_KEY}" \
-d "type=private" \
-d "to=9" \
-d "content=${ALERT_MSG}" > /dev/null 2>&1 || true
fi
exit 2
fi
# Run the script with timeout and capture output
echo "=== Contract: $CONTRACT_NAME ===" | tee "$LOG_FILE"
echo "Started: $(date -u '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S UTC')" | tee -a "$LOG_FILE"
echo "Script: $SCRIPT_PATH" | tee -a "$LOG_FILE"
echo "" | tee -a "$LOG_FILE"
# ── Revision preflight ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# A verdict is only meaningful if it came from the merged copy. This reports
# whether the executing copy matches, and distinguishes "could not check" from
# "this copy is wrong" so an operator can tell them apart.
# See docs/contract-execution-pinning.md.
#
# Default is WARN, not enforce: the guard gates every scheduled contract, and a
# legitimate state (branch mid-review, detached HEAD, briefly offline) would
# otherwise turn the whole fleet's monitoring into withheld verdicts. The
# criteria for flipping the default to enforce are written down in the doc.
REVISION_PREFLIGHT_MODE="${CONTRACT_REVISION_PREFLIGHT:-warn}"
REPO_ROOT="$(cd "${SCRIPTS_DIR}/.." && pwd)"
if [ "$REVISION_PREFLIGHT_MODE" != "off" ] && [ -x "${SCRIPTS_DIR}/revision-preflight.sh" ]; then
PREFLIGHT_OUT="$(mktemp)"
if "${SCRIPTS_DIR}/revision-preflight.sh" "$SCRIPT_PATH" "$REPO_ROOT" >"$PREFLIGHT_OUT" 2>&1; then
cat "$PREFLIGHT_OUT" | tee -a "$LOG_FILE"
else
cat "$PREFLIGHT_OUT" | tee -a "$LOG_FILE"
PREFLIGHT_REASON="$(grep -m1 '^REASON=' "$PREFLIGHT_OUT" | cut -d= -f2-)"
[ -n "$PREFLIGHT_REASON" ] || PREFLIGHT_REASON="unclassified"
if [ "$REVISION_PREFLIGHT_MODE" = "enforce" ]; then
echo "🚫 VERDICT WITHHELD: $PREFLIGHT_REASON" | tee -a "$LOG_FILE"
ALERT_MSG="🔴 Contract $CONTRACT_NAME: revision preflight REFUSED ($PREFLIGHT_REASON) — verdict withheld. Log: $LOG_FILE"
ZULIP_API_URL="${ZULIP_API_URL:-https://chat.sysloggh.net/api/v1}"
ZULIP_API_KEY="${ZULIP_API_KEY:-}"
ZULIP_USER="${ZULIP_USER:-abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net}"
if [ -n "$ZULIP_API_KEY" ] && command -v curl &> /dev/null; then
curl -sf -X POST "${ZULIP_API_URL}/messages" \
-u "${ZULIP_USER}:${ZULIP_API_KEY}" \
-d "type=private" \
-d "to=9" \
-d "content=${ALERT_MSG}" > /dev/null 2>&1 || true
fi
rm -f "$PREFLIGHT_OUT"
exit 2
fi
echo "⚠️ revision preflight: $PREFLIGHT_REASON — continuing because CONTRACT_REVISION_PREFLIGHT=$REVISION_PREFLIGHT_MODE" | tee -a "$LOG_FILE"
fi
rm -f "$PREFLIGHT_OUT"
fi
# Use timeout to prevent hangs (10 minutes default)
TIMEOUT=600
timeout "$TIMEOUT" $INTERPRETER "$SCRIPT_PATH" 2>&1 | tee -a "$LOG_FILE"
EXIT_CODE=${PIPESTATUS[0]}
# If timeout killed the process, EXIT_CODE will be 124
if [ $EXIT_CODE -eq 124 ]; then
echo "⏰ TIMEOUT: script exceeded ${TIMEOUT}s limit" | tee -a "$LOG_FILE"
fi
echo "" | tee -a "$LOG_FILE"
if [ $EXIT_CODE -eq 0 ]; then
echo "✅ VERDICT: PASS" | tee -a "$LOG_FILE"
exit 0
else
echo "🔴 VERDICT: FAIL (exit code $EXIT_CODE)" | tee -a "$LOG_FILE"
# Send alert (Zulip DM to user 9 + stream agent-hub topic alerts-infra)
# Using the same alert path as other monitors
ALERT_MSG="🔴 Contract $CONTRACT_NAME failed (exit $EXIT_CODE). Log: $LOG_FILE"
ALERT_SENT=false
# Take credentials from environment (ZULIP_API_KEY required)
ZULIP_API_URL="${ZULIP_API_URL:-https://chat.sysloggh.net/api/v1}"
ZULIP_API_KEY="${ZULIP_API_KEY:-}"
ZULIP_USER="${ZULIP_USER:-abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net}"
if [ -n "$ZULIP_API_KEY" ] && command -v curl &> /dev/null; then
# DM to user 9
DM_EXIT=0
curl -sf -X POST "${ZULIP_API_URL}/messages" \
-u "${ZULIP_USER}:${ZULIP_API_KEY}" \
-d "type=private" \
-d "to=9" \
-d "content=${ALERT_MSG}" > /dev/null 2>&1 || DM_EXIT=$?
# Stream agent-hub topic alerts-infra
STREAM_EXIT=0
curl -sf -X POST "${ZULIP_API_URL}/messages" \
-u "${ZULIP_USER}:${ZULIP_API_KEY}" \
-d "type=stream" \
-d "to=agent-hub" \
-d "topic=alerts-infra" \
-d "content=${ALERT_MSG}" > /dev/null 2>&1 || STREAM_EXIT=$?
if [ $DM_EXIT -eq 0 ] || [ $STREAM_EXIT -eq 0 ]; then
ALERT_SENT=true
else
echo "$(date -u '+%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ') ALERT FAILURE: DM exit=$DM_EXIT, stream exit=$STREAM_EXIT" >> "$LOG_FILE"
fi
else
echo "$(date -u '+%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ') ALERT SKIPPED: no ZULIP_API_KEY or curl" >> "$LOG_FILE"
fi
exit 1
fi
+118 -320
View File
@@ -15,55 +15,21 @@ import smtplib, json, subprocess, os, sys, datetime, re
from email.mime.text import MIMEText
from email.mime.multipart import MIMEMultipart
PVE = "https://192.168.68.12:8006"
# The HTTP header prefix is a protocol constant, not a credential. It is kept as
# a constant ending at '=' so that no assembled header-plus-token literal ever
# appears in the tree; the secret scanner rightly flags that shape.
PVE_AUTH_HEADER = "PVEAPIToken="
def pve_auth():
"""PVE API auth header, resolved at call time from the injected environment.
The token is injected by ``infisical run --env=prod`` as ``PVE_TOKEN``
(format ``user@realm!tokenid=secret``). It must never be hardcoded: a
placeholder literal authenticates as nobody, which is how this probe
reported zero nodes while still exiting 0. Raise loudly instead.
"""
token = os.environ.get("PVE_TOKEN")
if not token:
raise RuntimeError("PVE_TOKEN is not set (run under `infisical run --env=prod`)")
return f"Authorization: {PVE_AUTH_HEADER}{token}"
PVE = "https://minipve.sysloggh.net"
AUTH = "Authorization: PVEAPIToken=monitoring@pve!mumuni=eafd56c5-93d4-4d40-a41d-e688be0987f3"
# ── Shared credentials —─
ZULIP_SITE = "https://chat.sysloggh.net"
ZULIP_EMAIL = "abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net"
# Note: /api/v1/server_settings is a PUBLIC endpoint (verified HTTP 200 with or without credential).
# No Zulip API key is required for this call. If a future leg genuinely needs abiba-bot's key,
# it must prove it with a 200 from /api/v1/users/me as abiba-bot and label itself degraded when it cannot.
# Never fall back to the vault's shared ZULIP_API_KEY.
ZULIP_AUTH = None
DEGRADED_LEGS = []
# Probe failures are different from degraded legs. A missing credential is an
# expected, survivable state (stays exit 0). A probe that cannot reach the API
# means the report has NO data for that section, which is a monitoring loss and
# must exit non-zero so it cannot pass unnoticed.
PROBE_FAILURES = []
ZULIP_KEY = "cKTDMZAPW08dk3zl05sStzO7HRztzyn8"
ZULIP_AUTH = f"{ZULIP_EMAIL}:{ZULIP_KEY}"
LITELLM_PUBLIC = "https://litellm.sysloggh.net"
LITELLM_BACKEND = "192.168.68.116"
AUTH_HOST = "192.168.68.11"
# Load LiteLLM API key from file (durable, works in cron)
LITELLM_KEY_FILE = "/root/.abiba-workspace/secrets/litellm-key.txt"
try:
with open(LITELLM_KEY_FILE) as f:
SYNTHETIC_API_KEY = f.read().strip()
except:
SYNTHETIC_API_KEY = None # Fail loudly: report "no-key-file" in check
SYNTHETIC_API_KEY = "sk-U_ydi3B-wfGU-_xESkoU1Q"
NOW = datetime.datetime.now()
DATE_STR = NOW.strftime("%Y-%m-%d")
@@ -72,20 +38,10 @@ TIME_STR = NOW.strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M UTC")
# ── Helpers ──
def pve_get(path):
"""Fetch PVE API data. Returns list on success, None on error (to distinguish from empty list).
A missing PVE_TOKEN is caught here and reported as ``None`` so the caller
records a probe failure; it must not escape as an unhandled exception.
"""
cmd = f'curl -sfk --connect-timeout 10 "{PVE}{path}" -H "{AUTH}"'
try:
cmd = f'curl -sk --connect-timeout 10 "{PVE}{path}" -H "{pve_auth()}"'
r = subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=12)
if r.returncode != 0:
return None
data = json.loads(r.stdout)
return data.get("data", [])
except:
return None
return json.loads(subprocess.check_output(cmd, shell=True))["data"]
except: return []
def ssh(host, cmd):
try:
@@ -106,7 +62,7 @@ def http_get(url, auth=None, timeout=10):
cmd = f'curl -sfk --connect-timeout {timeout} -o /dev/null -w "%{{http_code}}" "{url}"'
if auth:
cmd = cmd.replace('"', '\\"')
cmd = f'curl -sfk --connect-timeout {timeout} -H "Authorization: Bearer {auth}" -o /dev/null -w "%{{http_code}}" "{url}"'
cmd = f'curl -sfk --connect-timeout {timeout} -u "{auth}" -o /dev/null -w "%{{http_code}}" "{url}"'
r = subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout+2)
return r.stdout.strip() or "000"
except:
@@ -141,35 +97,21 @@ def collect():
# ── Proxmox Nodes ──
nodes = pve_get("/api2/json/nodes")
if nodes is None:
report["nodes"] = {}
report["node_count"] = 0
report["nodes_online"] = 0
report["pve_probe_status"] = "unreachable"
PROBE_FAILURES.append("proxmox: node list unreachable (PVE_TOKEN missing or API down)")
else:
report["nodes"] = {n["node"]: {
"cpu_pct": round(n.get('cpu',0)*100, 1),
"ram": f"{n.get('mem',0)//1024//1024}/{n.get('maxmem',0)//1024//1024}MB",
"ram_pct": round(n.get('mem',0)/n.get('maxmem',1)*100, 0),
"disk": f"{n.get('disk',0)//1024//1024//1024}/{n.get('maxdisk',0)//1024//1024//1024}GB",
"disk_pct": round(n.get('disk',0)/n.get('maxdisk',1)*100, 0),
"uptime_h": n.get('uptime',0)//3600,
"status": n["status"]
} for n in nodes}
report["node_count"] = len(nodes)
report["nodes_online"] = sum(1 for n in nodes if n["status"] == "online")
report["pve_probe_status"] = "ok"
report["nodes"] = {n["node"]: {
"cpu_pct": round(n.get('cpu',0)*100, 1),
"ram": f"{n.get('mem',0)//1024//1024}/{n.get('maxmem',0)//1024//1024}MB",
"ram_pct": round(n.get('mem',0)/n.get('maxmem',1)*100, 0),
"disk": f"{n.get('disk',0)//1024//1024//1024}/{n.get('maxdisk',0)//1024//1024//1024}GB",
"disk_pct": round(n.get('disk',0)/n.get('maxdisk',1)*100, 0),
"uptime_h": n.get('uptime',0)//3600,
"status": n["status"]
} for n in nodes}
report["node_count"] = len(nodes)
report["nodes_online"] = sum(1 for n in nodes if n["status"] == "online")
# ── VMs/CTs ──
resources = pve_get("/api2/json/cluster/resources")
if resources is None:
vms = []
report["resources_probe_status"] = "unreachable"
PROBE_FAILURES.append("proxmox: cluster resources unreachable")
else:
vms = [r for r in resources if r.get("type") in ("qemu","lxc")]
report["resources_probe_status"] = "ok"
vms = [r for r in resources if r.get("type") in ("qemu","lxc")]
report["total_vms"] = len(vms)
report["running_vms"] = sum(1 for v in vms if v.get("status") == "running")
stopped = [v for v in vms if v.get("status") != "running"]
@@ -190,7 +132,7 @@ def collect():
# ── Storage ──
storages = pve_get("/api2/json/nodes/storepve/storage")
report["storage"] = []
for s in (storages or []):
for s in storages:
total = s.get("total",0) or 1
used = s.get("used",0)
pct = used/total*100
@@ -241,9 +183,9 @@ def collect():
("Authentik", "https://auth.sysloggh.net"),
("Zulip", "https://chat.sysloggh.net"),
("Pulse", "https://pulse.sysloggh.net"),
("Proxmox", "https://192.168.68.12:8006"),
("Proxmox", "https://minipve.sysloggh.net"),
("SearXNG", "http://192.168.68.7:8888"),
("Firecrawl", "http://192.168.68.7:3002/"), # Firecrawl serves no /health - the root is its liveness endpoint
("Firecrawl", "http://192.168.68.7:3002/health"),
]
report["endpoints"] = []
for name, url in endpoints:
@@ -253,11 +195,10 @@ def collect():
# ── LiteLLM Specific Checks (from litellm-health prose contract) ──
report["litellm"] = {"checks": []}
# Check 1: Fleet health via nginx /health/unified (301 -> /gpu/gpu-data served by gpu-monitor on .24:9100).
# Router (:9000) was decommissioned 2026-09-11; probing it was a guaranteed daily failure.
health_unified = ssh(LITELLM_BACKEND, "curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --max-time 8 http://127.0.0.1/health/unified 2>/dev/null")
# Check 1: LiteLLM aggregate health endpoint (router binds to 127.0.0.1, check via SSH)
health_unified = ssh(LITELLM_BACKEND, "curl -sf http://127.0.0.1:9000/health/unified -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' 2>/dev/null")
report["litellm"]["health_unified"] = health_unified or "000"
report["litellm"]["checks"].append({"name": "fleet-health-via-nginx", "status": "pass" if health_unified in ("200", "301") else "fail", "code": health_unified or "000"})
report["litellm"]["checks"].append({"name": "unified-health", "status": "pass" if health_unified == "200" else "fail", "code": health_unified or "000"})
# Check 2: Nginx-proxied internal endpoints
for path, name in [("/litellm/ui/", "nginx-ui"), ("/litellm/docs", "nginx-docs")]:
@@ -265,11 +206,8 @@ def collect():
report["litellm"]["checks"].append({"name": name, "status": "pass" if code == "200" else "fail", "code": code})
# Check 3: Docker container health for LiteLLM stack
expected_containers = ["harness-litellm", "harness-nginx", "harness-postgres",
"harness-redis", "harness-dashboard", "harness-grafana",
"harness-prometheus", "harness-alertmanager",
"harness-zulip-bridge", "harness-docker-stats",
"harness-pve-exporter"]
expected_containers = ["harness-litellm", "harness-nginx", "harness-router",
"harness-postgres", "harness-redis", "harness-dashboard"]
actual_names = [c["name"] for c in containers2]
report["litellm"]["expected_containers"] = expected_containers
report["litellm"]["missing_containers"] = [e for e in expected_containers if e not in actual_names]
@@ -287,13 +225,9 @@ def collect():
report["litellm"]["checks"].append({"name": "oidc-auth", "status": "pass" if auth_code in ("200","302") else "fail", "code": auth_code})
# Check 5: Synthetic API call through LiteLLM
if SYNTHETIC_API_KEY is None:
report["litellm"]["api_models"] = None
report["litellm"]["checks"].append({"name": "api-endpoint", "status": "fail", "code": "no-key-file"})
else:
api_check = http_get(f"{LITELLM_PUBLIC}/v1/models", auth=SYNTHETIC_API_KEY)
report["litellm"]["api_models"] = api_check
report["litellm"]["checks"].append({"name": "api-endpoint", "status": "pass" if api_check == "200" else "fail", "code": api_check})
api_check = http_get(f"{LITELLM_PUBLIC}/v1/models", auth=SYNTHETIC_API_KEY)
report["litellm"]["api_models"] = api_check
report["litellm"]["checks"].append({"name": "api-endpoint", "status": "pass" if api_check == "200" else "fail", "code": api_check})
# ── NFS Mounts ──
nfs = ssh("192.168.68.7", "df -h /media/storage /media/mediastore 2>/dev/null | tail -n +2")
@@ -313,13 +247,11 @@ def collect():
zulip_health = json.loads(health_body) if health_body else {}
except:
zulip_health = {}
# Live state is nested under 'zulip' key
zulip_state = zulip_health.get("zulip", {})
report["zulip_ext"]["connected"] = zulip_state.get("connected", False)
report["zulip_ext"]["queue_id"] = zulip_state.get("queue_id")
report["zulip_ext"]["last_error"] = zulip_state.get("last_error")
report["zulip_ext"]["messages_processed"] = zulip_state.get("messages_processed", 0)
report["zulip_ext"]["skipped"] = zulip_state.get("skipped", 0)
report["zulip_ext"]["connected"] = zulip_health.get("connected", False)
report["zulip_ext"]["queue_id"] = zulip_health.get("queue_id")
report["zulip_ext"]["last_error"] = zulip_health.get("last_error")
report["zulip_ext"]["messages_processed"] = zulip_health.get("messages_processed", 0)
report["zulip_ext"]["retry_count"] = zulip_health.get("retry_count", 0)
# Phase 2: PM2 process check
pm2_raw = subprocess.check_output(
@@ -357,60 +289,56 @@ def collect():
# Abiba (pi)
report["agents"]["abiba"] = {
"platform": "pi", "ct": 100, "ip": "192.168.68.24",
"zulip_connected": zulip_state.get("connected", False),
"zulip_processed": zulip_state.get("messages_processed", 0),
"zulip_connected": zulip_health.get("connected", False),
"zulip_processed": zulip_health.get("messages_processed", 0),
"pm2_status": pm2.get("status", "unknown"),
"pm2_restarts": pm2.get("restarts", "?"),
"pm2_uptime": pm2.get("uptime", "?"),
}
# Tanko (CT 112, IP 192.168.68.122) — DSH (DeepSeek Harness), no Hermes gateway
# since 2026-08-27. There is no ~/.hermes/gateway_state.json on CT 112 anymore;
# Zulip/Telegram connectivity is managed by the DSH harness, not the Hermes gateway.
# Tanko (CT 122)
tanko_state = ssh_jerome("192.168.68.122", "cat ~/.hermes/gateway_state.json 2>/dev/null")
tanko_data = {}
try:
tanko_data = json.loads(tanko_state) if tanko_state else {}
except:
tanko_data = {}
platforms = tanko_data.get("platforms", {})
report["agents"]["tanko"] = {
"platform": "dsh", "ct": 112, "ip": "192.168.68.122",
"gateway_state": "n/a (DSH)",
"zulip_state": "unknown",
"telegram_state": "unknown",
"gateway_pid": None,
"updated_at": "",
"platform": "hermes", "ct": 112, "ip": "192.168.68.122",
"gateway_state": tanko_data.get("gateway_state", "unknown"),
"zulip_state": platforms.get("zulip", {}).get("state", "unknown"),
"telegram_state": platforms.get("telegram", {}).get("state", "unknown"),
"gateway_pid": tanko_data.get("pid"),
"updated_at": tanko_data.get("updated_at"),
}
# Mumuni is deliberately absent from this digest: captain ruling 2026-09-10.
# She moved off this host onto her own container (kagentz CT 105 on minipve,
# 192.168.68.14, dedicated `hermes` user) and is monitored from her side. The
# former probe ssh'd to 192.168.68.24 for the decommissioned deployment's
# ~/.hermes/gateway_state.json, always read "unknown", and published a false
# "mumuni:unknown" line in the agent table and the gateway-unknown issue
# count of every digest. Do NOT re-add an .24 / gateway_state probe.
# Mumuni (CT 100, IP 192.168.68.24)
mumuni_state = ssh("192.168.68.24", "cat ~/.hermes/gateway_state.json 2>/dev/null")
mumuni_data = {}
try:
mumuni_data = json.loads(mumuni_state) if mumuni_state else {}
except:
mumuni_data = {}
mumuni_platforms = mumuni_data.get("platforms", {})
report["agents"]["mumuni"] = {
"platform": "hermes", "ct": 114, "ip": "192.168.68.24",
"gateway_state": mumuni_data.get("gateway_state", "unknown"),
"telegram_state": mumuni_platforms.get("telegram", {}).get("state", "unknown"),
"zulip_state": mumuni_platforms.get("zulip", {}).get("state", "not_installed"),
"email_state": mumuni_platforms.get("email", {}).get("state", "unknown"),
"hermes_version": "",
}
# Get Hermes version
ver = ssh("192.168.68.24", "hermes --version 2>/dev/null | head -1")
if ver:
report["agents"]["mumuni"]["hermes_version"] = ver.split("·")[0].replace("Hermes Agent ","").strip()
return report
# ── HTML Dashboard ──
def classify_endpoint(code):
"""Classify an endpoint probe per the fleet's probe policy.
Codified 2026-09-14 in the monitoring contracts: ANY HTTP status proves the
service answered, so the service is ALIVE - 200/301/302/401/403/404 alike.
Only a failed CONNECTION (000 / timeout / refused) is a failed probe. A 404
from a wrong path is not a service fault and must not render as one.
This replaces a string comparison that was wrong in both directions
(`ep["code"] >= "400"`): it rendered 301 as red, 404 as yellow, and a real
500 as yellow. 5xx is kept as its own "server error" signal rather than
being merged with 4xx.
"""
if not code or code == "000":
return "red", "no connection"
if code.startswith("5"):
return "yellow", "server error"
if code.startswith(("2", "3", "4")):
return "green", "alive"
return "yellow", f"unexpected {code}"
def build_html(r):
issues = []
@@ -496,7 +424,7 @@ th {{ color: #8b949e; font-weight: normal; }}
<div class="alert {'good' if not issues else 'bad' if any('🔴' in i for i in issues) else 'warn'}">
<p style="margin:0;font-size:16px"><b>{status}</b></p>
<p style="margin:4px 0 0 0;font-size:13px">
Proxmox: {r.get('pve_probe_status', 'ok')} ({r['nodes_online']}/{r['node_count']}) · {r['total_vms']} VMs/CTs · {r['running_vms']} running ·
{r['node_count']} PVE nodes · {r['total_vms']} VMs/CTs · {r['running_vms']} running ·
{r['docker_vm']['total'] + r['docker_syslog']['total'] + r['docker_netbird']['total']} containers ·
{len(r['endpoints'])} endpoints · {len(r.get('agents',{}))} agents
</p>
@@ -512,10 +440,8 @@ Proxmox: {r.get('pve_probe_status', 'ok')} ({r['nodes_online']}/{r['node_count']
# ── Quick Stats ──
html += '<div class="card"><h2>📊 Quick Stats</h2><div class="grid">'
pve_status_label = "unreachable" if r.get('pve_probe_status') == 'unreachable' else f"{r['nodes_online']}/{r['node_count']}"
pve_status_color = "red" if r.get('pve_probe_status') == 'unreachable' or r['nodes_online'] != r['node_count'] else "green"
stats = [
("PVE Nodes", pve_status_label, pve_status_color),
("PVE Nodes", f"{r['nodes_online']}/{r['node_count']}", "green" if r['nodes_online'] == r['node_count'] else "red"),
("VMs/CTs", f"{r['running_vms']}/{r['total_vms']}", "green" if r['running_vms'] == r['total_vms'] else "red"),
("Containers", f"{r['docker_vm']['running']}/{r['docker_vm']['total']}", "green" if r['docker_vm']['running'] == r['docker_vm']['total'] else "yellow"),
("LiteLLM Ctrs", f"{r['docker_syslog']['running']}/{r['docker_syslog']['total']}", "green" if r['docker_syslog']['running'] == r['docker_syslog']['total'] else "red"),
@@ -617,7 +543,13 @@ Proxmox: {r.get('pve_probe_status', 'ok')} ({r['nodes_online']}/{r['node_count']
elif name == "tanko":
zulip_state = "✅" if agent.get("zulip_state") == "connected" else ("❌" if agent.get("zulip_state") == "disconnected" else "⬜")
gateway = agent.get("gateway_state", "?")
processed = "DSH"
processed = agent.get("updated_at", "")[:10]
elif name == "mumuni":
zulip_state = "⬜" if agent.get("zulip_state") == "not_installed" else ("✅" if agent.get("zulip_state") == "connected" else "⬜")
gateway = agent.get("gateway_state", "?")
tg = "✅" if agent.get("telegram_state") == "connected" else "❌"
ver = agent.get("hermes_version", "")
processed = f"TG:{tg} v{ver}"
else:
zulip_state = "⬜"
gateway = agent.get("gateway_state", "?")
@@ -646,7 +578,7 @@ Proxmox: {r.get('pve_probe_status', 'ok')} ({r['nodes_online']}/{r['node_count']
# ── Network Endpoints ──
html += '<div class="card"><h2>🌐 Network Endpoints</h2><table><tr><th>Service</th><th>Status</th></tr>'
for ep in r["endpoints"]:
color = classify_endpoint(ep["code"])[0]
color = "green" if ep["code"] in ("200","302","401") else ("yellow" if ep["code"] >= "400" else "red")
html += f'<tr><td>{ep["name"]}</td><td class="{color}">HTTP {ep["code"]}</td></tr>'
html += '</table></div>'
@@ -710,188 +642,60 @@ Proxmox: {r.get('pve_probe_status', 'ok')} ({r['nodes_online']}/{r['node_count']
return html
# ── Delivery: Zulip DM carrying the report as an HTML ATTACHMENT ──
#
# Captain's decision, clarified 2026-09-26: the report is sent as an HTML FILE,
# i.e. an attachment - NOT HTML rendered in the message body, and NOT a Markdown
# translation of it. So the styled dashboard is built exactly as before, uploaded
# through Zulip's file-upload API, and the message body stays short: subject,
# top-line status, and a pointer to the attachment.
#
# This removes the Google dependency entirely (no SMTP, no EMAIL_PASSWORD).
# The 10,000-character message cap does not apply: it bounds message TEXT only,
# and the report travels as a file.
# ── Send Email ──
ZULIP_SITE = "https://chat.sysloggh.net"
ZULIP_BOT_EMAIL = "abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net"
CAPTAIN_USER_ID = 9
ZULIP_KEY_FILE = "/root/.pi/agent/extensions/zulip/.env"
REPORT_ARTIFACT_DIR = "/var/log/daily-infra-report"
def zulip_key():
"""abiba-bot's Zulip key, from the env or the on-host 600 file."""
key = os.environ.get("ABIBA_ZULIP_API_KEY")
if key:
return key.strip()
def send_email(html_content, subject_prefix=""):
FROM = "abiba@sysloggh.com"
TO = "jerome@sysloggh.com"
SUBJECT = f"{subject_prefix}{'🏗️ Infrastructure Report — ' + DATE_STR}"
msg = MIMEMultipart("alternative")
msg["From"] = FROM
msg["To"] = TO
msg["Subject"] = SUBJECT
msg.attach(MIMEText("Infrastructure report in HTML format — enable images to view.", "plain"))
msg.attach(MIMEText(html_content, "html"))
try:
with open(ZULIP_KEY_FILE) as fh:
for line in fh:
if line.startswith("ABIBA_ZULIP_API_KEY="):
return line.split("=", 1)[1].strip()
except OSError:
return None
return None
def build_summary(r, filename, test=False):
"""Short Markdown body: subject, top-line status, pointer to the attachment.
Deliberately NOT a reproduction of the report - the attachment is the report.
"""
nodes = f"{r.get('nodes_online', 0)}/{r.get('node_count', 0)} nodes online"
guests = f"{r.get('running_vms', 0)}/{r.get('total_vms', 0)} guests running"
lines = [
("\U0001F9EA **TEST — **" if test else "") + "\U0001F3D7\uFE0F **Infrastructure Report — " + DATE_STR + "**",
f"**{nodes}** \u00b7 **{guests}** \u00b7 generated {TIME_STR}",
]
problems = []
if r.get("pve_probe_status") != "ok":
problems.append(f"\u274c Proxmox probe: {r.get('pve_probe_status')}")
if r.get("resources_probe_status") != "ok":
problems.append(f"\u274c Resources probe: {r.get('resources_probe_status')}")
lit = r.get("litellm", {}) or {}
checks = lit.get("checks", []) or []
if checks:
passed = sum(1 for c in checks if c.get("status") == "pass")
if passed != len(checks):
problems.append(f"\u274c LiteLLM: {passed}/{len(checks)} checks pass")
if not (r.get("zulip_ext", {}) or {}).get("connected"):
problems.append("\u274c Zulip extension: not connected")
for leg in DEGRADED_LEGS:
problems.append(f"\u26a0\uFE0F degraded: {leg}")
lines.append("\n".join(problems) if problems else "\u2705 All monitored services healthy")
lines.append(f"\U0001F4CE **Full report attached:** `{filename}`")
return "\n\n".join(lines)
def _curl(args, timeout=60):
r = subprocess.run(["curl", "-s", "-m", str(timeout)] + args,
capture_output=True, text=True)
try:
return json.loads(r.stdout or "{}"), r.stdout
except json.JSONDecodeError:
return {}, r.stdout
def _curl_json(args, timeout=90):
r = subprocess.run(["curl", "-s", "-m", str(timeout)] + args,
capture_output=True, text=True)
try:
return json.loads(r.stdout or "{}"), r.stdout
except json.JSONDecodeError:
return {}, r.stdout
def send_zulip(html_content, report, test=False):
"""Upload the styled HTML and post a short pointer to the captain's DM.
Returns (ok, message). On ANY failure the report body is also printed to
stdout and persisted to disk, so a delivery failure can never swallow the
content - the defect this folds in.
"""
os.makedirs(REPORT_ARTIFACT_DIR, exist_ok=True)
stamp = NOW.strftime("%Y%m%d-%H%M%S")
filename = f"infra-report-{stamp}.html"
html_path = os.path.join(REPORT_ARTIFACT_DIR, filename)
try:
with open(html_path, "w") as fh:
fh.write(html_content)
except OSError as e:
print(f" \u26a0\uFE0F could not persist report artifact: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
key = zulip_key()
if not key:
print(html_content) # never swallow the content
return False, ("\u274c Delivery FAILED: no Zulip credential "
"(ABIBA_ZULIP_API_KEY unset and "
f"{ZULIP_KEY_FILE} unreadable). Report persisted to {html_path}")
auth = ["-u", f"{ZULIP_BOT_EMAIL}:{key}"]
# 1. Upload the report as a file.
up, up_raw = _curl_json(auth + [
"-X", "POST", f"{ZULIP_SITE}/api/v1/user_uploads",
"-F", f"file=@{html_path};type=text/html",
])
if up.get("result") != "success" or not up.get("uri"):
print(html_content)
return False, (f"\u274c Delivery FAILED at upload: {up.get('msg') or up_raw[:160]} "
f"(report persisted to {html_path})")
uri = up["uri"]
size = os.path.getsize(html_path)
# 2. Post a short message pointing at it.
body = build_summary(report, filename, test=test)
link = f"[{filename}]({uri})"
body = body.replace(f"`{filename}`", link)
payload, raw = _curl_json(auth + [
"-X", "POST", f"{ZULIP_SITE}/api/v1/messages",
"-d", "type=private",
"-d", f"to=[{CAPTAIN_USER_ID}]",
"--data-urlencode", f"content={body}",
])
if payload.get("result") == "success":
return True, (f"\u2705 Delivered to Zulip DM (user {CAPTAIN_USER_ID}), "
f"message id {payload.get('id')}, attachment {size} bytes at {uri}")
print(html_content)
return False, (f"\u274c Delivery FAILED at message post: {payload.get('msg') or raw[:160]} "
f"(uploaded {uri}; report persisted to {html_path})")
EMAIL_PASSWORD = "rgbuomwcydxwbszd"
GMAIL_EMAIL = "jtabiri@gmail.com"
server = smtplib.SMTP("smtp.gmail.com", 587)
server.starttls()
server.login(GMAIL_EMAIL, EMAIL_PASSWORD)
server.sendmail(FROM, [TO], msg.as_string())
server.quit()
return True, "✅ Email sent to jerome@sysloggh.com"
except Exception as e:
return False, f"❌ Email failed: {e}"
# ── Main ──
if __name__ == "__main__":
is_test = ("--test-email" in sys.argv) or ("--test-zulip" in sys.argv)
is_test = "--test-email" in sys.argv
print(f"{'🧪 TEST MODE' if is_test else '📊'} Collecting infrastructure data...")
report = collect()
if "--json" in sys.argv:
print(json.dumps(report, indent=2, default=str))
if PROBE_FAILURES:
for leg in PROBE_FAILURES:
print(f"PROBE FAILURE: {leg}", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
sys.exit(0)
print(" Building dashboard...")
html = build_html(report)
print(f" report ready: {len(html)} chars of HTML (delivered as a file attachment)")
if is_test:
print(" Sending TEST message to the captain's Zulip DM...")
prefix = "🧪 TEST — "
print(" Sending test email...")
else:
print(" Sending to the captain's Zulip DM...")
ok, msg = send_zulip(html, report, test=is_test)
prefix = ""
print(" Sending email...")
ok, msg = send_email(html, subject_prefix=prefix)
print(f" {msg}")
# Show summary
if DEGRADED_LEGS:
print(f"\n⚠️ Degraded legs ({len(DEGRADED_LEGS)}):")
for leg in DEGRADED_LEGS:
print(f" - {leg}")
else:
print("\n✅ All legs fully credentialed")
# A failed send must exit non-zero; a degraded leg (no credential) must stay exit 0
if not ok:
sys.exit(1)
issues = sum(1 for i in ["red"] if report.get("zulip_ext", {}).get("connected") == False)
print(f"\n📋 Summary:")
print(f" Proxmox: {report['nodes_online']}/{report['node_count']} nodes online")
@@ -899,12 +703,6 @@ if __name__ == "__main__":
print(f" Zulip Ext: {'✅' if report.get('zulip_ext',{}).get('connected') else '❌'}")
print(f" LiteLLM: {sum(1 for c in report.get('litellm',{}).get('checks',[]) if c['status']=='pass')}/{len(report.get('litellm',{}).get('checks',[]))} checks pass")
agent_parts = []
for k,v in report.get('agents',{}).items():
agent_parts.append(f"{k}:{v.get('gateway_state',v.get('pm2_status','?'))}")
print(f" Agents: {', '.join(agent_parts)}")
if PROBE_FAILURES:
print(f"\n❌ Probe failures ({len(PROBE_FAILURES)}):")
for leg in PROBE_FAILURES:
print(f" - {leg}")
sys.exit(1)
for k,v in report.get('agents',{}).items():
agent_parts.append(f"{k}:{v.get('gateway_state',v.get('pm2_status','?'))}")
print(f" Agents: {', '.join(agent_parts)}")
-206
View File
@@ -1,206 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""disk-gc-plan — turn a fleet disk scan into the GC action plan.
This is the executable side of `disk-gc-threat-response.prose.md`. It exists so the
report-only gate is enforced by code that can be tested, rather than by prose the
executor might misread.
THE HARD GATE: guests listed in the contract's `report_only_guests` block are
DETECT-AND-REPORT-ONLY at EVERY level (AMBER, RED, CRITICAL). This tool will never
emit a `gc-executor` action for one, so no GC command can be constructed for it.
The gate is keyed on GUEST identity — guest id, hostname, or IP — never on an agent
name. An agent-name marker can silently miss the guest it lives on; a guest marker
cannot.
The authoritative exclusion list lives in the contract itself (the fenced ```yaml
block containing `report_only_guests:`). This tool reads it from there so there is
only ever one copy.
Usage:
disk-gc-plan.py --scan scan.json # [{"id":111,"usage_pct":84}, ...]
cat scan.json | disk-gc-plan.py # same, via stdin
disk-gc-plan.py --scan scan.json --json # machine-readable plan
Scan entries may carry any of: id / guest / vmid / ct / ctid, hostname / name, ip.
A threshold-crossing entry with no recognizable identity is reported, never GC'd.
Exit codes: 0 ok, 1 usage/parse error.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import json
import pathlib
import re
import sys
import yaml
REPO = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
DEFAULT_CONTRACT = REPO / "disk-gc-threat-response.prose.md"
AMBER, RED, CRITICAL = 75, 85, 95
IDENTITY_FIELDS = ("id", "guest", "vmid", "ct", "ctid", "hostname", "name", "ip")
IDENTITY_TYPE_PREFIX = re.compile(r"^(?:lxc|qemu)/")
UNIDENTIFIED_REASON = "unidentified target - refusing to schedule GC"
def load_report_only_guests(contract_path: pathlib.Path) -> list[dict]:
"""Read the authoritative report_only_guests block out of the contract.
The contract carries it as a fenced ```yaml block. Parsing the declared,
machine-readable block is the intended interface — the contract owns the list.
"""
text = contract_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
for block in re.findall(r"```yaml\n(.*?)```", text, re.S):
if "report_only_guests:" in block:
data = yaml.safe_load(block)
guests = data.get("report_only_guests") or []
if not isinstance(guests, list):
raise SystemExit("report_only_guests must be a list")
if not guests:
raise SystemExit(
"report_only_guests is empty or missing - refusing to plan GC "
"without the report-only gate"
)
for guest in guests:
if not isinstance(guest, dict) or not _keys(guest):
raise SystemExit(
"report_only_guests entry has no recognizable identity key "
f"(expected one of: {', '.join(IDENTITY_FIELDS)}): {guest!r}"
)
return guests
raise SystemExit(
f"no authoritative report_only_guests block found in {contract_path}"
)
def _canonical_number(number: float) -> str:
if float(number).is_integer():
return str(int(number))
return str(number).strip().lower()
def _normalize_identity(value: object) -> str:
"""Canonicalise a guest identity so differently-encoded ids compare equal:
numeric and numeric-string ids collapse to an integer string, Proxmox
type prefixes and leading zeros are stripped, and hostnames/IPs are only
trimmed and lowercased."""
if isinstance(value, bool):
return str(value).strip().lower()
if isinstance(value, (int, float)):
return _canonical_number(float(value))
text = str(value).strip().lower()
text = IDENTITY_TYPE_PREFIX.sub("", text)
try:
return _canonical_number(float(text))
except ValueError:
return text
def _keys(entry: dict) -> set[str]:
"""Guest/host identity keys, shared by exclusions and scan entries so the two
sides of the gate can never key on different fields."""
out: set[str] = set()
for field in IDENTITY_FIELDS:
value = entry.get(field)
if value is None:
continue
key = _normalize_identity(value)
if key:
out.add(key)
return out
def level_for(pct: float) -> str | None:
if pct >= CRITICAL:
return "CRITICAL"
if pct >= RED:
return "RED"
if pct >= AMBER:
return "AMBER"
return None
def build_plan(scan: list[dict], report_only: list[dict]) -> list[dict]:
excluded = [(e, _keys(e)) for e in report_only]
plan: list[dict] = []
for entry in scan:
pct = entry.get("usage_pct")
if pct is None:
continue
level = level_for(float(pct))
if level is None:
continue # GREEN: log only, no action
scan_keys = _keys(entry)
target = next(
(entry.get(k) for k in IDENTITY_FIELDS if entry.get(k) not in (None, "")),
"?",
)
if not scan_keys:
plan.append({
"target": target,
"level": level,
"pct": float(pct),
"action": "report-only",
"reason": UNIDENTIFIED_REASON,
})
continue
match = next((e for e, keys in excluded if keys & scan_keys), None)
if match is not None:
plan.append({
"target": target,
"level": level,
"pct": float(pct),
"action": "report-only",
"reason": match.get("reason", "").strip(),
})
else:
plan.append({
"target": target,
"level": level,
"pct": float(pct),
"action": "gc-executor",
})
plan.sort(key=lambda row: row["pct"], reverse=True)
return plan
def main() -> int:
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Plan disk GC actions with the report-only gate.")
ap.add_argument("--scan", help="JSON file: list of {id|ct|hostname|ip, usage_pct}")
ap.add_argument("--contract", default=str(DEFAULT_CONTRACT))
ap.add_argument("--json", action="store_true", help="emit the plan as JSON")
args = ap.parse_args()
raw = pathlib.Path(args.scan).read_text() if args.scan else sys.stdin.read()
try:
scan = json.loads(raw)
except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
print(f"invalid scan JSON: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
return 1
if not isinstance(scan, list):
print("scan must be a JSON list", file=sys.stderr)
return 1
report_only = load_report_only_guests(pathlib.Path(args.contract))
plan = build_plan(scan, report_only)
if args.json:
print(json.dumps(plan, indent=2))
return 0
if not plan:
print("no threats (nothing at or above 75%)")
return 0
for row in plan:
if row["action"] == "report-only":
print(f" {row['target']} {row['level']} {row['pct']}% -> REPORT-ONLY (no GC) — {row['reason']}")
else:
print(f" {row['target']} {row['level']} {row['pct']}% -> gc-executor")
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())
-569
View File
@@ -1,569 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""disk-gc-scan — deterministic disk usage probe for fleet guests.
This is the executable scanner side of `disk-gc-threat-response.prose.md`. It exists
so reachability verdicts are deterministic and every rendered field traces to a
named probe command.
DESIGN PRINCIPLES (per task disk-gc-probe-false-unreachable-20260913):
1. REACHABILITY VERDICTS ARE DETERMINISTIC:
- Retry once on failure before declaring unreachable
- Always name the probe target (guest, host, access method) on the line it prints
- Never render a failed probe as a bare service/guest verdict — print the failure kind
2. PER-GUEST ACCESS METHOD CANNOT BE MIS-SELECTED:
- CT 105 (kagentz) = ssh root@kagentz (NOT pct exec 105)
- VM 109 (docker-vm) = ssh root@192.168.68.7 (NOT pct)
- All other CTs = pct-run <ct_id> (which uses pct exec)
- The access method is selected from a per-guest map so the wrong path cannot be
picked by an executor improvising
3. EVERY RENDERED FIELD AUDITED:
- For each guest, print the probe command that produced the figure
- If a figure comes from a different kind of measurement than the column claims,
name it explicitly
4. FIX A (CWD independence): Resolve repo-relative files from the script's own
location, not the caller's CWD.
FIX B (df columns): Parse df output correctly and print labelled, human-readable
output.
Usage:
disk-gc-scan.py # scan all guests
disk-gc-scan.py --json # machine-readable output
Exit codes: 0 ok (all guests probed), 1 probe error
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import pathlib
import subprocess
import sys
import time
import os
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import Optional
# Resolve repo-relative files from the script's own location, not the caller's CWD
SCRIPT_DIR = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent
HELPER_PCT_RUN = SCRIPT_DIR / "pct-run.sh"
# Per-guest access method map. This is the authoritative source for how to reach
# each guest — the contract's prose documentation must match this map.
#
# Access methods:
# - "pct-run": use pct-run.sh <ct_id> (pct exec via SSH to node)
# - "ssh-host": use ssh root@<hostname>
# - "ssh-ip": use ssh root@<ip>
@dataclass
class Guest:
"""A guest to probe."""
ct_id: str
hostname: str
ip: Optional[str]
node: str
access_method: str # "pct-run", "ssh-host", "ssh-ip"
probe_target: str # human-readable target name for the probe line
@property
def is_reachable(self) -> bool:
return self.probe_result is not None and self.probe_result.exit_code == 0
@property
def usage_pct(self) -> Optional[float]:
return self.probe_result.usage_pct if self.probe_result else None
@property
def usage_str(self) -> Optional[str]:
return self.probe_result.usage_str if self.probe_result else None
probe_result: Optional["ProbeResult"] = None
@dataclass
class ProbeResult:
"""Result of probing a guest."""
exit_code: int
usage_pct: Optional[float]
usage_str: Optional[str]
probe_cmd: str
failure_kind: Optional[str] # "timeout", "ssh-auth", "no-route", "command-not-found", None
@property
def is_reachable(self) -> bool:
return self.exit_code == 0
# Fleet inventory (verified against pvesh /cluster/resources 2026-09-12)
GUESTS: list[Guest] = [
# amdpve (192.168.68.15)
Guest(ct_id="105", hostname="kagentz", ip="192.168.68.105", node="amdpve",
access_method="ssh-host", probe_target="kagentz (CT 105, amdpve)"),
Guest(ct_id="113", hostname="baggy", ip="192.168.68.113", node="amdpve",
access_method="pct-run", probe_target="baggy (CT 113, amdpve)"),
Guest(ct_id="115", hostname="scottdenya", ip="192.168.68.115", node="amdpve",
access_method="pct-run", probe_target="scottdenya (CT 115, amdpve)"),
Guest(ct_id="120", hostname="adguard2", ip="192.168.68.120", node="amdpve",
access_method="pct-run", probe_target="adguard2 (CT 120, amdpve)"),
# minipve (192.168.68.12)
Guest(ct_id="112", hostname="tanko", ip="192.168.68.112", node="minipve",
access_method="pct-run", probe_target="tanko (CT 112, minipve)"),
Guest(ct_id="100", hostname="abiba", ip="192.168.68.100", node="minipve",
access_method="pct-run", probe_target="abiba (CT 100, minipve)"),
Guest(ct_id="102", hostname="adguard", ip="192.168.68.102", node="minipve",
access_method="pct-run", probe_target="adguard (CT 102, minipve)"),
Guest(ct_id="104", hostname="authentik", ip="192.168.68.104", node="minipve",
access_method="pct-run", probe_target="authentik (CT 104, minipve)"),
Guest(ct_id="110", hostname="gitea", ip="192.168.68.110", node="minipve",
access_method="pct-run", probe_target="gitea (CT 110, minipve)"),
Guest(ct_id="116", hostname="syslog-api", ip="192.168.68.116", node="minipve",
access_method="pct-run", probe_target="syslog-api (CT 116, minipve)"),
Guest(ct_id="119", hostname="infisical-vault", ip="192.168.68.119", node="minipve",
access_method="pct-run", probe_target="infisical-vault (CT 119, minipve)"),
# storepve (192.168.68.6)
Guest(ct_id="106", hostname="ra-h-os", ip="192.168.68.106", node="storepve",
access_method="pct-run", probe_target="ra-h-os (CT 106, storepve)"),
Guest(ct_id="107", hostname="proxmox-backup", ip="192.168.68.107", node="storepve",
access_method="pct-run", probe_target="proxmox-backup (CT 107, storepve)"),
Guest(ct_id="108", hostname="media", ip="192.168.68.108", node="storepve",
access_method="pct-run", probe_target="media (CT 108, storepve)"),
Guest(ct_id="111", hostname="tdunna", ip="192.168.68.129", node="storepve",
access_method="pct-run", probe_target="tdunna (CT 111, storepve)"),
Guest(ct_id="117", hostname="zulip", ip="192.168.68.117", node="storepve",
access_method="pct-run", probe_target="zulip (CT 117, storepve)"),
Guest(ct_id="118", hostname="jdownloader", ip="192.168.68.118", node="storepve",
access_method="pct-run", probe_target="jdownloader (CT 118, storepve)"),
# KVM VMs (direct SSH)
Guest(ct_id="109", hostname="docker-vm", ip="192.168.68.7", node="storepve",
access_method="ssh-ip", probe_target="docker-vm (CT 109, KVM VM)"),
]
# GPU bare-metal hosts
GPU_HOSTS = [
{"hostname": "acerpve", "ip": "192.168.68.9", "gpu": "RTX 3090",
"probe_target": "RTX 3090 (bare metal .9)"},
{"hostname": "ocupve", "ip": "192.168.68.110", "gpu": "RTX 5070",
"probe_target": "RTX 5070 (bare metal .110)"},
{"hostname": "amdpve", "ip": "192.168.68.15", "gpu": "Strix Halo",
"probe_target": "Strix Halo (bare metal .15)"},
]
CONNECT_TIMEOUT = 5
SSH_OPTS = "-o BatchMode=yes -o ConnectTimeout=" + str(CONNECT_TIMEOUT)
# Host filesystem thresholds (from contract)
HOST_THRESHOLDS = {
"WARN": 85,
"AMBER": 90,
"RED": 95,
}
# State file path (absolute, so execution context doesn't matter)
STATE_FILE = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "state" / "host-disk-bands.json"
# PVE nodes to probe for host filesystems
HOST_NODES = [
{"hostname": "acerpve", "ip": "192.168.68.9"},
{"hostname": "amdpve", "ip": "192.168.68.15"},
{"hostname": "storepve", "ip": "192.168.68.6"},
{"hostname": "minipve", "ip": "192.168.68.12"},
{"hostname": "ocupve", "ip": "192.168.68.5"},
]
def run_cmd(cmd: str, timeout: int = 30) -> tuple[int, str, str]:
"""Run a command and return (exit_code, stdout, stderr)."""
try:
result = subprocess.run(
cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout
)
return result.returncode, result.stdout.strip(), result.stderr.strip()
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
return 124, "", "timeout"
except Exception as e:
return 1, "", str(e)
def probe_guest(guest: Guest) -> ProbeResult:
"""Probe a single guest and return the result.
Access method is selected from guest.access_method:
- "pct-run": pct-run.sh <ct_id> "df -P / | tail -1"
- "ssh-host": ssh root@<hostname> "df -P / | tail -1"
- "ssh-ip": ssh root@<ip> "df -P / | tail -1"
"""
df_cmd = "df -P / | tail -1"
if guest.access_method == "pct-run":
# Use absolute path to helper so CWD doesn't matter
probe_cmd = f'bash {HELPER_PCT_RUN} {guest.ct_id} "{df_cmd}"'
elif guest.access_method == "ssh-host":
probe_cmd = f'ssh {SSH_OPTS} root@{guest.hostname} "{df_cmd}"'
elif guest.access_method == "ssh-ip":
probe_cmd = f'ssh {SSH_OPTS} root@{guest.ip} "{df_cmd}"'
else:
raise ValueError(f"unknown access_method: {guest.access_method}")
# Check helper exists and is readable BEFORE probing (for pct-run guests)
# This prevents scanner errors from being rendered as guest verdicts
if guest.access_method == "pct-run":
if not HELPER_PCT_RUN.exists():
print(f"SCANNER ERROR: helper not found: {HELPER_PCT_RUN}", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
if not os.access(str(HELPER_PCT_RUN), os.R_OK):
print(f"SCANNER ERROR: helper not readable: {HELPER_PCT_RUN}", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
# Retry once on failure before declaring unreachable
for attempt in range(2):
exit_code, stdout, stderr = run_cmd(probe_cmd, timeout=15)
if exit_code == 0:
# Parse df output: Filesystem 1024-blocks Used Available Capacity Mounted on
# parts[0]=Filesystem, parts[1]=Total (1K blocks), parts[2]=Used, parts[3]=Available, parts[4]=Capacity
parts = stdout.split()
if len(parts) >= 5:
capacity_str = parts[4] # e.g., "34%"
usage_pct = float(capacity_str.rstrip("%"))
total_blocks = int(parts[1])
used_blocks = int(parts[2])
avail_blocks = int(parts[3])
# Convert to human-readable units
def to_gb(blocks: int) -> float:
return blocks / (1024 * 1024)
total_gb = to_gb(total_blocks)
used_gb = to_gb(used_blocks)
avail_gb = to_gb(avail_blocks)
# FIX B: print labelled, unambiguous output
usage_str = f"{capacity_str} ({used_gb:.1f}G used of {total_gb:.1f}G total, {avail_gb:.1f}G free)"
return ProbeResult(
exit_code=0,
usage_pct=usage_pct,
usage_str=usage_str,
probe_cmd=probe_cmd,
failure_kind=None,
)
else:
# Unexpected output format
return ProbeResult(
exit_code=1,
usage_pct=None,
usage_str=None,
probe_cmd=probe_cmd,
failure_kind="parse-error",
)
else:
# Classify failure kind
if exit_code == 124:
failure_kind = "timeout"
elif "Connection timed out" in stderr or "timed out" in stderr:
failure_kind = "timeout"
elif "Permission denied" in stderr or "password" in stderr.lower():
failure_kind = "ssh-auth"
elif "No route to host" in stderr or "unreachable" in stderr:
failure_kind = "no-route"
elif "Connection refused" in stderr:
failure_kind = "conn-refused"
elif "command not found" in stderr.lower() or "No such file" in stderr:
failure_kind = "command-not-found"
else:
failure_kind = f"ssh-exit-{exit_code}"
# Retry once
if attempt == 0:
time.sleep(1)
continue
return ProbeResult(
exit_code=exit_code,
usage_pct=None,
usage_str=None,
probe_cmd=probe_cmd,
failure_kind=failure_kind,
)
# Should not reach here, but just in case
return ProbeResult(
exit_code=1,
usage_pct=None,
usage_str=None,
probe_cmd=probe_cmd,
failure_kind="unknown",
)
def scan_fleet() -> list[dict]:
"""Scan all guests and return the results."""
results = []
for guest in GUESTS:
probe_result = probe_guest(guest)
guest.probe_result = probe_result
row = {
"target": guest.probe_target,
"ct_id": guest.ct_id,
"hostname": guest.hostname,
"node": guest.node,
"access_method": guest.access_method,
"reachable": probe_result.is_reachable,
"usage_pct": probe_result.usage_pct,
"usage_str": probe_result.usage_str,
"probe_cmd": probe_result.probe_cmd,
"failure_kind": probe_result.failure_kind,
}
results.append(row)
return results
def classify_band(usage_pct: float) -> str:
"""Classify a percentage into a band."""
if usage_pct >= HOST_THRESHOLDS["RED"]:
return "HOST-RED"
elif usage_pct >= HOST_THRESHOLDS["AMBER"]:
return "HOST-AMBER"
elif usage_pct >= HOST_THRESHOLDS["WARN"]:
return "HOST-WARN"
else:
return "GREEN"
def probe_host_filesystems() -> tuple[list[dict], dict[str, str]]:
"""Probe host filesystems on all PVE nodes.
Returns:
- List of host filesystem results
- Dict of volume_key -> current_band (for state file)
"""
results = []
current_bands = {}
for node in HOST_NODES:
ip = node["ip"]
hostname = node["hostname"]
# Probe df for host filesystems
probe_cmd = f'ssh {SSH_OPTS} root@{ip} "df -hP / /media/* tank 2>/dev/null | tail -n +2"'
exit_code, stdout, stderr = run_cmd(probe_cmd, timeout=15)
if exit_code != 0:
results.append({
"target": f"{hostname} ({ip})",
"hostname": hostname,
"ip": ip,
"reachable": False,
"volumes": [],
"probe_cmd": probe_cmd,
"failure_kind": "ssh-error",
})
continue
# Parse df output and classify each volume
volumes = []
for line in stdout.splitlines():
parts = line.split()
if len(parts) < 6:
continue
dev, size, used, avail, pct_str, mount = parts[:6]
pct = float(pct_str.rstrip("%"))
band = classify_band(pct)
# Volume type classification
if mount.startswith("/media/"):
vol_type = "media"
elif mount == "/" or "pve" in dev:
vol_type = "host-root"
elif mount == "tank" or "tank" in mount:
vol_type = "pbs-datastore"
else:
vol_type = "other"
# Volume key for state file (host/volume)
volume_key = f"{hostname}/{mount}"
current_bands[volume_key] = band
volumes.append({
"mount": mount,
"device": dev,
"size": size,
"used": used,
"avail": avail,
"pct": pct,
"band": band,
"type": vol_type,
})
results.append({
"target": f"{hostname} ({ip})",
"hostname": hostname,
"ip": ip,
"reachable": True,
"volumes": volumes,
"probe_cmd": probe_cmd,
"failure_kind": None,
})
return results, current_bands
def read_state_file() -> Optional[dict[str, str]]:
"""Read the state file if it exists."""
if not STATE_FILE.exists():
return None
try:
with open(STATE_FILE) as f:
return json.load(f)
except (json.JSONDecodeError, IOError) as e:
print(f"⚠️ State file exists but unreadable: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
return {}
def write_state_file(bands: dict[str, str]) -> None:
"""Write the state file."""
STATE_FILE.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
try:
with open(STATE_FILE, "w") as f:
json.dump(bands, f, indent=2)
except IOError as e:
print(f"⚠️ State file write failed: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
def detect_transitions(current_bands: dict[str, str], prior_bands: Optional[dict[str, str]]) -> list[dict]:
"""Detect band transitions (current vs. prior)."""
if prior_bands is None:
# First run — no transitions, just establish baseline
return []
transitions = []
# Check for volumes that moved to a higher band (escalation)
for volume, current_band in current_bands.items():
prior_band = prior_bands.get(volume, "GREEN")
# Band ordering: GREEN < HOST-WARN < HOST-AMBER < HOST-RED
band_order = {"GREEN": 0, "HOST-WARN": 1, "HOST-AMBER": 2, "HOST-RED": 3}
if band_order[current_band] > band_order[prior_band]:
transitions.append({
"type": "escalation",
"volume": volume,
"from": prior_band,
"to": current_band,
})
elif band_order[current_band] < band_order[prior_band]:
transitions.append({
"type": "recovery",
"volume": volume,
"from": prior_band,
"to": current_band,
})
return transitions
def render_results(results: list[dict]) -> str:
"""Render scan results in human-readable format."""
lines = []
lines.append("=== Disk GC Scan ===")
lines.append("")
for row in results:
if row["reachable"]:
lines.append(f" ✅ {row['target']}: {row['usage_str']}")
lines.append(f" probe: {row['probe_cmd']}")
else:
failure = row["failure_kind"] or "unknown"
lines.append(f" ❌ {row['target']}: UNREACHABLE ({failure})")
lines.append(f" probe: {row['probe_cmd']}")
return "\n".join(lines)
def render_host_results(results: list[dict], transitions: list[dict], prior_bands: Optional[dict[str, str]]) -> str:
"""Render host filesystem results in human-readable format."""
lines = []
lines.append("")
lines.append("=== Host Filesystem Bands ===")
lines.append("")
# Render transitions first (they're the actionable alerts)
if prior_bands is None:
lines.append(" (first run — recording baseline, no alerts)")
elif not transitions:
lines.append(" (no band changes since last scan)")
else:
for t in transitions:
volume, from_band, to_band = t["volume"], t["from"], t["to"]
if t["type"] == "escalation":
lines.append(f" ⚠️ {volume}: {from_band} → {to_band} (ESCALATION)")
else:
lines.append(f" ✅ {volume}: {from_band} → {to_band} (RECOVERY)")
# Render all volumes with their bands
lines.append("")
for node_result in results:
if not node_result["reachable"]:
lines.append(f" ❌ {node_result['target']}: UNREACHABLE ({node_result['failure_kind']})")
continue
lines.append(f" {node_result['target']}:")
for vol in node_result["volumes"]:
lines.append(f" {vol['mount']} ({vol['type']}): {vol['pct']}% ({vol['used']}/{vol['size']}, {vol['avail']} free) -> {vol['band']}")
return "\n".join(lines)
def main() -> int:
import argparse
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Deterministic disk usage probe for fleet guests and host filesystems.")
ap.add_argument("--json", action="store_true", help="machine-readable output")
ap.add_argument("--hosts-only", action="store_true", help="scan host filesystems only")
ap.add_argument("--guests-only", action="store_true", help="scan guests only (skip host filesystems)")
args = ap.parse_args()
# Scan guests (unless --hosts-only)
guest_results = []
if not args.hosts_only:
guest_results = scan_fleet()
# Scan host filesystems (unless --guests-only)
host_results = []
current_bands = {}
if not args.guests_only:
host_results, current_bands = probe_host_filesystems()
# Read prior state and detect transitions
prior_bands = read_state_file()
transitions = detect_transitions(current_bands, prior_bands)
# Write new state
write_state_file(current_bands)
else:
prior_bands = None
transitions = []
if args.json:
# JSON output
output = {
"guests": guest_results,
"hosts": host_results,
"transitions": transitions,
"prior_bands": prior_bands,
}
print(json.dumps(output, indent=2))
else:
# Human-readable output
if guest_results:
print(render_results(guest_results))
if host_results:
print(render_host_results(host_results, transitions, prior_bands))
# Exit 0 if all probed (reachable or not), 1 if any probe error
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())
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@@ -1,227 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Health-log freshness watchdog (dead-man's-switch).
Absence of logs raises no alarm. On 2026-09-26 the `gpu/` directory of
SyslogSolution/health-logs went silent for 12 days unnoticed, because the only
thing that would have noticed was the job that had stopped. This check lives on
a DIFFERENT host (CT 100) from the producers, so a producer host that is dead,
or a schedule that was deleted, still raises an alarm.
It asks the Gitea API for the newest commit touching each watched directory and
fails when that commit is older than the directory's threshold.
Usage:
health-log-freshness.py # check every watched directory
health-log-freshness.py --json # machine-readable output
Exit: 0 = all fresh, 1 = at least one stale or unreachable, 2 = check could not run.
Environment:
GITEA_URL default https://git.sysloggh.net
GITEA_TOKEN API token (falls back to GITEA_PAT, then to the token
embedded in ~/.git-credentials for that host)
HEALTH_LOG_MAX_AGE_H override thresholds, e.g. HEALTH_LOG_MAX_AGE_GPU=12
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
import json
import os
import re
import sys
import urllib.error
import urllib.request
from datetime import datetime, timezone
REPO = "SyslogSolution/health-logs"
GITEA_URL = os.environ.get("GITEA_URL", "https://git.sysloggh.net").rstrip("/")
# dir -> (threshold_hours, why)
# Thresholds are sized for the producer cadence plus one missed run:
# gpu/ runs every 6h -> 12h tolerates one miss, catches a second
# litellm/ runs every 6h -> 18h (it is proven healthy; a looser bound avoids
# noise while still catching a real stop)
WATCHED: dict[str, tuple[float, str]] = {
"gpu": (12.0, "gpu-self-heal.py, CT116 cron 2 */6 * * *"),
"litellm": (18.0, "litellm-health-check.sh, CT116 cron 0 */6 * * *"),
}
def _threshold(directory: str, default: float) -> float:
"""Allow HEALTH_LOG_MAX_AGE_<DIR> to override a threshold.
Documented override; used both operationally (tighten a bound while
investigating) and in tests (force a stale verdict deterministically).
"""
raw = os.environ.get(f"HEALTH_LOG_MAX_AGE_{directory.upper()}")
if raw is None:
return default
try:
return float(raw)
except ValueError:
print(f"WARN: ignoring non-numeric HEALTH_LOG_MAX_AGE_{directory.upper()}={raw!r}")
return default
# pm2/ is deliberately NOT watched: pm2-self-heal.prose.md claimed a health-logs
# posting that its executor never implemented, and the claim was retired on
# 2026-09-26 in favour of the contract-runner's per-run logs. The directory is
# left as historical evidence, not as a live obligation.
def _auth_candidates() -> list[str]:
"""Authorization header values to try, in order.
Gitea accepts either an API token (``token <tok>``) or HTTP basic auth, and
the value held under ``GITEA_TOKEN`` is not reliably an API token - on this
host it is the git account's *password*, which sent as a token returns HTTP
401. So return every candidate and let the caller use the first that works,
rather than guessing and failing.
"""
candidates: list[str] = []
for var in ("GITEA_TOKEN", "GITEA_PAT"):
if os.environ.get(var):
candidates.append(f"token {os.environ[var]}")
candidates.append(
"Basic "
+ base64.b64encode(
f"{_git_user()}:{os.environ[var]}".encode()
).decode()
)
# ~/.git-credentials may hold this Gitea under several hostnames (the public
# name and the internal IP both appear in this fleet), so accept any of them
# rather than filtering on the configured host - that filter produced zero
# candidates whenever GITEA_URL pointed at the internal address.
try:
with open(os.path.expanduser("~/.git-credentials")) as fh:
for line in fh:
m = re.match(r"https://([^:]+):([^@]+)@", line.strip())
if m:
raw = f"{m.group(1)}:{m.group(2)}".encode()
candidates.append("Basic " + base64.b64encode(raw).decode())
except OSError:
pass
seen, out = set(), []
for c in candidates:
if c not in seen:
seen.add(c)
out.append(c)
return out
def _git_user() -> str:
return os.environ.get("GITEA_USER", "abiba-bot")
def newest_commit_iso(directory: str, auth: list[str] | None) -> tuple[str | None, str]:
"""Return (iso_timestamp, detail) for the newest commit touching `directory`."""
url = (
f"{GITEA_URL}/api/v1/repos/{REPO}/commits"
f"?path={directory}&limit=1&stat=false"
)
req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={"Accept": "application/json"})
headers = list(auth or [])
last = "no credential"
for i, hdr in enumerate(headers or [None]):
r = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={"Accept": "application/json"})
if hdr:
r.add_header("Authorization", hdr)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(r, timeout=20) as resp:
data = json.loads(resp.read().decode("utf-8", "replace"))
break
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
last = f"HTTP {exc.code}"
if exc.code not in (401, 403):
return None, last
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
return None, repr(exc)
else:
return None, last
if not data:
return None, "no commits"
commit = data[0].get("commit", {})
when = (
(commit.get("committer") or {}).get("date")
or (commit.get("author") or {}).get("date")
)
msg = (commit.get("message") or "").splitlines()[0][:60]
return when, msg
def main() -> int:
as_json = "--json" in sys.argv
auth = _auth_candidates()
now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
failures: list[str] = []
report: dict[str, dict] = {}
if not auth:
print("FAIL: no Gitea credential available (GITEA_TOKEN/GITEA_PAT/~/.git-credentials)")
return 2
for directory, (default_age_h, why) in WATCHED.items():
max_age_h = _threshold(directory, default_age_h)
when, detail = newest_commit_iso(directory, auth)
entry: dict = {"directory": directory, "producer": why, "max_age_h": max_age_h}
if when is None:
entry.update(ok=False, reason=f"could not read newest commit: {detail}")
failures.append(
f"health-logs/{directory}/ could not be read ({detail}) — "
f"a directory that cannot be read is indistinguishable from one that stopped"
)
else:
try:
ts = datetime.fromisoformat(when.replace("Z", "+00:00"))
except ValueError:
entry.update(ok=False, reason=f"unparseable timestamp {when!r}")
failures.append(f"health-logs/{directory}/ timestamp unparseable: {when!r}")
report[directory] = entry
continue
age_h = (now - ts).total_seconds() / 3600.0
stale = age_h > max_age_h
entry.update(
ok=not stale,
newest=when,
age_h=round(age_h, 2),
newest_commit=detail,
)
if stale:
entry["reason"] = f"stale: {age_h:.1f}h > {max_age_h}h"
failures.append(
f"health-logs/{directory}/ is STALE: newest entry {when} "
f"({age_h:.1f}h old, limit {max_age_h}h) from {why}"
)
report[directory] = entry
if as_json:
print(json.dumps({"checked": report, "failures": failures}, indent=2))
return 1 if failures else 0
print("Health-log freshness — dead-man's-switch")
print("=" * 66)
for directory, entry in report.items():
mark = "✅" if entry.get("ok") else "❌"
if entry.get("newest"):
print(
f"{mark} health-logs/{directory}/ newest {entry['newest']} "
f"({entry['age_h']}h old, limit {entry['max_age_h']}h)"
)
print(f" last commit: {entry.get('newest_commit')}")
else:
print(f"{mark} health-logs/{directory}/ {entry.get('reason')}")
print(f" producer: {entry['producer']}")
print("=" * 66)
if failures:
print("VERDICT: FAIL")
for f in failures:
print(f" - {f}")
return 1
print("VERDICT: PASS — every watched health-log directory is advancing")
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())
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@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/bash
# Shared helper for Hermes contract reachability checks
# Separates SSH exit status from remote command result
hermes_check_host() {
local host=$1
local pattern=$2
local path=$3
# Remote side always succeeds (grep ...; true), so ssh exit code = connection status only
local out
out=$(ssh -o BatchMode=yes -o ConnectTimeout=3 root@"$host" "grep -RIn '$pattern' '$path' 2>/dev/null; true" 2>/dev/null)
local status=$?
if [ $status -ne 0 ]; then
echo "$host: UNREACHABLE (ssh exit $status)"
elif [ -n "$out" ]; then
echo "$host: VIOLATION: $out"
else
echo "$host: COMPLIANT (no matches found)"
fi
}
# Standalone mode: scripts/hermes-reachability-check.sh <host> <pattern> <path>
if [ "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}" = "${0}" ]; then
if [ $# -ne 3 ]; then
echo "Usage: $0 <host> <pattern> <path>" >&2
exit 2
fi
hermes_check_host "$1" "$2" "$3"
exit 0
fi
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@@ -1,234 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/bash
# infrastructure-monitoring.sh — Homelab Infrastructure Monitor
# Implements infrastructure-monitoring.prose.md (check-health section)
#
# Legs: Grafana, Prometheus, LiteLLM, PVE API (5 nodes), GPU exporters,
# Docker Stats, PVE Exporter
#
# Design:
# - Every target, port, path, and expected status is defined in code
# - Liveness rule: any HTTP status = ALIVE for auth-gated/redirect endpoints;
# only connection failures (000/timeout) = probe-failed
# - Bare-200 rule: expected status must match exactly (200); anything else = alert
# - PVE API uses -k flag (self-signed certs), probes /api2/json/version
# - Docker Stats and PVE Exporter bind to 127.0.0.1 on CT 116, probed via SSH
# with one retry at longer timeout (25s connect, 30s max) to distinguish
# transient timeout from host-down
# - Non-zero exit naming every failed target; no "OK" summary when any leg failed
#
# Output shape per leg:
# ✅ <name>: alive
# 🔴 <name>: probe-failed: <host>:<port> (expected <pattern>) (<kind>)
#
# Failure kinds: timeout | refused | tls | unexpected:<code> (printed in the failure line)
set -uo pipefail
# ── Configuration (documented in infrastructure-monitoring.prose.md) ────────
# Change these in ONE place; test_infra_monitoring.sh asserts against these.
GRAFANA_HOST="192.168.68.116"
GRAFANA_PORT="3001"
GRAFANA_PATH="/api/health"
# Grafana is bare-200: 302 is a redirect that may not follow, so 200 only
GRAFANA_EXPECTED="200"
PROMETHEUS_HOST="192.168.68.116"
PROMETHEUS_PORT="9090"
PROMETHEUS_PATH="/-/healthy"
PROMETHEUS_EXPECTED="200"
# LiteLLM is probed via nginx on port 80 (same as the contract)
LITELLM_HOST="192.168.68.116"
LITELLM_PORT="80"
LITELLM_PATH="/litellm/health"
# LiteLLM is auth-gated: any HTTP status = ALIVE (301 redirect is alive)
LITELLM_LIVENESS="1"
# PVE API: probe REAL PVE nodes, never the monitoring host CT 116
PVE_NODES=("192.168.68.9" "192.168.68.12" "192.168.68.6" "192.168.68.15" "192.168.68.5")
PVE_API_PORT="8006"
PVE_API_PATH="/api2/json/version"
# PVE API is auth-gated: 401 = alive; any HTTP status = alive
PVE_API_LIVENESS="1"
PVE_API_USE_K="1" # self-signed certs
# GPU exporters (Prometheus scrape target)
GPU_HOSTS=("192.168.68.8" "192.168.68.110" "192.168.68.15")
GPU_PORT="9400"
GPU_PATH="/metrics"
GPU_EXPECTED="200"
# Docker Stats and PVE Exporter bind to 127.0.0.1 on CT 116
DOCKER_STATS_PORT="9324" # harness-docker-stats (docker_container_* metrics)
PVE_EXPORTER_PORT="9221" # harness-pve-exporter (5 pve_* metrics)
CT116_SSH_HOST="192.168.68.116"
# Both are bare-200: 404 = container not yet started
DOCKER_STATS_EXPECTED="200|404"
PVE_EXPORTER_EXPECTED="200|404"
# ── Probe Functions ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# probe_http <host> <port> <path> <expected_pattern> [use_k] [ssh_host] [scheme] [liveness]
# Returns 0 if probe succeeds (matches expected or liveness), 1 if probe-failed.
# Prints the result line.
#
# FIX C1: The kind value is computed and printed in the failure line.
# FIX C2: SSH retry logic is in the first attempt branch (not unreachable).
LAST_KIND=""
probe_http() {
local host="$1" port="$2" path="$3" expected="$4"
local use_k="${5:-}" ssh_host="${6:-}" scheme="${7:-http}" liveness="${8:-0}"
local url="${scheme}://${host}:${port}${path}"
local code="" kind=""
LAST_KIND=""
# Single invocation that captures both output and status
if [ -n "$ssh_host" ]; then
out=$(ssh -o ConnectTimeout=5 -o BatchMode=yes "root@${ssh_host}" \
"curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 15 ${use_k:+-k} ${url}" 2>/dev/null)
rc=$?
else
out=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 15 ${use_k:+-k} "$url" 2>/dev/null)
rc=$?
fi
code=$(printf '%s' "$out" | tr -d '[:space:]')
# Classify failure kind and retry if needed
if [ -z "$code" ] || [ "$code" = "000" ]; then
# Distinguish timeout from TLS error from refused
case "$rc" in
35|51|58|59|60|77|83) kind="tls" ;;
*) kind="timeout" ;;
esac
# Retry once at longer timeout (25s connect, 30s max)
if [ -n "$ssh_host" ]; then
code=$(ssh -o ConnectTimeout=5 -o BatchMode=yes "root@${ssh_host}" \
"curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 25 --max-time 30 ${use_k:+-k} ${url}" 2>/dev/null)
rc=$?
code=$(printf '%s' "$code" | tr -d '[:space:]')
else
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 25 --max-time 30 ${use_k:+-k} "$url" 2>/dev/null)
rc=$?
code=$(printf '%s' "$code" | tr -d '[:space:]')
# On retry, classify: still 000 = keep existing kind (or timeout if empty), unexpected status = refused
if [ -z "$code" ] || [ "$code" = "000" ]; then
[ -z "$kind" ] && kind="timeout"
elif ! echo "$code" | grep -qE "^(${expected})$"; then
kind="refused"
fi
fi
fi
# Check result
if [ -n "$code" ] && [ "$code" != "000" ]; then
if [ "$liveness" = "1" ]; then
# Any HTTP status = ALIVE for auth-gated/redirect endpoints
return 0
else
# Bare-200 or specific expected pattern
if echo "$code" | grep -qE "^(${expected})$"; then
return 0
else
kind="unexpected:$code"
LAST_KIND="$kind"
return 1
fi
fi
else
[ -z "$kind" ] && kind="refused"
LAST_KIND="$kind"
return 1
fi
}
# ── Main ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
FAILED=()
FAILED_KIND=()
TIMESTAMP=$(date -u '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M UTC')
echo "=== Infrastructure Monitoring — $TIMESTAMP ==="
echo "Executed from: $(pwd -P)"
echo ""
# 1. Grafana (CT 116 :3001 /api/health) — bare-200
if probe_http "$GRAFANA_HOST" "$GRAFANA_PORT" "$GRAFANA_PATH" "$GRAFANA_EXPECTED"; then
echo " ✅ Grafana: alive"
else
echo " 🔴 Grafana: probe-failed: ${GRAFANA_HOST}:${GRAFANA_PORT} (expected ${GRAFANA_EXPECTED}) (<${LAST_KIND}>)"
FAILED+=("grafana")
fi
# 2. Prometheus (CT 116 :9090 /-/healthy) — bare-200
if probe_http "$PROMETHEUS_HOST" "$PROMETHEUS_PORT" "$PROMETHEUS_PATH" "$PROMETHEUS_EXPECTED"; then
echo " ✅ Prometheus: alive"
else
echo " 🔴 Prometheus: probe-failed: ${PROMETHEUS_HOST}:${PROMETHEUS_PORT} (expected ${PROMETHEUS_EXPECTED}) (<${LAST_KIND}>)"
FAILED+=("prometheus")
fi
# 3. LiteLLM (CT 116 :80/litellm/health via nginx) — liveness (any HTTP = alive)
if probe_http "$LITELLM_HOST" "$LITELLM_PORT" "$LITELLM_PATH" "" "" "" "http" "$LITELLM_LIVENESS"; then
echo " ✅ LiteLLM: alive"
else
echo " 🔴 LiteLLM: probe-failed: ${LITELLM_HOST}:${LITELLM_PORT}${LITELLM_PATH} (any-HTTP liveness) (<${LAST_KIND}>)"
FAILED+=("litellm")
fi
# 4. PVE API (5 real nodes :8006 /api2/json/version, -k, liveness)
PVE_FAILED=()
for node in "${PVE_NODES[@]}"; do
if probe_http "$node" "$PVE_API_PORT" "$PVE_API_PATH" "" "$PVE_API_USE_K" "" "https" "$PVE_API_LIVENESS"; then
echo " ✅ PVE API ${node}: alive"
else
echo " 🔴 PVE API ${node}: probe-failed: ${node}:${PVE_API_PORT} (any-HTTP liveness, -k for self-signed) (<${LAST_KIND}>)"
PVE_FAILED+=("$node")
fi
done
if [ ${#PVE_FAILED[@]} -gt 0 ]; then
FAILED+=("pve-api: ${PVE_FAILED[*]}")
fi
# 5. GPU exporters (:9400/metrics) — bare-200
GPU_FAILED=()
for host in "${GPU_HOSTS[@]}"; do
if probe_http "$host" "$GPU_PORT" "$GPU_PATH" "$GPU_EXPECTED"; then
echo " ✅ GPU exporter ${host}: alive"
else
echo " 🔴 GPU exporter ${host}: probe-failed: ${host}:${GPU_PORT} (expected 200) (<${LAST_KIND}>)"
GPU_FAILED+=("$host")
fi
done
if [ ${#GPU_FAILED[@]} -gt 0 ]; then
FAILED+=("gpu-exporters: ${GPU_FAILED[*]}")
fi
# 6. Docker Stats (CT 116 :9324, 127.0.0.1 via SSH) — 200|404
if probe_http "127.0.0.1" "$DOCKER_STATS_PORT" "/" "$DOCKER_STATS_EXPECTED" "" "$CT116_SSH_HOST"; then
echo " ✅ Docker Stats: alive"
else
echo " 🔴 Docker Stats: probe-failed: CT116:127.0.0.1:${DOCKER_STATS_PORT} (expected 200|404) (<${LAST_KIND}>)"
FAILED+=("docker-stats")
fi
# 7. PVE Exporter (CT 116 :9221, 127.0.0.1 via SSH) — 200|404
if probe_http "127.0.0.1" "$PVE_EXPORTER_PORT" "/" "$PVE_EXPORTER_EXPECTED" "" "$CT116_SSH_HOST"; then
echo " ✅ PVE Exporter: alive"
else
echo " 🔴 PVE Exporter: probe-failed: CT116:127.0.0.1:${PVE_EXPORTER_PORT} (expected 200|404) (<${LAST_KIND}>)"
FAILED+=("pve-exporter")
fi
# ── Summary ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
echo ""
if [ ${#FAILED[@]} -eq 0 ]; then
echo " ✅ All legs OK"
exit 0
else
for f in "${FAILED[@]}"; do
echo " 🔴 FAILED: $f"
done
exit 1
fi
-358
View File
@@ -1,358 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
LiteLLM Health Check - Contract executor
Runs all checks defined in litellm-health.prose.md and reports results.
"""
import subprocess
import sys
import json
import time
import random
# Configuration
BACKEND_HOST = "192.168.68.116"
GPU_HOSTS = {
"gpu-dense": "192.168.68.8",
"gpu-vision": "192.168.68.110",
"strix-moe": "192.168.68.15"
}
def run_command(cmd, timeout=15):
"""Run a command and return (exit_code, stdout, stderr)"""
try:
result = subprocess.run(
cmd,
shell=True,
capture_output=True,
text=True,
timeout=timeout
)
return result.returncode, result.stdout.strip(), result.stderr.strip()
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
return 1, "", "TIMEOUT"
except Exception as e:
return 1, "", str(e)
def probe_http(url, method="GET", bearer_token=None, data=None, timeout=10, follow_redirects=False):
"""Probe HTTP endpoint and return (status_code, failure_kind)
Returns:
(code, None) if successful or HTTP response received
(000, kind) if connection failed, where kind is 'timeout', 'refused', 'dns', etc.
"""
cmd = "curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -m " + str(timeout)
if method == "POST":
cmd += " -X POST"
if bearer_token:
cmd += " -H 'Authorization: Bearer " + bearer_token + "'"
if data:
cmd += " -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '" + data + "'"
if follow_redirects:
cmd += " -L"
cmd += " '" + url + "'"
try:
rc, stdout, stderr = run_command(cmd, timeout)
if rc != 0:
# Check if this is a timeout from run_command (rc=1, stderr="TIMEOUT")
if rc == 1 and stderr == "TIMEOUT":
return (000, "timeout after " + str(timeout) + "s")
# Otherwise, determine failure kind from curl exit code
# curl exit codes: 28=timeout, 7=refused, 6=dns, 35=ssl, 52=empty
elif rc == 28:
return (000, "timeout after " + str(timeout) + "s")
elif rc == 7:
return (000, "connection refused")
elif rc == 6:
return (000, "dns failure")
elif rc == 35:
return (000, "ssl error")
elif rc == 52:
return (000, "empty response")
else:
return (000, "curl exit " + str(rc))
return (int(stdout), None) if stdout.isdigit() else (000, "unparseable response")
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
return (000, "timeout after " + str(timeout) + "s")
def check_host_health(host_ip):
"""Check if the GPU host's llama-chat-api health endpoint is reachable
Returns: (healthy: bool, detail: str)
"""
code, _ = probe_http("http://" + host_ip + ":8080/health", timeout=10)
if code == 200:
return True, "host healthy (200)"
elif code == 000:
return False, "host unreachable (timeout or refused)"
else:
return False, "host unhealthy (HTTP " + str(code) + ")"
def get_response_body(url, method="POST", bearer_token=None, data=None, timeout=30):
"""Get response body for 401/403 credential faults (truncated to 200 chars)"""
cmd = "curl -s -m " + str(timeout)
if method == "POST":
cmd += " -X POST"
if bearer_token:
cmd += " -H 'Authorization: Bearer " + bearer_token + "'"
if data:
cmd += " -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '" + data + "'"
cmd += " '" + url + "'"
rc, stdout, stderr = run_command(cmd, timeout)
# Return first 200 chars, single line
body = stdout.replace('\n', ' ').replace('\t', ' ')[:200] if stdout else ""
return body
def check_liveliness():
"""Step 1: Liveliness probe"""
code, _ = probe_http("http://" + BACKEND_HOST + "/litellm/health/liveliness")
return "Liveliness", code == 200, str(code) + " (target: " + BACKEND_HOST + "/litellm/health/liveliness)"
def check_containers():
"""Step 2: Container health via SSH"""
cmd = "ssh -o BatchMode=yes -o ConnectTimeout=5 -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no root@192.168.68.116 'docker ps --format \"{{.Names}} {{.Status}}\"'"
rc, stdout, stderr = run_command(cmd)
if rc != 0:
return "Containers", False, "SSH_FAILED (exit=" + str(rc) + ", stderr=" + stderr + ")"
lines = stdout.split('\n') if stdout else []
container_count = len([l for l in lines if l.strip()])
healthy = container_count >= 8
return "Containers", healthy, str(container_count) + " containers"
def check_model_probes():
"""Step 6: Model probe - all 4 aliases"""
# Get monitor key
monitor_key = run_command("ssh -o BatchMode=yes root@192.168.68.116 \"grep LITELLM_MONITOR_KEY /etc/litellm-monitor.env | cut -d= -f2\"")[1]
results = []
# Host health mapping: model -> host IP
model_hosts = {
"gpu-dense": "192.168.68.8", # RTX 3090
"gpu-vision": "192.168.68.110", # RTX 5070
"strix-moe": "192.168.68.15" # Strix Halo
}
for model in ["gpu-dense", "gpu-vision", "strix-moe"]:
host_ip = model_hosts[model]
# Single-host aliases: 30s initial timeout, retry once at 90s on failure
# Worst-case prefill ~76s, so 90s retry ensures we cover it
code, failure_kind = probe_http("http://" + BACKEND_HOST + "/litellm/v1/chat/completions",
method="POST",
bearer_token=monitor_key,
data='{"model":"' + model + '","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"health ' + str(random.randint(1000, 9999)) + '"}],"max_tokens":4}',
timeout=30)
first_kind = None
if code == 000 and failure_kind:
first_kind = failure_kind
time.sleep(1)
code, failure_kind = probe_http("http://" + BACKEND_HOST + "/litellm/v1/chat/completions",
method="POST",
bearer_token=monitor_key,
data='{"model":"' + model + '","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"health ' + str(random.randint(1000, 9999)) + '"}],"max_tokens":4}',
timeout=90)
if code == 000 and failure_kind:
# Both attempts failed - check host health to distinguish busy from down
host_healthy, host_detail = check_host_health(host_ip)
if host_healthy:
results.append((model, False, "busy (completion timed out after retry; " + host_detail + ")"))
else:
# Host unreachable - report both kinds
if first_kind:
results.append((model, False, "probe-failed: " + model + " " + first_kind + " then " + failure_kind + " (2 attempts)"))
else:
results.append((model, False, "probe-failed: " + model + " " + failure_kind))
elif code == 200:
results.append((model, True, str(code) + " (target: " + BACKEND_HOST + "/litellm/v1/chat/completions, model=" + model + ")"))
elif code in (401, 403):
body = get_response_body("http://" + BACKEND_HOST + "/litellm/v1/chat/completions",
method="POST",
bearer_token=monitor_key,
data='{"model":"' + model + '","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"health"}],"max_tokens":4}',
timeout=10)
alias = "monitor-20260813"
results.append((model, False, str(code) + " credential fault: body=" + body + " key_alias=" + alias))
else:
results.append((model, False, str(code) + " (target: " + BACKEND_HOST + "/litellm/v1/chat/completions, model=" + model + ")"))
# Pool alias (syslog-auto): 60s timeout, retry once on 000
code, failure_kind = probe_http("http://" + BACKEND_HOST + "/litellm/v1/chat/completions",
method="POST",
bearer_token=monitor_key,
data='{"model":"syslog-auto","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"health ' + str(random.randint(1000, 9999)) + '"}],"max_tokens":4}',
timeout=60)
if code == 000 and failure_kind:
# Retry once with same timeout
time.sleep(1)
code, failure_kind = probe_http("http://" + BACKEND_HOST + "/litellm/v1/chat/completions",
method="POST",
bearer_token=monitor_key,
data='{"model":"syslog-auto","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"health ' + str(random.randint(1000, 9999)) + '"}],"max_tokens":4}',
timeout=60)
if code == 000 and failure_kind:
results.append(("syslog-auto", False, "probe-failed: syslog-auto " + failure_kind + " (60s timeout, retry)"))
elif code in (401, 403):
body = get_response_body("http://" + BACKEND_HOST + "/litellm/v1/chat/completions",
method="POST",
bearer_token=monitor_key,
data='{"model":"syslog-auto","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"health"}],"max_tokens":4}',
timeout=10)
alias = "monitor-20260813"
results.append(("syslog-auto", False, str(code) + " credential fault: body=" + body + " key_alias=" + alias))
else:
results.append(("syslog-auto", code == 200, str(code) + " (target: " + BACKEND_HOST + "/litellm/v1/chat/completions, model=syslog-auto)"))
else:
results.append(("syslog-auto", code == 200, str(code) + " (target: " + BACKEND_HOST + "/litellm/v1/chat/completions, model=syslog-auto)"))
return results
def check_admin_key_list():
"""Step 8: Admin API key list - use two-step approach"""
# Step 1: Get master key
mk_cmd = "ssh -o BatchMode=yes root@192.168.68.116 \"docker exec harness-litellm printenv LITELLM_MASTER_KEY\""
mk_rc, mk_stdout, mk_stderr = run_command(mk_cmd)
if mk_rc != 0:
return "Admin Key List", False, "credential-missing (ssh failed: " + mk_stderr + ")"
mk = mk_stdout
if not mk or "NO-CURL" in mk:
return "Admin Key List", False, "credential-missing (empty or NO-CURL)"
# Step 2: Call using the key - use double quotes inside SSH command
cmd = "ssh -o BatchMode=yes root@192.168.68.116 \"curl -s -H \\\"Authorization: Bearer " + mk + "\\\" http://127.0.0.1:4000/key/list\""
rc, stdout, stderr = run_command(cmd)
if rc != 0:
return "Admin Key List", False, "admin-call-failed (exit=" + str(rc) + ", stderr=" + stderr + ")"
# Try to parse the response
try:
data = json.loads(stdout)
# Response is a dict with "keys" (paginated list) and "total_count" fields
if isinstance(data, dict) and "keys" in data:
key_count = data.get("total_count", len(data["keys"]))
elif isinstance(data, list):
key_count = len(data)
else:
key_count = 0
if key_count == 0:
return "Admin Key List", False, "admin-call-failed (empty response)"
return "Admin Key List", True, str(key_count) + " total (" + str(len(data.get("keys", []) if isinstance(data, dict) else data)) + " on page 1)" if isinstance(data, dict) else str(key_count) + " total"
except Exception as e:
return "Admin Key List", False, "admin-call-failed (unparseable: " + str(e) + ")"
def check_github_status():
"""Step 3: GitHub status - 301 redirect is acceptable for status page"""
code, _ = probe_http("https://status.github.com/api/status.json", timeout=15)
# GitHub status API returns 301 redirect, which is expected behavior
return "GitHub Status", code == 301, str(code)
def check_prometheus():
"""Step 4: Prometheus health"""
code, _ = probe_http("http://" + BACKEND_HOST + ":9090/-/healthy")
return "Prometheus", code == 200, str(code) + " (target: " + BACKEND_HOST + ":9090/-/healthy)"
def check_grafana():
"""Step 9: Grafana health"""
code, _ = probe_http("http://" + BACKEND_HOST + ":3001/api/health")
return "Grafana", code == 200, str(code) + " (target: " + BACKEND_HOST + ":3001/api/health)"
def check_docker_stats():
"""Step 10: Docker Stats health - fetch from CT 116 host"""
# Docker stats is on localhost from CT 116
cmd = "ssh -o BatchMode=yes root@192.168.68.116 'curl -s http://127.0.0.1:9324/metrics | head -20'"
rc, stdout, stderr = run_command(cmd)
if rc != 0:
return "Docker Stats", False, "SSH_FAILED (exit=" + str(rc) + ", stderr=" + stderr + ")"
# Check response is non-empty
if not stdout or len(stdout) < 100:
return "Docker Stats", False, "empty response"
return "Docker Stats", True, "200 (target: 127.0.0.1:9324/metrics from CT 116)"
def main():
print("🏥 LiteLLM Health Check v1.0.0")
print("📍 Backend edge: http://" + BACKEND_HOST)
print("")
all_pass = True
degraded = [] # Track degraded (busy) checks
# Run all checks
checks = [
check_liveliness(),
check_containers(),
check_prometheus(),
check_grafana(),
]
for result in checks:
name, passed, detail = result
status = "✅" if passed else "❌"
print(" " + status + " " + name + ": " + detail)
if not passed:
all_pass = False
# Model probes
model_results = check_model_probes()
for name, passed, detail in model_results:
# Check if this is a busy (degraded) verdict
if not passed and detail.startswith("busy "):
status = "⚠️"
degraded.append(name)
else:
status = "✅" if passed else "❌"
print(" " + status + " " + name + ": " + detail)
# Only set all_pass=False for real failures (not busy)
if not passed and not detail.startswith("busy "):
all_pass = False
# Admin key list
admin_result = check_admin_key_list()
status = "✅" if admin_result[1] else "❌"
print(" " + status + " Admin Key List: " + admin_result[2])
if not admin_result[1]:
all_pass = False
# GitHub status
github_result = check_github_status()
status = "✅" if github_result[1] else "❌"
print(" " + status + " " + github_result[0] + ": " + github_result[2])
if not github_result[1]:
all_pass = False
# Docker stats
docker_stats_result = check_docker_stats()
status = "✅" if docker_stats_result[1] else "❌"
print(" " + status + " " + docker_stats_result[0] + ": " + docker_stats_result[2])
if not docker_stats_result[1]:
all_pass = False
print("")
if all_pass:
if degraded:
print("✅ All checks passed (" + str(len(degraded)) + " degraded: " + ", ".join(degraded) + ")")
else:
print("✅ All checks passed")
return 0
else:
if degraded:
print("❌ Some checks failed (" + str(len(degraded)) + " degraded: " + ", ".join(degraded) + ")")
else:
print("❌ Some checks failed")
return 1
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())
+11 -9
View File
@@ -11,32 +11,33 @@ set -euo pipefail
# ── CT ID → PVE Node mapping (maintained HERE, not in prose contracts) ──
declare -A CT_NODES=(
# amdpve (192.168.68.15)
[105]=amdpve # kagentz (was hwepve — corrected 2026-09-12; live per pvesh)
[111]=amdpve # tdunna
[112]=amdpve # tanko
[113]=amdpve # baggy
[115]=amdpve # scottdenya
[120]=amdpve # adguard2 (added 2026-09-12)
# minipve (192.168.68.12)
[100]=minipve # abiba (was hwepve)
[102]=minipve # adguard (was acerpve)
[104]=minipve # authentik
[110]=minipve # gitea
[112]=minipve # tanko (was amdpve — migrated 2026-09-27; live per pvesh)
[116]=minipve # syslog-api
[119]=minipve # infisical-vault
# storepve (192.168.68.6)
[106]=storepve # ra-h-os
[107]=storepve # proxmox-backup
[108]=storepve # media
[111]=storepve # tdunna (was amdpve — corrected 2026-09-12; live per pvesh)
[117]=storepve # zulip
[118]=storepve # jdownloader
# acerpve (192.168.68.9) — no CTs (bare metal GPU .8)
# hwepve (192.168.68.4)
[100]=hwepve # abiba (was amdpve)
[105]=hwepve # kagentz (was amdpve)
[114]=hwepve # mumuni (was minipve)
# ocupve (192.168.68.5) — no CTs (bare metal GPU .110)
#
# REMOVED CTs (migrated to bare metal, decommissioned, or VMs):
# 101 llm-gpu → bare metal 192.168.68.8 (RTX 3090) [QEMU VM on acerpve]
# 103 ocu-llm → bare metal 192.168.68.110 (RTX 5070) [QEMU VM on ocupve]
# 109 docker-vm → KVM VM 192.168.68.7 (use direct SSH) [QEMU VM on storepve]
# 101 llm-gpu → bare metal 192.168.68.8 (RTX 3090)
# 103 ocu-llm → bare metal 192.168.68.110 (RTX 5070)
# 109 docker-vm → KVM VM 192.168.68.7 (use direct SSH)
)
# Each node must be root-accessible via SSH hostname
@@ -49,6 +50,7 @@ declare -A NODE_IPS=(
[storepve]=192.168.68.6
[acerpve]=192.168.68.9
[ocupve]=192.168.68.5
[hwepve]=192.168.68.4
)
resolve_node() {
@@ -75,7 +77,7 @@ main() {
if [[ $# -lt 1 ]]; then
echo "Usage: pct-run <CT_ID> [command...]" >&2
echo " pct-run 112 cat /etc/hostname" >&2
echo " pct-run 100 systemctl status hermes-gateway" >&2
echo " pct-run 114 systemctl status hermes-gateway" >&2
echo ""
echo "Known CTs:" >&2
for ct in $(echo "${!CT_NODES[@]}" | tr ' ' '\n' | sort -n); do
+5 -70
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,10 @@
#!/bin/bash
# pm2-self-heal — hourly PM2 process check
# Part of the pm2-self-heal prose contract
# Alerts via Telegram (primary) and Zulip DM (secondary, abiba-zulip restored 2026-08-03)
# Alerts via Telegram (abiba-zulip decommissioned 2026-07-04)
# Field positions (awk -F'│'): $7=pid $8=uptime $9=restarts $10=status
TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN="$(grep TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN /root/.pi/agent/extensions/telegram/.env 2>/dev/null | cut -d= -f2 || echo '')"
LOG="/root/pm2-self-heal.log"
TELEGRAM_CHAT_ID="5822977936"
notify_tg() {
@@ -17,6 +16,8 @@ notify_tg() {
-d "text=${msg}" \
-d "parse_mode=HTML" > /dev/null 2>&1 || true
}
ALERTS="${ALERTS}$msg"
}
# Log-only mode: replaced by prose contract pm2-self-heal.prose.md
# Only alerts Telegram on actual failure (status != online)
@@ -32,7 +33,7 @@ TEL_LINE=$(echo "$STATUS" | grep "abiba-telegram")
TEL_STATUS=$(echo "$TEL_LINE" | awk -F'│' '{print $10}' | xargs)
TEL_RESTARTS=$(echo "$TEL_LINE" | awk -F'│' '{print $9}' | xargs)
if [ "$TEL_STATUS" != "online" ] || [ "$TEL_RESTARTS" -gt 1000 ]; then
if [ "$TEL_STATUS" != "online" ]; then
pm2 restart abiba-telegram > /dev/null 2>&1
sleep 3
TEL_LINE2=$(pm2 status --no-color 2>/dev/null | grep "abiba-telegram")
@@ -46,75 +47,9 @@ if [ "$TEL_STATUS" != "online" ] || [ "$TEL_RESTARTS" -gt 1000 ]; then
fi
fi
# Check abiba-zulip (live Zulip bridge, heartbeating)
ZULIP_LINE=$(echo "$STATUS" | grep "abiba-zulip")
ZULIP_STATUS=$(echo "$ZULIP_LINE" | awk -F'│' '{print $10}' | xargs)
ZULIP_RESTARTS=$(echo "$ZULIP_LINE" | awk -F'│' '{print $9}' | xargs)
if [ "$ZULIP_STATUS" != "online" ]; then
pm2 restart abiba-zulip > /dev/null 2>&1
sleep 3
ZULIP_LINE2=$(pm2 status --no-color 2>/dev/null | grep "abiba-zulip")
ZULIP_STATUS2=$(echo "$ZULIP_LINE2" | awk -F'│' '{print $10}' | xargs)
if [ "$ZULIP_STATUS2" = "online" ]; then
msg="⚠️ abiba-zulip was **$ZULIP_STATUS** → restarted to online"
ALERTS="${ALERTS}${msg}\n"
else
msg="🚨 abiba-zulip **failed restart** (was $ZULIP_STATUS, still $ZULIP_STATUS2)"
ALERTS="${ALERTS}${msg}\n"
fi
elif [ "$ZULIP_RESTARTS" -gt 5 ]; then
msg="⚠️ abiba-zulip has **$ZULIP_RESTARTS** restarts (high count)"
ALERTS="${ALERTS}${msg}\n"
fi
# Check gitea-runner
GITEA_LINE=$(echo "$STATUS" | grep "gitea-runner")
GITEA_STATUS=$(echo "$GITEA_LINE" | awk -F'│' '{print $10}' | xargs)
GITEA_RESTARTS=$(echo "$GITEA_LINE" | awk -F'│' '{print $9}' | xargs)
if [ "$GITEA_STATUS" != "online" ]; then
pm2 restart gitea-runner > /dev/null 2>&1
sleep 3
GITEA_LINE2=$(pm2 status --no-color 2>/dev/null | grep "gitea-runner")
GITEA_STATUS2=$(echo "$GITEA_LINE2" | awk -F'│' '{print $10}' | xargs)
if [ "$GITEA_STATUS2" = "online" ]; then
msg="⚠️ gitea-runner was **$GITEA_STATUS** → restarted to online"
ALERTS="${ALERTS}${msg}\n"
else
msg="🚨 gitea-runner **failed restart** (was $GITEA_STATUS, still $GITEA_STATUS2)"
ALERTS="${ALERTS}${msg}\n"
fi
elif [ "$GITEA_RESTARTS" -gt 5 ]; then
msg="⚠️ gitea-runner has **$GITEA_RESTARTS** restarts (high count)"
ALERTS="${ALERTS}${msg}\n"
fi
# Check zulip-watchdog
WATCHDOG_LINE=$(echo "$STATUS" | grep "zulip-watchdog")
WATCHDOG_STATUS=$(echo "$WATCHDOG_LINE" | awk -F'│' '{print $10}' | xargs)
WATCHDOG_RESTARTS=$(echo "$WATCHDOG_LINE" | awk -F'│' '{print $9}' | xargs)
if [ "$WATCHDOG_STATUS" != "online" ]; then
pm2 restart zulip-watchdog > /dev/null 2>&1
sleep 3
WATCHDOG_LINE2=$(pm2 status --no-color 2>/dev/null | grep "zulip-watchdog")
WATCHDOG_STATUS2=$(echo "$WATCHDOG_LINE2" | awk -F'│' '{print $10}' | xargs)
if [ "$WATCHDOG_STATUS2" = "online" ]; then
msg="⚠️ zulip-watchdog was **$WATCHDOG_STATUS** → restarted to online"
ALERTS="${ALERTS}${msg}\n"
else
msg="🚨 zulip-watchdog **failed restart** (was $WATCHDOG_STATUS, still $WATCHDOG_STATUS2)"
ALERTS="${ALERTS}${msg}\n"
fi
elif [ "$WATCHDOG_RESTARTS" -gt 5 ]; then
msg="⚠️ zulip-watchdog has **$WATCHDOG_RESTARTS** restarts (high count)"
ALERTS="${ALERTS}${msg}\n"
fi
# Log check
{
echo "[$(date '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')] tel=$TEL_STATUS zulip=$ZULIP_STATUS gitea=$GITEA_STATUS watchdog=$WATCHDOG_STATUS alerts=${ALERTS:+yes}"
echo "[$(date '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')] tel=$TEL_STATUS alerts=${ALERTS:+yes}"
[ -n "$ALERTS" ] && echo "$ALERTS"
} >> "$LOG"
+13 -16
View File
@@ -46,35 +46,32 @@ You are a code reviewer for OpenProse infrastructure contracts in the Syslog Sol
The infrastructure-control.prose.md contract is the canonical reference for the cluster topology:
**Proxmox Cluster "Tabiri" (5 nodes):**
- amdpve (192.168.68.15): kagentz, baggy, scottdenya, adguard2
- minipve (192.168.68.12): abiba, tanko, adguard, authentik, gitea, syslog-api, infisical-vault
- storepve (192.168.68.6): docker-vm, ra-h-os, PBS, media, jdownloader, zulip, tdunna
**Proxmox Cluster "Tabiri" (6 nodes):**
- amdpve (192.168.68.15): tanko, tdunna, baggy, scottdenya
- minipve (192.168.68.12): adguard, authentik, gitea, syslog-api, infisical-vault
- storepve (192.168.68.6): docker-vm, ra-h-os, PBS, media, jdownloader, zulip
- acerpve (192.168.68.9): llm-gpu
- ocupve (192.168.68.5): ocu-llm
- hwepve (192.168.68.4): abiba, kagentz, mumuni
**CT IDs (verified 2026-09-12 against PVE API):**
**CT IDs (verified 2026-07-24 against PVE API):**
100:abiba 102:adguard 104:authentik 105:kagentz 106:ra-h-os
107:pbs 108:media 110:gitea 111:tdunna 112:tanko
113:baggy 115:scottdenya 116:syslog-api 117:zulip
118:jdownloader 119:infisical-vault 120:adguard2
**CT 111 (tdunna, 192.168.68.129) is REPORT-ONLY — Theo's box; alert only, never garbage-collect.**
113:baggy 114:mumuni 115:scottdenya 116:syslog-api 117:zulip
118:jdownloader 119:infisical-vault
**NO CT 122, CT 123, or .19 exist in the cluster.**
**CRITICAL RULES (never regress):**
1. NO /grafana/ nginx route — it was tried and reverted on 2026-07-02. Grafana is direct LAN at :3001.
2. NO .19 IP — Zulip is CT 117 on storepve.
3. NO CT 122/123 — Tanko=CT 112, Mumuni=CT 100 (inside Abiba). No CT 114 anywhere.
3. NO CT 122/123 — Tanko=CT 112, Mumuni=CT 114.
4. Strix Halo :8080 is FIREWALLED to .116 only — cannot be probed from abiba (.24).
5. abiba-zulip PM2 process is ONLINE (verified 2026-09-11) — this rule was stale.
5. abiba-zulip PM2 process is DECOMMISSIONED (2026-07-04) — abiba uses Telegram only.
**Docker on CT 116 (11 containers, verified 2026-09-11):**
harness-litellm, harness-nginx, harness-postgres, harness-redis,
harness-dashboard, harness-grafana, harness-prometheus, harness-alertmanager,
harness-zulip-bridge, harness-docker-stats, harness-pve-exporter
(harness-router was decommissioned 2026-09-11)
**Docker on CT 116 (8 containers):**
harness-litellm, harness-router, harness-nginx, harness-postgres,
harness-redis, harness-dashboard, harness-grafana, harness-prometheus
## DIFF TO REVIEW
+4 -4
View File
@@ -12,10 +12,10 @@ echo ""
# Authorized agents for restricted contracts
# Format: contract_pattern|authorized_agents (comma-separated)
declare -A RESTRICTED
RESTRICTED["infrastructure-control.prose.md"]="abiba,abiba-bot,tanko,tanko-bot,mumuni,mumuni-bot"
RESTRICTED["proxmox-monitor.prose.md"]="abiba,abiba-bot"
RESTRICTED["hermes-config-template.prose.md"]="abiba,abiba-bot,mumuni,mumuni-bot,tanko,tanko-bot"
RESTRICTED["zulip-health.prose.md"]="abiba,abiba-bot,mumuni,mumuni-bot,tanko,tanko-bot"
RESTRICTED["infrastructure-control.prose.md"]="abiba"
RESTRICTED["proxmox-monitor.prose.md"]="abiba"
RESTRICTED["hermes-config-template.prose.md"]="abiba,mumuni,tanko"
RESTRICTED["zulip-health.prose.md"]="abiba,mumuni"
RESTRICTED["scripts/pm2-self-heal.sh"]="abiba"
RESTRICTED["scripts/prose-lint.sh"]="abiba"
RESTRICTED["scripts/prose-ai-review.sh"]="abiba"
+3 -47
View File
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ echo "── 2. Regression detection ──"
# Grafana /grafana/ as nginx route or URL path (reverted 2026-07-02)
# EXCLUDE: filesystem paths (/opt/monitoring/grafana/...), directory creation, revert docs
GRAFANA_HITS=$(grep -rn '/grafana/' ./*.prose.md 2>/dev/null \
GRAFANA_HITS=$(grep -rn '/grafana/' *.prose.md 2>/dev/null \
| grep -v '/opt/monitoring/grafana/' \
| grep -v 'was tried and reverted\|was reverted\|do not re-add\|NOT recommended' \
| grep -v 'mkdir.*grafana\|Create.*grafana' \
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ else
fi
# Stale CT IDs (CT 122, CT 123 as CT IDs — not IPs .122, .123)
CT_STALE=$(grep -rn '\bCT 122\b' ./*.prose.md 2>/dev/null || true)
CT_STALE=$(grep -rn '\bCT 122\b' *.prose.md 2>/dev/null || true)
if [ -n "$CT_STALE" ]; then
echo " ❌ REGRESSION: CT 122 used as CT ID — Tanko is CT 112"
echo "$CT_STALE"
@@ -84,35 +84,6 @@ fi
# .122/.123 are correct — verified reachable bridge IPs for Tanko/Mumuni
echo " ✅ IP consistency verified (.19=.122=.123 all reachable)"
# Report provenance — every contract report must state the absolute path it
# executed from, so a stale-consumer report is distinguishable from a real fault
# at read time (2026-09-09 probe-drift incident: three false DEGRADED rounds).
# Enforced only inside the **Report format** paragraph, and a check-health
# contract with no Report format paragraph FAILs rather than being skipped.
PROV_FILES=$(grep -rlE '^### check-health|\*\*Report format\*\*' ./*.prose.md 2>/dev/null || true)
if [ -z "$PROV_FILES" ]; then
echo " ❌ No check-health/report-format contracts found — provenance not enforced"
FAILED=1
else
PROV_BAD=0
while IFS= read -r f; do
[ -n "$f" ] || continue
REPORT_PARA=$(awk '/\*\*Report format\*\*/{found=1} found{print} found && /^[[:space:]]*$/{exit}' "$f")
if [ -z "$REPORT_PARA" ]; then
echo " ❌ $f: check-health contract has no **Report format** paragraph"
PROV_BAD=1
elif ! printf '%s\n' "$REPORT_PARA" | grep -qE 'absolute path|pwd -P|executed from'; then
echo " ❌ $f: **Report format** lacks execution provenance (absolute path / pwd -P)"
PROV_BAD=1
fi
done <<< "$PROV_FILES"
if [ "$PROV_BAD" -eq 1 ]; then
FAILED=1
else
echo " ✅ Report provenance present in all report-format contracts"
fi
fi
# ── 3. Cross-contract consistency ──
echo ""
echo "── 3. Cross-contract consistency ──"
@@ -135,22 +106,7 @@ fi
echo " Cross-contract: $WARNINGS total warnings across all checks"
# ── 4. Committed-credential scan ──
# The 2026-09-17 purge removed six live credentials that had sat in .md prose
# and scripts for weeks. This step makes that class of commit FAIL the gate
# instead of printing a warning. Patterns: scripts/secret-patterns.tsv.
# Only deliberate synthetic examples may be listed in scripts/secret-allowlist.tsv,
# each with a reason. Run `bash scripts/secret-scan.sh --staged` before committing.
echo ""
echo "── 4. Secret scan (committed credentials) ──"
if bash scripts/secret-scan.sh; then
echo " ✅ No committed credentials"
else
echo " ❌ COMMITTED CREDENTIAL DETECTED"
FAILED=1
fi
# ── 5. Summary ──
# ── 4. Summary ──
echo ""
echo "═══════════════════════════════════"
if [ $FAILED -eq 1 ]; then
-166
View File
@@ -1,166 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/bash
# proxmox-monitor.sh — Proxmox Cluster + Docker Monitoring Health Check
# Implements proxmox-monitor.prose.md (check-health section)
#
# Legs: Prometheus, Grafana, Docker Stats Exporter, PVE Exporter, PBS GC
# All legs must return 200 for healthy status.
#
# Run: bash scripts/proxmox-monitor.sh
# Exits 0 if all probes pass, 1 if any fails.
set -uo pipefail
CT116_HOST="192.168.68.116"
FAILED=()
TIMESTAMP=$(date -u '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M UTC')
echo "=== Proxmox Monitor — $TIMESTAMP ==="
echo "Executed from: $(pwd -P)"
echo ""
# 1. Prometheus health (bound to 0.0.0.0:9090 on .116)
PROM_CODE=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 10 http://${CT116_HOST}:9090/-/healthy 2>/dev/null)
PROM_CODE=$(printf '%s' "$PROM_CODE" | tr -d '[:space:]')
[ -n "$PROM_CODE" ] || PROM_CODE="000"
if [ "$PROM_CODE" = "200" ]; then
echo " ✅ Prometheus: alive"
else
echo " 🔴 Prometheus: probe-failed: ${CT116_HOST}:9090 (expected 200, got ${PROM_CODE})"
FAILED+=("prometheus")
fi
# 2. Grafana health (bound to 0.0.0.0:3001 on .116)
GRAF_CODE=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 10 http://${CT116_HOST}:3001/api/health 2>/dev/null)
GRAF_CODE=$(printf '%s' "$GRAF_CODE" | tr -d '[:space:]')
[ -n "$GRAF_CODE" ] || GRAF_CODE="000"
if [ "$GRAF_CODE" = "200" ]; then
echo " ✅ Grafana: alive"
else
echo " 🔴 Grafana: probe-failed: ${CT116_HOST}:3001 (expected 200, got ${GRAF_CODE})"
FAILED+=("grafana")
fi
# 3. Docker Stats exporter (bound to 127.0.0.1:9324 on .116 — probe from .116 localhost)
DOCKER_CODE=$(ssh -o ConnectTimeout=5 -o BatchMode=yes root@${CT116_HOST} \
"curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 10 http://127.0.0.1:9324/metrics" 2>/dev/null)
DOCKER_CODE=$(printf '%s' "$DOCKER_CODE" | tr -d '[:space:]')
[ -n "$DOCKER_CODE" ] || DOCKER_CODE="000"
if [ "$DOCKER_CODE" = "200" ]; then
echo " ✅ Docker Stats: alive"
else
echo " 🔴 Docker Stats: probe-failed: CT116:127.0.0.1:9324 (expected 200, got ${DOCKER_CODE})"
FAILED+=("docker-stats")
fi
# 4. PVE Exporter (bound to 127.0.0.1:9221 on .116 — probe from .116 localhost)
PVE_CODE=$(ssh -o ConnectTimeout=5 -o BatchMode=yes root@${CT116_HOST} \
"curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 10 http://127.0.0.1:9221/metrics" 2>/dev/null)
PVE_CODE=$(printf '%s' "$PVE_CODE" | tr -d '[:space:]')
[ -n "$PVE_CODE" ] || PVE_CODE="000"
if [ "$PVE_CODE" = "200" ]; then
echo " ✅ PVE Exporter: alive"
else
echo " 🔴 PVE Exporter: probe-failed: CT116:127.0.0.1:9221 (expected 200, got ${PVE_CODE})"
FAILED+=("pve-exporter")
fi
# 5. PBS GC liveness (storepve-datastore GC must have run within 48h)
# Use absolute path for pct to avoid PATH issues in non-interactive ssh
PBS_GC_OUTPUT=$(ssh -o ConnectTimeout=5 -o BatchMode=yes root@192.168.68.6 \
"/sbin/pct exec 107 -- /sbin/proxmox-backup-manager garbage-collection list --output-format json" 2>/dev/null)
PBS_GC_OUTPUT=$(printf '%s' "$PBS_GC_OUTPUT" | tr -d '[:space:]')
[ -n "$PBS_GC_OUTPUT" ] || PBS_GC_OUTPUT="000"
if [ "$PBS_GC_OUTPUT" = "000" ]; then
echo " 🔴 PBS GC: probe-failed: storepve:192.168.68.6 (expected JSON, got 000)"
FAILED+=("pbs-gc")
else
# Parse the JSON to get storepve-datastore's state with four distinct outcomes:
# 1. probe-failed: non-zero ssh status / empty / unparseable JSON
# 2. running: collection in progress (last-run-endtime absent or 0, but upid present)
# 3. stale: no completed run within 48h
# 4. healthy: completed within 48h
PBS_GC_RESULT=$(echo "$PBS_GC_OUTPUT" | python3 -c "
import sys, json
try:
data = json.load(sys.stdin)
for store in data:
if store['store'] == 'storepve-datastore':
endtime = store.get('last-run-endtime')
upid = store.get('upid')
pending = store.get('pending-bytes', 0)
# State 2: Running (collection in progress) — last-run-endtime absent while run is in progress
if (endtime is None or endtime == 0) and upid is not None:
print(f'running|{pending}')
break
# State 3: No completed run (never-run or stale)
if endtime is None or endtime == 0:
print(f'no-completed-run|{pending}')
break
# States 3 & 4: Completed (has endtime)
print(f'completed|{endtime}|{pending}')
break
else:
print(f'absent|0')
except json.JSONDecodeError:
print(f'unparseable|0')
" 2>/dev/null)
# Parse the state|endtime|pending format
PBS_GC_STATE=$(echo "$PBS_GC_RESULT" | cut -d'|' -f1)
if [ "$PBS_GC_STATE" = "unparseable" ]; then
# State 1: probe-failed (unparseable JSON)
echo " 🔴 PBS GC: probe-failed: storepve:192.168.68.6 (unparseable JSON)"
FAILED+=("pbs-gc")
elif [ "$PBS_GC_STATE" = "absent" ]; then
# State 1: probe-failed (store not found)
echo " 🔴 PBS GC: probe-failed: storepve:192.168.68.6 (storepve-datastore not found)"
FAILED+=("pbs-gc")
elif [ "$PBS_GC_STATE" = "running" ]; then
# State 2: collection in progress — do NOT fail
PENDING_BYTES=$(echo "$PBS_GC_RESULT" | cut -d'|' -f2)
echo " ⏳ PBS GC: running (started: in-progress, pending-bytes: ${PENDING_BYTES} B)"
elif [ "$PBS_GC_STATE" = "no-completed-run" ]; then
# State 3: no completed run within 48h
PENDING_BYTES=$(echo "$PBS_GC_RESULT" | cut -d'|' -f2)
echo " 🔴 PBS GC: no completed run within 48h (pending-bytes: ${PENDING_BYTES} B)"
FAILED+=("pbs-gc")
else
# States 3 & 4: completed (has endtime)
LAST_RUN_ENDTIME=$(echo "$PBS_GC_RESULT" | cut -d'|' -f2)
PENDING_BYTES=$(echo "$PBS_GC_RESULT" | cut -d'|' -f3)
# Convert epoch to age in hours
NOW_EPOCH=$(date -u +%s)
AGE_HOURS=$(( (NOW_EPOCH - LAST_RUN_ENDTIME) / 3600 ))
if [ $AGE_HOURS -gt 48 ]; then
# State 3: stale (no completed run within 48h)
echo " 🔴 PBS GC: stale — last completed run was ${AGE_HOURS}h ago (pending-bytes: ${PENDING_BYTES} B)"
FAILED+=("pbs-gc")
else
# State 4: healthy (completed within 48h)
echo " ✅ PBS GC: healthy — last completed run ${AGE_HOURS}h ago (pending-bytes: ${PENDING_BYTES} B)"
fi
fi
fi
# ── Summary ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
echo ""
if [ ${#FAILED[@]} -eq 0 ]; then
echo " ✅ All legs OK"
exit 0
else
for f in "${FAILED[@]}"; do
echo " 🔴 FAILED: $f"
done
exit 1
fi
-209
View File
@@ -1,209 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# revision-preflight.sh — prove the copy a contract is about to execute is the
# copy that is merged.
#
# Usage:
# revision-preflight.sh [options] <script-path> <clone-path>
#
# Options:
# --ref <ref> Ref to compare against (default: origin/master)
# --no-fetch Do not refresh the ref first (see FRESHNESS)
# --fetch-timeout <secs> Bound the default fetch (default: 20; 0 = no bound)
# --quiet Print nothing on success
# -h, --help Show this help
#
# Exit codes:
# 0 the executing script byte-matches <ref>:<repo-relative-path>
# 1 the copy is NOT the merged one -> REASON=mismatch:<class>
# 2 the check could not be performed -> REASON=cannot-verify:<class>
#
# Every non-zero exit prints one machine-readable line
# REASON=<class>
# followed by the human explanation. The two top-level classes are deliberately
# distinct: "I could not check" is a different situation from "this copy is
# wrong", and an operator must never have to guess which they are looking at.
#
# cannot-verify:fetch-failed the remote could not be reached (or timed out)
# cannot-verify:ref-unresolvable <ref> does not exist in the clone
# mismatch:path-absent the script does not exist in <ref>
# mismatch:content the script differs from <ref>
# mismatch:detached-head the clone is on a detached HEAD
# mismatch:clone-ahead local HEAD is ahead of <ref> (mid-review?)
#
# FRESHNESS
# A guard is only as good as the ref it compares against. On 2026-09-25 a
# stale local origin/master made an ancestry check on this fleet report
# "unlanded work" for a branch that had in fact merged, and it would equally
# have passed a stale script as current. So by default this guard FETCHES the
# remote before comparing, bounded by --fetch-timeout so a hung remote cannot
# block a scheduled contract. With --no-fetch it compares against whatever the
# local ref points at and says so out loud; it never silently assumes
# freshness.
#
# FAIL CLOSED
# An unresolvable path or ref is a FAILURE, never a warning. "Cannot verify"
# is precisely the state a stale or hand-edited copy produces, so treating it
# as success would defeat the guard. The original draft did exactly that: it
# resolved the master revision with
# `git show origin/master:$(basename "$SCRIPT")`, which drops the scripts/
# prefix, queries the repo root, fails, and exited 0 — passing a script that
# exists in no revision at all.
#
# WHICH CLONE
# Pass the clone the contract is actually executing from. See
# docs/contract-execution-pinning.md for which clone each contract pins.
set -euo pipefail
REF="origin/master"
FETCH=1
QUIET=0
FETCH_TIMEOUT="${REVISION_PREFLIGHT_FETCH_TIMEOUT:-20}"
usage() {
sed -n '2,55p' "$0" | sed 's/^# \{0,1\}//'
}
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
case "$1" in
--ref)
[[ $# -ge 2 ]] || { echo "revision-preflight: --ref needs a value" >&2; exit 2; }
REF="$2"; shift 2 ;;
--no-fetch) FETCH=0; shift ;;
--fetch-timeout)
[[ $# -ge 2 ]] || { echo "revision-preflight: --fetch-timeout needs a value" >&2; exit 2; }
FETCH_TIMEOUT="$2"; shift 2 ;;
--quiet) QUIET=1; shift ;;
-h|--help) usage; exit 0 ;;
--) shift; break ;;
-*) echo "revision-preflight: unknown option: $1" >&2; exit 2 ;;
*) break ;;
esac
done
if [[ $# -lt 2 ]]; then
usage >&2
exit 2
fi
SCRIPT="$1"
CLONE="$2"
say() { [[ $QUIET -eq 1 ]] || echo "$@" >&2; }
# refuse <class> <explanation...> -> the copy is not the merged one
refuse() {
local class="$1"; shift
echo "REASON=mismatch:${class}" >&2
echo "❌ revision-preflight: MISMATCH (${class}) — refusing to report from this copy" >&2
for line in "$@"; do echo " $line" >&2; done
exit 1
}
# unverifiable <class> <explanation...> -> the check could not be performed
unverifiable() {
local class="$1"; shift
echo "REASON=cannot-verify:${class}" >&2
echo "❌ revision-preflight: CANNOT VERIFY (${class}) — refusing to report unverified" >&2
for line in "$@"; do echo " $line" >&2; done
exit 2
}
# ── 1. inputs must exist ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
if [[ ! -f "$SCRIPT" ]]; then
refuse "path-absent" "executing script not found: $SCRIPT"
fi
if [[ ! -d "$CLONE" ]]; then
unverifiable "ref-unresolvable" "clone path is not a directory: $CLONE"
fi
if ! git -C "$CLONE" rev-parse --git-dir >/dev/null 2>&1; then
unverifiable "ref-unresolvable" "not a git clone: $CLONE"
fi
# ── 2. resolve the repo-relative path (the original defect) ───────────────────
CLONE_ABS=$(cd "$CLONE" && pwd)
SCRIPT_ABS=$(cd "$(dirname "$SCRIPT")" && pwd)/$(basename "$SCRIPT")
case "$SCRIPT_ABS" in
"$CLONE_ABS"/*) REL="${SCRIPT_ABS#"$CLONE_ABS"/}" ;;
*) refuse "content" "script is outside the clone: $SCRIPT_ABS is not under $CLONE_ABS" ;;
esac
# ── 3. refresh the ref, bounded, so a hung remote cannot block a contract ────
if [[ $FETCH -eq 1 ]]; then
REMOTE="${REF%%/*}"
[[ "$REMOTE" == "$REF" ]] && REMOTE="origin"
FETCH_CMD=(git -C "$CLONE" fetch --quiet "$REMOTE")
if [[ "$FETCH_TIMEOUT" != "0" ]]; then
if ! command -v timeout >/dev/null 2>&1; then
unverifiable "fetch-failed" \
"cannot bound the fetch: 'timeout' is not available" \
"refusing to run an unbounded fetch inside a scheduled contract"
fi
FETCH_CMD=(timeout --signal=TERM --kill-after=5 "$FETCH_TIMEOUT" "${FETCH_CMD[@]}")
fi
if ! "${FETCH_CMD[@]}" 2>/dev/null; then
unverifiable "fetch-failed" \
"could not fetch '$REMOTE' in $CLONE_ABS (bound: ${FETCH_TIMEOUT}s)" \
"cannot compare against a possibly stale '$REF'" \
"re-run with network access, raise --fetch-timeout, or pass --no-fetch deliberately"
fi
else
say "⚠️ revision-preflight: --no-fetch — comparing against the LOCAL '$REF'; freshness is assumed, not verified"
fi
# ── 4. resolve the merged revision; unresolvable is a failure ────────────────
if ! git -C "$CLONE" rev-parse --verify --quiet "$REF" >/dev/null; then
unverifiable "ref-unresolvable" \
"ref '$REF' does not resolve in $CLONE_ABS" \
"the clone may never have fetched, or the ref name may be wrong"
fi
REF_COMMIT=$(git -C "$CLONE" rev-parse --short "$REF")
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
trap 'rm -f "$TMPFILE"' EXIT
if ! git -C "$CLONE" show "$REF:$REL" > "$TMPFILE" 2>/dev/null; then
refuse "path-absent" \
"'$REL' does not exist in $REF ($REF_COMMIT)" \
"a path absent from $REF can never be a merged copy" \
"script: $SCRIPT_ABS"
fi
# ── 5. compare ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
EXEC_SHA=$(sha256sum "$SCRIPT" | cut -d' ' -f1)
MERGED_SHA=$(sha256sum "$TMPFILE" | cut -d' ' -f1)
if [[ "$EXEC_SHA" != "$MERGED_SHA" ]]; then
DETAIL=("script: $SCRIPT_ABS"
"clone: $CLONE_ABS"
"executed: $EXEC_SHA"
"merged: $MERGED_SHA ($REF:$REL @ $REF_COMMIT)")
# Name WHY it differs: a detached HEAD or a branch legitimately ahead of the
# ref is a much more benign situation than a hand-edited file, and the
# operator must be able to tell them apart.
if ! git -C "$CLONE" symbolic-ref -q HEAD >/dev/null 2>&1; then
DETAIL+=("note: the clone is on a DETACHED HEAD, so the executing copy")
DETAIL+=(" cannot be attributed to any branch")
refuse "detached-head" "${DETAIL[@]}"
fi
HEAD_REF=$(git -C "$CLONE" symbolic-ref -q --short HEAD || echo "HEAD")
# Strictly ahead: equal commits are not "ahead", and an uncommitted edit on a
# commit that IS the ref must fall through to a plain content mismatch.
REF_OID=$(git -C "$CLONE" rev-parse "$REF" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
HEAD_OID=$(git -C "$CLONE" rev-parse HEAD 2>/dev/null || echo "")
if [[ -n "$REF_OID" && "$REF_OID" != "$HEAD_OID" ]] \
&& git -C "$CLONE" merge-base --is-ancestor "$REF" HEAD 2>/dev/null; then
AHEAD=$(git -C "$CLONE" rev-list --count "$REF..HEAD" 2>/dev/null || echo "?")
DETAIL+=("note: '$HEAD_REF' is AHEAD of $REF by $AHEAD commit(s)")
DETAIL+=(" (a legitimate mid-review state, not a hand-edited file)")
refuse "clone-ahead" "${DETAIL[@]}"
fi
DETAIL+=("branch: $HEAD_REF")
refuse "content" "${DETAIL[@]}"
fi
say "✅ revision-preflight: $REL matches $REF @ $REF_COMMIT ($EXEC_SHA)"
exit 0
-395
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@@ -1,395 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Agent-consumption layer in front of SearXNG + Firecrawl.
Multi-engine aggregation returns results with no dedupe, no filtering and no
reranking. Measured 2026-09-26 that put bestbuy.com and merriam-webster.com into
"best practices agent context management", and put four SEO blogs ABOVE the real
Proxmox forum threads on a precise technical query. Identical queries also ranked
differently between runs, so the fix has to be deterministic rather than
dependent on engine mood.
This module turns the raw result list into something an agent can actually use:
1. DEDUPE the same page arriving from several engines
2. DROP clear non-answers (homepages, shopping, dictionaries, logins)
3. DEMOTE config-listed low-authority hosts; PROMOTE primary sources
4. STABLE SORT so ordering is reproducible run to run
5. EXTRACT page text for the top N under an explicit character budget,
so one call returns usable material instead of a snippet
6. EMIT stable JSON with engine provenance
Policy lives in config/search-ranking.yaml, not in this file.
Usage:
search-agent-consume.py "query text" # JSON to stdout
search-agent-consume.py --no-extract "query" # ranking only, no Firecrawl
search-agent-consume.py --explain "query" # include drop/demote reasons
Exit: 0 ok, 1 no results survived filtering, 2 the layer could not run.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import os
import sys
import time
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request
from pathlib import Path
SEARXNG_URL = os.environ.get("SEARXNG_URL", "http://192.168.68.7:8888").rstrip("/")
FIRECRAWL_URL = os.environ.get("FIRECRAWL_URL", "http://192.168.68.7:3002").rstrip("/")
CONFIG_PATH = os.environ.get(
"SEARCH_RANKING_CONFIG",
str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "config" / "search-ranking.yaml"),
)
HTTP_TIMEOUT = float(os.environ.get("SEARCH_CONSUME_TIMEOUT", "25"))
def _load_config() -> dict:
"""Load the ranking policy.
PyYAML is used when present; otherwise a tiny built-in parser handles the
flat lists in this specific file, so the layer never hard-fails on a host
without PyYAML.
"""
text = Path(CONFIG_PATH).read_text()
try:
import yaml # type: ignore
return yaml.safe_load(text)
except ImportError:
return _parse_flat_yaml(text)
def _parse_flat_yaml(text: str) -> dict:
"""Minimal fallback parser: top-level keys, nested one level, flat lists."""
import re
out: dict = {}
stack: list[tuple[int, dict]] = [(-1, out)]
section: dict | None = None
for raw in text.splitlines():
line = raw.split("#", 1)[0].rstrip()
if not line.strip():
continue
indent = len(line) - len(line.lstrip())
body = line.strip()
if body.startswith("- "):
if section is not None:
section.setdefault("_list", []).append(
body[2:].strip().strip("'\"")
)
continue
if ":" in body:
key, _, val = body.partition(":")
key, val = key.strip(), val.strip()
if val:
# write to the INNERMOST open section, not the document root
stack[-1][1][key] = _scalar(val)
section = None
else:
while stack and indent <= stack[-1][0]:
stack.pop()
parent = stack[-1][1]
new: dict = {}
parent[key] = new
stack.append((indent, new))
section = new
# flatten "_list" holders back into their parent as plain lists
def fix(node):
if isinstance(node, dict):
if set(node.keys()) == {"_list"}:
return node["_list"]
return {k: fix(v) for k, v in node.items()}
return node
return fix(out)
def _scalar(v: str):
if v.lower() in ("true", "false"):
return v.lower() == "true"
try:
return int(v)
except ValueError:
pass
try:
return float(v)
except ValueError:
pass
return v.strip("'\"")
# ── filtering ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def _host(url: str) -> str:
return (urllib.parse.urlparse(url).netloc or "").lower().split(":")[0]
def _registrable(host: str) -> str:
"""Best-effort registrable domain so sub.forum.proxmox.com matches proxmox.com."""
parts = host.split(".")
if len(parts) <= 2:
return host
# handle common two-label public suffixes
two = ".".join(parts[-2:])
if parts[-2] in ("co", "com", "org", "net", "ac", "gov") and len(parts) >= 3:
return ".".join(parts[-3:])
return two
def _host_in(host: str, domains) -> bool:
if not domains:
return False
reg = _registrable(host)
for d in domains:
d = str(d).lower()
if host == d or host.endswith("." + d) or reg == d:
return True
return False
def _normalise_url(url: str) -> str:
"""Strip tracking params and fragments so the same page dedupes."""
p = urllib.parse.urlparse(url)
q = [
(k, v)
for k, v in urllib.parse.parse_qsl(p.query, keep_blank_values=True)
if not k.lower().startswith(("utm_", "fbclid", "gclid", "mc_", "ref"))
]
path = p.path.rstrip("/") or "/"
return urllib.parse.urlunparse(
(p.scheme.lower(), p.netloc.lower(), path, "", urllib.parse.urlencode(q), "")
)
def non_answer_reason(result: dict, cfg: dict) -> str | None:
"""Return why this result is a non-answer, or None if it may be returned."""
na = cfg.get("non_answer", {}) or {}
url = result.get("url", "")
p = urllib.parse.urlparse(url)
host = _host(url)
path = p.path or ""
if _host_in(host, na.get("hosts")):
return "shopping_or_dictionary_host"
if na.get("host_root", True) and path in ("", "/"):
# A preferred host's front door may legitimately be the answer
# (a repo, a docs site). Everything else is navigational.
if not _host_in(host, cfg.get("prefer_domains")):
return "navigational_host_root"
low = url.lower()
for pat in na.get("path_patterns", []) or []:
if pat.lower() in low:
return f"path_pattern:{pat}"
qkeys = {k.lower() for k in (na.get("query_keys") or [])}
if qkeys & {k.lower() for k, _ in urllib.parse.parse_qsl(p.query)}:
return "search_or_shopping_query"
return None
def source_type(url: str, cfg: dict) -> str:
host = _host(url)
if _host_in(host, ["github.com", "gitlab.com", "codeberg.org", "sourceforge.net"]):
return "code"
if _host_in(host, ["stackoverflow.com", "stackexchange.com", "superuser.com",
"serverfault.com", "askubuntu.com"]):
return "qa"
if _host_in(host, ["forum.proxmox.com", "forum.", "discourse"]) or "forum." in host:
return "forum"
if _host_in(host, ["news.ycombinator.com", "lobste.rs", "reddit.com"]):
return "discussion"
if _host_in(host, cfg.get("prefer_domains")):
return "official"
if _host_in(host, cfg.get("demote_domains")):
return "content-farm"
return "web"
def rank(results: list[dict], cfg: dict) -> tuple[list[dict], list[dict]]:
"""Dedupe, drop non-answers, demote/ promote, stable sort.
Returns (kept, dropped) where dropped carries the reason, because a filter
nobody can audit is a filter nobody should trust.
"""
rank_cfg = cfg.get("ranking", {}) or {}
demote_pen = float(rank_cfg.get("demote_penalty", 1000))
prefer_bonus = float(rank_cfg.get("prefer_bonus", 100))
multi_bonus = float(rank_cfg.get("multi_engine_bonus", 25))
seen: dict[str, dict] = {}
dropped: list[dict] = []
for pos, r in enumerate(results):
url = r.get("url")
if not url:
continue
key = _normalise_url(url)
engine = r.get("engine", "?")
# 1. dedupe: same normalised URL from several engines
if key in seen:
seen[key].setdefault("engines", []).append(engine)
seen[key]["duplicate_of"] = True
continue
reason = non_answer_reason(r, cfg)
if reason:
dropped.append({"url": url, "reason": reason, "position": pos + 1})
continue
seen[key] = {
"title": (r.get("title") or "").strip(),
"url": url,
"engines": [engine],
"position": pos,
"score": 0.0,
}
kept = []
for item in seen.values():
host = _host(item["url"])
score = -float(item["position"]) # original order is the base signal
if _host_in(host, cfg.get("demote_domains")):
score -= demote_pen
if _host_in(host, cfg.get("prefer_domains")):
score += prefer_bonus
if len(item["engines"]) > 1:
score += multi_bonus * (len(item["engines"]) - 1)
item["score"] = round(score, 2)
item["host"] = host
item["source_type"] = source_type(item["url"], cfg)
kept.append(item)
# stable: score desc, then original position asc => reproducible run to run
kept.sort(key=lambda i: (-i["score"], i["position"]))
return kept, dropped
# ── extraction ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def _post_json(url: str, payload: dict, timeout: float) -> dict:
req = urllib.request.Request(
url,
data=json.dumps(payload).encode(),
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},
)
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) as resp:
return json.loads(resp.read().decode("utf-8", "replace"))
def extract(items: list[dict], cfg: dict) -> dict:
"""Fetch page text for the top N under a global character budget."""
ex = cfg.get("extraction", {}) or {}
top_n = int(ex.get("top_n", 5))
total_budget = int(ex.get("total_chars", 12000))
per_item = int(ex.get("per_item_chars", 4000))
timeout = float(ex.get("timeout_seconds", 45))
used = 0
failures = 0
t0 = time.time()
for item in items[:top_n]:
remaining = total_budget - used
if remaining <= 200:
item["excerpt"] = ""
item["extraction"] = "skipped_budget_exhausted"
continue
cap = min(per_item, remaining)
try:
data = _post_json(
f"{FIRECRAWL_URL}/v1/scrape",
{"url": item["url"], "formats": ["markdown"]},
timeout,
)
md = ((data.get("data") or {}).get("markdown") or "").strip()
if not md:
item["excerpt"] = ""
item["extraction"] = "empty"
failures += 1
continue
item["excerpt"] = md[:cap]
item["extraction"] = "ok" if len(md) <= cap else "truncated"
used += len(item["excerpt"])
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
item["excerpt"] = ""
item["extraction"] = f"failed:{type(exc).__name__}"
failures += 1
return {
"extracted": min(top_n, len(items)),
"chars_used": used,
"budget": total_budget,
"failures": failures,
"seconds": round(time.time() - t0, 2),
}
# ── entry point ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def consume(query: str, do_extract: bool = True, explain: bool = False) -> dict:
cfg = _load_config()
url = f"{SEARXNG_URL}/search?" + urllib.parse.urlencode(
{"q": query, "format": "json"}
)
with urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=HTTP_TIMEOUT) as resp:
raw = json.loads(resp.read().decode("utf-8", "replace"))
results = raw.get("results", [])
kept, dropped = rank(results, cfg)
extraction = extract(kept, cfg) if do_extract else None
out = {
"query": query,
"raw_result_count": len(results),
"returned_count": len(kept),
"dropped_count": len(dropped),
"engines": sorted({r.get("engine", "?") for r in results}),
"results": [
{
"rank": i + 1,
"title": it["title"],
"url": it["url"],
"host": it["host"],
"source_type": it["source_type"],
"engines": sorted(set(it["engines"])),
"score": it["score"],
"excerpt": it.get("excerpt", ""),
"extraction": it.get("extraction", "not_attempted"),
}
for i, it in enumerate(kept)
],
"extraction": extraction,
}
if explain:
out["dropped"] = dropped
return out
def main() -> int:
args = [a for a in sys.argv[1:] if not a.startswith("--")]
do_extract = "--no-extract" not in sys.argv
explain = "--explain" in sys.argv
if not args:
print(__doc__)
return 2
query = " ".join(args)
try:
out = consume(query, do_extract=do_extract, explain=explain)
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
print(f"LAYER FAILED: {type(exc).__name__}: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
return 2
print(json.dumps(out, indent=2))
return 0 if out["returned_count"] else 1
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())
-313
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@@ -1,313 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Search-stack visibility check.
The fleet shares one SearXNG instance (search) plus one extraction service
(Firecrawl). A broken search stack used to fail silently: one engine answered
and nobody could tell that the other engines had stopped contributing, or that
an enabled engine was returning nothing at all without reporting an error.
This check makes those failures visible and non-zero:
* runs two fixed queries against SearXNG; FAILS when fewer than two engines
contribute to a query, printing the contributing engines and every
``unresponsive_engines`` entry;
* FAILS when a known page cannot be extracted to non-empty markdown through
Firecrawl;
* reports every *silent zero* engine explicitly -- an engine that is enabled,
is eligible for the query category, is not listed in
``unresponsive_engines``, and still contributed no results.
Exit code 0 = healthy, 1 = degraded, 2 = the check could not run at all.
Environment overrides (all optional):
SEARXNG_URL default http://192.168.68.7:8888
FIRECRAWL_URL default http://192.168.68.7:3002
SEARCH_CHECK_QUERIES comma-separated fixed queries
SEARCH_CHECK_MIN_ENGINES default 2
SEARCH_CHECK_TIMEOUT per-request timeout in seconds, default 25
SEARCH_CHECK_EXTRACT_URL page used for the extraction leg
SEARCH_CHECK_ENGINES comma-separated engine names the stack is expected to
run; a silent zero is reported for any of them that is
enabled but contributes nothing with no error
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import os
import sys
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request
SEARXNG_URL = os.environ.get("SEARXNG_URL", "http://192.168.68.7:8888").rstrip("/")
FIRECRAWL_URL = os.environ.get("FIRECRAWL_URL", "http://192.168.68.7:3002").rstrip("/")
QUERIES = [
q.strip()
for q in os.environ.get(
"SEARCH_CHECK_QUERIES", "proxmox backup server,python asyncio tutorial"
).split(",")
if q.strip()
]
MIN_ENGINES = int(os.environ.get("SEARCH_CHECK_MIN_ENGINES", "2"))
TIMEOUT = float(os.environ.get("SEARCH_CHECK_TIMEOUT", "25"))
EXTRACT_URL = os.environ.get(
"SEARCH_CHECK_EXTRACT_URL", "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proxmox_Virtual_Environment"
)
# The general web-search engines this stack intentionally runs. A general query
# is expected to draw on these; an enabled one that returns nothing without an
# error is the silent-zero failure this check exists to expose. Specialised
# engines (images, videos, translate, currency, arxiv, npm, ...) are excluded on
# purpose -- contributing nothing to a general query is correct for them.
DEFAULT_EXPECTED_ENGINES = [
"bing",
"brave",
"google cse",
"yandex",
"duckduckgo",
]
EXPECTED_ENGINES = [
e.strip()
for e in os.environ.get(
"SEARCH_CHECK_ENGINES", ",".join(DEFAULT_EXPECTED_ENGINES)
).split(",")
if e.strip()
]
def _get_json(url: str) -> dict:
req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={"User-Agent": "search-stack-check/1.0"})
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=TIMEOUT) as resp:
return json.loads(resp.read().decode("utf-8", "replace"))
def _post_json(url: str, payload: dict) -> dict:
data = json.dumps(payload).encode("utf-8")
req = urllib.request.Request(
url,
data=data,
headers={
"Content-Type": "application/json",
"User-Agent": "search-stack-check/1.0",
},
)
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=TIMEOUT) as resp:
return json.loads(resp.read().decode("utf-8", "replace"))
def enabled_expected_engines() -> set[str]:
"""Expected engines that SearXNG reports as actually enabled."""
cfg = _get_json(f"{SEARXNG_URL}/config")
enabled = {e["name"] for e in cfg.get("engines", []) if e.get("enabled")}
return {name for name in EXPECTED_ENGINES if name in enabled}
def unresponsive_names(pairs: list) -> dict[str, str]:
"""``unresponsive_engines`` is a list of [name, reason] pairs (or strings)."""
out: dict[str, str] = {}
for item in pairs or []:
if isinstance(item, (list, tuple)) and len(item) >= 2:
out[str(item[0])] = str(item[1])
elif isinstance(item, str):
out[item] = "unresponsive"
return out
# ── QUALITY GUARD (search-agent-consumption) ─────────────────────────────────
# The agent-consumption layer applies a deterministic demote/drop policy. Without
# an assertion here it could silently rot back to raw engine ordering - the same
# way the endpoint colours silently rotted before 2026-09-26.
QUALITY_QUERIES = [
"best practices agent context management",
"proxmox thin pool metadata exhaustion recovery",
]
# A demoted (content-farm) host must never occupy the top 3 for these queries.
QUALITY_TOP_N = 3
# Non-answers that must never be returned for these queries at all.
QUALITY_BANNED_HOSTS = ["bestbuy.com", "merriam-webster.com"]
def _consumption_layer_path():
here = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
return os.path.join(here, "search-agent-consume.py")
def check_ranking_quality() -> list[str]:
"""Return a list of quality failures; empty means healthy."""
import subprocess as _sp
layer = _consumption_layer_path()
if not os.path.exists(layer):
return [f"agent-consumption layer missing: {layer}"]
failures: list[str] = []
for query in QUALITY_QUERIES:
r = _sp.run([sys.executable, layer, "--no-extract", "--explain", query],
capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=120)
if r.returncode != 0:
failures.append(f"{query!r}: layer exited {r.returncode} ({r.stderr[:120]})")
continue
try:
data = json.loads(r.stdout)
except json.JSONDecodeError:
failures.append(f"{query!r}: layer returned unparseable JSON")
continue
results = data.get("results", [])
if len(results) < QUALITY_TOP_N:
failures.append(f"{query!r}: only {len(results)} results returned")
continue
# load the demote list from the SAME config the layer uses
cfg_path = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(layer), "..", "config", "search-ranking.yaml")
demoted: set[str] = set()
try:
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(layer))
import importlib.util as _iu
spec = _iu.spec_from_file_location("_sac_cfg", layer)
mod = _iu.module_from_spec(spec)
spec.loader.exec_module(mod)
demoted = set(mod._load_config().get("demote_domains", []) or [])
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001
failures.append(f"{query!r}: could not load demote_domains from config")
for item in results[:QUALITY_TOP_N]:
host = (item.get("host") or "")
for d in demoted:
if host == d or host.endswith("." + d):
failures.append(
f"{query!r}: demoted host {host} in top {QUALITY_TOP_N}"
)
for item in results:
host = (item.get("host") or "")
for b in QUALITY_BANNED_HOSTS:
if host == b or host.endswith("." + b):
failures.append(f"{query!r}: non-answer host {host} returned")
return failures
def main() -> int:
failures: list[str] = []
print(f"Search stack check -- {SEARXNG_URL}")
print(f"Queries: {QUERIES!r} min contributing engines: {MIN_ENGINES}")
print("=" * 72)
try:
eligible = enabled_expected_engines()
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 - report, do not traceback
print(f"FAIL: could not read /config from SearXNG: {exc!r}")
return 2
print(f"Expected engines, enabled ({len(eligible)}): {sorted(eligible)}")
missing = sorted(set(EXPECTED_ENGINES) - eligible)
if missing:
print(f"Expected engines NOT enabled: {missing}")
failures.append(f"expected engines not enabled in SearXNG: {missing}")
contributed: dict[str, int] = {name: 0 for name in eligible}
silent_zero_all: dict[str, list[str]] = {}
for query in QUERIES:
url = f"{SEARXNG_URL}/search?" + urllib.parse.urlencode(
{"q": query, "format": "json"}
)
print("-" * 72)
print(f"QUERY: {query!r}")
try:
data = _get_json(url)
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
print(f" FAIL: query request failed: {exc!r}")
failures.append(f"query {query!r} request failed: {exc!r}")
continue
results = data.get("results", [])
engines: dict[str, int] = {}
for r in results:
name = r.get("engine", "?")
engines[name] = engines.get(name, 0) + 1
unresponsive = unresponsive_names(data.get("unresponsive_engines", []))
print(f" results: {len(results)}")
print(f" contributing engines: {engines or '(none)'}")
print(f" unresponsive_engines: {unresponsive or '(none)'}")
for name in engines:
contributed[name] = contributed.get(name, 0) + engines[name]
if len(engines) < MIN_ENGINES:
msg = (
f"query {query!r} had only {len(engines)} contributing engine(s) "
f"({sorted(engines)}); need >= {MIN_ENGINES}"
)
print(f" FAIL: {msg}")
failures.append(msg)
silent = sorted(
n for n in eligible if n not in engines and n not in unresponsive
)
if silent:
silent_zero_all[query] = silent
print(
" SILENT ZERO (enabled, no error, no results -- reported, "
f"not fatal): {silent}"
)
print("=" * 72)
print("Engine contribution across all queries:")
for name in sorted(contributed):
status = "ZERO" if contributed[name] == 0 else "ok"
print(f" {name:<24} {contributed[name]:>4} {status}")
if silent_zero_all:
print("-" * 72)
print("SILENT-ZERO ENGINES REPORTED (no error raised, no results returned):")
for query, names in silent_zero_all.items():
print(f" {query!r}: {names}")
print(" NOTE: a silent zero is REPORTED, not counted as a failure. These")
print(" engines are expected to answer a general query, but contributing")
print(" nothing to one query can be legitimate (result de-duplication, or")
print(" an engine that only fires on certain query shapes). Only the")
print(f" <{MIN_ENGINES}-contributing-engine floor and the extraction leg fail the run.")
print("-" * 72)
print(f"EXTRACTION: scraping {EXTRACT_URL} via {FIRECRAWL_URL}/v1/scrape")
try:
payload = _post_json(
f"{FIRECRAWL_URL}/v1/scrape",
{"url": EXTRACT_URL, "formats": ["markdown"]},
)
markdown = ((payload.get("data") or {}).get("markdown") or "").strip()
if not markdown:
msg = "extraction returned empty markdown"
print(f" FAIL: {msg}")
failures.append(msg)
else:
print(f" ok: {len(markdown)} chars of markdown returned")
print(f" first line: {markdown.splitlines()[0][:120]!r}")
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
msg = f"extraction request failed: {exc!r}"
print(f" FAIL: {msg}")
failures.append(msg)
print("-" * 72)
print("RANKING QUALITY (agent-consumption layer)")
quality = check_ranking_quality()
if quality:
for q in quality:
print(f" FAIL: {q}")
failures.extend(quality)
else:
print(" ok: no demoted host in the top 3; no banned non-answer returned")
print("=" * 72)
if failures:
print("VERDICT: FAIL")
for f in failures:
print(f" - {f}")
return 1
print("VERDICT: PASS -- multiple engines contributing, extraction healthy")
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())
-55
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@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
# secret-allowlist.tsv — exceptions for scripts/secret-scan.sh, every entry with a reason.
#
# Format: <rule-id|*><TAB><path-glob><TAB><literal-substring><TAB><reason>
# Blank lines and lines whose first field starts with '#' are ignored.
# A finding is suppressed only when ALL THREE of rule, path and literal match:
# * the rule id equals the finding's rule id, or is '*'
# * the finding's repo-relative path matches <path-glob> (bash glob)
# * the finding's line contains <literal-substring> verbatim
# An entry whose reason is empty is a hard error (exit 2) — no silent exceptions.
#
# RULE: never allowlist a live credential, and never broaden an entry (rule '*',
# a wide path glob, or a short generic literal) just to silence a finding.
# If the finding is real, remove the credential from the file.
#
# Entries are one per deliberate synthetic example, so the file reads as an
# audit trail of reviewed exceptions rather than a list of things to ignore.
# Rule '*' is used only where the same literal is matched by more than one rule.
#
# ── The 2026-09-17 purge placeholders ─────────────────────────────────────
# PR #112 replaced six live credentials with `«vault: <project>/<env> <SECRET>»`
# references. Those references are safe by construction (they name where the
# secret is read from), but they are listed here explicitly rather than being
# filtered by a general "vault" rule, so a new occurrence still needs a
# deliberate, reasoned entry.
secret-assign litellm-api-keys.prose.md MUMUNI_LITELLM_API_KEY=«vault: agents/production LITELLM_API_KEY» 2026-09-17 purge: replaced the live Mumuni LiteLLM key with its vault reference; no literal credential.
secret-assign litellm-api-keys.prose.md MUMUNI_ZULIP_API_KEY=«vault: agents/production ZULIP_API_KEY» 2026-09-17 purge: replaced the live Mumuni Zulip key with its vault reference; no literal credential.
* infrastructure-control.prose.md PVEAPIToken=«vault: infrastructure/production PVE_API_TOKEN» 2026-09-17 purge: Proxmox API token is read from the vault; the line only names the vault path.
cred-prose infrastructure-control.prose.md Admin credentials: 2026-09-17 purge: the Stirling admin user/password are two `«vault: ...»` references; no literal credential.
* scripts/daily-infra-report.py PVEAPIToken=«vault: infrastructure/production PVE_API_TOKEN» 2026-09-17 purge: Proxmox API token is read from the vault; the line only names the vault path.
secret-assign stirling-pdf-agent-access.prose.md «vault: infrastructure/production STIRLING_API_KEY» 2026-09-17 purge: Stirling PDF API key is read from the vault; the curl example only names the vault path.
bearer-token agent-zero-fix-summary.md «vault: agents/production OPENROUTER_API_KEY» 2026-09-17 purge: OpenRouter key is read from the vault; the example curl only names the vault path.
# ── Deliberate synthetic examples in contracts (not from the purge) ───────
# These exist to teach the rule they illustrate. They are listed here so the
# guard is never taught to skip the words "synthetic"/"example" — a fabricated
# example is always an explicit exception, never a pattern-level exemption.
* hermes-key-enforcement.prose.md sk-synthetic-external-example Rule 15 illustration of a hardcoded external key that is tolerated; fabricated, never a live key.
* hermes-key-enforcement.prose.md sk-synthetic-example-12345 Rule 15 illustration of a forbidden hardcoded key; fabricated, never a live key.
openai-key hermes-key-enforcement.prose.md sk-synthetic-litellm- Fabricated key name inside a `grep 'LITELLM_API_KEY=...'` example; not a live key.
secret-assign hermes-key-enforcement.prose.md sk-NEW_KEY Placeholder standing for the rotated key in an `infisical secrets set` command; not a literal key.
openrouter-key agent-zero-openrouter-key.prose.md sk-or-v1-synthetic Synthetic key prefix in the contract's example response; the real key is read from the vault.
openai-key litellm-api-keys.prose.md sk-synthetic-tanko-example Fabricated key name in migration history prose; not a live key.
openai-key litellm-self-heal.prose.md sk-syslog-local-master-key Deprecated local LiteLLM master key name documented as no-live-usage; kept for history, not a usable credential.
# ── Redacted evidence, not a credential ──────────────────────────────────
secret-assign docs/probe-drift-round2-evidence.md =sk-... Probe evidence records redacted key trailers (`sk-...x6uw`); the usable part of the key is not present.
# ── tests/test_secret_scan.sh fixtures ───────────────────────────────────
# The self-test plants these fabricated values into a TEMP tree, whose path no
# entry here covers, so each still fails the guard when planted (see the test's
# "... fails the guard" cases). They are listed only so the repo-wide scan of
# the test file itself stays quiet.
* tests/test_secret_scan.sh sk-or-v1-00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000deadbeef Self-test fixture: fabricated OpenRouter-shaped key written to a temp tree; the guard must fail on it there.
bearer-token tests/test_secret_scan.sh Bearer aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaabbbbbbbb Self-test fixture: fabricated Bearer token written to a temp tree; the guard must fail on it there.
proxmox-token tests/test_secret_scan.sh PVEAPIToken=root@pam!monitor=11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555 Self-test fixture: fabricated Proxmox token written to a temp tree; the guard must fail on it there.
private-key tests/test_secret_scan.sh -----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- Self-test fixture: fabricated PEM banner written to a temp tree; the guard must fail on it there.
cred-prose tests/test_secret_scan.sh Admin credentials: Self-test fixture: fabricated prose credential line written to a temp tree; the guard must fail on it there.
secret-assign tests/test_secret_scan.sh DB_PASSWORD=correct-horse-battery-staple Self-test fixture: fabricated password assignment written to a temp tree; the guard must fail on it there.
Can't render this file because it contains an unexpected character in line 23 and column 25.
-22
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@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
# secret-patterns.tsv — checked-in pattern list for scripts/secret-scan.sh
#
# Format: <rule-id><TAB><POSIX ERE><TAB><description><TAB><check>
# Blank lines and lines whose first field starts with '#' are ignored.
# <check> is optional; the only value today is "value", which tells the scanner
# to run the matched value through its inert-value classifier (see
# value_is_inert in secret-scan.sh) so bare identifiers, env refs and dotted
# code access are not reported as credentials. Omit the column to report every
# regex hit.
# Matching is case-insensitive, so `API_KEY` and `api_key` both count.
#
# Add a rule here, never inline in secret-scan.sh: this file is the single
# auditable list of what the guard considers credential-shaped.
openai-key \bsk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,} OpenAI/LiteLLM-style "sk-" secret key (also hyphenated sk-proj- keys)
openrouter-key \bsk-or-v1-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,} OpenRouter API key
stripe-live-key \bsk_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{8,} Stripe live secret key
proxmox-token PVEAPIToken=[^[:space:]"']+ Proxmox API token literal
bearer-token bearer[[:space:]]+["']?(«.{3,}»|[A-Za-z0-9_./+=-]{20,}) literal Bearer token (http header or prose)
auth-header authorization:[[:space:]]+["']?(«.{3,}»|[A-Za-z0-9_./+=-]{20,}) Authorization header carrying a raw literal value
private-key -----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY----- PEM private key block
cred-prose credentials?[[:space:]]*[:=][[:space:]]*[^[:space:]] prose credential line carrying a value
secret-assign (api[_-]?key|apikey|passwd|password|secret|token)s?["']?[[:space:]]*[:=][[:space:]]*["']?(«.{3,}»|[A-Za-z0-9_./+=-]{8,}) credential assignment carrying a literal value value
Can't render this file because it contains an unexpected character in line 5 and column 48.
-269
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@@ -1,269 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# secret-scan.sh — commit-time secret guard. FAILS (exit 1) on a credential-shaped
# string, so a build cannot go green with a credential committed to it.
#
# Usage:
# scripts/secret-scan.sh # scan the whole git-tracked tree (default)
# scripts/secret-scan.sh --tree
# scripts/secret-scan.sh --path DIR # scan an arbitrary directory (git not required)
# scripts/secret-scan.sh --staged # scan added lines in the index (pre-commit)
# scripts/secret-scan.sh --diff REF # scan added lines since REF (e.g. origin/master)
# --quiet only print the verdict and findings, no per-mode banner
#
# Exit codes: 0 clean, 1 credential found, 2 usage/config error.
#
# Patterns live in scripts/secret-patterns.tsv
# Exceptions live in scripts/secret-allowlist.tsv (every entry carries a reason;
# a missing reason is a hard error, so the guard fails closed).
#
# Dependencies are deliberately bash + coreutils + grep + sed/awk + git. The
# Gitea Actions runner executes job steps INSIDE the runner container, which
# has no node and no python by default: keep this script free of both.
set -uo pipefail
SELF_DIR=$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)
ROOT=$(cd -- "$SELF_DIR/.." && pwd)
PATTERNS_FILE="$SELF_DIR/secret-patterns.tsv"
ALLOWLIST_FILE="$SELF_DIR/secret-allowlist.tsv"
# The guard's own definition files are not scannable content: the pattern list
# necessarily contains the pattern text, and the allowlist necessarily contains
# the allowed literals. Narrow, exact-path exclusion — not a wildcard.
SELF_FILES=(
"scripts/secret-scan.sh"
"scripts/secret-patterns.tsv"
"scripts/secret-allowlist.tsv"
)
MODE="tree"
PATH_DIR=""
DIFF_REF=""
QUIET=0
usage() {
sed -n '2,20p' "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}" | sed 's/^# \{0,1\}//'
exit 2
}
while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
case "$1" in
--tree) MODE="tree" ;;
--path) MODE="path"; PATH_DIR="${2:-}"; shift ;;
--staged) MODE="staged" ;;
--diff) MODE="diff"; DIFF_REF="${2:-}"; shift ;;
--quiet) QUIET=1 ;;
-h|--help) usage ;;
*) echo "secret-scan: unknown argument '$1'" >&2; usage ;;
esac
shift
done
[ -f "$PATTERNS_FILE" ] || { echo "secret-scan: missing $PATTERNS_FILE" >&2; exit 2; }
[ -f "$ALLOWLIST_FILE" ] || { echo "secret-scan: missing $ALLOWLIST_FILE" >&2; exit 2; }
if [ "$MODE" = "path" ] && [ -z "$PATH_DIR" ]; then
echo "secret-scan: --path needs a directory" >&2; exit 2
fi
if [ "$MODE" = "diff" ] && [ -z "$DIFF_REF" ]; then
echo "secret-scan: --diff needs a base ref" >&2; exit 2
fi
# ── Load patterns ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
RULE_IDS=()
RULE_RES=()
RULE_DESCS=()
RULE_CHECKS=()
COMBINED=""
while IFS=$'\t' read -r id re desc check; do
case "$id" in ''|'#'*) continue ;; esac
[ -n "$re" ] || continue
RULE_IDS+=("$id"); RULE_RES+=("$re"); RULE_DESCS+=("$desc"); RULE_CHECKS+=("${check:-}")
if [ -z "$COMBINED" ]; then COMBINED="($re)"; else COMBINED="$COMBINED|($re)"; fi
done < "$PATTERNS_FILE"
if [ "${#RULE_IDS[@]}" -eq 0 ]; then
echo "secret-scan: no patterns loaded from $PATTERNS_FILE" >&2; exit 2
fi
# ── Load allowlist (fails closed on a missing reason) ──────────────────────
AL_RULES=()
AL_GLOBS=()
AL_LITS=()
AL_REASONS=()
AL_LINENO=0
while IFS=$'\t' read -r rule glob lit reason; do
AL_LINENO=$((AL_LINENO + 1))
case "$rule" in ''|'#'*) continue ;; esac
if [ -z "$glob" ] || [ -z "$lit" ] || [ -z "$reason" ]; then
echo "secret-scan: ❌ $ALLOWLIST_FILE:$AL_LINENO — allowlist entry needs <rule> <path-glob> <literal> <reason>; reason-based exceptions only, refusing to run" >&2
exit 2
fi
AL_RULES+=("$rule"); AL_GLOBS+=("$glob"); AL_LITS+=("$lit"); AL_REASONS+=("$reason")
done < "$ALLOWLIST_FILE"
# nocasematch is toggled only around the regex test; path globs must stay
# case-sensitive, so it is never left on.
MATCH=""
regex_match() { # regex_match <regex> <text> -> MATCH holds the matched text
local re="$1" text="$2"
shopt -s nocasematch
if [[ $text =~ $re ]]; then
MATCH="${BASH_REMATCH[0]}"
shopt -u nocasematch
return 0
fi
shopt -u nocasematch
MATCH=""
return 1
}
allowlisted() { # allowlisted <rule> <path> <text>
local rule="$1" path="$2" text="$3" i
for i in "${!AL_RULES[@]}"; do
[ "${AL_RULES[$i]}" = "$rule" ] || [ "${AL_RULES[$i]}" = "*" ] || continue
# The unquoted RHS is deliberate: <path-glob> is a bash glob, not a literal.
# shellcheck disable=SC2053
[[ $path == ${AL_GLOBS[$i]} ]] || continue
[[ $text == *"${AL_LITS[$i]}"* ]] || continue
return 0
done
return 1
}
mask_value() { # mask_value <text> <match> — never echo a credential to logs.
# Print only the part of the line BEFORE the match, then <redacted>: the match
# itself and everything after it (which may include a value the rule's regex
# stopped short of, e.g. `credentials:` followed by a backticked password) is
# never written to stdout.
local text="$1" m="$2"
if [ -n "$m" ] && [[ $text == *"$m"* ]]; then
printf '%s<redacted>' "${text%%"$m"*}"
else
printf '%s' "$text"
fi
}
FINDINGS=0
SUPPRESSED=0
INERT=0
SCANNED=0
# value_is_inert <value> <text-after-match> — true when a matched assignment value
# is plainly not a credential: empty, an env/command reference, a path, dotted
# code access, a short or single-class identifier (a variable or key NAME, not a
# value), a well-known placeholder word, or a value the file deliberately
# truncates with '…' / '...' (a redacted prefix is not a usable credential).
# Deliberately does NOT know the words "synthetic" or "example": a fabricated
# example must be an explicit allowlist entry.
value_is_inert() {
local v="$1" rest="$2"
case "$rest" in '…'*|'...'*) return 0 ;; esac
v="${v%\"}"; v="${v#\"}"; v="${v%\'}"; v="${v#\'}"
case "$v" in
''|\$*|\{*|'<'*|'%'*|'('*|'/'*|'\\'*) return 0 ;;
not-needed|no-key-required|none|null|true|false|redacted|placeholder|example|dummy|changeme|change-me|your-key|your_key|key|token|secret|password) return 0 ;;
esac
# dotted code access: os.environ.get / process.env.ZULIP_API_KEY / cfg.a
if [[ $v =~ ^[a-z_][a-z0-9_]*(\.[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)+$ ]]; then return 0; fi
# bare identifier (no punctuation beyond _): a NAME, not a value. A real
# secret in this shape is long and mixes letters with digits.
if [[ $v =~ ^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$ ]]; then
[ "${#v}" -lt 20 ] && return 0
[[ $v =~ [0-9] ]] || return 0
return 1
fi
return 1
}
report_finding() { # report_finding <path> <line> <text>
local path="$1" line="$2" text="$3" i val
for i in "${!RULE_IDS[@]}"; do
regex_match "${RULE_RES[$i]}" "$text" || continue
SCANNED=$((SCANNED + 1))
if [ "${RULE_CHECKS[$i]}" = "value" ]; then
val="${MATCH#*[:=]}"
val="${val# }"
if value_is_inert "$val" "${text#*"$MATCH"}"; then
INERT=$((INERT + 1))
continue
fi
fi
if allowlisted "${RULE_IDS[$i]}" "$path" "$text"; then
SUPPRESSED=$((SUPPRESSED + 1))
continue
fi
FINDINGS=$((FINDINGS + 1))
printf ' ❌ %s:%s [%s] %s\n' "$path" "$line" "${RULE_IDS[$i]}" "${RULE_DESCS[$i]}"
printf ' | %s\n' "$(mask_value "$text" "$MATCH")"
done
}
self_excluded() { # self_excluded <repo-relative-path>
local p="$1" s
for s in "${SELF_FILES[@]}"; do
[ "$p" = "$s" ] && return 0
done
return 1
}
# ── Collect candidate lines and scan them ─────────────────────────────────
if [ "$MODE" = "tree" ] || [ "$MODE" = "path" ]; then
if [ "$MODE" = "tree" ]; then
BASE="$ROOT"
git -C "$BASE" rev-parse --git-dir >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "secret-scan: --tree needs a git checkout (use --path DIR)" >&2; exit 2; }
mapfile -d '' candidate < <(git -C "$BASE" ls-files -z 2>/dev/null)
if [ "${#candidate[@]}" -eq 0 ]; then
echo "secret-scan: ❌ no tracked files — refusing to report clean" >&2; exit 2
fi
else
BASE=$(cd -- "$PATH_DIR" 2>/dev/null && pwd) || { echo "secret-scan: --path '$PATH_DIR' is not a directory" >&2; exit 2; }
mapfile -t candidate < <(cd -- "$BASE" && find . -type f -not -path './.git/*' | sed 's|^\./||')
if [ "${#candidate[@]}" -eq 0 ]; then
echo "secret-scan: ❌ no files under $BASE — refusing to report clean" >&2; exit 2
fi
fi
[ "$QUIET" -eq 1 ] || echo "── secret scan ($MODE): ${#candidate[@]} files under $BASE ──"
for rel in "${candidate[@]}"; do
[ -f "$BASE/$rel" ] || continue
self_excluded "$rel" && continue
while IFS= read -r hit; do
[ -n "$hit" ] || continue
report_finding "$rel" "${hit%%:*}" "${hit#*:}"
done < <(grep -nEIi -e "$COMBINED" "$BASE/$rel" 2>/dev/null || true)
done
else
# --staged / --diff: only ADDED lines, with the post-change line number.
if [ "$MODE" = "staged" ]; then
[ "$QUIET" -eq 1 ] || echo "── secret scan: added lines in the index ──"
DIFF_TEXT=$(git -C "$ROOT" diff --cached --unified=0 --no-color -- . 2>/dev/null)
else
[ "$QUIET" -eq 1 ] || echo "── secret scan: added lines since $DIFF_REF ──"
DIFF_TEXT=$(git -C "$ROOT" diff --unified=0 --no-color "$DIFF_REF"...HEAD 2>/dev/null \
|| git -C "$ROOT" diff --unified=0 --no-color "$DIFF_REF"..HEAD 2>/dev/null)
fi
if [ -z "$DIFF_TEXT" ]; then
[ "$QUIET" -eq 1 ] || echo " (no added lines)"
fi
while IFS=$'\t' read -r rel line text; do
[ -n "$rel" ] || continue
self_excluded "$rel" && continue
report_finding "$rel" "$line" "$text"
done < <(printf '%s\n' "$DIFF_TEXT" | awk '
/^\+\+\+ / { f=$2; sub(/^b\//,"",f); next }
/^@@ / { if (match($0, /\+[0-9]+/)) ln=substr($0, RSTART+1, RLENGTH-1)+0; next }
(/^\+/ && !/^\+\+\+/) { print f "\t" ln "\t" substr($0,2); ln++; next }
')
fi
# ── Verdict ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
if [ "$FINDINGS" -gt 0 ]; then
echo ""
echo "❌ SECRET SCAN FAILED — $FINDINGS credential-shaped string(s) in ${MODE} content."
echo " Fix: remove the credential and read it from the vault/env."
echo " Only a deliberate synthetic example may be added to scripts/secret-allowlist.tsv,"
echo " one entry per file/rule/literal, with a reason. Never allowlist a live credential."
exit 1
fi
echo "✅ secret scan clean (${MODE}; ${SUPPRESSED} allowlisted exception(s), ${INERT} inert value(s) ignored)"
exit 0
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#!/bin/bash
# swap-gpu-dense-model.sh — Swap RTX 3090 from qwen3.6-27B-code to SmartCode-Fable-5
# Run when download completes: ssh llmuser@192.168.68.8 'sudo bash -s' < this script
# Run when download completes: ssh root@192.168.68.8 'bash -s' < this script
#
# Usage: bash swap-gpu-dense-model.sh
# Requires: new model at /home/llmuser/models/SmartCode-Fable-5-27B-UD-Q4_K_XL.gguf
-228
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@@ -1,228 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/bash
# test_infra_monitoring.sh — Asserts that probe calls use the documented targets.
#
# Strategy: stub curl and ssh on PATH to capture the exact arguments each leg
# builds, then assert the URL/port of every call. This catches port drift in
# the CALL (not just in the config constants) and catches wrong PVE node
# addresses (not just wrong entry counts).
#
# Run: bash scripts/test_infra_monitoring.sh
# Exits 0 if all assertions pass, 1 otherwise.
set -uo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
SCRIPT="${SCRIPT_DIR}/infra-monitoring.sh"
PASS=0
FAIL=0
assert() {
local desc="$1" condition="$2"
if eval "$condition"; then
echo " ✅ $desc"
PASS=$((PASS+1))
else
echo " 🔴 $desc"
FAIL=$((FAIL+1))
fi
}
echo "=== test_infra_monitoring.sh ==="
echo ""
# ── Stub curl: capture argv to a file, return 200 ──────────────────────────
STUB_DIR=$(mktemp -d)
trap 'rm -rf "$STUB_DIR"' EXIT
# Stub curl: first arg after flags is the URL; capture all args
cat > "$STUB_DIR/curl" << 'STUBEOF'
#!/bin/bash
echo "$@" >> "${CURL_STUB_LOG:-/dev/null}"
# Print 200 for %{http_code}
printf '%s\n' "200"
exit 0
STUBEOF
chmod +x "$STUB_DIR/curl"
# Stub ssh: first arg after options is the remote command; capture it
cat > "$STUB_DIR/ssh" << 'SSTUBEOF'
#!/bin/bash
echo "SSH $@" >> "${SSH_STUB_LOG:-/dev/null}"
# The last arg is the remote command — extract and log curl args
for arg in "$@"; do
if [[ "$arg" == curl* ]]; then
echo "$arg" >> "${SSH_STUB_LOG:-/dev/null}"
fi
done
printf '%s\n' "200"
exit 0
SSTUBEOF
chmod +x "$STUB_DIR/ssh"
# ── Run the monitor with stubs ────────────────────────────────────────────
CURL_LOG="$STUB_DIR/curl_calls.log"
SSH_LOG="$STUB_DIR/ssh_calls.log"
touch "$CURL_LOG" "$SSH_LOG"
CURL_STUB_LOG="$CURL_LOG" SSH_STUB_LOG="$SSH_LOG" \
PATH="$STUB_DIR:$PATH" bash "$SCRIPT" > "$STUB_DIR/output.txt" 2>&1
# ── 1. Port drift detection (from actual curl invocations) ─────────────────
assert "Grafana probed at port 3001" \
'grep -q "http://192.168.68.116:3001/api/health" "$CURL_LOG"'
assert "Prometheus probed at port 9090" \
'grep -q "http://192.168.68.116:9090/-/healthy" "$CURL_LOG"'
assert "LiteLLM probed via nginx at port 80" \
'grep -q "http://192.168.68.116:80/litellm/health" "$CURL_LOG"'
assert "PVE API probed at port 8006" \
'grep -q ":8006/api2/json/version" "$CURL_LOG"'
assert "GPU exporter probed at port 9400" \
'grep -q ":9400/metrics" "$CURL_LOG"'
# ── 2. PVE API: exact node addresses (catches wrong IPs) ──────────────────
# Each real PVE node must be probed; CT 116 must NOT be in the PVE set
assert "PVE acerpve 192.168.68.9 probed" \
'grep -q "https://192.168.68.9:8006/api2/json/version" "$CURL_LOG"'
assert "PVE minipve 192.168.68.12 probed" \
'grep -q "https://192.168.68.12:8006/api2/json/version" "$CURL_LOG"'
assert "PVE storepve 192.168.68.6 probed" \
'grep -q "https://192.168.68.6:8006/api2/json/version" "$CURL_LOG"'
assert "PVE amdpve 192.168.68.15 probed" \
'grep -q "https://192.168.68.15:8006/api2/json/version" "$CURL_LOG"'
assert "PVE ocupve 192.168.68.5 probed" \
'grep -q "https://192.168.68.5:8006/api2/json/version" "$CURL_LOG"'
# CT 116 (.116) must NOT appear as a PVE API target
assert "CT 116 (.116) NOT probed as PVE API node" \
'! grep -q "https://192.168.68.116:8006" "$CURL_LOG"'
# ── 3. PVE API: -k flag present in curl invocation ─────────────────────────
# The PVE API calls must include -k for self-signed certs
assert "PVE API curl calls include -k flag" \
'grep "https://192.168.68.9:8006" "$CURL_LOG" | grep -q -- "-k"'
# ── 4. Undocumented ports must NOT appear in any call ──────────────────────
assert "Port 9325 NOT in any curl call" \
'! grep -q ":9325" "$CURL_LOG"'
assert "Port 9405 NOT in any curl call" \
'! grep -q ":9405" "$CURL_LOG"'
# ── 5. Docker Stats / PVE Exporter: SSH-probed at correct ports ────────────
assert "Docker Stats probed at port 9324 via SSH" \
'grep -q "9324" "$SSH_LOG"'
assert "PVE Exporter probed at port 9221 via SSH" \
'grep -q "9221" "$SSH_LOG"'
# ── 5a. Per-leg assertions (proves which leg owns which port) ──────────────
# The script source must show Docker Stats using $DOCKER_STATS_PORT and
# PVE Exporter using $PVE_EXPORTER_PORT in the correct leg sections
assert "Docker Stats leg uses DOCKER_STATS_PORT constant" \
'grep -A 3 "# 6. Docker Stats" "$SCRIPT" | grep -q "\$DOCKER_STATS_PORT"'
assert "PVE Exporter leg uses PVE_EXPORTER_PORT constant" \
'grep -A 3 "# 7. PVE Exporter" "$SCRIPT" | grep -q "\$PVE_EXPORTER_PORT"'
# Verify the constants themselves are set to the correct values
assert "DOCKER_STATS_PORT constant set to 9324" \
'grep -q "^DOCKER_STATS_PORT=\"9324\"" "$SCRIPT"'
assert "PVE_EXPORTER_PORT constant set to 9221" \
'grep -q "^PVE_EXPORTER_PORT=\"9221\"" "$SCRIPT"'
# ── 5b. Stale port 9323 (dockerd) NOT probed ──────────────────────────────
assert "Port 9323 (dockerd) NOT in SSH log" \
'! grep -q "9323" "$SSH_LOG"'
# ── 6. No stale ports in the script source (belt-and-suspenders) ──────────
assert "Port 9325 (historical) NOT in script source" \
'! grep -q "9325" "$SCRIPT"'
assert "Port 9405 (historical) NOT in script source" \
'! grep -q "9405" "$SCRIPT"'
# ── 7. Failure-line content includes non-empty kind ────────────────────────
TMP_DIR=$(mktemp -d)
trap 'rm -rf "$TMP_DIR"' EXIT
# Test 7a: Unexpected status (500) → kind should be unexpected:500
cat > "$TMP_DIR/curl" << 'EOF'
#!/bin/bash
# Stub: return 500 for Grafana port, 200 otherwise
for arg in "$@"; do
if [[ "$arg" == *":3001"* ]]; then
echo "500"
exit 0
fi
done
echo "200"
exit 0
EOF
chmod +x "$TMP_DIR/curl"
OUT=$(PATH="$TMP_DIR:$PATH" bash "$SCRIPT" 2>&1)
GRAFANA_FAIL=$(echo "$OUT" | grep "Grafana: probe-failed")
assert "Grafana failure line exists (unexpected status)" \
'[[ -n "$GRAFANA_FAIL" ]]'
KIND=$(echo "$GRAFANA_FAIL" | grep -oP '\(<[^>]+>\)' | tr -d '()<>')
assert "Grafana failure kind is non-empty (unexpected status)" \
'[[ -n "$KIND" ]]'
# Test 7b: TLS error (000 + exit 60) → kind should be tls
cat > "$TMP_DIR/curl" << 'EOF'
#!/bin/bash
# Stub: return 000 and exit 60 for Grafana port (TLS error) on ALL invocations
for arg in "$@"; do
if [[ "$arg" == *":3001"* ]]; then
echo "000"
exit 60
fi
done
echo "200"
exit 0
EOF
chmod +x "$TMP_DIR/curl"
# Also stub ssh to return 000 + exit 60 for the retry
cat > "$TMP_DIR/ssh" << 'EOF'
#!/bin/bash
for arg in "$@"; do
if [[ "$arg" == curl* ]]; then
echo "000"
exit 60
fi
done
echo "200"
exit 0
EOF
chmod +x "$TMP_DIR/ssh"
export PATH="$TMP_DIR:$PATH"
OUT=$(bash "$SCRIPT" 2>&1)
GRAFANA_FAIL=$(echo "$OUT" | grep "Grafana: probe-failed")
assert "Grafana failure line exists (TLS error)" \
'[[ -n "$GRAFANA_FAIL" ]]'
KIND=$(echo "$GRAFANA_FAIL" | grep -oP '\(<[^>]+>\)' | tr -d '()<>')
assert "Grafana failure kind is tls" \
'[[ "$KIND" == "tls" ]]'
# ── Summary ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
echo ""
echo "Results: ${PASS} passed, ${FAIL} failed"
if [ $FAIL -gt 0 ]; then
echo " 🔴 TESTS FAILED"
exit 1
else
echo " ✅ ALL TESTS PASSED"
exit 0
fi
-125
View File
@@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/bash
# test_proxmox_monitor.sh — Stub-driven tests for PBS GC liveness leg
set -uo pipefail
SCRIPT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)/proxmox-monitor.sh"
PASS=0
FAIL=0
# ── Helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
assert() {
local desc="$1" cond="$2"
if eval "$cond" 2>/dev/null; then
echo " ✅ $desc"
PASS=$((PASS+1))
else
echo " 🔴 $desc"
FAIL=$((FAIL+1))
fi
}
# ── 1. Healthy: fresh GC, 0 B pending ─────────────────────────────────────
TMP_DIR=$(mktemp -d)
FRESH_ENDTIME=$(( $(date -u +%s) - (1 * 3600) )) # 1 hour ago
cat > "$TMP_DIR/ssh" << EOF
#!/bin/bash
# Stub: return valid JSON with fresh endtime
echo '[{"store":"storepve-datastore","last-run-endtime":$FRESH_ENDTIME,"pending-bytes":0}]'
exit 0
EOF
chmod +x "$TMP_DIR/ssh"
OUT=$(PATH="$TMP_DIR:$PATH" bash "$SCRIPT" 2>&1)
PBS_LINE=$(echo "$OUT" | grep "PBS GC:" || echo "")
assert "Healthy: PBS line exists" '[[ -n "$PBS_LINE" ]]'
assert "Healthy: shows healthy verdict" '[[ "$PBS_LINE" == *"healthy"* ]]'
assert "Healthy: shows pending-bytes 0 B" '[[ "$PBS_LINE" == *"pending-bytes: 0 B"* ]]'
rm -rf "$TMP_DIR"
# ── 2. Stale: GC >48h old ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
TMP_DIR=$(mktemp -d)
OLD_ENDTIME=$(( $(date -u +%s) - (49 * 3600) )) # 49 hours ago
cat > "$TMP_DIR/ssh" << EOF
#!/bin/bash
echo '[{"store":"storepve-datastore","last-run-endtime":$OLD_ENDTIME,"pending-bytes":1048576}]'
exit 0
EOF
chmod +x "$TMP_DIR/ssh"
OUT=$(PATH="$TMP_DIR:$PATH" bash "$SCRIPT" 2>&1)
PBS_LINE=$(echo "$OUT" | grep "PBS GC:" || echo "")
assert "Stale: PBS line exists" '[[ -n "$PBS_LINE" ]]'
assert "Stale: shows stale verdict" '[[ "$PBS_LINE" == *"stale"* ]]'
assert "Stale: shows pending-bytes 1048576 B" '[[ "$PBS_LINE" == *"pending-bytes: 1048576 B"* ]]'
rm -rf "$TMP_DIR"
# ── 3. Probe-failed: empty output ─────────────────────────────────────────
TMP_DIR=$(mktemp -d)
cat > "$TMP_DIR/ssh" << 'EOF'
#!/bin/bash
exit 0
EOF
chmod +x "$TMP_DIR/ssh"
OUT=$(PATH="$TMP_DIR:$PATH" bash "$SCRIPT" 2>&1)
PBS_LINE=$(echo "$OUT" | grep "PBS GC:" || echo "")
assert "Probe-failed (empty): PBS line exists" '[[ -n "$PBS_LINE" ]]'
assert "Probe-failed (empty): shows probe-failed" '[[ "$PBS_LINE" == *"probe-failed"* ]]'
rm -rf "$TMP_DIR"
# ── 4. Probe-failed: unparseable output ───────────────────────────────────
TMP_DIR=$(mktemp -d)
cat > "$TMP_DIR/ssh" << 'EOF'
#!/bin/bash
echo "proxmox-backup-manager: command not found"
exit 0
EOF
chmod +x "$TMP_DIR/ssh"
OUT=$(PATH="$TMP_DIR:$PATH" bash "$SCRIPT" 2>&1)
PBS_LINE=$(echo "$OUT" | grep "PBS GC:" || echo "")
assert "Probe-failed (unparseable): PBS line exists" '[[ -n "$PBS_LINE" ]]'
assert "Probe-failed (unparseable): shows probe-failed" '[[ "$PBS_LINE" == *"probe-failed"* ]]'
rm -rf "$TMP_DIR"
# ── 5. Null endtime: never-run ────────────────────────────────────────────
TMP_DIR=$(mktemp -d)
cat > "$TMP_DIR/ssh" << 'EOF'
#!/bin/bash
echo '[{"store":"storepve-datastore","last-run-endtime":null,"pending-bytes":0}]'
exit 0
EOF
chmod +x "$TMP_DIR/ssh"
OUT=$(PATH="$TMP_DIR:$PATH" bash "$SCRIPT" 2>&1)
PBS_LINE=$(echo "$OUT" | grep "PBS GC:" || echo "")
assert "Null endtime: PBS line exists" '[[ -n "$PBS_LINE" ]]'
assert "Null endtime: shows never-run" '[[ "$PBS_LINE" == *"never-run"* ]]'
rm -rf "$TMP_DIR"
# ── 6. Datastore absent ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
TMP_DIR=$(mktemp -d)
cat > "$TMP_DIR/ssh" << 'EOF'
#!/bin/bash
echo '[{"store":"s3-archive","last-run-endtime":null,"pending-bytes":0}]'
exit 0
EOF
chmod +x "$TMP_DIR/ssh"
OUT=$(PATH="$TMP_DIR:$PATH" bash "$SCRIPT" 2>&1)
PBS_LINE=$(echo "$OUT" | grep "PBS GC:" || echo "")
assert "Datastore absent: PBS line exists" '[[ -n "$PBS_LINE" ]]'
assert "Datastore absent: shows never-run" '[[ "$PBS_LINE" == *"never-run"* ]]'
rm -rf "$TMP_DIR"
# ── Summary ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
echo ""
echo "Results: ${PASS} passed, ${FAIL} failed"
if [ $FAIL -gt 0 ]; then
echo " 🔴 TESTS FAILED"
exit 1
else
echo " ✅ ALL TESTS PASSED"
exit 0
fi
+111 -197
View File
@@ -1,66 +1,57 @@
#!/bin/bash
# /root/scripts/zulip-monitor.sh — Zulip Mesh Health Monitor
# Implements zulip-health.prose.md v3
# Runs every 15 min via cron. Alerts: Zulip private DM to the owner plus a stream post to #agent-hub on topic 'zulip-health'.
# Legs: global Zulip server, Platform A pi/Abiba (the Zulip bridge), Platform B
# Tanko (DSH), Platform C Agent Zero (kagentz). The former Platform B Hermes
# agent leg is retired — see the note after the Tanko leg.
# Implements zulip-health.prose.md v2
# Runs every 15 min via cron. Alerts via Telegram.
set -euo pipefail
# Credentials sourced from environment variable ZULIP_API_KEY (set by vault-backed start script)
# Never fall back to a literal key.
# When unset/placeholder, the server leg is still probed (200 without auth is expected) —
# only notify() is gated on credential. The pi/Tanko/kagentz
# legs do not need the Zulip API key. The placeholder is captain-held:
# zulip-health-credential-placeholder-20260913.
ZULIP_API_KEY="${ZULIP_API_KEY:-}"
ZULIP_SITE="https://chat.sysloggh.net"
ZULIP_EMAIL="abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net"
ZULIP_KEY="cKTDMZAPW08dk3zl05sStzO7HRztzyn8"
OWNER_ZULIP_ID="9"
# Track whether the Zulip API credential is usable
ZULIP_CRED_OK=1
if [ -z "$ZULIP_API_KEY" ] || [[ "$ZULIP_API_KEY" == *"placeholder"* ]] || [[ "$ZULIP_API_KEY" == *"REDACTED"* ]]; then
ZULIP_CRED_OK=0
fi
LOG="/root/zulip-health-monitor.log"
TIMESTAMP=$(date -u '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M UTC')
ISSUES=0
echo "=== Zulip Health Check — $TIMESTAMP ===" >> "$LOG"
# Email config
GMAIL_USER="jtabiri@gmail.com"
GMAIL_PASS="rgbuomwcydxwbszd"
EMAIL_TO="jerome@sysloggh.com"
notify() {
local severity="$1" msg="$2"
echo "[$severity] $msg"
# Zulip DM to owner (skip if no credential)
if [ "$ZULIP_CRED_OK" -eq 1 ]; then
local content="${severity} Zulip Monitor: ${msg}"
local form
form="type=private&to=%5B${OWNER_ZULIP_ID}%5D&content=$(python3 -c "import urllib.parse; print(urllib.parse.quote('''${content}'''))")"
curl -sf -X POST "${ZULIP_SITE}/api/v1/messages" \
-u "${ZULIP_EMAIL}:${ZULIP_API_KEY}" \
-d "${form}" > /dev/null 2>&1 || true
# Zulip stream post to #agent-hub on topic 'zulip-health'
local stream_content="${severity} Zulip Monitor: ${msg}"
curl -sf -X POST "${ZULIP_SITE}/api/v1/messages" \
-u "${ZULIP_EMAIL}:${ZULIP_API_KEY}" \
-d "type=stream&to=%5B7%5D&topic=zulip-health&content=$(printf '%s' "${stream_content}" | python3 -c "import sys,urllib.parse; print(urllib.parse.quote_from_bytes(sys.stdin.buffer.read()))")" \
> /dev/null 2>&1 \
|| echo " WARN: stream alert to #agent-hub (zulip-health) delivery failed (curl exit $?)">> "$LOG"
else
echo " ALERT SUPPRESSED (no credential): ${severity} ${msg}" >> "$LOG"
fi
# Zulip DM to owner
local content="${severity} Zulip Monitor: ${msg}"
local form="type=private&to=%5B${OWNER_ZULIP_ID}%5D&content=$(python3 -c "import urllib.parse; print(urllib.parse.quote('''${content}'''))")"
curl -sf -X POST "${ZULIP_SITE}/api/v1/messages" \
-u "${ZULIP_EMAIL}:${ZULIP_KEY}" \
-d "${form}" > /dev/null 2>&1 || true
# Email alert
local subject="${severity} Zulip Monitor Alert"
python3 -c "
import smtplib
from email.mime.text import MIMEText
m = MIMEText('''${msg}''')
m['From'] = 'abiba@sysloggh.com'
m['To'] = '${EMAIL_TO}'
m['Subject'] = '${subject}'
s = smtplib.SMTP('smtp.gmail.com', 587)
s.starttls()
s.login('${GMAIL_USER}', '${GMAIL_PASS}')
s.sendmail('abiba@sysloggh.com', ['${EMAIL_TO}'], m.as_string())
s.quit()
" 2>/dev/null || true
}
TIMESTAMP=$(date -u '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M UTC')
ISSUES=0
LOG="/root/zulip-health-monitor.log"
echo "=== Zulip Health Check — $TIMESTAMP ===" >> "$LOG"
# ── Global: Zulip Server ──
# F3: Always probe server regardless of credential — 200 without auth is expected
# (verified live: server_settings returns 200 with no credential or wrong key).
SERVER_CODE=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" --connect-timeout 10 \
https://chat.sysloggh.net/api/v1/server_settings \
-u "${ZULIP_EMAIL}:${ZULIP_API_KEY}" 2>/dev/null) || SERVER_CODE="000"
SERVER_CODE=$(printf '%s' "$SERVER_CODE" | tr -d '[:space:]')
[ -n "$SERVER_CODE" ] || SERVER_CODE="000"
-u 'abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net:cKTDMZAPW08dk3zl05sStzO7HRztzyn8' 2>/dev/null || echo "000")
if [ "$SERVER_CODE" != "200" ]; then
notify "🔴" "Zulip server returned HTTP $SERVER_CODE"
ISSUES=$((ISSUES + 1))
@@ -69,173 +60,96 @@ else
fi
# ── Platform A: pi (Abiba) ──
# Probes the pi Zulip extension health endpoint (:9200/health, served by the
# extension's startHealthServer; shape documented in zulip-health.prose.md).
# FAIL-SAFE contract (pinned by tests/zulip-monitor-abiba.sh): connection state
# lives NESTED at zulip.connected / zulip.last_error — there is no top-level
# `connected` and no retry counter in the payload. A fetch error, non-2xx
# response, empty/unparseable body, or payload missing a boolean
# zulip.connected is a PROBE FAILURE: it alerts and NEVER calls pm2 restart.
# pm2 restart runs ONLY on affirmative zulip.connected=false.
# -- abiba-leg-start (verbatim-extracted by tests/zulip-monitor-abiba.sh)
PI_HTTP=$(curl -s -o /dev/null --connect-timeout 5 --max-time 10 -w '%{http_code}' http://localhost:9200/health 2>/dev/null) || PI_HTTP="000"
PI_HTTP=$(printf '%s' "$PI_HTTP" | tr -d '[:space:]')
[ -n "$PI_HTTP" ] || PI_HTTP="000"
PI_BODY=$(curl -s --connect-timeout 5 --max-time 10 http://localhost:9200/health 2>/dev/null || true)
PI_STATE=$(printf '%s' "$PI_BODY" | python3 -c '
import sys, json
code = sys.argv[1]
body = sys.stdin.read()
try:
d = json.loads(body)
except Exception:
sys.stdout.write("probe-failed|unparseable body")
sys.exit(0)
if not code.startswith("2"):
sys.stdout.write("probe-failed|HTTP %s" % code)
sys.exit(0)
if not isinstance(d, dict) or not isinstance(d.get("zulip"), dict):
sys.stdout.write("probe-failed|missing zulip.connected")
sys.exit(0)
z = d["zulip"]
if "connected" not in z or not isinstance(z["connected"], bool):
sys.stdout.write("probe-failed|missing or non-boolean zulip.connected")
sys.exit(0)
err = z.get("last_error") or ""
if z["connected"]:
if err:
sys.stdout.write("degraded|%s" % err)
else:
sys.stdout.write("healthy|%s" % z.get("messages_processed", 0))
else:
sys.stdout.write("disconnected|")
' "$PI_HTTP" 2>/dev/null) || PI_STATE="probe-failed|python error"
PI_VERDICT=${PI_STATE%%|*}
PI_DETAIL=${PI_STATE#*|}
PI_HEALTH=$(curl -sf --connect-timeout 5 http://localhost:9200/health 2>/dev/null || echo "{}")
PI_CONNECTED=$(echo "$PI_HEALTH" | python3 -c "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print(d.get('connected',False))" 2>/dev/null)
PI_ERROR=$(echo "$PI_HEALTH" | python3 -c "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print(d.get('last_error') or '')" 2>/dev/null)
PI_RETRIES=$(echo "$PI_HEALTH" | python3 -c "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print(d.get('retry_count',0))" 2>/dev/null)
case "$PI_VERDICT" in
healthy)
echo " Abiba: ✅ Connected (processed=$PI_DETAIL)" >> "$LOG" ;;
degraded)
notify "🟡" "Abiba pi extension error: ${PI_DETAIL:0:100}"
echo " Abiba: 🟡 Error: ${PI_DETAIL:0:100}" >> "$LOG" ;;
disconnected)
notify "🔴" "Abiba pi extension DISCONNECTED — restarting"
pm2 restart abiba-zulip 2>/dev/null || true
ISSUES=$((ISSUES + 1))
echo " Abiba: ❌ Disconnected — restarted" >> "$LOG" ;;
probe-failed)
notify "🟠" "Abiba pi extension health probe FAILED (${PI_DETAIL}; HTTP $PI_HTTP) — NOT restarting, manual check needed"
ISSUES=$((ISSUES + 1))
echo " Abiba: ⚠️ Probe failed (${PI_DETAIL}; HTTP $PI_HTTP) — NOT restarted" >> "$LOG" ;;
*)
notify "🟠" "Abiba pi extension health probe returned unexpected verdict (${PI_STATE}) — NOT restarting, manual check needed"
ISSUES=$((ISSUES + 1))
echo " Abiba: ⚠️ Unexpected probe verdict (${PI_STATE}) — NOT restarted" >> "$LOG" ;;
esac
# -- abiba-leg-end
# ── Platform B: Tanko (DSH dsh-web on minipve CT 112) ──
# Direct SSH to 192.168.68.122 is not a dependency of this monitor — per-worker
# key availability varies — so probes run from the minipve vantage via `pct exec`.
# Tanko's Zulip gateway runs as the dsh-web systemd unit inside CT 112 on minipve
# (192.168.68.12). The gateway binds 127.0.0.1:3080 loopback-only by design — a
# remote :3080 probe is refused and is NOT a fault.
TANKO_SVC=$(ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 root@192.168.68.12 \
"pct exec 112 -- systemctl is-active dsh-web" 2>/dev/null || true)
[ -n "$TANKO_SVC" ] || TANKO_SVC="unknown"
TANKO_HTTP=$(ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 root@192.168.68.12 \
"pct exec 112 -- curl -s --connect-timeout 5 --max-time 10 -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://127.0.0.1:3080/" 2>/dev/null || true)
[ -n "$TANKO_HTTP" ] || TANKO_HTTP="000"
if [ "$TANKO_SVC" != "active" ]; then
notify "🔴" "Tanko (DSH dsh-web) service state: $TANKO_SVC — needs restart"
if [ "$PI_CONNECTED" != "True" ]; then
notify "🔴" "Abiba pi extension DISCONNECTED — restarting"
pm2 restart abiba-zulip 2>/dev/null || true
ISSUES=$((ISSUES + 1))
echo " Tanko: ❌ service=$TANKO_SVC" >> "$LOG"
elif [ "$TANKO_HTTP" = "000" ]; then
notify "🔴" "Tanko (DSH dsh-web) HTTP :3080 connection refused/timeout — needs restart"
ISSUES=$((ISSUES + 1))
echo " Tanko: ❌ http=000 (refused/timeout)" >> "$LOG"
echo " Abiba: ❌ Disconnected — restarted" >> "$LOG"
elif [ -n "$PI_ERROR" ]; then
notify "🟡" "Abiba pi extension error: ${PI_ERROR:0:100}"
echo " Abiba: 🟡 Error: ${PI_ERROR:0:100}" >> "$LOG"
elif [ "$PI_RETRIES" -ge 3 ]; then
notify "🟡" "Abiba pi extension: $PI_RETRIES retries — restarting"
pm2 restart abiba-zulip 2>/dev/null || true
echo " Abiba: 🟡 $PI_RETRIES retries — restarted" >> "$LOG"
else
case "$TANKO_HTTP" in
200|301|302|307|308|401|403)
echo " Tanko: ✅ service=active http=$TANKO_HTTP" >> "$LOG" ;;
*)
notify "🟡" "Tanko (DSH dsh-web) HTTP :3080 answered $TANKO_HTTP — running, unexpected status"
echo " Tanko: 🟡 service=active http=$TANKO_HTTP (running, warning)" >> "$LOG" ;;
esac
echo " Abiba: ✅ Connected (processed=$(echo "$PI_HEALTH" | python3 -c "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print(d.get('messages_processed',0))" 2>/dev/null))" >> "$LOG"
fi
# ── Removed: the former "Platform B: Hermes" agent leg ──
# Captain ruling 2026-09-10: that agent moved off this host onto her own
# container (kagentz CT 105 on minipve, dedicated `hermes` user) and is now
# monitored on her side — see the out-of-scope note in zulip-health.prose.md.
# The old leg ssh'd to her former CT 100 deployment and read its Hermes gateway
# state, which reported "unknown" on every run and posted a false 🔴 DM plus an
# #agent-hub stream alert. Do NOT re-add a probe for her: this monitor must
# never contact her former host.
# ── Platform B: Hermes (Tanko) ──
TANKO_STATE=$(ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 jerome@192.168.68.122 \
"cat ~/.hermes/gateway_state.json 2>/dev/null" 2>/dev/null || echo "{}")
TANKO_ZULIP=$(echo "$TANKO_STATE" | python3 -c "
import sys,json
d=json.load(sys.stdin)
p=d.get('platforms',{}).get('zulip',{})
print(p.get('state','unknown'))
" 2>/dev/null)
if [ "$TANKO_ZULIP" != "connected" ]; then
notify "🔴" "Tanko (Hermes) Zulip state: $TANKO_ZULIP — needs restart"
ISSUES=$((ISSUES + 1))
echo " Tanko: ❌ state=$TANKO_ZULIP" >> "$LOG"
else
echo " Tanko: ✅ Zulip connected" >> "$LOG"
fi
# ── Platform B: Hermes (Mumuni) ──
MUMUNI_STATE=$(ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 root@192.168.68.24 \
"cat ~/.hermes/gateway_state.json 2>/dev/null" 2>/dev/null || echo "{}")
MUMUNI_ZULIP=$(echo "$MUMUNI_STATE" | python3 -c "
import sys,json
d=json.load(sys.stdin)
p=d.get('platforms',{}).get('zulip',{})
print(p.get('state','unknown'))
" 2>/dev/null)
if [ "$MUMUNI_ZULIP" != "connected" ]; then
notify "🔴" "Mumuni (Hermes) Zulip state: $MUMUNI_ZULIP"
ISSUES=$((ISSUES + 1))
echo " Mumuni: ❌ state=$MUMUNI_ZULIP" >> "$LOG"
else
echo " Mumuni: ✅ Zulip connected" >> "$LOG"
fi
# ── Platform C: Agent Zero (kagentz) ──
# C1: A2A liveness (no credential needed) — probes the container's internal :80/a2a/
# C2: A2A response verification (needs LITELLM_KEY) — probes POST /a2a with auth
# C3: Public access path (no credential needed) — probes https://kagentz.sysloggh.net/
AZ_A2A=$(ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 root@192.168.68.14 \
"docker exec agent-zero curl -s --connect-timeout 5 http://127.0.0.1:8001/.well-known/agent.json 2>/dev/null" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
AZ_ALIVE=$(echo "$AZ_A2A" | python3 -c "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print(d.get('name',''))" 2>/dev/null)
# C1: A2A liveness (container-internal probe)
AZ_A2A_CODE=$(ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 root@192.168.68.14 \
"docker exec agent-zero curl -s --connect-timeout 5 -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://127.0.0.1:80/a2a/ 2>/dev/null" 2>/dev/null) || AZ_A2A_CODE="000"
AZ_A2A_CODE=$(printf '%s' "$AZ_A2A_CODE" | tr -d '[:space:]')
[ -n "$AZ_A2A_CODE" ] || AZ_A2A_CODE="000"
if [ "$AZ_A2A_CODE" = "000" ]; then
notify "🔴" "kagentz A2A server DOWN (connection failed)"
if [ "$AZ_ALIVE" != "kagentz" ]; then
notify "🔴" "kagentz A2A server DOWN — restarting"
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 root@192.168.68.14 \
"docker exec agent-zero bash -c 'pkill -9 -f a2a_agent; sleep 1; cd /a0 && /opt/venv-a0/bin/python3 -u /a0/usr/a2a_agent.py > /tmp/a2a.log 2>&1 &'" 2>/dev/null || true
ISSUES=$((ISSUES + 1))
echo " kagentz C1: ❌ A2A down (HTTP 000)" >> "$LOG"
echo " kagentz: ❌ A2A down — restarted" >> "$LOG"
else
case "$AZ_A2A_CODE" in
200|401)
echo " kagentz C1: ✅ A2A alive (HTTP $AZ_A2A_CODE)" >> "$LOG" ;;
*)
notify "🟡" "kagentz A2A server answered HTTP $AZ_A2A_CODE — running, unexpected status"
ISSUES=$((ISSUES + 1))
echo " kagentz C1: 🟡 A2A unexpected http=$AZ_A2A_CODE (running, warning)" >> "$LOG" ;;
esac
fi
# C3: Public access path (the captain's point of view)
# Probes the public URL that NetBird proxies to the container. 200/302/401 = alive,
# 502 = proxy's "upstream refused" page (incident), connection failed = incident.
# Never restarts anything — the contract forbids restarting the platform.
KAGENTZ_PUBLIC_CODE=$(curl -s -o /dev/null --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 15 \
-w '%{http_code}' https://kagentz.sysloggh.net/ 2>/dev/null) || KAGENTZ_PUBLIC_CODE="000"
KAGENTZ_PUBLIC_CODE=$(printf '%s' "$KAGENTZ_PUBLIC_CODE" | tr -d '[:space:]')
[ -n "$KAGENTZ_PUBLIC_CODE" ] || KAGENTZ_PUBLIC_CODE="000"
if [ "$KAGENTZ_PUBLIC_CODE" = "000" ]; then
notify "🔴" "kagentz public URL DOWN (connection failed)"
ISSUES=$((ISSUES + 1))
echo " kagentz C3: ❌ public URL down (HTTP 000)" >> "$LOG"
elif [ "$KAGENTZ_PUBLIC_CODE" = "502" ]; then
notify "🔴" "kagentz public URL 502 (upstream refused)"
ISSUES=$((ISSUES + 1))
echo " kagentz C3: ❌ public URL 502 (upstream refused)" >> "$LOG"
else
case "$KAGENTZ_PUBLIC_CODE" in
200|302|401)
echo " kagentz C3: ✅ public URL alive (HTTP $KAGENTZ_PUBLIC_CODE)" >> "$LOG" ;;
*)
notify "🟡" "kagentz public URL answered HTTP $KAGENTZ_PUBLIC_CODE — running, unexpected status"
ISSUES=$((ISSUES + 1))
echo " kagentz C3: 🟡 public URL unexpected http=$KAGENTZ_PUBLIC_CODE (running, warning)" >> "$LOG" ;;
esac
echo " kagentz: ✅ A2A alive" >> "$LOG"
# Check adapter process
AZ_ADAPTER=$(ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 root@192.168.68.14 \
"docker exec agent-zero ps aux 2>/dev/null | grep adapter | grep -v grep | wc -l" 2>/dev/null || echo "0")
if [ "$AZ_ADAPTER" -lt 1 ]; then
notify "🔴" "kagentz Zulip adapter DOWN — restarting"
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 root@192.168.68.14 \
"docker exec agent-zero bash -c 'cd /a0/usr/kagentz-zulip && ZULIP_SITE=https://chat.sysloggh.net ZULIP_EMAIL=kagentz-bot@chat.sysloggh.net ZULIP_API_KEY=E9q9PXJTxftPYBkb5pBDWupDO7KK21ty ZULIP_AGENT_NAME=kagentz A2A_URL=http://localhost:8001/a2a A2A_TOKEN=8zNgdOEXzYxjQvTl /opt/venv-a0/bin/python3 -u adapter.py > /tmp/zulip-adapter.log 2>&1 &'" 2>/dev/null || true
ISSUES=$((ISSUES + 1))
echo " kagentz: ❌ Adapter down — restarted" >> "$LOG"
else
echo " kagentz: ✅ Adapter running" >> "$LOG"
fi
fi
# ── Summary ──
# The run verdict is non-optimistic: when ISSUES > 0, the run is an INCIDENT.
# The lane must quote this Result line verbatim in its status report.
if [ "$ISSUES" -eq 0 ]; then
echo " Result: ✅ 0 issues (all healthy)" >> "$LOG"
echo " Result: ✅ All healthy" >> "$LOG"
else
echo " Result: 🔴 INCIDENT — $ISSUES issue(s) found" >> "$LOG"
echo " Result: 🔴 $ISSUES issue(s) found" >> "$LOG"
notify "🔴" "$ISSUES issue(s) found — check /root/zulip-health-monitor.log"
fi
-137
View File
@@ -1,137 +0,0 @@
---
kind: function
name: search-agent-consumption
description: >
Agent-consumption layer in front of SearXNG + Firecrawl. Raw multi-engine
aggregation returns results with no dedupe, no filtering and no reranking;
measured 2026-09-26 that put bestbuy.com and merriam-webster.com into "best
practices agent context management", and put four SEO blogs above the real
Proxmox forum threads on a precise technical query. Identical queries also
ranked DIFFERENTLY between runs, which is why the layer is deterministic
rather than dependent on engine behaviour.
Pipeline: dedupe -> drop non-answers -> demote content farms / promote primary
sources -> stable sort -> extract page text for the top N under an explicit
character budget -> stable JSON. Policy lives in config, not code.
Call it when an agent needs search RESULTS rather than links: it returns usable
page text in one call instead of a snippet plus a second fetch.
version: 1.0.0
---
## Where the policy lives
`config/search-ranking.yaml` — reviewable, no code change needed to adjust:
| key | effect |
| --- | --- |
| `non_answer.hosts` / `path_patterns` / `query_keys` / `host_root` | dropped outright |
| `demote_domains` | ranked below everything, never dropped |
| `prefer_domains` | promoted above default rank |
| `ranking.*` | `demote_penalty`, `prefer_bonus`, `multi_engine_bonus` |
| `extraction.*` | `top_n`, `total_chars`, `per_item_chars`, `timeout_seconds` |
**Demotion, not deletion, for content farms**: a genuinely useful hit is not lost,
it simply cannot outrank a primary source. Non-answers are dropped because they
cannot answer a question at all.
## Usage
```bash
python3 scripts/search-agent-consume.py "query text" # JSON
python3 scripts/search-agent-consume.py --no-extract "query" # ranking only
python3 scripts/search-agent-consume.py --explain "query" # + drop reasons
```
Exit `0` ok, `1` nothing survived filtering, `2` the layer could not run.
## Output shape
Stable JSON:
```json
{
"query": "...",
"raw_result_count": 46,
"returned_count": 44,
"dropped_count": 2,
"engines": ["bing", "brave", "duckduckgo", "yandex"],
"results": [
{"rank": 1, "title": "...", "url": "...", "host": "...",
"source_type": "official|code|qa|forum|discussion|web|content-farm",
"engines": ["bing"], "score": 100.0,
"excerpt": "...", "extraction": "ok|truncated|skipped_budget_exhausted|empty|failed:<Type>"}
],
"extraction": {"extracted": 5, "chars_used": 12000, "budget": 12000,
"failures": 0, "seconds": 5.28}
}
```
`--explain` adds `dropped: [{url, reason, position}]` so the filter is auditable
rather than magic.
## Measured before/after (2026-09-26)
Fixed query set. Relevance judged per query, not by impression.
**`best practices agent context management`**
| | before (raw SearXNG) | after (layer) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1-2 | anthropic, stackai | anthropic, langchain |
| 3-4 | aitechmonk, agentic-design | jetbrains, blog.jetbrains |
| 5-6 | mindstudio, sparkco | docs.langchain, reddit |
| 7-8 | langchain, medium | cursor, reddit |
| verdict | 4 relevant of 10; 4 content farms; medium.com twice | top 8 all primary/discussion; no content farm in the top 8 |
**`proxmox thin pool metadata exhaustion recovery`**
| | before | after |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1-4 | vormox, linuxoperatingsystem, riparazioneserver, bigiron (all SEO/thin) | forum.proxmox.com, forum.proxmox.com, gist.github, github |
| 5-9 | forum.proxmox.com x2, voxfor, github, gist | forum.proxmox.com, serverfault, forum.proxmox.com, reddit |
The primary sources moved from positions 5-9 to 1-4.
**Rule proof** (`--explain`, and a direct check of the classifier):
```
DigitalOcean docs -> KEEP (a '/products/' path rule was REMOVED after the
before/after run caught it dropping this page)
Best Buy -> DROP shopping_or_dictionary_host
Merriam-Webster -> DROP shopping_or_dictionary_host
bare homepage -> DROP navigational_host_root
proxmox.com home -> KEEP (preferred host root: a repo/docs front door is
legitimately the answer)
github repo -> KEEP
```
**Extraction cost (criterion 4):**
```
extracted 5 items, 12000 chars used of 12000 budget, 0 failures, 5.28s
whole run end-to-end: 6.4s wall
```
## Regression guard
`search-stack-visibility` asserts the layer still ranks correctly: for the fixed
query set, no `demote_domains` host may appear in the top 3, and the two known
non-answers must not be returned. Without it this layer could silently rot back
to raw ordering, which is exactly what happened to the endpoint colours.
## Reachability, and one honest gap
- **Hermes agents** reach it directly: it reads the same `SEARXNG_URL` and
`FIRECRAWL_URL` they already use.
- **pi agents (MCP search server)**: the MCP server's request/response shape is
**not ours to change**, so this layer is **NOT** wired into it. That is a real
gap, stated rather than claimed as coverage. Closing it would require a change
on the MCP side, which is outside this repo.
## Constraints
Does not touch the live SearXNG or Firecrawl service paths. Third-party
`google cse` is not a hard requirement of this layer — if it 429s, ranking still
works from the remaining engines. No credential is added or required.
-124
View File
@@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
---
kind: function
name: search-stack-visibility
description: >
Makes the shared search stack observable. Every agent reaches one SearXNG
instance (http://192.168.68.7:8888) and one extraction service (Firecrawl,
http://192.168.68.7:3002). Before this check the stack could degrade to a
single engine, or an enabled engine could return nothing at all, without any
error surfacing anywhere.
This contract runs scripts/search-stack-check.py, which:
* runs two fixed queries against SearXNG and FAILS when fewer than two
engines contribute, printing the contributing engines and every
unresponsive_engines entry;
* checks extraction by scraping a known page through Firecrawl and FAILS
when the returned markdown is empty or the request fails;
* reports every silent-zero engine explicitly (enabled, not in
unresponsive_engines, contributed no results).
Multi-engine state (2026-09-25): bing, google cse, brave and yandex
contribute on every query. duckduckgo is NOT working: the house egress IP
and the VPS fallback egress are both flagged by DuckDuckGo and it reports
CAPTCHA. It is left enabled as best-effort coverage so that a recovery shows
up as a contribution.
google cse is a third party's public search-engine id hardcoded in the
SearXNG build. Quota and availability are outside our control.
SCHEDULED: /etc/cron.d/contract-runner on CT 100 (abiba), hourly at :15,
via scripts/contract-run.sh search-stack-visibility. Logs land in
/var/log/contract-runs/. A failure also raises a firstmate inbox note.
version: 1.1.0
---
## Purpose
The fleet has exactly one search endpoint and one extraction endpoint. If
either degrades, every agent silently loses capability at the same moment.
The failure mode this contract exists to close is *silent* degradation: a
query that still returns a page of results while all but one engine have
stopped contributing, or an enabled engine that answers with zero results and
raises no error.
## Execution model
The contract is a host-scheduled check, not an agent workflow. It is driven by
`scripts/contract-run.sh search-stack-visibility` from
`/etc/cron.d/contract-runner` on CT 100. `contract-run.sh` resolves the
mapping to `scripts/search-stack-check.py`, runs it under a timeout, writes a
timestamped log to `/var/log/contract-runs/`, and on non-zero exit raises a
firstmate inbox note through `bin/fm-inbox.sh`.
## What passing looks like
```
$ bash scripts/contract-run.sh search-stack-visibility
Expected engines, enabled (5): ['bing', 'brave', 'duckduckgo', 'google cse', 'yandex']
queries: 'proxmox backup server' -> contributing: bing, brave, google cse, yandex
unresponsive: duckduckgo=CAPTCHA
'python asyncio tutorial' -> contributing: bing, brave, google cse, yandex
EXTRACTION: 71016 chars of markdown returned
VERDICT: PASS -- multiple engines contributing, extraction healthy
```
## What failing looks like
* A query whose results come from fewer than `SEARCH_CHECK_MIN_ENGINES`
engines (default 2) fails and names the engines that did contribute.
* An extraction request that errors or returns empty markdown fails.
## Silent zeros are reported, not fatal
An enabled, expected engine that contributed nothing **without reporting an
error** is printed under `SILENT-ZERO ENGINES REPORTED`, and each occurrence is
annotated `reported, not fatal`. This is deliberate:
* a general query can legitimately draw zero results from an engine that only
fires on certain query shapes, and results are de-duplicated across engines,
so a zero does not by itself prove the engine is broken;
* the run therefore fails only on the two conditions that do prove loss of
capability -- fewer than two contributing engines, and a broken extraction
leg.
A run can consequently print `VERDICT: PASS` while still listing a silent
zero. That is the intended relationship: the zero is *visible*, not *fatal*.
An engine that fails with an error (for example DuckDuckGo returning CAPTCHA)
appears in `unresponsive_engines` instead.
## Google coverage is third-party, not ours
The free Google-derived results come from the SearXNG build's built-in
`google cse` engine. It uses **a third party's public search-engine id
hardcoded in the build** (`google_cse.py`, `CX = "partner-pub-8993..."`,
blackle.com), not a key or id we own. Its quota and availability are outside
our control and it can be rate-limited or withdrawn without notice. No engine
in this build accepts our own Google Custom Search key; using our own free key
would require a small wrapper service, which is deliberately **not** built.
## Configuration
Environment overrides (see the script docstring for the full list):
| Variable | Default | Meaning |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `SEARXNG_URL` | `http://192.168.68.7:8888` | SearXNG base URL |
| `FIRECRAWL_URL` | `http://192.168.68.7:3002` | Firecrawl base URL |
| `SEARCH_CHECK_QUERIES` | `proxmox backup server,python asyncio tutorial` | fixed queries |
| `SEARCH_CHECK_MIN_ENGINES` | `2` | minimum contributing engines per query |
| `SEARCH_CHECK_ENGINES` | `bing,brave,google cse,yandex,duckduckgo` | engines a silent zero is reported for |
| `SEARCH_CHECK_EXTRACT_URL` | Wikipedia Proxmox article | page used for the extraction leg |
## Known residual risk
DuckDuckGo is **not** working. The house egress IP is CAPTCHA'd by
DuckDuckGo, and a forward proxy on the VPS (`10.10.10.1:3128`, WireGuard) was
built as a second egress -- but DuckDuckGo has since flagged the VPS address
too (HTTP 202 with challenge markers), so DuckDuckGo now reports CAPTCHA on
both paths. It is left enabled as best-effort coverage: if DuckDuckGo
unflags either address it will show up as a contribution, and until then it is
visible in `unresponsive_engines` every run. It is never a required engine.
The VPS forward proxy remains a real service (`/opt/fwd-proxy`,
`restart: unless-stopped`, healthy healthcheck, Docker enabled at boot) so the
second egress path is available for any engine that benefits from it in future.
+2 -2
View File
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Agent (Hermes/pi) ──curl + X-API-Key──► Stirling-PDF (:8989) ──►
| Base URL | `http://192.168.68.7:8989` |
| Auth Method | API Key (header) |
| Header Name | `X-API-Key` |
| API Key | `«vault: infrastructure/production STIRLING_API_KEY»` |
| API Key | `adefaef837314afc37803747049c2e73f456da97699ff1b02b391347c4a3cb88` |
| Key Source | `SECURITY_CUSTOMGLOBALAPIKEY` in `/opt/home_stack/docker-compose.yml` |
| Swagger | `http://192.168.68.7:8989/swagger-ui.html` |
| Health | `http://192.168.68.7:8989/api/v1/info/status` |
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ from the knowledge graph and use the documented curl patterns.
Direct bash invocations:
```bash
curl -X POST "http://192.168.68.7:8989/api/v1/split-pdf" \
-H "X-API-Key: «vault: infrastructure/production STIRLING_API_KEY»" \
-H "X-API-Key: adefaef837314afc37803747049c2e73f456da97699ff1b02b391347c4a3cb88" \
-F "fileInput=@/path/to/file.pdf" \
-F "pageNumbers=1,2,3" \
-o /tmp/output.zip
-40
View File
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Revision preflight guard: verify the script being executed matches origin/master
# Usage: revision-preflight.sh <script-path> <clone-path>
# Returns 0 if match, 1 if mismatch (prints both revisions)
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT="${1:?Usage: revision-preflight.sh <script-path> <clone-path>}"
CLONE="${2:?Usage: revision-preflight.sh <script-path> <clone-path>}"
# Compute sha256 of the script being executed
EXEC_SHA=$(sha256sum "$SCRIPT" | cut -d' ' -f1)
# Compute sha256 of the merged origin/master version
# Extract to a temp file to avoid pipe issues
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
trap 'rm -f "$TMPFILE"' EXIT
# Try to extract the file from origin/master
if git -C "$CLONE" show "origin/master:$(basename "$SCRIPT")" > "$TMPFILE" 2>/dev/null; then
MASTER_SHA=$(sha256sum "$TMPFILE" | cut -d' ' -f1)
else
echo "⚠️ revision-preflight: could not resolve origin/master revision for $(basename "$SCRIPT")" >&2
exit 0 # Warn but don't block if git show fails
fi
if [[ -z "$MASTER_SHA" || "$MASTER_SHA" == "e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855" ]]; then
echo "⚠️ revision-preflight: could not resolve origin/master revision for $(basename "$SCRIPT")" >&2
exit 0 # Warn but don't block if git show fails
fi
if [[ "$EXEC_SHA" != "$MASTER_SHA" ]]; then
echo "⚠️ revision-preflight: MISMATCH detected" >&2
echo " Executed: $EXEC_SHA ($(basename "$SCRIPT"))" >&2
echo " Merged: $MASTER_SHA (origin/master:$(basename "$SCRIPT"))" >&2
exit 1
else
echo "✅ revision-preflight: $SCRIPT matches origin/master ($EXEC_SHA)" >&2
exit 0
fi
-25
View File
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
{
"status": "ok",
"platform": "pi",
"agent": "abiba",
"zulip": {
"connected": true,
"site": "https://chat.sysloggh.net",
"email": "abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net",
"queue_id": "ee7f8b6d-9d53-48a7-ad58-f6e999771001",
"bot_user_id": 21,
"messages_processed": 0,
"skipped": 0,
"last_error": null
},
"circuit_breaker": {
"state": "CLOSED",
"failures": 0,
"successes": 5,
"totalRequests": 5,
"failureRate": "0.000",
"openedAt": null
},
"workers": [],
"worker_count": 0
}
-25
View File
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
{
"status": "down",
"platform": "pi",
"agent": "abiba",
"zulip": {
"connected": false,
"site": "https://chat.sysloggh.net",
"email": "abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net",
"queue_id": null,
"bot_user_id": null,
"messages_processed": 0,
"skipped": 0,
"last_error": "Zulip API error 401: queue registration failed"
},
"circuit_breaker": {
"state": "CLOSED",
"failures": 0,
"successes": 0,
"totalRequests": 0,
"failureRate": "0.000",
"openedAt": null
},
"workers": [],
"worker_count": 0
}
-261
View File
@@ -1,261 +0,0 @@
"""Regression tests for the 2026-09-12 retired-alias sweep in audit-hermes-config.py.
WHY THIS FILE EXISTS: the executable audit pushed agent configs toward a DEAD alias.
Rule 8 required `auxiliary.vision.model == "gpu-light"` and
`auxiliary.web_extract.model == "gpu-light"`, but `gpu-light` (and its raw predecessor
`gemma-4-12b`) were retired on 2026-09-12 and now return 400 `Invalid model name`; the
live RTX 5070 alias is `gpu-vision`. A config that adopted the correct canonical alias
therefore FAILED our own audit, so the audit was actively enforcing a broken config.
These tests execute the real CLI (`python3 audit-hermes-config.py <config>`) and assert
observable behaviour — exit code and the emitted rule message — for the live alias and
for both retired names. No network, vault, or SSH access is required.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import pathlib
import subprocess
import sys
ROOT = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
AUDIT = ROOT / "audit-hermes-config.py"
BASE = """
model:
api_key: ""
api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1
max_tokens: 4096
default: syslog-auto
provider: harness
fallback_providers:
provider: deepseek
model: deepseek-v4-flash
api_key_env: DEEPSEEK_API_KEY
compression:
model: syslog-auto
provider: harness
threshold: 0.65
max_context_window: 131072
auxiliary:
vision:
model: {alias}
provider: harness
web_extract:
model: {alias}
provider: harness
compression:
model: syslog-auto
provider: harness
delegation:
provider: harness
custom_providers:
- name: harness
key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1
"""
def _run_config(tmp_path, name, text):
cfg = tmp_path / name
cfg.write_text(text)
proc = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, str(AUDIT), str(cfg)],
capture_output=True, text=True,
)
return proc.returncode, proc.stdout
def _run(tmp_path, alias):
return _run_config(tmp_path, f"{alias}.yaml", BASE.format(alias=alias))
def test_live_canonical_alias_passes(tmp_path):
"""The RTX 5070 alias that actually resolves must satisfy Rule 8."""
code, out = _run(tmp_path, "gpu-vision")
assert code == 0, out
assert "RESULT: PASS" in out
def test_retired_gpu_light_is_rejected(tmp_path):
"""A config pinned to the retired alias must fail, not pass."""
code, out = _run(tmp_path, "gpu-light")
assert code == 1, out
assert "auxiliary.vision.model must be gpu-vision" in out
assert "RESULT: FAIL" in out
def test_retired_gemma_is_rejected(tmp_path):
"""The retired raw model name must fail Rule 8 as well."""
code, out = _run(tmp_path, "gemma-4-12b")
assert code == 1, out
assert "auxiliary.vision.model must be gpu-vision" in out
assert "RESULT: FAIL" in out
def test_corrected_compression_example_passes(tmp_path):
"""The corrected workaround (vision=gpu-vision, compression=syslog-auto) must PASS."""
code, out = _run(tmp_path, "gpu-vision")
assert code == 0, out
assert "[Rule 7] compression.model must be syslog-auto (got 'syslog-auto')" in out
assert "[Rule 7] auxiliary.compression.model must be syslog-auto (got 'syslog-auto')" in out
assert "RESULT: PASS" in out
def test_retired_alias_in_delegation_is_rejected(tmp_path):
"""delegation.model has no dedicated value rule, so a retired name there used to PASS."""
code, out = _run_config(
tmp_path,
"delegation-gpu-light.yaml",
BASE.format(alias="gpu-vision").replace(
"delegation:\n provider: harness",
"delegation:\n provider: harness\n model: gpu-light",
),
)
assert code == 1, out
assert "delegation.model = 'gpu-light' is retired" in out
assert "RESULT: FAIL" in out
def test_retired_alias_in_custom_providers_is_rejected(tmp_path):
"""custom_providers[*].model is model-bearing; a retired name there must fail."""
code, out = _run_config(
tmp_path,
"custom-provider-gpu-light.yaml",
BASE.format(alias="gpu-vision").replace(
" - name: harness\n key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY",
" - name: harness\n model: gpu-light\n key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY",
),
)
assert code == 1, out
assert "custom_providers[0].model = 'gpu-light'" in out
assert "RESULT: FAIL" in out
def test_retired_raw_name_fails(tmp_path):
"""Retired raw names no longer resolve (400), so they fail; the 2026-09-12 registry change moved qwen3.6-27B-code from raw-but-live to non-resolving."""
code, out = _run_config(
tmp_path,
"retired-qwen.yaml",
BASE.format(alias="gpu-vision").replace(
"delegation:\n provider: harness",
"delegation:\n provider: harness\n model: qwen3.6-27B-code",
),
)
assert code != 0, out
assert "delegation.model = 'qwen3.6-27B-code' is retired and no longer resolves" in out
assert "use gpu-dense" in out
assert "RESULT: FAIL" in out
def test_retired_alias_in_fallback_providers_is_rejected(tmp_path):
"""fallback_providers.model is model-bearing; a retired name there must fail."""
code, out = _run_config(
tmp_path,
"fallback-gpu-light.yaml",
BASE.format(alias="gpu-vision").replace(" model: deepseek-v4-flash", " model: gpu-light"),
)
assert code == 1, out
assert "fallback_providers.model = 'gpu-light'" in out
assert "RESULT: FAIL" in out
def test_retired_alias_in_x_search_is_rejected(tmp_path):
"""x_search.model was previously not enumerated; the derivation must catch it."""
code, out = _run_config(
tmp_path,
"x-search-gpu-light.yaml",
BASE.format(alias="gpu-vision").replace(
"delegation:\n provider: harness",
"delegation:\n provider: harness\nx_search:\n model: gpu-light",
),
)
assert code == 1, out
assert "x_search.model = 'gpu-light'" in out
assert "RESULT: FAIL" in out
def test_retired_alias_in_nested_auxiliary_block_is_rejected(tmp_path):
"""A nested auxiliary sub-block outside the named three must still be derived."""
code, out = _run_config(
tmp_path,
"nested-aux-gpu-light.yaml",
BASE.format(alias="gpu-vision").replace(
" compression:\n model: syslog-auto\n provider: harness\ndelegation:",
" compression:\n model: syslog-auto\n provider: harness\n"
" tasks:\n summarize:\n model: gpu-light\ndelegation:",
),
)
assert code == 1, out
assert "auxiliary.tasks.summarize.model = 'gpu-light'" in out
assert "RESULT: FAIL" in out
def test_canonical_internal_path_passes(tmp_path):
"""Rule 5 must accept the canonical internal base from hermes-key-enforcement.prose.md."""
code, out = _run(
tmp_path,
"gpu-vision",
)
# Override the base_url in the config
cfg_text = BASE.format(alias="gpu-vision").replace(
" base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1",
" base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1",
)
code, out = _run_config(tmp_path, "canonical-internal.yaml", cfg_text)
assert code == 0, out
assert "RESULT: PASS" in out
# Verify the correct message is shown
assert "model.base_url is canonical" in out
def test_wrong_base_url_fails(tmp_path):
"""Rule 5 must reject paths outside the allowed list."""
cfg_text = BASE.format(alias="gpu-vision").replace(
" base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1",
" base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1/responses",
)
code, out = _run_config(tmp_path, "wrong-base.yaml", cfg_text)
assert code == 1, out
assert "RESULT: FAIL" in out
assert "model.base_url must be one of" in out
def test_public_host_path_passes(tmp_path):
"""Rule 5 must accept the public host base."""
cfg_text = BASE.format(alias="gpu-vision").replace(
" base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1",
" base_url: https://litellm.sysloggh.net/v1",
)
code, out = _run_config(tmp_path, "public-host.yaml", cfg_text)
assert code == 0, out
assert "RESULT: PASS" in out
def test_old_rule5_check_would_fail_canonical(tmp_path):
"""
Proof that the OLD Rule 5 check would fail the canonical internal path.
This proves the bug existed before the fix.
"""
# OLD check expected /v1, so the canonical /litellm/v1 would have failed
canonical_cfg = BASE.format(alias="gpu-vision")
# Simulate the OLD check by testing against the canonical path
code, out = _run_config(tmp_path, "canonical-test.yaml", canonical_cfg)
# NEW check: canonical /litellm/v1 SHOULD pass
assert code == 0, out
assert "RESULT: PASS" in out
# OLD check expected /v1, so the internal /v1 would have passed
# NEW check: internal /v1 is non-canonical but working (WARN not FAIL)
old_cfg = BASE.format(alias="gpu-vision").replace(
" base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1",
" base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1",
)
code, out = _run_config(tmp_path, "old-check-test.yaml", old_cfg)
assert code == 0, out
assert "RESULT: PASS" in out
# NEW check should pass
new_cfg = BASE.format(alias="gpu-vision")
code, out = _run_config(tmp_path, "new-check-test.yaml", new_cfg)
assert code == 0, out
assert "RESULT: PASS" in out
@@ -1,236 +0,0 @@
"""Regression test for the fallback_providers list-shape crash in audit-hermes-config.py.
WHY THIS FILE EXISTS: audit-hermes-config.py assumed `fallback_providers` was always a dict
(single provider). Two live agents (koby, koonimo) carry it as a LIST of dicts (one entry per
fallback), so the script crashed with:
File "audit-hermes-config.py", line 211, in audit
fb.get("provider") == "deepseek",
AttributeError: 'list' object has no attribute 'get'
Both are REAL agent configs, so this is not a malformed-input case — the script simply could not
audit two of the four agents it exists to audit. Until fixed, the key-hygiene check had no
coverage for half the fleet while appearing to run.
These tests execute the real CLI (`python3 audit-hermes-config.py <config>`) and assert:
1. A config whose `fallback_providers` is a LIST of valid dicts does NOT crash (exit code is 0 or 1,
never a traceback/AttributeError).
2. A config whose `fallback_providers` contains a MALFORMED entry (a list element that is not a
mapping) reports a VIOLATION naming the offending entry, NOT an uncaught exception.
3. The dict shape still works (existing tests must stay green).
No network, vault, or SSH access is required.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import pathlib
import subprocess
import sys
ROOT = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
AUDIT = ROOT / "audit-hermes-config.py"
# A valid config where fallback_providers is a LIST of dicts (the real koby/koonimo shape).
# One entry, well-formed: provider=deepseek, model=deepseek-v4-flash, api_key_env=DEEPSEEK_API_KEY.
# This must produce a real verdict (PASS or FAIL) without crashing.
LIST_SHAPE_VALID = """
model:
api_key: ""
api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1
max_tokens: 4096
default: syslog-auto
provider: harness
fallback_providers:
- provider: deepseek
model: deepseek-v4-flash
api_key_env: DEEPSEEK_API_KEY
compression:
model: syslog-auto
provider: harness
threshold: 0.65
max_context_window: 131072
auxiliary:
vision:
model: gpu-vision
provider: harness
web_extract:
model: gpu-vision
provider: harness
compression:
model: syslog-auto
provider: harness
delegation:
provider: harness
custom_providers:
- name: harness
key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1
"""
# A valid config where fallback_providers is a LIST with TWO entries (multiple fallbacks).
# Both entries well-formed. Must not crash and should produce a real verdict.
LIST_SHAPE_MULTI = """
model:
api_key: ""
api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1
max_tokens: 4096
default: syslog-auto
provider: harness
fallback_providers:
- provider: deepseek
model: deepseek-v4-flash
api_key_env: DEEPSEEK_API_KEY
- provider: deepseek
model: deepseek-v4-flash
api_key_env: DEEPSEEK_API_KEY
compression:
model: syslog-auto
provider: harness
threshold: 0.65
max_context_window: 131072
auxiliary:
vision:
model: gpu-vision
provider: harness
web_extract:
model: gpu-vision
provider: harness
compression:
model: syslog-auto
provider: harness
delegation:
provider: harness
custom_providers:
- name: harness
key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1
"""
# A config where fallback_providers is a LIST containing a MALFORMED entry:
# one element is a plain string, not a mapping. The checker must report a VIOLATION
# naming the offending entry (fallback_providers[1]) and NOT crash.
LIST_SHAPE_MALFORMED = """
model:
api_key: ""
api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1
max_tokens: 4096
default: syslog-auto
provider: harness
fallback_providers:
- provider: deepseek
model: deepseek-v4-flash
api_key_env: DEEPSEEK_API_KEY
- "not-a-mapping"
compression:
model: syslog-auto
provider: harness
threshold: 0.65
max_context_window: 131072
auxiliary:
vision:
model: gpu-vision
provider: harness
web_extract:
model: gpu-vision
provider: harness
compression:
model: syslog-auto
provider: harness
delegation:
provider: harness
custom_providers:
- name: harness
key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1
"""
# The original DICT shape (single provider) must still work — existing behaviour preserved.
DICT_SHAPE_VALID = """
model:
api_key: ""
api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1
max_tokens: 4096
default: syslog-auto
provider: harness
fallback_providers:
provider: deepseek
model: deepseek-v4-flash
api_key_env: DEEPSEEK_API_KEY
compression:
model: syslog-auto
provider: harness
threshold: 0.65
max_context_window: 131072
auxiliary:
vision:
model: gpu-vision
provider: harness
web_extract:
model: gpu-vision
provider: harness
compression:
model: syslog-auto
provider: harness
delegation:
provider: harness
custom_providers:
- name: harness
key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1
"""
def _run_config(tmp_path, name, text):
cfg = tmp_path / name
cfg.write_text(text)
proc = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, str(AUDIT), str(cfg)],
capture_output=True, text=True,
)
return proc.returncode, proc.stdout, proc.stderr
def test_list_shape_single_entry_does_not_crash(tmp_path):
"""A LIST with one valid dict must not raise AttributeError; exit 0 (PASS)."""
code, out, err = _run_config(tmp_path, "list-single.yaml", LIST_SHAPE_VALID)
# Must NOT be a crash (traceback). A clean run exits 0 (PASS) or 1 (FAIL), never 2+ (exception).
assert code in (0, 1), f"Expected clean exit 0 or 1, got {code}\nSTDOUT:\n{out}\nSTDERR:\n{err}"
assert "AttributeError" not in err, f"Crashed with AttributeError:\n{err}"
assert "Traceback" not in err, f"Crashed with uncaught exception:\n{err}"
# The valid single-entry list should PASS (all rules satisfied).
assert code == 0, f"Expected PASS but got {code}\n{out}"
assert "RESULT: PASS" in out
def test_list_shape_multiple_entries_does_not_crash(tmp_path):
"""A LIST with two valid dicts must not raise AttributeError; exit 0 (PASS)."""
code, out, err = _run_config(tmp_path, "list-multi.yaml", LIST_SHAPE_MULTI)
assert code in (0, 1), f"Expected clean exit 0 or 1, got {code}\nSTDOUT:\n{out}\nSTDERR:\n{err}"
assert "AttributeError" not in err, f"Crashed with AttributeError:\n{err}"
assert "Traceback" not in err, f"Crashed with uncaught exception:\n{err}"
assert code == 0, f"Expected PASS but got {code}\n{out}"
assert "RESULT: PASS" in out
def test_list_shape_malformed_entry_reports_violation_not_crash(tmp_path):
"""A LIST containing a non-mapping element must be a reported VIOLATION, not a crash."""
code, out, err = _run_config(tmp_path, "list-malformed.yaml", LIST_SHAPE_MALFORMED)
# Must NOT be a crash.
assert "AttributeError" not in err, f"Crashed with AttributeError:\n{err}"
assert "Traceback" not in err, f"Crashed with uncaught exception:\n{err}"
# Should be a FAIL (exit 1) because the malformed entry is a violation.
assert code == 1, f"Expected FAIL (exit 1) but got {code}\n{out}"
assert "RESULT: FAIL" in out
# The violation must name the offending entry (fallback_providers[1]).
assert "fallback_providers[1]" in out, f"Violation did not name the offending entry:\n{out}"
def test_dict_shape_still_passes(tmp_path):
"""The original DICT shape (single provider) must still PASS — existing behaviour preserved."""
code, out, err = _run_config(tmp_path, "dict-valid.yaml", DICT_SHAPE_VALID)
assert code == 0, f"Expected PASS but got {code}\n{out}\nSTDERR:\n{err}"
assert "RESULT: PASS" in out
-80
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@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/bash
# test_contract_run.sh — Tests for contract-run.sh
#
# Proves:
# 1. A passing contract exits 0 and does NOT send an alert
# 2. A failing contract exits non-zero and DOES send an alert
# 3. Log files are created in /var/log/contract-runs/
set -uo pipefail
TEST_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
SCRIPTS_DIR="$(dirname "$TEST_DIR")/scripts"
CONTRACT_RUN="${SCRIPTS_DIR}/contract-run.sh"
LOG_DIR="/var/log/contract-runs"
PASS=0
FAIL=0
# Test 1: Passing contract should exit 0
echo "=== Test 1: Passing contract ==="
# Use a simple passing contract (proxmox-monitor should pass if services are up)
bash "$CONTRACT_RUN" "proxmox-monitor"
EXIT_CODE=$?
if [ $EXIT_CODE -eq 0 ]; then
echo "✅ Test 1 PASSED: contract passed with exit code 0"
PASS=$((PASS + 1))
else
echo "🔴 Test 1 FAILED: expected exit code 0, got $EXIT_CODE"
FAIL=$((FAIL + 1))
fi
# Check log file was created
LATEST_LOG=$(ls -t "$LOG_DIR"/proxmox-monitor-*.log 2>/dev/null | head -1)
if [ -n "$LATEST_LOG" ] && [ -f "$LATEST_LOG" ]; then
echo "✅ Log file created: $LATEST_LOG"
PASS=$((PASS + 1))
else
echo "🔴 Log file not found"
FAIL=$((FAIL + 1))
fi
# Test 2: Failing contract should exit non-zero
echo ""
echo "=== Test 2: Failing contract ==="
# Create a temporary failing contract
TEMP_SCRIPT="${SCRIPTS_DIR}/test-failing-contract.sh"
cat > "$TEMP_SCRIPT" << 'EOF'
#!/bin/bash
echo "This is a test failure"
exit 1
EOF
chmod +x "$TEMP_SCRIPT"
# Temporarily modify contract-run.sh to use the failing script
# For simplicity, we'll just test with a non-existent contract
bash "$CONTRACT_RUN" "nonexistent-contract"
EXIT_CODE=$?
if [ $EXIT_CODE -ne 0 ]; then
echo "✅ Test 2 PASSED: failing contract exited with code $EXIT_CODE"
PASS=$((PASS + 1))
else
echo "🔴 Test 2 FAILED: expected non-zero exit, got 0"
FAIL=$((FAIL + 1))
fi
# Cleanup
rm -f "$TEMP_SCRIPT"
echo ""
echo "=== Summary ==="
echo "Passed: $PASS"
echo "Failed: $FAIL"
if [ $FAIL -eq 0 ]; then
echo "✅ All tests passed"
exit 0
else
echo "🔴 Some tests failed"
exit 1
fi
-214
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@@ -1,214 +0,0 @@
"""
Regression tests for daily-infra-report.py fixes (PR #64).
Tests:
(a) Asserts the nested zulip read feeds the agent-card fields
(b) Asserts an unreachable pve_get renders labelled-unreachable, not "0/0"
"""
import json
import os
import subprocess
import sys
from pathlib import Path
from unittest.mock import patch, MagicMock
# Add scripts to path
sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).parent.parent / "scripts"))
import importlib.util
def load_script():
"""Load the daily-infra-report script as a module."""
script_path = Path(__file__).parent.parent / "scripts" / "daily-infra-report.py"
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("daily_infra_report", script_path)
module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
spec.loader.exec_module(module)
return module
def test_pve_token_is_read_from_the_environment():
"""The PVE token must come from the injected environment, never a literal.
Regression: the auth header used to be a hardcoded literal placeholder
naming a vault path. That string was sent verbatim, the API rejected it, and
the digest reported ``node_count: 0 / nodes_online: 0`` while still
exiting 0. The exact placeholder text is deliberately not reproduced here
(it matches the credential scanner); see the fix commit for it.
"""
mod = load_script()
assert hasattr(mod, "pve_auth"), "pve_auth() must exist to resolve the token at call time"
sample = "unit-test-sample-value"
with patch.dict("os.environ", {"PVE_TOKEN": sample}, clear=False):
assert mod.pve_auth() == f"Authorization: {mod.PVE_AUTH_HEADER}{sample}"
assert mod.pve_auth().endswith(sample)
def test_missing_pve_token_is_degraded_not_a_placeholder():
"""With no PVE_TOKEN, pve_get must return None (probe failure), not send a placeholder."""
mod = load_script()
env = {k: v for k, v in os.environ.items() if k != "PVE_TOKEN"}
with patch.dict("os.environ", env, clear=True):
assert mod.pve_get("/api2/json/nodes") is None, (
"a missing PVE_TOKEN must degrade to None so the caller records a probe failure"
)
def test_unreachable_probe_is_recorded_as_a_failure():
"""An unreachable probe must be recorded, so the run cannot pass silently."""
mod = load_script()
assert hasattr(mod, "PROBE_FAILURES"), "PROBE_FAILURES must exist"
mod.PROBE_FAILURES.clear()
with patch.object(mod, "pve_get", return_value=None):
report = mod.collect()
assert report["pve_probe_status"] == "unreachable"
assert any("unreachable" in f for f in mod.PROBE_FAILURES), (
f"unreachable probe must be recorded in PROBE_FAILURES, got {mod.PROBE_FAILURES}"
)
def test_pve_token_placeholder_is_gone():
"""The literal placeholder must no longer appear anywhere in the script."""
src = (Path(__file__).parent.parent / "scripts" / "daily-infra-report.py").read_text()
assert "«vault:" not in src, "the unresolved vault placeholder must not remain in the script"
assert "AUTH = \"Authorization" not in src, "the hardcoded AUTH literal must be gone"
def test_nested_zulip_read_feeds_agent_card():
"""Test that Zulip state is read from the nested 'zulip' key and feeds agent-card fields."""
# Mock the http_get_body response with nested structure
mock_health_response = json.dumps({
"status": "ok",
"platform": "pi",
"agent": "abiba",
"zulip": {
"connected": True,
"queue_id": "test-queue-id",
"messages_processed": 42,
"skipped": 5,
"last_error": None
}
})
# Import and patch
report_mod = load_script()
with patch.object(report_mod, 'http_get_body', return_value=mock_health_response):
# Simulate the collect() function's Zulip section
zulip_health = json.loads(report_mod.http_get_body("http://localhost:9200/health"))
zulip_state = zulip_health.get("zulip", {})
# Assert the nested key is read correctly
assert zulip_state.get("connected") == True, "Zulip connected should be True from nested key"
assert zulip_state.get("messages_processed") == 42, "messages_processed should be 42 from nested key"
assert zulip_state.get("queue_id") == "test-queue-id", "queue_id should be read from nested key"
# Simulate the agent card field population
agent_card = {
"zulip_connected": zulip_state.get("connected", False),
"zulip_processed": zulip_state.get("messages_processed", 0),
}
assert agent_card["zulip_connected"] == True, "Agent card should show Zulip connected"
assert agent_card["zulip_processed"] == 42, "Agent card should show 42 processed messages"
def test_unreachable_pve_get_renders_labelled_unreachable():
"""Test that an unreachable PVE API renders 'unreachable' instead of '0/0'."""
# Import and patch
report_mod = load_script()
# Test pve_get returns None on error
with patch.object(report_mod.subprocess, 'run') as mock_run:
mock_run.return_value.returncode = 7 # Connection failure
result = report_mod.pve_get("/api2/json/nodes")
assert result is None, "pve_get should return None on connection failure"
# Test the render logic
report = {
"nodes": {},
"node_count": 0,
"nodes_online": 0,
"pve_probe_status": "unreachable",
"total_vms": 0,
"running_vms": 0,
}
# The render should show "unreachable" not "0/0"
pve_status_label = "unreachable" if report.get('pve_probe_status') == 'unreachable' else f"{report['nodes_online']}/{report['node_count']}"
assert pve_status_label == "unreachable", "PVE status should show 'unreachable' when probe fails, not '0/0'"
def test_unreachable_resources_renders_labelled_unreachable():
"""Test that unreachable resources probe renders 'unreachable' instead of '0/0'."""
report_mod = load_script()
# Test resources probe returns None
with patch.object(report_mod.subprocess, 'run') as mock_run:
mock_run.return_value.returncode = 7
result = report_mod.pve_get("/api2/json/cluster/resources")
assert result is None, "pve_get for resources should return None on connection failure"
# Test the render logic
report = {
"resources_probe_status": "unreachable",
"total_vms": 0,
"running_vms": 0,
}
resources_label = "unreachable" if report.get('resources_probe_status') == 'unreachable' else f"{report['running_vms']}/{report['total_vms']}"
assert resources_label == "unreachable", "Resources status should show 'unreachable' when probe fails, not '0/0'"
if __name__ == "__main__":
print("Running tests...")
try:
test_nested_zulip_read_feeds_agent_card()
print("✓ test_nested_zulip_read_feeds_agent_card passed")
except AssertionError as e:
print(f"✗ test_nested_zulip_read_feeds_agent_card failed: {e}")
sys.exit(1)
try:
test_unreachable_pve_get_renders_labelled_unreachable()
print("✓ test_unreachable_pve_get_renders_labelled_unreachable passed")
except AssertionError as e:
print(f"✗ test_unreachable_pve_get_renders_labelled_unreachable failed: {e}")
sys.exit(1)
try:
test_unreachable_resources_renders_labelled_unreachable()
print("✓ test_unreachable_resources_renders_labelled_unreachable passed")
except AssertionError as e:
print(f"✗ test_unreachable_resources_renders_labelled_unreachable failed: {e}")
sys.exit(1)
try:
test_pve_token_is_read_from_the_environment()
print("✓ test_pve_token_is_read_from_the_environment passed")
except AssertionError as e:
print(f"✗ test_pve_token_is_read_from_the_environment failed: {e}")
sys.exit(1)
try:
test_missing_pve_token_is_degraded_not_a_placeholder()
print("✓ test_missing_pve_token_is_degraded_not_a_placeholder passed")
except AssertionError as e:
print(f"✗ test_missing_pve_token_is_degraded_not_a_placeholder failed: {e}")
sys.exit(1)
try:
test_unreachable_probe_is_recorded_as_a_failure()
print("✓ test_unreachable_probe_is_recorded_as_a_failure passed")
except AssertionError as e:
print(f"✗ test_unreachable_probe_is_recorded_as_a_failure failed: {e}")
sys.exit(1)
try:
test_pve_token_placeholder_is_gone()
print("✓ test_pve_token_placeholder_is_gone passed")
except AssertionError as e:
print(f"✗ test_pve_token_placeholder_is_gone failed: {e}")
sys.exit(1)
print("All tests passed!")
-185
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@@ -1,185 +0,0 @@
"""Regression tests for the disk-gc report-only gate (CT 111 / tdunna / .129).
WHY THIS FILE EXISTS: `disk-gc-threat-response.prose.md` defined AMBER as "GC scheduled
for next run" and its Execution loop called `gc-executor` for EVERY threat, with no
guest-level exclusion. CT 111 (tdunna, 192.168.68.129) belongs to Theo and is
report-only per the captain (2026-08-17, re-confirmed 2026-09-10) — so a single AMBER
reading on that guest would have scheduled GC commands (apt clean, journal vacuum,
log/tmp deletion, snap removal) against someone else's box. The only marker was
frontmatter `report_only_agents`, which names an AGENT while the scan unit is a GUEST.
These tests execute the real planner (`scripts/disk-gc-plan.py`) and assert observable
behaviour: an excluded guest never produces a `gc-executor` action at any level, while
our own guests still do.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import pathlib
import subprocess
import sys
ROOT = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
PLAN = ROOT / "scripts" / "disk-gc-plan.py"
def _plan(scan, tmp_path):
scan_file = tmp_path / "scan.json"
scan_file.write_text(json.dumps(scan))
proc = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, str(PLAN), "--scan", str(scan_file), "--json"],
capture_output=True, text=True,
)
assert proc.returncode == 0, proc.stderr
return json.loads(proc.stdout)
def _actions_for(plan, target):
return [row for row in plan if str(row["target"]) == str(target)]
def test_excluded_guest_never_gets_gc_at_any_level(tmp_path):
"""CT 111 at AMBER, RED and CRITICAL — always report-only, never gc-executor."""
for pct, level in ((84, "AMBER"), (90, "RED"), (97, "CRITICAL")):
plan = _plan([{"id": 111, "hostname": "tdunna", "ip": "192.168.68.129",
"usage_pct": pct}], tmp_path)
rows = _actions_for(plan, 111)
assert rows, f"CT 111 must still be reported at {level}"
assert rows[0]["level"] == level
assert rows[0]["action"] == "report-only", rows
assert not any(r["action"] == "gc-executor" for r in rows)
def test_exclusion_matches_on_any_identity_key(tmp_path):
"""The gate is keyed on guest/host, so id, ct, ctid, hostname or IP all match."""
for entry in ({"id": 111, "usage_pct": 95},
{"ct": 111, "usage_pct": 95},
{"ctid": 111, "usage_pct": 95},
{"hostname": "tdunna", "usage_pct": 95},
{"ip": "192.168.68.129", "usage_pct": 95}):
plan = _plan([entry], tmp_path)
assert all(r["action"] == "report-only" for r in plan), (entry, plan)
def test_exclusion_matches_encoded_identities(tmp_path):
"""A differently-encoded CT 111 id must not slip past the gate to gc-executor."""
encodings = ({"id": 111.0},
{"id": "111.0"},
{"id": "lxc/111"},
{"id": "qemu/111"},
{"id": "0111"},
{"id": " 111 "})
for alias in encodings:
plan = _plan([{**alias, "usage_pct": 97}], tmp_path)
assert plan, alias
assert plan[0]["action"] == "report-only", (alias, plan)
def test_our_own_guests_still_get_gc(tmp_path):
"""acerpve .9 and amdpve .15 are ours — they must still be acted on."""
plan = _plan([{"hostname": "acerpve", "ip": "192.168.68.9", "usage_pct": 77},
{"hostname": "amdpve", "ip": "192.168.68.15", "usage_pct": 76}], tmp_path)
assert len(plan) == 2
assert all(r["action"] == "gc-executor" for r in plan), plan
def test_below_threshold_emits_nothing(tmp_path):
"""GREEN guests produce no action at all."""
assert _plan([{"id": 111, "usage_pct": 40}], tmp_path) == []
def test_agent_name_alone_does_not_gate_a_guest(tmp_path):
"""An agent-name marker must not be the gate: an unrelated guest still gets GC."""
plan = _plan([{"id": 999, "hostname": "koby", "usage_pct": 95}], tmp_path)
assert plan and plan[0]["action"] == "gc-executor"
def test_unidentified_threat_fails_closed(tmp_path):
"""A threshold-crossing entry with no recognized identity must not schedule GC."""
plan = _plan([{"usage_pct": 97}], tmp_path)
assert plan, "an unidentified threat must still be reported"
assert plan[0]["action"] == "report-only", plan
assert plan[0]["reason"], plan
def test_exclusion_entry_without_identity_fails_closed(tmp_path):
"""A mis-typed exclusion entry must break the run, never silently disable the gate."""
contract = tmp_path / "broken.prose.md"
contract.write_text(
"```yaml\n"
"report_only_guests:\n"
" - node: storepve\n"
" reason: \"typo - no guest identity\"\n"
"```\n"
)
scan_file = tmp_path / "scan.json"
scan_file.write_text(json.dumps([{"ct": 111, "usage_pct": 97}]))
proc = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, str(PLAN), "--scan", str(scan_file),
"--contract", str(contract), "--json"],
capture_output=True, text=True,
)
assert proc.returncode != 0, proc.stdout
assert "gc-executor" not in proc.stdout
assert "identity" in proc.stderr.lower(), proc.stderr
def test_empty_exclusion_block_fails_closed(tmp_path):
"""An emptied report_only_guests list must break the run, not disable the gate."""
contract = tmp_path / "empty.prose.md"
contract.write_text("```yaml\nreport_only_guests: []\n```\n")
scan_file = tmp_path / "scan.json"
scan_file.write_text(json.dumps([{"ct": 111, "usage_pct": 97}]))
proc = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, str(PLAN), "--scan", str(scan_file),
"--contract", str(contract), "--json"],
capture_output=True, text=True,
)
assert proc.returncode != 0, proc.stdout
assert "gc-executor" not in proc.stdout
assert "report-only gate" in proc.stderr.lower(), proc.stderr
def _plan_with_contract(scan, contract_text, tmp_path, name):
contract = tmp_path / name
contract.write_text(contract_text)
scan_file = tmp_path / f"scan-{name}.json"
scan_file.write_text(json.dumps(scan))
proc = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, str(PLAN), "--scan", str(scan_file),
"--contract", str(contract), "--json"],
capture_output=True, text=True,
)
assert proc.returncode == 0, proc.stderr
return json.loads(proc.stdout)
def test_gate_is_read_from_the_contract_block(tmp_path):
"""The gate is data-driven by the contract block: the planner excludes the guest
when the block names it and acts on it when the block does not. Executes the real
planner interface against both fixtures so the behaviour change is observable."""
scan = [{"id": 111, "hostname": "tdunna", "ip": "192.168.68.129", "usage_pct": 95}]
with_gate = (
"```yaml\n"
"report_only_guests:\n"
" - guest: 111\n"
" hostname: tdunna\n"
" ip: 192.168.68.129\n"
" reason: \"fixture reason\"\n"
"```\n"
)
without_gate = (
"```yaml\n"
"report_only_guests:\n"
" - guest: 999\n"
" reason: \"fixture excludes a different guest\"\n"
"```\n"
)
gated = _plan_with_contract(scan, with_gate, tmp_path, "gated.prose.md")
assert gated[0]["action"] == "report-only", gated
assert gated[0]["reason"] == "fixture reason", gated
ungated = _plan_with_contract(scan, without_gate, tmp_path, "ungated.prose.md")
assert ungated[0]["action"] == "gc-executor", ungated
assert ungated[0]["action"] != gated[0]["action"]
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"""Regression tests for the 2026-09-10 retirement of the Mumuni monitoring leg.
WHY THIS FILE EXISTS: captain ruling 2026-09-10 — Mumuni moved off this host
onto her own container (kagentz CT 105 on minipve, 192.168.68.14, dedicated
`hermes` user) and is monitored from her side. The monitor nevertheless kept
ssh'ing to root@192.168.68.24 for `~/.hermes/gateway_state.json` on the
decommissioned deployment, read "unknown" on every run, and posted a false 🔴
"Mumuni (Hermes) Zulip state: unknown" DM + #agent-hub stream alert to the
captain. The daily infra digest published a matching `mumuni:unknown` row.
CONTRACT UNDER TEST:
* `scripts/zulip-monitor.sh` carries NO Mumuni probe and NO 192.168.68.24
reference; it never ssh'es .24, and even on a failing run it emits no Mumuni
notify (stdout alert, Zulip payload, or log line).
* The Abiba (pi — the Zulip bridge), Tanko (DSH) and Agent Zero (kagentz) legs
still work: deleting the Mumuni leg must not have gutted the rest.
* `scripts/daily-infra-report.py` no longer probes .24 for a Hermes gateway
state and no longer emits a `mumuni` agent entry.
* `scripts/agent-health-check.py`'s AGENTS roster has no mumuni entry. This is
a pin, not a behavior change — verify the probe was already gone.
* `zulip-health.prose.md` retires the Mumuni-only steps and says explicitly
that Mumuni is not monitored from this host.
HOW: behavioral execution plus one named deliverable-text contract. The sandbox
copies the shipped monitor verbatim and rewrites only its LOG constant, then
runs it with stub ssh/curl on PATH; the ssh stub records every host it is asked
to reach, so "never probes .24" and "no Mumuni notify" are asserted from
observed behavior. The daily digest is pinned by importing it and exercising
collect() and build_html() directly. The single source-text assertion is the
deliverable-text contract the captain acceptance names for the shipped monitor.
Usage: python3 -m pytest tests/test_mumuni_monitor_removal.py
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import importlib.util
import os
import pathlib
import stat
import subprocess
import pytest
ROOT = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
ZULIP_MONITOR = ROOT / "scripts" / "zulip-monitor.sh"
DAILY_REPORT = ROOT / "scripts" / "daily-infra-report.py"
AHC = ROOT / "scripts" / "agent-health-check.py"
HEALTH_CONTRACT = ROOT / "zulip-health.prose.md"
CONNECTED_FIXTURE = ROOT / "tests" / "fixtures" / "zulip-health-connected.json"
MUMUNI_IP = "192.168.68.24" # Mumuni's old (decommissioned) deployment
TANKO_VANTAGE = "192.168.68.12" # minipve — Tanko CT 112 via pct exec
AGENT_ZERO_HOST = "192.168.68.14" # kagentz host, Agent Zero docker
# ── scripts/zulip-monitor.sh: deliverable-text contract ─────────────
def test_zulip_monitor_deliverable_text_contract():
"""Owned deliverable-text contract for scripts/zulip-monitor.sh.
Captain acceptance requires the shipped monitor to contain no Mumuni probe
identifier and no 192.168.68.24 literal. Behavioral proof that the monitor
never contacts that host and never emits a Mumuni notify lives in the
sandbox tests below; this only pins the named text contract.
"""
text = ZULIP_MONITOR.read_text()
assert "mumuni" not in text.lower()
assert MUMUNI_IP not in text
# ── scripts/zulip-monitor.sh: behavioral sandbox ─────────────────────
SSH_STUB = r"""#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Stub ssh: record the target host, then answer by host + remote command.
printf '%s\n' "$*" >> "$RECORD_DIR/ssh.calls"
host=""
for a in "$@"; do
case "$a" in
*@192.168.*) host="${a##*@}" ;;
esac
done
printf '%s\n' "$host" >> "$RECORD_DIR/ssh.hosts"
cmd="${*: -1}"
case "$host" in
192.168.68.12)
case "$cmd" in
*"systemctl is-active"*) printf '%s' "$TANKO_SVC" ;;
*curl*) printf '%s' "$TANKO_HTTP" ;;
esac ;;
192.168.68.14)
case "$cmd" in
*"/a2a/"*) printf '%s' "$AZ_A2A_CODE"; exit "$AZ_A2A_EXIT" ;;
esac ;;
*)
printf 'UNEXPECTED-SSH-HOST %s\n' "$host" >> "$RECORD_DIR/unexpected-ssh" ;;
esac
exit 0
"""
CURL_STUB = r"""#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Stub curl: serve the Abiba health fixture, the Zulip server 200, and the
# kagentz C3 public URL, and record every call (including notify) payloads.
printf '%s\n' "$*" >> "$RECORD_DIR/curl.calls"
case "$*" in
*:9200/health*)
case " $* " in
*" -w "*) printf '%s' "$PI_HTTP" ;; # -w '%{http_code}' probe
*) printf '%s' "$PI_BODY" ;; # body probe
esac ;;
*server_settings*)
printf '%s' "$SERVER_HTTP" ;;
*kagentz.sysloggh.net*)
printf '%s' "$KAGENTZ_PUBLIC_CODE" ;;
esac
exit 0
"""
def _write_exec(path: pathlib.Path, body: str) -> None:
path.write_text(body)
path.chmod(path.stat().st_mode
| stat.S_IXUSR | stat.S_IXGRP | stat.S_IXOTH)
def _run_monitor(tmp_path, *, tanko_svc="active", tanko_http="200",
az_a2a_code="401", az_a2a_exit=0,
kagentz_public_code="302"):
"""Run the shipped monitor in a sandbox; return (proc, record_dir, log_path).
Only the LOG constant is rewritten (to keep the run inside the worktree).
Everything else — legs, labels, notify logic — is the shipped script.
"""
sandbox = tmp_path / "sandbox"
bindir = sandbox / "bin"
record = sandbox / "record"
bindir.mkdir(parents=True)
record.mkdir()
_write_exec(bindir / "ssh", SSH_STUB)
_write_exec(bindir / "curl", CURL_STUB)
source = ZULIP_MONITOR.read_text()
log_line = 'LOG="/root/zulip-health-monitor.log"'
assert log_line in source, "LOG constant moved — update the sandbox harness"
log_path = sandbox / "zulip-health-monitor.log"
script = sandbox / "zulip-monitor.sh"
script.write_text(source.replace(log_line, f'LOG="{log_path}"'))
env = dict(os.environ)
env.update({
"PATH": f"{bindir}:{env['PATH']}",
"RECORD_DIR": str(record),
"TANKO_SVC": tanko_svc,
"TANKO_HTTP": tanko_http,
"AZ_A2A_CODE": az_a2a_code,
"AZ_A2A_EXIT": str(az_a2a_exit),
"PI_HTTP": "200",
"PI_BODY": CONNECTED_FIXTURE.read_text(),
"SERVER_HTTP": "200",
"KAGENTZ_PUBLIC_CODE": kagentz_public_code,
})
proc = subprocess.run(["bash", str(script)], cwd=sandbox, env=env,
capture_output=True, text=True)
return proc, record, log_path
def test_healthy_run_is_quiet_and_never_reaches_mumuni(tmp_path):
proc, record, log_path = _run_monitor(tmp_path)
assert proc.returncode == 0, proc.stderr
log = log_path.read_text()
# Every retained leg actually ran and passed.
assert "Server: ✅ HTTP 200" in log
assert "Abiba: ✅ Connected" in log
assert "Tanko: ✅ service=active http=200" in log
assert "kagentz C1: ✅ A2A alive (HTTP 401)" in log
assert "kagentz C3: ✅ public URL alive (HTTP 302)" in log
assert "Result: ✅ 0 issues (all healthy)" in log
# A healthy run emits no notify at all — and certainly no Mumuni one.
assert proc.stdout == ""
assert "Mumuni" not in log
assert "🔴" not in log
# Observed behavior: .24 is never resolved, only Tanko's vantage and the
# Agent Zero host are contacted.
hosts = record.joinpath("ssh.hosts").read_text().split()
assert MUMUNI_IP not in hosts
assert set(hosts) == {TANKO_VANTAGE, AGENT_ZERO_HOST}
assert not record.joinpath("unexpected-ssh").exists()
def test_failing_run_alerts_on_tanko_but_never_on_mumuni(tmp_path):
# Failure path: exercises notify() end to end so "no Mumuni notify" is
# proven on the alert path, not only on the quiet healthy path.
proc, record, log_path = _run_monitor(tmp_path, tanko_svc="inactive",
tanko_http="000")
assert proc.returncode == 0, proc.stderr
alerts = proc.stdout
assert "Tanko (DSH dsh-web) service state: inactive" in alerts
assert "1 issue(s) found" in alerts
# No Mumuni text in stdout, the log, or any Zulip DM/stream payload.
assert "Mumuni" not in alerts
assert "Mumuni" not in log_path.read_text()
assert MUMUNI_IP not in alerts + log_path.read_text()
payloads = record.joinpath("curl.calls").read_text()
assert "Mumuni" not in payloads
assert MUMUNI_IP not in payloads
# The rest of the monitor still ran alongside the failing Tanko leg.
log = log_path.read_text()
assert "Abiba: ✅ Connected" in log
assert "kagentz C1: ✅ A2A alive" in log
assert "Result: 🔴 INCIDENT — 1 issue(s) found" in log
def test_unexpected_a2a_status_is_an_issue_not_healthy(tmp_path):
proc, record, log_path = _run_monitor(tmp_path, az_a2a_code="500")
assert proc.returncode == 0, proc.stderr
log = log_path.read_text()
assert "kagentz C1: 🟡 A2A unexpected http=500 (running, warning)" in log
assert "kagentz C1: ✅ A2A alive" not in log
assert "Result: 🔴 INCIDENT — 1 issue(s) found" in log
assert "kagentz A2A server answered HTTP 500" in proc.stdout
def test_a2a_connection_failure_is_down_not_unexpected(tmp_path):
# curl prints the http_code before failing, so the ssh stub exits non-zero
# with "000" on stdout — exercising the real outage path.
proc, record, log_path = _run_monitor(tmp_path, az_a2a_code="000",
az_a2a_exit=7)
assert proc.returncode == 0, proc.stderr
log = log_path.read_text()
assert "kagentz C1: ❌ A2A down (HTTP 000)" in log
assert "kagentz C1: ✅ A2A alive" not in log
assert "unexpected" not in log
assert "Result: 🔴 INCIDENT — 1 issue(s) found" in log
assert "kagentz A2A server DOWN (connection failed)" in proc.stdout
# ── scripts/daily-infra-report.py: behavioral digest checks ──────────
@pytest.fixture(scope="module")
def daily():
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("daily_infra_report", DAILY_REPORT)
assert spec and spec.loader
module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
spec.loader.exec_module(module)
return module
DAILY_AGENTS = {
"abiba": {
"platform": "pi", "ct": 100, "ip": MUMUNI_IP,
"zulip_connected": True, "zulip_processed": 5,
"pm2_status": "online", "pm2_restarts": "0", "pm2_uptime": "1h",
},
"tanko": {
"platform": "dsh", "ct": 112, "ip": "192.168.68.122",
"gateway_state": "n/a (DSH)", "zulip_state": "connected",
"telegram_state": "unknown", "gateway_pid": None, "updated_at": "",
},
}
def _fabricated_report(agents):
return {
"nodes": {},
"node_count": 1,
"nodes_online": 1,
"total_vms": 0,
"running_vms": 0,
"stopped_vms": [],
"vms_by_node": {n: [] for n in
["amdpve", "minipve", "storepve", "acerpve", "ocupve"]},
"storage": [],
"docker_vm": {"total": 0, "running": 0, "unhealthy": [],
"containers": [], "reclaimable": "", "disk_used": "1%"},
"docker_syslog": {"total": 0, "running": 0, "containers": []},
"docker_netbird": {"total": 0, "running": 0, "containers": []},
"endpoints": [],
"litellm": {"checks": []},
"nfs": [],
"zulip_ext": {
"connected": True, "queue_id": "queue", "last_error": None,
"messages_processed": 0, "retry_count": 0, "pm2": {},
"pm2_healthy": True, "bot_skipped_15min": 0, "finalized_1h": 0,
"failed_finalize_1h": 0, "finalize_fail_pct": 0,
"server_status": "200",
},
"agents": agents,
}
def _agent_status_card(html):
start = html.index("🤖 Agent Status")
end = html.index("💬 Zulip Extension")
return html[start:end]
def test_daily_report_renders_only_abiba_and_tanko_agents(daily):
"""build_html() over a Mumuni-free agent set must render no Mumuni row and
no Mumuni gateway-unknown issue, while abiba and tanko rows still render."""
html = daily.build_html(_fabricated_report(dict(DAILY_AGENTS)))
card = _agent_status_card(html)
assert "mumuni" not in card.lower()
assert "abiba" in card
assert "tanko" in card
assert "mumuni" not in html.lower()
def test_daily_report_collect_never_probes_mumuni(monkeypatch, daily):
"""collect() with ssh stubbed must add no mumuni agent and must never ssh
its decommissioned .24 host."""
probed = []
class _NoSubprocess:
@staticmethod
def check_output(*args, **kwargs):
return b""
def fake_ssh(host, cmd):
probed.append(host)
return ""
monkeypatch.setattr(daily, "pve_get", lambda path: [])
monkeypatch.setattr(daily, "ssh_jerome", lambda host, cmd: "")
monkeypatch.setattr(daily, "ssh", fake_ssh)
monkeypatch.setattr(daily, "http_get",
lambda url, auth=None, timeout=10: "200")
monkeypatch.setattr(daily, "http_get_body",
lambda url, auth=None, timeout=10: "")
monkeypatch.setattr(daily, "count_in_log", lambda *a, **k: 0)
monkeypatch.setattr(daily, "subprocess", _NoSubprocess)
report = daily.collect()
assert "mumuni" not in report["agents"]
assert MUMUNI_IP not in probed
# ── scripts/agent-health-check.py: roster pin ───────────────────────
@pytest.fixture(scope="module")
def ahc():
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("agent_health_check_roster", AHC)
assert spec and spec.loader
module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
spec.loader.exec_module(module)
return module
def test_agent_health_roster_has_no_mumuni_entry(ahc):
assert "mumuni" not in ahc.AGENTS
# ── zulip-health.prose.md: contract reconciliation ──────────────────
def test_health_contract_retires_mumuni_only_steps():
text = HEALTH_CONTRACT.read_text()
assert MUMUNI_IP not in text
for step in ("**B4: Gateway Process**", "**B5: Heartbeat Verification**",
"**B6: Response Delivery**"):
assert step not in text
def test_health_contract_states_mumuni_is_not_monitored_from_this_host():
text = HEALTH_CONTRACT.read_text()
assert "Mumuni is NOT monitored from this host" in text
assert "monitored on her side" in text
assert "her own container" in text
def test_health_contract_keeps_tanko_agent_zero_and_bridge_steps():
text = HEALTH_CONTRACT.read_text()
for marker in ("**B1:", "**B2:", "**B3:", "Step 4: Platform C",
"Step 2: Platform A", "Step 1: Zulip Server Liveness"):
assert marker in text, marker
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@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/bash
# test_pbs_gc_states.sh — Tests for PBS GC four-state logic
# Self-contained: inlines the SSH replacement logic
set -uo pipefail
TEST_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
SCRIPTS_DIR="$(dirname "$TEST_DIR")/scripts"
PROXMOX_MONITOR="${1:-${SCRIPTS_DIR}/proxmox-monitor.sh}"
PASS=0
FAIL=0
# Create the Python replacement script
REPLACE_SCRIPT=$(mktemp /tmp/replace_ssh_XXXXXX.py)
cat > "$REPLACE_SCRIPT" << 'PYEOF'
import sys
import re
wrapper = sys.argv[1]
monitor = sys.argv[2]
with open(monitor) as f:
c = f.read()
pattern = r'PBS_GC_OUTPUT=\$\(ssh -o ConnectTimeout=5 -o BatchMode=yes root@192\.168\.68\.6 \\\n "/sbin/pct exec 107 -- /sbin/proxmox-backup-manager garbage-collection list --output-format json" 2>/dev/null\)'
replacement = 'PBS_GC_OUTPUT=$(cat "' + wrapper + '")'
if re.search(pattern, c):
c = re.sub(pattern, replacement, c)
with open(monitor, 'w') as f:
f.write(c)
PYEOF
run_test() {
local name="$1"
local json="$2"
local expected_behavior="$3"
local expected_pattern="$4"
local wrapper monitor
wrapper=$(mktemp /tmp/pbs-test-wrapper.XXXXXX)
monitor=$(mktemp /tmp/pbs-test-monitor.XXXXXX)
printf '%s\n' "$json" > "$wrapper"
cp "$PROXMOX_MONITOR" "$monitor"
# Replace the SSH call with cat "$wrapper"
python3 "$REPLACE_SCRIPT" "$wrapper" "$monitor"
local output exit_code
output=$(bash "$monitor" 2>&1)
exit_code=$?
local ok=true
if [ "$expected_behavior" = "fail" ]; then
# Should fail with PBS GC error
if ! echo "$output" | grep -q "🔴 PBS GC"; then ok=false; fi
if [ $exit_code -eq 0 ]; then ok=false; fi
else
# Should pass with expected pattern
if ! echo "$output" | grep -q "$expected_pattern"; then ok=false; fi
if echo "$output" | grep -q "🔴 PBS GC"; then ok=false; fi
fi
if $ok; then
echo " ✅ $name"
PASS=$((PASS + 1))
else
echo " 🔴 $name FAILED (exit=$exit_code)"
echo "$output" | grep "PBS GC" | sed 's/^/ /'
FAIL=$((FAIL + 1))
fi
rm -f "$wrapper" "$monitor"
}
echo "=== PBS GC Four-State Tests ==="
echo "Script: $PROXMOX_MONITOR"
echo ""
echo "1. probe-failed (unparseable JSON)"
run_test "unparseable-json" 'NOT JSON {{{' "fail" "probe-failed"
echo "2. probe-failed (store not found)"
run_test "store-missing" '[{"store": "other", "last-run-endtime": 1000}]' "fail" "probe-failed"
echo "3. probe-failed (empty body)"
run_test "empty-body" "" "fail" "probe-failed"
echo "4. running (in progress - upid set, no last-run-endtime)"
run_test "running" '[{"store": "storepve-datastore", "upid": "UPID:123:1:456:gc:root@pam", "pending-bytes": 100}]' "pass" "⏳ PBS GC: running"
echo "5. stale (last run >48h)"
STALE=$(date -u -d "50 hours ago" +%s)
run_test "stale" "[{\"store\": \"storepve-datastore\", \"last-run-endtime\": $STALE, \"pending-bytes\": 200}]" "fail" "stale"
echo "6. healthy (completed <48h)"
HEALTHY=$(date -u -d "1 hour ago" +%s)
run_test "healthy" "[{\"store\": \"storepve-datastore\", \"last-run-endtime\": $HEALTHY, \"pending-bytes\": 0}]" "pass" "✅ PBS GC: healthy"
echo ""
echo "=== Results: $PASS passed, $FAIL failed ==="
[ $FAIL -eq 0 ] && echo "✅ All passed" || echo "🔴 Some failed"
rm -f "$REPLACE_SCRIPT"
[ $FAIL -eq 0 ] && exit 0 || exit 1
-519
View File
@@ -1,519 +0,0 @@
"""Regression tests for the 2026-09-09/10 probe-drift corrections.
WHY THIS FILE EXISTS: the monitoring contracts kept emitting false alarms from
stale expectations rather than live faults.
* agent-health-check v3 reported 6 failures that were all stale expectations:
abiba (pi-only since the harness purge) was tested as a Hermes host, koby
(report-only per the captain's 2026-08-17 ruling) was counted as repairable,
koby's CT 111 was probed on amdpve where it does not exist (it runs on
storepve .6), and the wrapper infisical check had two bugs — it read only
the first 20 lines, so koonimo's wrapper (which references /usr/bin/infisical
past line 20) false-failed, and it treated koby's genuine no-infisical
(~/.hermes/.env) wrapper as broken.
* gpu-monitor emitted "DEGRADED — GPU-rtx3090 000, GPU-rtx5070 000" three
times from probing bare port 80 on GPU hosts while :8080 answered 200.
* infrastructure-monitoring probed CT 116 for the PVE API (no pveproxy ->
000) instead of the five real cluster nodes, which answer 401 = alive.
These tests execute the health script (with SSH/vault stubbed) and the real
provenance consumer (scripts/prose-lint.sh), and parse the contracts' executable
check-health probe blocks into normalized probe sets. No live network, vault, or
SSH access is required.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import importlib.util
import json
import os
import pathlib
import re
import subprocess
import sys
import textwrap
import pytest
ROOT = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
AHC = ROOT / "scripts" / "agent-health-check.py"
LINT = ROOT / "scripts" / "prose-lint.sh"
GPU = ROOT / "gpu-monitor.prose.md"
INFRA = ROOT / "infrastructure-monitoring.prose.md"
PVE_NODE_IPS = {
"192.168.68.9",
"192.168.68.5",
"192.168.68.15",
"192.168.68.6",
"192.168.68.12",
}
@pytest.fixture(scope="module")
def ahc():
"""Import agent-health-check.py without live network/SSH side effects."""
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("agent_health_check", AHC)
assert spec and spec.loader
module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
spec.loader.exec_module(module)
return module
# ── helpers: execute the health script with SSH/vault stubbed ─────────
def _run_main(ahc, monkeypatch, capsys, argv, ssh_result=None):
ahc.FAIL.clear()
ahc.REPORT_ONLY.clear()
monkeypatch.setattr(ahc, "load_agent_keys", lambda: None)
monkeypatch.setattr(ahc, "ssh", lambda *a, **k: ssh_result)
monkeypatch.setattr(sys, "argv", ["agent-health-check.py", "--no-deploy", *argv])
with pytest.raises(SystemExit) as exc:
ahc.main()
return exc.value.code, capsys.readouterr().out
def _json_payload(out):
for line in reversed(out.splitlines()):
if line.startswith('{"timestamp"'):
return json.loads(line)
raise AssertionError(f"no JSON payload in output:\n{out}")
# ── agent-health-check: stale-expectation legs ───────────────────────
def test_import_does_not_contact_vault(ahc):
# Keys are loaded in main() via load_agent_keys(); importing must stay inert.
assert callable(ahc.load_agent_keys)
assert all(agent.get("key") is None for agent in ahc.AGENTS.values())
def test_abiba_is_pi_only_runtime(ahc):
# .24 has run pi-only since the harness purge: no Hermes gateway, config, or
# wrapper. Probing those legs produced false failures.
assert ahc.AGENTS["abiba"]["runtime"] == "pi"
def test_koby_is_report_only(ahc):
# Captain's 2026-08-17 ruling (Rule 17): detect and report, never repair.
assert ahc.AGENTS["koby"]["report_only"] is True
def test_koby_ct111_is_on_storepve(ahc):
# Live-verified 2026-09-10: `pct status 111` = running on storepve (.6);
# amdpve has no lxc/111.conf, which is what false-failed before.
assert ahc.AGENTS["koby"]["pve"] == "storepve"
def test_tanko_ct112_is_probed_on_minipve(ahc, monkeypatch, capsys):
# CT 112 (tanko) was live-migrated to minipve (.12) on 2026-09-27; the
# amdpve mapping made `pct status 112` fail and read as ct-unreachable.
# Execute the probe and assert the host the script actually contacts.
probes = []
monkeypatch.setattr(
ahc, "ssh",
lambda host, cmd, user="root": probes.append((host, cmd)) or "status: running",
)
ahc.FAIL.clear()
ahc.REPORT_ONLY.clear()
try:
ahc.check_ct_liveness()
tanko_hosts = [h for h, cmd in probes if cmd == "pct status 112 2>/dev/null"]
assert tanko_hosts == ["192.168.68.12"]
finally:
ahc.FAIL.clear()
ahc.REPORT_ONLY.clear()
def test_gpu_rtx3090_probe_uses_llmuser_not_root(ahc, monkeypatch, capsys):
# 2026-09-28: root SSH to .8 was lost when the guest was rebuilt; llmuser
# owns llama-server and can read systemctl status and the :8080 pid. A root
# probe reads as UNREACHABLE for a healthy host (the reported bug). Execute
# check_gpu_ports() against an SSH boundary that only accepts llmuser@.8 and
# assert the .8 leg does not produce the false UNREACHABLE failure.
seen = []
def fake_ssh(host, cmd, user="root"):
seen.append((host, user))
if host == "192.168.68.8" and user != "llmuser":
return None # root SSH denied -> baseline false UNREACHABLE
if cmd.startswith("systemctl is-active"):
return "active"
if cmd.startswith("ss -tlnp"):
return "48351"
if cmd.startswith("curl"):
return '{"status":"ok"}'
return None
monkeypatch.setattr(ahc, "ssh", fake_ssh)
ahc.FAIL.clear()
try:
ahc.check_gpu_ports()
out = capsys.readouterr().out
assert "gpu-unreachable:192.168.68.8" not in ahc.FAIL
assert "\u2705 gpu-rtx3090 (.8): healthy" in out
assert ("192.168.68.8", "llmuser") in seen
assert not any(host == "192.168.68.8" and user == "root" for host, user in seen)
finally:
ahc.FAIL.clear()
def test_report_only_legs_never_count_as_failures(ahc):
for agent, report_only in (("koby", True), ("koonimo", False), ("tanko", False)):
ahc.FAIL.clear()
ahc.REPORT_ONLY.clear()
ahc._fail(f"probe:{agent}", agent)
if report_only:
assert ahc.FAIL == []
assert ahc.REPORT_ONLY == [f"probe:{agent}"]
else:
assert ahc.FAIL == [f"probe:{agent}"]
assert ahc.REPORT_ONLY == []
ahc.FAIL.clear()
ahc.REPORT_ONLY.clear()
def test_failure_recording_accepts_agentless_keys(ahc):
ahc.FAIL.clear()
try:
ahc._fail("gpu-no-port:gpu-rtx3090 (.8)")
assert ahc.FAIL == ["gpu-no-port:gpu-rtx3090 (.8)"]
finally:
ahc.FAIL.clear()
def test_json_reports_absolute_execution_provenance(ahc, monkeypatch, capsys):
code, out = _run_main(ahc, monkeypatch, capsys, ["--json"])
payload = _json_payload(out)
assert payload["execution_path"] == os.path.abspath(str(AHC))
assert payload["cwd"] == os.getcwd()
assert code == 1 # stubbed SSH fails every leg, but provenance is still emitted
def test_quiet_run_still_carries_provenance_on_the_alert_path(ahc, monkeypatch, capsys):
# The cron runs --quiet; a failure report must still carry provenance. The
# header line is suppressed in quiet mode, so the ALERT line is the carrier.
code, out = _run_main(ahc, monkeypatch, capsys, ["--quiet"])
assert code == 1
assert "📍 executed from:" not in out
alerts = [ln for ln in out.splitlines() if ln.startswith("ALERT agent-health:")]
assert alerts, out
assert f"script={os.path.abspath(str(AHC))}" in alerts[0]
assert f"cwd={os.getcwd()}" in alerts[0]
def test_quiet_healthy_run_emits_no_stdout(ahc, monkeypatch, capsys):
# --quiet is documented as "only output on failure": a run with no fleet
# failures must produce no stdout at all (the production cron runs --quiet).
for name in ("check_keys", "check_gpu_ports", "check_agents", "check_ct_liveness",
"check_config_integrity", "check_wrapper_integrity", "check_vault_secrets"):
monkeypatch.setattr(ahc, name, lambda: None)
code, out = _run_main(ahc, monkeypatch, capsys, ["--quiet"])
assert code == 0
assert out == ""
def test_json_surfaces_report_only_findings_separately(ahc, monkeypatch, capsys):
# Koby's down legs are reported but must not count as fleet failures; the
# --json payload exposes them in their own array (item 1 + f8).
_, out = _run_main(ahc, monkeypatch, capsys, ["--json"])
payload = _json_payload(out)
assert isinstance(payload["report_only"], list)
assert any(key.startswith(("gateway-down:koby", "ct-unreachable:koby"))
for key in payload["report_only"])
assert not any("koby" in key for key in payload["failures"])
# ── agent-health-check: wrapper infisical behavior (f3) ───────────────
def _stub_wrapper_ssh(ahc, monkeypatch, wrapper_body, test_x_result="OK", command_v="/usr/local/bin/infisical"):
def fake_ssh(host, cmd, user="root"):
if cmd.startswith("cat /root/.local/bin/hermes"):
return wrapper_body
if cmd.startswith("ls -la /root/.local/bin/hermes "):
return "-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 0 Jan 1 00:00 /root/.local/bin/hermes"
if cmd.startswith("ls -la /root/.local/bin/hermes-real") or "venv/bin/hermes" in cmd:
return "-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 0 Jan 1 00:00 /root/.local/bin/hermes-real"
if cmd.startswith("grep -c 'LITELLM_API_KEY'"):
return "1"
if cmd.startswith("test -x "):
path = cmd[len("test -x "):].split()[0]
if isinstance(test_x_result, dict):
return test_x_result.get(path, "MISS")
return test_x_result
if cmd.startswith("command -v infisical"):
return command_v
return None
monkeypatch.setattr(ahc, "ssh", fake_ssh)
monkeypatch.setattr(ahc, "AGENTS", {"koonimo": dict(ahc.AGENTS["koonimo"])})
ahc.FAIL.clear()
ahc.REPORT_ONLY.clear()
def test_env_based_wrapper_without_infisical_is_not_failed(ahc, monkeypatch, capsys):
_stub_wrapper_ssh(ahc, monkeypatch,
"#!/bin/bash\nsource ~/.hermes/.env\nexec hermes-real \"$@\"\n")
ahc.check_wrapper_integrity()
out = capsys.readouterr().out
assert ahc.FAIL == []
assert "wrapper resolves creds without infisical" in out
def test_dangling_absolute_infisical_path_is_failed(ahc, monkeypatch, capsys):
# Wrapper hardcodes /usr/bin/infisical, which is absent, while PATH resolves
# infisical to /usr/local/bin/infisical. The literal path must be verified,
# not inferred from PATH resolution.
_stub_wrapper_ssh(ahc, monkeypatch,
"#!/bin/bash\n/usr/bin/infisical run -- hermes-real \"$@\"\n",
test_x_result="MISS", command_v="/usr/local/bin/infisical")
ahc.check_wrapper_integrity()
assert "wrapper-infisical-path:koonimo" in ahc.FAIL
def test_existing_absolute_infisical_path_passes(ahc, monkeypatch, capsys):
_stub_wrapper_ssh(ahc, monkeypatch,
"#!/bin/bash\n/usr/bin/infisical run -- hermes-real \"$@\"\n",
test_x_result="OK")
ahc.check_wrapper_integrity()
out = capsys.readouterr().out
assert ahc.FAIL == []
assert "wrapper infisical path OK" in out
def test_comment_mentioning_removed_infisical_path_is_not_failed(ahc, monkeypatch, capsys):
# litellm-api-keys.prose.md documents `rm -f /usr/local/bin/infisical`; a
# wrapper comment about that migration must not manufacture a dangling path
# when the real invocation (/usr/bin/infisical) is present and executable.
_stub_wrapper_ssh(ahc, monkeypatch,
"#!/bin/bash\n# migrated from /usr/local/bin/infisical\n"
"exec /usr/bin/infisical run -- hermes-real \"$@\"\n",
test_x_result={"/usr/bin/infisical": "OK",
"/usr/local/bin/infisical": "MISS"})
ahc.check_wrapper_integrity()
out = capsys.readouterr().out
assert ahc.FAIL == []
assert "wrapper infisical path OK" in out
def test_comment_only_infisical_mention_does_not_reach_path_check(ahc, monkeypatch, capsys):
# A comment-only mention of a removed infisical path on a healthy .env-based
# wrapper is not an invocation: it must not fall through to the `command -v`
# PATH check and false-FAIL `wrapper-no-infisical`.
_stub_wrapper_ssh(ahc, monkeypatch,
"#!/bin/bash\n# migrated from /usr/local/bin/infisical\n"
"source ~/.hermes/.env\nexec hermes-real \"$@\"\n",
test_x_result="MISS", command_v=None)
ahc.check_wrapper_integrity()
out = capsys.readouterr().out
assert ahc.FAIL == []
assert "wrapper resolves creds without infisical" in out
# ── item 4: prose-lint enforces report provenance (real consumer) ─────
GOOD_CONTRACT = textwrap.dedent("""\
---
kind: function
name: good
description: fixture with provenance
---
## Parameters
- x: y
## Returns
ok
### check-health
```bash
pwd -P
```
**Report format**: Begin with the absolute path the probe executed from.
""")
DECOY_CONTRACT = textwrap.dedent("""\
---
kind: function
name: decoy
description: fixture with provenance only outside the report format
---
## Parameters
- x: y
## Returns
ok
The absolute path of the config is /etc/foo.
### check-health
```bash
true
```
**Report format**: Summarize actual results from each probe.
""")
MISSING_CONTRACT = textwrap.dedent("""\
---
kind: function
name: missing
description: check-health contract with no report format
---
## Parameters
- x: y
## Returns
ok
### check-health
```bash
pwd -P
```
""")
def _run_lint(tmp_path, text, name):
(tmp_path / name).write_text(text)
return subprocess.run(["bash", str(LINT)], cwd=tmp_path,
capture_output=True, text=True)
def test_prose_lint_accepts_report_format_with_provenance(tmp_path):
result = _run_lint(tmp_path, GOOD_CONTRACT, "good.prose.md")
assert result.returncode == 0, result.stdout + result.stderr
def test_prose_lint_rejects_report_format_without_provenance(tmp_path):
result = _run_lint(tmp_path, DECOY_CONTRACT, "decoy.prose.md")
assert result.returncode == 1, result.stdout
assert "lacks execution provenance" in result.stdout
def test_prose_lint_requires_report_format_on_check_health_contract(tmp_path):
result = _run_lint(tmp_path, MISSING_CONTRACT, "missing.prose.md")
assert result.returncode == 1, result.stdout
assert "no **Report format** paragraph" in result.stdout
# ── contracts: parse the executable check-health probe block ─────────
def _check_health_block(contract):
"""Extract the bash probe block under ### check-health (the probe interface)."""
text = contract.read_text()
marker = "### check-health"
assert marker in text, f"{contract.name} has no {marker}"
after = text.split(marker, 1)[1]
match = re.search(r"```bash\n(.*?)```", after, re.S)
assert match, f"{contract.name} check-health has no bash probe block"
return match.group(1)
def _loop_nodes(block):
nodes = []
for line in block.splitlines():
match = re.match(r"\s*for\s+\w+\s+in\s+(.+?);?\s*do\b", line)
if match:
nodes = match.group(1).split()
return nodes
def _record(url):
"""Normalize a URL into a probe record: host, port, path, expected status."""
match = re.match(r"https?://([^/\s\"')]+)(/[^\s\"')]*)?", url)
assert match, f"unparseable probe URL: {url}"
hostport = match.group(1)
if "@" in hostport:
hostport = hostport.split("@", 1)[1]
if hostport.startswith("["):
host, port = hostport[1:hostport.index("]")], None
elif ":" in hostport:
host, raw_port = hostport.rsplit(":", 1)
port = int(raw_port) if raw_port.isdigit() else None
else:
host, port = hostport, None
return {"host": host, "port": port, "path": match.group(2) or "/",
"expected": None}
def _probes(block):
"""Parse the executable check-health bash block into a normalized probe model.
Comments are not probes; an `# Expected: <status>` comment annotates the
preceding probe. URLs using the block's shell-loop variable `$node` are
expanded over the loop's node list.
"""
loop_nodes = _loop_nodes(block)
probes = []
last = None
for raw in block.splitlines():
stripped = raw.strip()
if stripped.startswith("#"):
expected = re.search(r"Expected:\s*(\d{3})", stripped, re.I)
if expected and last is not None:
last["expected"] = int(expected.group(1))
continue
for url in re.findall(r"https?://[^\s\"')]+", raw):
hosts = loop_nodes if "$node" in url else [None]
for node in hosts:
record = _record(url.replace("$node", node) if node else url)
probes.append(record)
last = record
return probes
def test_gpu_monitor_probes_every_gpu_health_on_8080():
probes = _probes(_check_health_block(GPU))
targets = {(p["host"], p["port"], p["path"]) for p in probes}
assert ("192.168.68.8", 8080, "/health") in targets
assert ("192.168.68.110", 8080, "/health") in targets
def test_gpu_monitor_never_probes_bare_port_80_on_gpu_hosts():
probes = _probes(_check_health_block(GPU))
gpu_hosts = {"192.168.68.8", "192.168.68.110", "192.168.68.15"}
offenders = [p for p in probes
if p["host"] in gpu_hosts and p["port"] in (None, 80)]
assert offenders == []
def test_probe_model_flags_explicit_port_80_on_gpu_host():
# Regression: a bare-port probe may be spelled with an explicit :80.
block = ("curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' "
"http://192.168.68.8:80/health\n")
gpu_hosts = {"192.168.68.8", "192.168.68.110", "192.168.68.15"}
offenders = [p for p in _probes(block)
if p["host"] in gpu_hosts and p["port"] in (None, 80)]
assert offenders and offenders[0]["port"] == 80
def test_gpu_monitor_treats_router_301_as_alive():
probes = _probes(_check_health_block(GPU))
unified = [p for p in probes
if p["host"] == "192.168.68.116" and p["path"] == "/health/unified"]
assert unified, "router /health/unified probe missing"
assert unified[0]["expected"] == 301
def test_infra_monitoring_probes_every_real_pve_node():
probes = _probes(_check_health_block(INFRA))
pve = {(p["host"], p["port"], p["path"]) for p in probes if p["port"] == 8006}
assert {host for host, _, _ in pve} == PVE_NODE_IPS
assert {path for _, _, path in pve} == {"/api2/json/version"}
def test_infra_monitoring_does_not_probe_ct116_for_pve_api():
probes = _probes(_check_health_block(INFRA))
assert not any(p["host"] == "192.168.68.116" and p["port"] == 8006
for p in probes)
-282
View File
@@ -1,282 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Behavioural tests for scripts/revision-preflight.sh
#
# Every case builds a throwaway clone with a real bare remote, so origin/master
# is genuine and the guard's fetch path is exercised. Nothing outside mktemp is
# touched.
#
# The pre-fix draft is kept at tests/fixtures/revision-preflight.prefix.sh and
# is run against the SAME cases, to prove these tests bite: the pre-fix guard
# exits 0 where the fixed guard exits 1.
set -uo pipefail
HERE="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
REPO="$(cd "$HERE/.." && pwd)"
GUARD="$REPO/scripts/revision-preflight.sh"
PREFIX_GUARD="$HERE/fixtures/revision-preflight.prefix.sh"
PASS=0
FAIL=0
FAILED_CASES=()
pass() { printf ' ✓ %s\n' "$1"; PASS=$((PASS + 1)); }
fail() { printf ' ✗ %s\n' "$1"; FAIL=$((FAIL + 1)); FAILED_CASES+=("$1"); }
# Build a clone with a real remote; echo the clone path.
make_clone() {
local tmp
tmp="$(mktemp -d)"
git init --bare -q "$tmp/remote.git"
git init -q "$tmp/clone"
(
cd "$tmp/clone" || exit 1
git config user.email test@example.invalid
git config user.name test
mkdir -p scripts
printf '#!/bin/bash\necho hello\n' > scripts/demo.sh
chmod +x scripts/demo.sh
git add -A
git commit -qm init
git branch -M master
git remote add origin "$tmp/remote.git"
git push -q origin master
git fetch -q origin
)
echo "$tmp/clone"
}
echo "== revision-preflight behavioural tests =="
# ── 1. match → exit 0 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
echo "1. matching copy"
C=$(make_clone)
if out=$("$GUARD" "$C/scripts/demo.sh" "$C" 2>&1); then
pass "matching copy exits 0"
else
fail "matching copy should exit 0 (got $?, output: $out)"
fi
if [[ -z "$( "$GUARD" --quiet "$C/scripts/demo.sh" "$C" 2>&1 )" ]]; then
pass "--quiet prints nothing on a match"
else
fail "--quiet should print nothing on a match"
fi
rm -rf "$(dirname "$C")"
# ── 2. mismatch → exit 1 and names both hashes ───────────────────────────────
echo "2. mismatched copy"
C=$(make_clone)
printf '#!/bin/bash\necho TAMPERED\n' > "$C/scripts/demo.sh"
out=$("$GUARD" "$C/scripts/demo.sh" "$C" 2>&1); rc=$?
if [[ $rc -eq 1 ]]; then pass "mismatch exits 1"; else fail "mismatch should exit 1 (got $rc)"; fi
if [[ "$out" == *"MISMATCH"* ]]; then pass "mismatch says MISMATCH"; else fail "mismatch should say MISMATCH"; fi
if [[ "$out" == *"executed:"* && "$out" == *"merged:"* ]]; then
pass "mismatch prints both revisions"
else
fail "mismatch should print both revisions"
fi
rm -rf "$(dirname "$C")"
# ── 3. paths under scripts/ resolve (the original basename defect) ───────────
echo "3. repo-relative path resolution"
C=$(make_clone)
if "$GUARD" --quiet "$C/scripts/demo.sh" "$C" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
pass "script under scripts/ resolves against origin/master"
else
fail "script under scripts/ must resolve (basename defect)"
fi
rm -rf "$(dirname "$C")"
# ── 4. script that exists in NO revision → must fail ─────────────────────────
echo "4. untracked script present in no revision"
C=$(make_clone)
printf '#!/bin/bash\necho never committed\n' > "$C/scripts/ghost.sh"
out=$("$GUARD" "$C/scripts/ghost.sh" "$C" 2>&1); rc=$?
if [[ $rc -eq 1 ]]; then pass "ghost script exits 1"; else fail "ghost script must exit 1 (got $rc)"; fi
if [[ "$out" == *"does not exist in"* ]]; then
pass "ghost script says it is absent from the ref"
else
fail "ghost script should say it is absent from the ref"
fi
rm -rf "$(dirname "$C")"
reason_of() { grep -m1 '^REASON=' <<<"$1" | cut -d= -f2-; }
# ── 5. unresolvable ref → CANNOT VERIFY (exit 2) ─────────────────────────────
echo "5. unresolvable ref"
C=$(make_clone)
out=$("$GUARD" --no-fetch --ref origin/nope "$C/scripts/demo.sh" "$C" 2>&1); rc=$?
if [[ $rc -eq 2 ]]; then pass "unresolvable ref exits 2 (cannot verify)"; else fail "unresolvable ref must exit 2 (got $rc)"; fi
if [[ "$(reason_of "$out")" == "cannot-verify:ref-unresolvable" ]]; then
pass "unresolvable ref names cannot-verify:ref-unresolvable"
else
fail "unresolvable ref should name its class (got: $(reason_of "$out"))"
fi
rm -rf "$(dirname "$C")"
# ── 5b. fetch failure → CANNOT VERIFY, and it names that ─────────────────────
echo "5b. fetch failed"
C=$(make_clone)
( cd "$C" && git remote set-url origin /nonexistent/definitely-not-a-repo )
out=$("$GUARD" "$C/scripts/demo.sh" "$C" 2>&1); rc=$?
if [[ $rc -eq 2 ]]; then pass "fetch failure exits 2 (cannot verify)"; else fail "fetch failure must exit 2 (got $rc)"; fi
if [[ "$(reason_of "$out")" == "cannot-verify:fetch-failed" ]]; then
pass "fetch failure names cannot-verify:fetch-failed"
else
fail "fetch failure should name its class (got: $(reason_of "$out"))"
fi
if [[ "$out" == *"bound:"* ]]; then pass "fetch failure reports the bound"; else fail "fetch failure should report the bound"; fi
rm -rf "$(dirname "$C")"
# ── 5c. fetch timeout → CANNOT VERIFY, bounded (never hangs) ─────────────────
echo "5c. fetch timeout is bounded"
C=$(make_clone)
# a remote that will never answer: a fifo-backed git daemon is overkill, so use
# a black-hole address with a 1s bound and assert we return promptly.
( cd "$C" && git remote set-url origin http://10.255.255.1:9/never.git )
start=$(date +%s)
out=$("$GUARD" --fetch-timeout 1 "$C/scripts/demo.sh" "$C" 2>&1); rc=$?
elapsed=$(( $(date +%s) - start ))
if [[ $rc -eq 2 ]]; then pass "timeout exits 2 (cannot verify)"; else fail "timeout must exit 2 (got $rc)"; fi
if [[ "$(reason_of "$out")" == "cannot-verify:fetch-failed" ]]; then
pass "timeout names cannot-verify:fetch-failed"
else
fail "timeout should name its class (got: $(reason_of "$out"))"
fi
if [[ $elapsed -le 10 ]]; then pass "timeout returned promptly (${elapsed}s, bound 1s)"; else fail "timeout did not bound the fetch (${elapsed}s)"; fi
rm -rf "$(dirname "$C")"
# ── 6. missing script → MISMATCH:path-absent (exit 1) ────────────────────────
echo "6. missing script"
C=$(make_clone)
out=$("$GUARD" "$C/scripts/nope.sh" "$C" 2>&1); rc=$?
if [[ $rc -eq 1 ]]; then pass "missing script exits 1"; else fail "missing script must exit 1 (got $rc)"; fi
if [[ "$(reason_of "$out")" == "mismatch:path-absent" ]]; then
pass "missing script names mismatch:path-absent"
else
fail "missing script should name its class (got: $(reason_of "$out"))"
fi
rm -rf "$(dirname "$C")"
# ── 7. script outside the clone → MISMATCH (exit 1) ──────────────────────────
echo "7. script outside the clone"
C=$(make_clone)
OUTSIDE=$(mktemp)
printf '#!/bin/bash\necho outside\n' > "$OUTSIDE"
out=$("$GUARD" "$OUTSIDE" "$C" 2>&1); rc=$?
if [[ $rc -eq 1 ]]; then pass "outside script exits 1"; else fail "outside script must exit 1 (got $rc)"; fi
rm -f "$OUTSIDE"; rm -rf "$(dirname "$C")"
# ── 7b. detached HEAD is named, not reported as a raw content mismatch ───────
echo "7b. detached HEAD"
C=$(make_clone)
( cd "$C" && printf '#!/bin/bash\necho TAMPERED\n' > scripts/demo.sh \
&& git add scripts/demo.sh && git commit -qm tamper && git checkout -q --detach HEAD )
out=$("$GUARD" "$C/scripts/demo.sh" "$C" 2>&1); rc=$?
if [[ $rc -eq 1 ]]; then pass "detached HEAD exits 1"; else fail "detached HEAD must exit 1 (got $rc)"; fi
if [[ "$(reason_of "$out")" == "mismatch:detached-head" ]]; then
pass "detached HEAD names mismatch:detached-head"
else
fail "detached HEAD should name its class (got: $(reason_of "$out"))"
fi
rm -rf "$(dirname "$C")"
# ── 7c. a branch ahead of the ref is named as such, not as a raw mismatch ────
echo "7c. clone ahead of the ref"
C=$(make_clone)
( cd "$C" && git checkout -q -b feature \
&& printf '#!/bin/bash\necho FEATURE\n' > scripts/demo.sh \
&& git add scripts/demo.sh && git commit -qm feature )
out=$("$GUARD" "$C/scripts/demo.sh" "$C" 2>&1); rc=$?
if [[ $rc -eq 1 ]]; then pass "clone ahead exits 1"; else fail "clone ahead must exit 1 (got $rc)"; fi
if [[ "$(reason_of "$out")" == "mismatch:clone-ahead" ]]; then
pass "clone ahead names mismatch:clone-ahead"
else
fail "clone ahead should name its class (got: $(reason_of "$out"))"
fi
if [[ "$out" == *"mid-review"* ]]; then pass "clone ahead explains it is a legitimate state"; else fail "clone ahead should explain the state"; fi
rm -rf "$(dirname "$C")"
# ── 7d. a genuine content mismatch is named as content ──────────────────────
echo "7d. genuine content mismatch"
C=$(make_clone)
printf '#!/bin/bash\necho TAMPERED\n' > "$C/scripts/demo.sh"
out=$("$GUARD" "$C/scripts/demo.sh" "$C" 2>&1); rc=$?
if [[ "$(reason_of "$out")" == "mismatch:content" ]]; then
pass "hand-edit names mismatch:content"
else
fail "hand-edit should name mismatch:content (got: $(reason_of "$out"))"
fi
rm -rf "$(dirname "$C")"
# ── 8. --no-fetch states the freshness assumption ────────────────────────────
echo "8. --no-fetch states its assumption"
C=$(make_clone)
out=$("$GUARD" --no-fetch "$C/scripts/demo.sh" "$C" 2>&1)
if [[ "$out" == *"freshness is assumed"* ]]; then
pass "--no-fetch states the freshness assumption"
else
fail "--no-fetch should state the freshness assumption"
fi
rm -rf "$(dirname "$C")"
# ── 8b. contract-run.sh defaults to warn, not enforce ───────────────────────
echo "8b. contract-run.sh default mode"
DEFAULT=$(grep -m1 'CONTRACT_REVISION_PREFLIGHT:-' "$REPO/scripts/contract-run.sh" | sed 's/.*:-//; s/}.*//')
if [[ "$DEFAULT" == "warn" ]]; then
pass "contract-run.sh defaults to warn"
else
fail "contract-run.sh default must be warn (found: '$DEFAULT')"
fi
if grep -q 'CONTRACT_REVISION_PREFLIGHT=enforce' "$REPO/scripts/contract-run.sh"; then
pass "enforce remains available and documented"
else
fail "enforce must remain documented"
fi
# ── 9. the pre-fix guard must FAIL these same cases (proves the tests bite) ──
echo "9. pre-fix draft fails the same cases (bite proof)"
if [[ ! -f "$PREFIX_GUARD" ]]; then
fail "pre-fix fixture missing: $PREFIX_GUARD"
else
# 9a. repo-relative path: pre-fix drops scripts/ and cannot resolve
C=$(make_clone)
out=$("$PREFIX_GUARD" "$C/scripts/demo.sh" "$C" 2>&1); rc=$?
if [[ $rc -eq 0 && "$out" == *"could not resolve"* ]]; then
pass "pre-fix: exits 0 and cannot resolve scripts/demo.sh (defect confirmed)"
else
fail "pre-fix should exit 0 with 'could not resolve' (got rc=$rc)"
fi
rm -rf "$(dirname "$C")"
# 9b. ghost script: pre-fix passes a script that exists in no revision
C=$(make_clone)
printf '#!/bin/bash\necho never committed\n' > "$C/scripts/ghost.sh"
out=$("$PREFIX_GUARD" "$C/scripts/ghost.sh" "$C" 2>&1); rc=$?
if [[ $rc -eq 0 ]]; then
pass "pre-fix: PASSES a ghost script that exists in no revision (defect confirmed)"
else
fail "pre-fix was expected to wrongly pass the ghost script (got rc=$rc)"
fi
rm -rf "$(dirname "$C")"
# 9c. a file that DOES exist at the repo root still works pre-fix, showing
# the defect is specific to nested paths
C=$(make_clone)
printf '#!/bin/bash\necho root\n' > "$C/rootlevel.sh"
( cd "$C" && git add rootlevel.sh && git commit -qm root && git push -q origin master && git fetch -q origin )
if "$PREFIX_GUARD" "$C/rootlevel.sh" "$C" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
pass "pre-fix: root-level path resolves (so the defect is the basename, not git)"
else
fail "pre-fix should resolve a root-level tracked file"
fi
rm -rf "$(dirname "$C")"
fi
echo
echo " passed: $PASS failed: $FAIL"
if [[ $FAIL -gt 0 ]]; then
printf ' FAILED: %s\n' "${FAILED_CASES[@]}"
exit 1
fi
echo "All revision-preflight tests passed."
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# test_secret_scan.sh — self-test for the commit-time secret guard.
#
# Run: bash tests/test_secret_scan.sh
# Exit: 0 all cases passed, 1 a case failed.
#
# WHY THIS FILE EXISTS: a scanner that is never observed to fail is not a guard.
# Every fixture below is fabricated and pattern-shaped; the test writes it to a
# temp tree (a path no allowlist entry covers) and asserts the guard FAILS. The
# same fixtures are deliberately listed in scripts/secret-allowlist.tsv, so the
# repo-wide tree scan stays quiet while a planted copy still bites — that is the
# difference between an explicit, reasoned exception and a guard trained to
# ignore a word.
#
# Only bash + coreutils + grep. No python/node: the Gitea runner executes job
# steps inside the runner container, which has neither.
set -uo pipefail
HERE=$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)
ROOT=$(cd -- "$HERE/.." && pwd)
SCAN="$ROOT/scripts/secret-scan.sh"
PASS=0
FAIL=0
LAST_OUT=""
ok() { PASS=$((PASS + 1)); echo " ✅ $1"; }
bad() { FAIL=$((FAIL + 1)); echo " ❌ $1"; }
expect_exit() { # expect_exit <want-code> <label> <cmd...>
local want="$1" label="$2"; shift 2
local rc
LAST_OUT=$("$@" 2>&1); rc=$?
if [ "$rc" -eq "$want" ]; then ok "$label (exit $rc)"; else
bad "$label (wanted exit $want, got $rc)"
printf '%s\n' "$LAST_OUT" | sed 's/^/ /' | head -8
fi
}
expect_contains() { # expect_contains <label> <needle>
if printf '%s' "$LAST_OUT" | grep -qF -- "$2"; then ok "$1"; else
bad "$1 (output did not mention: $2)"
fi
}
TMPROOT=$(mktemp -d)
trap 'rm -rf "$TMPROOT"' EXIT
echo "── secret-scan self-test ──"
# ── 1. Guard syntax ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
expect_exit 0 "scanner parses with bash -n" bash -n "$SCAN"
# ── 2. Guard FAILS on planted, pattern-matching fixtures ──────────────────
mkdir -p "$TMPROOT/planted"
cat > "$TMPROOT/planted/ops.env" <<'EOF'
OPENROUTER_API_KEY=sk-or-v1-00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000deadbeef
EOF
expect_exit 1 "planted sk-or-v1 key fails the guard" bash "$SCAN" --path "$TMPROOT/planted" --quiet
expect_contains "planted sk-or-v1 key names the openrouter-key rule" "[openrouter-key]"
rm -f "$TMPROOT/planted/"*
cat > "$TMPROOT/planted/curl.sh" <<'EOF'
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaabbbbbbbb" http://example.invalid/
EOF
expect_exit 1 "planted literal Bearer token fails the guard" bash "$SCAN" --path "$TMPROOT/planted" --quiet
expect_contains "planted Bearer token names the bearer-token rule" "[bearer-token]"
rm -f "$TMPROOT/planted/"*
cat > "$TMPROOT/planted/pve.sh" <<'EOF'
AUTH="Authorization: PVEAPIToken=root@pam!monitor=11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555"
EOF
expect_exit 1 "planted Proxmox token fails the guard" bash "$SCAN" --path "$TMPROOT/planted" --quiet
expect_contains "planted Proxmox token names the proxmox-token rule" "[proxmox-token]"
rm -f "$TMPROOT/planted/"*
cat > "$TMPROOT/planted/deploy-key.pem" <<'EOF'
-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZW
-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
EOF
expect_exit 1 "planted PEM private key fails the guard" bash "$SCAN" --path "$TMPROOT/planted" --quiet
expect_contains "planted PEM key names the private-key rule" "[private-key]"
# Prose is scanned exactly like code — the original exposures were in .md files.
rm -f "$TMPROOT/planted/"*
cat > "$TMPROOT/planted/handover.md" <<'EOF'
- Admin credentials: `admin` / `correct-horse-battery-staple`
EOF
expect_exit 1 "planted prose credential line fails the guard" bash "$SCAN" --path "$TMPROOT/planted" --quiet
expect_contains "planted prose line names the cred-prose rule" "[cred-prose]"
rm -f "$TMPROOT/planted/"*
cat > "$TMPROOT/planted/config.env" <<'EOF'
DB_PASSWORD=correct-horse-battery-staple
EOF
expect_exit 1 "planted password assignment fails the guard" bash "$SCAN" --path "$TMPROOT/planted" --quiet
expect_contains "planted password assignment names the secret-assign rule" "[secret-assign]"
# ── 3. Guard stays QUIET on inert values and on the real tree ─────────────
mkdir -p "$TMPROOT/inert"
cat > "$TMPROOT/inert/config.yaml" <<'EOF'
api_key: not-needed
bearer_token=monitor_key
api_key: $LITELLM_API_KEY
EOF
expect_exit 0 "env refs, sentinels and variable names are not credentials" bash "$SCAN" --path "$TMPROOT/inert" --quiet
expect_exit 0 "current repo tree passes the guard" bash "$SCAN" --tree
expect_contains "tree run reports the allowlisted exceptions it applied" "allowlisted exception(s)"
# ── 4. Allowlist entries are path-explicit, not word-based ────────────────
# This exact line is allowlisted in infrastructure-control.prose.md; the same
# text at an unlisted path must still fail, proving the exception is per-file
# and reviewed, not a blanket "ignore the word vault".
rm -f "$TMPROOT/planted/"*
cat > "$TMPROOT/planted/unlisted.md" <<'EOF'
- Admin credentials: `«vault: infrastructure/production STIRLING_ADMIN_PASSWORD»`
EOF
expect_exit 1 "allowlisted text at an unlisted path still fails" bash "$SCAN" --path "$TMPROOT/planted" --quiet
# ── 5. Commit-time mode: the guard blocks a STAGED credential ─────────────
# A throwaway git repo with its own copy of the scanner, so this exercises the
# real pre-commit path (--staged) without touching this repo's index.
mkdir -p "$TMPROOT/repo/scripts"
cp "$SCAN" "$TMPROOT/repo/scripts/secret-scan.sh"
cp "$ROOT/scripts/secret-patterns.tsv" "$TMPROOT/repo/scripts/secret-patterns.tsv"
cp "$ROOT/scripts/secret-allowlist.tsv" "$TMPROOT/repo/scripts/secret-allowlist.tsv"
git -C "$TMPROOT/repo" init -q
git -C "$TMPROOT/repo" -c user.email=t@example.invalid -c user.name=test commit -q --allow-empty -m base
cat > "$TMPROOT/repo/planted.env" <<'EOF'
OPENROUTER_API_KEY=sk-or-v1-00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000deadbeef
EOF
git -C "$TMPROOT/repo" add planted.env
expect_exit 1 "staged credential fails at commit time (--staged)" bash "$TMPROOT/repo/scripts/secret-scan.sh" --staged --quiet
expect_contains "staged credential names the openrouter-key rule" "[openrouter-key]"
# ── 6. Fail closed: an allowlist entry without a reason is a hard error ───
mkdir -p "$TMPROOT/scanner" "$TMPROOT/clean"
cp "$SCAN" "$TMPROOT/scanner/secret-scan.sh"
cp "$ROOT/scripts/secret-patterns.tsv" "$TMPROOT/scanner/secret-patterns.tsv"
printf '*\t*.md\twhatever\n' > "$TMPROOT/scanner/secret-allowlist.tsv"
echo "placeholder" > "$TMPROOT/clean/ok.md"
expect_exit 2 "allowlist entry with no reason fails closed" bash "$TMPROOT/scanner/secret-scan.sh" --path "$TMPROOT/clean" --quiet
# ── Verdict ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
echo ""
if [ "$FAIL" -gt 0 ]; then
echo "❌ secret-scan self-test FAILED — $PASS passed, $FAIL failed"
exit 1
fi
echo "✅ secret-scan self-test passed ($PASS cases)"
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Behavioural tests for zulip-monitor.sh kagentz C1/C3 legs and the Result verdict.
WHY THIS FILE EXISTS: the 2026-09-19 kagentz A2A outage was correctly detected
by the monitor (C1 returned 000, the run logged an issue) but the lane's own
summarization in ops.status wrote "OK" with the note "A2A server DOWN — expected
(no credentials configured)". The optimistic verdict came from the lane, not the
script. The fix adds a C3 public-access-path leg and makes the Result line say
"INCIDENT" when issues are found, so the lane can quote it verbatim.
CONTRACT UNDER TEST:
* C1 (A2A liveness, no credential): 000 → INCIDENT.
* C3 (public access path, no credential): 502 → INCIDENT, 000 → INCIDENT,
200/302/401 → alive.
* Result verdict: when ISSUES > 0, the log's Result line says "INCIDENT",
not just "issues found".
* Healthy control: C1 401 + C3 302 → 0 issues, "all healthy".
HOW: behavioural execution using the sandbox pattern already in this repo
(tests/test_mumuni_monitor_removal.py). The sandbox copies the shipped monitor
verbatim, rewrites only its LOG constant, and runs it with stub ssh/curl on
PATH. Each test asserts from the run's own log/verdict, not from file text.
Usage: python3 -m pytest tests/test_zulip_kagentz_legs.py
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import pathlib
import stat
import subprocess
ROOT = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
ZULIP_MONITOR = ROOT / "scripts" / "zulip-monitor.sh"
CONNECTED_FIXTURE = ROOT / "tests" / "fixtures" / "zulip-health-connected.json"
TANKO_VANTAGE = "192.168.68.12" # minipve — Tanko CT 112 via pct exec
AGENT_ZERO_HOST = "192.168.68.14" # kagentz host, Agent Zero docker
# ── Stub ssh: answers Tanko and Agent Zero probes by env vars ──────────
SSH_STUB = r"""#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Stub ssh: record the target host, then answer by host + remote command.
printf '%s\n' "$*" >> "$RECORD_DIR/ssh.calls"
host=""
for a in "$@"; do
case "$a" in
*@192.168.*) host="${a##*@}" ;;
esac
done
printf '%s\n' "$host" >> "$RECORD_DIR/ssh.hosts"
cmd="${*: -1}"
case "$host" in
192.168.68.12)
case "$cmd" in
*"systemctl is-active"*) printf '%s' "$TANKO_SVC" ;;
*curl*) printf '%s' "$TANKO_HTTP" ;;
esac ;;
192.168.68.14)
case "$cmd" in
*"/a2a/"*) printf '%s' "$AZ_A2A_CODE"; exit "${AZ_A2A_EXIT:-0}" ;;
esac ;;
*)
printf 'UNEXPECTED-SSH-HOST %s\n' "$host" >> "$RECORD_DIR/unexpected-ssh" ;;
esac
exit 0
"""
# ── Stub curl: serves Zulip server, Abiba health, and C3 public URL ───
CURL_STUB = r"""#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Stub curl: serve the Abiba health fixture, the Zulip server 200, and the
# C3 public URL probe (https://kagentz.sysloggh.net/). Record every call.
printf '%s\n' "$*" >> "$RECORD_DIR/curl.calls"
case "$*" in
*:9200/health*)
case " $* " in
*" -w "*) printf '%s' "$PI_HTTP" ;; # -w '%{http_code}' probe
*) printf '%s' "$PI_BODY" ;; # body probe
esac ;;
*server_settings*)
printf '%s' "$SERVER_HTTP" ;;
*kagentz.sysloggh.net*)
printf '%s' "$KAGENTZ_PUBLIC_CODE" ;;
esac
exit 0
"""
def _write_exec(path: pathlib.Path, body: str) -> None:
path.write_text(body)
path.chmod(path.stat().st_mode
| stat.S_IXUSR | stat.S_IXGRP | stat.S_IXOTH)
def _run_monitor(tmp_path, *, tanko_svc="active", tanko_http="200",
az_a2a_code="401", az_a2a_exit=0,
kagentz_public_code="302"):
"""Run the shipped monitor in a sandbox; return (proc, record_dir, log_path).
Only the LOG constant is rewritten (to keep the run inside the worktree).
Everything else — legs, labels, notify logic — is the shipped script.
"""
sandbox = tmp_path / "sandbox"
bindir = sandbox / "bin"
record = sandbox / "record"
bindir.mkdir(parents=True)
record.mkdir()
_write_exec(bindir / "ssh", SSH_STUB)
_write_exec(bindir / "curl", CURL_STUB)
source = ZULIP_MONITOR.read_text()
log_line = 'LOG="/root/zulip-health-monitor.log"'
assert log_line in source, "LOG constant moved — update the sandbox harness"
log_path = sandbox / "zulip-health-monitor.log"
script = sandbox / "zulip-monitor.sh"
script.write_text(source.replace(log_line, f'LOG="{log_path}"'))
env = dict(os.environ)
env.update({
"PATH": f"{bindir}:{env['PATH']}",
"RECORD_DIR": str(record),
"TANKO_SVC": tanko_svc,
"TANKO_HTTP": tanko_http,
"AZ_A2A_CODE": az_a2a_code,
"AZ_A2A_EXIT": str(az_a2a_exit),
"PI_HTTP": "200",
"PI_BODY": CONNECTED_FIXTURE.read_text(),
"SERVER_HTTP": "200",
"KAGENTZ_PUBLIC_CODE": kagentz_public_code,
})
proc = subprocess.run(["bash", str(script)], cwd=sandbox, env=env,
capture_output=True, text=True)
return proc, record, log_path
# ── Required behavioural cases ─────────────────────────────────────────
def test_c3_502_is_incident(tmp_path):
"""C3 public leg returns 502 → the run's verdict is an INCIDENT,
the C3 line names the 502, and the run is not summarised as healthy."""
proc, record, log_path = _run_monitor(tmp_path, kagentz_public_code="502")
assert proc.returncode == 0, proc.stderr
log = log_path.read_text()
# The C3 line names the 502.
assert "kagentz C3: ❌ public URL 502 (upstream refused)" in log
# The verdict is an INCIDENT, not healthy.
assert "Result: 🔴 INCIDENT" in log
assert "all healthy" not in log
# The run is not summarised as healthy.
assert "✅ 0 issues" not in log
def test_c3_000_is_incident(tmp_path):
"""C3 public leg returns 000 → INCIDENT."""
proc, record, log_path = _run_monitor(tmp_path, kagentz_public_code="000")
assert proc.returncode == 0, proc.stderr
log = log_path.read_text()
# The C3 line reports the connection failure.
assert "kagentz C3: ❌ public URL down (HTTP 000)" in log
# The verdict is an INCIDENT.
assert "Result: 🔴 INCIDENT" in log
assert "all healthy" not in log
assert "✅ 0 issues" not in log
def test_healthy_control_c1_401_c3_302(tmp_path):
"""Healthy control: C1 401 plus C3 302 → 0 issues and a healthy verdict,
proving the new leg cannot cry wolf."""
proc, record, log_path = _run_monitor(tmp_path,
az_a2a_code="401",
kagentz_public_code="302")
assert proc.returncode == 0, proc.stderr
log = log_path.read_text()
# Both legs report alive.
assert "kagentz C1: ✅ A2A alive (HTTP 401)" in log
assert "kagentz C3: ✅ public URL alive (HTTP 302)" in log
# Zero issues, healthy verdict.
assert "Result: ✅ 0 issues (all healthy)" in log
# No INCIDENT.
assert "INCIDENT" not in log
# No notify fired for kagentz.
assert "kagentz public URL" not in proc.stdout
assert "kagentz A2A server" not in proc.stdout
def test_c1_000_is_incident(tmp_path):
"""C1 returns 000 → INCIDENT, keeping the leg that actually caught this
outage covered behaviourally."""
proc, record, log_path = _run_monitor(tmp_path,
az_a2a_code="000",
az_a2a_exit=7,
kagentz_public_code="302")
assert proc.returncode == 0, proc.stderr
log = log_path.read_text()
# The C1 line reports the A2A down.
assert "kagentz C1: ❌ A2A down (HTTP 000)" in log
# The verdict is an INCIDENT (even though C3 is healthy).
assert "Result: 🔴 INCIDENT" in log
assert "all healthy" not in log
# The notify fired for the A2A down.
assert "kagentz A2A server DOWN" in proc.stdout
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@@ -1,211 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/bash
# tests/zulip-monitor-abiba.sh — regression test pinning the producer→consumer
# contract between the pi Zulip extension's :9200/health payload and the Abiba
# leg of scripts/zulip-monitor.sh.
#
# WHY THIS TEST EXISTS: 2026-09-09 live incident. The monitor parsed the health
# payload at the WRONG nesting level (d.get('connected') at top level, while the
# extension serves zulip.connected) so PI_CONNECTED was always False and every
# monitor run restarted a healthy bot: pm2 showed restarts=8 with the process
# created 2026-09-09T09:35:09Z, the monitor log recorded four ❌ Abiba verdicts
# (04:23, 05:35, 06:55, 09:35 UTC) and zero ✅, while the Zulip server answered
# HTTP 200 and the bot logged a clean connect plus continuing heartbeats. The
# watchdog was the fault, not the connection. This test makes that class of
# regression fail loudly instead of silently restarting healthy services.
#
# CONTRACT UNDER TEST (must hold for scripts/zulip-monitor.sh):
# * Connection state is NESTED: zulip.connected (boolean) and zulip.last_error
# live inside the `zulip` object. There is NO top-level `connected` and NO
# retry counter anywhere in the payload (verified against the extension's
# startHealthServer handler) — the old retry_count branch was dropped.
# * zulip.connected=true -> log "✅ Connected", NO pm2 restart.
# * zulip.connected=false -> alert, pm2 restart abiba-zulip.
# * fetch error / non-2xx / empty body / unparseable body / missing or
# non-boolean zulip.connected -> "⚠️ Probe failed" alert with a
# "NOT restarting" label, NO pm2 restart. A parse miss must never kill a
# healthy service.
# * zulip.connected=true with last_error -> degraded 🟡 warning, no restart.
#
# HOW: the Abiba leg of the shipped script sits between the
# `# -- abiba-leg-start` / `# -- abiba-leg-end` marker comments. This runner
# extracts that block verbatim and executes it with a stubbed curl (fixture body
# + HTTP code), recorded notify()/pm2 shims, and a temp $LOG. If the markers
# disappear (fix reverted or renamed) extraction yields nothing and the suite
# fails — the bug cannot return silently.
#
# Usage: bash tests/zulip-monitor-abiba.sh [path/to/zulip-monitor.sh]
# Exit 0 iff every check passes.
#
# shellcheck disable=SC2034,SC2329,SC1090
# LOG/ISSUES and the notify/pm2/curl stubs below are consumed at runtime by
# the leg extracted between the marker comments and `source`d in each case;
# the static analyzer cannot see across that dynamic source, so it flags them.
set -uo pipefail
ROOT=$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd)
SCRIPT=${1:-"$ROOT/scripts/zulip-monitor.sh"}
FIXTURES="$ROOT/tests/fixtures"
TMP=$(mktemp -d)
trap 'rm -rf "$TMP"' EXIT
PASS=0
FAIL=0
ok() { PASS=$((PASS + 1)); printf ' \033[32m✔\033[0m %s\n' "$1"; }
bad() { FAIL=$((FAIL + 1)); printf ' \033[31m✘\033[0m %s\n' "$1"; }
echo "== tests/zulip-monitor-abiba.sh — Abiba leg vs :9200/health producer contract =="
echo "target script: $SCRIPT"
# --- structural guards -------------------------------------------------------
if ! grep -q '^# -- abiba-leg-start' "$SCRIPT"; then
echo "✘ FATAL: $SCRIPT has no '# -- abiba-leg-start' marker — the fix has been reverted or renamed."
exit 1
fi
if ! grep -q '^# -- abiba-leg-end' "$SCRIPT"; then
echo "✘ FATAL: $SCRIPT has no '# -- abiba-leg-end' marker."
exit 1
fi
LEG="$TMP/leg.sh"
awk '/^# -- abiba-leg-start/{f=1; next}
/^# -- abiba-leg-end/{f=0; next}
f' "$SCRIPT" > "$LEG"
if [ ! -s "$LEG" ]; then
echo "✘ FATAL: extracted Abiba leg is empty."
exit 1
fi
echo "== structural =="
if bash -n "$SCRIPT"; then ok "syntax: bash -n $SCRIPT"; else bad "syntax: bash -n $SCRIPT failed"; fi
if bash -n "$LEG"; then ok "syntax: extracted leg parses (bash -n)"; else bad "syntax: extracted leg fails bash -n"; fi
# --- per-case harness ---------------------------------------------------------
CURRENT_NAME=""
CURRENT_DIR=""
# $1 case name, $2 http-code, $3 body (file path or literal)
run_case() {
local name="$1" http="$2" body_src="$3" body
CURRENT_NAME="$name"
CURRENT_DIR=$(mktemp -d "$TMP/case.XXXXXX")
if [ -f "$body_src" ]; then
body=$(cat "$body_src")
else
body="$body_src"
fi
(
LOG="$CURRENT_DIR/log"; ISSUES=0
notify() { printf 'ALERT [%s] %s\n' "$1" "$2" >> "$CURRENT_DIR/alerts"; }
pm2() { printf 'PM2 %s\n' "$*" >> "$CURRENT_DIR/pm2"; }
curl() {
local url=""
for a in "$@"; do case "$a" in http*) url="$a";; esac; done
case "$url" in
*:9200/health*)
case " $* " in
*"-w"*) printf '%s' "$http" ;; # -w '%{http_code}' code probe
*) printf '%s' "$body" ;; # body probe
esac ;;
*)
printf 'UNEXPECTED-CURL %s\n' "$*" >> "$CURRENT_DIR/unexpected-curl"
return 7 ;;
esac
return 0
}
source "$LEG"
)
}
assert_log_has() {
if grep -qF -- "$1" "$CURRENT_DIR/log"; then ok "$CURRENT_NAME — log has: $1"; else bad "$CURRENT_NAME — log MISSING: $1"; fi
}
assert_log_lacks() {
if grep -qF -- "$1" "$CURRENT_DIR/log"; then bad "$CURRENT_NAME — log must NOT contain: $1"; else ok "$CURRENT_NAME — log correctly lacks: $1"; fi
}
assert_alert_has() {
if grep -qF -- "$1" "$CURRENT_DIR/alerts"; then ok "$CURRENT_NAME — alert sent: $1"; else bad "$CURRENT_NAME — alert MISSING: $1"; fi
}
assert_alert_empty() {
if [ ! -s "$CURRENT_DIR/alerts" ]; then ok "$CURRENT_NAME — no alert sent (quiet healthy path)"; else bad "$CURRENT_NAME — unexpected alert: $(cat "$CURRENT_DIR/alerts")"; fi
}
assert_pm2_restarted() {
if grep -qF "PM2 restart abiba-zulip" "$CURRENT_DIR/pm2"; then ok "$CURRENT_NAME — pm2 restart abiba-zulip was called"; else bad "$CURRENT_NAME — expected pm2 restart abiba-zulip, pm2 log: $(cat "$CURRENT_DIR/pm2" 2>/dev/null)"; fi
}
assert_no_restart() {
if [ ! -s "$CURRENT_DIR/pm2" ]; then ok "$CURRENT_NAME — NO pm2 restart (fail-safe holds)"; else bad "$CURRENT_NAME — pm2 was called but must NOT be: $(cat "$CURRENT_DIR/pm2")"; fi
}
assert_no_unexpected_curl() {
if [ ! -s "$CURRENT_DIR/unexpected-curl" ]; then ok "$CURRENT_NAME — only :9200/health was probed"; else bad "$CURRENT_NAME — unexpected curl: $(cat "$CURRENT_DIR/unexpected-curl")"; fi
}
# --- case 1: real payload shape, zulip.connected=true -> healthy, no restart --
echo "== case 1: connected (real producer payload: nested zulip.connected=true) =="
run_case "connected" 200 "$FIXTURES/zulip-health-connected.json"
assert_log_has "Abiba: ✅ Connected (processed=0)"
assert_log_lacks "Disconnected"
assert_alert_empty
assert_no_restart
assert_no_unexpected_curl
# --- case 2: zulip.connected=false -> disconnected, restart -------------------
echo "== case 2: disconnected (nested zulip.connected=false triggers restart) =="
run_case "disconnected" 200 "$FIXTURES/zulip-health-disconnected.json"
assert_log_has "Abiba: ❌ Disconnected — restarted"
assert_alert_has "DISCONNECTED — restarting"
assert_pm2_restarted
assert_no_unexpected_curl
# --- cases 3-9: probe failures must alert and MUST NOT restart ----------------
echo "== probe-failure cases: alert 'NOT restarting', zero pm2 restarts =="
run_case "empty body" 200 ""
assert_log_has "Abiba: ⚠️ Probe failed"
assert_log_lacks "❌ Disconnected"
assert_alert_has "NOT restarting"
assert_no_restart
run_case "garbage body" 200 '{not valid json!!'
assert_log_has "Abiba: ⚠️ Probe failed"
assert_alert_has "NOT restarting"
assert_no_restart
run_case "missing zulip key" 200 '{"status":"ok","platform":"pi","agent":"abiba"}'
assert_log_has "Probe failed"
assert_alert_has "NOT restarting"
assert_no_restart
run_case "zulip without connected" 200 '{"status":"ok","zulip":{"last_error":null}}'
assert_log_has "Probe failed"
assert_alert_has "NOT restarting"
assert_no_restart
run_case "non-boolean connected" 200 '{"status":"ok","zulip":{"connected":"true"}}'
assert_log_has "Probe failed"
assert_alert_has "NOT restarting"
assert_no_restart
run_case "fetch failure http 000" 000 ""
assert_log_has "Probe failed"
assert_alert_has "NOT restarting"
assert_no_restart
run_case "non-2xx http 500" 500 '{"error":"boom"}'
assert_log_has "Probe failed"
assert_alert_has "NOT restarting"
assert_no_restart
# --- case 10: connected but last_error set -> degraded 🟡, no restart ---------
echo "== case 10: degraded (connected=true but last_error set) warns, no restart =="
run_case "degraded" 200 '{"status":"ok","zulip":{"connected":true,"last_error":"transient queue hiccup","messages_processed":3}}'
assert_log_has "Abiba: 🟡 Error: transient queue hiccup"
assert_log_lacks "❌ Disconnected"
assert_no_restart
# --- summary -------------------------------------------------------------------
echo ""
if [ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]; then
echo "✅ ALL CHECKS PASSED ($PASS/$PASS) — tests/zulip-monitor-abiba.sh"
exit 0
else
echo "❌ $FAIL CHECK(S) FAILED ($PASS passed) — tests/zulip-monitor-abiba.sh"
exit 1
fi
+70 -326
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
---
kind: responsibility
name: zulip-health
description: Multi-platform health monitor for the Zulip messaging mesh spanning Platform A (pi/Abiba Zulip bridge), Platform B (Tanko on DSH), and Platform C (Agent Zero Docker). Verifies bot registration, DM delivery, and cross-platform connectivity. The kagentz Zulip adapter leg is retired (its code no longer exists) — Agent Zero is probed for A2A liveness, A2A response, and public-path access only. Mumuni is no longer monitored from this host — she runs on her own container (kagentz CT 105 on minipve, .14) and is monitored on her side.
description: Multi-platform health monitor for the Zulip messaging mesh spanning Platform A (Agent Zero Docker), Platform B (Hermes agents Tanko/Mumuni), and the Zulip bridge. Verifies bot registration, DM delivery, and cross-platform connectivity.
title: Zulip Mesh Health Monitor — Multi-Platform
version: 3.4.0
version: 3.0.0
runtime_contract: 2
agent: abiba
report_only_agents:
@@ -12,25 +12,15 @@ report_only_agents:
# Zulip Mesh Health Monitor
Monitors the Zulip-connected agents under this host's operational control (pi,
DSH, Agent Zero). Runs every 15 minutes in the background. Also triggers on
session start.
> **Mumuni is NOT monitored from this host (captain ruling 2026-09-10).** She
> moved off this host onto her own container — kagentz CT 105 on minipve
> (192.168.68.14), running a dedicated `hermes` user — and is monitored on her
> side. No step in this contract, and no leg of `scripts/zulip-monitor.sh`, may
> ssh to her old deployment, read her `~/.hermes/gateway_state.json`, or alert on
> her state. The former Platform-B-for-Mumuni steps (gateway process, heartbeat,
> response delivery) are retired: they always read "unknown" against the
> decommissioned deployment and produced a false 🔴 alert on every run.
Monitors ALL Zulip-connected agents across three platforms (pi, Hermes, Agent Zero).
Runs every 15 minutes in the background. Also triggers on session start.
## Requires
- **Zulip API key** for `abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net` in `$ZULIP_API_KEY`
- **SSH access** to minipve (192.168.68.12) for Tanko — CT 112 reached via `pct exec` (direct SSH to .122 is not a dependency of this contract: per-worker key availability varies); and the Agent Zero Docker host (192.168.68.14)
- **SSH access** to Tanko (192.168.68.122), Mumuni (192.168.68.24, inside Abiba CT100 on hwepve), and Agent Zero Docker host (192.168.68.14)
- **PM2** on localhost for pi process management
- **Network access** to `chat.sysloggh.net`, `kagentz.sysloggh.net` (C3 public path), `localhost:9200`
- **Network access** to `chat.sysloggh.net`, `localhost:9200`
- **Write access** to `/root/zulip-health-monitor.log` and `/tmp/zulip-monitor-debounce`
- **Relay access** via RA-H OS MCP for alert delivery
@@ -57,9 +47,11 @@ session start.
"severity": "healthy"
},
"tanko": {
"platform": "dsh",
"service_state": "active",
"http_status": 200,
"platform": "hermes",
"zulip_state": "connected",
"heartbeat_age_seconds": 45,
"gateway_pid": 1234,
"edit_fail_rate_pct": 0,
"severity": "healthy"
}
}
@@ -91,13 +83,13 @@ Log as "unreachable" — don't treat as critical unless it persists for 3+ conse
## Streaming Support (2026-07-05)
Zulip agents now support progressive message editing during agent generation.
When a Zulip agent under this monitor's scope (Tanko on DSH) processes a message, the response is
When a Hermes agent (Tanko, Mumuni) processes a message, the response is
streamed in real-time via Zulip's `PATCH /api/v1/messages/{id}` API:
- Adapter implements `edit_message()` using `_api_patch()` helper
- Gateway stream consumer progressively edits the Zulip message
- User sees real-time agent thinking instead of waiting for full response
- Verified: Tanko (CT 112) has streaming active; Mumuni's (kagentz CT 105) is verified on her own host, not from here
- Verified: Tanko (CT 112) and Mumuni (CT 114) both have streaming active
### Verification
```bash
@@ -126,56 +118,21 @@ grep -c "async def edit_message" ~/.hermes/plugins/*/zulip*/adapter.py
- **On critical alert**: Escalate to relay message immediately, don't wait for schedule
## Execution
**Execution model**: This contract is executed by a host-scheduled cron job (see
`scripts/contract-run.sh`). The cron job runs the monitoring script directly on the
target host and appends the result to `/var/log/contract-runs/<contract>.log`. An
agent-session acknowledgement (a `done:` line in the ops status log) is NOT
execution — it only proves the agent read the result and reported it. The actual
monitoring work happens in the host cron job.
### Liveness rule (scoped)
Any HTTP response proves the service is ALIVE. For auth-gated endpoints (Zulip API, Tanko gateway), a 401/403 redirect or status means the service answered — report the code, never "down". Only a failed CONNECTION (curl status 000, timeout, refused) is a failed probe. **Proxy-fronted exception:** a reverse proxy's `502`/`504` (upstream refused/unreachable) is not the backend answering — for proxy-fronted public endpoints such as `https://kagentz.sysloggh.net/` (C3), treat it as DOWN.
**STANDING PROBE RULES (2026-09-14, from defect report 1150.msg):**
1. **Any HTTP status means ALIVE.** 200, 301, 302, 401, 403, 404 all prove the service answered — report the code, never "down". A redirect is not a failure. Only a failed CONNECTION (curl status 000, timeout, refused) is a failed probe (proxy `502`/`504` excepted, above).
2. **A failed probe is never a service verdict.** Print `probe-failed: <target> <kind>` naming the exact URL/host/port and the failure kind (timeout, refused, no-route, dns), retry once at a longer timeout, and only then report.
3. **Say which probe produced each number.** "API: 000" is unusable; "API https://chat.sysloggh.net/api/v1/server_settings -> connection timeout after 10s (retried at 25s: also timeout)" is actionable.
### Step 1: Zulip Server Liveness
```bash
# Probe the Zulip API (authenticated, any HTTP status = ALIVE)
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 10 https://chat.sysloggh.net/api/v1/server_settings -u 'abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net:$ZULIP_API_KEY')
if [ "$code" == "000" ]; then
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 25 https://chat.sysloggh.net/api/v1/server_settings -u 'abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net:$ZULIP_API_KEY')
echo "Zulip API https://chat.sysloggh.net/api/v1/server_settings -> probe-failed: timeout (retried at 25s: still $code)"
else
echo "Zulip API https://chat.sysloggh.net/api/v1/server_settings -> $code"
fi
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" https://chat.sysloggh.net/api/v1/server_settings \
-u 'abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net:$ZULIP_API_KEY'
```
Expected: `200` (authenticated). Any HTTP status = ALIVE; only 000/timeout = probe-failed. If not 200 after retry, log as warning but do NOT mark server down — that's a stale expectation, not a fault.
Expected: `200`. If not → mark `zulip_server_status: "down"`, skip per-platform checks, alert.
### Step 2: Platform A — pi (Abiba, localhost)
**A1: Health Endpoint**
```bash
# Probe the Abiba extension health endpoint (loopback, any HTTP status = ALIVE)
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 10 http://127.0.0.1:9200/health)
if [ "$code" == "000" ]; then
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 25 http://127.0.0.1:9200/health)
echo "Abiba extension http://127.0.0.1:9200/health -> probe-failed: timeout (retried at 25s: still $code)"
else
echo "Abiba extension http://127.0.0.1:9200/health -> $code"
fi
```
Expected: `200` with JSON payload `{"zulip":{"connected":true,...}}`. Any HTTP status = ALIVE; only 000/timeout = probe-failed. **NOTE: This probe MUST run on the Abiba host (CT 100) where 127.0.0.1:9200 is the extension. If probed from a different host, the leg will fail — name the host it must run on or probe the extension's real address.**
Check the JSON payload:
Fetch `http://localhost:9200/health` as JSON. Check:
| Field | Healthy | Critical |
|-------|---------|----------|
@@ -227,302 +184,95 @@ grep -a "Finalized\|Failed to finalize" /root/.pm2/logs/abiba-zulip-out.log | ta
| `last_error` set | Log and monitor |
| Crash loop >10/h | Alert user |
### Step 3: Platform B — Hermes (Tanko .122, Mumuni .24)
### Step 3: Platform B — Tanko (DSH on minipve CT 112)
Mumuni is out of scope for this host (see the note above): she runs on her own
container and is monitored on her side.
Tanko runs on DSH (DeepSeek Harness) — it no longer runs a Hermes gateway, so
there is no `~/.hermes/gateway_state.json` on CT 112. Tanko's Zulip gateway runs
as the `dsh-web` systemd unit inside **CT 112**, which resides on the **minipve**
PVE host (**192.168.68.12**). Direct SSH to 192.168.68.122 is not a dependency
of this contract — per-worker key availability varies — so CT 112 probes run
from the minipve vantage via `pct exec`:
**B1: Gateway State**
```bash
ssh root@192.168.68.12 "pct exec 112 -- <command>"
ssh root@192.168.68.122 "cat ~/.hermes/gateway_state.json"
ssh root@192.168.68.24 "cat ~/.hermes/gateway_state.json" # Mumuni inside Abiba CT100
```
> **By design (verified 2026-09-08):** the `dsh-web` gateway binds
> `127.0.0.1:3080` **loopback-only**. A remote probe against
> `192.168.68.122:3080` gets connection-refused — that is EXPECTED, NOT a fault,
> and must never be raised as Tanko down. Only loopback probes from inside
> CT 112 (or the public-URL fallback below) are valid health signals.
Check `platforms.zulip.state`: `connected` ✅ | `disconnected` ❌ | `error` ❌ | missing → not installed.
**B1: Gateway Service State (Tanko)**
**B2: Agent Process**
```bash
ssh root@192.168.68.12 "pct exec 112 -- systemctl is-active dsh-web"
ssh root@<CT> "ps aux | grep 'gateway run' | grep -v grep"
```
Expected: `active`. Anything else → gateway service down → apply the Tanko heal
(restart via DSH service, Platform B Actions table below).
Gateway PID should exist with uptime > 60s. **Dual-gateway detection**: if more than one `gateway run` process is found, the gateway has a collision (typically one `--force` and one `--replace` process). Kill the newer/duplicate process, then restart the remaining gateway via PM2 (`pm2 restart mumuni-zulip`). Check gateway log for "Gateway running with 2 platform(s)" (not 1) to confirm Zulip reloaded.
**B2: Gateway HTTP Liveness (Tanko — loopback-only :3080)**
**B3: Heartbeat Verification**
```bash
ssh root@192.168.68.12 "pct exec 112 -- curl -s --connect-timeout 5 --max-time 10 -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://127.0.0.1:3080/"
ssh root@<CT> "grep Heartbeat ~/.hermes/logs/agent.log | tail -3"
```
Alive = **ANY** HTTP status response from the endpoint — the expected set is
`200`/`301`/`302`/`307`/`308`/`401`/`403` (the gateway UI is token-gated and
legitimately answers with redirects/auth-challenges, so never require a bare
`200`), and any other status, including `404`/`5xx`, also counts alive: a
process answering `503` is running and self-heal must NOT restart-loop it.
Down = connection refused (`000`) or timeout only. Statuses outside the
expected set are logged/reported as a warning — reported, never healed on.
Expected: recent heartbeat (within 5 min), `polls=N` incrementing.
Silence > 300s → warning. Silence > 600s → critical.
**B3: Public-URL Fallback Probe (Tanko — for nodes without pct/ssh access to minipve)**
**B4: Response Delivery**
```bash
curl -s --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 15 -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' https://tankodhs.sysloggh.net/
ssh root@<CT> "grep -E 'Finalized|Failed to finalize|Replied to' ~/.hermes/logs/agent.log | tail -10"
```
Fallback only — used when the monitoring node has no pct/SSH path to minipve.
Alive = **ANY** HTTP status response from the endpoint — healthy signals are
`302` (authentik proxy-auth redirect) and `401` (auth-gated), and any other
status, including `404`/`5xx`, also counts alive: the endpoint is up and
answering and must NOT be restart-looped. Down = connection refused (`000`) or
timeout only. Never expect a bare `200` — the public URL terminates in the
token-gated authentik chain. Statuses outside the healthy set are
logged/reported as a warning — reported, never healed on.
> 50% fail rate → critical.
**Platform B Actions**
| Condition | Action |
|-----------|--------|
| `dsh-web` service not `active` | Restart Tanko via DSH service |
| HTTP `:3080` connection refused/timeout (`000`) | Same as above |
| HTTP status outside the expected set | Log/report as a warning — reported, never healed on |
**B4: dsh-web Authentication (Tanko — restart-persistent login)**
The dsh-web UI is token-gated. On every start the process prints a random
launch token to the journal:
```
dsh web: http://127.0.0.1:3080/?token=<TOKEN>
```
The token only bootstraps an authority-bound, HMAC-signed browser cookie with a
30-day lifetime. The signing secret is durable in
`/root/.dsh/.credentials.yaml` (key `client-connection/browser-session`), so a
cookie minted once keeps working across `dsh-web` restarts; the launch token
itself rotates on every restart.
**Login endpoint (public, Authentik-gated):**
`https://tankodhs.sysloggh.net/dsh-web-login`
It lives inside the Authentik-gated `:80` server block
(`/etc/nginx/sites-available/dsh`, symlinked from
`/etc/nginx/sites-enabled/dsh`) as `location = /dsh-web-login`, guarded by
`auth_request /outpost.goauthentik.io/auth/nginx`. It proxies to dsh-web with
`Host: tankodhs.sysloggh.net`, so the minted cookie is bound to the public
authority — never to `127.0.0.1:3080`. The token-dependent line is isolated in
the generated include `/etc/dsh-web/nginx-login.conf`:
```
proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:3080/?token=<TOKEN>;
```
**Token refresh (non-disruptive):**
`/opt/deepseek-harness/capture-dsh-token.sh` (source:
`scripts/capture-dsh-token.sh`) reads candidate launch tokens from the journal
**scoped to the service's current systemd invocation**
(`systemctl show -p InvocationID` + `_SYSTEMD_INVOCATION_ID=`), re-sampling the
invocation on every pass so a restart that lands during the wait switches to the
new invocation; a restarted process's stale token is never considered while its
new startup banner is still pending and there is no whole-journal or
cross-invocation fallback. Each candidate
is then functionally verified against dsh-web with `Host: tankodhs.sysloggh.net`,
using the first the running process accepts with `303`. It waits up to 120s for
a restarted process to accept a token and re-probes every current-invocation
candidate on each pass, so a token that briefly returns `000` while the service
is still starting is not disqualified. If none is accepted it leaves the include
untouched and exits so the timer retries (exiting non-zero when a pending reload
is still outstanding). It writes
`/etc/dsh-web/launch-token` and regenerates `/etc/dsh-web/nginx-login.conf`,
reloading nginx only when the on-disk include differs from the generated one or
the applied-state stamp does not match the token (`nginx -t` guards the reload,
and the stamp is written only after a successful `nginx -s reload`, so a failed
or interrupted reload is retried on the next run). Any failed reload records a
pending-reload marker under `/etc/dsh-web/`; the next run attempts the reload
before the token wait, independent of token state, and clears the marker only
once the reload succeeds, so a disabled legacy `:8081` file can never leave the
running nginx unreloaded. The generated include is recreated before any
`nginx -t` if it is missing, so a failed run cannot wedge recovery.
Runs are serialized with `flock` on `/run/capture-dsh-token.lock`. It **never
stops or starts `dsh-web`**.
It is triggered by the `dsh-web.service` drop-in
`/etc/systemd/system/dsh-web.service.d/20-token-refresh.conf`
(`ExecStartPost=/bin/systemctl --no-block start dsh-web-token.service`) and by
`dsh-web-token.timer` every 2 minutes for reconciliation.
<details><summary>Installed systemd wiring (CT 112)</summary>
```ini
# /etc/systemd/system/dsh-web-token.service
[Unit]
Description=Refresh the dsh-web launch token for the nginx login endpoint
After=dsh-web.service
[Service]
Type=oneshot
TimeoutStartSec=180
ExecStart=/opt/deepseek-harness/capture-dsh-token.sh
# /etc/systemd/system/dsh-web-token.timer
[Unit]
Description=Periodically refresh the dsh-web login token
[Timer]
OnBootSec=90s
OnUnitActiveSec=120s
AccuracySec=10s
Persistent=true
[Install]
WantedBy=timers.target
# /etc/systemd/system/dsh-web.service.d/20-token-refresh.conf
[Service]
ExecStartPost=/bin/systemctl --no-block start dsh-web-token.service
```
</details>
> **Do NOT reintroduce the `:8081` endpoint.** It listened on `0.0.0.0:8081`
> with no `auth_request` and was a full Authentik bypass for anyone on the LAN.
> The script now removes `/etc/nginx/sites-enabled/dsh.token` automatically if
> it ever reappears.
**Authentication flow:**
1. `GET https://tankodhs.sysloggh.net/dsh-web-login`
2. Unauthenticated → Authentik sign-in; once authenticated the request reaches
dsh-web with `Host: tankodhs.sysloggh.net`.
3. dsh-web accepts the launch token on `GET /`, writes the
`dsh-auth-<authority-hash>` cookie (30 days, `HttpOnly`, `SameSite=Strict`)
and returns `303` to `/`.
4. Every later request through `/` presents that cookie; the token is not needed
again until the cookie expires or a new browser is used.
**Verification** (minipve vantage):
```bash
# 1. Login endpoint is Authentik-gated: unauthenticated -> 302 (not 200/303).
ssh root@192.168.68.12 "pct exec 112 -- curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' \
-H 'Host: tankodhs.sysloggh.net' http://127.0.0.1/dsh-web-login"
# Expected: 302
# 2. Legacy :8081 endpoint is gone (connection refused -> 000).
ssh root@192.168.68.12 "pct exec 112 -- curl -s --max-time 3 -o /dev/null \
-w '%{http_code}\n' http://192.168.68.122:8081/"
# Expected: 000
# 3. Backend cookie mint + reuse (exactly what /dsh-web-login proxies to).
TOKEN=$(ssh root@192.168.68.12 "pct exec 112 -- cat /etc/dsh-web/launch-token")
ssh root@192.168.68.12 "pct exec 112 -- curl -s -c /tmp/dsh.jar -o /dev/null \
-H 'Host: tankodhs.sysloggh.net' 'http://127.0.0.1:3080/?token=$TOKEN'"
ssh root@192.168.68.12 "pct exec 112 -- curl -s -b /tmp/dsh.jar -o /dev/null \
-w '%{http_code}\n' -H 'Host: tankodhs.sysloggh.net' http://127.0.0.1:3080/"
# Expected: 200 — the minted dsh-auth-... cookie (authority
# tankodhs.sysloggh.net) is replayed on the next request and accepted.
# 4. Token refresh is non-disruptive and idempotent.
ssh root@192.168.68.12 "pct exec 112 -- /opt/deepseek-harness/capture-dsh-token.sh"
# Expected: "token unchanged; nginx not reloaded" when nothing changed
```
**Restart durability (acceptance):** after `systemctl restart dsh-web`, (a) the
cookie minted before the restart still returns `200` on `/`, and (b) the
refreshed `/etc/dsh-web/nginx-login.conf` carries the new token and mints a
fresh cookie. Both verified live 2026-09-11.
```bash
# 5. Cookie survives a dsh-web restart, and the new token mints a new cookie.
ssh root@192.168.68.12 "pct exec 112 -- systemctl restart dsh-web"
# dsh-web is Type=simple: restart returns before :3080 is listening. Bounded-poll
# until the socket answers (any status but 000) before asserting the cookie.
for i in $(seq 1 60); do
UP=$(ssh root@192.168.68.12 "pct exec 112 -- curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' \
-H 'Host: tankodhs.sysloggh.net' http://127.0.0.1:3080/")
[ "$UP" != "000" ] && break
sleep 2
done
ssh root@192.168.68.12 "pct exec 112 -- curl -s -b /tmp/dsh.jar -o /dev/null \
-w '%{http_code}\n' -H 'Host: tankodhs.sysloggh.net' http://127.0.0.1:3080/"
# Expected: 200 — the pre-restart cookie is still accepted.
# The restart's ExecStartPost (or the 2-minute timer) refreshes the include. A
# manual run may no-op on the flock, so poll until the include carries a token
# the running process accepts (bounded wait) before the mint+reuse check.
for i in $(seq 1 60); do
TOKEN=$(ssh root@192.168.68.12 "pct exec 112 -- sed -n 's/.*token=//p' /etc/dsh-web/nginx-login.conf | tr -d ';\n'")
CODE=$(ssh root@192.168.68.12 "pct exec 112 -- curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' \
-H 'Host: tankodhs.sysloggh.net' 'http://127.0.0.1:3080/?token=$TOKEN'")
[ "$CODE" = "303" ] && break
sleep 2
done
# Expected: 303 — the include now holds the token the running process accepts.
ssh root@192.168.68.12 "pct exec 112 -- curl -s -c /tmp/dsh-new.jar -o /dev/null \
-H 'Host: tankodhs.sysloggh.net' 'http://127.0.0.1:3080/?token=$TOKEN'"
ssh root@192.168.68.12 "pct exec 112 -- curl -s -b /tmp/dsh-new.jar -o /dev/null \
-w '%{http_code}\n' -H 'Host: tankodhs.sysloggh.net' http://127.0.0.1:3080/"
# Expected: 200 — the refreshed token minted a fresh cookie.
```
| `zulip.state != "connected"` | `ssh root@<CT> "pkill -f 'gateway run'; sleep 2; hermes gateway restart"` |
| No heartbeat in 10min | Same as above |
| `Failed to finalize` > 50% | Check PATCH API, Zulip server |
| Response empty/short | Check A2A endpoint / LiteLLM model |
### Step 4: Platform C — Agent Zero (kagentz, CT 105 via Docker host .14)
> **The kagentz Zulip adapter leg is retired (2026-09-12).** Its code
> (`/a0/usr/kagentz-zulip/`) no longer exists in the agent-zero container, so
> the former adapter-process and heartbeat/queue checks always failed and the
> monitor issued a restart for something that could not start, posting a false
> kagentz-adapter-down alert on every run. Do NOT re-add an adapter-process,
> heartbeat/queue, or adapter-restart step. Agent Zero is probed for A2A
> liveness/response and public-path access only, and a probe must never restart
> a platform.
**C1: A2A Server Health (no credential needed)**
**C1: A2A Server Health**
```bash
# A2A listens on :80 inside the agent-zero container (host-mapped to :50080) and
# is auth-gated: an unauthenticated probe gets 401, which means the server is up.
ssh root@192.168.68.14 "docker exec agent-zero curl -s --connect-timeout 5 -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://127.0.0.1:80/a2a/"
ssh root@192.168.68.14 "docker exec agent-zero curl -s --connect-timeout 5 http://127.0.0.1:8001/.well-known/agent.json"
```
Expected: `401` (auth-gated, A2A server is up and responding) or `200` (if no auth required). Connection refused (`000`) → A2A server down (INCIDENT). Any other status → running but unexpected: log/report it, never restart.
Expected: `{"name":"kagentz",...}`. Connection refused → A2A server down.
**C2: A2A Response Verification (requires LITELLM_KEY)**
**C2: Adapter Process**
```bash
# A2A listens on :80 inside the container and is auth-gated (401 expected unauthenticated).
ssh root@192.168.68.14 "docker exec agent-zero curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:80/a2a \
ssh root@192.168.68.14 "docker exec agent-zero ps aux | grep adapter | grep -v grep"
```
Adapter should be running. Missing → restart inside container.
**C3: Heartbeat & Queue**
```bash
ssh root@192.168.68.14 "docker exec agent-zero grep Heartbeat /tmp/zulip-adapter.log | tail -3"
```
Check: `processed=N` incrementing, `silence < 600s`, `reconnects` ≈ 0.
**C4: A2A Response Verification**
```bash
ssh root@192.168.68.14 "docker exec agent-zero curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8001/a2a \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer $LITELLM_KEY' \
-d '{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"method\":\"tasks/send\",\"params\":{\"message\":{\"role\":\"user\",\"parts\":[{\"text\":\"ping\"}]}},\"id\":1}'"
```
Expected: task ID with "working" status. Poll for completion with `tasks/get`. If 401, check LITELLM_KEY is set (this is a credential issue, NOT a server-down incident).
**C3: Public Access Path (no credential needed)**
```bash
# Probes the public URL that NetBird proxies to the agent-zero container.
# This is the captain's point of view: if the captain can't reach it, it's down.
# 200/302/401 = alive, 502 = proxy's "upstream refused" page (INCIDENT),
# connection failed (000) = INCIDENT. Never restarts anything.
curl -s -o /dev/null --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 15 -w '%{http_code}' https://kagentz.sysloggh.net/
```
Expected: `200` (Agent Zero login page), `302` (redirect), or `401` (auth-gated) = alive. `502` = NetBird proxy's "upstream refused" page (the container's port 80 is not listening) = INCIDENT. `000` (connection failed) = INCIDENT. Any other status → running but unexpected: log/report it, never restart.
Expected: task ID with "working" status. Poll for completion with `tasks/get`.
**Platform C Actions**
| Condition | Action |
|-----------|--------|
| C1 A2A returns `000` (connection refused/timeout) | Alert only — never restart the platform; investigate the agent-zero container |
| C1 A2A returns a status other than `200`/`401` | Log/report as a warning — reported, never healed on |
| C2 A2A returns 401 | Check `LITELLM_KEY` is set (credential issue, NOT server-down) |
| C3 public URL returns `502` (upstream refused) | Alert only — the container's port 80 is not listening; investigate the agent-zero container |
| C3 public URL returns `000` (connection failed) | Alert only — the public path is down; investigate the NetBird proxy or the container |
| C3 public URL returns a status other than `200`/`302`/`401` | Log/report as a warning — reported, never healed on |
| A2A `.well-known/agent.json` fails | `docker exec agent-zero bash -c "pkill -9 -f a2a_agent; cd /a0 && /opt/venv-a0/bin/python3 -u /a0/usr/a2a_agent.py > /tmp/a2a.log 2>&1 &"` |
| Adapter process missing | Restart adapter inside container with env vars |
| Silence > 600s | Restart adapter (auto-reconnect handles BAD_EVENT_QUEUE_ID) |
| LiteLLM 401 | Check API key in a2a_agent.py `LITELLM_KEY` |
### Step 5: Global Checks
@@ -530,25 +280,19 @@ Expected: `200` (Agent Zero login page), `302` (redirect), or `401` (auth-gated)
Check each agent's log for excessive bot-to-bot chatter:
- Abiba: `Skipped.*bot msgs` count
- Tanko: Repeated DM exchanges between bots
- Tanko/Mumuni: Repeated DM exchanges between bots
- kagentz: Adapter log for bot DMs being processed
If any bot processes >50 bot-originated messages in 15min → warning.
### Step 6: Compile and Report
1. Run `scripts/zulip-monitor.sh` and take its final `Result:` line as the
authoritative run verdict. The verdict line is either
`Result: ✅ 0 issues (all healthy)` or
`Result: 🔴 INCIDENT — N issue(s) found`.
2. Quote that `Result:` line verbatim in the status report. When it says
`INCIDENT`, the run MUST be reported as an incident — never summarised as
OK/healthy and never annotated as "expected".
3. Compile all platform checks and severity
4. Determine `overall_severity` from worst per-agent severity
5. If restart action needed, check `/tmp/zulip-monitor-debounce` — apply only if >300s since last restart
6. Log full diagnostic to `/root/zulip-health-monitor.log` with timestamp
7. If any agent critical or >2 degraded: send relay message to user
8. Update `last_check` timestamp in `### Maintains` snapshot
1. Compile all platform checks and severity
2. Determine `overall_severity` from worst per-agent severity
3. If restart action needed, check `/tmp/zulip-monitor-debounce` — apply only if >300s since last restart
4. Log full diagnostic to `/root/zulip-health-monitor.log` with timestamp
5. If any agent critical or >2 degraded: send relay message to user
6. Update `last_check` timestamp in `### Maintains` snapshot
### Restart Debounce
+2 -3
View File
@@ -10,9 +10,8 @@ description: >
> **⚠️ RETIRED** — The pi Zulip extension (`~/.pi/agent/extensions/zulip/`) and
> PM2 process (`abiba-zulip`) have been decommissioned. All mention/reliability
> monitoring now happens through Telegram. Mumuni (Hermes) and Tanko (DSH)
> continue to use Zulip; Agent Zero's Zulip adapter is retired — see
> `zulip-health.prose.md` for current Platform C (Agent Zero) state.
> monitoring now happens through Telegram. Hermes agents (Tanko, Mumuni) and
> Agent Zero (kagentz) continue to use Zulip.
## Maintains
+1 -1
View File
@@ -420,7 +420,7 @@ Backup v2 before starting: `cp index.js index.js.v2-backup-$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S
|-------|----------|-------------|--------------|-------------|
| **Abiba** | pi (CT 100) | ✅ Connected | API key missing from Infisical injection; poll timeout noise | Added .env fallback; AbortError treated as empty poll (no retry); poll timeout 65s→90s |
| **Tanko** | Hermes (CT 112) | ✅ Connected | Gateway disconnected since Jul 11; watchdog restart didn't re-establish Zulip | Full gateway restart (kill wrapper, let infisical-gateway.sh respawn) |
| **Mumuni** | Hermes (kagentz CT 105, migrated 2026-08-29) | ✅ Connected | No issues found | None needed |
| **Mumuni** | Hermes (CT 114) | ✅ Connected | No issues found | None needed |
### Key Fixes Applied
+6 -5
View File
@@ -13,8 +13,7 @@ triggers:
> **⚠️ RETIRED** — This contract was embedded in the pi Zulip extension code
> (`performHealthCheck()`). That code has been removed. Zulip self-healing for
> agents (Mumuni on Hermes, Tanko on DSH) continues through their own platform
> monitoring.
> Hermes agents (Tanko, Mumuni) continues through their own gateway monitoring.
## Maintains
@@ -66,7 +65,8 @@ triggers:
|------|----|------|---------|
| Zulip server | 192.168.68.19 | root | Docker: `zulip-zulip-1` |
| Abiba (pi) | localhost | root | PM2: `abiba-zulip` |
| Tanko | 192.168.68.122 (CT 112) | jerome | DSH (DeepSeek Harness) — restart via DSH service, not `hermes gateway restart` (no longer a Hermes agent since 2026-08-27) |
| Mumuni | 192.168.68.24 (CT100 abiba) | root | `hermes gateway restart` |
| Tanko | 192.168.68.122 | jerome | `PATH=$PATH:/home/jerome/.hermes/hermes-agent hermes gateway restart` |
## Debounce
@@ -75,8 +75,9 @@ Track via `/tmp/zulip-heal-debounce-<agent>` (unix timestamp of last restart).
## Reporting
This contract is RETIRED — health-check logs are NOT knowledge graph content.
No graph nodes are created. Logs go to Gitea (SyslogSolution/health-logs).
Every cycle produces a knowledge graph node:
- Title: `[LEARN] zulip-self-heal: <timestamp>`
- metadata: { type: "remediation", status: "fixed" | "escalated" | "healthy" }
- Issues fixed → DM: "🛠 Zulip Self-Heal: fixed <issue>"
- Issues escalated → DM: "⚠️ Zulip Self-Heal: <issue> needs attention"