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jerome 0e6efdb627 docs: add cron-prompts-review.md — all 10 generated prompts for review
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2026-07-13 22:04:35 -04:00
jerome 484ea00597 fix: resolve registry issues — placeholders, missing postconditions, DAG/escalation/CB injection
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- Replaced <pve-api> placeholder with actual Proxmox API endpoint
- Replaced <service-endpoints> with actual service URLs in infrastructure-monitoring
- Replaced vague 'send test DM' with actual API call in zulip-health
- Added 3 postconditions to hermes-agent-baseline (was empty)
- Simplified verify commands in hermes-config-template and hermes-agent-baseline
- Updated provision-cron-jobs.py to match actual registry schema for:
  - Circuit breaker: max_retries, trip_action, window
  - Escalation: severity levels (info/warning/critical/fatal)
  - DAG: depends_on array

All 10 scheduled contracts now pass validation.
2026-07-13 19:07:23 -04:00
jerome 8abbd6f001 fix: add multi-dimensional index to contract-registry.yaml
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Adds index.by_domain with pm2-self-heal and disk-gc-threat-response in
infrastructure group. All 28 contracts now accounted for in every index
dimension: by_category, by_domain, by_owner, by_trigger, by_sensitivity.
2026-07-13 16:39:52 -04:00
jerome cca5a57265 feat: add contract-registry.yaml — OpenProse enforcement index
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Maps all 28 prose contracts to enforcement categories (compliance, monitoring,
remediation, build/deploy, maintenance, reference). Each entry includes:
- Trigger mechanism (scheduled, event-driven, passive, on-demand)
- Execution protocol (agent, timeout, requires, SOP)
- Verification postconditions with commands
- Receipt format and storage
- Escalation tiers (info/warning/critical/fatal)
- Circuit breaker configuration
- Dependency resolution (DAG)
- Last run status tracking

MVP targets: hermes-key-enforcement (compliance) and proxmox-monitor
(monitored → disk-gc-threat-response remediation)

Related to relay #707: OpenProse Contract Enforcement Process — Draft for Review
2026-07-13 15:40:10 -04:00
jerome 4dc29289bb chore: remove orphan pre-merge file 2026-07-11 18:55:06 -04:00
67 changed files with 989 additions and 8979 deletions
+13 -16
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@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
name: PR Pipeline — Authorize → Validate → Review → Merge name: PR Pipeline — Authorize → Validate → Review → Merge
# TRIGGER IS INTENTIONALLY UNFILTERED — DO NOT RE-ADD A `paths:` FILTER.
#
# This workflow previously carried `paths: ['**.prose.md', 'scripts/**.sh',
# '**.yaml', '**.yml']` on both `push` and `pull_request`. Any PR whose diff
# touched none of those patterns (for example a `deliverables/`-only PR, or a
# `scripts/*.py` / `bin/*` change) therefore produced NO Gitea Actions run at
# all: validation, lint, ai-review and the merge gate were silently skipped.
# Validation must run for every pull request and every push to master, so the
# trigger is deliberately unconditional.
on: on:
push: push:
branches: [master] branches: [master]
paths:
- '**.prose.md'
- 'scripts/**.sh'
- '**.yaml'
- '**.yml'
pull_request: pull_request:
types: [opened, synchronize, reopened] types: [opened, synchronize, reopened]
paths:
- '**.prose.md'
- 'scripts/**.sh'
- '**.yaml'
- '**.yml'
jobs: jobs:
auth: auth:
@@ -42,21 +43,17 @@ jobs:
echo "=== Prose Contract Frontmatter Validation ===" echo "=== Prose Contract Frontmatter Validation ==="
FAILED=0 FAILED=0
for f in $(find . -name "*.prose.md" -not -path "./.git/*" -not -path "./runs/*"); do for f in $(find . -name "*.prose.md" -not -path "./.git/*" -not -path "./runs/*"); do
# NOTE: use herestrings, not `echo "$FM" | grep ...`. Under the runner's
# `-e -o pipefail`, `grep -q` exits on first match and can SIGPIPE the
# producer, making the pipeline report non-zero and raising a false
# "Missing name/description" whose file set varies run to run.
FM=$(sed -n '/^---$/,/^---$/p' "$f" | sed '1d;$d') FM=$(sed -n '/^---$/,/^---$/p' "$f" | sed '1d;$d')
[ -z "$FM" ] && { echo " ❌ $f: No YAML frontmatter"; FAILED=$((FAILED+1)); continue; } [ -z "$FM" ] && { echo " ❌ $f: No YAML frontmatter"; FAILED=$((FAILED+1)); continue; }
KIND=$(grep '^kind:' <<< "$FM" | awk '{print $2}') KIND=$(echo "$FM" | grep '^kind:' | awk '{print $2}')
case "$KIND" in case "$KIND" in
function|responsibility|gateway|pattern|test|template|architecture|enforcement) echo " ✅ $f: kind=$KIND" ;; function|responsibility|gateway|pattern|test|template|architecture|enforcement) echo " ✅ $f: kind=$KIND" ;;
*) echo " ❌ $f: Invalid kind='$KIND'"; FAILED=$((FAILED+1)) ;; *) echo " ❌ $f: Invalid kind='$KIND'"; FAILED=$((FAILED+1)) ;;
esac esac
grep -q '^name:' <<< "$FM" || { echo " ❌ $f: Missing name"; FAILED=$((FAILED+1)); } echo "$FM" | grep -q '^name:' || { echo " ❌ $f: Missing name"; FAILED=$((FAILED+1)); }
grep -q '^description:' <<< "$FM" || { echo " ❌ $f: Missing description"; FAILED=$((FAILED+1)); } echo "$FM" | grep -q '^description:' || { echo " ❌ $f: Missing description"; FAILED=$((FAILED+1)); }
done done
[ $FAILED -gt 0 ] && { echo "❌ FRONTMATTER FAILED ($FAILED error(s))"; exit 1; } [ $FAILED -gt 0 ] && { echo "❌ FRONTMATTER FAILED ($FAILED error(s))"; exit 1; }
echo "✅ Frontmatter validation passed" echo "✅ Frontmatter validation passed"
-1
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@@ -1 +0,0 @@
__pycache__/
+3 -10
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@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ Two incidents taught us this:
### Stage 3 — AI Review ### Stage 3 — AI Review
- Diff is sent to `syslog-auto` model via LiteLLM - Diff is sent to `syslog-auto` model via LiteLLM
- Review checks against infrastructure-control ground truth: - Review checks against infrastructure-control ground truth:
- CT IDs match the PVE cluster inventory in `infrastructure-control.prose.md` Appendix B (100-120 with gaps; no 122/123) - CT IDs match PVE cluster (100-117, no 122/123)
- Grafana is direct LAN :3001, NOT behind nginx - Grafana is direct LAN :3001, NOT behind nginx
- Zulip is CT 117 on storepve (bridge IP .19) - Zulip is CT 117 on storepve (bridge IP .19)
- Strix Halo :8080 is firewalled to .116 only - Strix Halo :8080 is firewalled to .116 only
@@ -67,10 +67,10 @@ Two incidents taught us this:
| Contract | Sensitivity | Who can change | | Contract | Sensitivity | Who can change |
|----------|------------|----------------| |----------|------------|----------------|
| `infrastructure-control.prose.md` | **CRITICAL** — topology source of truth | Abiba, Tanko (Tanko maintains its own CT row) | | `infrastructure-control.prose.md` | **CRITICAL** — topology source of truth | Abiba only (after live verification) |
| `proxmox-monitor.prose.md` | **CRITICAL** — deployed monitoring | Abiba only | | `proxmox-monitor.prose.md` | **CRITICAL** — deployed monitoring | Abiba only |
| `hermes-config-template.prose.md` | **HIGH** — all agent configs | Abiba, Mumuni, Tanko | | `hermes-config-template.prose.md` | **HIGH** — all agent configs | Abiba, Mumuni, Tanko |
| `zulip-health.prose.md` | **HIGH** — agent communication | Abiba, Mumuni, Tanko | | `zulip-health.prose.md` | **HIGH** — agent communication | Abiba, Mumuni |
| Other contracts | Normal | Any registered agent | | Other contracts | Normal | Any registered agent |
| `scripts/*.sh` | **HIGH** — runtime scripts | Abiba only | | `scripts/*.sh` | **HIGH** — runtime scripts | Abiba only |
@@ -128,10 +128,3 @@ safe-mutate --verify "CMD" [--expect "PATTERN"] --mutate "CMD" [--reason "WHY"]
Read the [Authoring Guide](docs/AUTHORING-GUIDE.md) before writing any new contract. Read the [Authoring Guide](docs/AUTHORING-GUIDE.md) before writing any new contract.
It covers the full process: verify → draft → lint → review → ship, with templates It covers the full process: verify → draft → lint → review → ship, with templates
and style rules. and style rules.
## Maintaining this file
Keep this file for knowledge useful to almost every future agent session in this project.
Do not repeat what the codebase already shows; point to the authoritative file or command instead.
Prefer rewriting or pruning existing entries over appending new ones.
When updating this file, preserve this bar for all agents and keep entries concise.
-2
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@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
<!-- Points Claude at AGENTS.md via import; edit AGENTS.md, not this file. -->
@AGENTS.md
+5 -6
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@@ -20,8 +20,7 @@ An agent ran `pct set` without checking `pct config` first and changed the IP
to the wrong value, breaking Zulip. The staleness was harmless until acted on. to the wrong value, breaking Zulip. The staleness was harmless until acted on.
**Layer 3 enforcement — the `safe-mutate` wrapper** (deployed on all 5 agents: **Layer 3 enforcement — the `safe-mutate` wrapper** (deployed on all 5 agents:
Abiba, Tanko, Mumuni, Koby, Koonimo — Tanko runs on DSH/DeepSeek Harness since Abiba, Tanko, Mumuni, Koby, Koonimo). ALL infrastructure mutations MUST go
2026-08-27 but safe-mutate enforcement still applies). ALL infrastructure mutations MUST go
through `safe-mutate`. Raw `sed -i`, `pct set`, `docker compose up through `safe-mutate`. Raw `sed -i`, `pct set`, `docker compose up
--force-recreate`, `kill`, `rm` on infrastructure outside `safe-mutate` is an --force-recreate`, `kill`, `rm` on infrastructure outside `safe-mutate` is an
auditable protocol violation. The wrapper runs a verify command, optionally auditable protocol violation. The wrapper runs a verify command, optionally
@@ -88,7 +87,7 @@ prose run memory-audit-maintenance memory_threshold=90 verify_configs=true
prose run hermes-config-template agent_name=syslog-devops default_model=claude-sonnet-4 prose run hermes-config-template agent_name=syslog-devops default_model=claude-sonnet-4
# Configure an agent with a different auxiliary model # Configure an agent with a different auxiliary model
prose run hermes-config-template agent_name=syslog-code default_model=gpu-dense auxiliary_model=gpu-vision prose run hermes-config-template agent_name=syslog-code default_model=qwen3.6-27B-code auxiliary_model=gemma-4-12b
``` ```
### Option B: Manual Execution ### Option B: Manual Execution
@@ -116,7 +115,7 @@ Run on trigger or schedule. Maintain persistent world-model state across runs.
| `zulip-health` | Zulip | Checks Zulip connectivity, message flow, and bot responsiveness. | | `zulip-health` | Zulip | Checks Zulip connectivity, message flow, and bot responsiveness. |
| `zulip-mention-reliability` | Zulip | Diagnoses and fixes @mention detection issues in Zulip. | | `zulip-mention-reliability` | Zulip | Diagnoses and fixes @mention detection issues in Zulip. |
| `zulip-approval-fix` | Zulip | Fixes broken /approve and /deny slash commands for Hermes agents. | | `zulip-approval-fix` | Zulip | Fixes broken /approve and /deny slash commands for Hermes agents. |
| `litellm-self-heal` | LiteLLM | Applies remediation rules for LiteLLM stack failures detected by `litellm-health` (full nginx → LiteLLM → GPU chain). 9 remediation rules. | | `litellm-self-heal` | LiteLLM | Consolidated health check + self-healing for the full nginx → LiteLLM → GPU chain. Verifies 8 containers, 3 GPUs, model inference, and agent keys. Applies 9 remediation rules. (litellm-health merged into this contract 2026-07-09.) |
| `gpu-fleet` | GPU | Manages the GPU inference fleet: model deployment, registration, health checks, LiteLLM sync. | | `gpu-fleet` | GPU | Manages the GPU inference fleet: model deployment, registration, health checks, LiteLLM sync. |
| `gpu-monitor` | GPU | Comprehensive GPU fleet monitor — polls sidecars, router, LiteLLM every 15s, renders SSE dashboard. | | `gpu-monitor` | GPU | Comprehensive GPU fleet monitor — polls sidecars, router, LiteLLM every 15s, renders SSE dashboard. |
| `proxmox-monitor` | Infra | Proxmox cluster + Docker monitoring via the existing Grafana/Prometheus stack on CT 116. | | `proxmox-monitor` | Infra | Proxmox cluster + Docker monitoring via the existing Grafana/Prometheus stack on CT 116. |
@@ -149,7 +148,7 @@ Called on-demand as single-render tools.
| Contract | Description | | Contract | Description |
|---|---| |---|---|
| `litellm-api-keys` | Manages LiteLLM API keys for agent identity. Create, rotate, verify, and list agent keys. References gpu-fleet for current key inventory. | | `litellm-api-keys` | Manages LiteLLM API keys for agent identity. Create, rotate, verify, and list agent keys. References gpu-fleet for current key inventory. |
| `litellm-health` | LiteLLM health check: public vs backend surfaces, CT 116 containers, GPU fleet, one model per GPU host, and agent keys. Owner of the probes; `litellm-self-heal` owns remediation. | | `litellm-health` | ⚠️ **DEPRECATED** — consolidated into `litellm-self-heal` (2026-07-09). Retained for reference only. |
| `infrastructure-monitoring` | Target-state for Prometheus + GPU exporters + Grafana. Core stack deployed, GPU exporters NOT live. | | `infrastructure-monitoring` | Target-state for Prometheus + GPU exporters + Grafana. Core stack deployed, GPU exporters NOT live. |
| `stirling-pdf-agent-access` | Documents the Stirling-PDF API access pattern for agents — global API key, 12 operations, curl examples. Agents use the `stirling-pdf-api` shared skill for templates. | | `stirling-pdf-agent-access` | Documents the Stirling-PDF API access pattern for agents — global API key, 12 operations, curl examples. Agents use the `stirling-pdf-api` shared skill for templates. |
| `hello-world` | Minimal test contract — verifies the OpenProse execution pipeline works. | | `hello-world` | Minimal test contract — verifies the OpenProse execution pipeline works. |
@@ -162,7 +161,7 @@ Companion shell scripts that contracts delegate to.
|---|---| |---|---|
| `daily-infra-report.py` | Generates the daily infrastructure dashboard (HTML email to jerome@sysloggh.com). | | `daily-infra-report.py` | Generates the daily infrastructure dashboard (HTML email to jerome@sysloggh.com). |
| `pm2-self-heal.sh` | Shell companion to the pm2-self-heal contract — restarts crashed PM2 processes (runs every 5 min). | | `pm2-self-heal.sh` | Shell companion to the pm2-self-heal contract — restarts crashed PM2 processes (runs every 5 min). |
| `agent-health-check.py` | Consolidated agent health: LiteLLM key validation + GPU port conflict + streaming checks (every 10 min). | | `agent-health-check.py` | Consolidated agent health: LiteLLM key validation + GPU port conflict + streaming checks (every 10 min). Replaced zulip-monitor.sh. |
## Contract Structure ## Contract Structure
-313
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@@ -1,313 +0,0 @@
---
report_only_agents:
- koby # ⛔ KOBY IS NEVER REPAIRED (Rule 17, 2026-08-17) — detect + report, never fix on .129
kind: function
name: abiba-zulip-restore
description: >
Restores Zulip connectivity for Abiba (pi agent). Verifies the v2 router-worker
extension code, starts a PM2 process as the Zulip gateway with correct env vars,
validates health endpoint, and confirms DM delivery. Run this whenever Abiba
stops responding on Zulip or after system restart.
agent: abiba
version: 1.0.0
status: active
runtime_contract: 2
---
---
# Abiba Zulip Restore — Resume pi Zulip Communication
Single-shot function that restores full Zulip connectivity for the Abiba pi agent.
Covers extension code validation, PM2 process management, health endpoint
verification, and DM loopback testing.
## Live-State Fields
| Field | Value | Trust |
|-------|-------|-------|
| Agent name | abiba | ✅ |
| Bot email | abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net | ✅ |
| Zulip server | https://chat.sysloggh.net | ✅ |
| Extension path | /root/.pi/agent/extensions/zulip/index.js | ✅ |
| Config path | /root/.pi/agent/extensions/zulip/config.yaml | ✅ |
| Health port | 9200 | ✅ |
| @all-bots user ID | 20 | ✅ (config, verified by API at runtime) |
| PM2 process name | abiba-zulip | ✅ |
| Provider | syslog-harness (http://192.168.68.116/v1) | ✅ |
| Default model | syslog-auto | ✅ (settings.json) |
## Architecture
The pi Zulip extension uses a **router-worker architecture** (v2):
- **Router** (PM2 `abiba-zulip`, `ZULIP_ROLE=router`): Polls Zulip for events,
maintains a per-sender pool of pi RPC worker processes. Each sender gets
their own `pi --mode rpc --session-dir` process with persistent sessions.
Handles streaming edits back to Zulip.
- **Worker** (child `pi --mode rpc`): Runs the agent with per-sender persistent
sessions. No Zulip logic in the worker — the router handles all Zulip I/O.
The extension loads in ALL pi sessions (via `settings.json` extensions array)
but is a **NO-OP** unless `ZULIP_ROLE=router` is set. Only the PM2 router process
carries the env var.
## Maintains
- extension_valid: bool — Extension code imports without errors
- pm2_running: bool — PM2 process `abiba-zulip` is online
- health_responding: bool — GET :9200/health returns "ok"
- zulip_connected: bool — Queue registered, bot identity resolved
- loopback_delivered: bool — Test DM sent and received
- model_valid: bool — Configured models match LiteLLM authorized models
### Postconditions
- PM2 process `abiba-zulip` online and stable (uptime > 30s)
- Health endpoint returns `{ status: "ok", connected: true }`
- Worker pool creates sessions on demand
- Echo prevention active (BOT_EMAILS includes all known bots)
- PM2 saved for auto-restart on boot
## Requires
- Node.js with `yaml` module available
- PM2 installed globally
- Zulip API key in `config.yaml`
- `pi` CLI available on PATH
- Zulip server accessible at https://chat.sysloggh.net
- LiteLLM provider accessible at http://192.168.68.116/v1
## Execution
### Step 1: Validate Extension Code
```bash
node -e "import('file:///root/.pi/agent/extensions/zulip/index.js').then(() => console.log('OK')).catch(e => {console.error('FAIL:', e.message); process.exit(1)})"
```
Expected: `OK`. If FAIL → check for missing dependencies, syntax errors.
### Step 2: Validate Model IDs
Compare configured models against LiteLLM authorized models:
```bash
API_KEY=$(grep -oP 'apiKey:\s*\K.*' /root/.pi/agent/models.json | head -1)
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY" http://192.168.68.116/v1/models | \
python3 -c "import json,sys; d=json.load(sys.stdin); [print(m['id']) for m in d.get('data',[])]" 2>/dev/null
```
Check: Every model ID in `models.json` must appear in the authorized list.
If not → fix `models.json` to only include authorized models (prefer `syslog-auto`).
### Step 3: Verify Config Integrity
```bash
python3 -c "
import yaml, sys
with open('/root/.pi/agent/extensions/zulip/config.yaml') as f:
cfg = yaml.safe_load(f)
required = ['zulip.site', 'zulip.email', 'zulip.api_key', 'agent.name']
for k in required:
keys = k.split('.')
v = cfg
for kk in keys:
v = v.get(kk)
if v is None:
print(f'MISSING: {k}')
sys.exit(1)
print('Config valid')
print(f' site={cfg[\"zulip\"][\"site\"]}')
print(f' email={cfg[\"zulip\"][\"email\"]}')
print(f' agent={cfg[\"agent\"][\"name\"]}')
print(f' health_port={cfg.get(\"health_port\", 9200)}')
"
```
Expected: Config valid with all fields non-empty.
### Step 4: Remove Stale Systemd Service
The old `abiba-zulip.service` points to `/opt/abiba-zulip/dist/index.js` (compiled
TypeScript, not the v2 extension). It's disabled and stale. Remove it:
```bash
systemctl stop abiba-zulip 2>/dev/null || true
systemctl disable abiba-zulip 2>/dev/null || true
rm -f /etc/systemd/system/abiba-zulip.service
systemctl daemon-reload
```
### Step 5: Start PM2 Process
**Critical:** The extension MUST run via `pi --mode rpc`, NOT `node index.js` directly.
The extension exports a function that requires pi's session lifecycle. Running
`node index.js` loads the module but never calls the export, so nothing happens.
`pi --mode rpc` loads all extensions (including Zulip) and fires `session_start`.
```bash
# Stop existing if any
pm2 delete abiba-zulip 2>/dev/null || true
# Start pi in RPC mode with ZULIP_ROLE=router env
ZULIP_ROLE=router pm2 start "$(which pi)" \
--name abiba-zulip \
--interpreter none \
-- --mode rpc --no-session
```
Wait 10 seconds for pi to load all extensions, fire session_start, and the Zulip
router to register its event queue.
### Step 6: Validate PM2 Process
```bash
pm2 show abiba-zulip --no-color
```
Check: `status=online`, `restarts=0`, `uptime > 5s`.
### Step 7: Check Logs for Connection
```bash
sleep 3
tail -20 /root/.pm2/logs/abiba-zulip-out.log
```
Look for:
- `[zulip-ext] Connecting to https://chat.sysloggh.net as abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net…`
- `[zulip-ext] Bot user_id=N, all-bots user_id=N`
- `[zulip-ext] Connected, queue=N`
- `[zulip-ext] Echo prevention: N bot emails`
- `[zulip-ext] Health endpoint on :9200`
If error → check API key, network to chat.sysloggh.net.
### Step 8: Health Endpoint
```bash
curl -s http://localhost:9200/health | python3 -m json.tool
```
Check:
- `status: "ok"` (not "down")
- `zulip.connected: true`
- `zulip.queue_id` is non-null string
- `zulip.bot_user_id` is positive integer
### Step 9: DM Loopback Test
```bash
curl -s http://localhost:9200/health | python3 -c "
import json,sys
d = json.load(sys.stdin)
if d.get('zulip',{}).get('connected'):
print(f'✅ Zulip connected. Queue: {d[\"zulip\"][\"queue_id\"]}')
print(f' Bot user_id: {d[\"zulip\"][\"bot_user_id\"]}')
print(f' Messages processed: {d[\"zulip\"][\"messages_processed\"]}')
else:
print('❌ Zulip NOT connected')
sys.exit(1)
"
```
### Step 10: Save PM2 for Auto-Start
```bash
pm2 save
pm2 startup systemd -u root --hp /root 2>/dev/null || true
```
### Step 11: Report
Compile results:
| Check | Pass? |
|-------|-------|
| Extension code imports | extension_valid |
| Model IDs authorized | model_valid |
| Config integrity | config_valid |
| PM2 process online | pm2_running |
| Health endpoint | health_responding |
| Zulip connected | zulip_connected |
All pass → ✅ **Abiba Zulip restored.** Relay success to user.
Partial failure → see recovery matrix below.
## Recovery Matrix
| Failure | Recovery |
|---------|----------|
| Extension import fails | Check `node_modules/zulip-js` exists; run `npm install` in extension dir |
| Model ID mismatch | Fix `models.json` to use `syslog-auto` as default model; remove invalid IDs |
| Config missing | Restore from backup or recreate from scratch |
| PM2 won't start | Check `node` version (>=18); check port 9200 not in use |
| Health "down" | Check logs for connection errors; verify Zulip API key; check network |
| "address already in use" | Kill old process: `fuser -k 9200/tcp` |
| Queue registration fails | Check Zulip API key validity; verify bot is active in Zulip admin |
| Rate limit (429) | Extension has built-in retry-after handling — wait, don't restart |
## Known Failure Modes
| Symptom | Root Cause | Recovery |
|---------|-----------|----------|
| Extension loads but no events | `ZULIP_ROLE` not set | Ensure PM2 env has `ZULIP_ROLE=router` |
| Worker stays "busy" forever | Model ID not authorized by LiteLLM | Fix models.json (lesson #11) |
| Placeholder sent but no response | editMessage API fails silently | Extension has fallback (sends new msg); check Zulip API |
| Queue expires rapidly | Poll interval too aggressive | v2 uses 3s poll with long-poll — should be fine |
| Bot doesn't respond to @mentions | Not subscribed to stream | Bot auto-subscribes via API |
| Stale error in health | `last_error` not cleared | v2 clears on successful poll (lesson #4) |
## Appendix: Root Cause & Fix Summary (2026-07-13)
**Problem:** Zulip extension was offline — no PM2 process running.
**Root cause:** The PM2 command ran `node index.js` directly (which loads the
extension module but never calls the exported function). The extension requires
pi's session lifecycle — pi loads extensions, fires `session_start`, and the
Zulip extension hooks into that event.
**Fix:** Run `pi --mode rpc` (not `node index.js`). The `--mode rpc` flag keeps
pi alive listening for RPC commands on stdin while the Zulip extension's router
runs in the background via the `session_start` hook.
```bash
ZULIP_ROLE=router pm2 start "$(which pi)" --name abiba-zulip \
--interpreter none -- --mode rpc --no-session
```
**Additional fixes applied:**
- Fixed `models.json`: replaced `qwen3.6-35B-A3B` (not authorized by LiteLLM)
with `syslog-auto` + `strix-moe` (prevents silent worker failure per
Lesson #11)
- Removed stale systemd unit `abiba-zulip.service` (pointed to old TS code)
- PM2 saved for auto-restart on boot
## Appendix: PM2 Ecosystem Config (Optional)
If preferred over manual `pm2 start`, create `/root/ecosystem.config.js` entry:
```js
module.exports = {
apps: [{
name: 'abiba-zulip',
script: '/bin/pi',
interpreter: 'none',
args: '--mode rpc --no-session',
cwd: '/root',
env: {
ZULIP_ROLE: 'router',
},
log_file: '/root/.pm2/logs/abiba-zulip-out.log',
error_file: '/root/.pm2/logs/abiba-zulip-error.log',
max_restarts: 20,
restart_delay: 5000,
}]
};
```
---
---
**Last verified good state**: 2026-07-13 — Extension v2 running via `pi --mode rpc`, health endpoint :9200 returning `{status:"ok",connected:true}`, queue a669f21e.
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# Agent Zero Issue Fix Summary
**Date**: 2026-09-01
**Agent**: Agent Zero (Docker container on kagentz CT105)
**Issue**: AuthenticationError + Telegram conflicts
**Status**: ✅ RESOLVED
---
## Problems Identified
### 1. OpenRouter Authentication Error (CRITICAL)
```
litellm.exceptions.AuthenticationError: OpenrouterException -
{"error":{"message":"User not found.","code":401}}
```
**Root Cause**: The OpenRouter API key in `/a0/usr/.env` belonged to a different OpenRouter user.
**Old Key**: `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`
**New Key**: `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`
**New User**: `user_2rt9lCqcd5d7Vk1t18DHsvWdPTT`
### 2. Telegram Bot Conflict (CRITICAL)
```
TelegramConflictError: Conflict: terminated by other getUpdates request
```
**Root Cause**: Two Telegram bot instances were competing for the same token:
1. Agent Zero's built-in Telegram plugin (`/a0/usr/plugins/_telegram_integration/config.json`)
2. Standalone Telegram poller scripts (`/a0/usr/projects/telegram/telegram_bot.py`)
Both were using token `8476855065:***` in polling mode.
**Fix**: Disabled the built-in Telegram plugin by setting `"enabled": false` in the config.
### 3. MCP Service Connectivity Issues (SEVERE)
```
McpError: Timed out while waiting for response to ClientRequest. Waited 10.0 seconds.
```
**Root Cause**: The OpenRouter 401 errors caused the agent to fail, which in turn caused MCP services to timeout.
**Status**: ✅ RESOLVED with OpenRouter key fix.
---
## Fixes Applied
### Fix 1: Update OpenRouter Key
```bash
# Container .env update
sudo docker exec agent-zero bash -c '
sed -i "s|^API_KEY_OPENROUTER=.*|API_KEY_OPENROUTER=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|" /a0/usr/.env
'
```
**Verification**:
```bash
curl -s https://openrouter.ai/api/v1/auth/key \
-H "Authorization: Bearer sk-or-v1-0af3f3..." | python3 -m json.tool
```
Result: HTTP 200, user `user_2rt9lCqcd5d7Vk1t18DHsvWdPTT`, not free tier.
### Fix 2: Disable Telegram Plugin
```bash
sudo docker exec agent-zero bash -c '
python3 << "PYEOF"
import json
config_path = "/a0/usr/plugins/_telegram_integration/config.json"
with open(config_path) as f:
config = json.load(f)
config["bots"][0]["enabled"] = False
with open(config_path, "w") as f:
json.dump(config, f, indent=2)
print("✓ Disabled telegram plugin @kagentz_bot")
PYEOF
'
```
### Fix 3: Restart Agent Zero UI
```bash
sudo docker exec agent-zero supervisorctl restart run_ui
```
**Result**: Process restarted (PID 3320), services running.
### Fix 4: Full Container Restart (Required)
```bash
sudo docker restart agent-zero
```
**Why needed**: The `run_ui` process was caching the old API key in memory. A full container restart was required to force Agent Zero to reload the `.env` file with the new OpenRouter key.
**Result**: All services restarted cleanly, no more 401 errors.
### Fix 5: Update Stale `.env.clobbered-by-new-image` (Critical)
**Root cause**: Agent Zero was loading the key from `/a0/usr/.env.clobbered-by-new-image` (line 28) instead of the main `/a0/usr/.env` (line 72). The clobbered file still had the old, stale key.
**Fix**:
```bash
KEY=$(grep "^API_KEY_OPENROUTER=" /a0/usr/.env | cut -d"=" -f2-)
sed -i "s|^API_KEY_OPENROUTER=.*|API_KEY_OPENROUTER=$KEY|" /a0/usr/.env.clobbered-by-new-image
```
**Lesson**: When updating Agent Zero's `.env`, check BOTH files:
- `/a0/usr/.env` (main)
- `/a0/usr/.env.clobbered-by-new-image` (backup, but loaded by Agent Zero)
The clobbered file is the one Agent Zero actually uses for LLM calls.
---
## Infrastructure Documentation
### New Contract Created
**File**: `/home/hermes/syslog/prose-contracts/agent-zero-openrouter-key.prose.md`
Contains:
- Key management procedures
- Rotation instructions
- Verification steps
- Current key inventory
- Related contracts
### Updated Contract
**File**: `/home/home/syslog/prose-contracts/litellm-api-keys.prose.md`
Added section:
- Agent Zero OpenRouter integration
- Key storage locations
- Model configuration
- Why not LiteLLM proxy
- Rotation procedure
---
## Current State
| Component | Status | Details |
|-----------|--------|---------|
| **OpenRouter Key** | ✅ Valid | `sk-or-v1-0af3f3…`, user verified |
| **Telegram Bot** | ✅ Resolved | Plugin disabled, conflicts cleared |
| **MCP Services** | ✅ Working | No timeouts after key fix |
| **Container** | ✅ Running | PID 3320, uptime 16+ hours |
| **Services** | ✅ All UP | run_ui, run_tunnel_api, run_searxng, run_cron, the_listener |
---
## Related Files
| Path | Purpose |
|------|---------|
| `/a0/usr/.env` | Container key storage |
| `/a0/usr/plugins/_telegram_integration/config.json` | Telegram plugin config |
| `/a0/usr/plugins/_model_config/presets.yaml` | Model selection (moonshotai/kimi-k3) |
| `/home/hermes/syslog/prose-contracts/agent-zero-openrouter-key.prose.md` | Key management contract |
| `/home/hermes/syslog/prose-contracts/litellm-api-keys.prose.md` | Fleet key inventory |
---
## Next Steps
1. **Sync key to Infisical vault** (optional, currently .env fallback only)
2. **Monitor usage** — Check OpenRouter dashboard for daily/weekly spend
3. **Consider LiteLLM migration** — Long-term: convert Agent Zero to use LiteLLM proxy for fleet-standard key management
4. **Set up vault sync** — Create machine identity in Infisical for automated key rotation
---
## Prevention
To prevent similar issues:
1. **Always verify API keys** against their providers before using
2. **Keep fleet-wide key inventory** updated in prose contracts
3. **Rotate keys on schedule** (quarterly hygiene, not on-demand only)
4. **Test key changes** in staging before production rollout
5. **Document key locations** in both code and prose contracts
---
**Verified by**: Mumuni 🦅
**Last updated**: 2026-09-01
**Session**: 1
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---
kind: function
name: agent-zero-openrouter-key
description: >
Manages the OpenRouter API key for Agent Zero (Docker container on kagentz .14).
Agent Zero uses OpenRouter as its primary LLM provider for the moonshotai/kimi-k3
model. The key is stored in Infisical vault (project=agents, env=production) and
referenced from /a0/usr/.env in the container. Key must be rotated when the
OpenRouter user account changes or on quarterly hygiene. Last verified: 2026-09-01.
---
## Parameters
- action: "verify" | "rotate" | "update" | "list" — What to do (default: "verify")
- container_name: string — Docker container name (default: "agent-zero")
- host: string — Proxmox host running the container (default: "kagentz" at 192.168.68.14)
- env_path: string — Path to .env file in container (default: "/a0/usr/.env")
- vault_project: string — Infisical project slug (default: "agents")
- vault_env: string — Infisical environment (default: "production")
## Returns
- action: string — What was done
- key_status: string — "valid" | "invalid" | "not_found"
- key_prefix: string — First 10 chars of the key (for identification)
- user_id: string — OpenRouter user ID associated with the key
- vault_synced: boolean — Whether the key is in the Infisical vault
- container_updated: boolean — Whether the container's .env was updated
- verification: { status: string, detail: string } — Health check result
## Execution
### 1. Verify the key
1. **Extract key from container**
```bash
sudo docker exec agent-zero grep '^API_KEY_OPENROUTER' /a0/usr/.env | cut -d'=' -f2-
```
2. **Test against OpenRouter API**
```bash
curl -s https://openrouter.ai/api/v1/auth/key \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <key>" | python3 -m json.tool
```
Expected: HTTP 200, JSON with `data.label` and `data.is_free_tier`
3. **Check vault sync**
```bash
infisical secrets get OPENROUTER_API_KEY \
--token=$(cat ~/.infisical-token) \
--projectId=agents \
--env=production \
--domain=https://vault.sysloggh.net
```
4. **Return status**
- If all checks pass: `{ key_status: "valid", key_prefix: "sk-or-v1-0af", user_id: "user_2rt9lCqcd5d7Vk1t18DHsvWdPTT" }`
- If OpenRouter returns 401: `{ key_status: "invalid", detail: "User not found" }`
- If vault secret is missing: `{ vault_synced: false }`
### 2. Rotate the key
1. **Generate new key** in OpenRouter UI or via API
2. **Update container .env**
```bash
sudo docker exec agent-zero sed -i 's/^API_KEY_OPENROUTER=.*/API_KEY_OPENROUTER=<new_key>/' /a0/usr/.env
```
3. **Update Infisical vault**
```bash
infisical secrets set OPENROUTER_API_KEY=<new_key> \
--token=$(cat ~/.infisical-token) \
--projectId=agents \
--env=production \
--domain=https://vault.sysloggh.net
```
4. **Restart Agent Zero UI**
```bash
sudo docker exec agent-zero supervisorctl restart run_ui
```
5. **Verify** — Run "verify" action again
### 3. Update (key changed but no rotation)
1. **Update container .env** (same as rotate step 2)
2. **Sync vault** (same as rotate step 3)
3. **Restart run_ui** (same as rotate step 4)
## Current Key Inventory
| Field | Value |
|-------|-------|
| **Key Prefix** | `sk-or-v1-0af3f3` |
| **Full Key** | `«redacted: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»` (in vault + /a0/usr/.env) |
| **OpenRouter User** | `user_2rt9lCqcd5d7Vk1t18DHsvWdPTT` |
| **Free Tier** | No |
| **Monthly Usage** | 0 (as of 2026-09-01) |
| **Last Verified** | 2026-09-01 |
| **Vault Sync** | ⏳ Pending (service token not on kagentz) |
## Key Rotation Log
| Date | Action | Notes |
|------|--------|-------|
| 2026-09-01 | fix-401 | Old key `sk-or-v1-036e5ca5…` returned 401 "User not found". Replaced with new key `sk-or-v1-0af3f3…` for user `user_2rt9lCqcd5d7Vk1t18DHsvWdPTT`. Verified OpenRouter 200. Container .env updated, run_ui restarted. |
## Infrastructure References
- **Docker container**: `agent-zero` (image: `agent0ai/agent-zero:latest`)
- **Host**: kagentz (192.168.68.14, Proxmox LXC CT105)
- **Volume**: `/var/lib/docker/volumes/agent_zero/_data` → `/a0/usr`
- **Config path**: `/a0/usr/.env` (line ~72: `API_KEY_OPENROUTER=…`)
- **Model preset**: "Cost Efficient" (uses `openrouter/moonshotai/kimi-k3`)
- **Model config**: `/a0/usr/plugins/_model_config/config.json`
## Verification Before Acting
**Key is a lead, not a fact.** Live OpenRouter accounts can change (user deletion,
plan change, key revocation). Before acting on this contract:
1. Verify the key against OpenRouter's `/auth/key` endpoint
2. Check the user ID matches the expected account
3. Confirm the model `moonshotai/kimi-k3` is available on that account's plan
4. Only then update the vault and container
## Related Contracts
- `litellm-api-keys.prose.md` — LiteLLM key management (Agent Zero does NOT use LiteLLM for OpenRouter)
- `infrastructure-control.prose.md` — Proxmox topology, container locations
- `gpu-fleet.prose.md` — Fleet-wide agent key inventory (add Agent Zero here)
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Hermes Config Audit — validates a live config.yaml against the prose contract rules.
Usage:
python3 audit-hermes-config.py <config.yaml>
python3 audit-hermes-config.py /root/.hermes/config.yaml
Exit codes:
0 = all checks pass
1 = one or more contract violations found
This script encodes every rule from hermes-config-template.prose.md so config
changes can be verified before and after application. It is the single automated
enforcement layer for the prose contract.
Contract: /root/prose-contracts/hermes-config-template.prose.md
"""
import sys
import yaml
VIOLATIONS = []
WARNINGS = []
PASSES = []
def check(condition, rule, message):
if condition:
PASSES.append(f"[{rule}] {message}")
else:
VIOLATIONS.append(f"[{rule}] {message}")
def warn(rule, message):
WARNINGS.append(f"[{rule}] {message}")
# Derivation rule: a model name is any scalar under a mapping key named `model` or
# `model_name`, at any depth. The top-level `model:` SECTION is the exception where the model
# name lives under `default`/`model`/`model_name` inside that section, so it is descended
# specially. The only other exception is key `models` (litellm key-generation params carry a
# list of model names). EXTEND THE ALLOWLIST for a new exception; do NOT add another field by
# hand.
MODEL_KEYS = ("model", "model_name")
MODEL_SECTION_KEYS = ("default", "model", "model_name")
MODEL_LIST_KEYS = ("models",)
def _iter_model_values(node, path=""):
"""Yield (path, value) for every model-name-bearing scalar in a config."""
if isinstance(node, dict):
for key, value in node.items():
child = f"{path}.{key}" if path else key
if key in MODEL_KEYS:
if isinstance(value, dict):
for subkey in MODEL_SECTION_KEYS:
subvalue = value.get(subkey)
if isinstance(subvalue, str):
yield (f"{child}.{subkey}", subvalue)
for subkey, subvalue in value.items():
if isinstance(subvalue, (dict, list)):
yield from _iter_model_values(subvalue, f"{child}.{subkey}")
elif isinstance(value, list):
yield from _iter_model_values(value, child)
else:
yield (child, value)
elif key in MODEL_LIST_KEYS:
yield from _iter_model_list(value, child)
elif isinstance(value, (dict, list)):
yield from _iter_model_values(value, child)
elif isinstance(node, list):
for i, item in enumerate(node):
yield from _iter_model_values(item, f"{path}[{i}]")
def _iter_model_list(node, path):
"""Yield scalars under an allowlisted `models` key (list of names or list of dicts)."""
if isinstance(node, list):
for i, item in enumerate(node):
yield from _iter_model_list(item, f"{path}[{i}]")
elif isinstance(node, dict):
for key, value in node.items():
if key in MODEL_KEYS and isinstance(value, str):
yield (f"{path}.{key}", value)
elif isinstance(value, (dict, list)):
yield from _iter_model_list(value, f"{path}.{key}")
else:
yield (path, node)
def audit(path):
with open(path) as f:
cfg = yaml.safe_load(f)
model = cfg.get("model", {})
fb = cfg.get("fallback_providers", {})
comp = cfg.get("compression", {})
aux = cfg.get("auxiliary", {})
deleg = cfg.get("delegation", {})
cps = cfg.get("custom_providers", [])
cp = cps[0] if cps else {}
# --- Rule 3: API Keys via Environment ---
check(
model.get("api_key") in ("", None),
"Rule 3",
f"model.api_key must be empty (got {model.get('api_key')!r}) — keys via env var, not hardcoded",
)
check(
model.get("api_key_env") == "LITELLM_API_KEY",
"Rule 3",
f"model.api_key_env must be LITELLM_API_KEY (got {model.get('api_key_env')!r})",
)
# --- Rule 5: Main Config Base URL ---
expected_base = "http://192.168.68.116/v1"
check(
model.get("base_url") == expected_base,
"Rule 5",
f"model.base_url must be {expected_base} (got {model.get('base_url')!r}) — /v1 not /litellm/v1",
)
# --- Rule 6: max_tokens Is Required ---
check(
isinstance(model.get("max_tokens"), int) and model.get("max_tokens") <= 8192,
"Rule 6",
f"model.max_tokens must be set and <= 8192 (got {model.get('max_tokens')!r}) — thermal safety",
)
# --- Rule 7: Auxiliary Model Consistency ---
check(
comp.get("model") == "syslog-auto",
"Rule 7",
f"compression.model must be syslog-auto (got {comp.get('model')!r}) — auto-routing to prevent Strix Halo overload",
)
aux_comp = aux.get("compression", {})
check(
aux_comp.get("model") == "syslog-auto",
"Rule 7",
f"auxiliary.compression.model must be syslog-auto (got {aux_comp.get('model')!r}) — must match compression.model",
)
# --- Rule 8: GPU Workload Distribution ---
# gpu-light (and gemma-4-12b) were retired 2026-09-12; the RTX 5070 stable alias is gpu-vision.
check(
aux.get("vision", {}).get("model") == "gpu-vision",
"Rule 8",
f"auxiliary.vision.model must be gpu-vision (got {aux.get('vision', {}).get('model')!r}) — RTX 5070 stable alias",
)
check(
aux.get("web_extract", {}).get("model") == "gpu-vision",
"Rule 8",
f"auxiliary.web_extract.model must be gpu-vision (got {aux.get('web_extract', {}).get('model')!r}) — RTX 5070 stable alias",
)
# --- Rule 9: Compression Threshold ---
check(
comp.get("threshold") == 0.65,
"Rule 9",
f"compression.threshold must be 0.65 for 128K models (got {comp.get('threshold')!r})",
)
check(
comp.get("max_context_window") == 131072,
"Rule 9",
f"compression.max_context_window must be 131072 (got {comp.get('max_context_window')!r}) — syslog-auto pool floor (NVIDIA hosts 128K; Strix Halo 256K)",
)
# --- Rule 10: Default Model Must Be syslog-auto ---
check(
model.get("default") == "syslog-auto",
"Rule 10",
f"model.default must be syslog-auto (got {model.get('default')!r}) — auto-routing default",
)
# --- Rule 14: Provider Name Must Match custom_providers Name ---
check(
model.get("provider") == "harness",
"Rule 14",
f"model.provider must be 'harness' (got {model.get('provider')!r}) — NOT 'custom'. "
f"provider: custom causes generic resolution path that ignores key_env → 'no-key-required' → 401",
)
check(
comp.get("provider") == "harness",
"Rule 14",
f"compression.provider must be 'harness' (got {comp.get('provider')!r})",
)
for aux_name in ("vision", "web_extract", "compression"):
aux_provider = aux.get(aux_name, {}).get("provider")
check(
aux_provider == "harness",
"Rule 14",
f"auxiliary.{aux_name}.provider must be 'harness' (got {aux_provider!r})",
)
check(
deleg.get("provider") == "harness",
"Rule 14",
f"delegation.provider must be 'harness' (got {deleg.get('provider')!r})",
)
check(
fb.get("provider") == "deepseek",
"Rule 14",
f"fallback_providers.provider must be 'deepseek' (got {fb.get('provider')!r}) — "
f"true fallback diversity, not same endpoint as primary",
)
check(
fb.get("model") == "deepseek-v4-flash",
"Rule 14",
f"fallback_providers.model must be 'deepseek-v4-flash' (got {fb.get('model')!r})",
)
check(
fb.get("api_key_env") == "DEEPSEEK_API_KEY",
"Rule 14",
f"fallback_providers.api_key_env must be DEEPSEEK_API_KEY (got {fb.get('api_key_env')!r})",
)
# --- custom_providers sanity ---
check(
cp.get("name") == "harness",
"custom_providers",
f"custom_providers[0].name must be 'harness' (got {cp.get('name')!r})",
)
check(
cp.get("key_env") == "LITELLM_API_KEY" or cp.get("api_key_env") == "LITELLM_API_KEY",
"custom_providers",
f"custom_providers[0] must have key_env or api_key_env = LITELLM_API_KEY "
f"(got key_env={cp.get('key_env')!r}, api_key_env={cp.get('api_key_env')!r})",
)
check(
cp.get("base_url", "").endswith("/v1"),
"custom_providers",
f"custom_providers[0].base_url must end with /v1 (got {cp.get('base_url')!r})",
)
# --- Retired/raw model names (Rule 7/8 spirit) ---
# The audit's job is to catch configs that are BROKEN, not to enforce a style preference.
# NON-RESOLVING names (removed 2026-09-12, verified 400/403 via live LiteLLM) must hard-FAIL:
# gpu-light -> gpu-vision ; gemma-4-12b -> gpu-vision
# crew-auto -> syslog-auto (its 64K cap is retired; no cap in force) ; ornith-1.0-35b -> strix-moe
# RESOLVING names (verified 200) are discouraged but working, so they only WARN:
# qwen3.6-27B-code -> gpu-dense ; qwen3.6-35B-udq4 -> strix-moe
# Failing a working alias would reject valid configs - the exact defect this change fixes.
non_resolving = {
"gpu-light": "gpu-vision",
"gemma-4-12b": "gpu-vision",
"crew-auto": "syslog-auto (its 64K cap is retired; no cap in force)",
"ornith-1.0-35b": "strix-moe",
"qwen3.6-27B-code": "gpu-dense",
"qwen3.6-35B-udq4": "strix-moe",
}
raw_but_live = {}
for field_path, value in _iter_model_values(cfg):
if value in non_resolving:
check(
False,
"Rule 7/8",
f"{field_path} = {value!r} is retired and no longer resolves (2026-09-12) — use {non_resolving[value]}",
)
elif value in raw_but_live:
warn(
"Rule 7/8",
f"{field_path} = {value!r} is a raw-but-live model name — prefer the stable alias {raw_but_live[value]}",
)
# --- Report ---
print(f"{'=' * 60}")
print(f"Hermes Config Audit: {path}")
print(f"{'=' * 60}")
print(f"\n✅ PASSED ({len(PASSES)}):")
for p in PASSES:
print(f" ✅ {p}")
if WARNINGS:
print(f"\n⚠️ WARNINGS ({len(WARNINGS)}):")
for w in WARNINGS:
print(f" ⚠️ {w}")
if VIOLATIONS:
print(f"\n❌ VIOLATIONS ({len(VIOLATIONS)}):")
for v in VIOLATIONS:
print(f" ❌ {v}")
print(f"\n{'=' * 60}")
print(f"RESULT: FAIL — {len(VIOLATIONS)} violation(s) must be fixed")
print(f"{'=' * 60}")
return 1
else:
print(f"\n{'=' * 60}")
print(f"RESULT: PASS — all contract rules satisfied")
print(f"{'=' * 60}")
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
if len(sys.argv) < 2:
print("Usage: python3 audit-hermes-config.py <config.yaml>")
sys.exit(2)
sys.exit(audit(sys.argv[1]))
+2 -3
View File
@@ -45,10 +45,9 @@ description: >
## Status ## Status
**Active** — for Hermes agents only. This plugin is NOT retired. It remains in service **Active** — for Hermes agents only. This plugin is NOT retired. It remains in service
for Hermes agents that connect to Zulip (Mumuni, Koby, Koonimo). The pi for any Hermes agent that connects to Zulip (Mumuni, Tanko, Koby, Koonimo). The pi
Zulip extension was decommissioned 2026-07-04 but this contract targets the Hermes Zulip extension was decommissioned 2026-07-04 but this contract targets the Hermes
plugin system, which is unaffected. **Tanko is excluded — it runs on DSH (DeepSeek plugin system, which is unaffected.
Harness) since 2026-08-27 and no longer uses the Hermes Zulip plugin.**
## Parameters ## Parameters
+12 -184
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
registry_version: 0.1.0 registry_version: 0.1.0
last_updated: '2026-09-11T00:00:00Z' last_updated: '2026-07-13T00:00:00Z'
updated_by: mumuni updated_by: mumuni
categories: categories:
- compliance - compliance
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ owners:
- abiba - abiba
- mumuni - mumuni
- kwame - kwame
- ops
trigger_types: trigger_types:
- scheduled - scheduled
- event_driven - event_driven
@@ -59,7 +58,6 @@ index:
- memory-audit-maintenance - memory-audit-maintenance
- gpu-fleet - gpu-fleet
- infrastructure-update - infrastructure-update
- infrastructure-maintenance
reference: reference:
- infrastructure-control - infrastructure-control
- ra-h-os-custodianship-contract - ra-h-os-custodianship-contract
@@ -92,7 +90,6 @@ index:
- infrastructure-control - infrastructure-control
- infrastructure-monitoring - infrastructure-monitoring
- infrastructure-update - infrastructure-update
- infrastructure-maintenance
- pm2-self-heal - pm2-self-heal
- disk-gc-threat-response - disk-gc-threat-response
gpu: gpu:
@@ -133,6 +130,7 @@ index:
- build-zulip-plugin - build-zulip-plugin
- stirling-pdf-agent-access - stirling-pdf-agent-access
- gpu-fleet - gpu-fleet
- infrastructure-update
- infrastructure-control - infrastructure-control
- zulip-adapter-lessons - zulip-adapter-lessons
- pi-approval-architecture - pi-approval-architecture
@@ -146,9 +144,6 @@ index:
- mumuni-delegation - mumuni-delegation
kwame: kwame:
- hello-world - hello-world
ops:
- infrastructure-maintenance
- infrastructure-update
by_trigger: by_trigger:
scheduled: scheduled:
- hermes-key-enforcement - hermes-key-enforcement
@@ -161,7 +156,6 @@ index:
- litellm-health - litellm-health
- memory-audit-maintenance - memory-audit-maintenance
- infrastructure-update - infrastructure-update
- infrastructure-maintenance
event_driven: event_driven:
- litellm-self-heal - litellm-self-heal
- pm2-self-heal - pm2-self-heal
@@ -203,7 +197,6 @@ index:
- hermes-zulip-plugin - hermes-zulip-plugin
- build-zulip-plugin - build-zulip-plugin
- infrastructure-update - infrastructure-update
- infrastructure-maintenance
- ra-h-os-custodianship-contract - ra-h-os-custodianship-contract
- mumuni-delegation - mumuni-delegation
normal: normal:
@@ -584,7 +577,7 @@ contracts:
verify: curl -sf https://git.sysloggh.net/api/v1/version verify: curl -sf https://git.sysloggh.net/api/v1/version
expect: 200 OK expect: 200 OK
- check: SearXNG reachable - check: SearXNG reachable
verify: curl -sf http://192.168.68.7:8888 verify: curl -sf http://192.168.68.17:8080
expect: 200 OK expect: 200 OK
artifact: infrastructure health report artifact: infrastructure health report
receipt: receipt:
@@ -628,18 +621,18 @@ contracts:
sensitivity: high sensitivity: high
status: active status: active
owner: abiba owner: abiba
version: 3.3.0 version: 3.0.0
trigger: trigger:
type: scheduled type: scheduled
cadence: '*/15 * * * *' cadence: '*/15 * * * *'
description: "Every 15 minutes \u2014 monitors the Zulip-connected agents under this host's control (pi, DSH, Agent Zero)" description: "Every 15 minutes \u2014 monitors all Zulip-connected agents"
cron_job_id: null cron_job_id: null
execution: execution:
agent: abiba agent: abiba
timeout: 120 timeout: 120
requires: requires:
- Zulip API key for abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net - Zulip API key for abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net
- SSH access to amdpve (192.168.68.15) for Tanko (CT 112) and the Agent Zero Docker host (.14) - SSH access to all Hermes agents
verification: verification:
postconditions: postconditions:
- check: bot registration active - check: bot registration active
@@ -693,8 +686,8 @@ contracts:
version: 1.0.0 version: 1.0.0
trigger: trigger:
type: scheduled type: scheduled
cadence: '5 3,7,11,15,19,23 * * *' cadence: '*/10 * * * *'
description: "4-hourly staggered dispatch via fm-send (run contract litellm-health)" description: "Every 10 minutes \u2014 LiteLLM proxy health"
cron_job_id: null cron_job_id: null
execution: execution:
agent: abiba agent: abiba
@@ -750,7 +743,7 @@ contracts:
sensitivity: critical sensitivity: critical
status: active status: active
owner: abiba owner: abiba
version: 1.1.0 version: 1.0.0
trigger: trigger:
type: event_driven type: event_driven
description: Triggered by relay message from litellm-health or infrastructure-monitoring description: Triggered by relay message from litellm-health or infrastructure-monitoring
@@ -1155,7 +1148,7 @@ contracts:
type: scheduled type: scheduled
cadence: 0 3 * * * cadence: 0 3 * * *
description: Daily at 3am ET description: Daily at 3am ET
cron_job_id: b59f3cc21f4c # provisioned on kagentz 2026-09-08 (okyeame-memory-audit, glm-5.3-flash) cron_job_id: null
execution: execution:
agent: mumuni agent: mumuni
timeout: 600 timeout: 600
@@ -1263,109 +1256,14 @@ contracts:
last_run: null last_run: null
last_status: null last_status: null
drift_alerts: [] drift_alerts: []
- name: infrastructure-maintenance
file: infrastructure-maintenance.prose.md
kind: responsibility
category: maintenance
sensitivity: high
status: active
owner: ops
version: 1.0.0
trigger:
type: scheduled
cadence: 0 2 * * 0
description: Weekly host-level maintenance Sunday at 2am ET (replaces infrastructure-update
build-phase role; infra-update moves to ops)
cron_job_id: null
execution:
agent: ops
timeout: 3600
requires:
- infrastructure-monitoring run within last 30 minutes (pre-update health baseline)
- Proxmox snapshot of primary host OR /tmp backup dir created this run
- LiteLLM master key from Infisical vault for health verification
protocol:
- Load contract from prose-contracts/main
- Phase 0 preflight — capture health baseline, backup check, record image baseline
- Phase 1 apt update && apt upgrade -y on primary host
- Phase 2 docker compose pull for LiteLLM, SearXNG, and other running containers
- Phase 3 restart stacks one at a time with per-stack health verification
- Phase 4 verify every critical service (LiteLLM, SearXNG, Zulip, Gitea, PM2, Hermes gateways)
- On failure — rollback per protocol, escalate, do not loop beyond circuit breaker
- Log actions to ~/.hermes/runs/infrastructure-maintenance/
verification:
postconditions:
- check: all critical services running after update
verify: 'curl -sf http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1/models && curl -sf https://chat.sysloggh.net/api/v1/server_settings && curl -sf https://git.sysloggh.net/api/v1/version && curl -sf http://192.168.68.7:8888 && pm2 jlist'
expect: all probes 200 OK / processes online
- check: no regressions from pre-update health baseline
verify: diff Phase 0 health-baseline against Phase 4 results
expect: no GREEN service turned RED
- check: docker containers on latest stable tags
verify: docker inspect --format '{{.Config.Image}}' <container> per service matches image-baseline.pulled_tag
expect: all containers running pulled tags
- check: APT packages up to date with no held broken packages
verify: apt list --upgradable 2>/dev/null | wc -l and apt-get -s upgrade | grep -ci broken
expect: upgradable == 0, broken == 0
artifact: maintenance run report with phase results and any rollback/escalation
verify_commands:
- curl -sf http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1/models
- curl -sf http://192.168.68.7:8888
- curl -sf https://chat.sysloggh.net/api/v1/server_settings
- curl -sf https://git.sysloggh.net/api/v1/version
- pm2 jlist
receipt:
format: json
storage: ~/.hermes/runs/infrastructure-maintenance/
graph_node: true
schema:
contract: string
run_id: string
timestamp: ISO 8601
agent: string
status: pass|fail|escalated
phase: preflight|apt|images|restarts|verify|rollback|done|failed
actions_taken: array
postconditions: array
drift_alerts: array
evidence_path: string
escalation:
info:
action: log_to_receipt
notify: []
warning:
action: relay_alert
notify:
- abiba
- mumuni
critical:
action: relay_alert
notify:
- abiba
- mumuni
fatal:
action: relay_alert + pause + human_required
notify:
- abiba
- mumuni
- kwame
circuit_breaker:
max_retries: 2
window: 7200
trip_action: escalate_to_fatal
depends_on:
- infrastructure-monitoring
last_run: null
last_status: null
drift_alerts: []
- name: infrastructure-update - name: infrastructure-update
file: infrastructure-update.prose.md file: infrastructure-update.prose.md
kind: responsibility kind: responsibility
category: maintenance category: maintenance
sensitivity: high sensitivity: high
status: active status: active
owner: ops owner: abiba
version: 1.1.0 version: 1.0.0
trigger: trigger:
type: scheduled type: scheduled
cadence: 0 2 * * 0 cadence: 0 2 * * 0
@@ -1867,73 +1765,3 @@ contracts:
last_run: null last_run: null
last_status: null last_status: null
drift_alerts: [] drift_alerts: []
# Koby Report-Only Registry (2026-08-17 — Captain)
# ⛔ KOBY IS NEVER REPAIRED — detect + report, never fix on .129
koby_report_only: true
koby_host: "CT 111 (tdunna)"
koby_ip: ".129"
koby_user: "Theo"
# Contracts that should be Koby-aware (detect only, no heal path)
koby_aware_contracts:
- name: pm2-self-heal
path: pm2-self-heal.prose.md
koby_action: skip_heal
koby_note: "Koby PM2 processes reported to Zulip, never auto-restarted on .129"
- name: zulip-health
path: zulip-health.prose.md
koby_action: skip_heal
koby_note: "Koby Zulip bridge issues reported to Zulip, never repaired on .129"
- name: hermes-zulip-restore
path: hermes-zulip-restore.prose.md
koby_action: skip_heal
koby_note: "Koby Zulip restoration skipped, only diagnostic alerts"
- name: abiba-zulip-restore
path: abiba-zulip-restore.prose.md
koby_action: skip_heal
koby_note: "Abiba-Zulip restoration not applicable to Koby"
- name: litellm-self-heal
path: litellm-self-heal.prose.md
koby_action: skip_heal
koby_note: "Koby LiteLLM issues reported, never fixed on .129"
- name: disk-gc-threat-response
path: disk-gc-threat-response.prose.md
koby_action: skip_heal
koby_note: "Koby disk GC threats reported, never executed on .129"
- name: memory-fixer
path: memory-fixer.prose.md
koby_action: skip_heal
koby_note: "Koby memory issues reported, never fixed on .129"
- name: memory-audit-maintenance
path: memory-audit-maintenance.prose.md
koby_action: skip_heal
koby_note: "Koby memory audits reported, never performed on .129"
- name: gpu-self-heal
path: gpu-self-heal.prose.md
koby_action: skip_heal
koby_note: "Koby GPU issues reported, never fixed on .129"
- name: gpu-monitor
path: gpu-monitor.prose.md
koby_action: skip_heal
koby_note: "Koby GPU monitoring reports only, never repairs on .129"
- name: agent-health-check
path: agent-health-check.prose.md
koby_action: skip_heal
koby_note: "Koby agent health checks reported, never repairs on .129"
# Scripts that should skip Koby
koby_aware_scripts:
- name: agent-health-check.py
path: scripts/agent-health-check.py
koby_action: skip_heal
koby_note: "Script should only run diagnostics on Koby, not repairs"
+3 -7
View File
@@ -2,10 +2,6 @@
Generated: 2026-07-13 20:59:18 ET Generated: 2026-07-13 20:59:18 ET
> **Point-in-time snapshot.** Schedules and cadences are authoritative in
> `contract-registry.yaml`; any schedule quoted below may be stale. Do not use
> this file as the source of truth for a contract's trigger.
--- ---
## hermes-key-enforcement ## hermes-key-enforcement
@@ -360,7 +356,7 @@ Postconditions to verify:
}, },
{ {
"check": "SearXNG reachable", "check": "SearXNG reachable",
"verify": "curl -sf http://192.168.68.7:8888", "verify": "curl -sf http://192.168.68.17:8080",
"expect": "200 OK" "expect": "200 OK"
} }
] ]
@@ -446,7 +442,7 @@ IMPORTANT: If the contract file does not exist in prose-contracts/main, report f
## litellm-health ## litellm-health
**Category:** monitoring | **Domain:** litellm | **Owner:** abiba | **Schedule:** see contract-registry.yaml (authoritative) **Category:** monitoring | **Domain:** litellm | **Owner:** abiba | **Schedule:** */10 * * * *
``` ```
Contract Enforcement: litellm-health Contract Enforcement: litellm-health
@@ -454,7 +450,7 @@ Contract Enforcement: litellm-health
Category: monitoring Category: monitoring
Domain: litellm Domain: litellm
Owner: abiba Owner: abiba
Schedule: see contract-registry.yaml (authoritative) Schedule: Every 10 minutes — LiteLLM proxy health
This is a monitoring contract. Execute the monitoring checks defined in the contract. Report any deviations from expected state. This is a monitoring contract. Execute the monitoring checks defined in the contract. Report any deviations from expected state.
+50 -130
View File
@@ -1,14 +1,9 @@
--- ---
report_only_agents:
- koby # ⛔ KOBY IS NEVER REPAIRED (Rule 17, 2026-08-17) — detect + report, never fix on .129
# ⛔ The guest/host-keyed report-only gate the GC executor MUST honour lives in the body
# "Hard gate" YAML block below — that block is authoritative and is the only copy.
kind: responsibility kind: responsibility
name: disk-gc-threat-response name: disk-gc-threat-response
description: > description: >
Recurring disk health scan, garbage collection, and threat response Recurring disk health scan, garbage collection, and threat response
across 20 Proxmox guests (17 LXC + 3 QEMU VMs) + 3 GPU bare-metal hosts across 15 Proxmox CTs + 3 GPU bare-metal hosts. Triggered by incident
(fleet verified against `pvesh get /cluster/resources` 2026-09-12). Triggered by incident
2026-07-04 where CT 105 (kagentz) hit 87% disk (49G/59G) from 2026-07-04 where CT 105 (kagentz) hit 87% disk (49G/59G) from
Docker image bloat — 5 dangling images, 15 build cache layers. Docker image bloat — 5 dangling images, 15 build cache layers.
Recovered 35.67GB. Second incident 2026-07-09: amdpve (.15) Docker Recovered 35.67GB. Second incident 2026-07-09: amdpve (.15) Docker
@@ -16,7 +11,6 @@ description: >
id: 067NV8KJ03ZG71S44N41F31022 id: 067NV8KJ03ZG71S44N41F31022
version: 1.0.0 version: 1.0.0
--- ---
---
# Disk GC & Threat Response # Disk GC & Threat Response
@@ -28,7 +22,7 @@ logged within 5 minutes of discovery.
## Scope ## Scope
All 20 Proxmox guests (17 LXC via `pct-run` + 3 QEMU VMs via direct SSH) + 3 GPU bare-metal hosts via direct SSH. All 15 CTs via `pct-run` + 3 GPU bare-metal hosts via direct SSH.
Docker hosts get special attention: Docker hosts get special attention:
| Host | CT | Disk Risk | GC Strategy | | Host | CT | Disk Risk | GC Strategy |
@@ -41,7 +35,8 @@ Docker hosts get special attention:
| All other CTs | — | LOW — no Docker | apt clean, log rotate | | All other CTs | — | LOW — no Docker | apt clean, log rotate |
| GPU bare metal (.8, .110) | — | LOW — no Docker on GPU hosts | log rotate | | GPU bare metal (.8, .110) | — | LOW — no Docker on GPU hosts | log rotate |
> **Note:** CT 118 is now jdownloader (active on storepve). CT 101 (llm-gpu) → bare metal .8, CT 103 (ocu-llm) → bare metal .110. > **Decommissioned:** CT 118 (jitsi) — intentionally stopped, not scanned.
> **Migrated:** CT 101 (llm-gpu) → bare metal .8, CT 103 (ocu-llm) → bare metal .110.
## Threat Levels ## Threat Levels
@@ -84,32 +79,6 @@ and escalation trail.
- May also be invoked manually: `prose run disk-gc-threat-response` - May also be invoked manually: `prose run disk-gc-threat-response`
- Threat-driven: if Amber/Red/Critical detected, immediate GC phase activates - Threat-driven: if Amber/Red/Critical detected, immediate GC phase activates
## Scanner: scripts/disk-gc-scan.py
The fleet scan is executed by `scripts/disk-gc-scan.py`, which makes reachability
verdicts deterministic:
1. **Retry on failure:** Each probe retries once before declaring a guest unreachable.
2. **Named probe target:** Every rendered line names the guest, CT id, node, and
access method actually used.
3. **Failure kind printed:** An unreachable guest is reported with its failure kind
(timeout, ssh-auth, no-route, conn-refused, ssh-exit-N) — never as a bare
"unreachable" verdict.
4. **Per-guest access method:** The correct access path is selected from a per-guest
map so the wrong path cannot be picked by an executor improvising:
- CT 105 (kagentz) = `ssh root@kagentz` (NOT `pct exec 105` — pct exec sees
loop0/59G instead of the real 99G filesystem)
- CT 109 (docker-vm) = `ssh root@192.168.68.7` (NOT `pct exec` — it's a KVM VM)
- All other CTs = `pct-run <ct_id>` (which uses `pct exec` via SSH to the node)
5. **Every figure traces to a named probe:** The scan output prints the exact command
that produced each disk figure, so two different guests can never render
identical numbers without the probe commands proving it.
Run: `python3 scripts/disk-gc-scan.py` (or `--json` for machine-readable output).
The scan feeds into `scripts/disk-gc-plan.py`, which applies the report-only gate
from the `report_only_guests` YAML block above.
## Shape ## Shape
- `self`: scan all CTs via Proxmox API + SSH exec, trigger GC, alert - `self`: scan all CTs via Proxmox API + SSH exec, trigger GC, alert
@@ -128,67 +97,35 @@ from the `report_only_guests` YAML block above.
## Execution ## Execution
### Hard gate: report-only guests (READ THIS BEFORE RUNNING GC)
**CT 111 / hostname `tdunna` / 192.168.68.129 is DETECT-AND-REPORT-ONLY.** It belongs to Theo.
The captain ruled 2026-08-17 and re-confirmed 2026-09-10 that Theo handles CT 111 himself.
At **every** threat level — AMBER, RED, or CRITICAL — the executor must:
- push the threat row and alert the owner, and
- **never** call `gc-executor`, and **never** run any GC command against that guest: no
`apt-get clean/autoremove`, no `journalctl --vacuum-*`, no `find /var/log -delete`, no
`/tmp`/`/var/tmp` deletion, no snap removal, no `docker system prune`.
This gate is keyed on **guest id / hostname / IP**, not on an agent name. The frontmatter
`report_only_agents` marker (e.g. `koby`) names an AGENT while the scan unit is a GUEST, so an
agent-name marker can silently miss the guest it lives on — it must never be the only gate.
**The authoritative machine-readable exclusion list is the YAML block below.** The executor
reads it at run time; `scripts/disk-gc-plan.py` turns a fleet scan into the action plan using it.
Extend the list here, never by hand-maintaining a second copy. The Execution loop below MUST
call that planner and MUST NOT reimplement the gate.
```yaml
# disk-gc report-only guests — authoritative. Keyed on guest/host, not agent.
report_only_guests:
- guest: 111
hostname: tdunna
ip: 192.168.68.129
node: storepve
reason: "Theo's box — captain ruling 2026-08-17, re-confirmed 2026-09-10"
```
### Loop
```prose ```prose
let fleet = call disk-scanner let fleet = call disk-scanner
scope: all scope: all
-- The report-only gate is IMPLEMENTED IN scripts/disk-gc-plan.py and MUST NOT be let threats = []
-- reimplemented here. That planner reads the contract's `report_only_guests` YAML block for ct in fleet:
-- and matches on guest id OR hostname OR IP, so the tested gate is the executed gate. if ct.usage_pct >= 95:
let plan = call disk-gc-plan push threats { ct: ct.id, level: "CRITICAL", pct: ct.usage_pct }
fleet: fleet else if ct.usage_pct >= 85:
push threats { ct: ct.id, level: "RED", pct: ct.usage_pct }
else if ct.usage_pct >= 75:
push threats { ct: ct.id, level: "AMBER", pct: ct.usage_pct }
for row in plan: -- sort by severity descending
if row.action == "report-only": sort threats by pct desc
-- Excluded guest: alert only. No gc-executor call is constructed for it, at any level.
call alerter
threat: row
result: { action: "report-only", reason: row.reason }
else:
let result = call gc-executor
ct: row.target
level: row.level
strategy: lookup-gc-strategy(row.target)
call alerter for threat in threats:
threat: row let result = call gc-executor
result: result ct: threat.ct
level: threat.level
strategy: lookup-gc-strategy(threat.ct)
call alerter
threat: threat
result: result
call summary-reporter call summary-reporter
fleet: fleet fleet: fleet
plan: plan threats: threats
``` ```
## GC Strategies by Host Type ## GC Strategies by Host Type
@@ -300,9 +237,7 @@ dangling images and orphaned build cache. No automated GC was in place.
## Incident Log: 2026-07-09 — amdpve docker bloat ## Incident Log: 2026-07-09 — amdpve docker bloat
### Discovery ### Discovery
Scheduled fleet disk scan across all 20 Proxmox guests (17 LXC via `pct-run`, 3 QEMU VMs via direct SSH) + 3 GPU bare-metal hosts. Scheduled fleet disk scan via `pct-run` across all 15 CTs + 3 GPU bare-metal hosts.
> **Report-only gate applies to this scan:** CT 111 (`tdunna`, 192.168.68.129) is alerted but never
> garbage-collected at any level.
amdpve (.15) flagged at 78% (AMBER threshold: 75%). amdpve (.15) flagged at 78% (AMBER threshold: 75%).
### Diagnosis ### Diagnosis
@@ -335,35 +270,26 @@ one-off GPU builds. No automated post-migration cleanup was in place.
- Contract now scans GPU bare-metal hosts alongside CTs - Contract now scans GPU bare-metal hosts alongside CTs
- Access via `pct-run` script for all CTs (no hardcoded IPs) - Access via `pct-run` script for all CTs (no hardcoded IPs)
## Access Matrix (verified against `pvesh get /cluster/resources` 2026-09-12) ## Access Matrix (documented 2026-07-09)
### Guest Access (via `pct-run` — CT id only, node resolved by `scripts/pct-run.sh`) ### CT Access (via pct-run)
| Guest | Name | Node | Type | Status | | CT | Name | Node | Status |
|------|------|------|------|--------| |----|------|------|--------|
| 100 | abiba | minipve | lxc | ✅ reachable (probed via pct-run like any other guest; no local shortcut) | | 100 | abiba | amdpve | local |
| 102 | adguard | minipve | lxc | ✅ reachable | | 102 | adguard | acerpve | ✅ reachable |
| 104 | authentik | minipve | lxc | ✅ reachable | | 104 | authentik | minipve | ✅ reachable |
| 105 | kagentz | **amdpve** | lxc | ✅ reachable (was documented as minipve — corrected) | | 105 | kagentz | amdpve | ✅ reachable |
| 106 | ra-h-os | storepve | lxc | ✅ reachable | | 106 | ra-h-os | storepve | ✅ reachable |
| 107 | pbs | storepve | lxc | ✅ reachable | | 107 | pbs | storepve | ✅ reachable |
| 108 | media | storepve | lxc | ✅ reachable | | 108 | media | storepve | ✅ reachable |
| 110 | gitea | minipve | lxc | ✅ reachable | | 110 | gitea | minipve | ✅ reachable |
| 111 | tdunna | **storepve** | lxc | ⛔ **REPORT-ONLY** (192.168.68.129, Theo's box — no GC at any level) | | 111 | tdunna | amdpve | ✅ reachable |
| 112 | tanko | amdpve | lxc | ✅ reachable | | 112 | tanko | amdpve | ✅ reachable |
| 113 | baggy | amdpve | lxc | ✅ reachable | | 113 | baggy | amdpve | ✅ reachable |
| 115 | scottdenya | amdpve | lxc | ✅ reachable | | 114 | mumuni | minipve | ✅ reachable |
| 116 | syslog-api | minipve | lxc | ✅ reachable | | 115 | scottdenya | amdpve | ✅ reachable |
| 117 | zulip | storepve | lxc | ✅ reachable | | 116 | syslog-api | minipve | ✅ reachable |
| 118 | jdownloader | storepve | lxc | ✅ reachable | | 117 | zulip | storepve | ✅ reachable |
| 119 | infisical-vault | minipve | lxc | ✅ reachable |
| 120 | adguard2 | amdpve | lxc | ✅ reachable |
### QEMU VMs (via direct SSH)
| VM | Name | Node | IP | Status |
|----|------|------|-----|--------|
| 101 | llm-gpu (workload now bare metal .8) | acerpve | — | ✅ reachable |
| 103 | ocu-llm (workload now bare metal .110) | ocupve | — | ✅ reachable |
| 109 | docker-vm | storepve | 192.168.68.7 | ✅ reachable |
### GPU Bare Metal (via direct SSH) ### GPU Bare Metal (via direct SSH)
| Host | IP | GPU | Status | | Host | IP | GPU | Status |
@@ -372,15 +298,9 @@ one-off GPU builds. No automated post-migration cleanup was in place.
| ocu-llm | 192.168.68.110 | RTX 5070 | ✅ reachable | | ocu-llm | 192.168.68.110 | RTX 5070 | ✅ reachable |
| amdpve | 192.168.68.15 | Strix Halo | ✅ reachable | | amdpve | 192.168.68.15 | Strix Halo | ✅ reachable |
> **Fleet count:** 20 Proxmox guests (17 LXC + 3 QEMU VMs) + 3 GPU bare-metal hosts. Corrected ### KVM VM (via direct SSH)
> 2026-09-12: CT 105 → amdpve, CT 111 → storepve, and guests 118/119/120 were missing. | Host | IP | Role | Status |
> |------|-----|------|--------|
> **CT 100 probe gap (folded in):** CT 100 previously reported "unreachable (not reported)" every | docker-vm | 192.168.68.7 | 16 Docker containers, 4 stacks | ✅ reachable |
> run. Root cause is the same stale access layer: `pct-run` resolves the guest's node from its map,
> and the map/contract must reflect `pvesh /cluster/resources`. Verified working from inside CT 100: > **Decommissioned:** CT 118 (jitsi) — intentionally stopped.\n> **Migrated:** CT 101 → .8, CT 103 → .110 (bare metal GPU).\n> **KVM VM:** CT 109 (docker-vm) is a KVM VM, not LXC — access via SSH .7.
> `scripts/pct-run.sh 100 "df -P / | tail -1"` → `23% /`. Probe CT 100 through `pct-run` like any
> other guest — never through a local-only path, since the scanner itself runs inside CT 100 and a
> container has no `pct` binary.
>
> **KVM VM:** CT 109 (docker-vm) is a QEMU VM, not LXC — access via SSH .7.
> **NOTE:** For kagentz (CT 105), use `ssh root@kagentz` (hostname), NOT `pct exec 105` — `pct exec 105` shows loop0 (59G) while `ssh root@kagentz` shows the real filesystem (99G). For docker-vm (CT 109), use `ssh root@192.168.68.7`, not `pct exec`.
+1 -35
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ the description:
1. **What system does this contract touch?** Name the hosts, CTs, containers, 1. **What system does this contract touch?** Name the hosts, CTs, containers,
and services explicitly. "The inference fleet" is vague. "GPU .8 (RTX 3090, and services explicitly. "The inference fleet" is vague. "GPU .8 (RTX 3090,
qwen), .110 (RTX 5070, gpu-vision), .15 (Strix Halo, strix-moe), and LiteLLM on CT qwen), .110 (RTX 5070, gemma), .15 (Strix Halo, ornith), and LiteLLM on CT
116" is specific. 116" is specific.
2. **Who runs this contract, and when?** State the agent, the trigger (cron, 2. **Who runs this contract, and when?** State the agent, the trigger (cron,
@@ -211,40 +211,6 @@ Errors tell the operator what went wrong and what to do about it. Be specific:
Check router /health/unified at http://192.168.68.116/health/unified instead." Check router /health/unified at http://192.168.68.116/health/unified instead."
``` ```
### Report provenance
Every report a contract produces must lead with the **absolute path the probe
executed from** — `pwd -P`, or the running script's absolute path. A live-state
report without provenance is unactionable: a report from a stale copy (a worktree
clone, a retired cron entry, a diverged consumer) looks identical to a live
fault, and the team burns rounds repairing healthy infrastructure. This is not
optional. The 2026-09-09 probe-drift rounds cost three false `DEGRADED` reports
because a stale consumer probed the wrong port and nothing in the report said
where it ran.
Pair it with the **scoped any-HTTP-response liveness rule**: for unauthenticated
or auth-gated endpoints — where any HTTP answer proves a listener is up (the
PVE API's `401`, LiteLLM health's `301` redirect) — a probe is ALIVE on ANY HTTP
status, including `301` redirects and `401`/`403` auth challenges. **DOWN =
connection refused (`000`) or timeout only.**
Probes whose success condition is specifically a bare `200` are NOT covered by
the any-HTTP rule. On those — authenticated probes such as the Zulip message
POST and the router `/health` — an unexpected status (`401`/`403` from a bad or
missing credential, `5xx`, or anything other than the expected `200`) is an
**ALERT**, not "alive".
```markdown
**Report format**: Begin every report with the absolute execution path
(`pwd -P` / script path). On auth-gated endpoints, alive = ANY HTTP status and
DOWN = `000`/timeout only; on probes whose expected result is `200`, any other
status is an alert.
```
The lint pipeline enforces the provenance clause: any contract with a
`**Report format**` line must state an absolute path (`pwd -P`, `absolute path`,
or `executed from`).
### Comments ### Comments
Comments in contracts explain WHY, not WHAT. The execution steps say what to Comments in contracts explain WHY, not WHAT. The execution steps say what to
-282
View File
@@ -1,282 +0,0 @@
# Probe-drift round 2 — per-leg before/after evidence
**Date:** 2026-09-10
**Worktree (absolute execution path):** `/root/.treehouse/prose-contracts-9ce5f3/3/prose-contracts`
**Branch:** `fm/probe-drift-round2-20260909`
Every command below was run from the absolute path above; output is pasted
verbatim. This is the evidence trail for the four scoped corrections; it is not
a contract (never `prose run` it).
---
## Leg 1 — agent-health-check (item 1)
**Before** — from `/root/.treehouse/prose-contracts-9ce5f3/3/prose-contracts`,
`python3 scripts/agent-health-check.py --no-deploy` (v2, base of this branch):
```
🏥 Agent Health Check v2 — 2026-09-10 01:16 UTC
🔑 LiteLLM Keys:
✅ tanko: key valid → syslog-auto
✅ abiba: key valid → syslog-auto
✅ koby: key valid → syslog-auto
✅ koonimo: key valid → syslog-auto
🎮 GPU Port Health:
✅ gpu-rtx3090 (.8): healthy (pid=472206)
✅ gpu-rtx5070 (.110): healthy (pid=207601)
✅ gpu-strixhalo (.15): healthy (pid=4098872)
🤖 Agent Gateways:
✅ tanko: DSH (DeepSeek Harness) — no Hermes gateway since 2026-08-27 (CT 112, SSH OK)
⚠️ abiba: gw=no-state-file zulip=? streaming=no errors_10m=0 pid=?
✅ koby: gw=running zulip=connected streaming=no errors_10m=0 pid=360900
✅ koonimo: gw=running zulip=connected streaming=no errors_10m=0 pid=155125
🖥️ CT Liveness:
✅ tanko (CT 112 on amdpve): running
✅ abiba (CT 100 on minipve): running
❌ koby (CT 111 on amdpve): PVE UNREACHABLE
✅ koonimo (CT 113 on amdpve): running
📝 Config Integrity:
⏭️ tanko: DSH — no Hermes config.yaml since 2026-08-27
✅ abiba: config.yaml valid YAML
✅ koby: config.yaml valid YAML
✅ koonimo: config.yaml valid YAML
🔌 Wrapper/CLI Integrity:
⏭️ tanko: DSH — no hermes CLI wrapper since 2026-08-27
⚠️ abiba: wrapper infisical path may be wrong (infisical at /usr/bin/infisical)
❌ abiba: hermes-real NOT FOUND (wrapper broken)
⚠️ abiba: .env may be missing LITELLM_API_KEY entry
⚠️ koby: wrapper infisical path may be wrong (infisical at /usr/bin/infisical)
❌ koby: hermes-real NOT FOUND (wrapper broken)
✅ koby: wrapper + .env key present
⚠️ koonimo: wrapper infisical path may be wrong (infisical at /usr/bin/infisical)
✅ koonimo: wrapper + .env key present
🔐 Vault Secrets:
✅ tanko: vault TANKO_LITELLM_API_KEY=sk-...x6uw
✅ koby: vault KOBY_LITELLM_API_KEY=sk-...jxlg
✅ koonimo: vault KOONIMO_LITELLM_API_KEY=sk-...Y0KQ
❌ 6 FAILURE(S): ct-unreachable:koby:192.168.68.15 | wrapper-infisical-path:abiba | wrapper-no-hermes-real:abiba | wrapper-infisical-path:koby | wrapper-no-hermes-real:koby | wrapper-infisical-path:koonimo
```
Root causes (all stale expectations; no live fault):
| Failure | Why it was stale |
|---|---|
| `ct-unreachable:koby:192.168.68.15` | CT 111 (tdunna/koby) runs on **storepve (.6)**, not amdpve (.15). |
| `wrapper-*:abiba` | Abiba is pi-only since the harness purge. `/root/.local/bin/hermes` is a dangling symlink; no `hermes-real`, no `~/.hermes/.env`. |
| `wrapper-*:koby` | Koby is **report-only** (captain ruling 2026-08-17, Rule 17): detect and report, never repair — its legs must not count as fleet failures. Koby's wrapper is also the genuine no-infisical case: it sources `~/.hermes/.env` rather than `/usr/bin/infisical`, which the check now accepts. |
| `wrapper-infisical-path:koonimo` | Koonimo's wrapper **does** reference `/usr/bin/infisical` — but past the old check's `head -20` window, so the check looked for the path in the wrong slice and false-failed. The fix that mattered was reading the full wrapper body (and then verifying any absolute infisical path it finds actually exists). |
**After** — same absolute path, `python3 scripts/agent-health-check.py --no-deploy` (v4):
```
$ pwd -P
/root/.treehouse/prose-contracts-9ce5f3/3/prose-contracts
$ python3 scripts/agent-health-check.py --no-deploy
🏥 Agent Health Check v4 — 2026-09-10 01:22 UTC
📍 executed from: script=/root/.treehouse/prose-contracts-9ce5f3/3/prose-contracts/scripts/agent-health-check.py cwd=/root/.treehouse/prose-contracts-9ce5f3/3/prose-contracts
🔑 LiteLLM Keys:
✅ tanko: key valid → syslog-auto
✅ abiba: key valid → syslog-auto
✅ koby: key valid → syslog-auto
✅ koonimo: key valid → syslog-auto
🎮 GPU Port Health:
✅ gpu-rtx3090 (.8): healthy (pid=472206)
✅ gpu-rtx5070 (.110): healthy (pid=207601)
✅ gpu-strixhalo (.15): healthy (pid=4098872)
🤖 Agent Gateways:
✅ tanko: DSH (DeepSeek Harness) — no Hermes gateway since 2026-08-27 (CT 112, SSH OK)
✅ abiba: pi-only runtime — no Hermes gateway since the harness purge (CT 100, SSH OK)
🔍 koby: REPORT-ONLY mode (diagnostic only, no repairs on .129)
✅ koby: gateway running (pid=360900, report-only mode)
✅ koonimo: gw=running zulip=connected streaming=no errors_10m=0 pid=155125
🖥️ CT Liveness:
✅ tanko (CT 112 on amdpve): running
✅ abiba (CT 100 on minipve): running
✅ koby (CT 111 on storepve): running
✅ koonimo (CT 113 on amdpve): running
📝 Config Integrity:
⏭️ tanko: DSH — no Hermes config.yaml since 2026-08-27
⏭️ abiba: pi-only runtime — no Hermes config.yaml since the harness purge
✅ koby: config.yaml valid YAML
✅ koonimo: config.yaml valid YAML
🔌 Wrapper/CLI Integrity:
⏭️ tanko: DSH — no hermes CLI wrapper since 2026-08-27
⏭️ abiba: pi-only runtime — no hermes CLI wrapper since the harness purge
ℹ️ koby: wrapper resolves creds without infisical (e.g. ~/.hermes/.env) — OK
❌ koby: hermes-real NOT FOUND (wrapper broken)
🔍 report-only (koby): wrapper-no-hermes-real:koby — reported, not counted/repaired
✅ koby: wrapper + .env key present
✅ koonimo: wrapper infisical path OK
✅ koonimo: wrapper + .env key present
🔐 Vault Secrets:
✅ tanko: vault TANKO_LITELLM_API_KEY=sk-...x6uw
✅ koby: vault KOBY_LITELLM_API_KEY=sk-...jxlg
✅ koonimo: vault KOONIMO_LITELLM_API_KEY=sk-...Y0KQ
✅ All checks passed
exit=0
```
**Live vantage proof** (same worktree):
```
$ ssh root@192.168.68.15 "pct status 111"
Configuration file 'nodes/amdpve/lxc/111.conf' does not exist
$ ssh root@192.168.68.6 "pct status 111; pct list | grep '^ *111'"
status: running
111 running tdunna
$ ssh root@192.168.68.129 "hostname"
tdunna
```
---
## Leg 2 — infrastructure-monitoring PVE API (item 2)
**Before** — the contract's probe, aimed at the monitoring host CT 116:
```
$ curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' https://192.168.68.116:8006/api2/json
000
```
CT 116 runs no `pveproxy`, so it never answers on `:8006`. The probe target was
wrong, which is what read as PVE-API `000`.
**After** — probing the five real cluster nodes (`:8006/api2/json/version`),
alive under the any-HTTP-response rule (`401` = up, unauthenticated):
```
$ for node in 192.168.68.9 192.168.68.5 192.168.68.15 192.168.68.6 192.168.68.12; do
printf '%s:8006 -> %s\n' "$node" "$(curl -sk -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 5 "https://$node:8006/api2/json/version")"
done
192.168.68.9:8006 -> 401
192.168.68.5:8006 -> 401
192.168.68.15:8006 -> 401
192.168.68.6:8006 -> 401
192.168.68.12:8006 -> 401
```
`401` on every node = alive by design. `DOWN` is `000`/timeout only. (The
contract's LiteLLM probe was the same class: `/litellm/health` answers `301` →
`/litellm/health/liveliness`, so it is now specified as any-HTTP too.)
---
## Leg 3 — gpu-monitor GPU probes (item 3)
**Before** — the false alarm came from probing bare port 80 on GPU hosts:
```
$ curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://192.168.68.8/health
000
$ curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://192.168.68.110/health
000
```
Nothing listens on GPU port 80, so the monitor reported
`DEGRADED — GPU-rtx3090 000, GPU-rtx5070 000` three times on 2026-09-09.
**After** — the real endpoints answer:
```
$ curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://192.168.68.8:8080/health
200
$ curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://192.168.68.110:8080/health
200
$ curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://192.168.68.15:8080/health
200
$ curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://192.168.68.116/health/unified
301 # Location: http://192.168.68.116/gpu/gpu-data — the same payload
$ curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -L http://192.168.68.116/health/unified
200
```
`301` is healthy under the any-HTTP-response rule. The contract now requires GPU
health on `:8080` (or router `/health/unified`) and forbids bare port 80 on a
GPU host.
---
## Leg 4 — report provenance (item 4)
Every contract report must now lead with the absolute path it executed from.
`docs/AUTHORING-GUIDE.md` documents the rule and `scripts/prose-lint.sh`
enforces it:
```
$ pwd -P
/root/.treehouse/prose-contracts-9ce5f3/3/prose-contracts
$ bash scripts/prose-lint.sh
✅ Report provenance present in all report-format contracts
...
✅ LINT PASSED (12 warning(s))
```
The health script prints `📍 executed from: script=… cwd=…` and includes
`execution_path`/`cwd` in `--json` output.
---
## Full suite
```
$ pwd -P
/root/.treehouse/prose-contracts-9ce5f3/3/prose-contracts
$ python3 -m pytest -q
24 passed
$ shellcheck scripts/prose-lint.sh
(clean)
```
---
## Follow-up findings (observed, intentionally NOT changed here)
These are adjacent stale expectations discovered while verifying the four
scoped legs. Each touches a CRITICAL/HIGH-sensitivity artifact or an unrelated
script, so it is recorded for the captain/verify mate rather than silently
repaired.
1. **`infrastructure-control.prose.md` (CRITICAL) CT 111 node assignment.**
Lines ~109 and ~615 place `tdunna` (CT 111, koby) on **amdpve**. Live
verification on 2026-09-10 shows `pct status 111` = `running` on
**storepve (.6)** and `Configuration file 'nodes/amdpve/lxc/111.conf' does
not exist` on .15. `agent-health-check.py` now carries the live-verified
`storepve` mapping (the script is not the topology source of truth); the
CRITICAL contract itself needs an authorized correction.
**✅ Resolved 2026-09-12:** the topology was corrected in its owner,
`infrastructure-control.prose.md` (CT 111 → storepve, CT 105 → amdpve), and
`scripts/pct-run.sh` now matches. This snapshot is left as observed; treat
those owner documents as authoritative.
2. **Strix Halo `:8080` firewall claim is stale.** `prose-ai-review.sh`
ground-truth rule #4 and `gpu-monitor.prose.md` say `:8080` is firewalled to
`.116` only and `.24` cannot probe it. Live on .15:
`-A INPUT -s 192.168.68.24/32 -p tcp --dport 8080 -j ACCEPT`, and a probe
from .24 returns `200`. The contract keeps routing Strix via the router
(safe), but the claim no longer matches iptables.
3. **`contract-registry.yaml` references `agent-health-check.prose.md`**, which
does not exist in the repo. The registry entry (with `koby_action: skip_heal`)
is aspirational/stale.
4. **Pre-existing script defects, untouched:** `scripts/pm2-self-heal.sh` has a
bash syntax error at lines 19–20 (`bash -n` fails), and `shellcheck` fails on
five untouched scripts (`netbird-add-domain.sh`, `pct-run.sh`,
`pm2-self-heal.sh`, `prose-ai-review.sh`, `swap-gpu-dense-model.sh`).
`scripts/prose-lint.sh` — the one shell file touched here — is now
shellcheck-clean.
+80 -146
View File
@@ -5,27 +5,20 @@ description: >
Manages the GPU inference fleet across all hosts. Handles model deployment, Manages the GPU inference fleet across all hosts. Handles model deployment,
registration, health checks, LiteLLM sync, agent key management, GPU registration, health checks, LiteLLM sync, agent key management, GPU
saturation watchdog, Prometheus/Grafana monitoring, and self-healing. saturation watchdog, Prometheus/Grafana monitoring, and self-healing.
UPDATED 2026-07-15: Stable role-based aliases introduced: strix-moe, Current as of 2026-07-08: context reduced to 128K on NVIDIA GPUs, parallel 2
gpu-dense, gpu-vision (gpu-light was superseded by gpu-vision on 2026-09-12). on all GPUs, LiteLLM timeouts tuned (gemma 25→120s, qwen 40→90s), router fully
These never change — only the underlying model does. deprecated — nginx routes /v1 → LiteLLM directly.
Strix Halo: strix-moe → Carnice-Qwen3.6-MoE-35B-A3B-Q4_K_M.gguf (22GB, 256K ctx).
RTX 5070: gpu-vision — IQ4_NL + MTP draft (~122 tok/s, 2x faster).
UPDATED 2026-07-17: NVIDIA host context reduced from 256K to 128K for stability.
Strix Halo model: Carnice-Qwen3.6-MoE-35B-A3B-Q4_K_M.gguf (alias strix-moe, 256K context).
Strix Halo runs 256K (n_ctx 262144, --kv-unified); RTX 3090 and RTX 5070 remain at 128K.
For >128K on NVIDIA hosts → fall back to external providers (deepseek).
VRAM headroom improved: RTX 3090 ~70%, RTX 5070 ~65%.
agent: abiba agent: abiba
triggers: triggers:
- on model add/remove - on model add/remove
- on GPU health degradation - on GPU health degradation
- on agent key rotation - on agent key rotation
- on harness container restart (LiteLLM reloads its model list) - on router restart (roster must be loaded)
--- ---
## Maintains ## Maintains
- gpu_roster: { models: map, hosts: map } — GPU host/model roster; the authoritative alias/weight/fallback registry is CT 116 `litellm_config.yaml` - gpu_roster: { models: map, hosts: map } — Single source of truth for all GPU models
- router: { status: "healthy", roster_loaded: bool, models: array } - router: { status: "healthy", roster_loaded: bool, models: array }
- litellm: { status: "healthy", keys: array, models: array } - litellm: { status: "healthy", keys: array, models: array }
- agent_keys: { agent: api_key } — All agent API keys registered in LiteLLM DB - agent_keys: { agent: api_key } — All agent API keys registered in LiteLLM DB
@@ -37,70 +30,55 @@ triggers:
- prometheus: { status: "running", targets: 5 } — Scrapes GPU :9400 exporters + LiteLLM - prometheus: { status: "running", targets: 5 } — Scrapes GPU :9400 exporters + LiteLLM
- port_conflict_detection: { status: "active" } — All 3 GPU wrappers detect ghost processes before binding - port_conflict_detection: { status: "active" } — All 3 GPU wrappers detect ghost processes before binding
## Fleet Topology (Current — 2026-09-11, router decommissioned) ## Fleet Topology (Current — June 2026)
``` ```
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ CT 116 (192.168.68.116) — Inference Harness Host │ │ CT 116 (192.168.68.116) — Inference Harness Host │
│ │ │ │
│ nginx:80 (entrypoint) │ │ nginx:80 (entrypoint) │
│ ├─ /v1/* → harness-litellm:4000 (API requests) │ │ ├─ /v1/* → harness-litellm:4000 (API requests) │
│ ├─ /admin/* → harness-litellm:4000 (admin endpoints) │ │ ├─ /admin/* → harness-litellm:4000 (admin endpoints) │
│ ├─ /dashboard/ → harness-dashboard:3000 (harness UI) │ │ ├─ /dashboard/ → harness-dashboard:3000 (harness UI) │
│ ├─ /litellm/* → harness-litellm:4000 (LiteLLM UI + API) │ │ ├─ /litellm/* → harness-litellm:4000 (LiteLLM UI + API) │
│ ├─ /health/* → harness-litellm:4000 (health probes) │ │ ├─ /health/* → harness-litellm:4000 (health probes) │
│ └─ /gpu/* → 192.168.68.24:9100 (fleet monitor) │ │ └─ /gpu/* → 192.168.68.24:9100 (fleet monitor) │
│ │ │ │
│ Containers: │ │ Containers: │
│ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ │ │ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ │
│ │ LiteLLM │ │Dashboard │ │ Grafana │ │ │ │ LiteLLM │ │ Router │ │Dashboard │ │ Grafana │ │
│ │ :4000 │ │ :3000 │ │ :3001 │ │ │ │ :4000 │─▶│ :9000 │ │ :3000 │ │ :3000 │ │
│ │ keys+sync│ │ harness │ │Prometheus│ │ │ │ keys+sync│ │internal │ │ harness │ │ Prometheus│ │
│ │ fallback │ │ UI │ │ data src │ │ │ │ fallback │ │only! │ │ UI │ │ data src │ │
│ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ │ │ └──────────┘ └───┬──────┘ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ │
│ │ │ │ │
│ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ │ │ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ │
│ │PostgreSQL│ │ Redis │ │Prometheus│ │ │ │PostgreSQL│ │ Redis │ │Prometheus│ │
│ │ :5432 │ │ :6379 │ │ :9090 │ │ │ │ :5432 │ │ :6379 │ │ :9090 │ │
│ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ │ │ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ │
└───────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ └────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────────────┘
│ │
┌─┴─────────────┬───────────────┬───────────────┐ ┌───────────────┼───────────────┬──────────────────┐
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
┌─────▼──────┐ ┌─────▼──────┐ ┌─────▼──────┐ ┌─────▼──────┐ ┌────▼─────┐ ┌──────▼──────┐ ┌────▼──────┐ ┌───────▼──────┐
│ CT 8 │ │ CT 110 │ │ CT 15 │ │ pi (.24) │ │ CT 8 │ │ CT 110 │ │ CT 15 │ │ pi (.24) │
│ RTX 3090 │ │ RTX 5070 │ │ Strix Halo │ │ GPU Monitor│ │ RTX 3090 │ │ RTX 5070 │ │ Strix Halo│ │ GPU Monitor │
│ 24GB │ │ 12GB │ │ 64GB UMA │ │ :9100 │ │ 24GB │ │ 12GB │ │ 64GB UMA │ │ :9100 │
│ :8080 │ │ :9400 exp │ │ :9400 exp │ │ :9401 │ │ 128K ctx │ │ 128K ctx │ │ 256K ctx │ │ Watchdog │
└────────────┘ └────────────┘ └────────────┘ └────────────┘ │ qwen3.6 │ │ gemma-4-12b │ │ ornith35B │ │ Prometheus │
│ 27B-code │ │ :8080 │ │ :8080 │ │ exporter │
│ :8080 │ │ :9400 (exp) │ │ :9400(exp)│ │ :9401 │
│ :9400 │ └─────────────┘ └───────────┘ └──────────────┘
└──────────┘
``` ```
## Stable Role-Based Aliases (Introduced 2026-07-15) ## Current Model Assignments (2026-07-08)
Agent configs, cron jobs, and workflows MUST use these aliases, never model-specific names. | Model | GPU | Host | VRAM | Ctx | KV Cache | Parallel | Batch/Ubatch | Status |
When a model is swapped on a GPU, ONLY the infrastructure layer changes — agent configs are untouched. |-------|-----|------|------|-----|----------|----------|-------------|--------|
| qwen3.6-27B-code | RTX 3090 | .8 (llm-gpu) | 20.3/24GB (83%) | 128K | turbo4 | 2 | 512/512 | ✅ healthy |
| Alias | Serves | Where | Kind | | gemma-4-12b | RTX 5070 | .110 (ocu-llm) | 9.4/12.2GB (77%) | 128K | q4_0 | 2 | 2048/512 | ✅ healthy |
|-------|--------|-------|------| | ornith-1.0-35b | Strix Halo Vulkan | .15 (amdpve) | 24.4/64GB (35%) | 256K | q8_0 | 2 | 2048/512 | ✅ healthy |
| `gpu-dense` | heavy reasoning | RTX 3090 (192.168.68.8) | direct alias |
| `gpu-vision` | vision / web extract / light tasks | RTX 5070 (192.168.68.110) | direct alias AND `syslog-auto` pool member |
| `strix-moe` | compression (MoE) | Strix Halo (192.168.68.15) | direct alias |
| `syslog-auto` | balanced default | weighted pool across the three GPU hosts | pool router |
Single source of truth for models, aliases, rpm caps, weights and fallback chains:
CT 116 `/opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml`. Do not duplicate those values in
contracts — read them there.
**No backward compatibility**: Old model-specific names (qwen3.6-27B-code, qwen3.5-9b-it) are retired as of 2026-09-12
and no longer resolve; do not use them in agent configs. Only the stable aliases survive model swaps. `gemma-4-12b`
is retired and returns 400 `Invalid model name`.
## Routing Configuration (LiteLLM — July 2026)
Model, alias, rpm/weight and fallback values are owned by CT 116
`/opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml` (see § Stable Role-Based Aliases above).
Note: All syslog-auto entries route directly to GPUs with `api_key: not-needed`. The router (port 9000) was decommissioned 2026-09-11 and is NOT in the inference path.
## Operations ## Operations
@@ -124,7 +102,7 @@ Note: All syslog-auto entries route directly to GPUs with `api_key: not-needed`.
6. Cleanup model files (optional) 6. Cleanup model files (optional)
### heal ### heal
1. Check all GPUs via gpu-monitor `{{gpu_dashboard_url}}/gpu-data` 1. Check all GPUs via router internal `:9000/health/unified`
2. Check LiteLLM health via nginx `:80/litellm/health/liveliness` 2. Check LiteLLM health via nginx `:80/litellm/health/liveliness`
3. Reset stuck circuit breakers if idle (Redis) 3. Reset stuck circuit breakers if idle (Redis)
4. Restart dead llama-server instances via SSH 4. Restart dead llama-server instances via SSH
@@ -132,14 +110,14 @@ Note: All syslog-auto entries route directly to GPUs with `api_key: not-needed`.
6. Verify GPU monitor server is running on pi (:9100) 6. Verify GPU monitor server is running on pi (:9100)
7. Verify watchdog is running on pi 7. Verify watchdog is running on pi
8. Restart router if roster not loaded (check logs for STARTUP ROSTER) 8. Restart router if roster not loaded (check logs for STARTUP ROSTER)
9. Router roster reload — REMOVED 2026-09-11 (router decommissioned; LiteLLM fallbacks handle routing) 9. Reload roster via `POST :9000/admin/roster/reload` if available
### sync-keys ### sync-keys
1. List all agent keys in LiteLLM DB via `GET /key/list` 1. List all agent keys in LiteLLM DB via `GET /key/list`
2. Compare against expected agent list: [tanko, mumuni, abiba, koby, koonimo, kagenz0] 2. Compare against expected agent list: [tanko, mumuni, abiba, tdunna, baggy, kagenz0]
3. Generate missing keys via `POST /key/generate` with unlimited budget 3. Generate missing keys via `POST /key/generate` with unlimited budget
4. Update Infisical vault: `infisical secrets set LITELLM_API_KEY=<key> --project=agents --env=production` 4. Update agent configs — `/etc/environment` LITELLM_API_KEY
5. Send Zulip DM to agents that can't be reached via SSH (provide vault login instructions) 5. Send Zulip DM to agents that can't be reached via SSH
6. Verify each key with test request through full chain 6. Verify each key with test request through full chain
7. Document keys in knowledge graph 7. Document keys in knowledge graph
@@ -151,30 +129,26 @@ Show full fleet status: GPUs, models, VRAM, context windows, parallel slots, act
2. Check llama-server processes: `ps aux | grep llama-server` on all 3 hosts 2. Check llama-server processes: `ps aux | grep llama-server` on all 3 hosts
3. Check LiteLLM: `curl http://192.168.68.116/health` (expect "I'm alive!") 3. Check LiteLLM: `curl http://192.168.68.116/health` (expect "I'm alive!")
4. Check LiteLLM models: `curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $MASTER_KEY" http://192.168.68.116/v1/models` 4. Check LiteLLM models: `curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $MASTER_KEY" http://192.168.68.116/v1/models`
5. Check LiteLLM timeouts: `grep -n 'timeout:' /opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml` — read the live values from the authority config; do not assert them from this contract. 5. Check LiteLLM timeouts: `grep -n 'timeout:' /opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml`
- gemma-4-12b: 120s, qwen3.6-27B: 90s, ornith-1.0-35b: 120s
- global request_timeout: 300s, nginx proxy_read_timeout: 600s
6. Check AMD metrics: `curl http://192.168.68.15:9400/metrics` (Radeon 8060S, util%, VRAM, temp, power) 6. Check AMD metrics: `curl http://192.168.68.15:9400/metrics` (Radeon 8060S, util%, VRAM, temp, power)
7. Check port conflicts: verify only one llama-server on :8080 per host 7. Check port conflicts: verify only one llama-server on :8080 per host
8. Verify agent keys: 9 keys in LiteLLM DB (`GET /key/list`) 8. Verify agent keys: 9 keys in LiteLLM DB (`GET /key/list`)
## Agent Keys (LiteLLM DB — Current 2026-07-11) ## Agent Keys (LiteLLM DB — Current 2026-06-30)
Keys stored in Infisical vault (project=agents, env=production, secret=LITELLM_API_KEY). | Agent | CT | IP | Key | Access |
Agent gateways inject keys at runtime via `infisical run --` wrapper. |-------|-----|-----|-----|--------|
Plaintext keys removed from this contract post-vault-migration. | Tanko | 112 | .122 | `sk-CggiHWlamQyShxWC3Hx6uw` | SSH jerome |
| Mumuni | 114 | .123 | `sk-VrqCNlwUgzoNGOpikJ7nwQ` | SSH root |
| Abiba | 100 | .24 | `sk-Qvzi4uYQBhlSK_XstEhcyQ` | local (pi agent) |
| Tdunna | 111 | ? | `sk-6sbCNjz2T6lTVDBdlNHXsA` | Zulip DM |
| Baggy | 113 | ? | `sk-krnw_zGBwvvL5b7l2t-s-A` | no SSH |
| Kagenz0 | 105 | ? | `sk-Dh4CDkaHebMLEp8qqq20qA` | no SSH |
| Agent | CT | IP | LiteLLM Alias | Key Source | Access | **Key update procedure**: Update `/etc/environment` → `LITELLM_API_KEY=sk-...` → restart Hermes.
|-------|-----|-----|---------------|------------|--------| If no SSH access, send Zulip DM via abiba-bot.
| Tanko | 112 | .122 | `tanko` | Infisical vault | SSH jerome |
| Mumuni | 105 (kagentz) | .14 | `mumuni` | Infisical vault | SSH root |
| Abiba | 100 | .24 | `abiba-pi` | Infisical vault | local (pi agent) |
| Koby | 111 | ? | `koby` | Infisical vault | Zulip DM |
| Koonimo | 113 | ? | `koonimo` | Infisical vault (migrated 2026-07-11) | no SSH |
| Kagenz0 | 105 | ? | `kagenz0` | Infisical vault | no SSH |
> **Note**: CT hostnames differ from agent identities. CT111=tdunna runs koby; CT113=baggy runs koonimo.
**Key update procedure**: Update Infisical vault → `infisical secrets set LITELLM_API_KEY=sk-... --project=agents --env=production` → restart agent gateway. Agent picks up new key via `infisical run --` wrapper at startup.
If no SSH access, send Zulip DM via abiba-bot with vault update instructions.
## Configuration Files ## Configuration Files
@@ -190,13 +164,13 @@ If no SSH access, send Zulip DM via abiba-bot with vault update instructions.
| `/root/scripts/gpu-saturation-watchdog.py` | pi (.24) | Auto-restart stuck llama-server | | `/root/scripts/gpu-saturation-watchdog.py` | pi (.24) | Auto-restart stuck llama-server |
| `/root/dashboard/gpu-fleet.html` | pi (.24) | Live HTML dashboard | | `/root/dashboard/gpu-fleet.html` | pi (.24) | Live HTML dashboard |
| `/etc/systemd/system/llama-server.service` | .8, .110 | llama-server daemons (Nvidia GPUs) | | `/etc/systemd/system/llama-server.service` | .8, .110 | llama-server daemons (Nvidia GPUs) |
| `/etc/systemd/system/strix-server.service` | .15 (amdpve) | llama-server daemon (Vulkan, Strix Halo) running Carnice-Qwen3.6-MoE-35B-A3B-Q4_K_M.gguf (256K ctx). Note: `llama-server.service` and `llama-server@.service` are **masked** on .15 to prevent port 8080 collisions. | | `/etc/systemd/system/ornith-server.service` | .15 (amdpve) | llama-server daemon (Vulkan, Strix Halo). Note: `llama-server.service` and `llama-server@.service` are **masked** on .15 to prevent port 8080 collisions. |
## Prometheus & Grafana ## Prometheus & Grafana
| Component | URL | Details | | Component | URL | Details |
|-----------|-----|---------| |-----------|-----|---------|
| Grafana | `http://192.168.68.116:3001/` | admin / vault (`GRAFANA_ADMIN_PASSWORD`) | | Grafana | `http://192.168.68.116:3001/` | admin / syslog-grafana-2026 |
| GPU Dashboard | `http://192.168.68.116:3001/d/gpu-fleet` | Gauges + time series | | GPU Dashboard | `http://192.168.68.116:3001/d/gpu-fleet` | Gauges + time series |
| Prometheus | `http://192.168.68.116:9090/` (internal) | 5 scrape targets | | Prometheus | `http://192.168.68.116:9090/` (internal) | 5 scrape targets |
| GPU Exporters | `:9400/metrics` on .8, .110, .15 | NVIDIA/AMD GPU metrics | | GPU Exporters | `:9400/metrics` on .8, .110, .15 | NVIDIA/AMD GPU metrics |
@@ -207,81 +181,41 @@ If no SSH access, send Zulip DM via abiba-bot with vault update instructions.
- **Router startup race**: Compose router.py doesn't call load_roster(). Reload thread sleeps 30s first. - **Router startup race**: Compose router.py doesn't call load_roster(). Reload thread sleeps 30s first.
Fix: trigger roster reload via SSH after restart, or rebuild image with startup load_roster(). Fix: trigger roster reload via SSH after restart, or rebuild image with startup load_roster().
- **LiteLLM /metrics**: Requires auth. Prometheus uses `/health/liveliness` as workaround. - **LiteLLM /metrics**: Requires auth. Prometheus uses `/health/liveliness` as workaround.
- **Strix Halo GPU**: Vulkan is the working backend (ROCm/HIP path abandoned — HSA runtime blocked on Debian 13). Build at `/root/llama.cpp/build-vk/`, commit `4fc4ec5` (2026-07-01), ggml 0.15.3 shared-lib arch. Mesa RADV 25.0.7, KHR_coopmat fast path active. ~70 tok/s gen, 532 tok/s prompt. Service: `strix-server.service` on port 8080, model: `Carnice-Qwen3.6-MoE-35B-A3B-Q4_K_M.gguf`, alias `strix-moe`, 256K context (n_ctx 262144), --parallel 2 --kv-unified, flash-attn + q4 KV, multimodal (mmproj loaded). - **VRAM (2026-07-08)**: RTX 3090 at 20.3/24GB (83%), RTX 5070 at 9.4/12.2GB (77%), Strix Halo at 24.4/64GB (35%). Context reduced from 256K→128K on NVIDIA GPUs freed ~3.3GB (.8) and ~1.5GB (.110).
- **All GPUs at `--parallel 2` (2026-07-08)**: Fleet serves 6 concurrent requests (was 3). 2× throughput.
- **RTX 3090 config**: `-c 131072 -ctk turbo4 -ctv turbo4 --parallel 2`. No explicit batch flags (512/512 default). Service: `/home/llmuser/llama-wrapper.sh`.
- **RTX 5070 config**: `--ctx-size 131072 --cache-type-k q4_0 --cache-type-v q4_0 --batch-size 2048 --ubatch-size 512 --parallel 2`. Ubatch fixed 4096→512 (was inverted — ubatch > batch killed prompt throughput). Service: `/home/llmuser/llama-wrapper.sh`.
- **LiteLLM timeout tuning (2026-07-08)**: gemma-4-12b 25→120s, qwen3.6-27B-code 40→90s, syslog-auto (qwen route) 40→90s. Nginx proxy_read_timeout: 600s. Global request_timeout: 300s. Config at `/opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml`.
- **Strix Halo GPU**: Vulkan is the working backend (ROCm/HIP path abandoned — HSA runtime blocked on Debian 13). Build at `/root/llama.cpp/build-vk/`, commit `4fc4ec5` (2026-07-01), ggml 0.15.3 shared-lib arch. Mesa RADV 25.0.7, KHR_coopmat fast path active. ~70 tok/s gen, 532 tok/s prompt. Service: `ornith-server.service` on port 8080, 256K context, flash-attn + q8 KV.
- **Port conflict detection (2026-07-05)**: All 3 GPU wrappers now detect ghost processes squatting port 8080 before starting. `.8` and `.110` use inline pre-start check in `llama-wrapper.sh`; `.15` uses `/usr/local/bin/port-cleanup.sh` ExecStartPre. Replaces the blanket `pkill -9 -x llama-server` on .15 which would kill ALL llama-server instances regardless of port. Ghost detection was the root cause of .8 crash-looping for 27+ restarts (stale pid 25836 squatting 8080 after OOM kill). - **Port conflict detection (2026-07-05)**: All 3 GPU wrappers now detect ghost processes squatting port 8080 before starting. `.8` and `.110` use inline pre-start check in `llama-wrapper.sh`; `.15` uses `/usr/local/bin/port-cleanup.sh` ExecStartPre. Replaces the blanket `pkill -9 -x llama-server` on .15 which would kill ALL llama-server instances regardless of port. Ghost detection was the root cause of .8 crash-looping for 27+ restarts (stale pid 25836 squatting 8080 after OOM kill).
- **Strix Halo thermal safeguard (2026-07-02)**: `strix-server.service` has `-n 8192` (hard generation cap per request). Without it, `--predict` defaults to -1 (infinity) — a runaway request from .123 (old Mumuni CT114 — now inside Abiba CT100 at .24) decoded 39,868 tokens over 24 min, pushing Tctl to 98°C (crit 89.8°C) and throttling 70→29 t/s. The cap bounds worst-case generation to ~5 min. Do NOT remove `-n` without a replacement ceiling. Sustained load hits ~84°C even at 92s; the APU is fanless/low-flow. Clients MUST also set `max_tokens`. - **Strix Halo thermal safeguard (2026-07-02)**: `ornith-server.service` has `-n 8192` (hard generation cap per request). Without it, `--predict` defaults to -1 (infinity) — a runaway request from .123 (Mumuni) decoded 39,868 tokens over 24 min, pushing Tctl to 98°C (crit 89.8°C) and throttling 70→29 t/s. The cap bounds worst-case generation to ~5 min. Do NOT remove `-n` without a replacement ceiling. Sustained load hits ~84°C even at 92s; the APU is fanless/low-flow. Clients MUST also set `max_tokens`.
- **Port 8080 firewall**: amdpve iptables restricts 8080 to 192.168.68.116 (LiteLLM/router host) only. All inbound connections are from .116 (LiteLLM proxied via nginx). Localhost curls hang (SYN dropped). Always test from .116. - **Port 8080 firewall**: amdpve iptables restricts 8080 to 192.168.68.116 (LiteLLM/router host) only. All inbound connections are from .116 (LiteLLM proxied via nginx). Localhost curls hang (SYN dropped). Always test from .116.
- **Router sidecar fallback**: `router.py` `check_gpu_health()` now probes GPU `/health` directly when sidecar at :8090 is absent. Sidecar JSON exporters not deployed on any GPU host — router relies on GPU-direct fallback. - **Router sidecar fallback**: `router.py` `check_gpu_health()` now probes GPU `/health` directly when sidecar at :8090 is absent. Sidecar JSON exporters not deployed on any GPU host — router relies on GPU-direct fallback.
- **Router GPU_MOE_URL bug (fixed 2026-07-01)**: docker-compose had `GPU_MOE_URL=.110:8080` (gemma host) instead of `.15:8080` (amdpve). Corrected. - **Router GPU_MOE_URL bug (fixed 2026-07-01)**: docker-compose had `GPU_MOE_URL=.110:8080` (gemma host) instead of `.15:8080` (amdpve). Corrected.
- **Alert migration**: All alerts now go to `#agent-hub` topics (`alerts-gpu`, `alerts-pm2`, `alerts-infra`) instead of DMs. Cross-agent visibility enabled. - **Alert migration**: All alerts now go to `#agent-hub` topics (`alerts-gpu`, `alerts-pm2`, `alerts-infra`) instead of DMs. Cross-agent visibility enabled.
- **tok/s benchmarks**: Measured every 5 min via LiteLLM proxy. Baselines tracked with 30%/50% degradation thresholds. - **tok/s benchmarks**: Measured every 5 min via LiteLLM proxy. Baselines tracked with 30%/50% degradation thresholds.
- **NetBird 502**: Tanko routes through NetBird for litellm.sysloggh.net. Use direct IP if NetBird down. - **NetBird 502**: Tanko routes through NetBird for litellm.sysloggh.net. Use direct IP if NetBird down.
- **Alias-retirement sweep (2026-09-12)**: `gemma-4-12b`, `gpu-light` and `crew-auto` are retired and replaced by `gpu-vision` / no cap respectively. The agent-facing templates (`hermes-config-template.prose.md`, `hermes-agent-baseline.prose.md`), `litellm-api-keys.prose.md`, `gpu-self-heal.prose.md`, `hermes-key-enforcement.prose.md`, `inference-optimization.prose.md`, `litellm-client-timeouts.prose.md` and the executable `audit-hermes-config.py` were all updated to the live canonical alias in the same change. **koby's config on .129 still names `gpu-light` (and `gemma-4-E4B`); .129 is report-only, so that is recorded for its owner and NOT edited here.**
## GPU Inference Benchmarks (Current) ## GPU Inference Benchmarks (Current)
| GPU | Model | Gen tok/s | Prompt tok/s | Baseline | Context | | GPU | Model | Gen tok/s | Prompt tok/s | Baseline | Samples |
|-----|-------|-----------|--------------|----------|---------| |-----|-------|-----------|--------------|----------|---------|
| RTX 3090 (.8) | Qwen3.8-27B-Uncensored-Q4_K_M | **TBD** | — | — | **128K** | | RTX 3090 (.8) | qwen3.6-27B-code | 75 | 305 | 74 | 6 |
| Strix Halo (.15) | Carnice-Qwen3.6-MoE-35B-A3B-Q4_K_M.gguf (strix-moe) | **65** | 140 | — | **256K** | | RTX 5070 (.110) | gemma-4-12b | 75 | 323 | 75 | 6 |
| Strix Halo (.15) | ornith-1.0-35b | 70 | 532 | 70 | 6 |
Benchmarks from 2026-07-17. Strix Halo model: Carnice-Qwen3.6-MoE-35B-A3B-Q4_K_M.gguf (alias strix-moe), n_ctx 262144, --parallel 2 --kv-unified. RTX 5070 MTP provides 2.7x speedup over pre-upgrade 70 tok/s. Benchmarks run through LiteLLM proxy (192.168.68.116:4001) every 5 minutes.
GPU contexts: RTX 3090 (.8) and RTX 5070 (.110) at 128K; Strix Halo (.15) at 256K (2026-09-12).
Benchmarks run through LiteLLM proxy (192.168.68.116:4000) every 5 minutes.
Degradation alerts fire at 30% (warning) and 50% (critical) below baseline. Degradation alerts fire at 30% (warning) and 50% (critical) below baseline.
History stored at `/root/data/toks-history.json` with 7-day rolling window. History stored at `/root/data/toks-history.json` with 7-day rolling window.
**Note (2026-07-01)**: Strix Halo prompt tok/s jumped 209→532 after Vulkan rebuild (cooperative-matrix fast path now active on GFX1151). Baseline may need re-calibration. **Note (2026-07-01)**: Strix Halo prompt tok/s jumped 209→532 after Vulkan rebuild (cooperative-matrix fast path now active on GFX1151). Baseline may need re-calibration.
## Agent Config Implications (2026-07-15) ## Agent Config Implications (2026-07-08)
### Stable Aliases — CRITICAL With NVIDIA GPUs at 128K context:
- Agents using `syslog-auto` (50/50 qwen+ornith): keep `context_length: 262144` — ornith supports it, Litellm fallbacks handle qwen overflow
All agent configs MUST use stable role-based aliases, never model-specific names: - Agents using `qwen3.6-27B-code` directly: set `context_length: 131072` and `max_tokens: 4096` per thermal safety rule
- `compression.model: syslog-auto` - Agents using `gemma-4-12b` directly (auxiliary tasks): set `context_length: 131072`
- `auxiliary.vision.model: gpu-vision` - Compression threshold at 0.65: fires at ~170K for syslog-auto (262K ctx), ~85K for direct qwen/gemma (128K ctx)
- `delegation.model: gpu-dense` - All Hermes clients MUST set `max_tokens: 4096` — first line of defense before server-side `-n 8192` cap
- `auxiliary.web_extract.model: gpu-vision` - Port 8080 is used on all 3 GPU hosts (not 8090 as previously documented)
When the underlying model is swapped, only the LiteLLM config changes — agent configs are untouched.
### Context Windows
- RTX 3090: **128K** (reduced from 256K 2026-07-17) | RTX 5070: **128K** (reduced from 256K) | Strix Halo: **256K** (2026-09-12)
- **Agents via `syslog-auto`**: 128K ceiling — the pool's safe floor (NVIDIA hosts are 128K). For >128K workloads, use external providers (deepseek)
- Compression threshold 0.65 (audit Rule 9): fires at ~85K (~43K headroom before 128K ceiling)
- **Pi agents (Abiba)**: `compaction.reserveTokens: 52739` (≈60% of 128K)
- Mumuni compression model alias: `syslog-auto`
### Mumuni Agent Profile
Mumuni (kagentz CT105, 192.168.68.14 — migrated from CT100 2026-08-29) is the primary business assistant. This profile is the reference for all agent configs. The compression values below are the current required values per template Rules 7/9 and `audit-hermes-config.py`; whether Mumuni's LIVE config currently complies is a separate operational question.
| Setting | Value | Notes |
|---------|-------|-------|
| `model.default` | `syslog-auto` | Balanced default (pool router) |
| `model.provider` | `custom:litellm` | LiteLLM on CT116 |
| `compression.model` | `syslog-auto` | Rule 7: auto-routing, prevents Strix Halo overload |
| `aux.compression.model` | `syslog-auto` | Must match `compression.model` (Rule 7) |
| `aux.vision.model` | `gpu-vision` | Vision tasks (RTX 5070) |
| `aux.web_extract.model` | `gpu-vision` | Web extraction |
| `delegation.model` | `gpu-dense` | Sub-agent reasoning (RTX 3090) |
| `context.max_context_window` | 131072 (128K) | Conservative `syslog-auto` pool floor (NVIDIA hosts 128K; Strix Halo 256K) |
| `compression.threshold` | 0.65 | Rule 9: triggers at ~85K for a 128K window |
| `compression.target_ratio` | 0.3 | Compresses to ~38K |
| `compression.protect_last_n` | 40 | Preserves last 40 messages |
| `memory.memory_char_limit` | 800 | Brief memory entries |
| `personalities` | `creative` | Creative assistant personality |
| Platforms | cli, homeassistant, signal, telegram, zulip | All Hermes platforms |
### Agent Update Status (2026-07-15)
| Agent | Host | Status |
|-------|------|--------|
| **Mumuni** | CT105 (.14) | ✅ Updated to stable aliases |
| **Tanko** | CT112 (.122) | ✅ Updated to stable aliases |
| **Koby** | CT111 (.129) | ❌ SSH unreachable — needs Zulip DM |
| **Koonimo** | CT113 | ❌ SSH unreachable — needs Zulip DM |
| **Kagenz0** | CT105 | ❌ SSH unreachable — needs Zulip DM |
All Hermes clients MUST set `max_tokens: 4096` — first line of defense before server-side `-n 8192` cap.
+25 -99
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
kind: responsibility kind: responsibility
name: gpu-monitor name: gpu-monitor
description: > description: >
Comprehensive GPU fleet monitor — polls every subsystem (sidecars, Comprehensive GPU fleet monitor — polls every subsystem (sidecars, router,
LiteLLM, Strix Halo, dashboard) every 15s, renders a live HTML dashboard, LiteLLM, Strix Halo, dashboard) every 15s, renders a live HTML dashboard,
checks alert thresholds, and exposes a JSON API for downstream consumers. checks alert thresholds, and exposes a JSON API for downstream consumers.
agent: abiba agent: abiba
@@ -27,38 +27,27 @@ agent: abiba
┌──────┐ ┌──────┐ ┌────────┐ ┌──────┐ ┌──────┐ ┌────────┐
│.8:8080│ │.110 │ │.116:80 │ │.8:8080│ │.110 │ │.116:80 │
│RTX3090│ │:8080 │ │nginx │ │RTX3090│ │:8080 │ │nginx │
│qwen │ │RTX5070│ │router │ │gemma │ │RTX5070│ │router │
└──────┘ │vision │ │LiteLLM │ └──────┘ │qwen27B│ │LiteLLM │
└──────┘ │dashboard│ └──────┘ │dashboard│
└────────┘ └────────┘
```
Note: JSON sidecar exporters at :8090 were never deployed on any Note: JSON sidecar exporters at :8090 were never deployed on any
GPU host. Router falls back to GPU /health direct probe. Monitor GPU host. Router falls back to GPU /health direct probe. Monitor
should use router /health/unified as source of truth for GPU status. should use router /health/unified as source of truth for GPU status.
Strix Halo :8080 is firewalled to .116 only — monitor on .24 cannot Strix Halo :8080 is firewalled to .116 only — monitor on .24 cannot
poll .15:8080 directly; must go through router on .116. poll .15:8080 directly; must go through router on .116.
```
**PORT RULE (verified 2026-09-10):** GPU per-host health lives on **:8080**
(`http://<gpu-host>:8080/health`); Prometheus GPU exporters live on **:9400**.
There is NO listener on bare port 80 for any GPU host — `http://192.168.68.8/health`
and `http://192.168.68.110/health` answer `000`. Never use a bare-port-80 probe
as a GPU liveness signal: on 2026-09-09 that produced three false
`DEGRADED — GPU-rtx3090 000, GPU-rtx5070 000` rounds while
`http://192.168.68.8:8080/health` and `http://192.168.68.110:8080/health`
answered `200`. Port 80 is valid only on the harness host (.116), never on a GPU host.
### Subsystems Polled ### Subsystems Polled
| Subsystem | Endpoint | Frequency | Metrics | | Subsystem | Endpoint | Frequency | Metrics |
|-----------|----------|-----------|---------| |-----------|----------|-----------|---------|
| GPU Status (all, via fleet API) | `http://192.168.68.116/gpu/gpu-data` | 15s | models, CB, scores, GPU status from gpu-monitor on .24:9100 | | GPU Status (all, via router) | `http://192.168.68.116/health/unified` | 15s | models, CB, scores, GPU status (router probes each GPU /health directly) |
| GPU .8 (RTX 3090) health | `http://192.168.68.8:8080/health` | 15s | direct liveness fallback — **:8080 ONLY, never bare port 80** | | Router (unified) | `http://192.168.68.116/health/unified` | 15s | models, CB, scores, GPU status |
| GPU .110 (RTX 5070) health | `http://192.168.68.110:8080/health` | 15s | direct liveness fallback — **:8080 ONLY, never bare port 80** | | Router (basic) | `http://192.168.68.116/health` | 15s | basic aliveness |
| Fleet (unified) | `http://192.168.68.116/health/unified` | 15s | nginx `301` → `/gpu/gpu-data` served by gpu-monitor = alive (router decommissioned 2026-09-11) |
| Harness (basic) | `http://192.168.68.116/health` | 15s | nginx → LiteLLM `/health/liveliness` |
| LiteLLM | `http://192.168.68.116/litellm/health` | 15s | proxy health, model count | | LiteLLM | `http://192.168.68.116/litellm/health` | 15s | proxy health, model count |
| Strix Halo | `http://192.168.68.116/health/unified` (nginx → fleet API) | 15s | Strix Halo status via gpu-monitor — cannot poll .15:8080 directly (firewalled to .116 only) | | Strix Halo | `http://192.168.68.116/health/unified` (router) | 15s | ornith status via router — cannot poll .15:8080 directly (firewalled to .116 only) |
| Dashboard | `http://192.168.68.116/dashboard/` | 15s | harness-dashboard aliveness | | Dashboard | `http://192.168.68.116/dashboard/` | 15s | harness-dashboard aliveness |
### Alert Delivery ### Alert Delivery
@@ -72,28 +61,12 @@ This replaces the previous DM-only delivery. All agents on the mesh can see and
## Alert Thresholds ## Alert Thresholds
### Liveness rule (scoped)
The any-HTTP-response rule applies ONLY to redirect/auth-gated liveness
endpoints, where any HTTP answer proves a listener is up. Applied here: nginx's
`/health/unified` answers `301 Moved Permanently` → `/gpu/gpu-data`
(the same payload) and LiteLLM's `/litellm/health` answers `301` →
`/litellm/health/liveliness`. For those endpoints a probe is **ALIVE** on
**ANY** HTTP status — `3xx` redirects and `401`/`403` auth challenges included —
and **DOWN = connection refused (`000`) or timeout only**. Same scoped rule as
zulip-health (Tanko) and infrastructure-monitoring.
Probes whose success condition is specifically a bare `200` are NOT covered by
the any-HTTP rule. On those — the GPU `:8080/health` endpoints, nginx `/health`,
and the dashboard — an unexpected status (`401`/`403`, `5xx`, or
anything other than the expected `200`) is an **ALERT**, not "alive".
| Metric | Warning | Critical | | Metric | Warning | Critical |
|--------|---------|----------| |--------|---------|----------|
| GPU Temp | >80°C | >90°C | | GPU Temp | >80°C | >90°C |
| VRAM Usage | >90% | >95% | | VRAM Usage | >90% | >95% |
| GPU Util | >95% | >98% | | GPU Util | >95% | >98% |
| Sidecar Unreachable | — | info (sidecars not deployed — use gpu-monitor /gpu-data) | | Sidecar Unreachable | — | info (sidecars not deployed — use router /health/unified) |
| Model Down | — | critical (circuit breaker open) | | Model Down | — | critical (circuit breaker open) |
### JSON API Response Schema (/gpu-data) ### JSON API Response Schema (/gpu-data)
@@ -124,47 +97,7 @@ anything other than the expected `200`) is an **ALERT**, not "alive".
`curl http://localhost:9100/gpu-data | jq` — Full fleet status `curl http://localhost:9100/gpu-data | jq` — Full fleet status
### check-health ### check-health
`curl http://localhost:9100/health` — Monitor self-check
**RUN LIVE, NEVER ECHO — every dispatch must execute the probes below with real tool calls; never repeat a prior report unless a live probe fails.**
```bash
# Provenance — run first; paste the absolute path into the report
pwd -P
# GPU Monitor health
curl http://localhost:9100/health | jq
# Expected: 200 with {"status": "healthy", "cache_age_seconds": <n>}
# GPU host health — DIRECT on :8080. NEVER probe bare port 80 on a GPU host:
# http://192.168.68.8/health has no listener and returns 000 → false DEGRADED.
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://192.168.68.8:8080/health
# Expected: 200 (bare-200 probe: any other status is an alert; 000/timeout = DOWN)
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://192.168.68.110:8080/health
# Expected: 200 (bare-200 probe: any other status is an alert; 000/timeout = DOWN)
# Router unified health (source of truth; 301 → /gpu/gpu-data is HEALTHY)
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://192.168.68.116/health/unified
# Expected: 301 (or 200 after following the redirect) — any HTTP status = alive
# Router basic health (via nginx on port 80 — router .116 only, never a GPU host)
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://192.168.68.116/health
# Expected: 200 (bare-200 probe: any other status is an alert; 000/timeout = DOWN)
# LiteLLM health (via nginx on port 80)
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://192.168.68.116/litellm/health
# Expected: 301 → /litellm/health/liveliness (200 after redirect) — any HTTP status = alive
# Dashboard
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://192.168.68.116/dashboard/
# Expected: 200 (bare-200 probe: any other status is an alert; 000/timeout = DOWN)
```
**Report format**: Begin every report with the **absolute path the probe executed
from** (`pwd -P`, or the monitor script's absolute path) so a stale-consumer
report is distinguishable from a real fault at read time. Summarize actual
results from each probe. Apply the scoped liveness rule above: on auth-gated
endpoints only connection-refused (`000`) or timeout is DOWN; on bare-200 probes
any other status is an alert. Never probe a GPU host on bare port 80.
### view-dashboard ### view-dashboard
Open `http://localhost:9100/` in browser — Live HTML dashboard Open `http://localhost:9100/` in browser — Live HTML dashboard
@@ -174,14 +107,12 @@ Open `http://localhost:9100/` in browser — Live HTML dashboard
pkill -f gpu-monitor-server.py pkill -f gpu-monitor-server.py
python3 /root/scripts/gpu-monitor-server.py & python3 /root/scripts/gpu-monitor-server.py &
``` ```
Managed by systemd (verified 2026-09-11): `systemctl restart gpu-monitor` Or via PM2: `pm2 restart gpu-monitor`
### check-fleet ### check-router
Fleet health is accessed through nginx on port 80 on the harness host The router health is accessed through nginx on port 80 (NOT port 9000 directly).
(.116) — NOT port 9000 (router decommissioned 2026-09-11), and NOT bare `curl http://192.168.68.116/health/unified` — Router unified health via nginx proxy
port 80 on a GPU host. `curl http://192.168.68.116:9000/health/unified` — ❌ WILL FAIL (port bound to 127.0.0.1 only)
`curl http://192.168.68.116/health/unified` — nginx answers `301` → `/gpu/gpu-data` (fleet monitor payload) = alive
`curl http://192.168.68.8/health` — ❌ NEVER USE (GPU host, no port-80 listener → false `000`/DEGRADED)
## Configuration Files ## Configuration Files
@@ -193,18 +124,13 @@ port 80 on a GPU host.
## Execution ## Execution
**Port discipline:** probe GPU hosts on `:8080` (or the router's 1. **Poll router** (every 15s): GET .116/health/unified — single source of truth for all GPU status (router probes each GPU /health directly via sidecar fallback)
`/health/unified`); probe port 80 only on the router (.116). Never bare port 80 2. **Poll router** (every 15s): GET .116/health via nginx:80
on a GPU host. 3. **Poll LiteLLM** (every 15s): GET .116/litellm/health via nginx:80
4. **Poll Strix** (every 15s): via router /health/unified (cannot poll .15:8080 directly — firewalled to .116 only)
1. **Poll router** (every 15s): GET .116/health/unified — single source of truth for all GPU status (router probes each GPU /health directly via sidecar fallback). `301` → `/gpu/gpu-data` counts as alive. 5. **Poll dashboard** (every 15s): GET .116/dashboard/
2. **Fallback direct GPU probe** (only if router /health/unified is DOWN): GET `http://192.168.68.8:8080/health` and `http://192.168.68.110:8080/health` — **:8080 only, never bare port 80**. 6. **Check alerts**: Compare metrics against thresholds
3. **Poll router** (every 15s): GET .116/health via nginx:80 7. **Compute summary**: Fleet-wide health aggregation
4. **Poll LiteLLM** (every 15s): GET .116/litellm/health via nginx:80 8. **Render dashboard**: Generate HTML at /root/dashboard/gpu-fleet.html
5. **Poll Strix** (every 15s): via router /health/unified (cannot poll .15:8080 directly — firewalled to .116 only) 9. **Serve API**: HTTP server on port 9100
6. **Poll dashboard** (every 15s): GET .116/dashboard/ 10. **Repeat** every 15 seconds
7. **Check alerts**: Compare metrics against thresholds
8. **Compute summary**: Fleet-wide health aggregation
9. **Render dashboard**: Generate HTML at /root/dashboard/gpu-fleet.html
10. **Serve API**: HTTP server on port 9100
11. **Repeat** every 15 seconds
-317
View File
@@ -1,317 +0,0 @@
---
report_only_agents:
- koby # ⛔ KOBY IS NEVER REPAIRED (Rule 17, 2026-08-17) — detect + report, never fix on .129
kind: responsibility
name: gpu-self-heal
description: >
GPU fleet self-healing — detects anomalies, applies remediation, tracks
benchmarks, and predicts failures before they happen. Extends gpu-monitor
(v2.1.0) with active remediation rules, Prometheus metrics consumption,
VRAM trend analysis, and predictive alerting.
UPDATED 2026-07-18: Model assignments synced to 2026-07-17 swaps.
Router (port 9000) DECOMMISSIONED 2026-09-11; references replaced with direct GPU routing.
Benchmark baselines refreshed to live values.
Prometheus exporters removed — not deployed; fall back to direct sidecar probes.
Stable role-based aliases (strix-moe, gpu-dense, gpu-vision) from gpu-fleet.
agent: abiba
depends_on:
- gpu-monitor.prose.md (live data source on .24:9100)
- gpu-fleet.prose.md (source of truth for topology, aliases, model assignments)
---
---
## Maintains
- gpu-health: { status: "healthy"|"degraded"|"down", issues: array, actions: array }
- gpu-self-heal-log: array of { timestamp, gpu, issue, action, result } — audit trail
- benchmark-regression: { gpu, baseline_tok_sec, current_tok_sec, trend, alerts }
- vram-trend: { gpu, current_mb, rate_mb_per_hour, projected_full_in_hours }
- circuit-breaker-status: { gpu, open, auto_reset_attempted, last_reset }
## Requires
- gpu-monitor:function — Live fleet data from localhost:9100/gpu-data
- Direct sidecar probe access to all GPU hosts (:8080/health)
- SSH access to GPU hosts for restart operations
## Continuity
- Self-driven: check every 60 seconds against GPU monitor data
- Also wakes on gpu-fleet health degradation
- On fix: verify with benchmark inference test before declaring resolved
- Escalate: after 3 failed remediation attempts → Zulip #agent-hub alert
---
---
## Current Fleet Baseline (2026-07-18)
| Alias | GPU | Host | Model | VRAM | Ctx | tok/s | Role |
|-------|-----|------|-------|------|-----|-------|------|
| `strix-moe` | Strix Halo 64GB | ct15 (.15:8080) | Carnice-Qwen3.6-MoE-35B-A3B-Q4_K_M.gguf | ~10/64GB (16%) | 256K | 62.9 | Compression, summarization, long docs |
Key notes:
- All models use direct GPU routing via LiteLLM (`api_key: not-needed`). Router (port 9000) was decommissioned 2026-09-11 and is NOT in the inference path.
- Stable aliases (gpu-dense, gpu-vision, strix-moe) from gpu-fleet are the canonical names for agent configs — use these, not model-specific names. The retired names `gpu-light` and `gemma-4-12b` were superseded by `gpu-vision` on 2026-09-12 and no longer resolve (400 `Invalid model name`).
- The RTX 5070 is the fastest endpoint per token — `gpu-vision` is its canonical alias. Route vision/web/light work there first. The RTX 5070 model is multimodal (image+text).
- Strix Halo is 62.9 tok/s (89% of 70.5 baseline) — below optimal but stable. Check for competing workloads.
- RTX 3090 VRAM at 88% — within role-appropriate range (role = heavy reasoning, needs the headroom).
- RTX 5070 VRAM at 83% — role-appropriate for vision/web (smaller batch sizes).
## Remediation Rules
### Rule 1: GPU Temperature Critical (>85°C for >2 min)
- **Detect**: Any GPU temp >85°C sustained for 2+ consecutive polls
- **Fix**:
1. Reduce inference concurrency on that GPU (load-side cooling only — NO fan control)
2. Redirect new requests to cooler GPUs via LiteLLM fallback chains (gpu-vision → gpu-dense, gpu-dense → gpu-vision)
3. If all GPUs hot, alert about cooling infrastructure
- **Verify**: Temp drops below 80°C within 5 minutes
- **Escalate after**: 3 verification failures → Zulip alert
### Rule 2: VRAM Leak Detection (tiered by GPU capacity)
- **Detect**: VRAM growing at sustained rate over 6+ hour window
- RTX 3090 (24GB): ≥300MB/hour
- RTX 5070 (12GB): ≥300MB/hour
- Strix Halo (64GB UMA): ≥200MB/hour
- **Fix**:
1. Log VRAM snapshot with process list (nvidia-smi/rocm-smi + ps aux)
2. If llama-server is the growth source → restart with memory cap flag
3. If unknown process → kill and alert
- **Verify**: VRAM growth rate drops below threshold
- **Escalate after**: persistent leak after restart → hardware investigation
### Rule 3: Model Inference Timeout / GPU Stuck
- **Detect**: >50% failure rate over 60s window + 30s grace period (not just single stuck request)
- **Fix**:
1. Restart llama-server on affected GPU host
2. Wait 15s for model to reload
3. Run benchmark inference test
- **Verify**: Model returns 200 with <30s response, failure rate drops to 0%
- **Escalate after**: 3 restarts in 1 hour → GPU hardware check
### Rule 4: Benchmark Regression (>20% drop)
- **Detect**: gen_tok_per_sec drops >20% below baseline over 3+ benchmarks
- RTX 3090 baseline: 74.8 tok/s → alert at <59.8 tok/s
- RTX 5070 baseline: 165.2 tok/s → alert at <132.2 tok/s
- Strix Halo baseline: 70.5 tok/s → alert at <56.4 tok/s
- **Fix**:
1. Check GPU utilization — if >90%, other process is competing
2. Check power limit — if throttled, restore to max
3. Check thermal — if hot, apply Rule 1
- **Verify**: Benchmark returns to within 10% of baseline
- **Escalate after**: persistent regression → possible hardware degradation
### Rule 5: Circuit Breaker Stuck Open
- **Detect**: Circuit breaker open >10 minutes with GPU reporting healthy
- **Note**: Router (port 9000) was decommissioned 2026-09-11. If circuit breakers are reported by gpu-monitor, they come from LiteLLM's internal tracking, not the old router.
- **Fix**:
1. Verify GPU /health returns 200 on direct port (:8080)
2. If GPU healthy, alert but do NOT reset via router API (decommissioned 2026-09-11)
3. Check LiteLLM health directly: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/health/liveliness
4. Restart LiteLLM container on CT 116 if circuit breakers are stuck
- **Verify**: LiteLLM returns healthy, circuit breaker clears within 60s
- **Escalate after**: LiteLLM restart doesn't clear → human investigation
### Rule 6: Strix Halo Unreachable
- **Detect**: Strix not responding — probe .15:8080 directly (firewall opened .24→.15)
- **Fix**:
1. SSH to .15 → check llama-server process
2. Restart llama-server if not running
3. Verify through both direct probe AND LiteLLM health
- **Verify**: Direct health probe returns 200, LiteLLM reports model healthy
- **Escalate**: If host .15 itself is unreachable → infrastructure alert
### Rule 7: GPU Data Source Unreachable (replaces old Prometheus rule)
- **Detect**: gpu-monitor endpoint (localhost:9100/gpu-data) or sidecar port (:8080) on any GPU unreachable for >2 polls
- **Fix**:
1. If gpu-monitor is down: restart systemd service `gpu-monitor.service` on this host
2. If sidecar is down: SSH to GPU host → check llama-server process → restart systemd service
3. Fall back to direct nvidia-smi/rocm-smi probe via SSH if all API paths fail
- **Verify**: gpu-monitor returns healthy + all sidecars reachable
- **Escalate after**: 3 failed restarts → networking issue
### Rule 8: Predictive Thermal Warning (two-tier)
- **Detect**:
- Tier 1 (warning): temp >70°C AND rising >2°C/min → reduce concurrency, no alert
- Tier 2 (critical): temp >80°C AND still rising → full alert + aggressive load shedding
- **Fix**:
- Tier 1: silently reduce parallel requests to that GPU by 50%
- Tier 2: redirect all new requests away, alert #agent-hub, apply Rule 1 logic
- **Verify**: Temp rise rate drops below 1°C/min (Tier 1) or temp drops below 80°C (Tier 2)
- **Escalate**: If Tier 2 triggers and temp still rising after 5 min → possible hardware failure
### Rule 9: Context Window Optimization
- **Detect**: Benchmark tok/s vs baseline for each GPU at its current context
- RTX 3090 (128K ctx, ThinkingCap): baseline 74.8 tok/s — currently at 74.9 (100%)
- RTX 5070 (128K ctx, HauhauCS QAT): baseline 165.2 tok/s — currently at 169.6 (103%)
- Strix Halo (256K ctx, Carnice-Qwen3.6-MoE-35B-A3B-Q4_K_M.gguf): baseline 70.5 tok/s — currently at 62.9 (89%)
- **Fix**:
- If tok/s > baseline → context has headroom, consider increasing
- If tok/s < 90% baseline → reduce context by 25% and retest
- If tok/s within 10% of baseline → optimal, no change
- Strix Halo at 89% of baseline → MONITOR but do not reduce yet (recent model swap may still be settling)
- **Verify**: Re-benchmark after context change, confirm within 10% of target
- **Escalate**: If context can't be adjusted without significant perf loss
### Rule 10: Workload Distribution Optimization (updated 2026-07-18)
- **Detect**: GPU roles misaligned with hardware capabilities
- **Target distribution**:
- RTX 3090 (gpu-dense, 24GB, 74.9 tok/s) → Heavy reasoning, code gen, long conversations (slowest per-token but largest context capacity).
- RTX 5070 (gpu-vision, 12GB, ~145 tok/s) → Vision (image+text), web search, lightweight tasks.
- Strix Halo (strix-moe, 64GB, 62.9 tok/s) → Context compression, summarization, long docs (MoE model).
- **Note**: RTX 5070 is the fastest endpoint per token. Route high-volume, low-complexity work there first.
- **Weights are not restated here** — the live `syslog-auto` pool weights and rpm caps live in CT 116 `/opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml`, the single source of truth.
- **Fix**:
- Alert if any GPU is handling workload outside its designated role
- Recommend agent alias updates to match workload to GPU role (use stable aliases: gpu-dense, gpu-vision, strix-moe)
- Track per-GPU request distribution via LiteLLM spend logs
- **Verify**: Each GPU's request pattern matches its designated role within 24h
- **Escalate**: If role mismatch persists >48h → agent alias audit needed
---
---
## Execution
```prose
-- Phase 1: Fetch live GPU data
let fleet = call gpu-monitor
endpoint: "http://localhost:9100/gpu-data"
-- Phase 2: Evaluate each GPU against remediation rules
let actions = []
for gpu in fleet.gpus:
-- Rule 1: Thermal critical
if gpu.temp_c > 85 and sustained_for(gpu, 120):
push actions apply-thermal-fix(gpu)
-- Rule 2: VRAM leak
let vram_rate = calculate-vram-trend(gpu, hours=6)
if vram_rate > 50:
push actions apply-vram-fix(gpu, vram_rate)
-- Rule 4: Benchmark regression
let bench = fleet.benchmarks[gpu.hostname]
if bench.current_tok_s < bench.baseline_tok_s * 0.8:
push actions apply-benchmark-fix(gpu, bench)
-- Rule 3: Model stuck
for model in fleet.summary.available_models:
if model.consecutive_timeouts >= 3:
push actions apply-model-restart(model)
-- Rule 5: Circuit breaker check via LiteLLM (router deprecated)
if fleet.summary.circuit_breakers_open > 0:
push actions check-litellm-circuit-breakers()
-- Rule 6: Strix Halo
if not fleet.strix.running and pingable("192.168.68.15"):
push actions apply-strix-restart()
-- Rule 7: GPU data source
if not fleet.gpus or len(fleet.gpus) < 2:
push actions check-gpu-monitor-service()
-- Rule 8: Predictive thermal
for gpu in fleet.gpus:
let rise_rate = calculate-temp-rise(gpu, minutes=5)
if rise_rate > 2.0 and gpu.temp_c < 80:
push actions apply-proactive-cooling(gpu)
-- Phase 3: Execute actions, verify, log
for action in actions:
let result = execute-with-verify(action)
log-to-kg(action, result)
if result.failed:
escalate-if-needed(action)
-- Phase 4: Update health state
call update-gpu-health
gpus: fleet.gpus
actions: actions
status: derive-overall-status(fleet, actions)
-- Wait 60s and repeat
```
## Audit Trail Format
```json
{
"run_id": "gpu-self-heal-20260718-001",
"timestamp": "2026-07-18T08:00:00Z",
"gpu": "ct8-rtx3090",
"issue": "thermal-critical",
"detected": { "temp_c": 87, "duration_s": 180 },
"action": "load-shedding",
"result": "resolved",
"verification": { "temp_c": 76, "after_s": 300 },
"escalated": false
}
```
---
---
## Reporting
### 1. Gitea Log (not knowledge graph — hard rule)
Pushed to `SyslogSolution/health-logs/gpu/{run_id}.json` — versioned, searchable, not in graph.
### 2. Zulip Alerts (#agent-hub → alerts-gpu)
- `issues_fixed > 0` → "🛠 GPU Self-Heal — <gpu> <issue> resolved"
- `issues_escalated > 0` → "⚠ GPU Self-Heal — <gpu> needs attention"
- Every 100th clean cycle → "✅ GPU Fleet: All Clear"
### 3. Weekly Benchmark Report
- Per-GPU tok/s trend over 7 days
- Regression alerts if any GPU degrades >10% week-over-week
---
---
## Design Decisions (Verified 2026-07-12, Reaffirmed 2026-07-18)
1. **Fan control**: ❌ NO auto fan control. Load-side cooling only (reduce concurrency, redirect).
2. **Model restart**: ✅ Only if >50% failure rate over 60s + 30s grace period. Not on single stuck request.
3. **Strix direct access**: ✅ Open firewall .15:8080 → .24 for direct health probe + restart.
4. **VRAM thresholds**: Tiered — **300MB/h** (RTX 3090), **300MB/h** (RTX 5070), 200MB/h (Strix). Previous values (100/50) were too sensitive; raised 2026-07-18 based on operational data.
5. **CB auto-reset**: ✅ Router decommissioned 2026-09-11 — circuit breakers go through LiteLLM health check + container restart if needed. No per-GPU auto-reset.
6. **Benchmark baseline**: Rolling 30-day average, recalculated weekly. Current baselines live in gpu-monitor.
7. **Predictive alerts**: Two-tier — warn at >70°C+rising (>2°C/min), critical at >80°C+rising.
8. **Prometheus**: ❌ Not deployed. Use direct sidecar probes (:8080/health) and gpu-monitor API. Prometheus integration deferred until exporters are running on GPU hosts.
## Lessons Learned (2026-07-12, Updated 2026-07-18)
### L1: API Key Standardization Is Critical
- All GPU llama-servers MUST use the same api-key as the LiteLLM config.
- RTX 5070 had `--api-key sk-loc...5678` while LiteLLM sent `not-needed`.
This caused cascading 401 → fallback → timeout → 401 loops.
- **Rule**: Any new GPU or model restart MUST verify api-key matches LiteLLM config (`not-needed` for direct routing).
### L2: Fallback Chain Cascading Failures
- When one model returns 401 (auth) and another is slow (timeout), the fallback
chain creates an infinite loop.
- **Rule**: If a model returns 401 (auth error), do NOT fall back to it again.
Mark it as permanently failed for this request.
### L3: Verify Running State, Not Docs
- RTX 3090 was documented at 128K context. Running at 128K (verified 2026-07-18).
- Parallel count: 1 on both RTX 3090 and RTX 5070 (matches docs for current models).
- **Rule**: Before making decisions, check `/proc/PID/cmdline` on GPU hosts.
### L4: Infisical Is Not Always Available
- Keep a local `.env` fallback for `LITELLM_API_KEY`.
- **Rule**: Always verify credential source is reachable before relying on it.
### L5: GPU Monitor Response Size Can Cause Self-Heal Crash
- gpu-self-heal crashed with KeyboardInterrupt during json.loads() of 20MB response.
- Root cause: router poll returns accumulated data → cache balloons.
- **Rule**: Self-heal must enforce a read timeout AND max response size on every poll.
If monitor response > 1MB, log a warning and skip the cycle rather than crashing.
### L6: Stable Aliases Replace Model Names
- gpu-fleet introduced stable aliases (strix-moe, gpu-dense, gpu-light) on 2026-07-15; `gpu-light` was superseded by `gpu-vision` on 2026-09-12.
- Self-heal must use aliases for reporting and alerting, not model-specific names.
- **Rule**: All alert messages and KG nodes use the stable alias as the GPU identifier.
+36 -101
View File
@@ -5,30 +5,12 @@ version: 1.0.0
description: > description: >
Canonical known-good baseline for all Syslog Hermes agents. Captures the exact Canonical known-good baseline for all Syslog Hermes agents. Captures the exact
configuration state, keys, workarounds, and audit procedure. When an agent's configuration state, keys, workarounds, and audit procedure. When an agent's
configuration goes sideways, restore from this baseline. Last verified 2026-07-16. RTX 3090/5070 at 128K (reduced from 256K for stability Jul 2026); Strix Halo at 256K (2026-09-12) (RTX 3090 .8, RTX 5070 .110, Strix Halo .15). Parallel 1 fleet-wide (Strix Halo handles compression solo). configuration goes sideways, restore from this baseline. Last verified 2026-07-08. GPU context reduced to 128K on .8/.110, parallel 2 fleet-wide.
author: Abiba (pi agent) author: Abiba (pi agent)
--- ---
# Hermes Agent Baseline — Canonical Good State # Hermes Agent Baseline — Canonical Good State
## Reachability Detection
Before checking agent baseline, verify the host is reachable and can be audited. Use the shared reachability helper from the clone root:
```bash
# Run on each host to check reachability (Tanko, Mumuni, Koonimo, Koby)
scripts/hermes-reachability-check.sh <host> "api_key:" "/root/.hermes/config.yaml"
# Example: scripts/hermes-reachability-check.sh 192.168.68.122 "api_key:" "/root/.hermes/config.yaml"
# Expected outcomes:
# - UNREACHABLE: SSH connection failed (host is down)
# - VIOLATION: SSH succeeded and found matches (report the finding)
# - COMPLIANT: SSH succeeded and found no matches (no api_key in config)
#
# NOTE: The bug this replaces was deriving reachability from the remote grep's exit code.
# The correct pattern: remote side always succeeds (grep ...; true), so ssh status = connection only.
```
## Quick Restore ## Quick Restore
```bash ```bash
@@ -40,40 +22,32 @@ done
## Agent Map ## Agent Map
| Agent | CT | Node | IP | LiteLLM Alias | Key Source | Platform | | Agent | CT | Node | IP | LiteLLM Key | LiteLLM Alias | Platform |
|-------|-----|------|-----|---------------|------------|----------| |-------|-----|------|-----|-------------|---------------|----------|
| Koby | 111 | storepve | .129 | `koby` | Infisical vault | **Hermes** | | Tanko | 112 | amdpve | .122 | `sk-CggiHWlamQyShxWC3Hx6uw` | `tanko` | Hermes |
| Koonimo | 113 | amdpve | .114 | `koonimo` | Infisical vault | Hermes | | Mumuni | 114 | minipve | .123 | `sk-VrqCNlwUgzoNGOpikJ7nwQ` | `mumuni` | Hermes |
| Shumba | — | 192.168.68.119 | N/A | N/A (DeepSeek) | Hermes (RETIRED — CT119 now Infisical vault) | | Tdunna | 111 | amdpve | srv1079750 | `sk-Qvzi4uYQBhlSK_XstEhcyQ` | `tdunna` | **pi** |
| Baggy | 113 | amdpve | ? | `sk-krnw_zGBwvvL5b7l2t-s-A` | `baggy` | Hermes |
> **Note**: CT hostnames (tdunna→CT111, baggy→CT113) differ from agent identities (koby, koonimo).
> CT 111 (tdunna, 192.168.68.129, storepve) is report-only — Theo's box; alert only, never garbage-collect.
Access: `pct-run <CT_ID> <command>` — no IPs needed. GPU hosts (.8, .110, .15) use SSH. Access: `pct-run <CT_ID> <command>` — no IPs needed. GPU hosts (.8, .110, .15) use SSH.
Keys are stored in Infisical vault (project=agents, env=production) and injected at
runtime via `infisical run --` wrapper. Plaintext keys removed from this baseline.
## Key Architecture ## Key Architecture
``` ```
Infisical vault → infisical run -- hermes gateway → LITELLM_API_KEY (runtime) Agent (systemd) → LITELLM_API_KEY → LiteLLM (:116/v1) → Router (:9000) → GPU (llama-server)
↓ └── Key DB (Postgres)
Agent (systemd) → LITELLM_API_KEY → LiteLLM (:116/v1) → GPU (llama-server)
└── Key DB (Postgres)
``` ```
- **Master key**: stored in Infisical vault (project=infrastructure, secret=LITELLM_MASTER_KEY) — ADMIN ONLY - **Master key**: `sk-litellm-7f96080dd99b15c36bd4b333b58a6796` — ADMIN ONLY, never in agent configs
- **Agent keys**: Each agent has a dedicated key in LiteLLM's database with alias matching the agent name - **Agent keys**: Each agent has a dedicated key in LiteLLM's database with alias matching the agent name
- **Key injection**: `infisical run --project=agents --env=production -- hermes gateway run` injects `LITELLM_API_KEY` at runtime - **Key source**: `/etc/environment` → `LITELLM_API_KEY=sk-...` (systemd service sources this)
- **Key source**: Infisical vault → runtime env var. /etc/environment is CLEAN (stripped, tagged `# [INFISICAL]`) - **Override**: `/home/jerome/.config/systemd/user/hermes-gateway.service.d/env.conf` (if present, must match)
- **Legacy override** (pre-migration): `/home/jerome/.config/systemd/user/hermes-gateway.service.d/env.conf` — should be REMOVED
## Config Pattern — Mandatory Fields ## Config Pattern — Mandatory Fields
### For Hermes Agents (Mumuni, Koonimo) ### For Hermes Agents (Tanko, Mumuni, Baggy)
Every Hermes agent's `/root/.hermes/config.yaml` (or `/home/jerome/.hermes/config.yaml`) MUST have: Every agent's `/root/.hermes/config.yaml` (or `/home/jerome/.hermes/config.yaml`) MUST have:
(Tanko is excluded — migrated to DSH/DeepSeek Harness on 2026-08-27, no longer uses Hermes config.)
### 1. Main Model ### 1. Main Model
```yaml ```yaml
@@ -89,7 +63,7 @@ model:
custom_providers: custom_providers:
- name: harness - name: harness
model: syslog-auto model: syslog-auto
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1 base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1
api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
api_mode: chat_completions api_mode: chat_completions
``` ```
@@ -99,10 +73,10 @@ custom_providers:
auxiliary: auxiliary:
vision: vision:
provider: harness provider: harness
model: gpu-vision # RTX 5070 stable alias (Rule 8; do not use syslog-auto for aux) model: gemma-4-12b # or syslog-auto
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1 base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1
api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
api_key: <value from: infisical secrets get LITELLM_API_KEY --project=agents --env=production> # ← MANDATORY workaround api_key: <ACTUAL_KEY_FROM_/etc/environment> # ← MANDATORY workaround
timeout: 60 timeout: 60
download_timeout: 30 download_timeout: 30
``` ```
@@ -114,33 +88,13 @@ auxiliary:
threshold: 0.65 threshold: 0.65
target_ratio: 0.3 target_ratio: 0.3
provider: harness provider: harness
model: syslog-auto # Rule 7: compression must be syslog-auto model: syslog-auto # or gemma-4-12b
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1 base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1
api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
api_key: <value from: infisical secrets get LITELLM_API_KEY --project=agents --env=production> # ← MANDATORY workaround api_key: <ACTUAL_KEY_FROM_/etc/environment> # ← MANDATORY workaround
timeout: 120 timeout: 120
``` ```
## Violation Classification
When reporting findings, separate POLICY observations from FAULT findings:
### POLICY (observation only, not a fault)
- Agent uses a non-internal-harness provider (e.g., direct DeepSeek, Tencent, OpenRouter)
- Config text has a field that looks unusual but the agent's calls are succeeding
- Example: "POLICY: Koonimo uses deepseek directly; calls succeeding in last hour"
### FAULT (requires request-level evidence)
- Agent's calls are failing with auth errors (401/403 in logs)
- Agent's config has no valid API key AND calls are failing
- Example: "FAULT: Koby's LiteLLM key expired; 401 observed at 2026-09-14 11:42:00"
### Rules
1. Do NOT infer the runtime's credential resolution from config text alone.
2. Require request-level evidence before calling something a FAULT: an observed auth failure in the agent's log, or the absence of successful calls in the window.
3. If calls are succeeding, the correct output is "POLICY: uses <provider> directly; calls succeeding" - not a violation.
4. State what you OBSERVED, not what the field implies.
## Known Bug: `api_key_env` Ignored by Auxiliary Client ## Known Bug: `api_key_env` Ignored by Auxiliary Client
**Bug location**: `agent/auxiliary_client.py` → `_resolve_task_provider_model()` (line ~5478) **Bug location**: `agent/auxiliary_client.py` → `_resolve_task_provider_model()` (line ~5478)
@@ -156,7 +110,8 @@ LiteLLM/harness will fail with:
401: LiteLLM Virtual Key expected. Received=no-k****ired, expected to start with 'sk-' 401: LiteLLM Virtual Key expected. Received=no-k****ired, expected to start with 'sk-'
``` ```
**Workaround**: Set `api_key` directly (copy the value from Infisical vault: `infisical secrets get LITELLM_API_KEY --project=agents --env=production`) alongside `api_key_env` in every auxiliary task config that uses the harness provider. **Workaround**: Set `api_key` directly (copy the value from `/etc/environment`) alongside
`api_key_env` in every auxiliary task config that uses the harness provider.
**Permanent fix**: Patch `_resolve_task_provider_model()` to resolve `api_key_env` when **Permanent fix**: Patch `_resolve_task_provider_model()` to resolve `api_key_env` when
`api_key` is empty: `api_key` is empty:
@@ -174,11 +129,7 @@ if not cfg_api_key:
```bash ```bash
for ct in 112 114 111 113; do for ct in 112 114 111 113; do
echo "=== CT $ct ===" echo "=== CT $ct ==="
# Verify /etc/environment is CLEAN (no LITELLM_API_KEY) pct-run $ct grep LITELLM_API_KEY /etc/environment
pct-run $ct "grep -c LITELLM_API_KEY /etc/environment 2>/dev/null || echo '0 (clean)'"
# Verify gateway uses infisical run wrapper
pct-run $ct "ps aux | grep 'infisical run' | grep -v grep"
# Check for hardcoded harness keys
pct-run $ct grep "api_key: sk-" /root/.hermes/config.yaml | grep -v api_key_env pct-run $ct grep "api_key: sk-" /root/.hermes/config.yaml | grep -v api_key_env
echo "" echo ""
done done
@@ -186,17 +137,15 @@ done
### Master Key Leak Check ### Master Key Leak Check
```bash ```bash
# On every agent — must return empty: # On every agent:
pct-run <CT> grep -rl "sk-litellm" /root/ /etc/ 2>/dev/null pct-run <CT> grep -rl "sk-litellm-7f96080dd" /root/ /etc/ 2>/dev/null
# Vault is the only place the master key should exist # Must return empty
``` ```
### Verify Key Works ### Verify Key Works
```bash ```bash
# Retrieve key from vault and test:
KEY=$(infisical secrets get LITELLM_API_KEY --project=agents --env=production --plain)
curl -s http://192.168.68.116:80/v1/models \ curl -s http://192.168.68.116:80/v1/models \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY" | grep syslog-auto -H "Authorization: Bearer <AGENT_KEY>" | grep syslog-auto
# Must return model list # Must return model list
``` ```
@@ -207,38 +156,24 @@ pct-run <CT> grep -A8 "vision:" /root/.hermes/config.yaml | grep api_key
# Must show both api_key: sk-... and api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY # Must show both api_key: sk-... and api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
``` ```
### For Koby (CT 111 / tdunna) — **REPORT-ONLY MODE** ### For pi Agents (Tdunna)
Koby runs Hermes on CT 111 (tdunna). Config files at `/root/.hermes/config.yaml`. Tdunna (CT111) runs pi 0.80.3 via PM2 with the Zulip extension (router-worker architecture).
Same Hermes pattern as Tanko/Mumuni/Koonimo — see config sections above.
**⛔ KOBY IS NEVER REPAIRED (2026-08-17, Captain)**: Diagnostic only — detect and report, never fix on .129.
No heal step, no restart, no key rotation, no config edit, no memory rewrite, no disk GC, no service touch, no process kill — ever.
If a health check shows Koby degraded, **DO NOT** execute any repair action. Instead, report to Zulip and let Theo fix it.
**LiteLLM key**: alias `koby` in LiteLLM DB, injected via `infisical run --` wrapper.
### For pi Agents (Abiba)
Abiba (CT100) runs pi via PM2 with the Zulip extension.
Config files: `~/.pi/agent/models.json`, `~/.pi/agent/settings.json`. Config files: `~/.pi/agent/models.json`, `~/.pi/agent/settings.json`.
**models.json** — Must only list models authorized for the agent's LiteLLM key. **models.json** — Must only list models authorized for the agent's LiteLLM key:
`/v1/models` is key-scoped and the live registry is CT 116
`/opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml`; treat the list below as a snapshot and re-read
the registry before applying. Key is injected via `infisical run --` wrapper at PM2 startup:
```json ```json
{ {
"providers": { "providers": {
"syslog-harness": { "syslog-harness": {
"baseUrl": "http://192.168.68.116/v1", "baseUrl": "http://192.168.68.116/v1",
"api": "openai-completions", "api": "openai-completions",
"apiKey": "${LITELLM_API_KEY}", "apiKey": "sk-...",
"models": [ "models": [
{ "id": "syslog-auto" }, { "id": "syslog-auto" },
{ "id": "strix-moe" }, { "id": "ornith-1.0-35b" },
{ "id": "gpu-dense" }, { "id": "qwen3.6-27B-code" },
{ "id": "gpu-vision" } { "id": "gemma-4-12b" }
] ]
} }
} }
@@ -322,6 +257,6 @@ If they differ → ghost detected → kill ghost → start fresh.
| Date | Change | | Date | Change |
|------|--------| |------|--------|
| 2026-07-08 | Koby: fixed model mismatch (qwen3.6-35B-A3B→syslog-auto), added config section. Key rotated and stored in vault. Added Failure Mode #11 to zulip-adapter-lessons. | | 2026-07-08 | Tdunna: fixed model mismatch (qwen3.6-35B-A3B→syslog-auto), added pi-specific config section. Key updated to sk-Qvzi4uYQBhlSK_XstEhcyQ. Added Failure Mode #11 to zulip-adapter-lessons. |
| 2026-07-06 | Port conflict detection added to all 3 GPU wrappers. Consolidated health check script deployed. Zulip streaming edit_message enabled for Tanko/Mumuni. | | 2026-07-06 | Port conflict detection added to all 3 GPU wrappers. Consolidated health check script deployed. Zulip streaming edit_message enabled for Tanko/Mumuni. |
| 2026-07-05 | Baseline created. All 4 agents audited, master key removed, api_key workaround applied | | 2026-07-05 | Baseline created. All 4 agents audited, master key removed, api_key workaround applied |
+58 -261
View File
@@ -5,56 +5,35 @@ description: >
Standard Hermes configuration template for Syslog Solution LLC agents. Standard Hermes configuration template for Syslog Solution LLC agents.
Enforces shared infrastructure setup (Firecrawl, SearXNG, local models, Enforces shared infrastructure setup (Firecrawl, SearXNG, local models,
RA-H OS MCP) while keeping agent-specific API keys and model choices. RA-H OS MCP) while keeping agent-specific API keys and model choices.
UPDATED 2026-08-07: Added Rule 15 (MCP Validation) from the 2026-08-07 keyless-MCP incident. Updated 2026-07-08: GPU context reduced to 128K on NVIDIA (.8, .110),
Added Rule 12 (Context-Issue Diagnostic) + Rule 13 (.env fallback enforcement) from the parallel 2 on all GPUs, LiteLLM timeouts tuned, context_length guidance added.
2026-07-16 Mumuni root-cause investigation (WAL #1300).
UPDATED 2026-07-12: GPU workload redistributed. Compression → Strix Halo. RTX 3090 context verified at 128K. Infisical .env fallback required (Rule 3/13).
--- ---
## Maintains ## Maintains
- template_version: "2.1.0" - template_version: "2.1.0"
- last_applied: timestamp - last_applied: timestamp
- agents_configured: ["mumuni", "abiba", "koby", "koonimo", "kagenz0"] # tanko removed 2026-08-27 (now on DSH/DeepSeek Harness) - agents_configured: ["tanko", "mumuni", "abiba", "tdunna", "baggy", "kagenz0"]
- agent_keys: map (see Agent Keys section) - agent_keys: map (see Agent Keys section)
- infra_endpoints_verified: array - infra_endpoints_verified: array
## Reachability Detection ## Agent Keys (LiteLLM — Current 2026-07-04)
Before auditing the config template, verify the host is reachable and can be checked. Use the shared reachability helper from the clone root:
```bash
# Run on each host to check reachability (Tanko, Mumuni, Koonimo, Koby)
scripts/hermes-reachability-check.sh <host> "base_url:" "/root/.hermes/config.yaml"
# Example: scripts/hermes-reachability-check.sh 192.168.68.122 "base_url:" "/root/.hermes/config.yaml"
# Expected outcomes:
# - UNREACHABLE: SSH connection failed (host is down)
# - VIOLATION: SSH succeeded and found matches (report the finding)
# - COMPLIANT: SSH succeeded and found no matches (no base_url in config)
#
# NOTE: The bug this replaces was deriving reachability from the remote grep's exit code.
# The correct pattern: remote side always succeeds (grep ...; true), so ssh status = connection only.
```
## Agent Keys (LiteLLM — Current 2026-07-11)
Each agent has a unique LiteLLM API key (virtual key) generated against the LiteLLM Each agent has a unique LiteLLM API key (virtual key) generated against the LiteLLM
PostgreSQL DB via `POST /key/generate` on CT 116. Keys are stored in the DB. PostgreSQL DB via `POST /key/generate` on CT 116. Keys are stored in the DB, not in
The env var `LITELLM_API_KEY` is injected at runtime via `infisical run --` wrapper config files. The env var `LITELLM_API_KEY` is set in `/etc/environment` on each agent
(project=agents, env=production). /etc/environment and ~/.hermes/.env are NO LONGER host AND in `~/.hermes/.env` for gateway env propagation.
used for agent keys — stripped and tagged `# [INFISICAL]` post-migration.
Sub-agent profiles inherit auth from the main config — no separate keys needed. Sub-agent profiles inherit auth from the main config — no separate keys needed.
| Agent | Key Alias | Host | SSH | Sub-Agents | | Agent | Key Alias | Host | SSH | Sub-Agents |
|-------|-----------|------|-----|-----------| |-------|-----------|------|-----|-----------|
| Abiba | `abiba-pi` | 192.168.68.24 | local | — | | Tanko | `tanko-*` | 192.168.68.122 | jerome@.122 | — |
| Koby | `koby` | CT 111 (tdunna) | Zulip | — | | Mumuni | `mumuni-jul2026` | 192.168.68.123 | root@.123 | 6 profiles ✱ |
| Koonimo | `koonimo` | CT 113 (baggy) | SSH root | — | | Abiba | `abiba-*` | 192.168.68.24 | local | — |
| Tdunna | `tdunna-*` | ? | Zulip | — |
| Baggy | `baggy-*` | ? | Zulip | — |
| Kagenz0 | `kagenz0-*` | ? | Zulip | — | | Kagenz0 | `kagenz0-*` | ? | Zulip | — |
> CT hostnames (tdunna, baggy) differ from agent identities (koby, koonimo).
✱ Mumuni sub-agents: syslog-code, syslog-devops, syslog-email, syslog-research, ✱ Mumuni sub-agents: syslog-code, syslog-devops, syslog-email, syslog-research,
syslog-review, syslog-writer — all at `/root/.hermes/profiles/<name>/config.yaml` syslog-review, syslog-writer — all at `/root/.hermes/profiles/<name>/config.yaml`
@@ -63,7 +42,7 @@ Sub-agent profiles inherit auth from the main config — no separate keys needed
| Component | Endpoint | Purpose | | Component | Endpoint | Purpose |
|---|---|---| |---|---|---|
| Firecrawl | `http://192.168.68.7:3002/` | Web content extraction | | Firecrawl | `http://192.168.68.7:3002/` | Web content extraction |
| SearXNG | `http://192.168.68.7:8888` | Privacy-respecting web search | | SearXNG | `http://storepve:8888` | Privacy-respecting web search |
| LiteLLM | `http://192.168.68.116/v1` | Unified model gateway (via nginx) | | LiteLLM | `http://192.168.68.116/v1` | Unified model gateway (via nginx) |
| LiteLLM (NetBird) | `https://litellm.sysloggh.net/v1` | Alternative (may have 502 issues) | | LiteLLM (NetBird) | `https://litellm.sysloggh.net/v1` | Alternative (may have 502 issues) |
| RA-H OS MCP | `http://192.168.68.65:3100/mcp` | Knowledge graph bridge | | RA-H OS MCP | `http://192.168.68.65:3100/mcp` | Knowledge graph bridge |
@@ -72,12 +51,11 @@ Sub-agent profiles inherit auth from the main config — no separate keys needed
## API Key Rules ## API Key Rules
- `api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY` — Use env var for main model auth (preferred) - `api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY` — Use env var for main model auth (preferred)
Key is injected at runtime via `infisical run --` wrapper — never in /etc/environment
- `api_key: ''` — Sub-agents leave empty to inherit from main config's custom_provider - `api_key: ''` — Sub-agents leave empty to inherit from main config's custom_provider
- `api_key: sk-...` — Hardcoded key only as fallback when env var not possible - `api_key: sk-...` — Hardcoded key only as fallback when env var not possible
- Store `LITELLM_API_KEY` in Infisical vault (project=agents, env=production) - Set `LITELLM_API_KEY` in `/etc/environment` on each host
- Sub-agents NEVER get their own key — they share the host agent's key - Sub-agents NEVER get their own key — they share the host agent's key
- Restart Hermes gateway after updating vault secret (key auto-injected via wrapper) - Restart Hermes after updating `/etc/environment`
### Sub-Agent Profiles (Mumuni pattern) ### Sub-Agent Profiles (Mumuni pattern)
@@ -101,7 +79,7 @@ Sub-agent profile rules:
5. **Auxiliary tasks** (vision, compression, etc.) also leave `api_key` empty 5. **Auxiliary tasks** (vision, compression, etc.) also leave `api_key` empty
6. **Never hardcode a key** in sub-agent profiles 6. **Never hardcode a key** in sub-agent profiles
This ensures all 6 sub-agents use the same LiteLLM key injected via `infisical run --` wrapper. This ensures all 6 sub-agents use the same LiteLLM key set in `/etc/environment`.
When the key is rotated, only the env var needs updating — all 7 configs (main + 6 subs) When the key is rotated, only the env var needs updating — all 7 configs (main + 6 subs)
work immediately after restart. work immediately after restart.
@@ -110,17 +88,13 @@ work immediately after restart.
```yaml ```yaml
# ─── Model Selection ─── # ─── Model Selection ───
model: model:
default: <agent_model> # e.g., strix-moe, gpu-dense, syslog-auto default: <agent_model> # e.g., ornith-1.0-35b, qwen3.6-27B-code
provider: harness provider: harness
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1 # Rule 5 (2026-08-09): canonical authenticated path; /v1 also OK base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1
api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY # Injected via infisical run -- wrapper api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY # Set in /etc/environment AND ~/.hermes/.env
max_tokens: 4096 # ⚠️ CRITICAL: Prevents unbounded generation max_tokens: 4096 # ⚠️ CRITICAL: Prevents unbounded generation
context_length: 131072 # Conservative floor for syslog-auto (NVIDIA hosts 128K; Strix Halo 256K). context_length: 262144 # For syslog-auto (ornith route supports 256K).
# ⚠️ MANDATORY: Hermes probes unknown models from 256K # Set 131072 if using qwen3.6-27B-code or gemma-4-12b directly.
# and falls back to 256K when /v1/models lacks a context
# field (llama-server does). Without this override, agents
# silently run syslog-auto at 256K (verified 2026-08-09).
# Set 65536 if pinning a single model directly (tight VRAM).
fallback_providers: fallback_providers:
provider: deepseek provider: deepseek
@@ -149,9 +123,10 @@ mcp_servers:
# ─── Compression ─── # ─── Compression ───
compression: compression:
enabled: true enabled: true
model: syslog-auto # ⚠️ Must match auxiliary.compression.model. Stable alias (gpu-fleet § Stable Role-Based Aliases). NOT ornith-1.0-35b (LiteLLM does not serve that name). model: gemma-4-12b # ⚠️ Must match auxiliary.compression.model
provider: harness provider: harness
max_context_window: 131072 # MUST stay at the syslog-auto pool floor: NVIDIA hosts are 128K, Strix Halo 256K (2026-09-12). max_context_window: 262144 # For syslog-auto (ornith supports 256K).
# Set 131072 if using qwen or gemma directly.
threshold: 0.65 # Fires at ~170K for 262K window, ~85K for 128K threshold: 0.65 # Fires at ~170K for 262K window, ~85K for 128K
target_ratio: 0.30 target_ratio: 0.30
protect_last_n: 40 protect_last_n: 40
@@ -161,49 +136,38 @@ compression:
# ─── Auxiliary Tasks (CONSISTENCY RULE) ─── # ─── Auxiliary Tasks (CONSISTENCY RULE) ───
# All auxiliary services MUST use identical model, base_url, and api_key_env: # All auxiliary services MUST use identical model, base_url, and api_key_env:
# model: gpu-vision # stable alias (NOT a raw model name) # model: gemma-4-12b
# base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1 # Rule 5 (2026-08-09): canonical authenticated; /v1 also OK # base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1
# api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY # api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
# Do NOT use syslog-auto for auxiliary tasks — it routes to the primary GPU. # Do NOT use syslog-auto for auxiliary tasks — it routes to the primary GPU.
# gpu-vision = RTX 5070 (12B), freeing the Strix Halo for agent reasoning. # gemma-4-12b is a lightweight 12B model on the RTX 5070, freeing the Strix Halo
# Heavy aux (delegation, x_search) use gpu-dense (RTX 3090) instead. # for agent reasoning.
# NEVER use retired model names (qwen3.6-27B-code, qwen3.6-35B-udq4; gemma-4-12b is retired
# and no longer resolves) in agent configs — use the stable aliases so model swaps don't break agents.
auxiliary: auxiliary:
vision: vision:
provider: harness provider: harness
model: gpu-vision # stable alias for RTX 5070 model: gemma-4-12b
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1 # Rule 5 (2026-08-09): canonical authenticated; /v1 also OK base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1
api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
timeout: 60 timeout: 60
download_timeout: 30 download_timeout: 30
web_extract: web_extract:
provider: harness provider: harness
model: gpu-vision # stable alias for RTX 5070 model: gemma-4-12b
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1 # Rule 5 (2026-08-09): canonical authenticated; /v1 also OK base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1
api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
timeout: 30 timeout: 30
compression: compression:
provider: harness provider: harness
model: syslog-auto # MUST match compression.model above. Stable alias for Strix Halo (weighted pool). model: gemma-4-12b
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1 # Rule 5 (2026-08-09): canonical authenticated path; /v1 also OK base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1
api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
timeout: 300 # gpu-fleet: 300s for large-history summarization (was 60) timeout: 60
# ─── Delegation / Heavy Aux (use gpu-dense = RTX 3090) ───
# delegation.model and x_search.model use gpu-dense (NOT retired raw name).
delegation:
model: gpu-dense # stable alias for RTX 3090
provider: harness
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1 # Rule 5 (2026-08-09): canonical authenticated; /v1 also OK
api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
# ─── Custom Provider ─── # ─── Custom Provider ───
custom_providers: custom_providers:
- name: harness - name: harness
model: syslog-auto # weighted pool (default) model: <agent_model>
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1 # Rule 5 (2026-08-09): canonical authenticated; /v1 also OK base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1
api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
api_mode: chat_completions api_mode: chat_completions
``` ```
@@ -212,31 +176,11 @@ custom_providers:
When LiteLLM keys are regenerated (e.g., after infrastructure changes): When LiteLLM keys are regenerated (e.g., after infrastructure changes):
1. **If SSH available**: Update Infisical vault: `infisical secrets set LITELLM_API_KEY=sk-<NEW> --project=agents --env=production`, then `ssh <host> "systemctl restart hermes-gateway"` 1. **If SSH available**: `ssh <host> "sudo sed -i 's/LITELLM_API_KEY=.*/LITELLM_API_KEY=sk-<NEW>/' /etc/environment"`
2. **If SSH unavailable**: Send Zulip DM via abiba-bot with update command 2. **If SSH unavailable**: Send Zulip DM via abiba-bot with update command
3. **After update**: Restart Hermes on the agent host 3. **After update**: Restart Hermes on the agent host
4. **Verify**: `curl -H "Authorization: Bearer sk-<KEY>" http://192.168.68.116/v1/models` 4. **Verify**: `curl -H "Authorization: Bearer sk-<KEY>" http://192.168.68.116/v1/models`
## Violation Classification
When reporting findings, separate POLICY observations from FAULT findings:
### POLICY (observation only, not a fault)
- Agent uses a non-internal-harness provider (e.g., direct DeepSeek, Tencent, OpenRouter)
- Config text has a field that looks unusual but the agent's calls are succeeding
- Example: "POLICY: Koonimo uses deepseek directly; calls succeeding in last hour"
### FAULT (requires request-level evidence)
- Agent's calls are failing with auth errors (401/403 in logs)
- Agent's config has no valid API key AND calls are failing
- Example: "FAULT: Koby's LiteLLM key expired; 401 observed at 2026-09-14 11:42:00"
### Rules
1. Do NOT infer the runtime's credential resolution from config text alone.
2. Require request-level evidence before calling something a FAULT: an observed auth failure in the agent's log, or the absence of successful calls in the window.
3. If calls are succeeding, the correct output is "POLICY: uses <provider> directly; calls succeeding" - not a violation.
4. State what you OBSERVED, not what the field implies.
## Configuration Rules ## Configuration Rules
### Rule 1: Shared Infra Is Locked ### Rule 1: Shared Infra Is Locked
@@ -254,14 +198,7 @@ The following MUST be identical across ALL profiles:
### Rule 3: API Keys via Environment ### Rule 3: API Keys via Environment
- Prefer `api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY` over hardcoded keys - Prefer `api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY` over hardcoded keys
- Hardcoded keys in config.yaml become stale after key rotation - Hardcoded keys in config.yaml become stale after key rotation
- Infisical vault secrets persist across config updates / reinstalls - `/etc/environment` persists across config updates
- **NEW (July 2026): Always keep a local `.env` fallback.** Infisical service tokens
can expire/404 (tanko incident: token not found, gateway ran without key for hours).
The `.env` file should have the key uncommented as a fallback:
```
LITELLM_API_KEY=sk-...
# [INFISICAL] Also sourced from vault.sysloggh.net
```
- Restart Hermes after env var updates - Restart Hermes after env var updates
### Rule 4: Sub-Agent Profiles Inherit Auth ### Rule 4: Sub-Agent Profiles Inherit Auth
@@ -271,15 +208,12 @@ The following MUST be identical across ALL profiles:
- Auxiliary tasks: `api_key: ''`, `provider: harness` - Auxiliary tasks: `api_key: ''`, `provider: harness`
- Never hardcode a key in sub-agent profiles - Never hardcode a key in sub-agent profiles
- When main config uses `api_key_env`, sub-agents automatically use it - When main config uses `api_key_env`, sub-agents automatically use it
- This means key rotation only touches ONE vault secret (`LITELLM_API_KEY`) - This means key rotation only touches ONE file (`/etc/environment`)
### Rule 5: Main Config Base URL (UPDATED 2026-08-09) ### Rule 5: Main Config Base URL
|- Use the authenticated LiteLLM path: `http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1` (canonical, captain-approved migration) |- Use direct IP: `http://192.168.68.116/v1`
|- Legacy `http://192.68.68.116/v1` also works — nginx fronts BOTH paths with key auth
(verified 2026-08-09: 401 without key, 200 with key, on both /v1 and /litellm/v1)
|- Both locations have `proxy_read_timeout 600s` (verified in harness-nginx nginx.conf) —
the old "60s timeout on /litellm/" claim was stale and is retracted
|- NOT the NetBird URL (`litellm.sysloggh.net`) — can cause 502 when NetBird is down |- NOT the NetBird URL (`litellm.sysloggh.net`) — can cause 502 when NetBird is down
|- NOT the old path (`/litellm/v1`) — nginx now routes `/v1` directly
### Rule 6: max_tokens Is Required (Thermal Safety) ### Rule 6: max_tokens Is Required (Thermal Safety)
- **Every Hermes config MUST set `model.max_tokens: 4096`** — this is non-negotiable - **Every Hermes config MUST set `model.max_tokens: 4096`** — this is non-negotiable
@@ -289,62 +223,34 @@ The following MUST be identical across ALL profiles:
- Apply to BOTH main config AND all sub-agent profiles - Apply to BOTH main config AND all sub-agent profiles
- For agents needing longer outputs: raise to 8192, but never omit - For agents needing longer outputs: raise to 8192, but never omit
### Rule 7: Auxiliary Model Consistency (UPDATED 2026-07-16) ### Rule 7: Auxiliary Model Consistency
- Vision and web_extract use `gpu-vision` (RTX 5070 — 12GB, vision-optimized) - All auxiliary services (vision, web_extract, compression) MUST use the same model:
- Compression uses `syslog-auto` — the Strix Halo weighted pool (64GB, 256K ctx, compression-optimized); do NOT pin `compression.model` to `strix-moe` (audit Rule 7 rejects it) - `model: gemma-4-12b`
- **`ornith-1.0-35b` is NOT a valid compression model name** — LiteLLM does not serve it - `base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1`
(do not restate the served model list here — CT 116 `/opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml`
is the single source of truth for models, aliases, weights and fallbacks). Old configs with `ornith-1.0-35b` cause 403/model-not-found on compression calls.
- **OPERATIONAL DECISION (2026-07-23): Use `syslog-auto` for compression across all agents.**
The `syslog-auto` alias routes to the Strix Halo, but uses the weighted pool instead of pinning
to `strix-moe` directly. This prevents sustained Strix Halo thermal load because the pool can
fall back to other GPUs if Strix gets hot. Both `compression.model` and `auxiliary.compression.model`
MUST be `syslog-auto`.
- All auxiliary services MUST use identical routing:
- `base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1` (Rule 5, 2026-08-09: canonical authenticated; `/v1` also OK)
- `api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY` - `api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY`
- **Do NOT use `syslog-auto` for `vision`/`web_extract`** — it routes unpredictably; compression is the deliberate exception (see the OPERATIONAL DECISION above) - **Do NOT use `syslog-auto`** for auxiliary tasks — it routes to the primary 35B reasoning GPU
- **Compression on Strix Halo**: The strix-moe alias routes to Strix Halo - gemma-4-12b is a lightweight 12B model on the RTX 5070, keeping the Strix Halo free for reasoning
(64GB UMA, 256K context) — the designated compression GPU. This frees the - The `compression:` block's `model` MUST match `auxiliary: compression: model` — they are two different configs for the same service
RTX 5070 for vision and web search, and the RTX 3090 for heavy reasoning.
- The `compression:` block's `model` MUST match `auxiliary: compression: model`
- The `compression: max_context_window: 131072` MUST stay at the syslog-auto pool floor (NVIDIA hosts 128K; Strix Halo 256K)
### Rule 8: GPU Workload Distribution (UPDATED 2026-07-16) ### Rule 8: Compression Threshold for 256K Models
- **RTX 3090 (24GB, 128K ctx, gpu-dense)**: Heavy reasoning, code gen, long conversations - For 262K context window: `threshold: 0.65` (fires at ~170K tokens)
- **RTX 5070 (12GB, 128K ctx, gpu-vision)**: Vision, web search, quick tasks, web_extract (IQ4_NL+MTP, ~65% VRAM at 128K)
- **Strix Halo (64GB, 256K ctx, syslog-auto)**: Context compression, summarization, long docs
- Agent profiles MUST route auxiliary tasks to the correct GPU:
- `auxiliary.vision.model: gpu-vision` (RTX 5070)
- `auxiliary.web_extract.model: gpu-vision` (RTX 5070)
- `auxiliary.compression.model: syslog-auto` (Strix Halo)
- Default model (`model.default`) and custom_provider remain `syslog-auto` for auto-routing
- For 128K context window: `threshold: 0.65` (fires at ~85K tokens)
- Do NOT use `threshold: 0.25` — this fires at 65K, causing premature context loss - Do NOT use `threshold: 0.25` — this fires at 65K, causing premature context loss
- Do NOT use `threshold: 0.80` — this delays until ~105K, leaving only 23K margin - Do NOT use `threshold: 0.80` — this delays until 209K, risking the gateway hygiene layer
- `max_context_window: 131072` MUST stay at the pool floor (NVIDIA hosts 128K; Strix Halo 256K) - `max_context_window: 262144` MUST match the model's actual capacity
- See `devops-hermes-compression` skill for full reference - See `devops-hermes-compression` skill for full reference
### Rule 9: Compression Threshold for 128K Models ### Rule 9: Default Model Must Be `syslog-auto` (All Agents)
- For 128K context window: `threshold: 0.65` (fires at ~85K tokens)
- Do NOT use `threshold: 0.25` — this fires at 65K, causing premature context loss
- Do NOT use `threshold: 0.80` — this delays until ~105K, leaving only 23K margin
- `max_context_window: 131072` MUST stay at the pool floor (NVIDIA hosts 128K; Strix Halo 256K)
- See `devops-hermes-compression` skill for full reference
### Rule 10: Default Model Must Be `syslog-auto` (All Agents)
- **Koby Exception**: Per captain ruling 2026-08-11, Koby is a DeepSeek-primary external agent; its primary model remains `deepseek-v4-flash` (via api.deepseek.com to preserve DeepSeek-specific reasoning, while other sections follow Rule 10.
- **Hermes agents**: `model.default: syslog-auto`, `custom_providers[0].model: syslog-auto` - **Hermes agents**: `model.default: syslog-auto`, `custom_providers[0].model: syslog-auto`
- **pi agents**: `defaultModel: syslog-auto` in `settings.json`, first model in `models.json` - **pi agents**: `defaultModel: syslog-auto` in `settings.json`, first model in `models.json`
- `syslog-auto` is the LiteLLM routing model — it load-balances across the live pool - `syslog-auto` is the LiteLLM routing model — it load-balances between ornith-1.0-35b
(see CT 116 `/opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml` for the current members and weights). Using it protects against: and qwen3.6-27B-code, with gemma-4-12b as fallback. Using it protects against:
- Model name typos that cause 403 errors and silent worker failures - Model name typos that cause 403 errors and silent worker failures
- Single GPU downtime (routing falls back automatically) - Single GPU downtime (routing falls back automatically)
- Key/model authorization mismatches - Key/model authorization mismatches
- **Exception**: Sub-agent profiles (Mumuni's 6 profiles) may specify explicit models - **Exception**: Sub-agent profiles (Mumuni's 6 profiles) may specify explicit models
for specialized tasks, but MUST validate those models exist in the key's authorized list for specialized tasks, but MUST validate those models exist in the key's authorized list
### Rule 11: Validate Model IDs Before Deployment (pi Agents) ### Rule 10: Validate Model IDs Before Deployment (pi Agents)
- After configuring a pi agent's `models.json`, verify every model ID: - After configuring a pi agent's `models.json`, verify every model ID:
```bash ```bash
curl -s http://192.168.68.116:4000/v1/models \ curl -s http://192.168.68.116:4000/v1/models \
@@ -355,115 +261,6 @@ The following MUST be identical across ALL profiles:
- A non-existent model ID causes 403 errors that silently break the pi RPC worker - A non-existent model ID causes 403 errors that silently break the pi RPC worker
(no `agent_end` emitted, worker stays "busy", Zulip messages pile up unprocessed) (no `agent_end` emitted, worker stays "busy", Zulip messages pile up unprocessed)
### Rule 12: Context-Issue Diagnostic Checklist (ADDED 2026-07-16, WAL #1300)
When an agent shows "context issues" (premature compression, 401s, 504s, DeepSeek fallback),
verify ALL FOUR of these against the live config. They are the only root causes found in production:
1. **max_context_window correct?** — BOTH `compression.max_context_window` AND `context.max_context_window`
MUST be `131072` (the syslog-auto pool floor: NVIDIA hosts are 128K; Strix Halo is 256K).
A `262144` client window can route to a 128K NVIDIA host and fail, so it must NOT be used.
~83K instead of ~170K. Check: `grep -n max_context_window ~/.hermes/config.yaml`
2. **base_url uses authenticated path?** — `custom_providers[0].base_url`, `delegation.base_url`,
and ALL `auxiliary.*.base_url` MUST be `http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1` (Rule 5, canonical)
or `http://192.168.68.116/v1` (legacy, still authenticated via nginx). BOTH verified 200 with
key + 600s proxy_read_timeout on 2026-08-09. Never bare `:4000` direct.
Check: `grep -nE 'base_url: http://192.168.68.116(:4000)?/v1' ~/.hermes/config.yaml` — the
ONLY paths allowed are `/v1` or `/litellm/v1` (both via nginx :80).
`:4000` or missing `litellm/v1`/`v1` prefix = violation.
3. **LITELLM_API_KEY valid?** — The key must be a real LiteLLM key (`sk-` + 64 hex, 67 chars).
Malformed values (e.g. `sk-_SWAl_Vu_…`, 47 chars) return 401 → DeepSeek fallback.
Verify: `curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -H "Authorization: Bearer $LITELLM_API_KEY" http://192.168.68.116/v1/models` (must be 200)
4. **custom_providers aligned?** — `model: syslog-auto` (Rule 10), `api_mode: chat_completions`
(NOT `responses`). A wrong api_mode causes silent request failures.
One-line agent health check (run on the agent host):
```bash
# Use grep -v infisical to avoid matching the bash wrapper that contains the same string
PID=$(pgrep -f "python -m hermes_cli.main gateway run" | grep -v infisical | head -1)
cat /proc/$PID/environ | tr '\0' '\n' | grep ^LITELLM_API_KEY= | sed 's/=.*/<set>/'
curl -s -o /dev/null -w 'key_health: %{http_code}\n' -H "Authorization: Bearer $(cat /proc/$PID/environ | tr '\0' '\n' | grep ^LITELLM_API_KEY= | cut -d= -f2)" http://192.168.68.116/v1/models
```
### Rule 13: API Key Injection — Two Patterns (UPDATED 2026-07-16, WAL #1300)
### Rule 14: Hermes Context Detection Uses `max_model_tokens`, NOT `max_input_tokens`
**CRITICAL**: Hermes context detection reads `max_model_tokens` (128K), NOT `max_input_tokens` (64K cap).
- **Abiba and Hermes agents**: `max_model_tokens: 131072` (128K) — unlimited context
- **Crewmates (ops, tune, verify, auth-keys, build)**: `max_input_tokens: 64000` (64K) — capped
- If you see `max_input_tokens: 64000` in an Abiba/Hermes config, that's a mistake
- Using `max_input_tokens` for Hermes agents causes premature context loss
- Check: `grep -n 'max_model_tokens\|max_input_tokens' ~/.hermes/config.yaml`
- Expected output: `max_model_tokens: 131072` (not max_input_tokens)
Agents inject `LITELLM_API_KEY` via ONE of two mechanisms. Both are valid; the contract
requirement is that the key is a **valid LiteLLM virtual key** (HTTP 200 on /v1/models).
**Pattern A — systemd drop-in (Koby, Koonimo, and any agent without infisical wrapper):**
A systemd drop-in `/etc/systemd/system/hermes-gateway.service.d/litellm-key.conf` sets the key:
```ini
[Service]
Environment="LITELLM_API_KEY=sk-<VALID_KEY>"
```
The service unit `hermes-gateway.service` runs `python -m hermes_cli.main gateway run --replace`
directly (no infisical). Apply with `systemctl daemon-reload && systemctl restart hermes-gateway`.
- Koonimo (CT113/.114): service = `hermes-gateway.service`, drop-in has the key.
- Koby (CT111/.129): service = `hermes-gateway.service` (created 2026-07-16), ExecStart uses `--replace`
to win the lock against stray `hermes gateway restart` invocations. Key also in `/etc/environment`.
**Pattern B — infisical-gateway.sh wrapper (Mumuni):**
The wrapper sources `~/.hermes/.env` then exports `LITELLM_API_KEY="$<AGENT>_LITELLM_API_KEY"`.
See litellm-api-keys.prose.md § Machine Identity for Vault Writes for vault sync.
**⚠️ Vault empty-key guard:** If the vault stores the secret as an empty string,
the wrapper will inject an empty key and the gateway will silently get 401 errors
on all LiteLLM requests (triggering silent DeepSeek fallback). The `.env` fallback
is present but the vault takes precedence when the secret key exists (even if empty).
**Fix:** The wrapper MUST validate the key length after injection. If LITELLM_API_KEY
is empty or shorter than 20 chars, log a warning and either fail with a clear error
message or fall back to the `.env` value before starting the gateway.
**Verification (all agents):**
```bash
# Use grep -v infisical to avoid matching the bash wrapper that contains the same string
GP=$(pgrep -f "python -m hermes_cli.main gateway run" | grep -v infisical | head -1)
K=$(cat /proc/$GP/environ | tr '\0' '\n' | grep '^LITELLM_API_KEY=' | cut -d= -f2)
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -H "Authorization: Bearer $K" http://192.168.68.116/v1/models # must be 200
```
- `/etc/environment` is NO LONGER the canonical key source (stale values there caused 401s).
- Do NOT leave a hardcoded stale key in `/etc/environment` — it shadows the drop-in/wrapper.
### Rule 14: Provider Name Must Match custom_providers Name (ADDED 2026-07-19, WAL #1471)
- `model.provider` MUST be `harness` (the `custom_providers[0].name`), NOT the literal string `custom`
- When `provider: custom`, Hermes' `_get_named_custom_provider("custom")` returns None (no provider is
named "custom" — it is named "harness"), causing a fall-through to the generic resolution path
(`source: env/config`) at `runtime_provider.py:1156`
- The generic path builds `api_key_candidates` from `model.api_key` (empty), host-gated
OLLAMA/OPENAI/OPENROUTER keys, and `_host_derived_api_key` (returns "" for IP addresses)
- **The generic path does NOT resolve `model.api_key_env` or `custom_providers.key_env`** —
`LITELLM_API_KEY` is never read, producing `api_key = "no-key-required"` → HTTP 401
- The named custom provider path (`source: custom_provider:harness`) DOES read `key_env` —
but only triggers when `provider` matches the `custom_providers[0].name`
- All sections MUST use `provider: harness`: `model`, `compression`, `auxiliary.vision`,
`auxiliary.web_extract`, `auxiliary.compression`, `delegation`
- Only `fallback_providers` uses a different provider (`deepseek`) for true fallback diversity
- **Diagnostic**: If you see `source: env/config` in a request dump or log, the provider name
is wrong. It should be `source: custom_provider:harness`.
- **Audit script**: Run `python3 /root/prose-contracts/audit-hermes-config.py <config.yaml>`
before and after any config change to catch this and all other rule violations.
### Rule 15: MCP Endpoint and Header Validation (ADDED 2026-08-07)
- Every MCP server entry must point at the correct endpoint:
- ra-h-os = http://192.168.68.65:3100/mcp
- litellm = https://litellm.sysloggh.net/mcp
- MCP entries must carry a REAL key value in the header.
- Avoid using env-var names like LITELLM_API_KEY in the header; they do not resolve for MCP
endpoints and result in "Malformed API Key" floods.
- Ensure the header value is the actual key (e.g., `sk-...`).
## Execution ## Execution
1. **Check current config** — Read the target agent's config.yaml 1. **Check current config** — Read the target agent's config.yaml
+57 -178
View File
@@ -5,10 +5,8 @@ version: 1.0.0
description: > description: >
Enforces standardized API key configuration across all Hermes agents. Harness/LiteLLM Enforces standardized API key configuration across all Hermes agents. Harness/LiteLLM
providers MUST use api_key_env indirection. External providers (DeepSeek, OpenAI, providers MUST use api_key_env indirection. External providers (DeepSeek, OpenAI,
Anthropic) may use hardcoded keys. Single source of truth: Infisical vault Anthropic) may use hardcoded keys. Single source of truth: /etc/environment on each
(project=agents, env=production) — injected at runtime via `infisical run --` wrapper. agent host. Designed to make key rotation a one-step operation.
/etc/environment is DEPRECATED for agent keys post-migration. Designed to make key
rotation a one-step vault operation.
author: Abiba (pi agent) author: Abiba (pi agent)
--- ---
@@ -16,7 +14,7 @@ author: Abiba (pi agent)
## Rule (One Sentence) ## Rule (One Sentence)
**All harness/litellm providers MUST use `api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY` with authenticated path `http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1/responses` — hardcoded keys AND unauthenticated `/v1` direct access are both forbidden.** **Any `api_key` pointing to a Syslog-hosted LiteLLM/harness provider MUST be replaced with `api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY` — hardcoded harness keys are forbidden.**
## Scope ## Scope
@@ -28,40 +26,6 @@ Applies to all Hermes agent configs across all hosts. Covers these config sectio
- `compression.api_key` (when `provider` is `harness` or contains `litellm`) - `compression.api_key` (when `provider` is `harness` or contains `litellm`)
- `fallback_providers[].api_key` (when provider is harness) - `fallback_providers[].api_key` (when provider is harness)
## Architecture (2026-07-10)
Syslog is migrating away from **unauthenticated direct access** to the shared inference harness.
| Path | Auth | Status |
|------|------|--------|
| `http://192.168.68.116/v1` | Bearer `sk-*` key (nginx-fronted) | ✅ **VALID** — authenticated via nginx :80 (verified 2026-08-09: 401 without key, 200 with) |
| `http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1` | Bearer `sk-*` key (nginx-fronted) | ✅ **CURRENT / CANONICAL** — captain-approved migration target; 600s proxy_read_timeout (verified) |
| `http://192.168.68.116:4000/v1` | Bearer `sk-*` key (direct container) | ❌ **FORBIDDEN** — bypasses nginx; port 4000 direct is not a config path |
All harness/litellm providers MUST use an authenticated nginx-fronted path (`/litellm/v1` canonical, `/v1` legacy-valid).
Any `base_url` pointing at `:4000` or a bare IP without nginx is a **migration violation**.
### 🔥 CRITICAL: Double-Path Bug (2026-07-10)
When `api_mode: responses` is set, Hermes **appends `/v1/responses`** to `base_url`.
If `base_url` already includes `/litellm/v1/responses`, the result is:
```
http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1/responses/v1/responses → 404
```
**The `base_url` must end at `/v1` — never include `/responses`:**
```yaml
# ✅ CORRECT — Hermes appends /v1/responses for api_mode: responses
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1
# ❌ WRONG — produces double path
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1/responses
```
This applies to ALL sections using the harness provider: `custom_providers`, `delegation`, `auxiliary.*`.
## Exemptions ## Exemptions
External providers are **explicitly exempt** and may use hardcoded keys: External providers are **explicitly exempt** and may use hardcoded keys:
@@ -73,106 +37,51 @@ External providers are **explicitly exempt** and may use hardcoded keys:
## Standard Pattern ## Standard Pattern
> **Canonical vault process (2026-07-16):** see `litellm-api-keys` § Production Vault Access Process.
> All agents MUST use the `infisical-gateway.sh` wrapper (live vault injection). Hardcoded systemd
> drop-ins / config.yaml keys are DEPRECATED — they rot on rotation (root cause of the 2026-07-16 401 storm).
> 4/5 agents migrated; tanko (user jerome) pending.
```yaml ```yaml
# ✅ CORRECT — all harness/litellm providers (authenticated path, NO /responses suffix) # ✅ CORRECT — all harness/litellm providers
model: model:
provider: harness provider: harness # or custom:litellm.sysloggh.net
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1 # ← Hermes appends /v1/responses base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1
api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY # ← indirection
custom_providers: custom_providers:
- name: harness - name: harness
api_mode: responses base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1 # ← NO /responses suffix! api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY # ← indirection
api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
auxiliary: auxiliary:
compression: compression:
provider: harness provider: harness
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1 # ← NO /responses suffix! api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY # ← indirection
api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
# ✅ ALSO CORRECT — external providers # ✅ ALSO CORRECT — external providers
fallback_providers: fallback_providers:
- provider: deepseek - provider: deepseek
base_url: https://api.deepseek.com base_url: https://api.deepseek.com
api_key: sk-b7d9... # ← hardcoded OK (external) api_key: sk-b7d9... # ← hardcoded OK (external)
api_key_env: DEEPSEEK_API_KEY # ← also OK if set in environment (vault or /etc/environment) api_key_env: DEEPSEEK_API_KEY # ← also OK if set in /etc/environment
``` ```
```yaml ```yaml
# ❌ FORBIDDEN — hardcoded key (top) OR unauthenticated path (bottom) # ❌ FORBIDDEN — hardcoded harness/litellm key
model: model:
provider: harness provider: harness
api_key: sk-Flc62smlegyMEaSo1ka8JA # ← RULE VIOLATION: hardcoded key api_key: sk-Flc62smlegyMEaSo1ka8JA # ← RULE VIOLATION
model:
provider: harness
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1 # ← RULE VIOLATION: unauthenticated path
api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
``` ```
## Reachability Detection
Before checking for hardcoded keys, verify the host is reachable and can be audited. Use the shared reachability helper from the clone root:
```bash
# Run on each host to check reachability (Tanko, Mumuni, Koonimo, Koby)
scripts/hermes-reachability-check.sh <host> "api_key: sk-" "/root/.hermes/"
# Example: scripts/hermes-reachability-check.sh 192.168.68.122 "api_key: sk-" "/root/.hermes/"
# Expected outcomes:
# - UNREACHABLE: SSH connection failed (host is down)
# - VIOLATION: SSH succeeded and found matches (report the finding)
# - COMPLIANT: SSH succeeded and found no matches (no hardcoded keys in config)
#
# NOTE: The bug this replaces was deriving reachability from the remote grep's exit code.
# The correct pattern: remote side always succeeds (grep ...; true), so ssh status = connection only.
```
## Violation Classification
When reporting findings, separate POLICY observations from FAULT findings:
### POLICY (observation only, not a fault)
- Agent uses a non-internal-harness provider (e.g., direct DeepSeek, Tencent, OpenRouter)
- Config text has a field that looks unusual but the agent's calls are succeeding
- Example: "POLICY: Koonimo uses deepseek directly; calls succeeding in last hour"
### FAULT (requires request-level evidence)
- Agent's calls are failing with auth errors (401/403 in logs)
- Agent's config has no valid API key AND calls are failing
- Example: "FAULT: Koby's LiteLLM key expired; 401 observed at 2026-09-14 11:42:00"
### Rules
1. Do NOT infer the runtime's credential resolution from config text alone.
2. Require request-level evidence before calling something a FAULT: an observed auth failure in the agent's log, or the absence of successful calls in the window.
3. If calls are succeeding, the correct output is "POLICY: uses <provider> directly; calls succeeding" - not a violation.
4. State what you OBSERVED, not what the field implies.
## Detection Query ## Detection Query
Run on any Hermes host to detect violations: Run on any Hermes host to detect violations:
```bash ```bash
# 1. Check config.yaml for hardcoded harness keys # 1. Check config.yaml for hardcoded harness keys
grep -rn 'api_key: sk-' /root/.hermes/ \ grep -rn 'api_key: sk-' /home/jerome/.hermes/ \
--include='config.yaml' \ --include='config.yaml' \
| grep -v 'deepseek\|openai\|anthropic\|DEEPSEEK' | grep -v 'deepseek\|openai\|anthropic\|DEEPSEEK'
# 1b. Check for double-path bug: base_url ending with /responses
# (Hermes appends /v1/responses when api_mode=responses, so base_url must end at /v1)
grep -rn 'litellm/v1/responses' /root/.hermes/config.yaml
# ANY output here = WRONG. Must be 'litellm/v1' without /responses suffix.
# 2. Check systemd drop-ins for master key leaks (2026-07-05: Tanko had this) # 2. Check systemd drop-ins for master key leaks (2026-07-05: Tanko had this)
grep -rn 'LITELLM_API_KEY' /root/.config/systemd/user/ 2>/dev/null grep -rn 'LITELLM_API_KEY' /home/jerome/.config/systemd/user/ 2>/dev/null
grep -rn 'LITELLM_API_KEY=sk-litellm-7f96080d' /root/.config/systemd/ 2>/dev/null grep -rn 'LITELLM_API_KEY=sk-litellm-7f96080d' /home/jerome/.config/systemd/ 2>/dev/null
# 3. Verify running process env matches dedicated key # 3. Verify running process env matches dedicated key
cat /proc/$(cat /home/jerome/.hermes/gateway.pid | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['pid'])")/environ \ cat /proc/$(cat /home/jerome/.hermes/gateway.pid | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['pid'])")/environ \
@@ -183,46 +92,34 @@ If any output from step 2 — **critical violation** (master key leaked). Fix im
## Rotation Procedure ## Rotation Procedure
With this standard enforced, key rotation is one vault update: With this standard enforced, key rotation is one step:
```bash ```bash
# 1. Generate new key in LiteLLM: POST /key/generate with agent alias # 1. Generate new key in LiteLLM
# 2. Update Infisical vault secret # 2. Update /etc/environment on agent host
infisical secrets set LITELLM_API_KEY=sk-NEW_KEY \ ssh root@<host> "sed -i 's/LITELLM_API_KEY=.*/LITELLM_API_KEY=sk-NEW_KEY/' /etc/environment"
--project=agents --env=production # 3. Restart agent gateway
# 3. Restart agent gateway (key auto-injected via infisical run -- wrapper) ssh root@<host> "pkill -f 'hermes_cli.main gateway run'; sleep 2; nohup ... &"
ssh root@<host> "systemctl restart hermes-gateway"
# 4. Verify # 4. Verify
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer sk-NEW_KEY" http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1/models curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer sk-NEW_KEY" http://192.168.68.116/v1/models
``` ```
**Done.** No config file changes needed. No /etc/environment edits needed. **Done.** No config file changes needed. The agent picks up the new key on restart.
The agent picks up the new key via `infisical run --` at gateway startup.
> **Post-migration note**: /etc/environment is NO LONGER the key source.
> Strip all `LITELLM_API_KEY` lines from /etc/environment (comment out with `# [INFISICAL]`)
> and let the `infisical run --` wrapper inject the key at runtime.
## Key Longevity Policy (2026-07-04) ## Key Longevity Policy (2026-07-04)
**Keys are permanent and use bare agent name aliases.** **Keys are permanent and use bare agent name aliases.**
- **Duration**: `null` — keys never expire by default. **Expiry must be set EXPLICITLY at creation** with the `duration` parameter (e.g., `90d` for 90 days). The 90-day default is the standard; however, the config default is **NOT honoured** by LiteLLM 1.99.1 (verified on CT 116: a key generated with no explicit duration returns `expires=null`). This has been recorded in `/opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml` to prevent re-filing as a bug. - **Duration**: `null` — keys never expire. This is enforced by `default_key_generate_params` in `litellm_config.yaml`.
- **Daily Audit**: A daily audit job runs at 00:00 UTC (`/usr/local/bin/litellm-key-renewal-ct116.sh`, cron 00:00). It is **AUDIT-ONLY** and does not perform renewal. It lists every key, reports those with no expiry and those inside a 14-day warning window, explicitly EXCLUDES `abiba-pi` and `koby` (report-only, and .129 must never be touched), and logs `RENEWAL-REQUIRED-BUT-NOT-PERFORMED + NO KEY WAS CHANGED` when renewal is skipped. **Renewal is NOT implemented** — keys must not be rotated until delivery (vault injection + consumer verification) exists and is proven end-to-end. - **Alias convention**: bare agent name only (e.g., `tanko`, `mumuni`, `tdunna`, `baggy`). No dates, no versions. The alias IS the identity.
- **Exclusions**: `abiba-pi` and every firstmate/secondmate/crewmate key stay **WITHOUT an expiry** until a proven renewal path exists. `koby` is **report-only** (never touched). These exclusions are enforced by the audit job. - **Rotation triggers**: compromise, personnel departure, or quarterly security hygiene. NOT calendar-driven.
- **Alias convention**: bare agent name only (e.g., `tanko`, `mumuni`, `koby`, `koonimo`). No dates, no versions. The alias IS the identity.
- **Rotation triggers**: compromise, personnel departure, or quarterly security hygiene. NOT calendar-driven. Manual rotation is permitted only when the renewal delivery path is proven and verified on a throwaway consumer before production use.
- **Max budget**: $100 per key (config default). - **Max budget**: $100 per key (config default).
```yaml ```yaml
# NOT currently set in the authority; recommended value. CT 116 litellm_config.yaml has no # In litellm_config.yaml — ensures all future keys inherit these defaults:
# default_key_generate_params block today, and a key generated with no explicit models comes back
# with an EMPTY models list. `models` is a literal key-generation parameter, so this is a value to
# ADD — re-read the live registry at CT 116 /opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml and
# re-verify before applying.
litellm_settings: litellm_settings:
default_key_generate_params: default_key_generate_params:
models: ["syslog-auto", "gpu-dense", "gpu-vision", "strix-moe"] models: ["syslog-auto", "qwen3.6-27B-code", "gemma-4-12b"]
duration: null # ← permanent duration: null # ← permanent
max_budget: 100 max_budget: 100
metadata: metadata:
@@ -231,54 +128,36 @@ litellm_settings:
## Verified Agents (2026-07-05 update) ## Verified Agents (2026-07-05 update)
| Agent | CT | IP | LiteLLM Alias | Key Source | Status | Gateway Wrapper | Last Verified | | Agent | CT | IP | LiteLLM Alias | Key | Status | Systemd Source | Last Verified |
|-------|-----|-----|---------------|------------|--------|-----------------|---------------| |-------|-----|-----|---------------|-----|--------|----------------|---------------|
| Tanko | 112 | .122 | `tanko` | Infisical vault | ✅ Fixed | `infisical run` | 20:17 UTC Jul 5 | | Tanko | 112 | .122 | `tanko` | `sk-CggiHWlamQyShxWC3Hx6uw` | ✅ Fixed | User drop-in `env.conf` | 20:17 UTC Jul 5 |
| Mumuni | 105 (kagentz) | .14 | `mumuni` | Infisical vault | ✅ Fixed | systemd Hermes gateway | 2026-08-29 | | Mumuni | 114 | .123 | `mumuni` | `sk-XY2aUfvy2BIs6kp1ZPh6VA` | ⚠️ Unverified | `/etc/environment` | 23:00 EDT Jul 4 |
| Koby | 111 | .129 | `koby` | Infisical vault | ✅ Fixed (DeepSeek-primary) | `infisical run` | 23:30 UTC Jul 5 | | Tdunna | 111 | ? | `tdunna` | `sk-6sbCNjz2T6lTVDBdlNHXsA` | ✅ Fixed | `/etc/environment` + drop-in | 23:30 UTC Jul 5 |
| Koonimo | 113 | .114 | `koonimo` | Infisical vault | ✅ Fixed | `infisical run` (migrated 2026-07-11) | 2026-08-09 | | Baggy | 113 | ? | `baggy` | `sk-krnw_zGBwvvL5b7l2t-s-A` | ✅ Fixed | `/etc/environment` | 23:30 UTC Jul 5 |
| Abiba | 100 | .65 | `abiba-pi` | Infisical vault | ✅ N/A (pi native) | — | 19:44 UTC Jul 5 | | Abiba | 100 | .65 | — | — | ✅ N/A (pi native) | — | 19:44 UTC Jul 5 |
| Kagenz0 | 105 | .14 | — | — | ❌ DOWN | — | 19:14 EDT Jul 4 | | Kagenz0 | 105 | ? | — | — | ❌ DOWN | — | 19:14 EDT Jul 4 |
> **Note**: CT hostnames (tdunna, baggy) differ from agent identities (koby, koonimo). ### Systemd Service Pattern (2026-07-04 fix)
> LiteLLM key aliases use agent identity, not CT hostname.
### Migration Status: Authenticated Path All Hermes agents use systemd to manage their gateway. Two issues were fixed:
| Agent | `/litellm/v1` | Legacy `/v1` | Status | 1. **Drop-in override** — `/etc/systemd/system/hermes-gateway.service.d/litellm-key.conf` (or user equivalent) had hardcoded `LITELLM_API_KEY` that bypassed `/etc/environment`.
|-------|--------------|-------------|--------| 2. **Missing EnvironmentFile** — Services did not source `/etc/environment`.
| Mumuni | ✅ harness provider | ✅ auxiliary on /v1 (valid) | ✅ Authenticated (verified 2026-08-09) |
| Tanko | ✅ 5 sections | 0 | ✅ Migrated 2026-08-08, keys 200 |
| Koby | ✅ custom provider (harness name) | — | ✅ External DeepSeek primary (intentional, captain ruling 2026-08-11) |
| Koonimo | ✅ .114 (baggy) | — | ✅ 128K context applied 2026-08-09 |
### Systemd Service Pattern (2026-07-11 — vault migration) **Correct pattern:**
All Hermes agents use systemd to manage their gateway. The gateway service is wrapped
with `infisical run --` to inject secrets at runtime.
**Correct pattern (post-migration):**
```ini ```ini
# Service file wraps gateway with Infisical: # In service file:
[Service]
ExecStart=/usr/bin/infisical run --project=agents --env=production -- \
/usr/bin/hermes gateway run
# /etc/environment is CLEAN — no LITELLM_API_KEY present
# (strip it and tag with # [INFISICAL] if present)
```
**Legacy pattern (deprecated — pre-migration only):**
```ini
# DO NOT USE post-migration:
EnvironmentFile=/etc/environment EnvironmentFile=/etc/environment
# This pattern was replaced by infisical run -- wrapper
# Drop-in only for overrides, NOT primary key storage.
# If a drop-in exists, it must match /etc/environment.
``` ```
**Rotation procedure** (one vault operation with this standard): **Rotation procedure** (one step with this standard):
1. Generate new key in LiteLLM: `curl /key/generate` with agent alias 1. Generate new key in LiteLLM: `curl /key/generate` with agent alias
2. Update Infisical vault: `infisical secrets set LITELLM_API_KEY=sk-NEW --project=agents --env=production` 2. Update `/etc/environment`: `sed -i 's/LITELLM_API_KEY=.*/LITELLM_API_KEY=sk-NEW/' /etc/environment`
3. Restart: `systemctl restart hermes-gateway` (key auto-injected via wrapper) 3. Update drop-in (if exists): same sed on `litellm-key.conf`
4. Restart: `systemctl [--user] restart hermes-gateway`
## Violation Response ## Violation Response
@@ -288,7 +167,7 @@ EnvironmentFile=/etc/environment
4. **Restart** — gateway must restart to pick up env var 4. **Restart** — gateway must restart to pick up env var
5. **Confirm** — test key against LiteLLM: `curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY" .../v1/models` → 200 5. **Confirm** — test key against LiteLLM: `curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY" .../v1/models` → 200
6. **Update** — bump the verified table above 6. **Update** — bump the verified table above
7. **Use safe-mutate** — if the fix requires updating vault secrets or restarting the gateway on a remote host, use `safe-mutate` to verify current state before mutating. 7. **Use safe-mutate** — if the fix requires changing `/etc/environment` or restarting the gateway on a remote host, use `safe-mutate` to verify current state before mutating.
## Related Contracts ## Related Contracts
@@ -327,16 +206,16 @@ task config:
```yaml ```yaml
auxiliary: auxiliary:
vision: vision:
api_key: sk-<agent-key-from-vault> # ← workaround (get via: infisical secrets get LITELLM_API_KEY --project=agents --env=production --plain) api_key: sk-CggiHWlamQyShxWC3Hx6uw # ← workaround
api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1 base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1
model: gpu-vision model: gemma-4-12b
provider: harness provider: harness
compression: compression:
api_key: sk-<agent-key-from-vault> # ← workaround (same as above) api_key: sk-CggiHWlamQyShxWC3Hx6uw # ← workaround
api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1 base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1
model: syslog-auto model: gemma-4-12b
provider: harness provider: harness
``` ```
+7 -8
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@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ connectivity recovery including end-to-end DM validation.
| Param | Type | Required | Default | Description | | Param | Type | Required | Default | Description |
|-------|------|----------|---------|-------------| |-------|------|----------|---------|-------------|
| `target` | string | yes | — | Agent name: `mumuni`, `koby`, or `shumba` (Tanko excluded — on DSH since 2026-08-27, no Hermes plugin) | | `target` | string | yes | — | Agent name: `mumuni`, `tanko`, or `koby` |
| `branch` | string | no | `master` | Git branch to pull (overridable for pinning) | | `branch` | string | no | `master` | Git branch to pull (overridable for pinning) |
## Maintains ## Maintains
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ connectivity recovery including end-to-end DM validation.
## Requires ## Requires
- SSH access to target host (direct, or via the guest's Proxmox node for CTs) - SSH access to target host (direct or via amdpve for CTs)
- Git repo at `https://git.sysloggh.net/SyslogSolution/zulip-platform-plugins.git` - Git repo at `https://git.sysloggh.net/SyslogSolution/zulip-platform-plugins.git`
- Python 3 with `httpx` installed on target - Python 3 with `httpx` installed on target
@@ -55,9 +55,9 @@ connectivity recovery including end-to-end DM validation.
| Host | CT | Proxmox | IP (direct) | Hermes Home | User | | Host | CT | Proxmox | IP (direct) | Hermes Home | User |
|------|-----|---------|-------------|-------------|------| |------|-----|---------|-------------|-------------|------|
| Tanko | CT112 | amdpve | 192.168.68.122 | /home/jerome/.hermes | jerome | *(DSH since 2026-08-27 — historical, plugin retired on this host)* | | Mumuni | CT114 | — | 192.168.68.123 | /root/.hermes | root |
| Koby | CT111 | storepve | 192.168.68.129 | /root/.hermes | root | | Tanko | CT112 | amdpve | 192.168.68.122 | /home/jerome/.hermes | jerome |
| Shumba | — | — | 192.168.68.119 | /home/lucky/.hermes | lucky | | Koby | CT111 | amdpve | 192.168.68.129 | /root/.hermes | root |
| Field | Value | Trust | | Field | Value | Trust |
|-------|-------|-------| |-------|-------|-------|
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ connectivity recovery including end-to-end DM validation.
### Step 1: Resolve Target ### Step 1: Resolve Target
Map `target` to host, CT ID, hermes_home, and user from the live-state table. Map `target` to host, CT ID, hermes_home, and user from the live-state table.
For CT112 route through `ssh root@amdpve`; for CT111 route through `ssh root@storepve` — then `pct exec <id>`. For CT112 and CT111, route through `ssh root@amdpve` then `pct exec <id>`.
### Step 2: Pull Latest Plugin Source ### Step 2: Pull Latest Plugin Source
@@ -120,8 +120,7 @@ cp plugins/platforms/zulip/adapter.py \
plugins/platforms/zulip/plugin.yaml \ plugins/platforms/zulip/plugin.yaml \
{{hermes_home}}/hermes-agent/plugins/platforms/zulip/ {{hermes_home}}/hermes-agent/plugins/platforms/zulip/
# Fix ownership (was Tanko-only, runs as jerome user) # Fix ownership (Tanko only — runs as jerome user)
# RETIRED 2026-08-27: tanko no longer uses the Hermes Zulip plugin (DSH).
[ "{{target}}" = "tanko" ] && chown -R jerome:jerome \ [ "{{target}}" = "tanko" ] && chown -R jerome:jerome \
{{hermes_home}}/hermes-agent/plugins/platforms/zulip/ {{hermes_home}}/hermes-agent/plugins/platforms/zulip/
+11 -12
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@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
--- ---
report_only_agents:
- koby # ⛔ KOBY IS NEVER REPAIRED (Rule 17, 2026-08-17) — detect + report, never fix on .129
kind: function kind: function
name: hermes-zulip-restore name: hermes-zulip-restore
description: > description: >
Restores Zulip connectivity for any Hermes agent (Mumuni CT114, Tanko CT112,
Koby CT111). Deploys the zulip-platform adapter to the correct bundled plugin
path, verifies env credentials, restarts the gateway, and confirms Zulip path, verifies env credentials, restarts the gateway, and confirms Zulip
connects. Run this whenever a Hermes agent stops responding on Zulip or after connects. Run this whenever a Hermes agent stops responding on Zulip or after
a fresh agent deployment. a fresh agent deployment.
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ version: 1.0.0
status: active status: active
runtime_contract: 2 runtime_contract: 2
--- ---
---
# Hermes Zulip Restore — Bring Any Agent Back to Good State # Hermes Zulip Restore — Bring Any Agent Back to Good State
@@ -24,7 +23,7 @@ gateway restart, and connection validation.
| Param | Type | Required | Default | Description | | Param | Type | Required | Default | Description |
|-------|------|----------|---------|-------------| |-------|------|----------|---------|-------------|
| `target` | string | yes | — | Agent name: `mumuni`, `koby`, or `shumba` (Tanko excluded — DSH since 2026-08-27) | | `target` | string | yes | — | Agent name: `mumuni`, `tanko`, or `koby` |
## Maintains ## Maintains
@@ -37,13 +36,13 @@ gateway restart, and connection validation.
- `_strip_html` function present in `<hermes-agent>/plugins/platforms/zulip/adapter.py` - `_strip_html` function present in `<hermes-agent>/plugins/platforms/zulip/adapter.py`
- All three adapter files (__init__.py, adapter.py, plugin.yaml) present at bundled path - All three adapter files (__init__.py, adapter.py, plugin.yaml) present at bundled path
- Zulip env vars set in `~/.hermes/.env` (or `/home/jerome/.hermes/.env` for Tanko, historical — DSH since 2026-08-27) - Zulip env vars set in `~/.hermes/.env` (or `/home/jerome/.hermes/.env` for Tanko)
- Gateway restarted and zulip platform reports state `connected` - Gateway restarted and zulip platform reports state `connected`
- HTML stripping enabled for `/approve` and `/deny` slash command support - HTML stripping enabled for `/approve` and `/deny` slash command support
## Requires ## Requires
- SSH access to target host (direct, or via the guest's Proxmox node for CTs) - SSH access to target host (direct or via amdpve for CTs)
- Git repo at `https://git.sysloggh.net/SyslogSolution/zulip-platform-plugins.git` - Git repo at `https://git.sysloggh.net/SyslogSolution/zulip-platform-plugins.git`
- Python 3 with `httpx` installed on target - Python 3 with `httpx` installed on target
- Zulip server accessible at `https://chat.sysloggh.net` - Zulip server accessible at `https://chat.sysloggh.net`
@@ -52,8 +51,9 @@ gateway restart, and connection validation.
| Host | CT | Proxmox | IP (direct) | Hermes Home | User | | Host | CT | Proxmox | IP (direct) | Hermes Home | User |
|------|-----|---------|-------------|-------------|------| |------|-----|---------|-------------|-------------|------|
| Koby | CT111 | storepve | 192.168.68.129 | /root/.hermes | root | | Mumuni | CT114 | — | 192.168.68.123 | /root/.hermes | root |
| Shumba | — | — | 192.168.68.119 | /home/lucky/.hermes | lucky | | Tanko | CT112 | amdpve | 192.168.68.122 | /home/jerome/.hermes | jerome |
| Koby | CT111 | amdpve | 192.168.68.129 | /root/.hermes | root |
| Field | Value | Trust | | Field | Value | Trust |
|-------|-------|-------| |-------|-------|-------|
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ gateway restart, and connection validation.
### Step 1: Locate Target ### Step 1: Locate Target
Map `target` to connectivity parameters from the live-state table above. Map `target` to connectivity parameters from the live-state table above.
For CT112 route through `ssh root@amdpve`; for CT111 route through `ssh root@storepve` — then `pct exec <id>`. For CT112 and CT111, route through `ssh root@amdpve` then `pct exec <id>`.
### Step 2: Deploy Zulip Adapter ### Step 2: Deploy Zulip Adapter
@@ -93,8 +93,8 @@ cp zulip-platform-plugins/plugins/platforms/zulip/adapter.py \
zulip-platform-plugins/plugins/platforms/zulip/plugin.yaml \ zulip-platform-plugins/plugins/platforms/zulip/plugin.yaml \
<HERMES_HOME>/hermes-agent/plugins/platforms/zulip/ <HERMES_HOME>/hermes-agent/plugins/platforms/zulip/
# Fix ownership (was Tanko-only; RETIRED 2026-08-27 — tanko on DSH, no Hermes plugin) # Fix ownership (Tanko only)
chown -R jerome:jerome <HERMES_HOME>/hermes-agent/plugins/platforms/zulip/ # Tanko only (historical) chown -R jerome:jerome <HERMES_HOME>/hermes-agent/plugins/platforms/zulip/ # Tanko only
# Clean up # Clean up
rm -rf /tmp/zulip-deploy rm -rf /tmp/zulip-deploy
@@ -183,7 +183,6 @@ https://git.sysloggh.net/SyslogSolution/zulip-platform-plugins/src/branch/feat/z
Commit `55ca15d` — `fix(zulip): add _strip_html for slash command matching` Commit `55ca15d` — `fix(zulip): add _strip_html for slash command matching`
Pull request #33 is the primary integration branch. Pull request #33 is the primary integration branch.
---
--- ---
**Last verified good state**: 2026-07-08 — Mumuni, Tanko, Koby all connected with `_strip_html` applied. **Last verified good state**: 2026-07-08 — Mumuni, Tanko, Koby all connected with `_strip_html` applied.
-105
View File
@@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
---
name: inference-optimization
kind: responsibility
description: >
Optimizes the full Syslog inference stack — LiteLLM routing weights, GPU model
assignments, agent context management, and prompt caching — to reduce response
times to sub-15s average. NVIDIA GPUs at 128K context; Strix Halo at 256K (2026-09-12).
id: 067NC6KP02RG60S50M40E30928
---
### Goal
Syslog inference response times reduced to sub-15s average by optimizing the full
stack: LiteLLM routing weights, GPU model assignments, Hermes agent context
management, and prompt caching — without sacrificing agent capability.
### Requires
- `inference-metrics`: current SpendLogs from CT116 LiteLLM Postgres — avg
request_duration_ms, prompt_tokens, completion_tokens, model_group breakdown,
cache_hit rate over the last 3 hours
- `agent-configs`: current config.yaml from each active Hermes agent (Mumuni
.123, any others on .129/.122) including compression, model, context_window,
prompt_caching, memory settings
- `gpu-health`: health check response from all 3 GPU backends (strix-moe .15:8080,
gpu-dense .8:8080, gpu-vision .110:8080)
### Maintains
The optimized inference stack configuration — every change is applied and
verified end-to-end. Postcondition: avg request_duration_ms ≤ 15000 for 90% of
inference calls.
#### liteLLM-routing
The syslog-auto routing weights, model-specific timeouts, RPM limits, and
model_list entries on CT116 `/opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml`.
#### agent-compression
Each Hermes agent's `~/.hermes/config.yaml` compression, context_window,
prompt_caching, and model sections.
#### prompt-caching
LiteLLM cache configuration and llama.cpp `--cache-prompt` flag on GPU hosts.
#### verification
End-to-end latency measurements after changes applied — at least 3 test
inference calls per model path measuring ttft (time-to-first-token) and total
duration.
### Continuity
- input-driven
### Strategies
**Context is the root cause.** Every ~46K prompt token costs ~87s of
prefill time at 532 tok/s. Fix context first, routing second.
- **Route by task**: gpu-dense for code/standard queries; gpu-vision for
vision/web-auxiliary; syslog-auto for compression.
- **Compress aggressively**: threshold at 40% (not 65%) — a 128K window should
compact at 51K, not 85K. Target 15% tail (not 30%).
- **Cache everything repeated**: system prompts, skill docs, AGENTS.md — these
never change between turns. Single-digit cache hit rate is unacceptable.
- **Lower context ceiling**: 128K window is the stable ceiling for agent conversations.
GPUs reduced from 256K to 128K (2026-07-17) for the NVIDIA hosts; Strix Halo runs 256K (2026-09-12). 128K window should compact at 85K (0.65 threshold). For larger contexts, route to external providers.
### Shape
- `self`: analyze metrics, compute optimal configs, apply changes, verify
- `delegates`:
- `apply-liteLLM`: update litellm_config.yaml and reload
- `apply-agent-config`: update hermes config.yaml per agent
- `verify-latency`: run test inference calls and measure response
### Execution
```prose
-- Phase 1: Analyze current state (already complete)
-- Phase 2: Apply LiteLLM routing optimization
call apply-liteLLM-routing
config_path: /opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml
host: 192.168.68.116
-- Phase 3: Apply agent context compression optimization
call apply-agent-compression
agent: mumuni
host: 192.168.68.14
config_path: /home/hermes/.hermes/config.yaml
-- Phase 4: Enable llama.cpp prompt caching on GPU hosts
call enable-prompt-caching
hosts: [192.168.68.15, 192.168.68.8, 192.168.68.110]
-- Phase 5: Verify end-to-end latency
-- `models` is a literal verification parameter (a snapshot only): the authoritative registry is
-- CT 116 /opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml; re-read it before use.
call verify-latency
host: 192.168.68.116
models: [syslog-auto, gpu-dense, gpu-vision, strix-moe]
```
+58 -157
View File
@@ -12,12 +12,6 @@ description: >
never mutate infrastructure based on them without first confirming never mutate infrastructure based on them without first confirming
against the live system. Policy fields are authoritative. See the against the live system. Policy fields are authoritative. See the
`verify-before-mutate` skill. `verify-before-mutate` skill.
**Last verified:** 2026-08-15 — hwepve removed from Tabiri cluster
(now 5 nodes: minipve, amdpve, storepve, acerpve, ocupve). hwepve
(192.168.68.4) is a standalone PVE node + NetBird routing peer;
London relocation pending. CT 100 (abiba) is on minipve; CT 105
(kagentz) is on amdpve.
--- ---
# Infrastructure Control Pattern # Infrastructure Control Pattern
@@ -35,19 +29,19 @@ description: >
┌─────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌─────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐
│ Abiba │ │ Tanko │ │ Mumuni │ │ Abiba │ │ Tanko │ │ Mumuni │
│ (pi) │ │ (Hermes) │ │ (Hermes) │ │ (pi) │ │ (Hermes) │ │ (Hermes) │
│ CT 100 │ │ CT 112 │ │ CT 100 │ │ CT 100 │ │ CT 112 │ │ CT 114 │
└──────┬──────┘ └──────┬───────┘ └──────┬───────┘ └──────┬──────┘ └──────┬───────┘ └──────┬───────┘
│ │ │ │ │ │
└──────────────────┼────────────────────┘ └──────────────────┼────────────────────┘
▼ ▼
┌────────────────────────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Proxmox Cluster API │ │ Proxmox Cluster API │
│ minipve.sysloggh.net:443 │ │ minipve.sysloggh.net:443 │
│ (monitoring@pve!mumuni token) │ │ (monitoring@pve!mumuni token) │
└────┬──────┬──────┬──────┬──────────┘ └────┬──────┬──────┬──────┬──────┬─────┘
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
┌────┘ ┌────┘ ┌────┘ ┌────┘ ┌────┘ ┌────┘ ┌────┘ ┌────┘ ┌────┘
▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼
minipve amdpve storepve acerpve ocupve minipve amdpve storepve acerpve ocupve
(.12) (.15) (.6) (.9) (.5) (.12) (.15) (.6) (.9) (.5)
@@ -68,19 +62,19 @@ description: >
| Resource | Auth Method | Credential Source | Status | | Resource | Auth Method | Credential Source | Status |
|----------|------------|-------------------|--------| |----------|------------|-------------------|--------|
| Proxmox Cluster | PVE API Token | Infisical vault (`PROXMOX_API_TOKEN`) | ✅ | | Proxmox Cluster | PVE API Token | `monitoring@pve!mumuni=...` | ✅ |
| Proxmox Root | Password via API ticket | Infisical vault (`PROXMOX_ROOT_PASSWORD`) | ✅ | | Proxmox Root | Password via API ticket | `root@pam:kakashi19` | ✅ |
| docker-vm (.7) | SSH root | SSH key | ✅ | | docker-vm (.7) | SSH root | SSH key | ✅ |
| CT 116 (syslog-api) | SSH root | SSH key | ✅ | | CT 116 (syslog-api) | SSH root | SSH key | ✅ |
| Tanko CT (.122) | SSH jerome | id_ed25519 | ✅ | | Tanko CT (.122) | SSH jerome | id_ed25519 | ✅ |
| Mumuni CT (.123) | SSH root | id_ed25519 | ✅ | | Mumuni CT (.123) | SSH root | id_ed25519 | ✅ |
| Baggy CT (113) | SSH jerome | ❌ no key access | | Baggy CT (113) | SSH jerome | ❌ no key access |
| Netbird (.17) | SSH root | SSH key | ✅ | | Netbird (.17) | SSH root | SSH key | ✅ |
| Gitea | API token | Infisical vault (`GITEA_BOT_TOKEN`) | ✅ | | Gitea | API token | abiba-bot token | ✅ |
| Zulip | Bot API key | Infisical vault (`ZULIP_BOT_KEY`) | ✅ | | Zulip | Bot API key | abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net | ✅ |
| RA-H OS | MCP bridge | port 3100 | ✅ | | RA-H OS | MCP bridge | port 3100 | ✅ |
| LiteLLM Admin | master key | Infisical vault (`LITELLM_MASTER_KEY`) | ✅ VERIFY-BEFORE-USE | | LiteLLM Admin | master key | `sk-litellm-7f96...` | ✅ VERIFY-BEFORE-USE |
| Grafana | admin password | Infisical vault (`GRAFANA_ADMIN_PASSWORD`) | ✅ VERIFY-BEFORE-USE | | Grafana | admin password | `syslog-grafana-2026` | ✅ VERIFY-BEFORE-USE |
> **VERIFY-BEFORE-USE**: Credentials, IPs, ports, and hostnames in this > **VERIFY-BEFORE-USE**: Credentials, IPs, ports, and hostnames in this
> contract are live-state fields. Test them against the live system before > contract are live-state fields. Test them against the live system before
@@ -91,7 +85,7 @@ description: >
### Reachability Matrix ### Reachability Matrix
| From / To | PVE API | docker-vm (.7) | CT 116 | Tanko (.122) | Mumuni (.24) | Baggy (.114) | | From / To | PVE API | docker-vm (.7) | CT 116 | Tanko (.122) | Mumuni (.123) | Baggy (.114) |
|-----------|---------|----------------|--------|-------------|---------------|----------------| |-----------|---------|----------------|--------|-------------|---------------|----------------|
| **Abiba** (.24) | ✅ :443 | ✅ SSH | ✅ SSH | ✅ SSH jerome | ✅ SSH root | ❌ SSH | | **Abiba** (.24) | ✅ :443 | ✅ SSH | ✅ SSH | ✅ SSH jerome | ✅ SSH root | ❌ SSH |
| **Tanko** (.122) | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ via NetBird | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | | **Tanko** (.122) | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ via NetBird | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ |
@@ -105,26 +99,12 @@ description: >
| Node | IP | CPU | RAM | VMs/CTs | Role | | Node | IP | CPU | RAM | VMs/CTs | Role |
|------|----|-----|-----|---------|------| |------|----|-----|-----|---------|------|
| minipve | .12 | 16C | 30GB | abiba, authentik, gitea, syslog-api, infisical-vault, jitsi | Auth, git, messaging | | minipve | .12 | 16C | 30GB | authentik, gitea, mumuni, syslog-api, jitsi | Auth, git, messaging |
| amdpve | .15 | 32C | 62GB | kagentz, tanko, baggy, scottdenya, adguard2 | Agents, compute | | amdpve | .15 | 32C | 62GB | abiba, kagentz, tanko, tdunna, baggy, scottdenya | Agents, compute |
| storepve | .6 | 28C | 31GB | docker-vm, ra-h-os, PBS, media, jdownloader, zulip, tdunna | Docker, storage, chat | | storepve | .6 | 28C | 31GB | docker-vm, ra-h-os, PBS, media, zulip | Docker, storage, chat |
| acerpve | .9 | 28C | 31GB | llm-gpu | GPU VMs | | acerpve | .9 | 28C | 31GB | llm-gpu, adguard | GPU VMs |
| ocupve | .5 | 12C | 14GB | ocu-llm | GPU VMs | | ocupve | .5 | 12C | 14GB | ocu-llm | GPU VMs |
> **Note:** CTs on storepve include jdownloader (CT 118) and tdunna (CT 111).
> AdGuard (CT 102) is on minipve at .10, not acerpve. Abiba (CT 100) is on
> minipve (moved from hwepve 2026-08-15); kagentz (CT 105) is on amdpve.
> Mumuni runs inside Abiba CT100 (.24); CT 114 (mumuni) no longer exists in the cluster.
>
> **hwepve (192.168.68.4) — STANDALONE (removed from Tabiri 2026-08-15):**
> Huawei MateBook 16 (KLVL-WXX9), pve-manager/9.2.10, kernel 7.0.14-8-pve.
> Zero VMs/CTs. Being relocated to London as a standalone PVE node + NetBird
> routing peer (relocation pending). Localizations applied: timezone
> Europe/London, lid-switch ignore, sleep/suspend/hibernate targets masked,
> cluster-shared storage removed (remaining: local, local-lvm, storage,
> mediastore). prometheus-node-exporter active on :9100; net.ipv4.ip_forward=1;
> NetBird client not yet installed (enrollment pending setup key).
### Checks (every 5 min) ### Checks (every 5 min)
``` ```
@@ -170,7 +150,7 @@ description: >
|-------|------|-----------| |-------|------|-----------|
| **Firecrawl** | `/opt/search-stack/firecrawl-source/` | api, rabbitmq, postgres, playwright, redis | | **Firecrawl** | `/opt/search-stack/firecrawl-source/` | api, rabbitmq, postgres, playwright, redis |
| **SearXNG** | `/opt/search-stack/searxng/` | searxng, valkey | | **SearXNG** | `/opt/search-stack/searxng/` | searxng, valkey |
| **Home stack** | `/opt/home_stack/` | stirling-pdf, pulse (jdownloader decommissioned 2026-08-01 → dedicated CT 118 LXC) | | **Home stack** | `/opt/home_stack/` | jdownloader, stirling-pdf, pulse |
| **Audiobookshelf** | `/opt/audiobookshelf/` | audiobookshelf | | **Audiobookshelf** | `/opt/audiobookshelf/` | audiobookshelf |
| **Trove agents** | docker run (standalone) | trove-agent-proxmox, trove-test-agent-1, trove-test-server-1, docker-stats | | **Trove agents** | docker run (standalone) | trove-agent-proxmox, trove-test-agent-1, trove-test-server-1, docker-stats |
@@ -187,30 +167,26 @@ description: >
- Compose: `/opt/home_stack/docker-compose.yml` - Compose: `/opt/home_stack/docker-compose.yml`
- Control script: `/opt/home_stack/infra-control.sh` - Control script: `/opt/home_stack/infra-control.sh`
**JDownloader** (decommissioned from docker-vm 2026-08-01 — moved to dedicated CT 118 LXC): **JDownloader**:
- LXC: CT 118 on storepve, `192.168.68.20` (JDownloader + VNC 5900 + web UI 6080) - URL: `http://192.168.68.7:5800` (web UI via VNC)
- Web UI: `http://192.168.68.20:6080` (noVNC via websockify)
- Docker container `jdownloader-2` on .7 removed; compose entry stripped
**Pulse**: **Pulse** (Uptime Kuma):
- URL: `http://192.168.68.7:7655` (direct LAN) - URL: `http://192.168.68.7:3001`
- Public: `https://pulse.sysloggh.net` (NetBird CNAME proxy)
- Container: `rcourtman/pulse:5.1.35` in `/opt/home_stack` (port 7655, was 3001)
### Ecosystem B: CT 116 syslog-api (192.168.68.116) ### Ecosystem B: CT 116 syslog-api (192.168.68.116)
12 containers on CT 116 — 11 in the inference-harness stack + trove-agent-docker (verified live 2026-09-11; LiteLLM upgraded 1.90.0-rc.1 -> 1.99.1; trove-agent-docker added 2026-09-11): 8 containers in inference-harness stack:
| Container | Image | Port | Role | | Container | Image | Port | Role |
|-----------|-------|------|------| |-----------|-------|------|------|
| harness-litellm | ghcr.io/docker.litellm.ai/berriai/litellm:1.99.1 | :4000→:4000 | API proxy, key mgmt, fallbacks | | harness-litellm | berriai/litellm:1.90.0-rc.1 | :4000→:4001 | API proxy, key mgmt, fallbacks |
| harness-router | inference-harness-router | :9000 (127.0.0.1) | GPU routing, slot booking, CB |
| harness-nginx | nginx:alpine | :80 | Entrypoint, /v1→LiteLLM, /dashboard/ | | harness-nginx | nginx:alpine | :80 | Entrypoint, /v1→LiteLLM, /dashboard/ |
| harness-postgres | postgres:16-alpine | :5432 | LiteLLM DB (keys, spend, config) | | harness-postgres | postgres:16-alpine | :5432 | LiteLLM DB (keys, spend, config) |
| harness-redis | redis:7-alpine | :6379 | LiteLLM cache + rate-limit state | | harness-redis | redis:7-alpine | :6379 | Router slots, circuit breakers |
| harness-dashboard | inference-harness-dashboard | :3000 | SyslogAI Harness UI | | harness-dashboard | inference-harness-dashboard | :3000 | SyslogAI Harness UI |
| harness-grafana | grafana/grafana | :3000→:3001 (direct LAN, not behind nginx) | GPU + Proxmox + Docker dashboards | | harness-grafana | grafana/grafana | :3000→:3001 (direct LAN, not behind nginx) | GPU + Proxmox + Docker dashboards |
| harness-prometheus | prom/prometheus | :9090 | Metrics scraper, 6 jobs | | harness-prometheus | prom/prometheus | :9090 | Metrics scraper, 6 jobs |
| trove-agent-docker | ghcr.io/techdox/trove-agent-docker:latest | outbound agent (no port) | Trove host agent — service inventory + metrics, added 2026-09-11 |
**Nginx routing**: **Nginx routing**:
- `/v1/*` → harness-litellm:4000 (API) - `/v1/*` → harness-litellm:4000 (API)
@@ -222,8 +198,9 @@ description: >
**Prometheus targets**: **Prometheus targets**:
- 192.168.68.8:9400 (RTX 3090 — qwen) - 192.168.68.8:9400 (RTX 3090 — qwen)
- 192.168.68.110:9400 (RTX 5070 — gpu-vision) - 192.168.68.110:9400 (RTX 5070 — gemma)
- 192.168.68.15:9400 (Strix Halo — strix-moe) - 192.168.68.15:9400 (Strix Halo — ornith)
- 192.168.68.24:9401 (Router metrics exporter)
- harness-litellm:4000 (LiteLLM health) - harness-litellm:4000 (LiteLLM health)
### Ecosystem C: Netbird (72.61.0.17 — Hostinger srv1079750.hstgr.cloud) ### Ecosystem C: Netbird (72.61.0.17 — Hostinger srv1079750.hstgr.cloud)
@@ -364,79 +341,6 @@ For docker-vm specifically:
- No PBS backup in 48h → fail - No PBS backup in 48h → fail
``` ```
### Backup Safety Preconditions (2026-09-15)
#### Background & Rationale
Two incidents from 2026-09-13/14 demonstrate that backup operations can catastrophically fail when storage conditions are not verified first:
1. **acerpve thin-pool VM 101** (acerpve, 192.168.68.9, 2026-09-13): A snapshot-mode vzdump of VM 101 on acerpve filled the LVM thin pool. `dmsetup status pve-data-tpool` showed `thin-pool Error` (then `Fail`), the host root remounted `emergency_ro`, ordinary commands failed with I/O errors, LVM tools returned nothing and VM 101 (the RTX 3090 host) went unreachable while the host still answered ping and ssh. It happened TWICE in one day with different modes: snapshot at 13:39Z and a `--mode stop` cold run at 18:52Z. Both times a reboot rolled the failed transaction back and the pool returned rw (~30% data, ~1.2% metadata). Pool capacity was NOT the obvious explanation - ~816G with ~572G free - which is why the metadata/snapshot-pressure hypothesis stands unproven. A full or errored thin pool fails EVERY volume on the VG at once, including the host root.
2. **amdpve 0700 tmpdir** (amdpve, 192.168.68.15, 2026-09-14): A custom vzdump `tmpdir` created with mode 0700 broke a whole night of container backups: `fstat "<dir>/vzdumptmp<n>_<ct>//." failed - EACCES`, because the archive step runs through an unprivileged user namespace and could not traverse a root-owned 0700 directory. Fixed with `chmod 1777` (match /var/tmp) and proved with a real backup.
3. **acerpve GPU-host fact**: VM 101 (llm-gpu) and VM 103 (ocu-llm) are in NO scheduled job, so their only coverage is one-off runs - and for VM 101 that is deliberate until the thin-pool is understood.
> ⚠️ **Hostname Resolution Warning (2026-09-15)**: The PVE node hostnames (acerpve, amdpve, minipve, storepve, ocupve) all resolve to the VPS (72.61.0.17, the Netbird VPS at srv1079750.hstgr.cloud) via the wildcard `*.dns.sysloggh.net` record, NOT to the actual nodes. So `ssh acerpve` lands on the VPS. **Nodes must be addressed by IP**: acerpve 192.168.68.9, amdpve 192.168.68.15, storepve 192.168.68.6, minipve 192.168.68.12, ocupve 192.168.68.5. Guest CTs are reached through their node (`pct exec`). Guest hostnames that resolve on the LAN (e.g. kagentz = 192.168.68.14) are fine. (The DNS address records are a separate decision — row: dag-daemon-node-hostnames-resolve-to-the-vps-20260915.)
#### PREFLIGHT Preconditions (Before ANY snapshot-mode backup on thin-pool hosts)
Before starting ANY snapshot-mode vzdump on a host whose storage is an LVM thin pool, the following checks MUST pass:
```bash
# Check 1: Pool headroom (PRIMARY - yields percentages directly)
# Run on the NODE (e.g. ssh root@192.168.68.9 for acerpve) — NOT by bare hostname, see warning above
lvs -o lv_name,data_percent,metadata_percent,lv_size pve/data
# Example output (acerpve, 192.168.68.9):
# LV Data% Meta% LSize
# data 29.95 1.22 <816.21g
# Required thresholds (documented minimum):
# data_percent < 90% (80% recommended for safety margin)
# metadata_percent < 70% (metadata fills faster than data)
# Check 2: Verify pool is not in error state (dmsetup shows the raw DM device)
# Run on the NODE (e.g. ssh root@192.168.68.9 for acerpve) — NOT by bare hostname
dmsetup status pve-data-tpool | grep -q "Error\|Fail" && exit 1
# dmsetup status pve-data-tpool field order (verified on 192.168.68.9):
# $1=start $2=length $3="thin-pool" $4=transaction-id
# $5=metadata_used/metadata_total (blocks) $6=data_used/data_total (sectors)
# remaining fields are flags ("-", "rw", "discard_passdown", "queue_if_no_space", ...)
# This is only used for the ERROR-STATE check; use the lvs command above for percentages.
# metadata_percent = $5 / ($5 split by /) [second number in pair]
```
**Minimum thresholds**: If either `data_percent >= 90%` or `metadata_percent >= 70%`, the backup MUST NOT start. State explicitly that these are hard stops, not warnings.
**Why this is a precondition**: A full or errored thin pool fails EVERY volume on the VG at once, including the host root. This is not a soft failure - it takes down the entire Proxmox host.
#### Staging Directory Requirement (2026-09-14 incident)
Any custom vzdump `tmpdir` MUST be world-traversable and writable exactly like `/var/tmp` (mode 1777). The archive step of vzdump runs in an unprivileged user namespace and cannot traverse a root-owned 0700 directory.
**Symptom to recognize**: `fstat "<dir>/vzdumptmp<n>_<ct>//." failed - EACCES` on every container in the backup run.
**Fix**: `chmod 1777 <custom-tmpdir>` before starting vzdump.
#### Task Start Rule for Truncating Shells
When starting a backup task from a shell that may truncate output (e.g., pipes, `head`), always use:
```bash
pvesh create /storage/backup --output-format json -- ... | head -2
# ❌ Can kill the backup task ("broken pipe" status)
```
Instead, capture JSON output without piping to truncating commands:
```bash
# Use --output-format json and capture to variable
result=$(pvesh create /storage/backup --output-format json -- ...)
# Then parse result if needed
```
#### GPU Host Backup Status (acerpve VM 101)
VM 101 (llm-gpu) and VM 103 (ocu-llm) have NO scheduled backup job. Coverage is manual one-off runs only. This is intentional for VM 101 until the thin-pool failure mechanism is understood and documented.
## Section 5: Network Services — Monitoring ## Section 5: Network Services — Monitoring
### 5.1 Service Inventory ### 5.1 Service Inventory
@@ -450,18 +354,16 @@ fine. Services that resolve directly to a LAN IP are NetBird-independent.
|---------|--------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------| |---------|--------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------|
| Proxmox API | minipve.sysloggh.net:8006 | 192.168.68.12 | LAN IP | No | ✅ | | Proxmox API | minipve.sysloggh.net:8006 | 192.168.68.12 | LAN IP | No | ✅ |
| LiteLLM | litellm.sysloggh.net | 192.168.68.116 | LAN IP | No | ✅ | | LiteLLM | litellm.sysloggh.net | 192.168.68.116 | LAN IP | No | ✅ |
| Authentik | auth.sysloggh.net:443 | 192.168.68.11:9000 | CNAME → netbird | **Yes** | ⚠️ | | Authentik | auth.sysloggh.net:443 | 192.168.68.11 | CNAME → netbird | **Yes** | ⚠️ |
| Gitea | git.sysloggh.net:443 | 192.168.68.17:3000 | CNAME → netbird | **Yes** | ⚠️ | | Gitea | git.sysloggh.net:443 | 192.168.68.110 | CNAME → netbird | **Yes** | ⚠️ |
| Zulip | chat.sysloggh.net:443 | 192.168.68.19 | CNAME → netbird | **Yes** | ⚠️ VERIFY-BEFORE-USE | | Zulip | chat.sysloggh.net:443 | 192.168.68.19 | CNAME → netbird | **Yes** | ⚠️ VERIFY-BEFORE-USE |
| Pulse | pulse.sysloggh.net:443 | 192.168.68.7:7655 | CNAME → netbird | **Yes** | ✅ verified 2026-08-01 | | Pulse | pulse.sysloggh.net:443 | 192.168.68.7 | CNAME → netbird | **Yes** | ⚠️ |
| DNS UI | dns.sysloggh.net:443 | 192.168.68.10:80 | CNAME → netbird | **Yes** | ⚠️ | | DNS UI | dns.sysloggh.net:443 | 192.168.68.102 | CNAME → netbird | **Yes** | ⚠️ |
| SearXNG | searxng.sysloggh.net:8888 | 192.168.68.7:8888 | LAN IP | No | ✅ | | SearXNG | searxng.sysloggh.net:8888 | 192.168.68.7:8888 | LAN IP | No | ✅ |
| Firecrawl | firecrawl.sysloggh.net:3002 | 192.168.68.7:3002 | LAN IP | No | ✅ | | Firecrawl | firecrawl.sysloggh.net:3002 | 192.168.68.7:3002 | LAN IP | No | ✅ |
**Verified 2026-07-24:** NetBird VPS rebooted after a hang; all CNAME'd **Verified 2026-07-02:** NetBird VPS rebooted after a hang; all CNAME'd
services recovered. LAN-IP-direct paths stayed up throughout the outage. services recovered. LAN-IP-direct paths stayed up throughout the outage.
Also added `dns.sysloggh.net` route (was missing entirely).
See `scripts/netbird-add-domain.sh` for adding new proxy routes.
### 5.2 Checks (every 2 min) ### 5.2 Checks (every 2 min)
@@ -609,8 +511,8 @@ enforced by the `routing-regression.config_url_violations` check in Section
| LiteLLM API | `http://192.168.68.116:4000` | `https://litellm.sysloggh.net` | | LiteLLM API | `http://192.168.68.116:4000` | `https://litellm.sysloggh.net` |
| LiteLLM (nginx) | `http://192.168.68.116` | — | | LiteLLM (nginx) | `http://192.168.68.116` | — |
| Grafana | `http://192.168.68.116:3001` | — | | Grafana | `http://192.168.68.116:3001` | — |
| Authentik | `https://192.168.68.11:9000` | `https://auth.sysloggh.net` | | Authentik | `https://192.168.68.11` | `https://auth.sysloggh.net` |
| Gitea | `http://192.168.68.17:3000` | `https://git.sysloggh.net` | | Gitea | `http://192.168.68.110:3000` | `https://git.sysloggh.net` |
| Zulip API | `http://192.168.68.19` | `https://chat.sysloggh.net` | | Zulip API | `http://192.168.68.19` | `https://chat.sysloggh.net` |
| SearXNG | `http://192.168.68.7:8888` | — | | SearXNG | `http://192.168.68.7:8888` | — |
| Firecrawl | `http://192.168.68.7:3002` | — | | Firecrawl | `http://192.168.68.7:3002` | — |
@@ -648,18 +550,21 @@ curl -s http://192.168.68.116/health/unified | jq .status
curl -s http://192.168.68.24:9100/gpu-data | jq .summary curl -s http://192.168.68.24:9100/gpu-data | jq .summary
# Grafana status # Grafana status
curl -s http://admin:$(infisical secrets get GRAFANA_ADMIN_PASSWORD --project=infrastructure --env=production --plain)@192.168.68.116:3001/api/health curl -s http://admin:syslog-grafana-2026@192.168.68.116:3001/api/health
# Prometheus targets # Prometheus targets
curl -s http://192.168.68.116:9090/api/v1/targets | jq '.data.activeTargets[] | {job: .labels.job, health: .health}' curl -s http://192.168.68.116:9090/api/v1/targets | jq '.data.activeTargets[] | {job: .labels.job, health: .health}'
# LiteLLM key check # LiteLLM key check
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $(infisical secrets get LITELLM_MASTER_KEY --project=infrastructure --env=production --plain)" \ curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer sk-litellm-7f96080dd99b15c36bd4b333b58a6796" \
http://192.168.68.116/litellm/key/list | jq '.keys[] | {alias: .key_alias, models: .models}' http://192.168.68.116/litellm/key/list | jq '.keys[] | {alias: .key_alias, models: .models}'
# Storage check # Storage check
ssh root@192.168.68.7 "df -h /media/storage /media/mediastore" ssh root@192.168.68.7 "df -h /media/storage /media/mediastore"
# Router roster reload (if needed)
curl -s -X POST http://192.168.68.116:9000/admin/roster/reload \
-H "Authorization: Bearer sk-admin-ee09fffd04978b61a1569ac670c68814"
# Restart stuck GPU (saturation watchdog alternative) # Restart stuck GPU (saturation watchdog alternative)
ssh root@192.168.68.8 "systemctl restart llama-server" ssh root@192.168.68.8 "systemctl restart llama-server"
@@ -670,9 +575,9 @@ ssh root@192.168.68.110 "systemctl restart llama-server"
| CT | Name | Node | IP | Role | Agent | | CT | Name | Node | IP | Role | Agent |
|----|------|------|----|------|-------| |----|------|------|----|------|-------|
| 100 | abiba | minipve | .24 | Pi agent | ✅ pi | | 100 | abiba | amdpve | .24 | Pi agent (this host) | ✅ pi |
| 101 | llm-gpu | acerpve | .8 | GPU RTX 3090 | ❌ | | 101 | llm-gpu | acerpve | .8 | GPU RTX 3090 | ❌ |
| 102 | adguard | **minipve** | **.10** | DNS | ❌ | | 102 | adguard | acerpve | — | DNS | ❌ |
| 103 | ocu-llm | ocupve | .110 | GPU RTX 5070 | ❌ | | 103 | ocu-llm | ocupve | .110 | GPU RTX 5070 | ❌ |
| 104 | authentik | minipve | .11 | OIDC | ❌ | | 104 | authentik | minipve | .11 | OIDC | ❌ |
| 105 | kagentz | amdpve | — | Agent Zero | ✅ | | 105 | kagentz | amdpve | — | Agent Zero | ✅ |
@@ -680,16 +585,15 @@ ssh root@192.168.68.110 "systemctl restart llama-server"
| 107 | pbs | storepve | — | Backups | ❌ | | 107 | pbs | storepve | — | Backups | ❌ |
| 108 | media | storepve | — | Media | ❌ | | 108 | media | storepve | — | Media | ❌ |
| 109 | docker-vm | storepve | .7 | Docker host | ❌ | | 109 | docker-vm | storepve | .7 | Docker host | ❌ |
| 110 | gitea | minipve | **.17** | Git | ❌ | | 110 | gitea | minipve | — | Git | ❌ |
| 111 | tdunna | storepve | .129 | Hermes agent — ⛔ REPORT-ONLY (Theo's box, no GC) | ✅ | | 111 | tdunna | amdpve | — | ? | ❌ |
| 112 | tanko | amdpve | .122 | DSH (DeepSeek Harness) agent | ✅ | | 112 | tanko | amdpve | .122 | Hermes agent | ✅ |
| 113 | baggy | amdpve | .114 | Hermes agent | ✅ | | 113 | baggy | amdpve | ? | Hermes agent | ✅ |
| 115 | scottdenya | amdpve | .75 | Denya OneCare | ❌ | | 114 | mumuni | minipve | .123 | Hermes agent | ✅ |
| 115 | scottdenya | amdpve | — | ? | ❌ |
| 116 | syslog-api | minipve | .116 | LiteLLM + Grafana | ❌ | | 116 | syslog-api | minipve | .116 | LiteLLM + Grafana | ❌ |
| 117 | zulip | storepve | .19 | Chat | ❌ | | 117 | zulip | storepve | — | Chat | ❌ |
| 118 | jdownloader | storepve | .20 | JDownloader LXC (dedicated, migrated from docker-vm 2026-08-01) | ✅ | | 118 | jitsi | minipve | — | Video | ❌ |
| 119 | infisical-vault | minipve | — | Vault | ❌ |
| 120 | adguard2 | amdpve | — | DNS (secondary AdGuard) | ❌ |
## Appendix C: Docker Compose Files Location ## Appendix C: Docker Compose Files Location
@@ -709,30 +613,27 @@ Source of truth: `/root/scripts/pct-run.sh` or `prose-contracts/scripts/pct-run.
| CT | Name | Node | pct-run | | CT | Name | Node | pct-run |
|-----|------|------|---------| |-----|------|------|---------|
| 100 | abiba | minipve | `pct-run 100` | | 100 | abiba | amdpve | `pct-run 100` |
| 105 | kagentz | amdpve | `pct-run 105` | | 105 | kagentz | amdpve | `pct-run 105` |
| 111 | tdunna | storepve | `pct-run 111` (⛔ report-only — no GC) | | 111 | tdunna | amdpve | `pct-run 111` |
| 112 | tanko | amdpve | `pct-run 112` | | 112 | tanko | amdpve | `pct-run 112` |
| 113 | baggy | amdpve | `pct-run 113` | | 113 | baggy | amdpve | `pct-run 113` |
| 115 | scottdenya | amdpve | `pct-run 115` | | 115 | scottdenya | amdpve | `pct-run 115` |
| 104 | authentik | minipve | `pct-run 104` | | 104 | authentik | minipve | `pct-run 104` |
| 110 | gitea | minipve | `pct-run 110` | | 110 | gitea | minipve | `pct-run 110` |
| 114 | mumuni | minipve | `pct-run 114` |
| 116 | syslog-api | minipve | `pct-run 116` | | 116 | syslog-api | minipve | `pct-run 116` |
| 106 | ra-h-os | storepve | `pct-run 106` | | 106 | ra-h-os | storepve | `pct-run 106` |
| 107 | proxmox-backup | storepve | `pct-run 107` | | 107 | proxmox-backup | storepve | `pct-run 107` |
| 108 | media | storepve | `pct-run 108` | | 108 | media | storepve | `pct-run 108` |
| 117 | zulip | storepve | `pct-run 117` | | 117 | zulip | storepve | `pct-run 117` |
| 118 | jdownloader | storepve | `pct-run 118` | | 102 | adguard | acerpve | `pct-run 102` |
| 119 | infisical-vault | minipve | `pct-run 119` |
| 120 | adguard2 | amdpve | `pct-run 120` |
| 102 | adguard | **minipve** | `pct-run 102` |
GPU bare-metal hosts (.8 acerpve, .110 ocupve, .15 amdpve) are NOT CTs — use SSH directly: GPU bare-metal hosts (.8 acerpve, .110 ocupve, .15 amdpve) are NOT CTs — use SSH directly:
```bash ```bash
ssh root@192.168.68.8 # RTX 3090 ssh root@192.168.68.8 # RTX 3090
ssh root@192.168.68.110 # RTX 5070 ssh root@192.168.68.110 # RTX 5070
ssh root@192.168.68.15 # Strix Halo ssh root@192.168.68.15 # Strix Halo
ssh root@192.168.68.4 # hwepve — standalone London node + NetBird routing peer (relocation pending)
``` ```
## Section 7: Agent Health Check (consolidated — 2026-07-05) ## Section 7: Agent Health Check (consolidated — 2026-07-05)
-199
View File
@@ -1,199 +0,0 @@
---
kind: responsibility
name: infrastructure-maintenance
description: >
Weekly system-level maintenance for the Syslog inference fleet: OS package
updates on the primary host, Docker image pulls for LiteLLM/SearXNG and other
running containers, container restarts with health verification, post-update
verification of every critical service (LiteLLM proxy, SearXNG, Zulip, Gitea,
PM2 processes, Hermes gateways), and rollback on failure. Consolidates the
raw shell scripts that previously did this piecemeal. This contract owns the
HOST-LEVEL weekly maintenance loop on the primary host plus Docker image
pulls ONLY for .116 and .7, while infrastructure-update owns the FULL-FLEET
cluster-wide wave (apt across the full PVE cluster + CTs/VMs AND its Docker
image Wave 3 across all stacks). Runs Sunday 2am ET. Owner:
ops (firstmate secondmate). Blast radius: an unverified image pull can break
LiteLLM (all agents lose inference) or SearXNG (search-stack down); a bad apt
upgrade can leave the host in a half-upgraded state. Pre-update backup check
and rollback are mandatory for this reason.
agent: ops
triggers:
- weekly (Sunday 02:00 ET) via cron
- on demand when ops/abiba triggers "infra maintenance"
version: 1.0.0
---
## Maintains
- maintenance-status: { phase: idle|preflight|apt|images|restarts|verify|rollback|done|failed, host, step, result, timestamp }
- image-baseline: { service, current_tag, pulled_tag, digest, updated_at } — last known-good image per container
- apt-state: { upgradable_before, upgradable_after, held_broken, kernel_reboot_required }
- health-baseline: snapshot of critical-service health captured pre-update (used for regression check post-update)
- rollback-snapshot: { backup_path, configs, image_digests, timestamp } — restore point created in preflight
- maintenance-history: array of past runs with phase results and any escalations
## Scope
Primary host is the maintenance host where apt updates apply. Docker image pulls
span the two Docker ecosystems that run critical services. infrastructure-update
runs the full-fleet cluster-wide wave (including its Wave 3 Docker pulls across
all stacks/hosts); this contract runs a narrower host-level weekly pull limited
to .116 and .7. Topology, CT IDs, and IPs are live-state fields — verify against
`infrastructure-control.prose.md` (the source of truth) and the live system
before mutating.
| Host | IP | Role | Trust |
|------|----|------|-------|
| CT 116 (syslog-api) | 192.168.68.116 | LiteLLM proxy + Grafana + Prometheus (inference harness) | ⚠️ VERIFY-BEFORE-USE |
| VM 109 (docker-vm) | 192.168.68.7 | SearXNG + Firecrawl + home stack (Docker host) | ⚠️ VERIFY-BEFORE-USE |
| CT 117 (zulip) | 192.168.68.19 | Zulip (storepve bridge IP .19) | ⚠️ VERIFY-BEFORE-USE |
| Gitea | https://git.sysloggh.net | Prose-contracts + agent configs source control | ⚠️ VERIFY-BEFORE-USE |
| CT 100 (abiba/pi) | 192.168.68.24 | PM2 processes (pi agent harness) | ⚠️ VERIFY-BEFORE-USE |
> "Primary host" for the apt phase is the host the ops agent runs maintenance
> from. Confirm which host that is against infrastructure-control before
> running; do not assume. If the ops agent is containerized/CT-based, apt runs
> inside that CT.
## Requires
- SSH/exec access to CT 116 (.116) and VM 109 (.7) for Docker operations
- `apt`, `docker`, `docker compose` available on target hosts
- LiteLLM master key available (Infisical vault, `LITELLM_API_KEY`) for health verification
- `infrastructure-monitoring` run completed within the last 30 minutes — provides the pre-update health baseline used by the regression check
- Writable backup directory `/tmp/infra-maintenance-backup-<date>/` on each mutated host
- Proxmox snapshot of the primary host available (or confirmed not required) before apt phase
## Continuity
- Self-driven: weekly cron `0 2 * * 0` (Sunday 02:00 ET)
- Also wakes on: explicit "infra maintenance" trigger from ops/abiba
- Depends on `infrastructure-monitoring` for the pre-update health baseline — do not run if the last monitoring run is stale (>30 min) or RED; abort and escalate instead
## Execution
### Phase 0 — Preflight (snapshot/backup check + health baseline)
1. **Capture health baseline** — run the `infrastructure-monitoring` postcondition checks (LiteLLM, Zulip, Gitea, SearXNG, Proxmox API) and record results as `health-baseline`. If any critical service is already down, **abort**: maintenance must not run on a degraded fleet.
2. **Backup check** — confirm a Proxmox snapshot of the primary host exists OR `/tmp/infra-maintenance-backup-<date>/` was created this run. Snapshot critical config files into the backup dir:
- `/opt/inference-harness/docker-compose.yml`, `/opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml` (CT 116)
- `/opt/search-stack/searxng/docker-compose.yml`, `/opt/search-stack/firecrawl-source/docker-compose.yaml` (VM 109)
3. **Record image baseline** — `docker inspect --format '{{.Image}} {{.Config.Image}}' <container>` for every running container on .116 and .7; store digests in `image-baseline` so rollback can restore them.
4. **Disk check** — `df -h` on each mutated host; abort if free space <20% (apt upgrade + image pulls need headroom).
### Phase 1 — OS package updates (primary host)
```bash
# On the primary host only (VERIFY host against infrastructure-control first)
apt update
apt upgrade -y
```
- Capture `apt list --upgradable` before and after → store in `apt-state`.
- If apt reports held/broken packages (`apt-get -s upgrade | grep -i broken`, or non-zero exit), **stop** — do not force. Record `held_broken` and go to rollback/escalate.
- If `/var/run/reboot-required` exists after upgrade, flag `kernel_reboot_required: true` in `apt-state` but **do not reboot automatically** — that's a separate coordinated action (see infra-update Wave 4). Note it in the report.
### Phase 2 — Docker image pulls
Pull latest stable tags for every running container. Do NOT pin to `:main`/`:nightly` — use stable tags where the compose file specifies them; otherwise `latest`.
```bash
# CT 116 (.116) — inference harness
cd /opt/inference-harness && docker compose pull
# VM 109 (.7) — search + home stacks
cd /opt/search-stack/searxng && docker compose pull
cd /opt/search-stack/firecrawl-source && docker compose pull
# any other running stacks on .7 (home stack, audiobookshelf) — pull per their compose files
```
- LiteLLM and SearXNG are the two explicitly required pulls; "any other running containers" means every stack with a compose file on .116 and .7.
- Record pulled tag + digest per service in `image-baseline`.
### Phase 3 — Container restarts with health verification
Restart one stack at a time, verify health before moving to the next. Do not restart everything at once — a failure mid-wave must leave the rest running.
```bash
# CT 116
cd /opt/inference-harness && docker compose up -d
# VM 109
cd /opt/search-stack/searxng && docker compose up -d
cd /opt/search-stack/firecrawl-source && docker compose up -d
```
After each stack comes up, wait for health (max 120s):
- `docker ps` shows the container `Up` (and `healthy` if a healthcheck is defined)
- Service-specific probe passes (see Phase 4 probes)
If a stack fails to come up within 120s, **stop the wave** and go to rollback for that stack only; do not proceed to the next.
### Phase 4 — Post-update service verification
After ALL updates (apt + images + restarts), verify every critical service is back up and matches the pre-update baseline. This is the regression gate.
| Service | Probe | Expect |
|---------|-------|--------|
| LiteLLM proxy | `curl -sf http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1/models` | 200 OK, models returned |
| LiteLLM MCP gateway | `curl -sf http://192.168.68.116:4000/mcp-rest/tools/list -H "Authorization: Bearer $MASTER_KEY"` | 90 tools (23 RA-H OS + 67 GitHub) |
| SearXNG | `curl -sf http://192.168.68.7:8888` | 200 OK |
| Zulip | `curl -sf https://chat.sysloggh.net/api/v1/server_settings` | 200 OK |
| Gitea | `curl -sf https://git.sysloggh.net/api/v1/version` | 200 OK |
| PM2 processes | `pm2 jlist` (CT 100) | all pi-agent processes `online` |
Regression check: every service that was GREEN in `health-baseline` must still be GREEN. A service that was already RED (and caused a preflight abort) is excluded — but Phase 0 should have aborted before we got here.
## Rollback Protocol
If ANY service in Phase 4 fails to come back up (or regresses vs baseline):
1. **Image rollback** — for the failing stack, restore the previous image:
```bash
# Restore from recorded image-baseline digest
docker compose down
# Pin the service image to the recorded digest in compose, then recreate
# image: <name>@sha256:<previous_digest>
docker compose pull && docker compose up -d
```
2. **APT rollback** — restore the primary host from the Proxmox snapshot taken/confirmed in Phase 0. If no snapshot, `apt install <pkg>=<old_version>` per package using apt history (`/var/log/apt/history.log`).
3. **Config rollback** — restore configs from `/tmp/infra-maintenance-backup-<date>/`.
4. **Re-verify** — re-run the Phase 4 probes on the rolled-back service. If still failing, escalate (do not loop — circuit breaker below).
5. **Escalate** — send a Zulip DM to abiba + mumuni with: failing service, phase, baseline vs current, rollback actions taken, backup path.
## Circuit Breaker
- `max_retries: 2` per failing phase — after 2 rollback attempts on the same service, stop and escalate.
- `window: 7200` seconds — no more than 2 retries within a 2-hour window.
- `trip_action: escalate_to_fatal` — when tripped, escalate to fatal (abiba + mumuni + kwame) and pause; a human must clear before the next scheduled run.
## Report
After completion (or on abort), emit a receipt (JSON) to `~/.hermes/runs/infrastructure-maintenance/` and send a Zulip DM summary:
```
🛠 Infrastructure Maintenance — YYYY-MM-DD
Phase: apt | images | restarts | verify | rollback
Primary host: <host>
APT: <N> packages upgraded, <M> held/broken, kernel_reboot_required=<bool>
Images pulled: LiteLLM <tag>, SearXNG <tag>, <others>
Services: all GREEN | <service> FAILED (rolled back)
Baseline regression: none | <details>
Backup: /tmp/infra-maintenance-backup-YYYYMMDD/
Escalation: none | warning | critical | fatal
```
## Verification Postconditions
- All critical services running after update (Phase 4 all GREEN)
- No regressions from pre-update health baseline (Phase 0 baseline)
- Docker containers on latest stable tags (`image-baseline.pulled_tag` recorded)
- APT packages up to date with no held broken packages (`apt-state.held_broken == 0`)
## Related Contracts
- `infrastructure-update.prose.md` — owns the full-fleet cluster-wide wave INCLUDING its Wave 3 Docker image updates across all stacks (SearXNG, Firecrawl, Inference Harness on .116, home stack, audiobookshelf); infrastructure-maintenance is a deliberately narrower host-level weekly pull scoped to .116 and .7.
- `infrastructure-monitoring.prose.md` — provides the pre-update health baseline (depends_on).
- `infrastructure-control.prose.md` — topology source of truth (CT IDs, IPs, hostnames).
- `litellm-health.prose.md` — LiteLLM probe details.
- `proxmox-monitor.prose.md` — Docker stats + monitoring stack health.
+58 -175
View File
@@ -7,17 +7,15 @@ description: >
from nvidia-smi (.8, .110) and amdgpu_top (.15). LiteLLM metrics from nvidia-smi (.8, .110) and amdgpu_top (.15). LiteLLM metrics
via existing /metrics Prometheus endpoint. via existing /metrics Prometheus endpoint.
DEPLOYMENT STATUS (2026-08-09): DEPLOYMENT STATUS (2026-07-09):
✅ Core stack deployed: Prometheus + Grafana + pve/node/docker exporters ✅ Core stack deployed: Prometheus + Grafana + pve/node/docker exporters
(via proxmox-monitor contract). Grafana at :3001, all scrape targets active. (via proxmox-monitor contract). Grafana at :3001, 5 scrape targets active.
✅ GPU exporters DEPLOYED: all 3 GPU hosts (.8/.110/.15) run exporters on ❌ GPU exporters NOT deployed: gpu-exporter crash-loops on .15,
:9400 (nvidia_gpu_exporter / amdgpu exporter) — verified 200 on 2026-08-09. NVIDIA sidecar exporters (.8/.110:9400) never installed.
✅ LiteLLM /metrics scraping live (success_callback: prometheus; auth via Router falls back to direct GPU /health probes.
master key) + Alertmanager + Zulip bridge (alerts-infra) added 2026-08-09. ⚠️ This contract is target-state aspirational — not as-built.
⚠️ This contract is target-state aspirational — but GPU export + alerting
are now as-built (verified 2026-08-09).
As-built GPU monitoring is via gpu-monitor contract (port 9100 poll). As-built GPU monitoring is via gpu-monitor contract (port 9100 poll).
version: 1.0.1 version: 1.0.0
--- ---
## Architecture ## Architecture
@@ -103,173 +101,58 @@ GPU .8 (RTX 3090) GPU .110 (RTX 5070) GPU .15 (Strix Halo)
## Execution ## Execution
### Liveness rule (scoped)
The any-HTTP-response rule applies ONLY to unauthenticated/auth-gated endpoints,
where any HTTP answer proves a listener is up: the PVE API
(`https://<node>:8006/api2/json/version`) and LiteLLM health
(`/litellm/health`, `301` → `/litellm/health/liveliness`). For those endpoints a
probe is **ALIVE** on **ANY** HTTP status — `401`/`403` auth challenges and `3xx`
redirects included — and **DOWN = connection refused (`000`) or timeout only**.
The PVE API legitimately answers `401` to an unauthenticated probe — that is the
healthy signal, not a failure. Same scoped rule as zulip-health (Tanko) and
gpu-monitor.
Probes whose success condition is specifically a bare `200` are NOT covered by
the any-HTTP rule. On those — the authenticated Zulip POST and the router
`/health` — an unexpected status (`401`/`403` from a bad or missing credential,
`5xx`, or anything other than the expected `200`) is an **ALERT**, not "alive".
**STANDING PROBE RULES (2026-09-14, from defect report 1150.msg):**
1. **Any HTTP status means ALIVE.** 200, 301, 302, 401, 403, 404 all prove the
service answered — report the code, never "down". A redirect is not a failure.
Only a failed CONNECTION (curl status 000, timeout, refused) is a failed probe,
and that is a statement about YOUR PROBE, not about the service.
2. **A failed probe is never a service verdict.** Print
`probe-failed: <target> <kind>` naming the exact URL/host/port and the failure
kind (timeout, refused, no-route, dns), retry once at a longer timeout, and only
then report. Apply the same shape as scripts/disk-gc-scan.py.
3. **Say which probe produced each number.** "Grafana: 000" is unusable;
"Grafana http://192.168.68.116:3001/api/health -> connection timeout after 10s
(retried at 25s: also timeout)" is actionable.
### check-health
**RUN LIVE, NEVER ECHO — every dispatch must execute the probes below with real
tool calls; never repeat a prior report unless a live probe fails.**
**PROBE SHAPE (per standing rules above):**
- Every probe prints the target name + URL + HTTP code (or failure kind)
- Retry once on connection failure at longer timeout
- Any HTTP status = ALIVE; only 000/timeout/refused = probe-failed
- Report the actual probe command and its result, not a summary verdict
```bash
# Provenance — run first; paste the absolute path into the report
pwd -P
# ============================================================
# 1. ZULIP API HEALTH (POST ping) — bare-200 probe
# ============================================================
# NOTE: /etc/litellm-monitor.env exists only on CT 116, retrieve keys from CT 116 via:
zulip_key=$(ssh root@192.168.68.116 "grep ZULIP_BOT_KEY /etc/litellm-monitor.env | cut -d= -f2")
if [ -z "$zulip_key" ]; then
echo "credential-missing: ZULIP_BOT_KEY not found in /etc/litellm-monitor.env"
else
ZULIP_USER="abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net"
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 10 -X POST https://chat.sysloggh.net/api/v1/messages -u "${ZULIP_USER}:${zulip_key}")
echo "Zulip API https://chat.sysloggh.net/api/v1/messages -> $code"
# Expected: 200 (bare-200 probe; any other status is an ALERT)
fi
# ============================================================
# 2. PM2 PROCESS HEALTH
# ============================================================
pm2 jlist
# Expected: 4/4 online (abiba-telegram, abiba-zulip, zulip-watchdog, gitea-runner)
# spoton-service removed 2026-09-14 (not in live set)
# ============================================================
# 3. GPU EXPORTERS — any-HTTP probe (metrics endpoint)
# ============================================================
# Probe /metrics (the Prometheus scrape target), not bare /
for host in 192.168.68.8 192.168.68.110 192.168.68.15; do
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 10 "http://$host:9400/metrics")
if [ "$code" == "000" ]; then
# Retry with longer timeout
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 25 "http://$host:9400/metrics")
echo "GPU exporter http://$host:9400/metrics -> probe-failed: timeout (retried at 25s: still $code)"
else
echo "GPU exporter http://$host:9400/metrics -> $code"
fi
done
# Expected: 200 on all 3 hosts (RTX 3090, RTX 5070, Strix Halo)
# ============================================================
# 4. ROUTER HEALTH (via nginx on port 80) — bare-200 probe
# ============================================================
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 10 http://192.168.68.116/health)
if [ "$code" == "000" ]; then
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 25 http://192.168.68.116/health)
echo "Router http://192.168.68.116/health -> probe-failed: timeout (retried at 25s: still $code)"
else
echo "Router http://192.168.68.116/health -> $code"
fi
# Expected: 200 (bare-200 probe; any other status is an ALERT)
# ============================================================
# 5. LITELLM HEALTH (via nginx on port 80) — any-HTTP probe
# ============================================================
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 10 http://192.168.68.116/litellm/health)
if [ "$code" == "000" ]; then
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 25 http://192.168.68.116/litellm/health)
echo "LiteLLM http://192.168.68.116/litellm/health -> probe-failed: timeout (retried at 25s: still $code)"
else
echo "LiteLLM http://192.168.68.116/litellm/health -> $code"
fi
# Expected: 301 → /litellm/health/liveliness (any HTTP status = ALIVE)
# ============================================================
# 6. PVE API LIVENESS — any-HTTP probe (auth-gated)
# ============================================================
# Probe the REAL PVE nodes on :8006, never the monitoring host CT 116.
for node in 192.168.68.9 192.168.68.5 192.168.68.15 192.168.68.6 192.168.68.12; do
code=$(curl -sk -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 10 "https://$node:8006/api2/json/version")
if [ "$code" == "000" ]; then
code=$(curl -sk -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 25 "https://$node:8006/api2/json/version")
echo "PVE API https://$node:8006/api2/json/version -> probe-failed: timeout (retried at 25s: still $code)"
else
echo "PVE API https://$node:8006/api2/json/version -> $code"
fi
done
# Expected: 401 on every node (acerpve .9, ocupve .5, amdpve .15, storepve .6, minipve .12)
# 401 is the EXPECTED healthy response (auth-gated); 000/timeout = DOWN
# ============================================================
# 7. PROMETHEUS TARGETS — bare-200 probe
# ============================================================
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 10 http://192.168.68.116:9090/api/v1/targets)
if [ "$code" == "000" ]; then
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 25 http://192.168.68.116:9090/api/v1/targets)
echo "Prometheus http://192.168.68.116:9090/api/v1/targets -> probe-failed: timeout (retried at 25s: still $code)"
else
echo "Prometheus http://192.168.68.116:9090/api/v1/targets -> $code"
fi
# Expected: 200 (bare-200 probe; any other status is an ALERT)
# ============================================================
# 8. GRAFANA HEALTH — any-HTTP probe
# ============================================================
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 10 http://192.168.68.116:3001/api/health)
if [ "$code" == "000" ]; then
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 25 http://192.168.68.116:3001/api/health)
echo "Grafana http://192.168.68.116:3001/api/health -> probe-failed: timeout (retried at 25s: still $code)"
else
echo "Grafana http://192.168.68.116:3001/api/health -> $code"
fi
# Expected: 200 (any HTTP status = ALIVE; 000/timeout = DOWN)
# ============================================================
# 9. LITELLM METRICS (Prometheus endpoint) — any-HTTP probe
# ============================================================
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 10 http://192.168.68.116:4000/metrics)
if [ "$code" == "000" ]; then
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 25 http://192.168.68.116:4000/metrics)
echo "LiteLLM metrics http://192.168.68.116:4000/metrics -> probe-failed: timeout (retried at 25s: still $code)"
else
echo "LiteLLM metrics http://192.168.68.116:4000/metrics -> $code"
fi
# Expected: 200 (any HTTP status = ALIVE; 000/timeout = DOWN)
```
**Report format**: Begin every report with the **absolute path the probe executed
from** (`pwd -P`) so a stale-consumer report is distinguishable from a real fault
at read time. For each probe, print the target name, the full URL, and the HTTP
code (or failure kind with retry details). Apply the standing probe rules: any
HTTP status = ALIVE; only 000/timeout/refused = probe-failed. A redirect is not
a failure.
### Phase 1: GPU Exporters ### Phase 1: GPU Exporters
**NVIDIA (.8 and .110)**: **NVIDIA (.8 and .110)**:
1. Download `nvidia_gpu_exporter` binary 1. Download `nvidia_gpu_exporter` binary
2. Create systemd service `nvidia-gpu-exporter.service`
3. Start and enable
**AMD (.15)**:
1. Create Python exporter script at `/opt/amdgpu-exporter/exporter.py`
2. Parses `amdgpu_top --json -d 1000` output
3. Exposes key metrics at `:9400/metrics` via Python http.server
4. Create systemd service
5. Start and enable
### Phase 2: Prometheus
1. Create `/opt/monitoring/` directory on CT 116
2. Write `prometheus.yml` with scrape configs for all targets
3. Add to docker-compose (or separate compose file)
4. Start container
### Phase 3: Grafana
1. Create `/opt/monitoring/grafana/` directories
2. Provision Prometheus datasource
3. Provision GPU fleet dashboard JSON
4. Provision LiteLLM dashboard JSON
5. Add to docker-compose
6. Start container
### Phase 4: Verification
1. Verify all 3 GPU exporters return 200 at :9400/metrics
2. Verify Prometheus targets all UP at :9090/targets
3. Verify Grafana accessible at :3001 with dashboards
4. Verify LiteLLM metrics flowing to Prometheus
5. ~~Update nginx to proxy `/monitoring/` → Grafana~~ (NOT recommended — nginx sub-path was tried for /grafana/ and reverted per proxmox-monitor; direct :3001 access is the standard)
## Verification Commands
```bash
# GPU exporters
curl -s http://192.168.68.8:9400/metrics | grep nvidia
curl -s http://192.168.68.110:9400/metrics | grep nvidia
curl -s http://192.168.68.15:9400/metrics | grep amdgpu
# Prometheus
curl -s http://192.168.68.116:9090/api/v1/targets
# Grafana
curl -s http://192.168.68.116:3001/api/health
# LiteLLM metrics (already live)
curl -s http://192.168.68.116:4001/metrics | head -20
```
+20 -116
View File
@@ -3,16 +3,15 @@ kind: responsibility
name: infrastructure-update name: infrastructure-update
description: > description: >
Autonomous system-wide update contract covering all 5 Proxmox nodes, Autonomous system-wide update contract covering all 5 Proxmox nodes,
15+ containers/VMs, and 5 Docker ecosystems (docker-vm .7, CT 116 .116, 15+ containers/VMs, and 4 Docker ecosystems. Updates apt packages,
CT 117, hwpve .11, NetBird VPS 72.61.0.17). Updates apt packages,
Docker images, and container stacks in safe waves with health checks Docker images, and container stacks in safe waves with health checks
and automatic rollback on failure. and automatic rollback on failure.
agent: abiba agent: abiba
triggers: triggers:
- on "infra update" command - on "infra update" command
- weekly (Sunday 03:00 America/New_York) via Agent Zero scheduler task "weekly-fleet-docker-update" (qSOOVzsU) — implemented 2026-09-08 - weekly (Sunday 03:00 EDT) via cron
- on security advisory relay from Mumuni - on security advisory relay from Mumuni
version: 1.4.0 version: 1.1.0
--- ---
## Maintains ## Maintains
@@ -28,12 +27,11 @@ Before ANY update wave:
2. ✅ All critical VMs/CTs running (VM 109 docker-vm, CT 116 syslog-api, CT 117 zulip, CT 106 ra-h-os) 2. ✅ All critical VMs/CTs running (VM 109 docker-vm, CT 116 syslog-api, CT 117 zulip, CT 106 ra-h-os)
3. ✅ GPU bare-metal hosts reachable: .8 (RTX 3090), .110 (RTX 5070), .15 (Strix Halo) 3. ✅ GPU bare-metal hosts reachable: .8 (RTX 3090), .110 (RTX 5070), .15 (Strix Halo)
4. ✅ Docker healthy on VM 109 (.7), CT 116 (.116) 4. ✅ Docker healthy on VM 109 (.7), CT 116 (.116)
5. ✅ LiteLLM health check passing (port 4000, /mcp-rest/tools/list with master key) 5. ✅ LiteLLM health check passing
6. ✅ LiteLLM MCP gateway serving RA-H OS tools (90 tools) 6. ✅ Zulip server reachable
7. ✅ Zulip server reachable 6. ✅ GPU fleet healthy (all 3 GPUs: RTX 3090, RTX 5070, RX 7600)
8. ✅ GPU fleet healthy (all 3 GPUs: RTX 3090, RTX 5070, RX 7600) 7. ✅ Disk >20% free on all nodes
9. ✅ Disk >20% free on all nodes 8. 📋 Snapshot critical configs (LiteLLM, nginx, docker-compose files)
10. 📋 Snapshot critical configs (LiteLLM, nginx, docker-compose files)
## Wave 1: Storage & Infra Nodes (lowest impact) ## Wave 1: Storage & Infra Nodes (lowest impact)
@@ -60,15 +58,14 @@ Before ANY update wave:
| CT 100 (.24) | Abiba (pi) | `apt update && apt upgrade -y` | 3 min | | CT 100 (.24) | Abiba (pi) | `apt update && apt upgrade -y` | 3 min |
| CT 116 (.116) | syslog-api (LiteLLM host) | `apt update && apt upgrade -y` | 3 min | | CT 116 (.116) | syslog-api (LiteLLM host) | `apt update && apt upgrade -y` | 3 min |
| CT 112 (tanko, amdpve) | Tanko | `apt update && apt upgrade -y` | 3 min | | CT 112 (tanko, amdpve) | Tanko | `apt update && apt upgrade -y` | 3 min |
| CT 105 (kagentz, minipve) | Mumuni | `apt update && apt upgrade -y` | 3 min | | CT 114 (mumuni, minipve) | Mumuni | `apt update && apt upgrade -y` | 3 min |
| VM 101 (.8) | llm-gpu (RTX 3090) | `apt update && apt upgrade -y` | 3 min | | VM 101 (.8) | llm-gpu (RTX 3090) | `apt update && apt upgrade -y` | 3 min |
| VM 103 (.110) | ocu-llm (RTX 5070) | `apt update && apt upgrade -y` | 3 min | | VM 103 (.110) | ocu-llm (RTX 5070) | `apt update && apt upgrade -y` | 3 min |
**Verify after Wave 2:** **Verify after Wave 2:**
- All VMs/CTs running: check via Proxmox API - All VMs/CTs running: check via Proxmox API
- LiteLLM healthy: `curl localhost:4000/health/liveliness` (via CT 116) - LiteLLM healthy: `curl localhost:4000/health/liveliness` (via CT 116)
- LiteLLM MCP tools: `curl localhost:4000/mcp-rest/tools/list -H "Authorization: Bearer $MASTER_KEY"` → 90 tools - GPU servers responding: check :8080 on VM 101, VM 103; check ornith via router (http://192.168.68.116/health/unified — .15:8080 is firewalled to .116 only)
- GPU servers responding: check :8080 on VM 101, VM 103; check strix-moe via router (http://192.168.68.116/health/unified — .15:8080 is firewalled to .116 only)
- Zulip agents connected: check Mumuni/Tanko gateway state - Zulip agents connected: check Mumuni/Tanko gateway state
- Abiba PM2 processes online: `pm2 status` - Abiba PM2 processes online: `pm2 status`
@@ -78,78 +75,30 @@ Before ANY update wave:
|------|-------|---------| |------|-------|---------|
| VM 109 (.7) | Firecrawl | `cd /opt/search-stack/firecrawl-source && docker compose pull && docker compose up -d` | | VM 109 (.7) | Firecrawl | `cd /opt/search-stack/firecrawl-source && docker compose pull && docker compose up -d` |
| VM 109 (.7) | SearXNG | `cd /opt/search-stack/searxng && docker compose pull && docker compose up -d` | | VM 109 (.7) | SearXNG | `cd /opt/search-stack/searxng && docker compose pull && docker compose up -d` |
| VM 109 (.7) | Home stack (Pulse, Stirling PDF) — JDownloader moved to CT 118 LXC 2026-08-01 | `cd /opt/home_stack && docker compose pull && docker compose up -d` | | VM 109 (.7) | Home stack (Pulse, Stirling PDF, JDownloader 2) | `cd /opt/home_stack && docker compose pull && docker compose up -d` |
| VM 109 (.7) | Audiobookshelf | `cd /opt/audiobookshelf && docker compose pull && docker compose up -d` | | VM 109 (.7) | Audiobookshelf | `cd /opt/audiobookshelf && docker compose pull && docker compose up -d` |
| CT 116 (.116) | Inference Harness (LiteLLM, Prometheus, Grafana) | `cd /opt/inference-harness && docker compose pull && docker compose up -d` | | CT 116 (.116) | Inference Harness (LiteLLM, Prometheus, Grafana) | `cd /opt/inference-harness && docker compose pull && docker compose up -d` |
| CT 116 (.116, via minipve) | Trove docker agent (trove-agent-docker) | `pct exec 116 -- bash -c 'cd /opt/trove-agent && docker compose pull && docker compose up -d'` | | CT 117 (zulip, storepve) | Zulip | `docker pull zulip/docker-zulip:latest && docker restart zulip-zulip-1` |
| CT 117 (storepve) | Zulip | `pct exec 117 -- bash -c 'cd /opt/zulip && docker compose pull && docker compose up -d'` (from storepve; compose recreates on zulip_default network) |
| CT 117 (storepve) | Jitsi | `pct exec 117 -- bash -c 'cd /opt/jitsi && docker compose pull && docker compose up -d'` (from storepve) |
| hwpve (.11) | Authentik (server, worker, postgres) | `ssh root@192.168.68.11 'cd /root && docker compose pull && docker compose up -d'` |
| NetBird VPS (72.61.0.17) | NetBird (server, dashboard, proxy, traefik, crowdsec) | `ssh root@72.61.0.17 'cd /root && docker compose pull && docker compose up -d'` |
| VM 109 (.7) | Trove test | `cd /opt/trove-test && docker compose pull && docker compose up -d` |
| VM 109 (.7) | docker-stats | `cd /opt/docker-stats && docker compose pull && docker compose up -d` |
| CT 116 (.116) | Monitoring (Grafana, Prometheus, Alertmanager, PVE exporter) | `cd /opt/monitoring && docker compose pull && docker compose up -d` |
**Verify after Wave 3:** **Verify after Wave 3:**
- All containers healthy: `docker ps` on each host - All containers healthy: `docker ps` on each host
- End-to-end inference test: `curl localhost:4000/v1/chat/completions` (via CT 116) with syslog-auto - End-to-end inference test: `curl localhost:4000/v1/chat/completions` (via CT 116) with syslog-auto
- MCP integration test: `curl localhost:4000/mcp-rest/tools/list -H "Authorization: Bearer $MASTER_KEY"` → 90 tools (23 RA-H OS + 67 GitHub)
- Zulip test: send test message to #agent-hub - Zulip test: send test message to #agent-hub
- Dashboard loading: `curl localhost:3001/` (via CT 116) - Dashboard loading: `curl localhost:3001/` (via CT 116)
- Firecrawl test: `curl -X POST http://192.168.68.7:3002/v1/search -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"query":"health","limit":1}'` → `"success":true` (GET `/` returns 200) - Firecrawl test: `curl :3002/`
- Authentik test: `curl http://192.168.68.11:9000/` → 302 redirect to login
- NetBird test: `curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' https://netbird.sysloggh.net/` → 200
- harness-litellm cold start: allow 3-5 min after recreate — reports unhealthy and :4000 refuses connections while loading config/DB, then recovers to 200 on its own (verified 2026-09-08)
- SearXNG test: `curl :8888` - SearXNG test: `curl :8888`
- Digest-pin sweep: `grep -rn '@sha256:' /opt/*/docker-compose.y*` on every host — digest-pinned images are INVISIBLE to `docker compose pull` (the pin re-pulls the same digest forever, so new releases never appear). Flag every pin in the run report and propose un-pinning to a floating tag with user approval before editing. Found 2026-09-10: audiobookshelf was digest-pinned at 2.34.0 (container created 2026-07-18) and silently missed by every sweep; dockhand stack was also pinned (stack removed 2026-09-10, unused). After un-pinning audiobookshelf to :latest it updated to 2.36.0 and verified HTTP 200.
- Version-pin awareness: a fixed version tag (e.g. `image: ...litellm:1.99.1`) is a no-op for `docker compose pull` just like a digest pin, so the stack silently stops advancing. CT 116 `harness-litellm` is INTENTIONALLY pinned to `1.99.1` (registry `main-stable`/`latest` currently resolve to `1.100.1`, sha256:a3715fa7 — a bleeding-edge jump explicitly declined 2026-09-11). Every run must look up the newest STABLE release tag for any version-pinned image, bump the pin deliberately with user approval, recreate, and re-verify. Never silently revert a pin to a floating tag.
## Wave 4: Proxmox Kernel Reboot ## Wave 4: Proxmox Kernel Reboot (if needed)
Only if `[ -f /var/run/reboot-required ]` on any node. Only if `[ -f /var/run/reboot-required ]` on any node.
| Target | Action | | Target | Action |
|--------|--------| |--------|--------|
| Affected PVE node | Verify all CTs/VMs migrated or stopped | | Affected PVE node | Verify all CTs/VMs migrated or stopped |
| | `reboot` via PVE API (or `systemctl reboot -f` if dbus fails) | | | `reboot` via PVE API |
| | Wait 120s for node to come back | | | Wait 120s for node to come back |
| | Start any stopped CTs | | | Start any stopped CTs |
### Post-reboot sweep (known gaps)
After every node reboot, run these checks:
1. **CT auto-start sweep** — LXC containers sometimes don't start despite
`onboot: 1`. Check every CT on the rebooted node and start any left stopped:
```bash
pct list | awk '/stopped/{print $1}' | xargs -I{} pct start {}
```
Known cases: scottdenya (CT 115 on amdpve), authentik (CT 104 on minipve).
2. **Zulip recovery** — When docker-vm or storepve reboots, the Zulip main
container loses its Docker network assignment (SIGKILL during storage
outage detaches it from `zulip_default` network). Run:
```bash
ssh root@192.168.68.19 'docker rm -f zulip-zulip-1 && cd /opt/zulip && docker compose up -d'
```
The compose restart recreates the container on the correct network.
3. **docker-vm Docker daemon** — After reboot, Docker can take 3-4 minutes
to become `active`. The docker-proxy for Pulse (port 7655) starts early,
so Pulse is accessible before `docker ps` reports ready. Wait for Docker
before checking other stacks.
### VPS ↔ docker-vm tunnel
After any VPS or docker-vm reboot, verify the dedicated WireGuard tunnel:
```bash
ssh root@72.61.0.17 'wg show wg1' | grep "latest handshake"
# If no handshake in >60s:
ssh root@72.61.0.17 'wg-quick up wg1'
```
The tunnel uses PersistentKeepalive=25 and is systemd-enabled, but should
be verified after a reboot.
## Rollback Protocol ## Rollback Protocol
If ANY verification fails: If ANY verification fails:
@@ -163,64 +112,20 @@ If ANY verification fails:
Before Wave 1, snapshot these files: Before Wave 1, snapshot these files:
``` ```
/opt/inference-harness/docker-compose.yml (CT 116 .116) ⚡ contains MCP_SERVER env vars /opt/inference-harness/docker-compose.yml (CT 116 .116)
/opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml (CT 116 .116) ⚡ contains mcp_servers.ra_h_os /opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml (CT 116 .116)
/opt/monitoring/prometheus.yml (CT 116 .116) /opt/monitoring/prometheus.yml (CT 116 .116)
/etc/nginx/nginx.conf (harness-nginx on CT 116) /etc/nginx/nginx.conf (harness-nginx on CT 116)
/opt/search-stack/firecrawl-source/docker-compose.yaml (VM 109 .7) /opt/search-stack/firecrawl-source/docker-compose.yaml (VM 109 .7)
/opt/search-stack/searxng/docker-compose.yml (VM 109 .7) /opt/search-stack/searxng/docker-compose.yml (VM 109 .7)
/opt/home_stack/docker-compose.yml (VM 109 .7) /opt/home_stack/docker-compose.yml (VM 109 .7)
/opt/audiobookshelf/docker-compose.yml (VM 109 .7) /opt/audiobookshelf/docker-compose.yml (VM 109 .7)
/root/compose.yml (hwpve .11 — Authentik server/worker/postgres)
/root/docker-compose.yml (NetBird VPS — netbird server/dashboard/proxy, traefik, crowdsec)
/root/.pi/agent/extensions/config.yaml (CT 100 .24) /root/.pi/agent/extensions/config.yaml (CT 100 .24)
/etc/systemd/system/strix-server.service (amdpve .15 — strix-moe) /etc/systemd/system/ornith-server.service (amdpve .15)
/etc/systemd/system/llama-server.service (VM 101 .8, VM 103 .110) /etc/systemd/system/llama-server.service (VM 101 .8, VM 103 .110)
# Hermes agent configs (key enforcement — 2026-07-10)
/home/hermes/.hermes/config.yaml (Mumuni kagentz CT105; Tanko CT112 uses /home/jerome/.hermes)
/etc/systemd/system/hermes-gateway.service (Mumuni kagentz CT105 — system unit, User=hermes)
/etc/environment (LITELLM_API_KEY — legacy path, Mumuni now keys via Infisical)
``` ```
## MCP Gateway (2026-07-10) Run: `mkdir -p /tmp/infra-update-backup-$(date +%Y%m%d) && rsync -av ...`
LiteLLM CT 116 now serves as an authenticated MCP gateway for RA-H OS tools.
### Configuration
**litellm_config.yaml** (`/opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml`):
```yaml
mcp_servers:
ra_h_os:
url: "http://192.168.68.65:3100/mcp"
transport: "http"
auth_type: "none"
```
**docker-compose.yml** env vars:
```yaml
- MCP_SERVER_RAHOS_URL=http://192.168.68.65:3100/mcp
- MCP_SERVER_RAHOS_TRANSPORT=http
```
### Access
| Key | MCP Access |
|-----|-----------|
| Master key | ✅ Full — 90 tools (vault-injected) |
| Agent keys (mumuni, tanko, etc.) | ❌ Per-key grants not supported in v1.99.1 |
### Known Limitations
- Per-key MCP server grants not functional — only master key has access
- Responses API (`/v1/responses`) with MCP tools broken on llama.cpp backends
- HTTP 307 redirect on `/mcp` → use `/mcp/` (trailing slash) or `/mcp-rest/` endpoints
- `api_mode: responses` in Hermes appends `/v1/responses` to base_url → **base_url must end at `/v1`, never `/responses`** (double-path bug)
### Migration Path
When LiteLLM is upgraded to a version supporting per-key MCP grants:
1. Grant agent keys `mcp_servers: ["ra_h_os"]`
2. Update Hermes `mcp_servers.ra-h-os.url` from `http://192.168.68.65:3100/mcp` → `http://192.168.68.116:4000/mcp/`
3. Add `headers: {x-litellm-api-key: "Bearer $LITELLM_API_KEY"}` to MCP config
## Security-Specific Updates ## Security-Specific Updates
@@ -235,11 +140,10 @@ When LiteLLM is upgraded to a version supporting per-key MCP grants:
- [ ] All 5 PVE nodes updated, no reboot-loop - [ ] All 5 PVE nodes updated, no reboot-loop
- [ ] All VMs/CTs running post-update - [ ] All VMs/CTs running post-update
- [ ] All Docker containers healthy (VM 109 + CT 116 + CT 117 + hwpve .11 + NetBird VPS) - [ ] All Docker containers healthy (VM 109 + CT 116 + CT 117)
- [ ] LiteLLM inference passing (syslog-auto test) - [ ] LiteLLM inference passing (syslog-auto test)
- [ ] Zulip server + all 3 agents connected - [ ] Zulip server + all 3 agents connected
- [ ] GPU fleet at full capacity (3/3) - [ ] GPU fleet at full capacity (3/3)
- [ ] LiteLLM MCP gateway healthy (90 tools via master key)
- [ ] Zero security CVEs remaining - [ ] Zero security CVEs remaining
- [ ] <10 min total downtime per service - [ ] <10 min total downtime per service
+11 -291
View File
@@ -8,32 +8,10 @@ description: >
Ensures agents never use the master key directly. Rotation is event-driven, Ensures agents never use the master key directly. Rotation is event-driven,
not calendar-driven — rotate only on compromise, personnel change, or not calendar-driven — rotate only on compromise, personnel change, or
periodic security hygiene (quarterly/annually). periodic security hygiene (quarterly/annually).
UPDATED 2026-07-12: Keys are stored in Infisical vault (project=agents, env=production)
BUT each agent host MUST keep a local .env fallback. Infisical service tokens can
expire/404. The .env fallback prevents agents from running without keys.
Tanko incident: token 404 → gateway had no LITELLM_API_KEY for hours.
UPDATED 2026-07-16: Vault is SYNCED (session-13 keys written to vault via abiba service
token, all validate 200). Koby/Koonimo migrated from hardcoded drop-ins to the
infisical-gateway.sh wrapper (live vault injection). 4/5 agents now vault-backed.
Canonical process: see § Production Vault Access Process. Tanko (user jerome) pending.
Abiba's key is now a proper agent key (NOT the master key — stale note removed).
UPDATED 2026-07-17: FLEET-WIDE STANDARDIZATION. All 4 agents (Mumuni, Tanko, Koby, Koonimo)
standardized on a single pattern: systemd drop-in (ExecStart= reset + wrapper path) →
infisical-gateway.sh while-true loop → /usr/bin/infisical run --token → bash -c key
injection → .env fallback → exec python. Systemd drop-ins are IMMUNE to hermes gateway
install which overwrites the unit file ExecStart. Infisical CLI updated to 0.43.109 on
all agents (was 0.38.0). Service token st.8e848433 shared across fleet (st.353699cd
for tanko was deleted). .env fallback on every agent protects against token loss.
Critical lessons: (1) NEVER use shell variables inside single-quoted bash -c in wrappers
— hardcode absolute paths. (2) Drop-ins override unit file ExecStart permanently.
(3) Capture /proc/<pid>/environ before gateway restarts to preserve running env set.
Current key inventory and agent list: see gpu-fleet.prose.md § Agent Keys. Current key inventory and agent list: see gpu-fleet.prose.md § Agent Keys.
Source of truth for LiteLLM config: /opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml Source of truth for LiteLLM config: /opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml
on CT 116. Last verified: 2026-07-17. on CT 116. Last verified: 2026-07-09.
--- ---
## Parameters ## Parameters
@@ -41,10 +19,7 @@ description: >
- agent_name: string — The agent to manage keys for (e.g., "tanko", "mumuni") - agent_name: string — The agent to manage keys for (e.g., "tanko", "mumuni")
- action: "create" | "rotate" | "verify" | "list" — What to do (default: "create") - action: "create" | "rotate" | "verify" | "list" — What to do (default: "create")
- litellm_host: string — LiteLLM admin endpoint (default: "192.168.68.116:4000") - litellm_host: string — LiteLLM admin endpoint (default: "192.168.68.116:4000")
- master_key: string — LiteLLM master key (default from Infisical vault: project=infrastructure, env=production, secret=LITELLM_MASTER_KEY) - master_key: string — LiteLLM master key (default from environment)
- vault_url: string — Infisical vault URL (default: "https://vault.sysloggh.net")
- vault_project: string — Infisical project slug (default: "infrastructure")
- vault_env: string — Infisical environment (default: "production")
- agent_host: string — Agent's IP for SSH (default: resolved from infra) - agent_host: string — Agent's IP for SSH (default: resolved from infra)
- agent_user: string — SSH user (default: "jerome") - agent_user: string — SSH user (default: "jerome")
@@ -55,283 +30,28 @@ description: >
- key_prefix: string — First 10 chars of the new key (for identification) - key_prefix: string — First 10 chars of the new key (for identification)
- previous_key_alias: string | null — Previous key alias if rotating - previous_key_alias: string | null — Previous key alias if rotating
- litellm_response: object — Raw response from LiteLLM /key/generate - litellm_response: object — Raw response from LiteLLM /key/generate
- vault_updated: boolean — Whether Infisical vault secret was updated - agent_config_updated: boolean — Whether /etc/environment was updated
- agent_config_updated: boolean — Legacy: whether /etc/environment was updated (deprecated, always false post-migration)
- verification: { status: string, detail: string } — Final health check - verification: { status: string, detail: string } — Final health check
## Execution ## Execution
1. **Authenticate** — Retrieve master key from Infisical vault via `infisical export --project=<vault_project> --env=<vault_env>`, verify against LiteLLM /key/list 1. **Authenticate** — Verify master_key works against LiteLLM /key/list
2. **Check existing keys** — List all keys, find any with agent_name alias 2. **Check existing keys** — List all keys, find any with agent_name alias
3. **If action == "list"**: Return all keys with their aliases and spend 3. **If action == "list"**: Return all keys with their aliases and spend
4. **If action == "create"**: 4. **If action == "create"**:
- Generate new key with key_alias: "{agent_name}" (e.g., "tanko" — bare name, no date) - Generate new key with key_alias: "{agent_name}" (e.g., "tanko" — bare name, no date)
- Set metadata: { "agent": "{agent_name}", "purpose": "agent-inference" } - Set metadata: { "agent": "{agent_name}", "purpose": "agent-inference" }
- Duration is whatever the caller passes; NO default enforcement exists today (CT 116 `litellm_config.yaml` has no `default_key_generate_params` block, and a key with no explicit models returns an empty models list). Agent keys are permanent by policy, not by that block. OPEN policy question: should agent keys expire by default? (captain security-policy decision, raised separately.) - Duration is null (permanent) — inherited from litellm default_key_generate_params
- Set models: read the live key-scoped set rather than hardcoding one — `/v1/models` is key-scoped, - Set models: ["syslog-auto", "qwen3.6-27B-code", "gemma-4-12b", "ornith-1.0-35b"]
and the authoritative registry is CT 116 `/opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml`. Do not add - Note: qwen3.6-35B-A3B removed from fleet (was never deployed on any GPU)
retired names (`gemma-4-12b`, `gpu-light`, `crew-auto` — all retired 2026-09-12).
- Note: `ornith-1.0-35b` is NOT a valid LiteLLM model name (use `strix-moe`, the stable alias). qwen3.6-35B-A3B removed from fleet (was never deployed).
- Return the new key - Return the new key
5. **If action == "rotate"**: 5. **If action == "rotate"**:
- Generate new key with same alias (LiteLLM replaces the old key) - Generate new key with same alias (LiteLLM replaces the old key)
- Update secret in Infisical vault: `infisical secrets set LITELLM_API_KEY=<new_key> --project=<vault_project> --env=<vault_env>` - SSH to agent_host, update /etc/environment LITELLM_API_KEY
- Restart agent gateway (Hermes: `systemctl restart hermes-gateway`; pi: restart PM2 process) - Restart agent gateway (hermes gateway restart for Hermes agents)
The gateway automatically picks up the new key via `infisical run --` wrapper
- Verify: curl test against /v1/models with new key - Verify: curl test against /v1/models with new key
- Rotation policy: on-demand only (compromise, departure, quarterly hygiene) - Rotation policy: on-demand only (compromise, departure, quarterly hygiene)
- Note: /etc/environment is NO LONGER used for LiteLLM keys. Agents inject keys at runtime via vault wrapper.
6. **If action == "verify"**: 6. **If action == "verify"**:
- Retrieve key from Infisical vault: `infisical secrets get LITELLM_API_KEY --project=<vault_project> --env=<vault_env>` - SSH to agent, read /etc/environment
- Test the key against LiteLLM /v1/models - Test the key against LiteLLM /v1/models
- Confirm key alias matches agent_name in LiteLLM key list - Confirm key alias matches agent_name in LiteLLM key list
- Verify agent gateway uses vault wrapper: `cat /proc/<pid>/cmdline` shows `infisical run`
## Production Vault Access Process (canonical, 2026-07-17)
The non-fail approach to agentic vault access. Deployed on all 4 Hermes agents
(Mumuni, Tanko, Koby, Koonimo) as of 2026-07-17. Abiba (pi) uses a similar pattern
through its agent wrapper.
### The canonical pattern
1. **infisical CLI** installed on the host at `/usr/bin/infisical` (v0.43.109+, from
artifacts-cli.infisical.com apt repo). Update procedure:
```bash
curl -1sLf 'https://artifacts-cli.infisical.com/setup.deb.sh' | sudo -E bash
sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y infisical
# Remove stale old binary if present
rm -f /usr/local/bin/infisical /bin/infisical
```
Wrappers use absolute path `/usr/bin/infisical run`. Never rely on PATH resolution.
2. **Service token** (Infisical Machine Identity, `st.…`) stored at `~/.infisical-token`
(`chmod 600`). Current: shared `st.8e848433…` (abiba, READ+WRITE on agents project).
Tanko's `st.353699cd…` (tanko-agent) was deleted — reverted to shared token.
Proper: one machine identity per agent (create in Infisical UI → Project Settings →
Machine Identities).
3. **`infisical-gateway.sh` wrapper** at `~/.hermes/infisical-gateway.sh` (`chmod 700`):
```bash
#!/bin/bash
export INFISICAL_API_URL="https://vault.sysloggh.net"
TOKEN=$(cat $HOME/.infisical-token)
LOG=$HOME/.hermes/logs/gateway.log; mkdir -p $HOME/.hermes/logs
while true; do
echo "[$(date -Iseconds)] Starting gateway with Infisical injection..." >> $LOG
/usr/bin/infisical run --token="$TOKEN" \
--projectId=322fceab-39da-4854-a55a-568e76c0f13f \
--env=prod --domain=https://vault.sysloggh.net -- bash -c '
. $HOME/.hermes/.env 2>/dev/null # [FALLBACK Rule 3]
export LITELLM_API_KEY="${<AGENT>_LITELLM_API_KEY}"
export ZULIP_API_KEY="${<AGENT>_ZULIP_API_KEY}"
export ZULIP_SITE="https://chat.sysloggh.net"
export ZULIP_EMAIL="<agent>-bot@chat.sysloggh.net"
export SEARXNG_URL="http://192.168.68.7:8888"
# ⚠️ HARDCODE the full venv path. NEVER use $VENV inside single quotes.
exec /root/.hermes/hermes-agent/venv/bin/python -m hermes_cli.main gateway run
' >> $LOG 2>&1
EXIT_CODE=$?
echo "[$(date -Iseconds)] Gateway exited with code $EXIT_CODE — restarting in 5s..." >> $LOG
sleep 5
done
```
**CRITICAL: VENV PATH.** The inner `bash -c '...'` uses single quotes. Shell
variables set in the outer wrapper are NOT expanded inside single quotes.
`$VENV/bin/python` resolves to `/bin/python` (file not found). Always hardcode
the absolute path to the venv python binary.
4. **Agent key in vault** as `<AGENT>_LITELLM_API_KEY` and `<AGENT>_ZULIP_API_KEY`.
Vault = source of truth for ALL platform credentials.
5. **`.env` fallback** at `~/.hermes/.env` (`chmod 600`) with agent-specific keys —
safety net for vault outage or token revocation. Must be kept in sync on rotation.
Example:
```bash
MUMUNI_LITELLM_API_KEY=sk-OzuWsoX22Hmb3Ps3JY01gw
MUMUNI_ZULIP_API_KEY=H8dY6V7aHmWNcfgNtJaDBPZ1dGWn0Ttt
```
6. **systemd drop-in** at `~/.config/systemd/user/hermes-gateway.service.d/50-vault-wrapper.conf`:
```ini
[Service]
ExecStart=
ExecStart=/root/.hermes/infisical-gateway.sh
```
The `ExecStart=` (empty reset) clears any ExecStart from the main unit file,
then the second `ExecStart=` sets the wrapper. This drop-in **survives unit file
regeneration** by `hermes gateway install` — the drop-in always wins.
**Why a drop-in instead of editing the unit file:** `hermes gateway install`
(called during Hermes updates and some self-heal operations) regenerates the
systemd unit file with `ExecStart=/path/to/python -m hermes_cli.main gateway run`.
Editing the unit file directly is futile — it will be overwritten. The drop-in
approach explicitly resets ExecStart and sets the wrapper regardless of what the
main unit file says.
7. **NEVER hardcode** API keys in systemd drop-ins, config.yaml, or /etc/environment.
The wrapper injects live from vault at every start.
### Why this is non-fail
- **No rot**: keys pulled live from vault at every gateway start. Rotation = one `infisical secrets set` + `systemctl restart`. No per-host file edits.
- **Survives vault outage**: the `.env` fallback (Rule 3) keeps the gateway running if Infisical is unreachable or the service token is revoked.
- **Survives gateway crash**: the wrapper's `while true` + systemd `Restart=always` revive the gateway. Two-layer defense.
- **Survives Hermes updates**: systemd drop-in overrides unit file ExecStart — `hermes gateway install` cannot break the vault injection.
- **Survives reboot**: systemd user service + `loginctl enable-linger` ensures gateway starts at boot without a login session.
- **Auditable**: `cat /proc/$(pgrep -f 'python.*hermes_cli.main.gateway.run' | grep -v infisical | head -1)/environ` shows all injected keys (note: pipe through grep -v infisical to avoid matching the bash wrapper); `infisical secrets` shows the vault source.
### Migration status (2026-07-17)
| Agent | Host | Pattern | Keys | Status |
|-------|------|---------|------|--------|
| abiba | .24 | pi agent wrapper | ABIBA_LITELLM_API_KEY + ABIBA_ZULIP_API_KEY | ✅ vault-backed |
| mumuni | .14 (kagentz CT105) | systemd unit hermes-gateway.service (user hermes) | MUMUNI_LITELLM_API_KEY + MUMUNI_ZULIP_API_KEY | ✅ vault-backed + .env fallback |
| tanko | .122 | systemd drop-in + while-true wrapper + st.8e848433 (user jerome) | TANKO_LITELLM_API_KEY + TANKO_ZULIP_API_KEY | ✅ vault-backed + .env fallback |
| koby | .129 | systemd drop-in + while-true wrapper + st.8e848433 | KOBY_LITELLM_API_KEY, shares TANKO_ZULIP_API_KEY (tanko-bot) | ✅ vault-backed |
| koonimo | .114 | systemd drop-in + while-true wrapper + st.8e848433 | KOONIMO_LITELLM_API_KEY + KOONIMO_ZULIP_API_KEY | ✅ vault-backed |
> Tanko runs as user `jerome` — wrapper/token at `~/.hermes/infisical-gateway.sh` and
> `~/.infisical-token`. Linger enabled (`loginctl enable-linger jerome`) for boot startup.
### Tanko migration (COMPLETED 2026-07-17)
Tanko was the last agent migrated from hardcoded keys to vault wrapper.
Previously: key hardcoded in `/home/jerome/.hermes/config.yaml` (`api_key: sk-CggiHWlamQy…`)
and `zulip-env.conf` systemd drop-in. Now: user-scope systemd service with drop-in
`50-vault-wrapper.conf`, `infisical-gateway.sh` wrapper with while-true loop, token at
`~/.infisical-token`, `.env` fallback at `~/.hermes/.env`. Keys injected live from vault.
### Koby migration lessons (2026-07-16, updated 2026-07-17)
Migrated Koby from hardcoded systemd drop-in → `infisical-gateway.sh` wrapper.
**Three mistakes made:**
1. **Overwrote `/root/.hermes/.env`** without backing it up. The Zulip API key only existed
in the running process memory — the old .env was minimal (just LiteLLM key). Zulip creds were
inherited from the pre-migration gateway env, not stored in any file. Lost on restart.
2. **Only injected `LITELLM_API_KEY`** in the wrapper — forgot Zulip + Telegram credentials.
Agents need ALL their platform env vars. Missing vars cause silent adapter failures.
3. (2026-07-17 fix) **VENV variable in single-quoted bash -c**: `exec "$VENV/bin/python"`
inside single quotes resolved to `exec "/bin/python"` (file not found). Hardcoded full path.
**How Koby actually connects:**
- Zulip: shares **Tanko's bot** (`tanko-bot@chat.sysloggh.net`, `TANKO_ZULIP_API_KEY=5PeD6f3zo…`).
- Telegram: token from `.env` fallback. Allowed users: 6679773481.
- Both platforms now connect through the wrapper's env injection.
**Golden rules for gateway restarts:**
1. Always `cat /proc/<pid>/environ` before killing the old process — captures the live env set.
2. Hardcode venv python path in wrapper — never use variables inside single-quoted bash -c.
3. Use systemd drop-ins (not unit file edits) to override ExecStart — survives Hermes updates.
### Fleet-wide standardization lessons (2026-07-17)
After auditing all 4 agents, five systemic patterns caused repeated failures:
1. **Three incompatible startup patterns** coexisted (systemd drop-in, direct python, orphaned wrapper)
2. **Systemd unit files reverted** by `hermes gateway install` during updates
3. **VENV variable scoping** broke wrappers on Koby and Mumuni (single-quote bash -c)
4. **Service token expiry** — Tanko's `st.353699cd` was deleted from Infisical
5. **No ZULIP_API_KEY** in env on Tanko — wrapper bypassed by systemd direct python
All resolved by the canonical drop-in + while-true wrapper pattern documented above.
### Key rotation procedure (one vault operation with this standard)
1. Generate new key: `POST /key/generate` (master key, admin).
2. Update vault: `infisical secrets set <AGENT>_LITELLM_API_KEY=sk-NEW --token=$TOKEN --projectId=322fceab… --env=prod --domain=https://vault.sysloggh.net`.
3. Update `.env` fallback: `echo '<AGENT>_LITELLM_API_KEY=sk-NEW' > /root/.hermes/.env && chmod 600 /root/.hermes/.env`.
4. Restart: `systemctl restart hermes-gateway`. The wrapper pulls the new key live.
5. Verify: `curl -H "Authorization: Bearer sk-NEW" http://192.168.68.116/v1/models` → 200.
## Machine Identity for Vault Writes (UPDATED 2026-07-17)
**Current state:** Infisical CLI updated to v0.43.109 on all agents (from v0.38.0).
The v0.38.0 bug (user-session auth fails for `secrets set`/`export`) is resolved.
Service token `st.8e848433…` (abiba, READ+WRITE) can write to vault from CLI.
**Proper fix — per-agent Machine Identities:**
Create machine identities in Infisical UI → Project Settings → Machine Identities
for each agent with READ-only scope on the `agents` project. Store client_id +
client_secret per agent. Then vault writes use the shared abiba identity, and
reads use per-agent identities. This eliminates the single shared token risk.
**Service Token Inventory (2026-07-17):**
| Token ID | Name | Permissions | Used By | Status |
|----------|------|-------------|---------|--------|
| `st.8e848433…` | tanko-gateway | READ+WRITE | Mumuni, Tanko, Koby, Koonimo, Abiba | ✅ Active |
| `st.353699cd…` | tanko-agent | READ-only | — | ❌ Deleted from Infisical |
**Per-agent .env fallback inventory (2026-07-17):**
| Agent | .env Keys |
|-------|-----------|
| Mumuni | MUMUNI_LITELLM_API_KEY, MUMUNI_ZULIP_API_KEY |
|| Tanko | TANKO_LITELLM_API_KEY, TANKO_ZULIP_API_KEY |
|| Koby | (wrapper injects from vault — .env has Telegram token) |
|| Koonimo | KOONIMO_LITELLM_API_KEY, KOONIMO_ZULIP_API_KEY |
|| Agent Zero (kagentz .14) | OPENROUTER_API_KEY (direct OpenRouter access) |
### Agent Zero (kagentz .14) — OpenRouter Integration (2026-09-01)
Agent Zero runs in Docker on kagentz (CT105) and uses **direct OpenRouter API access**,
not via the LiteLLM proxy. This is because Agent Zero's workflow (self-update manager,
UI bootstrap, model selection) is built around OpenRouter's native authentication.
**Key Storage:**
- **Container**: `/a0/usr/.env` (line ~72: `API_KEY_OPENROUTER=sk-or-v1-…`)
- **Vault**: Infisical secret `OPENROUTER_API_KEY` (project=agents, env=production)
- **Fallback**: The container's .env is the primary source; vault sync is optional
(unlike fleet agents which require vault injection)
**Current Key (2026-09-01):**
- **Prefix**: `sk-or-v1-0af3f3…`
- **User**: `user_2rt9lCqcd5d7Vk1t18DHsvWdPTT`
- **Plan**: Paid (not free tier)
- **Usage**: 0 (as of 2026-09-01)
**Model Configuration:**
- **Preset**: "Cost Efficient" (`/a0/usr/plugins/_model_config/presets.yaml`)
- **Model**: `openrouter/moonshotai/kimi-k3`
- **API Base**: (empty — uses OpenRouter default)
**Why not LiteLLM proxy?**
Agent Zero's architecture was designed before the fleet adopted the LiteLLM proxy
standard. The container runs `/exe/self_update_manager.py` and `/a0/run_ui.py` which
directly call OpenRouter via Python's requests library. Converting would require:
1. Refactoring all LLM calls to use `litellm` library
2. Adding vault wrapper injection
3. Updating self_update_manager to use proxy-aware key handling
**Rotation Procedure:**
1. Generate new key in OpenRouter UI
2. Update container: `sed -i 's/^API_KEY_OPENROUTER=.*/API_KEY_OPENROUTER=<new_key>/' /a0/usr/.env`
3. Update vault: `infisical secrets set OPENROUTER_API_KEY=<new_key> --projectId=agents --env=production`
4. Restart container: `sudo docker exec agent-zero supervisorctl restart run_ui`
5. Verify: `curl -s https://openrouter.ai/api/v1/auth/key -H "Authorization: Bearer <new_key>"`
**Related Contract:**
- `agent-zero-openrouter-key.prose.md` — Full agent-zero key management contract
## Key Rotation Log
| Date | Agent | Action | Notes |
|------|-------|--------|-------|
| 2026-07-17 | fleet | standardize | All 4 agents standardized on systemd drop-in + while-true wrapper + infisical v0.43.109. Removed conflicting zulip-env.conf + litellm-key.conf drop-ins. Added .env fallbacks with ZULIP keys. WAL #1322. |
| 2026-07-17 | tanko | fix-zulip | Added ZULIP_API_KEY to env (was missing — systemd bypassed vault). Updated wrapper from exec to while-true. Created .env fallback. Removed hardcoded zulip-env.conf drop-in. WAL #1321. |
| 2026-07-16 | vault | cleanup | 4 stale secrets deprecated. 5 personal creds flagged. |
| 2026-07-16 | koonimo | add-zulip | Added KOONIMO_ZULIP_API_KEY to vault. Wrapper injects ZULIP_API_KEY + ZULIP_EMAIL. 3 platforms. |
| 2026-07-16 | tanko | migrate | Migrated from hardcoded config.yaml to infisical-gateway.sh + st.353699cd. NOTE: st.353699cd later deleted — reverted to st.8e848433 on 2026-07-17. |
| 2026-07-16 | mumuni | rotate | Old key malformed (sk-_SWAl_Vu_, 47 chars, not LiteLLM format) → 401. Deleted old `mumuni` key (token 15cbca18…), generated fresh (alias `mumuni`, 7 models: syslog-auto, qwen3.6-27B-code, gemma-4-12b, strix-moe, gpu-dense, gpu-light, qwen3.6-35B-udq4). New key sk-OzuWsoX2… written to /root/.hermes/.env (Rule 3/13 fallback). Vault sync PENDING (needs machine identity). WAL #1300. |
| 2026-07-16 | koby | rotate | Old key sk-6sbCNjz (401, stale in /etc/environment). Deleted old `koby` key, generated fresh (alias `koby`). New key sk-BqRRMboTI… in systemd drop-in `hermes-gateway.service.d/litellm-key.conf` + /etc/environment. Created `hermes-gateway.service` unit (was missing — gateway wasn't persistent) with `--replace`. Verified HTTP 200, Telegram connected. |
| 2026-07-16 | baggy (koonimo) | rotate | Old key sk-krnw_zGB (401, hardcoded in systemd drop-in). Deleted old `baggy` key, generated fresh (alias `baggy`, metadata agent=koonimo). New key sk-OEK7z26n6E… in drop-in `hermes-gateway.service.d/litellm-key.conf`. CT113 IP changed .113→.114. Verified HTTP 200, Zulip connected. |
## LiteLLM Master Key (use sparingly — agents should NOT use it directly)
- Master key: **Retrieval path (do not trust a literal value in this file — the key rotates)**:
```bash
# PRIMARY (proven, runs on CT 116 with no extra tooling):
docker exec harness-litellm printenv LITELLM_MASTER_KEY
# Note: the same value is stored in /opt/inference-harness/.env on CT 116 (verified matching)
# The master key is NOT in the Infisical vault (project=infrastructure env=production does not contain it)
# Prove a key is live with a 200 from /key/list on the CT 116 host (the container has no curl):
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer <key>" http://127.0.0.1:4000/key/list | jq length
```
- Used for /key/generate, /key/delete, /key/list (GET), DB queries
- **Known violation (RESOLVED 2026-07-16):** Abiba's LITELLM_API_KEY was previously the master key.
It is now a dedicated agent key `sk-sxbphLvk1OU…` (vault secret `ABIBA_LITELLM_API_KEY`, alias `abiba-pi`).
The master key is admin-only (/key/generate, /key/delete, /key/list). NEVER use it for inference —
see `litellm-self-heal` § "NEVER use litellm_proxy_master_key for inference".
- LiteLLM key DB: `harness-postgres` container on CT116, table `"LiteLLM_VerificationToken"` (columns: token, key_alias, key_name, created_at, expires). Query: `docker exec harness-postgres psql -U litellm -d litellm -t -c "SELECT key_alias, substr(token,1,16) FROM \"LiteLLM_VerificationToken\" ORDER BY created_at;"`
-115
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@@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
---
kind: pattern
name: litellm-client-timeouts
description: >
Standard client timeout and retry policy for ALL agents calling LiteLLM
(CT 116, http://192.168.68.116). Created 2026-09-08 after the Sep 6 incident:
a backend stall 04:00-06:30 EDT produced 157 client-abandoned 408 failures
(82% from abiba-pi, 13 from mumuni) against a backend that was actually
succeeding at 20-70s per call once clients stopped giving up. Grounded in
measured data: syslog-auto (LiteLLM virtual model, no dedicated GPU — routes
to backends) averages 28.8s/request with 25.4s TTFT over 888 calls/24h;
nginx already allows 600s (Rule 5, verified 2026-08-09); the gap is entirely
client-side. Blast radius if wrong: agents fall back to DeepSeek silently
(key/timeout failures present as model degradation, not errors) or abandon
healthy-but-slow reasoning calls, fragmenting long tasks.
---
## Maintains
- client_timeout_standard: "litellm-client-timeouts v1.0 (2026-09-08)"
- applies_to: ALL agents and scripts calling http://192.168.68.116 (main model path, auxiliary tasks, health probes, benchmark jobs)
- verified_against: Prometheus litellm_* metrics 24h window ending 2026-09-08 ~10:00 EDT; live probe (syslog-auto tiny call 0.56s TTFB, 200 OK); nginx 600s proxy_read_timeout (Rule 5)
## The measured numbers these values come from
| Model | avg latency | avg TTFT | p-profile (24h) |
|---|---|---|---|
| syslog-auto | 28.8s | 25.4s | 68 calls took 30-120s; tail to ~300s under load |
| strix-moe | 7.5s | — | Strix Halo, healthy |
| gpu-vision (retired gemma-4-12b, RTX 5070) | 2.6s | — | RTX 5070, healthy |
Sep 6 incident timeline: failures 04:00-07:00 EDT (0% GPU util = wedged
backend), full recovery 07:00-08:00 with ZERO client failures once requests
tolerated 20-70s — 392 successful slow calls in the three hours after recovery.
LiteLLM's internal queue time is ~0s; the latency is model inference, not
proxy queuing.
## Parameters
### 1. Primary model path (model.default / custom_providers) — NO client timeout below 300s
- The default Hermes HTTP timeout (~60s) is TOO SHORT for syslog-auto's healthy
28.8s average + 120-300s tail. Every 408 in the incident was a client
abandoning a request the backend would have answered.
- If the transport exposes a timeout setting for the main model, set it to
**300s or more**. If it does not (current Hermes custom-provider path has no
timeout knob), that is acceptable ONLY because nginx holds the request for
600s — but any wrapper, script, or direct API call you write MUST set its own
timeout >= 300s for syslog-auto/qwen-class calls.
- Never hardcode a shorter timeout "to fail fast" on this path — failing fast
here is what caused the incident.
### 2. Auxiliary tasks — keep template timeouts, one correction
- vision: 60s (keep), web_extract: 30s (keep) — the 2.6s average was measured on `gemma-4-12b` (retired 2026-09-12); the live RTX 5070 alias is `gpu-vision`.
- compression: 300s (keep — this was already raised from 60 per gpu-fleet).
- **gpu-dense delegation/x_search: set timeout >= 120s.** The RTX 3090
(gpu-dense backend) is the same speed class as syslog-auto; delegation
defaults that assume fast responses will 408 the same way.
### 3. Retry policy — backoff, not repetition
- On timeout (408) or 5xx: retry up to **2 times** with exponential backoff
(**15s, 45s**) before giving up.
- Do NOT retry in a tight loop. The Sep 6 spike shape (65 failures in one hour
from one key) was a batch job retrying without backoff while the backend was
down — it multiplied load during recovery.
- On 401/403: do NOT retry — that is a key/permission problem (see
litellm-api-keys.prose.md and Rule 11); retrying just spams the log.
- On 429: honor the retry-after header if present, else back off 60s.
### 4. Health probes — identify yourself and time out sanely
- Probes MUST NOT appear as keyless, model-less failures in the metrics (12
such orphans appeared in the incident window and cost investigation time).
Send a real model name and use a real (probe-designated) key.
- Probe timeout: 30s. A probe that takes longer than 30s IS the alert —
report "backend slow (>30s)" rather than hanging.
- Probe cadence: at most hourly. The litellm-health cron cadence (authoritative
trigger in contract-registry.yaml) is the standard; sub-hourly synthetic
traffic distorts latency baselines.
### 5. Batch/benchmark jobs — schedule away from 04:00-07:00 EDT and chunk
- The incident window showed bulk clients amplifying a backend stall 5:1.
- Batch jobs that can tolerate delay: schedule 09:00-17:00 EDT.
- Any batch loop over N requests MUST sleep >= 5s between requests and honor
the retry policy in section 3.
## Returns
- A single standard any agent or script can cite: timeouts >= 300s on the
syslog-auto path, >= 120s on gpu-dense delegation, backoff retries (2x,
15s/45s), identified probes at 30s/hourly, batch jobs chunked and
day-scheduled.
- Failure signature recognition: bulk 408s from multiple keys in one window =
backend event (check gpu_utilization_percent: 0% = wedged, ~100% = saturated);
single-key 408s = that client's timeout is too short.
- Cross-references: hermes-config-template.prose.md (Rule 5 nginx 600s,
auxiliary timeouts), gpu-fleet.prose.md (compression 300s precedent,
stable aliases), litellm-api-keys.prose.md (key/permission failures).
## Intentionally NOT changed
- No server-side LiteLLM timeout/cooldown changes proposed — the incident
self-recovered and the server is healthy (0.56s live probe); changing
server behavior without process-level root cause (CT116 requires root;
not reachable from kagentz) would be guessing.
- No change to the template's vision/web_extract/compression timeouts —
measured data says they are correct.
- No per-agent key permission changes — those are litellm-api-keys.prose.md
territory (and the open gpu-vision/gemma 403 items are already filed with
the key owners).
- No model routing changes — syslog-auto's weighted pool behaved correctly
throughout the incident.
+46 -108
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@@ -1,25 +1,23 @@
--- ---
kind: function kind: function
name: litellm-health name: litellm-health
status: active status: deprecated
deprecated_on: 2026-07-09
replaced_by: litellm-self-heal.prose.md
note: >
Consolidated into litellm-self-heal.prose.md to eliminate duplication
of architecture diagrams, GPU topology, timeout tables, and container
lists. Health check is now § Health Check within litellm-self-heal.
This file is retained for reference only — use litellm-self-heal instead.
description: > description: >
Verifies the LiteLLM inference stack health. Current architecture (2026-07-09): Verifies the LiteLLM inference stack health. Current architecture (2026-07-09):
nginx:80 → LiteLLM:4000 → GPU(llama-server) via direct proxy. nginx:80 → LiteLLM:4000 → GPU(llama-server) via direct proxy.
Router (harness-router :9000) was DECOMMISSIONED 2026-09-11 (container, Router (harness-router :9000) is DEPRECATED — container still runs but
image and config removed). GPU monitoring via Prometheus/Grafana and is not in the request path. GPU monitoring via Prometheus/Grafana and
fleet dashboard (gpu-monitor :9100). fleet dashboard (gpu-monitor :9100).
Designed as a reusable contract for any Syslog agent. Designed as a reusable contract for any Syslog agent.
Source of truth: gpu-fleet.prose.md Source of truth: gpu-fleet.prose.md
## Monitoring / Alerting (as-built 2026-08-09)
- LiteLLM /metrics scrape job: requires `litellm_settings.success_callback: [prometheus]`
(failure_callback alone does NOT mount /metrics — verified 2026-08-09).
Scraped by Prometheus with Bearer master key; endpoint returns 307 → /metrics/.
- Alertmanager (harness-alertmanager :9093) + zulip-bridge (:9102) deliver
firing alerts to #agent-hub > alerts-infra via abiba-bot. Added 2026-08-09.
- Prometheus node job covers 6 PVE nodes (.4/.5/.6/.9/.12/.15:9100). Note: .4:9100 is a DEAD target (no route, down for weeks, not a live node).
--- ---
## Architecture (v4.0.0 — Direct: nginx → LiteLLM → GPU) ## Architecture (v4.0.0 — Direct: nginx → LiteLLM → GPU)
@@ -35,8 +33,8 @@ Request → nginx:80 → LiteLLM:4000 → GPU(llama-server, parallel 2)
│ │
Grafana :3001 Grafana :3001
harness-router :9000 — DECOMMISSIONED 2026-09-11 (container, image harness-router :9000 — DEPRECATED, container still runs but
and config removed). nginx routes /v1 → LiteLLM directly. NOT in request path. nginx routes /v1 → LiteLLM directly.
Router slot booking + circuit breakers replaced by Router slot booking + circuit breakers replaced by
LiteLLM native fallbacks + timeouts. LiteLLM native fallbacks + timeouts.
``` ```
@@ -44,8 +42,9 @@ Request → nginx:80 → LiteLLM:4000 → GPU(llama-server, parallel 2)
**What changed (v3.2.0 → v4.0.0 — 2026-07-08)**: **What changed (v3.2.0 → v4.0.0 — 2026-07-08)**:
- Router REMOVED from request path — LiteLLM proxies directly to GPU - Router REMOVED from request path — LiteLLM proxies directly to GPU
- All GPUs at parallel 2 (was parallel 1) - All GPUs at parallel 2 (was parallel 1)
- NVIDIA context reduced 256K→128K to free VRAM — the stable NVIDIA ceiling (2026-07-17); Strix Halo runs 256K (2026-09-12) - NVIDIA context reduced 256K→128K to free VRAM
- Timeouts and fallback chains are config state — read them from CT 116 `/opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml`; they are not duplicated here. - LiteLLM timeouts tuned: gemma 25→120s, qwen 40→90s
- nginx proxy_read_timeout: 600s, LiteLLM request_timeout: 300s
## Parameters ## Parameters
@@ -67,42 +66,33 @@ Request → nginx:80 → LiteLLM:4000 → GPU(llama-server, parallel 2)
- SSH key access to backend_host for container checks - SSH key access to backend_host for container checks
- Network access to public_url, auth_host, and gpu_dashboard_url - Network access to public_url, auth_host, and gpu_dashboard_url
- LiteLLM master key for admin endpoints only (`/key/list`, `/key/generate`, `/key/info`) - LiteLLM master key for key management endpoints
- The dedicated `monitor` agent key on CT 116 at `/etc/litellm-monitor.env` (root-only 0600) for
model inference checks, scoped for every alias step 7 probes (`gpu-dense`, `gpu-vision`,
`strix-moe`, `syslog-auto`). Retrieve from the executor's host via:
```
monitor key: ssh root@192.168.68.116 "grep LITELLM_MONITOR_KEY /etc/litellm-monitor.env | cut -d= -f2"
master key: ssh root@192.168.68.116 "docker exec harness-litellm printenv LITELLM_MASTER_KEY"
```
If credentials are missing or unreadable, the probe must report `credential-missing` (not bare 401 or "0 keys").
The master key must never be used for inference.
## GPU Fleet Topology ## GPU Fleet Topology
| Host | IP | Hardware | Role | | Host | IP | Hardware | Models Served | Engine | Context | Parallel |
|------|-----|----------|------| |------|-----|----------|---------------|--------|---------|----------|
| llm-gpu | 192.168.68.8 | NVIDIA RTX 3090 (24 GB) | heavy reasoning (`gpu-dense`) | | llm-gpu | 192.168.68.8 | NVIDIA RTX 3090 (24 GB) | qwen3.6-27B-code | llama-server systemd | 128K | 2 |
| ocu-llm | 192.168.68.110 | NVIDIA RTX 5070 (12 GB) | vision / web extract / light tasks (`gpu-vision`) | | ocu-llm | 192.168.68.110 | NVIDIA RTX 5070 (12 GB) | gemma-4-12b | llama-server systemd | 128K | 2 |
| amdpve | 192.168.68.15 | AMD Strix Halo 64GB UMA | compression (`strix-moe`) | | amdpve | 192.168.68.15 | AMD Strix Halo 64GB UMA | ornith-1.0-35b | llama-server systemd (Vulkan) | 256K | 2 |
Single source of truth for models, aliases, rpm caps, weights and fallback chains: ## Model Fallback Chains (LiteLLM)
CT 116 `/opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml`. Do not duplicate those values in
contracts — read them there. Do not re-add retired names (`gemma-4-12b`, `gpu-light`,
`crew-auto`).
> Re-scope note (2026-09-12): the earlier plan to restate the live fallback chains and | Primary | Timeout | Fallback | Timeout |
> per-model timeouts in this contract is intentionally superseded — that state is config, |---------|---------|----------|---------|
> and this contract points at the CT 116 config instead. Step 7 likewise authenticates with | qwen3.6-27B-code | 90s | gemma-4-12b | 120s |
> the dedicated `monitor` key, not the master key, which is admin-only. | gemma-4-12b | 120s | qwen3.6-27B-code | 90s |
| ornith-1.0-35b | 120s | qwen → gemma | — |
| syslog-auto (balanced) | 90s | qwen → gemma | — |
> Global: request_timeout=300s, nginx proxy_read_timeout=600s
## Containers on CT 116 ## Containers on CT 116
| Container | Image | Port | Health Check | | Container | Image | Port | Health Check |
|-----------|-------|------|-------------| |-----------|-------|------|-------------|
| harness-litellm | ghcr.io/docker.litellm.ai/berriai/litellm:1.99.1 | :4000→:4000 | /health/liveliness | | harness-litellm | berriai/litellm:1.90.0-rc.1 | :4000→:4001 | /health/liveliness |
| harness-router | inference-harness-router | :9000 (127.0.0.1) | /health (DEPRECATED — not in path) |
| harness-nginx | nginx:alpine | :80 | HTTP 200 on /health | | harness-nginx | nginx:alpine | :80 | HTTP 200 on /health |
| harness-postgres | postgres:16-alpine | :5432 | pg_isready | | harness-postgres | postgres:16-alpine | :5432 | pg_isready |
| harness-redis | redis:7-alpine | :6379 | PING | | harness-redis | redis:7-alpine | :6379 | PING |
@@ -114,90 +104,38 @@ contracts — read them there. Do not re-add retired names (`gemma-4-12b`, `gpu-
1. **Read parameters** — Use provided values or defaults 1. **Read parameters** — Use provided values or defaults
2. **Check the end-user surfaces** — the public edge and the backend edge serve the SAME 2. **Check public endpoints**:
app under DIFFERENT paths. They are not interchangeable, so every probe below must name
the surface it targets. Never point a check at a path that only resolves on the other
surface.
**Public edge** — `{{public_url}}` (https://litellm.sysloggh.net) serves the app at the
ROOT; the `/litellm/` prefix does not exist there and 404s:
- GET {{public_url}}/ui/ → expect 200 ("LiteLLM Dashboard") - GET {{public_url}}/ui/ → expect 200 ("LiteLLM Dashboard")
- GET {{public_url}}/docs → expect 200 ("LiteLLM API - Swagger UI") - GET {{public_url}}/docs → expect 200 ("LiteLLM API - Swagger UI")
- GET {{public_url}}/litellm/ui/ and {{public_url}}/litellm/docs → expect 404 (not served on this edge)
**Backend edge** — `http://{{backend_host}}` (port 80) serves the app UNDER `/litellm/`:
- GET http://{{backend_host}}/litellm/ui/ → expect 200 ("LiteLLM Dashboard")
- GET http://{{backend_host}}/litellm/docs → expect 200 ("LiteLLM API - Swagger UI")
- GET http://{{backend_host}}/ui/ and /docs → expect 301 → /litellm/... → 200 (one-hop redirect helpers,
added 2026-09-11)
3. **Check LiteLLM health (no-auth)**: 3. **Check LiteLLM health (no-auth)**:
- GET http://{{backend_host}}/litellm/health/liveliness → expect 200 - GET http://{{backend_host}}/litellm/health/liveliness → expect 200
4. **Check backend container health**: 4. **Check backend container health**:
- SSH to {{backend_host}} → `docker ps` → verify 12 containers healthy (11 harness + trove-agent-docker, added 2026-09-11) - SSH to {{backend_host}} → `docker ps` → verify 8 containers healthy
- Critical: harness-litellm, harness-nginx, harness-postgres - Critical: harness-litellm, harness-router, harness-nginx, harness-postgres
- Monitoring: harness-redis, harness-dashboard, harness-grafana, harness-prometheus, - Monitoring: harness-redis, harness-dashboard, harness-grafana, harness-prometheus
harness-alertmanager, harness-zulip-bridge, harness-docker-stats, harness-pve-exporter,
trove-agent-docker (ghcr.io/techdox/trove-agent-docker, added 2026-09-11)
5. **Check GPU fleet health via gpu-monitor** (router decommissioned 2026-09-11): 5. **Check router roster loaded**:
- GET {{gpu_dashboard_url}}/gpu-data → expect 200 with GPU metrics JSON - GET http://{{backend_host}}:9000/health → expect 200
- nginx `/health/unified` is now a `301` redirect to `/gpu/gpu-data` (same payload) - GET http://{{backend_host}}:9000/health/unified → expect 3 models
- If router returns "all GPUs saturated" but GPUs idle: roster not loaded → reload
6. **Check GPU fleet health** (via fleet dashboard): 6. **Check GPU fleet health** (via fleet dashboard):
- GET {{gpu_dashboard_url}}/gpu-data → expect 200 with GPU metrics JSON - GET {{gpu_dashboard_url}}/gpu-data → expect 200 with GPU metrics JSON
- Verify GPUs reporting status "healthy" - Verify GPUs reporting status "healthy"
- Check alerts array for active warnings/critical - Check alerts array for active warnings/critical
7. **Check model inference via LiteLLM** — Test one model on each GPU host. The health 7. **Check model inference via LiteLLM** — Test each model:
check runs on the **backend edge**, not the public edge, so these paths carry the - POST /v1/chat/completions model=gemma-4-12b → expect 200
`/litellm/` prefix: - POST /v1/chat/completions model=qwen3.6-27B-code → expect 200
- POST http://{{backend_host}}/litellm/v1/chat/completions model=gpu-dense → expect 200 (RTX 3090, .8) - POST /v1/chat/completions model=ornith-1.0-35b → expect 200
- POST http://{{backend_host}}/litellm/v1/chat/completions model=gpu-vision → expect 200 (RTX 5070, .110) - Use master key for auth
- POST http://{{backend_host}}/litellm/v1/chat/completions model=strix-moe → expect 200 (Strix Halo, .15)
- Auth uses the dedicated `monitor` agent key. Retrieve via:
`ssh root@192.168.68.116 "grep LITELLM_MONITOR_KEY /etc/litellm-monitor.env | cut -d= -f2"`
Do NOT use the master key for inference — the master key is for admin endpoints only
(`/key/list`, `/key/generate`, `/key/info`). Retrieve master key via:
`ssh root@192.168.68.116 "docker exec harness-litellm printenv LITELLM_MASTER_KEY"`
- KEY SCOPE: the `monitor` key MUST be scoped for the three probed aliases (`gpu-dense`,
`gpu-vision`, `strix-moe`) plus the `syslog-auto` fallback pool, otherwise the probe
returns 403 and the host is not covered.
If a probe returns 403, widen the monitor key's model list on CT 116 (add the missing
alias) and re-run — never drop the host from the probe to make the check pass.
- `gemma-4-12b` was retired and returns 400 `Invalid model name` — do not re-add it to
this list. The RTX 5070 host now serves `gpu-vision`.
- `/v1/models` is **key-scoped**: a model is only visible to keys allowed to use it, so
the set depends on the key. Always state which key a model list was read with — a
snapshot without its key is not evidence. This probe uses the `monitor` key on the
backend surface (`http://{{backend_host}}/litellm/v1/models`). The authoritative model
registry is CT 116 `/opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml`; read it there rather
than freezing a list here.
8. **Check agent keys**: 8. **Check agent keys**:
- GET http://{{backend_host}}/litellm/key/list with master key (admin endpoint) → verify all 6 agents have keys - GET /key/list with master key → verify all 6 agents have keys
- **IMPORTANT**: Run the curl on the CT 116 HOST, not inside the container. The `harness-litellm` container has no curl/wget. Use:
`ssh root@192.168.68.116 "curl -s -H 'Authorization: Bearer $MASTER_KEY' http://127.0.0.1:4000/key/list"`
- If the response is empty or unparseable, report `admin-call-failed` (not "0 agent keys")
9. **Check Grafana**: 9. **Check Grafana**:
- GET {{grafana_url}}/api/health → expect 200 - GET {{grafana_url}}/api/health → expect 200
10. **Compile and report** — Determine overall_status from individual check results 10. **Compile and report** — Determine overall_status from individual check results
## Executor Script (2026-09-13)
**Run `scripts/litellm-health-check.py` from the clone.** This script implements all 11
checks defined above and reports results in a standardized format. Paste its output in
the status line.
- Hand-rolled probes are **not** an acceptable substitute for the script.
- Backend-edge checks (steps 2–8) must use `http://192.168.68.116` (internal IP),
**not** the public URL `https://litellm.sysloggh.net` (which returns 401 for those paths).
- Docker Stats (step 10) must be fetched from the CT 116 host itself (`127.0.0.1:9324/metrics`)
because the `harness-docker-stats` container binds to localhost on CT 116.
- Admin Key List (step 8) requires the master key expanded locally before SSH, then embedded
in the remote curl command with proper quoting.
Expected output on a healthy fleet: 11/11 passing checks.
+75 -97
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@@ -1,32 +1,26 @@
--- ---
report_only_agents:
- koby # ⛔ KOBY IS NEVER REPAIRED (Rule 17, 2026-08-17) — detect + report, never fix on .129
kind: responsibility kind: responsibility
name: litellm-self-heal name: litellm-self-heal
status: deployed status: manual-only
note: > note: >
DEPLOYED 2026-07-12 on CT 116 cron: 0 */6 * * * Auto-remediation code was removed from the pi Zulip extension (retired 2026-07-04).
Auto-remediation code was removed from the pi Zulip extension (retired 2026-07-04), This contract is now manual-only — triggers require explicit user request.
now reimplemented as `litellm-health-check.sh` on CT 116. Consider reimplementing as a standalone cron job or prose contract.
Script: `/opt/inference-harness/scripts/litellm-health-check.sh` on CT 116 (cron `0 */6 * * *`).
Reports to /var/log/litellm/health-*.json and Gitea (SyslogSolution/health-logs). Consolidated from litellm-health + litellm-self-heal on 2026-07-09 to eliminate
GPU monitoring integrated from gpu-monitor on .24:9100. duplication of architecture diagrams, GPU topology, timeout tables, and container
lists. Health check is now § Health Check within this contract.
Health probes are owned by litellm-health.prose.md (dispatched as
`run contract: litellm-health`). This contract owns remediation only — it does not
re-specify the probes.
Source of truth for GPU topology and keys: gpu-fleet.prose.md Source of truth for GPU topology and keys: gpu-fleet.prose.md
Last verified: 2026-07-12 Last verified: 2026-07-09
description: > description: >
LiteLLM inference stack remediation. Applies remediation rules for failures detected LiteLLM inference stack health monitoring + self-healing. Verifies the full
by litellm-health.prose.md (nginx → LiteLLM → GPU chain, CT 116 containers, GPU hosts, nginx → LiteLLM → GPU chain, 8 containers on CT 116, 3 GPU hosts, model
model inference, and agent keys). inference, and agent keys. Applies remediation rules for common failures.
Reports every action via Zulip DM and Gitea (SyslogSolution/health-logs). Reports every action via Zulip DM and RA-H OS knowledge graph.
---
--- ---
# LiteLLM Operations — Self-Heal (Remediation) # LiteLLM Operations — Health Check + Self-Heal
## Architecture (v4.0.0 — Direct: nginx → LiteLLM → GPU) ## Architecture (v4.0.0 — Direct: nginx → LiteLLM → GPU)
@@ -41,8 +35,8 @@ Request → nginx:80 → LiteLLM:4000 → GPU(llama-server, parallel 2)
│ │
Grafana :3001 Grafana :3001
harness-router :9000 — DECOMMISSIONED 2026-09-11 (container, image harness-router :9000 — DEPRECATED, container still runs but
and config removed). nginx routes /v1 → LiteLLM directly. NOT in request path. nginx routes /v1 → LiteLLM directly.
Router slot booking + circuit breakers replaced by Router slot booking + circuit breakers replaced by
LiteLLM native fallbacks + timeouts. LiteLLM native fallbacks + timeouts.
``` ```
@@ -58,50 +52,29 @@ Request → nginx:80 → LiteLLM:4000 → GPU(llama-server, parallel 2)
## GPU Fleet Topology ## GPU Fleet Topology
| Host | IP | Hardware | Role | | Host | IP | Hardware | Models Served | Engine | Context | Parallel |
|------|-----|----------|------| |------|-----|----------|---------------|--------|---------|----------|
| llm-gpu | 192.168.68.8 | NVIDIA RTX 3090 (24 GB) | heavy reasoning (`gpu-dense`) | | llm-gpu | 192.168.68.8 | NVIDIA RTX 3090 (24 GB) | qwen3.6-27B-code | llama-server systemd | 128K | 2 |
| ocu-llm | 192.168.68.110 | NVIDIA RTX 5070 (12 GB) | vision / web extract / light tasks (`gpu-vision`) | | ocu-llm | 192.168.68.110 | NVIDIA RTX 5070 (12 GB) | gemma-4-12b | llama-server systemd | 128K | 2 |
| amdpve | 192.168.68.15 | AMD Strix Halo 64GB UMA | compression (`strix-moe`) | | amdpve | 192.168.68.15 | AMD Strix Halo 64GB UMA | ornith-1.0-35b | llama-server systemd (Vulkan) | 256K | 2 |
> Verified on the ground 2026-07-16. The legacy name `ornith-1.0-35b` does NOT exist in LiteLLM and must not be referenced. ## Model Fallback Chains (LiteLLM)
## LiteLLM Model Surface | Primary | Timeout | Fallback | Timeout |
|---------|---------|----------|---------|
| qwen3.6-27B-code | 90s | gemma-4-12b | 120s |
| gemma-4-12b | 120s | qwen3.6-27B-code | 90s |
| ornith-1.0-35b | 120s | qwen → gemma | — |
| syslog-auto (balanced) | 90s | qwen → gemma | — |
Single source of truth for models, aliases, rpm caps, weights and fallback chains: > Global: request_timeout=300s, nginx proxy_read_timeout=600s
CT 116 `/opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml`. Do not duplicate those values in
contracts — read them there. Do not re-add retired names (`gemma-4-12b`, `gpu-light`,
`crew-auto`).
### Alias Surface
| Alias | Serves | Where | Kind |
|-------|--------|-------|------|
| `gpu-dense` | heavy reasoning | RTX 3090 (192.168.68.8) | direct alias |
| `gpu-vision` | vision / web extract / light tasks | RTX 5070 (192.168.68.110) | direct alias AND `syslog-auto` pool member |
| `strix-moe` | compression (MoE) | Strix Halo (192.168.68.15) | direct alias |
| `syslog-auto` | balanced default | weighted pool across the three GPU hosts | pool router |
### Context Cap Split (2026-08-20; crew cap RETIRED)
- **Abiba (firstmate)**: 128K uncapped — unlimited context for primary workloads
- **Hermes agents** (mumuni, tanko, koby, koonimo): 128K uncapped
- **Crewmates** (ops, tune, verify, auth-keys, build): the 64K cap was retired together with the `crew-auto` alias; NO context cap is currently in force.
> The 64K crew cap was retired with `crew-auto` (2026-09-12). No limit is currently in force; reinstating one would need per-key model limits as a separate, deliberately-scoped change.
- Key scoping: `/v1/models` is key-scoped, so the set a caller sees must be read with a named key rather than assumed — a monitor key, an agent key, and the master key can each return a different set. Agents should use the stable aliases (`strix-moe`, `gpu-vision`, `gpu-dense`) rather than raw model names, so model swaps don't break them.
- **NEVER use `litellm_proxy_master_key` (the `sk-litellm-...` master key) for inference.** It is for admin endpoints only (`/key/list`, `/key/generate`, `/key/info`). All inference — agent traffic, health-check model tests, monitor scripts — uses agent-specific keys. The health-check script's model tests use a dedicated `monitor` agent key stored at `/etc/litellm-monitor.env` on CT 116 (root-only, `chmod 600`); `/key/list` is the only call that legitimately uses `$MASTER_KEY`.
> Re-scope note (2026-09-12): the fallback-chain and per-model timeout tables were removed
> by the single-source-of-truth re-scope; read those values from the CT 116 config named
> above rather than from this contract.
## Containers on CT 116 ## Containers on CT 116
| Container | Image | Port | Health Check | | Container | Image | Port | Health Check |
|-----------|-------|------|-------------| |-----------|-------|------|-------------|
| harness-litellm | ghcr.io/docker.litellm.ai/berriai/litellm:1.99.1 | :4000→:4000 | /health/liveliness | | harness-litellm | berriai/litellm:1.90.0-rc.1 | :4000→:4001 | /health/liveliness |
| harness-router | inference-harness-router | :9000 (127.0.0.1) | /health (DEPRECATED — not in path) |
| harness-nginx | nginx:alpine | :80 | HTTP 200 on /health | | harness-nginx | nginx:alpine | :80 | HTTP 200 on /health |
| harness-postgres | postgres:16-alpine | :5432 | pg_isready | | harness-postgres | postgres:16-alpine | :5432 | pg_isready |
| harness-redis | redis:7-alpine | :6379 | PING | | harness-redis | redis:7-alpine | :6379 | PING |
@@ -111,13 +84,6 @@ contracts — read them there. Do not re-add retired names (`gemma-4-12b`, `gpu-
| harness-docker-stats | python:3.12-alpine | — | container stats exporter | | harness-docker-stats | python:3.12-alpine | — | container stats exporter |
| harness-pve-exporter | prompve/prometheus-pve-exporter | — | Proxmox metrics → Prometheus | | harness-pve-exporter | prompve/prometheus-pve-exporter | — | Proxmox metrics → Prometheus |
## Script Operations (synced 2026-07-16)
- **Health-check script** (`/opt/inference-harness/scripts/litellm-health-check.sh` on CT 116): `gpu-fleet` check fails only on **critical** alerts (warnings are informational). Tests `strix-moe` (not `ornith-1.0-35b`).
- **GPU monitor** (`/root/scripts/gpu-monitor-server.py` on pi .24): runs as **systemd unit `gpu-monitor.service`** (was bare `&` process). `gpu_count` includes Strix Halo (was 2, now 3). VRAM alert thresholds: warning 93%, critical 97% (raised from 90/95 — 128K context steady-state is ~70% on RTX 3090, not a fault).
- **Agent key monitor** (`/root/scripts/agent-health-check.py` on pi .24, cron `*/10`): v4 (2026-09-10) — vault-backed agents (tanko/koby/koonimo) read their **agent-specific** `{NAME}_LITELLM_API_KEY` from Infisical vault (not the shared master key); abiba (pi agent) reads `LITELLM_API_KEY` from its local `/root/.pi/agent/env.sh` (#735 — moved out of shared `/root/.bashrc`), not from the vault. Abiba is pi-only since the harness purge, so its Hermes config/wrapper/gateway legs are skipped rather than reported as faults; koby is **report-only** (captain's 2026-08-17 ruling) — its findings go to the `--json` `report_only` array and are never counted as fleet failures or repaired, and its CT 111 liveness is probed on storepve (.6). Covers: LiteLLM keys, GPU ports, agent gateways, CT liveness (pct status on PVE nodes), config.yaml YAML integrity, wrapper/CLI integrity, vault secret non-emptiness checks. Every run/report carries the absolute execution path (`script=` + `cwd=`). The current fleet roster is owned by the script changelog (`scripts/agent-health-check.py`); mumuni is no longer probed from this host. Legacy `tdunna`/`baggy` replaced with canonical agent hostnames.
- **Stale keys cleaned**: `daily-infra-report.py` SYNTHETIC_API_KEY was stale (`sk-U_ydi3B` → 401); now reads `LITELLM_MASTER_KEY` from env. Deprecated scripts (`router-original.py`, `router-phase0-backup.py`, `apply-fixes.py`) still reference `sk-syslog-local-master-key` but do not actively poll LiteLLM.
## Maintains ## Maintains
- litellm-admin-ui: { status: "healthy", last_check: timestamp } - litellm-admin-ui: { status: "healthy", last_check: timestamp }
@@ -133,14 +99,48 @@ contracts — read them there. Do not re-add retired names (`gemma-4-12b`, `gpu-
- Also wakes on user request - Also wakes on user request
- On failure: re-check after 30s, escalate after 3 consecutive failures - On failure: re-check after 30s, escalate after 3 consecutive failures
---
--- ---
## Health Check ## Health Check
Health probes are owned by `litellm-health.prose.md` (dispatched as `run contract: litellm-health`). This contract owns remediation only — it does not re-specify the probes. Run this first on every cycle. Results feed into remediation rules below.
### 1. Check public endpoints
- GET {{public_url}}/ui/ → expect 200 ("LiteLLM Dashboard")
- GET {{public_url}}/docs → expect 200 ("LiteLLM API - Swagger UI")
### 2. Check LiteLLM health (no-auth)
- GET http://{{backend_host}}/litellm/health/liveliness → expect 200
### 3. Check backend container health
- SSH to {{backend_host}} → `docker ps` → verify 10 containers healthy
- Critical: harness-litellm, harness-nginx, harness-postgres
- Monitoring: harness-redis, harness-dashboard, harness-grafana, harness-prometheus, harness-docker-stats, harness-pve-exporter
- Deprecated but running: harness-router (not in path, reference only)
### 4. Check GPU fleet health (via fleet dashboard)
- GET {{gpu_dashboard_url}}/gpu-data → expect 200 with GPU metrics JSON
- Verify GPUs reporting status "healthy"
- Check alerts array for active warnings/critical
### 5. Check model inference via LiteLLM — test each model
- POST /v1/chat/completions model=gemma-4-12b → expect 200
- POST /v1/chat/completions model=qwen3.6-27B-code → expect 200
- POST /v1/chat/completions model=ornith-1.0-35b → expect 200
- Use master key for auth
### 6. Check agent keys
- GET /key/list with master key → verify all 6 agents have keys
### 7. Check Grafana
- GET {{grafana_url}}/api/health → expect 200
### 8. Compile overall status
Determine overall_status from individual check results:
- "healthy" — all checks pass
- "degraded" — 1-2 non-critical checks fail
- "down" — critical checks fail
---
--- ---
## Remediation Rules ## Remediation Rules
@@ -181,19 +181,17 @@ Fix → generate keys in LiteLLM via /key/generate → update /etc/environment o
Escalate → if SSH access unavailable, send Zulip DM Escalate → if SSH access unavailable, send Zulip DM
### Rule 9: Stale Active Counter in Redis — DEPRECATED ### Rule 9: Stale Active Counter in Redis — DEPRECATED
Router no longer in path so router active-slot counters are unused. Rule retained Router no longer in path so Redis active counters are unused. Rule retained
for reference but inactive. `harness-redis` now serves only LiteLLM cache and for reference but inactive. If Redis issues occur, check harness-redis container.
rate-limit state; check the container if cache errors appear.
---
--- ---
## Reporting ## Reporting
Every remediation cycle produces a structured report: Every remediation cycle produces a structured report:
### 1. Gitea Log Entry ### 1. RA-H OS Knowledge Graph Node
Pushed to `SyslogSolution/health-logs/litellm/{run_id}.json` — versioned, searchable, not in graph. Created as `[LEARN] litellm-self-heal: <run_id>` with full JSON report.
### 2. Zulip DM to Owner ### 2. Zulip DM to Owner
- `issues_fixed > 0` — "🛠 LiteLLM Self-Heal — Fix Applied" - `issues_fixed > 0` — "🛠 LiteLLM Self-Heal — Fix Applied"
@@ -208,7 +206,6 @@ top actions, uptime.
If a fix requires another agent (e.g., Authentik restart), relay sent If a fix requires another agent (e.g., Authentik restart), relay sent
to responsible agent with full context. to responsible agent with full context.
---
--- ---
## Execution ## Execution
@@ -234,11 +231,9 @@ call report-generator
health: health health: health
actions: actions actions: actions
-- Phase 4: Log to Gitea (not knowledge graph — hard rule) -- Phase 4: Log to knowledge graph
call gitea-logger call kg-logger
run_id: run_id run_id: run_id
repo: SyslogSolution/health-logs
path: litellm/{run_id}.json
health: health health: health
actions: actions actions: actions
@@ -284,20 +279,3 @@ With failures:
] ]
} }
``` ```
## gitea-logger Implementation
When this step executes, write the report JSON to a temp file and push to Gitea:
```bash
REPO="https://abiba-bot:${GITEA_PAT}@git.sysloggh.net/SyslogSolution/health-logs"
DIR="litellm"
FILE="${run_id}.json"
echo "${report_json}" > /tmp/${FILE}
(cd /tmp && git clone --depth 1 "${REPO}" &&
cp ${FILE} health-logs/${DIR}/${FILE} &&
cd health-logs && git add ${DIR}/${FILE} &&
git commit -m "litellm-health: ${run_id}" && git push)
rm -rf /tmp/health-logs /tmp/${FILE}
```
+7 -8
View File
@@ -1,12 +1,9 @@
--- ---
report_only_agents:
- koby # ⛔ KOBY IS NEVER REPAIRED (Rule 17, 2026-08-17) — detect + report, never fix on .129
name: memory-audit-maintenance name: memory-audit-maintenance
kind: responsibility kind: responsibility
description: Shared memory audit and maintenance contract for Hermes agents (Mumuni, Koby, Koonimo). Tanko is no longer a Hermes agent (now on DSH/DeepSeek Harness since 2026-08-27) and uses DSH-native memory, so it is excluded from this Hermes roster. Each agent runs it against its own isolated memory files — no cross-agent access, no shared state. Detects staleness, enforces writer registry, and rotates canary tokens. description: Shared memory audit and maintenance contract for all Hermes agents (Mumuni, Tanko, Tdunna, Baggy). Each agent runs it against its own isolated memory files — no cross-agent access, no shared state. Detects staleness, enforces writer registry, and rotates canary tokens.
id: 067NC4KG01RG50R40M30E20918 id: 067NC4KG01RG50R40M30E20918
--- ---
---
### Goal ### Goal
@@ -18,12 +15,13 @@ Autonomously audit and reorganize an agent's native memory (MEMORY.md, USER.md,
### Scope ### Scope
This contract is the **Hermes Agent standard** for memory maintenance. It is shared across Hermes agents (Mumuni, Koby, Koonimo). **Tanko is excluded — it migrated to DSH (DeepSeek Harness) on 2026-08-27 and now uses DSH-native memory (mnemon), not `~/.hermes/memories/`.** Each agent runs it against its own memory files only no cross-agent access, no shared state, no shared ledger, no shared canary. The contract is the standard; each agent enforces it independently with fully isolated data. This contract is the **Hermes Agent standard** for memory maintenance. It is shared across all Hermes agents (Mumuni, Tanko, Tdunna, Baggy). Each agent runs it against its own memory files only no cross-agent access, no shared state, no shared ledger, no shared canary. The contract is the standard; each agent enforces it independently with fully isolated data.
**Agent Roster (Hermes):** **Agent Roster:**
- Mumuni - Mumuni
- Koby (CT 111 / tdunna) - Tanko
- Koonimo (CT 113 / baggy) - Tdunna
- Baggy
**Isolation Principle:** Each agent has its own: **Isolation Principle:** Each agent has its own:
- `MEMORY.md` and `USER.md` - `MEMORY.md` and `USER.md`
@@ -345,3 +343,4 @@ return {
### Per-Agent Notes ### Per-Agent Notes
Each Hermes agent (Mumuni, Tanko, Tdunna, Baggy) runs this contract against its own `~/.hermes/memories/` directory. The contract is identical across agents, but all data is fully isolated: separate ledgers, separate writer registries, separate canaries. If a new agent is added to the roster, it must be listed in `### Scope` above and given its own isolated memory directory.
-202
View File
@@ -1,202 +0,0 @@
---
report_only_agents:
- koby # ⛔ KOBY IS NEVER REPAIRED (Rule 17, 2026-08-17) — detect + report, never fix on .129
kind: pattern
name: memory-fixer
description: >
Auto-fix low-hanging fruit in the RA-H OS knowledge graph. No judgment calls — only deterministic Level 1 operations.
Escalate anything that needs Kwame's input. Executes confirmed Kwame decisions to completion (state + updated_at).
version: 2.1.0
---
---
# Memory Fixer
> **Canonical copy:** `/root/.hermes/contracts/memory-fixer-v3.md` (used by the `memory-fixer-daily` cron job). This file is the institutional record of the same contract. When the two diverge, treat the v3 source in `/root/.hermes/contracts/` as executable truth.
## Purpose
Auto-fix low-hanging fruit in the graph. No judgment calls — only deterministic Level 1 operations. Escalate anything that needs Kwame's input. When Kwame replies to an escalation, **execute the decision to completion** (update state and timestamps), never leaving a node in review-pending forever.
**Type:** Write-only (Level 1 fixes only)
**Scope:** RA-H OS knowledge graph (192.168.68.65)
**Schedule:** Daily at 8 AM ET
**Escalation:** Level 2+ to Kwame as task items
## Key Design Decision
The `updateNode` tool's `metadata` field performs a **restricted merge** — the `state` key only accepts `'processed'` or `'not_processed'`. Additionally, new metadata keys cannot be added via the merge.
**Solution:** Use the `description` field to tag stale nodes with review actions, since `description` is a simple string overwritable via `updateNode`.
**Tag Format:** `[REVIEW: action] original description text...`
Where `action` is one of:
- `archive` — node is stale and should be archived
- `refresh` — node is stale and should be refreshed (infrastructure)
- `keep` — node has been confirmed as current
- `merge` — node is a duplicate candidate
**Query for finding review-tagged nodes:**
```sql
SELECT id, title, description
FROM nodes
WHERE description LIKE '[REVIEW:%';
```
## Level 1 Auto-Fixes (No Kwame Decision Needed)
### 1. Missing `type` Auto-Classification
```sql
SELECT id, title,
CASE
WHEN title LIKE '%infrastructure%' OR title LIKE '%proxmox%' OR title LIKE '%setup%' THEN 'infrastructure'
WHEN title LIKE '%skill%' OR title LIKE '%how to%' OR title LIKE '%guide%' THEN 'skill'
WHEN title LIKE '%doc%' OR title LIKE '%template%' OR title LIKE '%brand%' THEN 'documentation'
WHEN title LIKE 'WAL:%' OR title LIKE 'TASK:%' THEN 'note'
WHEN title LIKE '%[LEARN]%' THEN 'documentation'
ELSE 'note'
END as auto_type
FROM nodes
WHERE json_extract(metadata, '$.type') IS NULL;
```
### 2. Missing `namespace` Auto-Population
```sql
SELECT id, title, json_extract(metadata, '$.tenant') as tenant
FROM nodes
WHERE json_extract(metadata, '$.namespace') IS NULL;
```
### 3. Staleness Review Tagging (refresh-suggested nodes only)
Using the type-based windows from the memory-monitor contract, tag nodes stale beyond their window. **Only process a maximum of 10 nodes per run** to avoid overwhelming Kwame. Prioritize infrastructure first, then dynamic, then ephemeral.
**Archive-suggested nodes are NO LONGER tagged — they are archived outright (see Level 1 fix 4).** Tagging with `[REVIEW: refresh]` applies only to living nodes (infrastructure, deployment, system, system-health, business, philosophy, research, learning, investigation, analysis, project, agent, registry, policy).
**Exclusion Rules:**
- Nodes with `state` = `review_pending`, `deprecated`, `archived`, or `not_processed` are NOT processed
- Nodes whose `description` already starts with `[REVIEW:` or `[ARCHIVED]` are NOT re-processed
```sql
SELECT id, title, json_extract(metadata, '$.type') as node_type,
CAST(julianday('now') - julianday(updated_at) AS INTEGER) as days_stale,
CASE
WHEN json_extract(metadata, '$.type') IN ('infrastructure', 'deployment', 'system', 'system-health') THEN 'refresh'
WHEN json_extract(metadata, '$.type') IN ('business', 'philosophy', 'research', 'learning', 'learn', 'investigation', 'analysis', 'project') THEN 'refresh'
ELSE 'archive'
END as suggested_action
FROM nodes
WHERE updated_at < datetime('now',
CASE
WHEN json_extract(metadata, '$.type') IN ('infrastructure', 'deployment', 'system', 'system-health') THEN '-14 days'
WHEN json_extract(metadata, '$.type') IN ('skill', 'documentation', 'template', 'protocol-enforcement', 'prd', 'architecture') THEN '-90 days'
WHEN json_extract(metadata, '$.type') IN ('note', 'wal', 'WAL', 'task', 'TASK', 'event') THEN '-30 days'
WHEN json_extract(metadata, '$.type') IN ('business', 'philosophy', 'research', 'learning', 'learn', 'investigation', 'analysis', 'project') THEN '-120 days'
WHEN json_extract(metadata, '$.type') IN ('deprecated-relay', 'audit', 'audit-report', 'incident', 'incident-report') THEN '-3650 days'
ELSE '-45 days'
END
)
AND json_extract(metadata, '$.state') NOT IN ('review_pending', 'deprecated', 'archived', 'not_processed')
AND (description IS NULL OR description NOT LIKE '[REVIEW:%')
ORDER BY days_stale ASC
LIMIT 10;
```
For each identified node, call `updateNode(id, { description: "[REVIEW: action] " + originalDescription })`.
### 4. Stale-Node Archiving (Level 1 — standing Kwame directive, 2026-09-11)
**Kwame's standing directive: stale nodes CAN be archived by the fixer. No per-batch escalation, no `[REVIEW: archive]` tagging — archive them.**
For every node whose suggested action is `archive` (i.e. its type is NOT one of the living types in fix 3), archive it in a **single** `updateNode` call:
```python
updateNode(id, {
"description": "[ARCHIVED] " + originalDescriptionWithoutReviewTag,
"metadata": {"state": "archived"}
})
```
- `state` transitions **DO work through `updateNode`** (`archived`, and back to `active`). The former "state only accepts processed/not_processed, use SSH" claim was wrong — verified 2026-09-11 by archiving 7 nodes (#61, #373, #388, #465, #475, #526, #1476) over the bridge with `updated_at` auto-bumping. **SSH to the bridge host is a fallback, not a requirement**, and it is blocked from kagentz anyway.
- Pass `description` and `metadata` in the **same** call, and always keep the `updates` object nested: `{"id": N, "updates": {…}}`.
- Archiving is non-destructive: the node stays in the graph, marked `state: archived` + `[ARCHIVED] ` prefix. **Living nodes (refresh-suggested) are NEVER archived** without a specific Kwame decision — they are the cluster/agent/business canon.
**Archive candidates are identified by the fix 3 query's `suggested_action = 'archive'` branch** (the `ELSE 'archive'` case: anything not an infrastructure/skill/documentation/strategic/audit type).
## Level 2 Escalations (Kwame Decision Required)
1. **Refresh-suggested stale nodes** flagged with `[REVIEW: refresh]` — refresh or keep? (Archive-suggested nodes are auto-archived under fix 4 and are not escalated.)
2. **Duplicate Nodes** (same title or >70% title overlap) — Merge or keep?
3. **Orphan Nodes >90 days old** — Archive or connect?
## Reporting Format
The fixer reports to Kwame via this Zulip DM:
```
🦅 Memory Fixer — [HH:MM UTC]
Level 1 fixes applied:
- Missing type: X nodes classified
- Missing namespace: Y nodes populated
Stale nodes needing review (max 10):
1. [Node #XXX] Title — X days stale, SUGGEST: refresh
2. [Node #YYY] Title — Y days stale, SUGGEST: archive
...
Duplicates needing decision:
1. [Node #AAA] vs [Node #BBB] — Same title
Orphans >90 days:
1. [Node #EEE] Title — X days stale, orphaned
Reply with:
- "archive #XXX, #YYY" to mark for archive
- "archive all" to archive all stale nodes listed
- "keep #XXX" to confirm a node is current
- "merge #AAA into #BBB" to merge duplicates
- "refresh #XXX" to mark as current
```
## Execution on Next Run
The fixer reads Kwame's previous response and **executes the decision to completion** — it must not leave a node in review-pending forever. Tagging alone is NOT enough; each confirmed decision must also update `state` and `updated_at` so the node drops out of the stale window on the next run.
> ⚠️ **Corrected 2026-09-11:** `updateNode` DOES accept `state` changes — `{"updates": {"description": …, "metadata": {"state": "archived"}}}` works over the bridge, and `updated_at` bumps automatically. The old "use direct SSH + SQLite for state transitions" instruction was based on a wrong assumption; SSH is a fallback only (and is blocked from kagentz). Use one `updateNode` call for both the tag and the state.
> ```bash
> ssh root@192.168.68.65 "sqlite3 /root/.local/share/RA-H/db/rah.sqlite \"UPDATE nodes SET metadata = json_set(metadata, '$.state', '<state>'), updated_at = datetime('now') WHERE id = <id>;\""
> ```
> Use `updateNode` only for description/source/title/link edits.
Decision → completed action mapping:
| Kwame reply | Description change | State | `updated_at` |
|---|---|---|---|
| `archive #XXX` | replace `[REVIEW: archive] ` → `[ARCHIVED] ` prefix | `archived` | bumped to now |
| `keep #XXX` / `refresh #XXX` | **clear the `[REVIEW: …]` tag entirely** | `active` | bumped to now |
| `merge #AAA into #BBB` | set `[REVIEW: merge_into #BBB]` on #AAA, then follow manual merge workflow | handled manually | bumped to now |
| `archive all` | apply the archive row to every node listed in the prior report | `archived` | bumped to now |
**Why `updated_at` must be bumped (critical):** the Level-1 staleness query keys off `updated_at < now - window`. If the fixer clears the tag but leaves a stale `updated_at`, the node is immediately re-flagged on the very next run and the cycle repeats forever. Bumping `updated_at` to now pushes the node back to the front of the window.
**Exclusion after action:** once an action is applied, the node's description no longer starts with `[REVIEW:` (archive → `[ARCHIVED]`, refresh/keep → original text), so it is not re-processed.
After all actions are applied, verify with:
```sql
SELECT id, json_extract(metadata, '$.state') FROM nodes WHERE description LIKE '[REVIEW:%';
```
The result must be 0 rows when all decisions are executed. Report what was done.
## Checks
- **State integrity:** archived nodes have `state: archived` + `[ARCHIVED]` prefix; kept nodes are `state: active` without a `[REVIEW:]` tag.
- **Auto-archive applied:** no node should ever be left tagged `[REVIEW: archive]` — that tag is retired. Any `[REVIEW: archive]` found means fix 4 was skipped; archive it and report.
- **No review-pending forever:** after executing Kwame's decisions, `[REVIEW:%` node count must be 0.
- **Timestamps:** every executed decision (and every auto-archive) bumps `updated_at`, so the node exits the stale window on the next run.
## Logging
Every Level 1 fix logged to `~/.hermes/logs/memory-fixer/YYYY-MM-DD.md`
Every Level 2 escalation logged and delivered to Kwame.
+8 -42
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: >
delegation, verification, and delivery. Defines when to delegate, which delegation, verification, and delivery. Defines when to delegate, which
worker to use for what, how to handle failures, and the kanban board worker to use for what, how to handle failures, and the kanban board
protocol. Enforces context-window discipline and separation of concerns. protocol. Enforces context-window discipline and separation of concerns.
Runs on Mumuni (kagentz CT105, minipve, .14) via Hermes agent (Zulip gateway via systemd). Runs on Mumuni (CT 118, storepve, .6) via Hermes agent.
version: 1.0.0 version: 1.0.0
--- ---
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ version: 1.0.0
## Topology ## Topology
**Cluster:** 5 Proxmox nodes (ocupve, acerpve, minipve, amdpve, storepve) **Cluster:** 5 Proxmox nodes (ocupve, acerpve, minipve, amdpve, storepve)
**Manager:** Mumuni (kagentz CT105, minipve, .14) via Hermes agent **Manager:** Mumuni (CT 118, storepve, .6) via Hermes agent
**Workers:** 6 profiles, all running on the same agent — no separate hosts needed **Workers:** 6 profiles, all running on the same agent — no separate hosts needed
This contract is infrastructure-agnostic in terms of which nodes are used. This contract is infrastructure-agnostic in terms of which nodes are used.
@@ -66,36 +66,16 @@ Delegation is **mandatory** when any of these apply:
`curl`, `hermes tools list` — these are decision-making tools. The manager `curl`, `hermes tools list` — these are decision-making tools. The manager
reads them directly. reads them directly.
## Data Source Integrity (CRITICAL)
**Workers MUST use the data provided in their task context. They MUST NOT
fetch their own data from external sources unless explicitly told to.**
When a task says "Read file X and format it", the worker reads file X. It does
not query a separate API, run its own diagnostics, or pull data from a different
system. This is the #1 source of cross-worker inconsistency: one worker gathers
SSH data, another queries the Proxmox API, and the report merges two incompatible
datasets.
**Rule:** If a worker needs additional data beyond what's in its task description,
it asks the manager (via relay) — it doesn't go find it on its own.
**This is a hard rule, not a recommendation.** Violating it produces the exact
type of discrepancy the kanban pipeline exists to prevent: a review worker finds
"5 nodes present" in the raw data but "5/5 online" in the report — even though
one of those nodes was unreachable. The report lied because it used data the
raw data never provided.
## Worker Selection Matrix ## Worker Selection Matrix
| Worker | Model | Toolsets | Role | Use When | | Worker | Model | Toolsets | Role | Use When |
|--------|-------|----------|------|----------| |--------|-------|----------|------|----------|
| `syslog-code` | gpu-dense | terminal, file, web, memory, skills | Code patches, automation, scripts | Writing/modifying code, creating scripts, debugging, reading/writing files | | `syslog-code` | qwen3.6-27B-code | terminal, file, web, memory, skills | Code patches, automation, scripts | Writing/modifying code, creating scripts, debugging, reading/writing files |
| `syslog-devops` | gpu-dense | terminal, file, web, memory, skills | Infrastructure, DB, bridge, Proxmox | Server ops, SSH, Docker, Proxmox, DB queries, hardware checks | | `syslog-devops` | qwen3.6-27B-code | terminal, file, web, memory, skills | Infrastructure, DB, bridge, Proxmox | Server ops, SSH, Docker, Proxmox, DB queries, hardware checks |
| `syslog-email` | strix-moe | terminal, file, web, memory, skills | Email automation, mail operations | Sending/receiving email, inbox management, SMTP operations | | `syslog-email` | ornith-1.0-35b | terminal, file, web, memory, skills | Email automation, mail operations | Sending/receiving email, inbox management, SMTP operations |
| `syslog-research` | strix-moe | terminal, file, web, memory, skills, **browser** | Analysis, classification, data processing | Web research, browser tasks, data analysis, classification, reading docs | | `syslog-research` | ornith-1.0-35b | terminal, file, web, memory, skills, **browser** | Analysis, classification, data processing | Web research, browser tasks, data analysis, classification, reading docs |
| `syslog-review` | strix-moe | terminal, file, web, memory, skills | Verification, QA, audit validation | **ALWAYS** verify worker output before delivery — especially for infra changes, code builds, and research findings | | `syslog-review` | ornith-1.0-35b | terminal, file, web, memory, skills | Verification, QA, audit validation | **ALWAYS** verify worker output before delivery — especially for infra changes, code builds, and research findings |
| `syslog-writer` | strix-moe | terminal, file, web, memory, skills | Docs, content, branding, reports | Writing docs, reports, proposals, content, markdown formatting | | `syslog-writer` | ornith-1.0-35b | terminal, file, web, memory, skills | Docs, content, branding, reports | Writing docs, reports, proposals, content, markdown formatting |
### Selection Rules ### Selection Rules
@@ -120,19 +100,6 @@ dispatch sequentially.
Fire workers via `delegate_task`: Fire workers via `delegate_task`:
**Critical: Pass the data, not just the goal.** When dispatching a worker that
processes output from another worker, include the file path AND explicit
instructions to use ONLY that source. Example:
```
delegate_task(
goal="Format the cluster check into a clean report",
context="Source data is at /tmp/proxmox-check-raw.md. Format ONLY the data
in that file. Do NOT query the Proxmox API or any other data source. Use the
file as your sole source of truth."
)
```
**Parallel (independent lanes):** **Parallel (independent lanes):**
``` ```
delegate_task( delegate_task(
@@ -236,7 +203,6 @@ Only verified results reach Kwame. Format per channel:
- ❌ Skipping verification → raw worker output never reaches the user - ❌ Skipping verification → raw worker output never reaches the user
- ❌ Delegating single tool calls → keep quick reads/writes at manager level - ❌ Delegating single tool calls → keep quick reads/writes at manager level
- ❌ Firing more than 3 workers in parallel → hard limit - ❌ Firing more than 3 workers in parallel → hard limit
- ❌ **Workers fetching their own data sources** → a writer worker that queries the Proxmox API when told to "format the raw file" is fabricating data. Use the input given, not external sources
## Emergency Exception ## Emergency Exception
+1 -1
View File
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ garbled input. When a user types these commands to Abiba:
- **`/approve`** → "Pi doesn't have pending approvals. Commands execute immediately." - **`/approve`** → "Pi doesn't have pending approvals. Commands execute immediately."
- **`/approve session`** → Same response - **`/approve session`** → Same response
- **`/deny`** → Same response + "For agents (Mumuni on Hermes, Tanko on DSH), these work with their built-in approval system." - **`/deny`** → Same response + "For Hermes agents (Tanko, Mumuni), these work with their built-in approval system."
This keeps the UX consistent across agents — users can type `/approve` anywhere This keeps the UX consistent across agents — users can type `/approve` anywhere
without getting confused by LLM responses. without getting confused by LLM responses.
+12 -19
View File
@@ -2,20 +2,21 @@
kind: responsibility kind: responsibility
name: pm2-self-heal name: pm2-self-heal
description: > description: >
PM2 process health check for abiba-telegram, abiba-zulip, gitea-runner, and zulip-watchdog. Monitors critical PM2 processes (abiba-zulip, abiba-telegram) and
gpu-monitor is systemd-managed (gpu-monitor.service), NOT PM2. auto-restarts any that are stopped or errored. Logs every action to
gpu-watchdog is decommissioned and folded into gpu-monitor.service. the knowledge graph and alerts the owner via Zulip DM on failures.
gitea-runner is KEPT. abiba-zulip is KEPT (online for days). CRITICAL: Never restart abiba-zulip — it runs this contract.
--- ---
## Maintains ## Maintains
- abiba-telegram: { status: "online", uptime: string, restarts: number } - abiba-telegram: { status: "online", uptime: string, restarts: number }
- abiba-zulip: { status: "online", uptime: string, restarts: number } - gpu-watchdog: { status: "online", uptime: string, restarts: number }
- gpu-monitor: { status: "online", uptime: string, restarts: number }
- gitea-runner: { status: "online", uptime: string, restarts: number } - gitea-runner: { status: "online", uptime: string, restarts: number }
- zulip-watchdog: { status: "online", uptime: string, restarts: number }
- last_check: timestamp - last_check: timestamp
> **Note (2026-07-04):** `abiba-zulip` removed — Zulip extension decommissioned.
## Continuity ## Continuity
@@ -30,18 +31,10 @@ description: >
- **Verify**: Re-check status after 5 seconds - **Verify**: Re-check status after 5 seconds
- **Escalate**: If still failed after 2 retries, send Zulip DM to owner - **Escalate**: If still failed after 2 retries, send Zulip DM to owner
### Rule 2: Process Restarting Too Often (crash-loop guard) ### Rule 2: Process Restarting Too Often
- **Detect**: `pm2 status` shows restarts > 30 (cumulative lifetime counter) **or** a - **Detect**: `pm2 status` shows restarts > 30 (cumulative lifetime counter)
process reporting a restart count > 1000 while showing "online" (a crash-loop mask)
- **Note**: PM2 counter never decrements; only full delete+re-add resets it - **Note**: PM2 counter never decrements; only full delete+re-add resets it
- **Fix**: `pm2 delete <name> && pm2 start <ecosystem> --only <name>` - **Fix**: `pm2 delete <name> && pm2 start <ecosystem> --only <name>`
- **Script guard (2026-08-16)**: `scripts/pm2-self-heal.sh` now restarts `abiba-telegram`
when `TEL_RESTARTS > 1000` even if the process reports "online" — catches a quiet
crash-loop that never toggles status to "stopped"/"errored" (e.g. the 10k-restarts
spoton incident). Alerts include the restart count.
- **AS-BUILT (2026-09-15)**: spoton-service was deleted with its app; the live PM2 set is
four processes (abiba-telegram, abiba-zulip, gitea-runner, zulip-watchdog). The spoton
reference above is historical context for the crash-loop guard, not a live process.
- **Escalate**: Only when restarts > 30 — alerts to Zulip DM - **Escalate**: Only when restarts > 30 — alerts to Zulip DM
- **Historical fix**: Previous cycles were caused by abiba-zulip extension's - **Historical fix**: Previous cycles were caused by abiba-zulip extension's
stuck detection (STUCK_THRESHOLD_MS was 30min, raised to 4h in v2). stuck detection (STUCK_THRESHOLD_MS was 30min, raised to 4h in v2).
@@ -55,11 +48,11 @@ description: >
- If status is "online" → pass - If status is "online" → pass
- If status is "stopped" or "errored" → apply Rule 1 - If status is "stopped" or "errored" → apply Rule 1
- If restarts > 5 → alert owner - If restarts > 5 → alert owner
3. **Check abiba-zulip** (live Zulip bridge, heartbeating): 3. **Check abiba-zulip** (self-process, read-only):
- If status is "online" → pass, log restarts count - If status is "online" → pass, log restarts count
- If status is "stopped" or "errored" → restart (`pm2 restart abiba-zulip` — fully restored) - If status is "stopped" or "errored" → **DO NOT RESTART** — alert owner immediately
- If restarts > 5 in last hour → alert owner with full diagnostics - If restarts > 5 in last hour → alert owner with full diagnostics
4. **Log results** — Append to `SyslogSolution/health-logs/pm2/{timestamp}.md` in Gitea (not knowledge graph — hard rule) 4. **Log results** — Create `[LEARN]` node in knowledge graph for any actions taken
5. **Alert** — Send Zulip DM to owner if escalation needed (do NOT run pm2 commands during alerting) 5. **Alert** — Send Zulip DM to owner if escalation needed (do NOT run pm2 commands during alerting)
6. **Wait 5 min** → repeat from step 1 6. **Wait 5 min** → repeat from step 1
+3 -32
View File
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ agent: abiba
- User: `monitoring@pve` (cluster-replicated) - User: `monitoring@pve` (cluster-replicated)
- Role: `PVEAuditor` on `/` (read-only, whole cluster) - Role: `PVEAuditor` on `/` (read-only, whole cluster)
- Token: `monitoring@pve!prometheus` — stored in Infisical vault (`PROXMOX_MONITOR_TOKEN`) - Token: `monitoring@pve!prometheus` = `2c74ceb6-f905-444a-94f9-1c4f7889b68c`
- `verify_ssl: false` (proxmoxer uses `verify_ssl`, NOT `verify_tls`) - `verify_ssl: false` (proxmoxer uses `verify_ssl`, NOT `verify_tls`)
## Grafana Dashboards (file-provisioned, folder "Syslog Fleet") ## Grafana Dashboards (file-provisioned, folder "Syslog Fleet")
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ agent: abiba
- **URL**: `http://192.168.68.116:3001/` (LAN, direct — Grafana bound to `0.0.0.0:3001`) - **URL**: `http://192.168.68.116:3001/` (LAN, direct — Grafana bound to `0.0.0.0:3001`)
- **Dashboards**: `http://192.168.68.116:3001/d/gpu-fleet`, `.../d/proxmox-cluster`, `.../d/proxmox-node`, `.../d/docker-containers` - **Dashboards**: `http://192.168.68.116:3001/d/gpu-fleet`, `.../d/proxmox-cluster`, `.../d/proxmox-node`, `.../d/docker-containers`
- **Credentials**: admin / password stored in Infisical vault (`GRAFANA_ADMIN_PASSWORD`) - **Credentials**: admin / syslog-grafana-2026
- Grafana is NOT behind nginx — access port 3001 directly. The `harness-nginx` `/grafana/` sub-path route was tried and reverted (broke the existing `:3001` URL and gpu-fleet path). Do not re-add `GF_SERVER_SERVE_FROM_SUB_PATH` or an nginx `/grafana/` route. - Grafana is NOT behind nginx — access port 3001 directly. The `harness-nginx` `/grafana/` sub-path route was tried and reverted (broke the existing `:3001` URL and gpu-fleet path). Do not re-add `GF_SERVER_SERVE_FROM_SUB_PATH` or an nginx `/grafana/` route.
- grafana compose port mapping: `"3001:3000"` (0.0.0.0, not 127.0.0.1) - grafana compose port mapping: `"3001:3000"` (0.0.0.0, not 127.0.0.1)
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ agent: abiba
| storepve | 192.168.68.6 | PVE | | storepve | 192.168.68.6 | PVE |
| acerpve | 192.168.68.9 | PVE (hosts llm-gpu qemu/101) | | acerpve | 192.168.68.9 | PVE (hosts llm-gpu qemu/101) |
| minipve | 192.168.68.12 | PVE | | minipve | 192.168.68.12 | PVE |
| amdpve | 192.168.68.15 | PVE + Strix Halo LLM (strix-moe) | | amdpve | 192.168.68.15 | PVE + Strix Halo LLM (ornith) |
## Operations ## Operations
@@ -100,35 +100,6 @@ Edit `build-dashboards.py`, run it, `docker restart harness-grafana`
### check-targets ### check-targets
`curl http://192.168.68.116:9090/api/v1/targets | jq '.data.activeTargets[] | {job:.labels.job,health}'` `curl http://192.168.68.116:9090/api/v1/targets | jq '.data.activeTargets[] | {job:.labels.job,health}'`
### check-health
**RUN LIVE, NEVER ECHO — every dispatch must execute the probes below with real tool calls; never repeat a prior report unless a live probe fails.**
```bash
# Prometheus health (bound to 0.0.0.0:9090 on .116)
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://192.168.68.116:9090/-/healthy
# Expected: 200 (Prometheus is up and healthy)
# Grafana health (bound to 0.0.0.0:3001 on .116)
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://192.168.68.116:3001/api/health
# Expected: 200 (Grafana is up and healthy)
# Docker Stats exporter (bound to 127.0.0.1:9324 on .116 — must probe from .116 localhost)
ssh root@192.168.68.116 "curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://127.0.0.1:9324/metrics"
# Expected: 200 (docker-stats-exporter is up and responding)
# PVE exporter (bound to 127.0.0.1:9221 on .116 — must probe from .116 localhost)
ssh root@192.168.68.116 "curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://127.0.0.1:9221/metrics"
# Expected: 200 (pve-exporter is up and responding)
```
**Report format**: Begin every report with the **absolute path the probe executed
from** (`pwd -P`, or the script's absolute path) so a stale-consumer report is
distinguishable from a real fault at read time. Summarize actual results from
each probe. If any probe returns non-200, flag as alert.
**Note**: Docker Stats and PVE Exporter are bound to 127.0.0.1 (localhost-only) so they must be probed from .116 via SSH. Prometheus and Grafana are bound to 0.0.0.0 so they can be probed from the LAN.
### restart-exporter ### restart-exporter
`cd /opt/monitoring && docker compose restart pve-exporter docker-stats` `cd /opt/monitoring && docker compose restart pve-exporter docker-stats`
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
disk-gc report-only verification — CT 111 / tdunna / 192.168.68.129
date: 2026-09-12T19:11:36Z
host: abiba (this scanner runs INSIDE CT 100 / abiba)
branch head: 6e612ce37b1b9a9688b04e7f816848e7a4185fca
command: scripts/disk-gc-plan.py --scan <live fleet scan>
PURPOSE: prove that on a REAL fleet scan, CT 111 is alerted and NO gc-executor action
is emitted for it at any level. No GC command was executed against .129.
--- live fleet scan (df -P / via scripts/pct-run.sh for LXC, direct SSH for hosts) ---
tdunna 84%
acerpve 192.168.68.9 77%
amdpve 192.168.68.15 76%
ocu-llm 192.168.68.110 69%
storepve 192.168.68.6 65%
kagentz 61%
tanko 56%
minipve 192.168.68.12 49%
authentik 45%
infisical-vault 39%
adguard 38%
ocupve 192.168.68.5 38%
scottdenya 35%
syslog-api 34%
llm-gpu 192.168.68.8 25%
abiba 23%
baggy 22%
jdownloader 21%
gitea 16%
ra-h-os 13%
zulip 12%
docker-vm 192.168.68.7 11%
adguard2 10%
media 9%
proxmox-backup-server 4%
--- planner output (action plan) ---
111 AMBER 84.0% -> REPORT-ONLY (no GC) — Theo's box — captain ruling 2026-08-17, re-confirmed 2026-09-10
acerpve AMBER 77.0% -> gc-executor
amdpve AMBER 76.0% -> gc-executor
--- verdict ---
CT 111 (tdunna) 84% AMBER -> report-only; no gc-executor row emitted; no GC run on .129.
Owned hosts acerpve .9 (77%) and amdpve .15 (76%) -> gc-executor (ours).
+42 -595
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3 #!/usr/bin/env python3
""" """
/root/scripts/agent-health-check.py — Consolidated Agent Health Verification v4 /root/scripts/agent-health-check.py — Consolidated Agent Health Verification
Verifies: LiteLLM keys (agent-specific), GPU port conflicts, agent Zulip streaming, Single non-disruptive health check replacing 7 scattered scripts.
gateway liveness, gateway log health, CT liveness, config YAML integrity, Verifies: LiteLLM keys, GPU port conflicts, agent Zulip streaming,
wrapper/CLI integrity, vault secret non-emptiness. NEVER restarts anything. gateway liveness, and gateway log health. NEVER restarts anything.
Usage: Usage:
python3 /root/scripts/agent-health-check.py # Full check python3 /root/scripts/agent-health-check.py # Full check
@@ -12,129 +12,27 @@ Usage:
python3 /root/scripts/agent-health-check.py --quiet # Only output on failure python3 /root/scripts/agent-health-check.py --quiet # Only output on failure
Cron: */10 * * * * python3 /root/scripts/agent-health-check.py --quiet Cron: */10 * * * * python3 /root/scripts/agent-health-check.py --quiet
Changelog:
v2 (2026-07-26): Added CT liveness, config validation, wrapper integrity,
vault secret emptiness check. Fixed Koby/Koonimo SSH hosts and agent key
name format ({NAME}_LITELLM_API_KEY not LITELLM_API_KEY_{NAME}).
Fleet roster: tanko (.122), koby (.129), koonimo (.114), abiba (.24).
(v2 also carried a mumuni probe; see v5 — mumuni is no longer probed: she
moved to her own container, kagentz CT 105 / .14, and is monitored there.)
v3 (2026-09-08): GPU unit repoint verified live (.8 llama-chat-api.service,
.110 llama-server.service, .15 strix-server.service) — .8 was probing a stale
llama-server unit that reads inactive, producing false UNREACHABLE legs.
systemctl is-active no longer swallows non-zero exit as SSH failure.
Fixed UnboundLocalError on the abiba/koonimo gateway leg (pid unbound in the
summary f-string). Abiba's LiteLLM key now comes from /root/.pi/agent/env.sh
(#735 agent separation; creds moved out of shared /root/.bashrc).
v4 (2026-09-10): probe-drift round 2 (prose-contracts follow-up to #65/#66/#68).
abiba declared pi-only runtime — Hermes-era config/wrapper/gateway checks are
skipped (harness purge). koby declared report_only per the captain's
2026-08-17 ruling: every koby leg is detected and reported, never counted as a
fleet failure and never repaired. koby's PVE mapping corrected to storepve
(CT 111 tdunna lives on .6 — the old amdpve mapping produced a false
ct-unreachable). The wrapper infisical-path check had two stale-expectation
bugs: it read only the first 20 lines of the wrapper, so koonimo (whose
wrapper does reference /usr/bin/infisical, just past line 20) was falsely
FAILed as "path may be wrong"; and it treated the absence of any infisical
reference as a fault, though koby's wrapper sources the key from
~/.hermes/.env and never invokes infisical. The check now reads the full
wrapper body, accepts a no-infisical wrapper, and verifies that any absolute
infisical path the wrapper references actually exists. Report-only findings
are surfaced in a machine-readable `report_only` array in --json output,
separate from `failures`. Every run prints absolute execution provenance
(script + cwd) in the header, in the cron ALERT line, and in --json output so
a stale-consumer report is distinguishable from a fault at read time.
v5 (2026-09-10): roster correction only, no behavior change. mumuni was removed
from the AGENTS dict when she moved off this host onto her own container
(kagentz CT 105 on minipve, .14, dedicated `hermes` user) and is monitored
from her side. This script must not probe mumuni or .24 — the v2 changelog
roster line was the last reference still placing her at .24 / CT100.
""" """
import subprocess, json, sys, os, time, re, io, contextlib import subprocess, json, sys, os, time
from datetime import datetime from datetime import datetime
LITELLM = "http://192.168.68.116:80" LITELLM = "http://192.168.68.116:80"
INFISICAL_PROJECT = "322fceab-39da-4854-a55a-568e76c0f13f"
INFISICAL_ENV = "prod"
# PVE node IPs for CT liveness checks
PVE_NODES = {
"amdpve": "192.168.68.15",
"minipve": "192.168.68.12",
"storepve": "192.168.68.6",
"acerpve": "192.168.68.9",
"ocupve": "192.168.68.5",
}
# Agent definitions: ct, host, user, pve_node, vault_key_name
AGENTS = { AGENTS = {
"tanko": {"ct": 112, "host": "192.168.68.122", "user": "jerome", "pve": "amdpve", "vault_key": "TANKO_LITELLM_API_KEY", "runtime": "dsh"}, "tanko": {"ct": 112, "host": "192.168.68.122", "key": "sk-CggiHWlamQyShxWC3Hx6uw", "user": "jerome"},
# abiba = pi agent (.24) — no vault key; its LiteLLM key is read from its "mumuni": {"ct": 114, "host": "192.168.68.123", "key": "sk-VrqCNlwUgzoNGOpikJ7nwQ", "user": "root"},
# local env file (key_env below), not from the shared vault or .bashrc. "tdunna": {"ct": 111, "host": None, "key": "sk-6sbCNjz2T6lTVDBdlNHXsA", "user": None},
# runtime=pi: abiba has run pi-only since the harness purge. There is no "baggy": {"ct": 113, "host": None, "key": "sk-krnw_zGBwvvL5b7l2t-s-A", "user": None},
# Hermes gateway, no ~/.hermes/config.yaml and no hermes CLI wrapper on .24
# (the /root/.local/bin/hermes symlink is dangling), so the Hermes-era
# config/wrapper/gateway legs are skipped rather than reported as faults.
"abiba": {"ct": 100, "host": "192.168.68.24", "user": "root", "pve": "minipve",
"vault_key": None, "runtime": "pi",
"key_env": {"file": "/root/.pi/agent/env.sh", "var": "LITELLM_API_KEY"}},
# koby = report-only (captain's 2026-08-17 ruling, Rule 17): detect and
# report, NEVER repair, and never count against fleet failures. CT 111
# (tdunna) lives on storepve (.6) — verified live 2026-09-10; the previous
# amdpve mapping made `pct status 111` fail and read as ct-unreachable.
"koby": {"ct": 111, "host": "192.168.68.129", "user": "root", "pve": "storepve", "vault_key": "KOBY_LITELLM_API_KEY", "report_only": True},
"koonimo": {"ct": 113, "host": "192.168.68.114", "user": "root", "pve": "amdpve", "vault_key": "KOONIMO_LITELLM_API_KEY"},
} }
# Systemd units verified live 2026-09-08 (systemctl list-units on each host):
# .8 rtx3090 (gpu-dense) -> llama-chat-api.service (active; the old
# llama-server.service unit file is stale/inactive — probing it read as
# UNREACHABLE for a healthy process)
# .110 rtx5070 (ocu-llm VM) -> llama-server.service (active)
# .15 strixhalo (amdpve) -> strix-server.service (active)
GPU_HOSTS = { GPU_HOSTS = {
"gpu-rtx3090 (.8)": {"host": "192.168.68.8", "port": 8080, "service": "llama-chat-api.service"}, "gpu-rtx3090 (.8)": {"host": "192.168.68.8", "port": 8080, "service": "llama-server"},
"gpu-rtx5070 (.110)": {"host": "192.168.68.110", "port": 8080, "service": "llama-server.service"}, "gpu-rtx5070 (.110)": {"host": "192.168.68.110", "port": 8080, "service": "llama-server"},
"gpu-strixhalo (.15)": {"host": "192.168.68.15", "port": 8080, "service": "strix-server.service"}, "gpu-strixhalo (.15)": {"host": "192.168.68.15", "port": 8080, "service": "ornith-server"},
} }
FAIL = [] FAIL = []
REPORT_ONLY = []
def _fail(key, agent_name=None):
"""Record a failure, except for report-only agents.
Koby is report-only per the captain's 2026-08-17 ruling (Rule 17): its legs
are detected and reported, never repaired and never counted as fleet
failures. A red fleet alert on a known report-only leg is a false alarm.
Report-only findings are tracked separately so --json consumers can still
see them without them counting as fleet failures. Any non-report-only agent
(or a leg with no agent, e.g. GPU hosts) records normally.
"""
if agent_name and AGENTS.get(agent_name, {}).get("report_only"):
REPORT_ONLY.append(key)
print(f" 🔍 report-only ({agent_name}): {key} — reported, not counted/repaired")
return
FAIL.append(key)
INFISICAL_TOKEN = os.environ.get("INFISICAL_TOKEN")
INFISICAL_API_URL = os.environ.get("INFISICAL_API_URL", "https://vault.sysloggh.net")
# Fallback: if no env token, read the shared vault token file
if not INFISICAL_TOKEN:
_token_path = os.path.expanduser("~/.infisical-token")
if os.path.isfile(_token_path):
try:
with open(_token_path) as _f:
INFISICAL_TOKEN = _f.read().strip()
except (OSError, UnicodeDecodeError):
pass
# ── Helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def ssh(host, cmd, user="root"): def ssh(host, cmd, user="root"):
"""Execute a command on a remote host, return stdout or None.""" """Execute a command on a remote host, return stdout or None."""
@@ -174,126 +72,25 @@ def http_json(url, headers=None, timeout=5):
except: except:
return None return None
def run_infisical(args, quiet=True):
"""Run infisical CLI with env-based auth, return stdout or None."""
env = os.environ.copy()
env["INFISICAL_API_URL"] = INFISICAL_API_URL
if INFISICAL_TOKEN:
env["INFISICAL_TOKEN"] = INFISICAL_TOKEN
try:
result = subprocess.run(
["/usr/bin/infisical"] + args,
capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=15, env=env
)
return result.stdout.strip() if result.returncode == 0 else None
except:
return None
# ── KEY LOOKUP FIX ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
def _get_agent_key(agent_name, vault_key_name):
"""Retrieve agent-specific key from Infisical vault.
Uses {NAME}_LITELLM_API_KEY format (e.g., TANKO_LITELLM_API_KEY,
KOONIMO_LITELLM_API_KEY) which matches actual vault key names.
"""
if not vault_key_name:
return None
# Primary: get the agent-specific key by name
key = run_infisical([
"secrets", "get", vault_key_name,
"--projectId=" + INFISICAL_PROJECT,
"--env=" + INFISICAL_ENV,
"--plain",
])
if key and key.startswith("sk-"):
return key
# Fallback: export all and search for the key name
try:
export = run_infisical([
"export",
"--projectId=" + INFISICAL_PROJECT,
"--env=" + INFISICAL_ENV,
"--format=dotenv",
])
if export:
for line in export.splitlines():
if line.startswith(vault_key_name + "="):
value = line.split("=", 1)[1].strip().strip('"').strip("'")
if value.startswith("sk-"):
return value
except:
pass
return None
def _read_env_export(path, var):
"""Parse `export VAR=value` (or `VAR=value`) out of a local env file.
#735 agent separation (2026-09-06): agent creds moved out of the shared
/root/.bashrc into per-agent env files under /root/.pi/agent/ (bashrc's
source line keeps abiba shells resolving them, but the file of record is
env.sh). Do NOT fall back to /root/.bashrc here: desktop (.200) SSH
sessions override LITELLM_API_KEY with mumuni's key, so sourcing bashrc
would validate the wrong identity.
"""
try:
with open(os.path.expanduser(path)) as _f:
for line in _f:
line = line.strip()
if not (line.startswith("export " + var + "=") or line.startswith(var + "=")):
continue
value = line.split("=", 1)[1].strip().strip('"').strip("'")
if value:
return value
except (OSError, UnicodeDecodeError):
pass
return None
def load_agent_keys():
"""Populate AGENTS[*]["key"] from the vault or the agent's local env file.
Called from main(), not at import: keeping this out of module scope lets the
module be imported (and unit tested) without live vault/SSH access. Vault
format is {NAME}_LITELLM_API_KEY (project 322fceab-39da-4854-a55a-568e76c0f13f,
env prod); abiba has no vault key and reads LITELLM_API_KEY from its local
/root/.pi/agent/env.sh (moved there from /root/.bashrc in #735).
"""
for agent_name in AGENTS:
info = AGENTS[agent_name]
key = _get_agent_key(agent_name, info.get("vault_key"))
if not key and info.get("key_env"):
key = _read_env_export(info["key_env"]["file"], info["key_env"]["var"])
AGENTS[agent_name]["key"] = key
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ # ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# CHECK 1: LiteLLM Key Validation (agent-specific keys) # CHECK 1: LiteLLM Key Validation
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ # ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
def check_keys(): def check_keys():
for name, agent in AGENTS.items(): for name, agent in AGENTS.items():
key = agent.get("key")
if not key:
print(f" ❌ {name}: NO KEY FOUND (vault/env empty or unreachable)")
_fail(f"key:{name}:no-key", name)
continue
data = http_json(f"{LITELLM}/v1/models", data = http_json(f"{LITELLM}/v1/models",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {key}"}) headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {agent['key']}"})
if data and data.get("data"): if data and data.get("data"):
model = data["data"][0].get("id", "?") model = data["data"][0].get("id", "?")
print(f" ✅ {name}: key valid → {model}") print(f" ✅ {name}: key valid → {model}")
else: else:
print(f" ❌ {name}: KEY FAILURE — auth rejected or unreachable") print(f" ❌ {name}: KEY FAILURE — auth rejected or unreachable")
_fail(f"key:{name}", name) FAIL.append(f"key:{name}")
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ # ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# CHECK 2: GPU Port Conflict Detection (unit names verified live 2026-09-08) # CHECK 2: GPU Port Conflict Detection
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ # ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
def check_gpu_ports(): def check_gpu_ports():
@@ -302,11 +99,7 @@ def check_gpu_ports():
port = gpu["port"] port = gpu["port"]
svc = gpu["service"] svc = gpu["service"]
# `systemctl is-active` exits non-zero when the unit is inactive or svc_status = ssh(host, f"systemctl is-active {svc}")
# missing, which the ssh() helper would swallow as an SSH failure and
# report as UNREACHABLE. `|| true` keeps the real state word so we can
# tell "unit inactive" from "host unreachable".
svc_status = ssh(host, f"systemctl is-active {svc} || true")
port_owner = ssh(host, f"ss -tlnp 2>/dev/null | grep -Po ':{port}\\s+.*pid=\\K[0-9]+' | head -1") port_owner = ssh(host, f"ss -tlnp 2>/dev/null | grep -Po ':{port}\\s+.*pid=\\K[0-9]+' | head -1")
if not svc_status: if not svc_status:
@@ -325,6 +118,7 @@ def check_gpu_ports():
else: else:
print(f" ⚠️ {label}: svc={svc_status}, port owned by {port_owner}") print(f" ⚠️ {label}: svc={svc_status}, port owned by {port_owner}")
else: else:
# Verify health endpoint
health = ssh(host, f"curl -s --max-time 5 http://localhost:{port}/health") health = ssh(host, f"curl -s --max-time 5 http://localhost:{port}/health")
if health and '"status":"ok"' in health: if health and '"status":"ok"' in health:
print(f" ✅ {label}: healthy (pid={port_owner})") print(f" ✅ {label}: healthy (pid={port_owner})")
@@ -337,97 +131,28 @@ def check_gpu_ports():
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ # ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# CHECK 3: Agent Gateway Liveness + Streaming (now covers all agents) # CHECK 3: Agent Gateway Liveness + Streaming
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ # ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
def _ssh_retry(host, cmd, user="root", timeout=15, retry_timeout=25, label=""):
"""SSH with one retry at a longer timeout.
Returns (stdout_or_None, probe_failed_bool, fail_kind).
When probe_failed is True, fail_kind is one of: timeout, ssh-failed.
"""
import subprocess as _sp
def _attempt(tmo, conn_tmo):
try:
r = _sp.run(
["ssh", "-o", "StrictHostKeyChecking=no", "-o", f"ConnectTimeout={conn_tmo}",
f"{user}@{host}", cmd],
capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=tmo)
return r.stdout.strip() if r.returncode == 0 else None
except _sp.TimeoutExpired:
return "__timeout__"
except:
return None
result = _attempt(timeout, 8)
if result is None or result == "__timeout__":
kind = "timeout" if result == "__timeout__" else "ssh-failed"
prefix = f"{label} " if label else ""
print(f" probe-failed: {prefix}ssh {user}@{host} — {kind} (retrying at {retry_timeout}s…)")
result = _attempt(retry_timeout, 15)
if result is None or result == "__timeout__":
kind = "timeout" if result == "__timeout__" else "ssh-failed"
return None, True, kind
return result, False, None
def check_agents(): def check_agents():
for name, agent in AGENTS.items(): for name, agent in AGENTS.items():
host = agent.get("host") host = agent.get("host")
user = agent.get("user") user = agent.get("user")
ct = agent["ct"] ct = agent["ct"]
report_only = agent.get("report_only", False)
# Tanko runs on DSH (DeepSeek Harness) since 2026-08-27 — it no longer runs a
# Hermes gateway, so skip the Hermes gateway/state/streaming/journal checks.
# Non-Hermes runtimes have no gateway to probe. dsh = Tanko since
# 2026-08-27; pi = abiba since the harness purge (.24 is pi-only).
if agent.get("runtime") in ("dsh", "pi"):
is_dsh = agent.get("runtime") == "dsh"
label = "DSH (DeepSeek Harness)" if is_dsh else "pi-only runtime"
since = "since 2026-08-27" if is_dsh else "since the harness purge"
live, probe_failed, fail_kind = _ssh_retry(host, "true", user=user)
if probe_failed:
print(f" ❌ {name}: {label} — probe-failed: ssh {user}@{host} {fail_kind} "
f"(retried at 25s: also {fail_kind}) [CT {ct}]")
_fail(f"probe-failed:{name}:{fail_kind}", name)
else:
print(f" ✅ {name}: {label} — no Hermes gateway {since} "
f"(ssh {user}@{host} OK, CT {ct})")
continue
if not host or not user: if not host or not user:
print(f" ⬜ {name} (CT {ct}): cannot SSH — skip liveness check") print(f" ⬜ {name} (CT {ct}): cannot SSH — skip liveness check")
continue continue
# Resolve the Hermes gateway PID with retry. The probe target is # Gateway process
# explicit: ssh {user}@{host} pgrep -f hermes gateway. pid = ssh(host, "pgrep -f 'hermes_cli.main gateway run' | head -1", user=user)
pid, probe_failed, fail_kind = _ssh_retry( if not pid:
host, "pgrep -f '[h]ermes_cli.main gateway run' | grep -v infisical | head -1", user=user) print(f" ❌ {name}: GATEWAY NOT RUNNING")
if not pid and not probe_failed: FAIL.append(f"gateway-down:{name}")
pid, probe_failed, fail_kind = _ssh_retry(
host, "pgrep -f '[h]ermes.*gateway' | grep -v infisical | grep -v bash | head -1", user=user)
if not pid and not probe_failed:
pid = "?"
if probe_failed:
print(f" ❌ {name}: probe-failed: ssh {user}@{host} {fail_kind} "
f"(retried at 25s: also {fail_kind}) [CT {ct}] — gateway status UNDETERMINED")
_fail(f"probe-failed:{name}:{fail_kind}", name)
continue continue
# ⛔ KOBY IS NEVER REPAIRED — diagnostic only (captain's 2026-08-17 ruling)
if report_only:
if pid == "?":
print(f" 🔍 {name}: REPORT-ONLY — probe: ssh {user}@{host} pgrep hermes-gateway "
f"-> no process found (reported only, NOT counted) [CT {ct}]")
_fail(f"gateway-down:{name}", name)
else:
print(f" 🔍 {name}: REPORT-ONLY — probe: ssh {user}@{host} pgrep hermes-gateway "
f"-> pid={pid} (running, reported only, NOT repaired) [CT {ct}]")
continue # Skip the rest of the check for Koby
# Gateway state file # Gateway state file
state, _, _ = _ssh_retry(host, "cat ~/.hermes/gateway_state.json 2>/dev/null", user=user) state = ssh(host, "cat ~/.hermes/gateway_state.json 2>/dev/null", user=user)
if state: if state:
try: try:
st = json.loads(state) st = json.loads(state)
@@ -438,272 +163,42 @@ def check_agents():
else: else:
gw_state, zulip = "no-state-file", "?" gw_state, zulip = "no-state-file", "?"
# Zulip streaming check # Zulip streaming: does adapter have edit_message?
adapter_paths = [ adapter_paths = [
"~/.hermes/plugins/zulip-platform/adapter.py", "~/.hermes/plugins/zulip-platform/adapter.py",
"~/.hermes/plugins/platforms/zulip/adapter.py", "~/.hermes/plugins/platforms/zulip/adapter.py",
] ]
streaming = "no" streaming = "no"
for p in adapter_paths: for p in adapter_paths:
has_edit, _, _ = _ssh_retry(host, f"grep -c 'async def edit_message' {p} 2>/dev/null", user=user) has_edit = ssh(host, f"grep -c 'async def edit_message' {p} 2>/dev/null", user=user)
if has_edit and has_edit != "0": if has_edit and has_edit != "0":
streaming = "yes" streaming = "yes"
break break
# Recent errors # Recent errors
recent_errors, _, _ = _ssh_retry( recent_errors = ssh(host,
host,
r"journalctl --user -u hermes-gateway --since '10 min ago' -o cat --no-pager 2>/dev/null " r"journalctl --user -u hermes-gateway --since '10 min ago' -o cat --no-pager 2>/dev/null "
r"| grep -ci 'error\|traceback\|exception\|401\|403\|500' || echo 0", r"| grep -ci 'error\|traceback\|exception\|401\|403\|500' || echo 0",
user=user) user=user)
recent_errors = (recent_errors or "0").strip().split("\n")[-1] recent_errors = (recent_errors or "0").strip().split("\n")[-1] # take last line
print(f" {'✅' if gw_state == 'running' and zulip == 'connected' else '⚠️'} " print(f" {'✅' if gw_state == 'running' and zulip == 'connected' else '⚠️'} "
f"{name}: probe: ssh {user}@{host} — gw={gw_state} zulip={zulip} " f"{name}: gw={gw_state} zulip={zulip} streaming={streaming} "
f"streaming={streaming} errors_10m={recent_errors.strip() or '0'} pid={pid} [CT {ct}]") f"errors_10m={recent_errors.strip() or '0'} pid={pid}")
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# CHECK 4: CT Liveness (NEW)
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
def check_ct_liveness():
"""Check that all agent CTs are running on their PVE nodes."""
for name, agent in AGENTS.items():
ct = agent["ct"]
pve_node = agent.get("pve")
if not pve_node:
print(f" ⬜ {name} (CT {ct}): no PVE node mapped — skip")
continue
pve_ip = PVE_NODES.get(pve_node)
if not pve_ip:
print(f" ⬜ {name}: unknown PVE node '{pve_node}' — skip")
continue
status = ssh(pve_ip, f"pct status {ct} 2>/dev/null", user="root")
if not status:
print(f" ❌ {name} (CT {ct} on {pve_node}): PVE UNREACHABLE")
_fail(f"ct-unreachable:{name}:{pve_ip}", name)
elif "running" in status:
print(f" ✅ {name} (CT {ct} on {pve_node}): running")
elif "stopped" in status:
print(f" ❌ {name} (CT {ct} on {pve_node}): STOPPED")
_fail(f"ct-stopped:{name}", name)
else:
print(f" ⚠️ {name} (CT {ct} on {pve_node}): {status.strip()}")
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# CHECK 5: Config YAML Integrity (NEW)
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
def check_config_integrity():
"""Verify agent config.yaml parses as valid YAML."""
for name, agent in AGENTS.items():
# Tanko runs on DSH (DeepSeek Harness) since 2026-08-27 — no Hermes config.yaml.
if agent.get("runtime") == "dsh":
print(f" ⏭️ {name}: DSH — no Hermes config.yaml since 2026-08-27")
continue
if agent.get("runtime") == "pi":
print(f" ⏭️ {name}: pi-only runtime — no Hermes config.yaml since the harness purge")
continue
host = agent.get("host")
user = agent.get("user")
if not host or not user:
print(f" ⬜ {name}: cannot SSH — skip config check")
continue
# Check YAML parses
yaml_ok = ssh(host,
"python3 -c "
'"import yaml; yaml.safe_load(open(\'/root/.hermes/config.yaml\')); print(\'OK\')" '
"2>&1 || echo 'FAIL'",
user=user)
if not yaml_ok:
print(f" ❌ {name}: SSH UNREACHABLE (config check skipped)")
_fail(f"config-unreachable:{name}", name)
elif "OK" in yaml_ok:
print(f" ✅ {name}: config.yaml valid YAML")
else:
print(f" ❌ {name}: config.yaml YAML ERROR — {yaml_ok[:120]}")
_fail(f"config-yaml-error:{name}", name)
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# CHECK 6: Wrapper/CLI Integrity (NEW)
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
def _infisical_invocation_paths(wrapper_body):
"""Absolute infisical paths the wrapper actually invokes.
Only executed (non-comment) lines count, and only a path followed by a real
infisical subcommand (e.g. `/usr/bin/infisical run`) is treated as an
invocation. A note such as `# migrated from /usr/local/bin/infisical` is
prose, not a call, so it must not manufacture a dangling-path false alarm.
"""
paths = []
for line in wrapper_body.splitlines():
code = line.split("#", 1)[0]
for _m in re.finditer(
r"(/[A-Za-z0-9._/-]*infisical)\s+(?:run|export|secrets|login|logout)\b",
code,
):
if _m.group(1) not in paths:
paths.append(_m.group(1))
return paths
def check_wrapper_integrity():
"""Verify the hermes CLI wrapper exists and can reach hermes-real."""
for name, agent in AGENTS.items():
# Tanko runs on DSH (DeepSeek Harness) since 2026-08-27 — no hermes CLI wrapper.
if agent.get("runtime") == "dsh":
print(f" ⏭️ {name}: DSH — no hermes CLI wrapper since 2026-08-27")
continue
if agent.get("runtime") == "pi":
print(f" ⏭️ {name}: pi-only runtime — no hermes CLI wrapper since the harness purge")
continue
host = agent.get("host")
user = agent.get("user")
if not host or not user:
print(f" ⬜ {name}: cannot SSH — skip wrapper check")
continue
# Check wrapper exists
wrapper = ssh(host, "ls -la /root/.local/bin/hermes 2>/dev/null", user=user)
if not wrapper:
# Check alternate wrapper locations
wrapper = ssh(host, "which hermes 2>/dev/null; command -v hermes 2>/dev/null", user=user)
if not wrapper:
print(f" ❌ {name}: NO HERMES CLI WRAPPER FOUND")
_fail(f"wrapper-missing:{name}", name)
continue
else:
print(f" ⚠️ {name}: hermes at {wrapper.strip()} (not ~/.local/bin/hermes)")
# Credential-injection mechanism. The Hermes-era wrapper injected creds
# with `/usr/bin/infisical run`, but the mechanism is not required to be
# infisical at all: koby's wrapper sources the key from ~/.hermes/.env
# and never mentions infisical, which is valid. The old check read only
# the first 20 lines, so koonimo's wrapper — which DOES reference
# /usr/bin/infisical, just past line 20 — false-failed as "path may be
# wrong". Read the full body, accept a no-infisical wrapper, and verify
# the absolute infisical path(s) the wrapper actually invokes. Only
# executed (non-comment) lines count: a comment or dead prose mentioning
# a removed path (litellm-api-keys.prose.md documents
# `rm -f /usr/local/bin/infisical`) must neither produce a dangling path
# nor trigger the PATH check — it is not an invocation.
wrapper_body = ssh(host, "cat /root/.local/bin/hermes 2>/dev/null", user=user) or ""
wrapper_code = "\n".join(line.split("#", 1)[0] for line in wrapper_body.splitlines())
invoked_paths = _infisical_invocation_paths(wrapper_body)
if "infisical" in wrapper_code:
if invoked_paths:
missing = []
for _p in invoked_paths:
_exists = ssh(host, f"test -x {_p} && echo OK || echo MISS", user=user)
if not _exists or _exists.strip().splitlines()[-1] != "OK":
missing.append(_p)
if len(missing) == len(invoked_paths):
inf_actual = ssh(host, "command -v infisical 2>/dev/null", user=user)
suffix = f" (infisical at {inf_actual})" if inf_actual else ""
print(f" ❌ {name}: wrapper invokes infisical via missing path(s) "
f"{', '.join(missing)}{suffix}")
_fail(f"wrapper-infisical-path:{name}", name)
elif missing:
print(f" ⚠️ {name}: wrapper has an unused/missing infisical path "
f"({', '.join(missing)}) but a working invocation — informational")
elif "/usr/bin/infisical" not in invoked_paths:
print(f" ⚠️ {name}: wrapper infisical path differs "
f"({', '.join(invoked_paths)}) — informational")
else:
print(f" ✅ {name}: wrapper infisical path OK")
else:
inf_actual = ssh(host, "command -v infisical 2>/dev/null", user=user)
if not inf_actual:
print(f" ❌ {name}: wrapper invokes infisical but the binary is MISSING")
_fail(f"wrapper-no-infisical:{name}", name)
else:
print(f" ✅ {name}: wrapper infisical resolves via PATH ({inf_actual})")
else:
print(f" ℹ️ {name}: wrapper resolves creds without infisical (e.g. ~/.hermes/.env) — OK")
# Check hermes-real exists
hermes_real = ssh(host,
"ls -la /root/.local/bin/hermes-real 2>/dev/null || echo MISS",
user=user)
if not hermes_real or hermes_real.strip() == "MISS":
# Check venv path
hermes_real = ssh(host,
"ls -la /usr/local/lib/hermes-agent/venv/bin/hermes 2>/dev/null || echo MISS",
user=user)
if not hermes_real or hermes_real.strip() == "MISS":
print(f" ❌ {name}: hermes-real NOT FOUND (wrapper broken)")
_fail(f"wrapper-no-hermes-real:{name}", name)
else:
print(f" ✅ {name}: hermes-real at alt path")
# Check the .env file has the key
env_has_key = ssh(host,
"grep -c 'LITELLM_API_KEY' /root/.hermes/.env 2>/dev/null || echo 0",
user=user)
if env_has_key and env_has_key.strip() not in ("", "0"):
print(f" ✅ {name}: wrapper + .env key present")
else:
print(f" ⚠️ {name}: .env may be missing LITELLM_API_KEY entry")
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# CHECK 7: Vault Secret Non-Emptiness (NEW)
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
def check_vault_secrets():
"""Verify agent-specific vault secrets are non-empty and start with sk-."""
for name, agent in AGENTS.items():
vault_key_name = agent.get("vault_key")
if not vault_key_name:
continue
key = agent.get("key")
if not key:
print(f" ❌ {name}: vault secret {vault_key_name} MISSING or EMPTY")
_fail(f"vault-empty:{name}:{vault_key_name}", name)
elif not key.startswith("sk-"):
print(f" ❌ {name}: vault secret {vault_key_name} WRONG FORMAT (starts '{key[:8]}...')")
_fail(f"vault-bad-format:{name}:{vault_key_name}", name)
else:
print(f" ✅ {name}: vault {vault_key_name}=sk-...{key[-4:]}")
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# DEPLOY: copy updated script to /root/scripts/ on local host
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
def deploy_self():
"""Copy this script to /root/scripts/agent-health-check.py if out of date."""
dest = "/root/scripts/agent-health-check.py"
try:
with open(__file__, "r") as f:
current = f.read()
if os.path.isfile(dest):
with open(dest, "r") as f:
existing = f.read()
if current == existing:
return # Already deployed
# Write new version
with open(dest, "w") as f:
f.write(current)
os.chmod(dest, 0o755)
print(f" 📦 Deployed updated script to {dest}")
except:
pass # Not fatal if deploy fails
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ # ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# MAIN # MAIN
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ # ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
def _run_checks(): def main():
quiet = "--quiet" in sys.argv
as_json = "--json" in sys.argv
if not quiet:
print(f"🏥 Agent Health Check — {datetime.now().strftime('%Y-%m-%d %H:%M UTC')}")
print()
print("🔑 LiteLLM Keys:") print("🔑 LiteLLM Keys:")
check_keys() check_keys()
print() print()
@@ -714,66 +209,18 @@ def _run_checks():
print("🤖 Agent Gateways:") print("🤖 Agent Gateways:")
check_agents() check_agents()
print()
print("🖥️ CT Liveness:")
check_ct_liveness()
print()
print("📝 Config Integrity:")
check_config_integrity()
print()
print("🔌 Wrapper/CLI Integrity:")
check_wrapper_integrity()
print()
print("🔐 Vault Secrets:")
check_vault_secrets()
def main():
quiet = "--quiet" in sys.argv
as_json = "--json" in sys.argv
# Self-deploy to canonical location
if not quiet and "--no-deploy" not in sys.argv:
deploy_self()
# Provenance: a report is only actionable if the reader can tell WHICH copy
# of this script produced it. A normal run carries it in the header, --json
# carries it for machine consumers, and the cron ALERT line carries it on
# failure. --quiet is documented as "only output on failure", so the header
# is emitted only when not quiet and a healthy quiet run stays silent.
script_path = os.path.abspath(__file__)
cwd = os.getcwd()
if quiet:
captured = io.StringIO()
with contextlib.redirect_stdout(captured):
load_agent_keys()
_run_checks()
if FAIL:
sys.stdout.write(captured.getvalue())
else:
print(f"🏥 Agent Health Check v4 — {datetime.now().strftime('%Y-%m-%d %H:%M UTC')}")
print(f"📍 executed from: script={script_path} cwd={cwd}")
print()
load_agent_keys()
_run_checks()
if FAIL: if FAIL:
print(f"\n❌ {len(FAIL)} FAILURE(S): {' | '.join(FAIL)}") print(f"\n❌ {len(FAIL)} FAILURE(S): {' | '.join(FAIL)}")
if quiet: if quiet:
print(f"ALERT agent-health:{','.join(FAIL)} script={script_path} cwd={cwd}") # In quiet mode, only print failures as a single alert line
print(f"ALERT agent-health:{','.join(FAIL)}")
elif not quiet: elif not quiet:
print("\n✅ All checks passed") print("\n✅ All checks passed")
if as_json: if as_json:
print(json.dumps({"timestamp": datetime.now().isoformat(), print(json.dumps({"timestamp": datetime.now().isoformat(),
"execution_path": script_path, "cwd": cwd, "failures": FAIL, "healthy": len(FAIL) == 0}))
"failures": FAIL, "report_only": REPORT_ONLY,
"healthy": len(FAIL) == 0}))
sys.exit(1 if FAIL else 0) sys.exit(1 if FAIL else 0)
-227
View File
@@ -1,227 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# capture-dsh-token.sh — refresh the dsh-web login token WITHOUT restarting dsh-web.
#
# Context (CT 112 / tankodhs.sysloggh.net)
# ----------------------------------------
# The dsh-web UI (systemd unit `dsh-web.service`, 127.0.0.1:3080) prints a random
# launch token to the journal on every start:
#
# dsh web: http://127.0.0.1:3080/?token=<TOKEN>
#
# That token is the only way to bootstrap the authority-bound 30-day browser
# cookie. It rotates on every dsh-web start, so the Authentik-gated
# `location = /dsh-web-login` in /etc/nginx/sites-available/dsh must always
# reference the token of the RUNNING process.
#
# This script:
# 1. selects the launch token the RUNNING service actually accepts from the
# current systemd invocation — it NEVER stops or starts dsh-web,
# 2. records it in /etc/dsh-web/launch-token,
# 3. regenerates the nginx include /etc/dsh-web/nginx-login.conf (the
# `proxy_pass ...?token=` line consumed by /dsh-web-login),
# 4. reloads nginx ONLY when the on-disk include differs from the generated
# one or the applied-state stamp does not match the token (the stamp is
# written only after a successful reload), rolling the include back on
# failure so the next run retries,
# 5. removes the legacy unauthenticated :8081 endpoint if it ever reappears.
#
# Idempotent and safe to run at any time (systemd ExecStartPost or timer).
set -euo pipefail
umask 077
PATH="/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin"
JOURNAL_UNIT="dsh-web.service"
TOKEN_FILE="/etc/dsh-web/launch-token"
INCLUDE_FILE="/etc/dsh-web/nginx-login.conf"
STAMP_FILE="/etc/dsh-web/nginx-login.conf.applied"
PENDING_FILE="/etc/dsh-web/nginx-reload.pending"
SITE_ENABLED="/etc/nginx/sites-enabled/dsh"
LEGACY_8081="/etc/nginx/sites-enabled/dsh.token"
STASH_DIR="/etc/nginx/sites-available"
LOCK_FILE="/run/capture-dsh-token.lock"
LOGIN_HOST="tankodhs.sysloggh.net"
LOGIN_UPSTREAM="http://127.0.0.1:3080"
TOKEN_WAIT=120
log() { printf 'capture-dsh-token: %s\n' "$*" >&2; }
die() { printf 'capture-dsh-token: ERROR: %s\n' "$*" >&2; exit 1; }
[ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ] || die "must run as root"
# ── 0. Serialize runs so timer/ExecStartPost/manual runs cannot interleave ──
exec 9>"$LOCK_FILE"
flock -n 9 || { log "another capture-dsh-token run holds $LOCK_FILE; exiting"; exit 0; }
mkdir -p "$(dirname "$PENDING_FILE")"
# ── 0b. Guarantee the generated include exists before any `nginx -t` ──────
# The :80 site includes /etc/dsh-web/nginx-login.conf by literal path, so a
# missing include makes every `nginx -t` fail and can wedge recovery. Seed it
# from the last known token (or a placeholder); step 4 replaces it.
if [ ! -f "$INCLUDE_FILE" ]; then
SEED="placeholder"
if [ -f "$TOKEN_FILE" ]; then
SEED="$(cat "$TOKEN_FILE" 2>/dev/null || true)"
[ -n "$SEED" ] || SEED="placeholder"
fi
printf '%s' "$SEED" | grep -qE '^[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=:@-]+$' || SEED="placeholder"
printf 'proxy_pass %s/?token=%s;\n' "$LOGIN_UPSTREAM" "$SEED" > "$INCLUDE_FILE"
chmod 600 "$INCLUDE_FILE"
log "created missing $INCLUDE_FILE"
fi
# ── 1. Remove the legacy unauthenticated :8081 endpoint, if present ─────────
# It bypassed Authentik entirely (listened on 0.0.0.0:8081 with no auth_request)
# and must never come back. Stash it rather than delete so it is auditable.
if [ -e "$LEGACY_8081" ] || [ -L "$LEGACY_8081" ]; then
TS="$(date -u +%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ)"
STASHED="$STASH_DIR/dsh.token.disabled-$TS"
mv "$LEGACY_8081" "$STASHED"
chmod 600 "$STASHED" 2>/dev/null || true
touch "$PENDING_FILE"
if ! NGINX_TEST_OUT="$(nginx -t 2>&1)"; then
die "nginx config test failed after disabling $LEGACY_8081 (kept disabled at $STASHED): $NGINX_TEST_OUT; a pending reload is recorded so running nginx is reloaded once the config is fixed. The legacy :8081 endpoint will NOT be restored."
fi
if ! nginx -s reload; then
die "nginx reload failed after disabling $LEGACY_8081 (kept disabled at $STASHED); a pending reload is recorded so running nginx is reloaded on the next run. The legacy :8081 endpoint will NOT be restored."
fi
rm -f "$PENDING_FILE"
log "removed legacy :8081 endpoint -> $STASHED"
fi
# ── 1b. Honor a recorded pending reload regardless of token selection ───────
# A failed reload leaves PENDING_FILE set so a stashed legacy :8081 file can
# never remain loaded in the running nginx while dsh-web is down or not yet
# answering. Reconcile it before the token wait.
if [ -e "$PENDING_FILE" ]; then
if ! NGINX_TEST_OUT="$(nginx -t 2>&1)"; then
log "WARNING: pending nginx reload recorded but 'nginx -t' fails: $NGINX_TEST_OUT; continuing so the include can be regenerated; will retry next run"
elif ! nginx -s reload; then
log "WARNING: pending nginx reload recorded but 'nginx -s reload' failed; will retry next run"
else
rm -f "$PENDING_FILE"
log "completed pending nginx reload"
fi
fi
# ── 2. Select the token the RUNNING service actually accepts ────────────────
# Re-sample the service's CURRENT systemd invocation on every pass and read
# candidates only from it, so a restart that lands during the wait immediately
# switches to the new invocation; there is no whole-journal or cross-invocation
# fallback, and an empty/unknown invocation just waits. Each candidate is then
# functionally verified against the local dsh-web using the public authority,
# exactly as the /dsh-web-login proxy does, and the first that answers 303 is
# the live token. Candidates are re-probed newest-first on each pass (connection
# failures stay eligible) until one is accepted or the wait elapses.
journal_tokens() {
journalctl -u "$JOURNAL_UNIT" "_SYSTEMD_INVOCATION_ID=$1" --no-pager -o cat 2>/dev/null \
| grep -oE 'dsh web: https?://[^[:space:]]+[?&]token=[^[:space:]]+' \
| sed -E 's/.*[?&]token=//' \
| grep -E '^[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=:@-]+$' \
| tac | awk '!seen[$0]++' || true
}
TOKEN=""
DEADLINE=$((SECONDS + TOKEN_WAIT))
NO_INVOCATION_WARNED=0
while [ -z "$TOKEN" ] && [ "$SECONDS" -lt "$DEADLINE" ]; do
INVOCATION="$(systemctl show -p InvocationID --value "$JOURNAL_UNIT" 2>/dev/null || true)"
if [ -z "$INVOCATION" ] || [ "$INVOCATION" = "n/a" ]; then
if [ "$NO_INVOCATION_WARNED" -eq 0 ]; then
log "WARNING: no invocation id for $JOURNAL_UNIT; waiting for a live invocation"
NO_INVOCATION_WARNED=1
fi
sleep 2
continue
fi
for cand in $(journal_tokens "$INVOCATION"); do
code="$(curl -s -o /dev/null --max-time 5 -w '%{http_code}' \
-H "Host: $LOGIN_HOST" "$LOGIN_UPSTREAM/?token=$cand" || true)"
if [ "$code" = "303" ]; then
TOKEN="$cand"
break
fi
done
[ -n "$TOKEN" ] && break
sleep 2
done
if [ -z "$TOKEN" ]; then
log "no accepted launch token in the current invocation within ${TOKEN_WAIT}s; leaving the include untouched for the next run"
[ -e "$PENDING_FILE" ] && die "pending nginx reload could not be completed; will retry next run"
exit 0
fi
# ── 3. Record the token (atomic, private) ──────────────────────────────────
mkdir -p "$(dirname "$TOKEN_FILE")"
if ! printf '%s\n' "$TOKEN" | cmp -s - "$TOKEN_FILE" 2>/dev/null; then
printf '%s\n' "$TOKEN" > "$TOKEN_FILE.tmp"
chmod 600 "$TOKEN_FILE.tmp"
mv "$TOKEN_FILE.tmp" "$TOKEN_FILE"
log "recorded live launch token in $TOKEN_FILE"
fi
chmod 600 "$TOKEN_FILE"
# ── 4. Regenerate the nginx login include (reload only when it changes) ────
NEW_INCLUDE="$(mktemp "$INCLUDE_FILE.XXXXXX")"
printf 'proxy_pass %s/?token=%s;\n' "$LOGIN_UPSTREAM" "$TOKEN" > "$NEW_INCLUDE"
chmod 600 "$NEW_INCLUDE"
# The stamp records the token nginx actually loaded. It is written only after a
# successful reload, so the early exit is safe only when both the stamp and the
# on-disk include agree with the live token; anything else falls through to the
# reload path so the include can never silently diverge from what nginx serves.
APPLIED=""
[ -f "$STAMP_FILE" ] && APPLIED="$(cat "$STAMP_FILE" 2>/dev/null || true)"
[ -f "$INCLUDE_FILE" ] && chmod 600 "$INCLUDE_FILE"
[ -f "$STAMP_FILE" ] && chmod 600 "$STAMP_FILE"
if [ "$APPLIED" = "$TOKEN" ] && [ -f "$INCLUDE_FILE" ] && cmp -s "$NEW_INCLUDE" "$INCLUDE_FILE" \
&& [ ! -e "$PENDING_FILE" ]; then
rm -f "$NEW_INCLUDE"
log "token unchanged; nginx not reloaded"
exit 0
fi
[ -e "$SITE_ENABLED" ] || { rm -f "$NEW_INCLUDE"; die "$SITE_ENABLED missing; refusing to reload"; }
RESTORE=""
if [ -f "$INCLUDE_FILE" ]; then
RESTORE="$(mktemp "$INCLUDE_FILE.bak.XXXXXX")"
cp -p "$INCLUDE_FILE" "$RESTORE"
chmod 600 "$RESTORE"
fi
mv "$NEW_INCLUDE" "$INCLUDE_FILE"
chmod 600 "$INCLUDE_FILE"
if ! NGINX_TEST_OUT="$(nginx -t 2>&1)"; then
if [ -n "$RESTORE" ]; then
mv "$RESTORE" "$INCLUDE_FILE"
else
rm -f "$INCLUDE_FILE"
fi
die "nginx config test failed: $NGINX_TEST_OUT; previous include restored"
fi
if ! nginx -s reload; then
if [ -n "$RESTORE" ]; then
mv "$RESTORE" "$INCLUDE_FILE"
else
rm -f "$INCLUDE_FILE"
fi
touch "$PENDING_FILE"
die "nginx reload failed; previous include restored; a pending reload is recorded so the next run retries"
fi
if [ -n "$RESTORE" ]; then
rm -f "$RESTORE"
fi
rm -f "$PENDING_FILE"
printf '%s\n' "$TOKEN" > "$STAMP_FILE.tmp"
chmod 600 "$STAMP_FILE.tmp"
mv "$STAMP_FILE.tmp" "$STAMP_FILE"
log "token changed; nginx reloaded"
log "login endpoint: https://$LOGIN_HOST/dsh-web-login (Authentik-gated)"
+80 -92
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ import smtplib, json, subprocess, os, sys, datetime, re
from email.mime.text import MIMEText from email.mime.text import MIMEText
from email.mime.multipart import MIMEMultipart from email.mime.multipart import MIMEMultipart
PVE = "https://192.168.68.12:8006" PVE = "https://minipve.sysloggh.net"
AUTH = "Authorization: PVEAPIToken=monitoring@pve!mumuni=eafd56c5-93d4-4d40-a41d-e688be0987f3" AUTH = "Authorization: PVEAPIToken=monitoring@pve!mumuni=eafd56c5-93d4-4d40-a41d-e688be0987f3"
# ── Shared credentials —─ # ── Shared credentials —─
@@ -29,13 +29,7 @@ LITELLM_PUBLIC = "https://litellm.sysloggh.net"
LITELLM_BACKEND = "192.168.68.116" LITELLM_BACKEND = "192.168.68.116"
AUTH_HOST = "192.168.68.11" AUTH_HOST = "192.168.68.11"
# Load LiteLLM API key from file (durable, works in cron) SYNTHETIC_API_KEY = "sk-U_ydi3B-wfGU-_xESkoU1Q"
LITELLM_KEY_FILE = "/root/.abiba-workspace/secrets/litellm-key.txt"
try:
with open(LITELLM_KEY_FILE) as f:
SYNTHETIC_API_KEY = f.read().strip()
except:
SYNTHETIC_API_KEY = None # Fail loudly: report "no-key-file" in check
NOW = datetime.datetime.now() NOW = datetime.datetime.now()
DATE_STR = NOW.strftime("%Y-%m-%d") DATE_STR = NOW.strftime("%Y-%m-%d")
@@ -44,16 +38,10 @@ TIME_STR = NOW.strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M UTC")
# ── Helpers ── # ── Helpers ──
def pve_get(path): def pve_get(path):
"""Fetch PVE API data. Returns list on success, None on error (to distinguish from empty list).""" cmd = f'curl -sfk --connect-timeout 10 "{PVE}{path}" -H "{AUTH}"'
cmd = f'curl -sk --connect-timeout 10 "{PVE}{path}" -H "{AUTH}"'
try: try:
r = subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=12) return json.loads(subprocess.check_output(cmd, shell=True))["data"]
if r.returncode != 0: except: return []
return None
data = json.loads(r.stdout)
return data.get("data", [])
except:
return None
def ssh(host, cmd): def ssh(host, cmd):
try: try:
@@ -74,7 +62,7 @@ def http_get(url, auth=None, timeout=10):
cmd = f'curl -sfk --connect-timeout {timeout} -o /dev/null -w "%{{http_code}}" "{url}"' cmd = f'curl -sfk --connect-timeout {timeout} -o /dev/null -w "%{{http_code}}" "{url}"'
if auth: if auth:
cmd = cmd.replace('"', '\\"') cmd = cmd.replace('"', '\\"')
cmd = f'curl -sfk --connect-timeout {timeout} -H "Authorization: Bearer {auth}" -o /dev/null -w "%{{http_code}}" "{url}"' cmd = f'curl -sfk --connect-timeout {timeout} -u "{auth}" -o /dev/null -w "%{{http_code}}" "{url}"'
r = subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout+2) r = subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout+2)
return r.stdout.strip() or "000" return r.stdout.strip() or "000"
except: except:
@@ -109,33 +97,21 @@ def collect():
# ── Proxmox Nodes ── # ── Proxmox Nodes ──
nodes = pve_get("/api2/json/nodes") nodes = pve_get("/api2/json/nodes")
if nodes is None: report["nodes"] = {n["node"]: {
report["nodes"] = {} "cpu_pct": round(n.get('cpu',0)*100, 1),
report["node_count"] = 0 "ram": f"{n.get('mem',0)//1024//1024}/{n.get('maxmem',0)//1024//1024}MB",
report["nodes_online"] = 0 "ram_pct": round(n.get('mem',0)/n.get('maxmem',1)*100, 0),
report["pve_probe_status"] = "unreachable" "disk": f"{n.get('disk',0)//1024//1024//1024}/{n.get('maxdisk',0)//1024//1024//1024}GB",
else: "disk_pct": round(n.get('disk',0)/n.get('maxdisk',1)*100, 0),
report["nodes"] = {n["node"]: { "uptime_h": n.get('uptime',0)//3600,
"cpu_pct": round(n.get('cpu',0)*100, 1), "status": n["status"]
"ram": f"{n.get('mem',0)//1024//1024}/{n.get('maxmem',0)//1024//1024}MB", } for n in nodes}
"ram_pct": round(n.get('mem',0)/n.get('maxmem',1)*100, 0), report["node_count"] = len(nodes)
"disk": f"{n.get('disk',0)//1024//1024//1024}/{n.get('maxdisk',0)//1024//1024//1024}GB", report["nodes_online"] = sum(1 for n in nodes if n["status"] == "online")
"disk_pct": round(n.get('disk',0)/n.get('maxdisk',1)*100, 0),
"uptime_h": n.get('uptime',0)//3600,
"status": n["status"]
} for n in nodes}
report["node_count"] = len(nodes)
report["nodes_online"] = sum(1 for n in nodes if n["status"] == "online")
report["pve_probe_status"] = "ok"
# ── VMs/CTs ── # ── VMs/CTs ──
resources = pve_get("/api2/json/cluster/resources") resources = pve_get("/api2/json/cluster/resources")
if resources is None: vms = [r for r in resources if r.get("type") in ("qemu","lxc")]
vms = []
report["resources_probe_status"] = "unreachable"
else:
vms = [r for r in resources if r.get("type") in ("qemu","lxc")]
report["resources_probe_status"] = "ok"
report["total_vms"] = len(vms) report["total_vms"] = len(vms)
report["running_vms"] = sum(1 for v in vms if v.get("status") == "running") report["running_vms"] = sum(1 for v in vms if v.get("status") == "running")
stopped = [v for v in vms if v.get("status") != "running"] stopped = [v for v in vms if v.get("status") != "running"]
@@ -207,7 +183,7 @@ def collect():
("Authentik", "https://auth.sysloggh.net"), ("Authentik", "https://auth.sysloggh.net"),
("Zulip", "https://chat.sysloggh.net"), ("Zulip", "https://chat.sysloggh.net"),
("Pulse", "https://pulse.sysloggh.net"), ("Pulse", "https://pulse.sysloggh.net"),
("Proxmox", "https://192.168.68.12:8006"), ("Proxmox", "https://minipve.sysloggh.net"),
("SearXNG", "http://192.168.68.7:8888"), ("SearXNG", "http://192.168.68.7:8888"),
("Firecrawl", "http://192.168.68.7:3002/health"), ("Firecrawl", "http://192.168.68.7:3002/health"),
] ]
@@ -219,11 +195,10 @@ def collect():
# ── LiteLLM Specific Checks (from litellm-health prose contract) ── # ── LiteLLM Specific Checks (from litellm-health prose contract) ──
report["litellm"] = {"checks": []} report["litellm"] = {"checks": []}
# Check 1: Fleet health via nginx /health/unified (301 -> /gpu/gpu-data served by gpu-monitor on .24:9100). # Check 1: LiteLLM aggregate health endpoint (router binds to 127.0.0.1, check via SSH)
# Router (:9000) was decommissioned 2026-09-11; probing it was a guaranteed daily failure. health_unified = ssh(LITELLM_BACKEND, "curl -sf http://127.0.0.1:9000/health/unified -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' 2>/dev/null")
health_unified = ssh(LITELLM_BACKEND, "curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --max-time 8 http://127.0.0.1/health/unified 2>/dev/null")
report["litellm"]["health_unified"] = health_unified or "000" report["litellm"]["health_unified"] = health_unified or "000"
report["litellm"]["checks"].append({"name": "fleet-health-via-nginx", "status": "pass" if health_unified in ("200", "301") else "fail", "code": health_unified or "000"}) report["litellm"]["checks"].append({"name": "unified-health", "status": "pass" if health_unified == "200" else "fail", "code": health_unified or "000"})
# Check 2: Nginx-proxied internal endpoints # Check 2: Nginx-proxied internal endpoints
for path, name in [("/litellm/ui/", "nginx-ui"), ("/litellm/docs", "nginx-docs")]: for path, name in [("/litellm/ui/", "nginx-ui"), ("/litellm/docs", "nginx-docs")]:
@@ -231,11 +206,8 @@ def collect():
report["litellm"]["checks"].append({"name": name, "status": "pass" if code == "200" else "fail", "code": code}) report["litellm"]["checks"].append({"name": name, "status": "pass" if code == "200" else "fail", "code": code})
# Check 3: Docker container health for LiteLLM stack # Check 3: Docker container health for LiteLLM stack
expected_containers = ["harness-litellm", "harness-nginx", "harness-postgres", expected_containers = ["harness-litellm", "harness-nginx", "harness-router",
"harness-redis", "harness-dashboard", "harness-grafana", "harness-postgres", "harness-redis", "harness-dashboard"]
"harness-prometheus", "harness-alertmanager",
"harness-zulip-bridge", "harness-docker-stats",
"harness-pve-exporter"]
actual_names = [c["name"] for c in containers2] actual_names = [c["name"] for c in containers2]
report["litellm"]["expected_containers"] = expected_containers report["litellm"]["expected_containers"] = expected_containers
report["litellm"]["missing_containers"] = [e for e in expected_containers if e not in actual_names] report["litellm"]["missing_containers"] = [e for e in expected_containers if e not in actual_names]
@@ -253,13 +225,9 @@ def collect():
report["litellm"]["checks"].append({"name": "oidc-auth", "status": "pass" if auth_code in ("200","302") else "fail", "code": auth_code}) report["litellm"]["checks"].append({"name": "oidc-auth", "status": "pass" if auth_code in ("200","302") else "fail", "code": auth_code})
# Check 5: Synthetic API call through LiteLLM # Check 5: Synthetic API call through LiteLLM
if SYNTHETIC_API_KEY is None: api_check = http_get(f"{LITELLM_PUBLIC}/v1/models", auth=SYNTHETIC_API_KEY)
report["litellm"]["api_models"] = None report["litellm"]["api_models"] = api_check
report["litellm"]["checks"].append({"name": "api-endpoint", "status": "fail", "code": "no-key-file"}) report["litellm"]["checks"].append({"name": "api-endpoint", "status": "pass" if api_check == "200" else "fail", "code": api_check})
else:
api_check = http_get(f"{LITELLM_PUBLIC}/v1/models", auth=SYNTHETIC_API_KEY)
report["litellm"]["api_models"] = api_check
report["litellm"]["checks"].append({"name": "api-endpoint", "status": "pass" if api_check == "200" else "fail", "code": api_check})
# ── NFS Mounts ── # ── NFS Mounts ──
nfs = ssh("192.168.68.7", "df -h /media/storage /media/mediastore 2>/dev/null | tail -n +2") nfs = ssh("192.168.68.7", "df -h /media/storage /media/mediastore 2>/dev/null | tail -n +2")
@@ -279,13 +247,11 @@ def collect():
zulip_health = json.loads(health_body) if health_body else {} zulip_health = json.loads(health_body) if health_body else {}
except: except:
zulip_health = {} zulip_health = {}
# Live state is nested under 'zulip' key report["zulip_ext"]["connected"] = zulip_health.get("connected", False)
zulip_state = zulip_health.get("zulip", {}) report["zulip_ext"]["queue_id"] = zulip_health.get("queue_id")
report["zulip_ext"]["connected"] = zulip_state.get("connected", False) report["zulip_ext"]["last_error"] = zulip_health.get("last_error")
report["zulip_ext"]["queue_id"] = zulip_state.get("queue_id") report["zulip_ext"]["messages_processed"] = zulip_health.get("messages_processed", 0)
report["zulip_ext"]["last_error"] = zulip_state.get("last_error") report["zulip_ext"]["retry_count"] = zulip_health.get("retry_count", 0)
report["zulip_ext"]["messages_processed"] = zulip_state.get("messages_processed", 0)
report["zulip_ext"]["skipped"] = zulip_state.get("skipped", 0)
# Phase 2: PM2 process check # Phase 2: PM2 process check
pm2_raw = subprocess.check_output( pm2_raw = subprocess.check_output(
@@ -323,32 +289,50 @@ def collect():
# Abiba (pi) # Abiba (pi)
report["agents"]["abiba"] = { report["agents"]["abiba"] = {
"platform": "pi", "ct": 100, "ip": "192.168.68.24", "platform": "pi", "ct": 100, "ip": "192.168.68.24",
"zulip_connected": zulip_state.get("connected", False), "zulip_connected": zulip_health.get("connected", False),
"zulip_processed": zulip_state.get("messages_processed", 0), "zulip_processed": zulip_health.get("messages_processed", 0),
"pm2_status": pm2.get("status", "unknown"), "pm2_status": pm2.get("status", "unknown"),
"pm2_restarts": pm2.get("restarts", "?"), "pm2_restarts": pm2.get("restarts", "?"),
"pm2_uptime": pm2.get("uptime", "?"), "pm2_uptime": pm2.get("uptime", "?"),
} }
# Tanko (CT 112, IP 192.168.68.122) — DSH (DeepSeek Harness), no Hermes gateway # Tanko (CT 122)
# since 2026-08-27. There is no ~/.hermes/gateway_state.json on CT 112 anymore; tanko_state = ssh_jerome("192.168.68.122", "cat ~/.hermes/gateway_state.json 2>/dev/null")
# Zulip/Telegram connectivity is managed by the DSH harness, not the Hermes gateway. tanko_data = {}
try:
tanko_data = json.loads(tanko_state) if tanko_state else {}
except:
tanko_data = {}
platforms = tanko_data.get("platforms", {})
report["agents"]["tanko"] = { report["agents"]["tanko"] = {
"platform": "dsh", "ct": 112, "ip": "192.168.68.122", "platform": "hermes", "ct": 112, "ip": "192.168.68.122",
"gateway_state": "n/a (DSH)", "gateway_state": tanko_data.get("gateway_state", "unknown"),
"zulip_state": "unknown", "zulip_state": platforms.get("zulip", {}).get("state", "unknown"),
"telegram_state": "unknown", "telegram_state": platforms.get("telegram", {}).get("state", "unknown"),
"gateway_pid": None, "gateway_pid": tanko_data.get("pid"),
"updated_at": "", "updated_at": tanko_data.get("updated_at"),
} }
# Mumuni is deliberately absent from this digest: captain ruling 2026-09-10. # Mumuni (CT 114, IP 192.168.68.123)
# She moved off this host onto her own container (kagentz CT 105 on minipve, mumuni_state = ssh("192.168.68.123", "cat ~/.hermes/gateway_state.json 2>/dev/null")
# 192.168.68.14, dedicated `hermes` user) and is monitored from her side. The mumuni_data = {}
# former probe ssh'd to 192.168.68.24 for the decommissioned deployment's try:
# ~/.hermes/gateway_state.json, always read "unknown", and published a false mumuni_data = json.loads(mumuni_state) if mumuni_state else {}
# "mumuni:unknown" line in the agent table and the gateway-unknown issue except:
# count of every digest. Do NOT re-add an .24 / gateway_state probe. mumuni_data = {}
mumuni_platforms = mumuni_data.get("platforms", {})
report["agents"]["mumuni"] = {
"platform": "hermes", "ct": 114, "ip": "192.168.68.123",
"gateway_state": mumuni_data.get("gateway_state", "unknown"),
"telegram_state": mumuni_platforms.get("telegram", {}).get("state", "unknown"),
"zulip_state": mumuni_platforms.get("zulip", {}).get("state", "not_installed"),
"email_state": mumuni_platforms.get("email", {}).get("state", "unknown"),
"hermes_version": "",
}
# Get Hermes version
ver = ssh("192.168.68.123", "hermes --version 2>/dev/null | head -1")
if ver:
report["agents"]["mumuni"]["hermes_version"] = ver.split("·")[0].replace("Hermes Agent ","").strip()
return report return report
@@ -440,7 +424,7 @@ th {{ color: #8b949e; font-weight: normal; }}
<div class="alert {'good' if not issues else 'bad' if any('🔴' in i for i in issues) else 'warn'}"> <div class="alert {'good' if not issues else 'bad' if any('🔴' in i for i in issues) else 'warn'}">
<p style="margin:0;font-size:16px"><b>{status}</b></p> <p style="margin:0;font-size:16px"><b>{status}</b></p>
<p style="margin:4px 0 0 0;font-size:13px"> <p style="margin:4px 0 0 0;font-size:13px">
Proxmox: {r.get('pve_probe_status', 'ok')} ({r['nodes_online']}/{r['node_count']}) · {r['total_vms']} VMs/CTs · {r['running_vms']} running · {r['node_count']} PVE nodes · {r['total_vms']} VMs/CTs · {r['running_vms']} running ·
{r['docker_vm']['total'] + r['docker_syslog']['total'] + r['docker_netbird']['total']} containers · {r['docker_vm']['total'] + r['docker_syslog']['total'] + r['docker_netbird']['total']} containers ·
{len(r['endpoints'])} endpoints · {len(r.get('agents',{}))} agents {len(r['endpoints'])} endpoints · {len(r.get('agents',{}))} agents
</p> </p>
@@ -456,10 +440,8 @@ Proxmox: {r.get('pve_probe_status', 'ok')} ({r['nodes_online']}/{r['node_count']
# ── Quick Stats ── # ── Quick Stats ──
html += '<div class="card"><h2>📊 Quick Stats</h2><div class="grid">' html += '<div class="card"><h2>📊 Quick Stats</h2><div class="grid">'
pve_status_label = "unreachable" if r.get('pve_probe_status') == 'unreachable' else f"{r['nodes_online']}/{r['node_count']}"
pve_status_color = "red" if r.get('pve_probe_status') == 'unreachable' or r['nodes_online'] != r['node_count'] else "green"
stats = [ stats = [
("PVE Nodes", pve_status_label, pve_status_color), ("PVE Nodes", f"{r['nodes_online']}/{r['node_count']}", "green" if r['nodes_online'] == r['node_count'] else "red"),
("VMs/CTs", f"{r['running_vms']}/{r['total_vms']}", "green" if r['running_vms'] == r['total_vms'] else "red"), ("VMs/CTs", f"{r['running_vms']}/{r['total_vms']}", "green" if r['running_vms'] == r['total_vms'] else "red"),
("Containers", f"{r['docker_vm']['running']}/{r['docker_vm']['total']}", "green" if r['docker_vm']['running'] == r['docker_vm']['total'] else "yellow"), ("Containers", f"{r['docker_vm']['running']}/{r['docker_vm']['total']}", "green" if r['docker_vm']['running'] == r['docker_vm']['total'] else "yellow"),
("LiteLLM Ctrs", f"{r['docker_syslog']['running']}/{r['docker_syslog']['total']}", "green" if r['docker_syslog']['running'] == r['docker_syslog']['total'] else "red"), ("LiteLLM Ctrs", f"{r['docker_syslog']['running']}/{r['docker_syslog']['total']}", "green" if r['docker_syslog']['running'] == r['docker_syslog']['total'] else "red"),
@@ -561,7 +543,13 @@ Proxmox: {r.get('pve_probe_status', 'ok')} ({r['nodes_online']}/{r['node_count']
elif name == "tanko": elif name == "tanko":
zulip_state = "✅" if agent.get("zulip_state") == "connected" else ("❌" if agent.get("zulip_state") == "disconnected" else "⬜") zulip_state = "✅" if agent.get("zulip_state") == "connected" else ("❌" if agent.get("zulip_state") == "disconnected" else "⬜")
gateway = agent.get("gateway_state", "?") gateway = agent.get("gateway_state", "?")
processed = "DSH" processed = agent.get("updated_at", "")[:10]
elif name == "mumuni":
zulip_state = "⬜" if agent.get("zulip_state") == "not_installed" else ("✅" if agent.get("zulip_state") == "connected" else "⬜")
gateway = agent.get("gateway_state", "?")
tg = "✅" if agent.get("telegram_state") == "connected" else "❌"
ver = agent.get("hermes_version", "")
processed = f"TG:{tg} v{ver}"
else: else:
zulip_state = "⬜" zulip_state = "⬜"
gateway = agent.get("gateway_state", "?") gateway = agent.get("gateway_state", "?")
@@ -715,6 +703,6 @@ if __name__ == "__main__":
print(f" Zulip Ext: {'✅' if report.get('zulip_ext',{}).get('connected') else '❌'}") print(f" Zulip Ext: {'✅' if report.get('zulip_ext',{}).get('connected') else '❌'}")
print(f" LiteLLM: {sum(1 for c in report.get('litellm',{}).get('checks',[]) if c['status']=='pass')}/{len(report.get('litellm',{}).get('checks',[]))} checks pass") print(f" LiteLLM: {sum(1 for c in report.get('litellm',{}).get('checks',[]) if c['status']=='pass')}/{len(report.get('litellm',{}).get('checks',[]))} checks pass")
agent_parts = [] agent_parts = []
for k,v in report.get('agents',{}).items(): for k,v in report.get('agents',{}).items():
agent_parts.append(f"{k}:{v.get('gateway_state',v.get('pm2_status','?'))}") agent_parts.append(f"{k}:{v.get('gateway_state',v.get('pm2_status','?'))}")
print(f" Agents: {', '.join(agent_parts)}") print(f" Agents: {', '.join(agent_parts)}")
-206
View File
@@ -1,206 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""disk-gc-plan — turn a fleet disk scan into the GC action plan.
This is the executable side of `disk-gc-threat-response.prose.md`. It exists so the
report-only gate is enforced by code that can be tested, rather than by prose the
executor might misread.
THE HARD GATE: guests listed in the contract's `report_only_guests` block are
DETECT-AND-REPORT-ONLY at EVERY level (AMBER, RED, CRITICAL). This tool will never
emit a `gc-executor` action for one, so no GC command can be constructed for it.
The gate is keyed on GUEST identity — guest id, hostname, or IP — never on an agent
name. An agent-name marker can silently miss the guest it lives on; a guest marker
cannot.
The authoritative exclusion list lives in the contract itself (the fenced ```yaml
block containing `report_only_guests:`). This tool reads it from there so there is
only ever one copy.
Usage:
disk-gc-plan.py --scan scan.json # [{"id":111,"usage_pct":84}, ...]
cat scan.json | disk-gc-plan.py # same, via stdin
disk-gc-plan.py --scan scan.json --json # machine-readable plan
Scan entries may carry any of: id / guest / vmid / ct / ctid, hostname / name, ip.
A threshold-crossing entry with no recognizable identity is reported, never GC'd.
Exit codes: 0 ok, 1 usage/parse error.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import json
import pathlib
import re
import sys
import yaml
REPO = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
DEFAULT_CONTRACT = REPO / "disk-gc-threat-response.prose.md"
AMBER, RED, CRITICAL = 75, 85, 95
IDENTITY_FIELDS = ("id", "guest", "vmid", "ct", "ctid", "hostname", "name", "ip")
IDENTITY_TYPE_PREFIX = re.compile(r"^(?:lxc|qemu)/")
UNIDENTIFIED_REASON = "unidentified target - refusing to schedule GC"
def load_report_only_guests(contract_path: pathlib.Path) -> list[dict]:
"""Read the authoritative report_only_guests block out of the contract.
The contract carries it as a fenced ```yaml block. Parsing the declared,
machine-readable block is the intended interface — the contract owns the list.
"""
text = contract_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
for block in re.findall(r"```yaml\n(.*?)```", text, re.S):
if "report_only_guests:" in block:
data = yaml.safe_load(block)
guests = data.get("report_only_guests") or []
if not isinstance(guests, list):
raise SystemExit("report_only_guests must be a list")
if not guests:
raise SystemExit(
"report_only_guests is empty or missing - refusing to plan GC "
"without the report-only gate"
)
for guest in guests:
if not isinstance(guest, dict) or not _keys(guest):
raise SystemExit(
"report_only_guests entry has no recognizable identity key "
f"(expected one of: {', '.join(IDENTITY_FIELDS)}): {guest!r}"
)
return guests
raise SystemExit(
f"no authoritative report_only_guests block found in {contract_path}"
)
def _canonical_number(number: float) -> str:
if float(number).is_integer():
return str(int(number))
return str(number).strip().lower()
def _normalize_identity(value: object) -> str:
"""Canonicalise a guest identity so differently-encoded ids compare equal:
numeric and numeric-string ids collapse to an integer string, Proxmox
type prefixes and leading zeros are stripped, and hostnames/IPs are only
trimmed and lowercased."""
if isinstance(value, bool):
return str(value).strip().lower()
if isinstance(value, (int, float)):
return _canonical_number(float(value))
text = str(value).strip().lower()
text = IDENTITY_TYPE_PREFIX.sub("", text)
try:
return _canonical_number(float(text))
except ValueError:
return text
def _keys(entry: dict) -> set[str]:
"""Guest/host identity keys, shared by exclusions and scan entries so the two
sides of the gate can never key on different fields."""
out: set[str] = set()
for field in IDENTITY_FIELDS:
value = entry.get(field)
if value is None:
continue
key = _normalize_identity(value)
if key:
out.add(key)
return out
def level_for(pct: float) -> str | None:
if pct >= CRITICAL:
return "CRITICAL"
if pct >= RED:
return "RED"
if pct >= AMBER:
return "AMBER"
return None
def build_plan(scan: list[dict], report_only: list[dict]) -> list[dict]:
excluded = [(e, _keys(e)) for e in report_only]
plan: list[dict] = []
for entry in scan:
pct = entry.get("usage_pct")
if pct is None:
continue
level = level_for(float(pct))
if level is None:
continue # GREEN: log only, no action
scan_keys = _keys(entry)
target = next(
(entry.get(k) for k in IDENTITY_FIELDS if entry.get(k) not in (None, "")),
"?",
)
if not scan_keys:
plan.append({
"target": target,
"level": level,
"pct": float(pct),
"action": "report-only",
"reason": UNIDENTIFIED_REASON,
})
continue
match = next((e for e, keys in excluded if keys & scan_keys), None)
if match is not None:
plan.append({
"target": target,
"level": level,
"pct": float(pct),
"action": "report-only",
"reason": match.get("reason", "").strip(),
})
else:
plan.append({
"target": target,
"level": level,
"pct": float(pct),
"action": "gc-executor",
})
plan.sort(key=lambda row: row["pct"], reverse=True)
return plan
def main() -> int:
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Plan disk GC actions with the report-only gate.")
ap.add_argument("--scan", help="JSON file: list of {id|ct|hostname|ip, usage_pct}")
ap.add_argument("--contract", default=str(DEFAULT_CONTRACT))
ap.add_argument("--json", action="store_true", help="emit the plan as JSON")
args = ap.parse_args()
raw = pathlib.Path(args.scan).read_text() if args.scan else sys.stdin.read()
try:
scan = json.loads(raw)
except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
print(f"invalid scan JSON: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
return 1
if not isinstance(scan, list):
print("scan must be a JSON list", file=sys.stderr)
return 1
report_only = load_report_only_guests(pathlib.Path(args.contract))
plan = build_plan(scan, report_only)
if args.json:
print(json.dumps(plan, indent=2))
return 0
if not plan:
print("no threats (nothing at or above 75%)")
return 0
for row in plan:
if row["action"] == "report-only":
print(f" {row['target']} {row['level']} {row['pct']}% -> REPORT-ONLY (no GC) — {row['reason']}")
else:
print(f" {row['target']} {row['level']} {row['pct']}% -> gc-executor")
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())
-339
View File
@@ -1,339 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""disk-gc-scan — deterministic disk usage probe for fleet guests.
This is the executable scanner side of `disk-gc-threat-response.prose.md`. It exists
so reachability verdicts are deterministic and every rendered field traces to a
named probe command.
DESIGN PRINCIPLES (per task disk-gc-probe-false-unreachable-20260913):
1. REACHABILITY VERDICTS ARE DETERMINISTIC:
- Retry once on failure before declaring unreachable
- Always name the probe target (guest, host, access method) on the line it prints
- Never render a failed probe as a bare service/guest verdict — print the failure kind
2. PER-GUEST ACCESS METHOD CANNOT BE MIS-SELECTED:
- CT 105 (kagentz) = ssh root@kagentz (NOT pct exec 105)
- VM 109 (docker-vm) = ssh root@192.168.68.7 (NOT pct)
- All other CTs = pct-run <ct_id> (which uses pct exec)
- The access method is selected from a per-guest map so the wrong path cannot be
picked by an executor improvising
3. EVERY RENDERED FIELD AUDITED:
- For each guest, print the probe command that produced the figure
- If a figure comes from a different kind of measurement than the column claims,
name it explicitly
4. FIX A (CWD independence): Resolve repo-relative files from the script's own
location, not the caller's CWD.
FIX B (df columns): Parse df output correctly and print labelled, human-readable
output.
Usage:
disk-gc-scan.py # scan all guests
disk-gc-scan.py --json # machine-readable output
Exit codes: 0 ok (all guests probed), 1 probe error
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import pathlib
import subprocess
import sys
import time
import os
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import Optional
# Resolve repo-relative files from the script's own location, not the caller's CWD
SCRIPT_DIR = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent
HELPER_PCT_RUN = SCRIPT_DIR / "pct-run.sh"
# Per-guest access method map. This is the authoritative source for how to reach
# each guest — the contract's prose documentation must match this map.
#
# Access methods:
# - "pct-run": use pct-run.sh <ct_id> (pct exec via SSH to node)
# - "ssh-host": use ssh root@<hostname>
# - "ssh-ip": use ssh root@<ip>
@dataclass
class Guest:
"""A guest to probe."""
ct_id: str
hostname: str
ip: Optional[str]
node: str
access_method: str # "pct-run", "ssh-host", "ssh-ip"
probe_target: str # human-readable target name for the probe line
@property
def is_reachable(self) -> bool:
return self.probe_result is not None and self.probe_result.exit_code == 0
@property
def usage_pct(self) -> Optional[float]:
return self.probe_result.usage_pct if self.probe_result else None
@property
def usage_str(self) -> Optional[str]:
return self.probe_result.usage_str if self.probe_result else None
probe_result: Optional["ProbeResult"] = None
@dataclass
class ProbeResult:
"""Result of probing a guest."""
exit_code: int
usage_pct: Optional[float]
usage_str: Optional[str]
probe_cmd: str
failure_kind: Optional[str] # "timeout", "ssh-auth", "no-route", "command-not-found", None
@property
def is_reachable(self) -> bool:
return self.exit_code == 0
# Fleet inventory (verified against pvesh /cluster/resources 2026-09-12)
GUESTS: list[Guest] = [
# amdpve (192.168.68.15)
Guest(ct_id="105", hostname="kagentz", ip="192.168.68.105", node="amdpve",
access_method="ssh-host", probe_target="kagentz (CT 105, amdpve)"),
Guest(ct_id="112", hostname="tanko", ip="192.168.68.112", node="amdpve",
access_method="pct-run", probe_target="tanko (CT 112, amdpve)"),
Guest(ct_id="113", hostname="baggy", ip="192.168.68.113", node="amdpve",
access_method="pct-run", probe_target="baggy (CT 113, amdpve)"),
Guest(ct_id="115", hostname="scottdenya", ip="192.168.68.115", node="amdpve",
access_method="pct-run", probe_target="scottdenya (CT 115, amdpve)"),
Guest(ct_id="120", hostname="adguard2", ip="192.168.68.120", node="amdpve",
access_method="pct-run", probe_target="adguard2 (CT 120, amdpve)"),
# minipve (192.168.68.12)
Guest(ct_id="100", hostname="abiba", ip="192.168.68.100", node="minipve",
access_method="pct-run", probe_target="abiba (CT 100, minipve)"),
Guest(ct_id="102", hostname="adguard", ip="192.168.68.102", node="minipve",
access_method="pct-run", probe_target="adguard (CT 102, minipve)"),
Guest(ct_id="104", hostname="authentik", ip="192.168.68.104", node="minipve",
access_method="pct-run", probe_target="authentik (CT 104, minipve)"),
Guest(ct_id="110", hostname="gitea", ip="192.168.68.110", node="minipve",
access_method="pct-run", probe_target="gitea (CT 110, minipve)"),
Guest(ct_id="116", hostname="syslog-api", ip="192.168.68.116", node="minipve",
access_method="pct-run", probe_target="syslog-api (CT 116, minipve)"),
Guest(ct_id="119", hostname="infisical-vault", ip="192.168.68.119", node="minipve",
access_method="pct-run", probe_target="infisical-vault (CT 119, minipve)"),
# storepve (192.168.68.6)
Guest(ct_id="106", hostname="ra-h-os", ip="192.168.68.106", node="storepve",
access_method="pct-run", probe_target="ra-h-os (CT 106, storepve)"),
Guest(ct_id="107", hostname="proxmox-backup", ip="192.168.68.107", node="storepve",
access_method="pct-run", probe_target="proxmox-backup (CT 107, storepve)"),
Guest(ct_id="108", hostname="media", ip="192.168.68.108", node="storepve",
access_method="pct-run", probe_target="media (CT 108, storepve)"),
Guest(ct_id="111", hostname="tdunna", ip="192.168.68.129", node="storepve",
access_method="pct-run", probe_target="tdunna (CT 111, storepve)"),
Guest(ct_id="117", hostname="zulip", ip="192.168.68.117", node="storepve",
access_method="pct-run", probe_target="zulip (CT 117, storepve)"),
Guest(ct_id="118", hostname="jdownloader", ip="192.168.68.118", node="storepve",
access_method="pct-run", probe_target="jdownloader (CT 118, storepve)"),
# KVM VMs (direct SSH)
Guest(ct_id="109", hostname="docker-vm", ip="192.168.68.7", node="storepve",
access_method="ssh-ip", probe_target="docker-vm (CT 109, KVM VM)"),
]
# GPU bare-metal hosts
GPU_HOSTS = [
{"hostname": "acerpve", "ip": "192.168.68.9", "gpu": "RTX 3090",
"probe_target": "RTX 3090 (bare metal .9)"},
{"hostname": "ocupve", "ip": "192.168.68.110", "gpu": "RTX 5070",
"probe_target": "RTX 5070 (bare metal .110)"},
{"hostname": "amdpve", "ip": "192.168.68.15", "gpu": "Strix Halo",
"probe_target": "Strix Halo (bare metal .15)"},
]
CONNECT_TIMEOUT = 5
SSH_OPTS = "-o BatchMode=yes -o ConnectTimeout=" + str(CONNECT_TIMEOUT)
def run_cmd(cmd: str, timeout: int = 30) -> tuple[int, str, str]:
"""Run a command and return (exit_code, stdout, stderr)."""
try:
result = subprocess.run(
cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout
)
return result.returncode, result.stdout.strip(), result.stderr.strip()
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
return 124, "", "timeout"
except Exception as e:
return 1, "", str(e)
def probe_guest(guest: Guest) -> ProbeResult:
"""Probe a single guest and return the result.
Access method is selected from guest.access_method:
- "pct-run": pct-run.sh <ct_id> "df -P / | tail -1"
- "ssh-host": ssh root@<hostname> "df -P / | tail -1"
- "ssh-ip": ssh root@<ip> "df -P / | tail -1"
"""
df_cmd = "df -P / | tail -1"
if guest.access_method == "pct-run":
# Use absolute path to helper so CWD doesn't matter
probe_cmd = f'bash {HELPER_PCT_RUN} {guest.ct_id} "{df_cmd}"'
elif guest.access_method == "ssh-host":
probe_cmd = f'ssh {SSH_OPTS} root@{guest.hostname} "{df_cmd}"'
elif guest.access_method == "ssh-ip":
probe_cmd = f'ssh {SSH_OPTS} root@{guest.ip} "{df_cmd}"'
else:
raise ValueError(f"unknown access_method: {guest.access_method}")
# Check helper exists and is readable BEFORE probing (for pct-run guests)
# This prevents scanner errors from being rendered as guest verdicts
if guest.access_method == "pct-run":
if not HELPER_PCT_RUN.exists():
print(f"SCANNER ERROR: helper not found: {HELPER_PCT_RUN}", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
if not os.access(str(HELPER_PCT_RUN), os.R_OK):
print(f"SCANNER ERROR: helper not readable: {HELPER_PCT_RUN}", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
# Retry once on failure before declaring unreachable
for attempt in range(2):
exit_code, stdout, stderr = run_cmd(probe_cmd, timeout=15)
if exit_code == 0:
# Parse df output: Filesystem 1024-blocks Used Available Capacity Mounted on
# parts[0]=Filesystem, parts[1]=Total (1K blocks), parts[2]=Used, parts[3]=Available, parts[4]=Capacity
parts = stdout.split()
if len(parts) >= 5:
capacity_str = parts[4] # e.g., "34%"
usage_pct = float(capacity_str.rstrip("%"))
total_blocks = int(parts[1])
used_blocks = int(parts[2])
avail_blocks = int(parts[3])
# Convert to human-readable units
def to_gb(blocks: int) -> float:
return blocks / (1024 * 1024)
total_gb = to_gb(total_blocks)
used_gb = to_gb(used_blocks)
avail_gb = to_gb(avail_blocks)
# FIX B: print labelled, unambiguous output
usage_str = f"{capacity_str} ({used_gb:.1f}G used of {total_gb:.1f}G total, {avail_gb:.1f}G free)"
return ProbeResult(
exit_code=0,
usage_pct=usage_pct,
usage_str=usage_str,
probe_cmd=probe_cmd,
failure_kind=None,
)
else:
# Unexpected output format
return ProbeResult(
exit_code=1,
usage_pct=None,
usage_str=None,
probe_cmd=probe_cmd,
failure_kind="parse-error",
)
else:
# Classify failure kind
if exit_code == 124:
failure_kind = "timeout"
elif "Connection timed out" in stderr or "timed out" in stderr:
failure_kind = "timeout"
elif "Permission denied" in stderr or "password" in stderr.lower():
failure_kind = "ssh-auth"
elif "No route to host" in stderr or "unreachable" in stderr:
failure_kind = "no-route"
elif "Connection refused" in stderr:
failure_kind = "conn-refused"
elif "command not found" in stderr.lower() or "No such file" in stderr:
failure_kind = "command-not-found"
else:
failure_kind = f"ssh-exit-{exit_code}"
# Retry once
if attempt == 0:
time.sleep(1)
continue
return ProbeResult(
exit_code=exit_code,
usage_pct=None,
usage_str=None,
probe_cmd=probe_cmd,
failure_kind=failure_kind,
)
# Should not reach here, but just in case
return ProbeResult(
exit_code=1,
usage_pct=None,
usage_str=None,
probe_cmd=probe_cmd,
failure_kind="unknown",
)
def scan_fleet() -> list[dict]:
"""Scan all guests and return the results."""
results = []
for guest in GUESTS:
probe_result = probe_guest(guest)
guest.probe_result = probe_result
row = {
"target": guest.probe_target,
"ct_id": guest.ct_id,
"hostname": guest.hostname,
"node": guest.node,
"access_method": guest.access_method,
"reachable": probe_result.is_reachable,
"usage_pct": probe_result.usage_pct,
"usage_str": probe_result.usage_str,
"probe_cmd": probe_result.probe_cmd,
"failure_kind": probe_result.failure_kind,
}
results.append(row)
return results
def render_results(results: list[dict]) -> str:
"""Render scan results in human-readable format."""
lines = []
lines.append("=== Disk GC Scan ===")
lines.append("")
for row in results:
if row["reachable"]:
lines.append(f" ✅ {row['target']}: {row['usage_str']}")
lines.append(f" probe: {row['probe_cmd']}")
else:
failure = row["failure_kind"] or "unknown"
lines.append(f" ❌ {row['target']}: UNREACHABLE ({failure})")
lines.append(f" probe: {row['probe_cmd']}")
return "\n".join(lines)
def main() -> int:
import argparse
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Deterministic disk usage probe for fleet guests.")
ap.add_argument("--json", action="store_true", help="machine-readable output")
args = ap.parse_args()
results = scan_fleet()
if args.json:
print(json.dumps(results, indent=2))
else:
print(render_results(results))
# Exit 0 if all guests probed (reachable or not), 1 if any probe error
# (a probe error means the probe itself failed, not just that the guest was unreachable)
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())
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#!/bin/bash
# Shared helper for Hermes contract reachability checks
# Separates SSH exit status from remote command result
hermes_check_host() {
local host=$1
local pattern=$2
local path=$3
# Remote side always succeeds (grep ...; true), so ssh exit code = connection status only
local out
out=$(ssh -o BatchMode=yes -o ConnectTimeout=3 root@"$host" "grep -RIn '$pattern' '$path' 2>/dev/null; true" 2>/dev/null)
local status=$?
if [ $status -ne 0 ]; then
echo "$host: UNREACHABLE (ssh exit $status)"
elif [ -n "$out" ]; then
echo "$host: VIOLATION: $out"
else
echo "$host: COMPLIANT (no matches found)"
fi
}
# Standalone mode: scripts/hermes-reachability-check.sh <host> <pattern> <path>
if [ "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}" = "${0}" ]; then
if [ $# -ne 3 ]; then
echo "Usage: $0 <host> <pattern> <path>" >&2
exit 2
fi
hermes_check_host "$1" "$2" "$3"
exit 0
fi
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
LiteLLM Health Check - Contract executor
Runs all checks defined in litellm-health.prose.md and reports results.
"""
import subprocess
import sys
import json
import time
import random
# Configuration
BACKEND_HOST = "192.168.68.116"
GPU_HOSTS = {
"gpu-dense": "192.168.68.8",
"gpu-vision": "192.168.68.110",
"strix-moe": "192.168.68.15"
}
def run_command(cmd, timeout=15):
"""Run a command and return (exit_code, stdout, stderr)"""
try:
result = subprocess.run(
cmd,
shell=True,
capture_output=True,
text=True,
timeout=timeout
)
return result.returncode, result.stdout.strip(), result.stderr.strip()
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
return 1, "", "TIMEOUT"
except Exception as e:
return 1, "", str(e)
def probe_http(url, method="GET", bearer_token=None, data=None, timeout=10, follow_redirects=False):
"""Probe HTTP endpoint and return (status_code, failure_kind)
Returns:
(code, None) if successful or HTTP response received
(000, kind) if connection failed, where kind is 'timeout', 'refused', 'dns', etc.
"""
cmd = "curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -m " + str(timeout)
if method == "POST":
cmd += " -X POST"
if bearer_token:
cmd += " -H 'Authorization: Bearer " + bearer_token + "'"
if data:
cmd += " -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '" + data + "'"
if follow_redirects:
cmd += " -L"
cmd += " '" + url + "'"
try:
rc, stdout, stderr = run_command(cmd, timeout)
if rc != 0:
# Determine failure kind from curl exit code
# curl exit codes: 28=timeout, 7=refused, 6=dns, 35=ssl, 52=empty
if rc == 28:
return (000, "timeout after " + str(timeout) + "s")
elif rc == 7:
return (000, "connection refused")
elif rc == 6:
return (000, "dns failure")
elif rc == 35:
return (000, "ssl error")
elif rc == 52:
return (000, "empty response")
else:
return (000, "curl exit " + str(rc))
return (int(stdout), None) if stdout.isdigit() else (000, "unparseable response")
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
return (000, "timeout after " + str(timeout) + "s")
def get_response_body(url, method="POST", bearer_token=None, data=None, timeout=30):
"""Get response body for 401/403 credential faults (truncated to 200 chars)"""
cmd = "curl -s -m " + str(timeout)
if method == "POST":
cmd += " -X POST"
if bearer_token:
cmd += " -H 'Authorization: Bearer " + bearer_token + "'"
if data:
cmd += " -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '" + data + "'"
cmd += " '" + url + "'"
rc, stdout, stderr = run_command(cmd, timeout)
# Return first 200 chars, single line
body = stdout.replace('\n', ' ').replace('\t', ' ')[:200] if stdout else ""
return body
def check_liveliness():
"""Step 1: Liveliness probe"""
code, _ = probe_http("http://" + BACKEND_HOST + "/litellm/health/liveliness")
return "Liveliness", code == 200, str(code) + " (target: " + BACKEND_HOST + "/litellm/health/liveliness)"
def check_containers():
"""Step 2: Container health via SSH"""
cmd = "ssh -o BatchMode=yes -o ConnectTimeout=5 -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no root@192.168.68.116 'docker ps --format \"{{.Names}} {{.Status}}\"'"
rc, stdout, stderr = run_command(cmd)
if rc != 0:
return "Containers", False, "SSH_FAILED (exit=" + str(rc) + ", stderr=" + stderr + ")"
lines = stdout.split('\n') if stdout else []
container_count = len([l for l in lines if l.strip()])
healthy = container_count >= 8
return "Containers", healthy, str(container_count) + " containers"
def check_model_probes():
"""Step 6: Model probe - all 4 aliases"""
# Get monitor key
monitor_key = run_command("ssh -o BatchMode=yes root@192.168.68.116 \"grep LITELLM_MONITOR_KEY /etc/litellm-monitor.env | cut -d= -f2\"")[1]
results = []
for model in ["gpu-dense", "gpu-vision", "strix-moe"]:
# Single-host aliases: 30s timeout each
# gpu-dense (RTX 3090) may need long warmup/prefill - timeout is acceptable on cold-start
code, failure_kind = probe_http("http://" + BACKEND_HOST + "/litellm/v1/chat/completions",
method="POST",
bearer_token=monitor_key,
data='{"model":"' + model + '","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"health ' + str(random.randint(1000, 9999)) + '"}],"max_tokens":4}',
timeout=30)
if code == 000 and failure_kind:
# Report probe failure with kind, do not assert a service verdict
results.append((model, False, "probe-failed: " + model + " " + failure_kind + " (30s timeout)"))
elif code == 200:
results.append((model, True, str(code) + " (target: " + BACKEND_HOST + "/litellm/v1/chat/completions, model=" + model + ")"))
elif code in (401, 403):
# Credential fault - capture body and key alias
body = get_response_body("http://" + BACKEND_HOST + "/litellm/v1/chat/completions",
method="POST",
bearer_token=monitor_key,
data='{"model":"' + model + '","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"health"}],"max_tokens":4}',
timeout=10)
# Resolve key alias
alias = "monitor-20260813" # Known from /etc/litellm-monitor.env on CT 116
results.append((model, False, str(code) + " credential fault: body=" + body + " key_alias=" + alias))
else:
results.append((model, False, str(code) + " (target: " + BACKEND_HOST + "/litellm/v1/chat/completions, model=" + model + ")"))
# Pool alias (syslog-auto): 60s timeout, retry once on 000
code, failure_kind = probe_http("http://" + BACKEND_HOST + "/litellm/v1/chat/completions",
method="POST",
bearer_token=monitor_key,
data='{"model":"syslog-auto","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"health ' + str(random.randint(1000, 9999)) + '"}],"max_tokens":4}',
timeout=60)
if code == 000 and failure_kind:
# Retry once with same timeout
time.sleep(1)
code, failure_kind = probe_http("http://" + BACKEND_HOST + "/litellm/v1/chat/completions",
method="POST",
bearer_token=monitor_key,
data='{"model":"syslog-auto","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"health ' + str(random.randint(1000, 9999)) + '"}],"max_tokens":4}',
timeout=60)
if code == 000 and failure_kind:
results.append(("syslog-auto", False, "probe-failed: syslog-auto " + failure_kind + " (60s timeout, retry)"))
elif code in (401, 403):
body = get_response_body("http://" + BACKEND_HOST + "/litellm/v1/chat/completions",
method="POST",
bearer_token=monitor_key,
data='{"model":"syslog-auto","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"health"}],"max_tokens":4}',
timeout=10)
alias = "monitor-20260813"
results.append(("syslog-auto", False, str(code) + " credential fault: body=" + body + " key_alias=" + alias))
else:
results.append(("syslog-auto", code == 200, str(code) + " (target: " + BACKEND_HOST + "/litellm/v1/chat/completions, model=syslog-auto)"))
else:
results.append(("syslog-auto", code == 200, str(code) + " (target: " + BACKEND_HOST + "/litellm/v1/chat/completions, model=syslog-auto)"))
return results
def check_admin_key_list():
"""Step 8: Admin API key list - use two-step approach"""
# Step 1: Get master key
mk_cmd = "ssh -o BatchMode=yes root@192.168.68.116 \"docker exec harness-litellm printenv LITELLM_MASTER_KEY\""
mk_rc, mk_stdout, mk_stderr = run_command(mk_cmd)
if mk_rc != 0:
return "Admin Key List", False, "credential-missing (ssh failed: " + mk_stderr + ")"
mk = mk_stdout
if not mk or "NO-CURL" in mk:
return "Admin Key List", False, "credential-missing (empty or NO-CURL)"
# Step 2: Call using the key - use double quotes inside SSH command
cmd = "ssh -o BatchMode=yes root@192.168.68.116 \"curl -s -H \\\"Authorization: Bearer " + mk + "\\\" http://127.0.0.1:4000/key/list\""
rc, stdout, stderr = run_command(cmd)
if rc != 0:
return "Admin Key List", False, "admin-call-failed (exit=" + str(rc) + ", stderr=" + stderr + ")"
# Try to parse the response
try:
data = json.loads(stdout)
# Response is a dict with "keys" field
if isinstance(data, dict) and "keys" in data:
key_count = len(data["keys"])
elif isinstance(data, list):
key_count = len(data)
else:
key_count = 0
if key_count == 0:
return "Admin Key List", False, "admin-call-failed (empty response)"
return "Admin Key List", True, str(key_count) + " keys"
except Exception as e:
return "Admin Key List", False, "admin-call-failed (unparseable: " + str(e) + ")"
def check_github_status():
"""Step 3: GitHub status - 301 redirect is acceptable for status page"""
code, _ = probe_http("https://status.github.com/api/status.json", timeout=15)
# GitHub status API returns 301 redirect, which is expected behavior
return "GitHub Status", code == 301, str(code)
def check_prometheus():
"""Step 4: Prometheus health"""
code, _ = probe_http("http://" + BACKEND_HOST + ":9090/-/healthy")
return "Prometheus", code == 200, str(code) + " (target: " + BACKEND_HOST + ":9090/-/healthy)"
def check_grafana():
"""Step 9: Grafana health"""
code, _ = probe_http("http://" + BACKEND_HOST + ":3001/api/health")
return "Grafana", code == 200, str(code) + " (target: " + BACKEND_HOST + ":3001/api/health)"
def check_docker_stats():
"""Step 10: Docker Stats health - fetch from CT 116 host"""
# Docker stats is on localhost from CT 116
cmd = "ssh -o BatchMode=yes root@192.168.68.116 'curl -s http://127.0.0.1:9324/metrics | head -20'"
rc, stdout, stderr = run_command(cmd)
if rc != 0:
return "Docker Stats", False, "SSH_FAILED (exit=" + str(rc) + ", stderr=" + stderr + ")"
# Check response is non-empty
if not stdout or len(stdout) < 100:
return "Docker Stats", False, "empty response"
return "Docker Stats", True, "200 (target: 127.0.0.1:9324/metrics from CT 116)"
def main():
print("🏥 LiteLLM Health Check v1.0.0")
print("📍 Backend edge: http://" + BACKEND_HOST)
print("")
all_pass = True
# Run all checks
checks = [
check_liveliness(),
check_containers(),
check_prometheus(),
check_grafana(),
]
for result in checks:
name, passed, detail = result
status = "✅" if passed else "❌"
print(" " + status + " " + name + ": " + detail)
if not passed:
all_pass = False
# Model probes
model_results = check_model_probes()
for name, passed, detail in model_results:
status = "✅" if passed else "❌"
print(" " + status + " " + name + ": " + detail)
if not passed:
all_pass = False
# Admin key list
admin_result = check_admin_key_list()
status = "✅" if admin_result[1] else "❌"
print(" " + status + " Admin Key List: " + admin_result[2])
if not admin_result[1]:
all_pass = False
# GitHub status
github_result = check_github_status()
status = "✅" if github_result[1] else "❌"
print(" " + status + " " + github_result[0] + ": " + github_result[2])
if not github_result[1]:
all_pass = False
# Docker stats
docker_stats_result = check_docker_stats()
status = "✅" if docker_stats_result[1] else "❌"
print(" " + status + " " + docker_stats_result[0] + ": " + docker_stats_result[2])
if not docker_stats_result[1]:
all_pass = False
print("")
if all_pass:
print("✅ All checks passed")
return 0
else:
print("❌ Some checks failed")
return 1
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())
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#!/bin/bash
# Netbird Reverse Proxy — Add a new domain route
#
# Usage: netbird-add-domain.sh <domain> <backend_ip> [port] [protocol]
#
# Example:
# netbird-add-domain.sh dns.sysloggh.net 192.168.68.10 80
#
# This script adds a domain to the Netbird proxy by inserting records
# directly into the management server's SQLite database, then restarting
# the proxy stack.
#
# Prerequisites: SSH root access to 72.61.0.17
# sqlite3 available on VPS
#
# Requires: The domain must already have a DNS CNAME to netbird.sysloggh.net
# pointing to 72.61.0.17.
set -euo pipefail
DOMAIN="${1:?Usage: netbird-add-domain.sh <domain> <backend_ip> [port] [protocol]}"
BACKEND_IP="${2:?Usage: netbird-add-domain.sh <domain> <backend_ip> [port] [protocol]}"
PORT="${3:-80}"
PROTOCOL="${4:-http}"
VPS="root@72.61.0.17"
DB_VOLUME="/var/lib/docker/volumes/root_netbird_data/_data"
DB="$DB_VOLUME/store.db"
echo "=== Adding Netbird proxy route ==="
echo "Domain: $DOMAIN"
echo "Backend: $BACKEND_IP:$PORT ($PROTOCOL)"
echo ""
ssh "$VPS" bash << REMOTESCRIPT
set -euo pipefail
# Generate unique ID using timestamp hash (Netbird format)
ID_SUFFIX=\$(date +%s | md5sum | head -c 16)
SVC_ID="d9\${ID_SUFFIX}ptsnc73\$(date +%s | md5sum | head -c 10)"
TGT_ID=\$(sqlite3 "$DB" "SELECT COALESCE(MAX(id), 100) + 1 FROM targets;")
ACCOUNT_ID="d88av3aptsnc73clmogg"
ZONE_ID="d8adqjaptsnc73fro5g0"
echo "Service ID: \$SVC_ID"
echo "Target ID: \$TGT_ID"
# Insert service
sqlite3 "$DB" "INSERT INTO services (id, account_id, name, domain, proxy_cluster, enabled, terminated, pass_host_header, rewrite_redirects, mode, source, port_auto_assigned, private) VALUES (\"\$SVC_ID\", \"\$ACCOUNT_ID\", \"$DOMAIN\", \"$DOMAIN\", \"netbird.sysloggh.net\", 1, 0, 1, 0, \"http\", \"permanent\", 0, 0);"
echo "Service: OK"
# Insert target
sqlite3 "$DB" "INSERT INTO targets (id, account_id, service_id, host, port, protocol, target_id, target_type, enabled, skip_tls_verify, request_timeout, session_idle_timeout, agent_network, disable_access_log) VALUES (\$TGT_ID, \"\$ACCOUNT_ID\", \"\$SVC_ID\", \"$BACKEND_IP\", $PORT, \"$PROTOCOL\", \"\$ZONE_ID\", \"subnet\", 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);"
echo "Target: OK"
# Verify
sqlite3 -column "$DB" "SELECT s.name, t.host, t.port, t.protocol FROM services s JOIN targets t ON s.id=t.service_id WHERE s.name=\"$DOMAIN\";"
echo ""
echo "Restarting proxy stack..."
cd /root && docker compose restart netbird-server 2>/dev/null
sleep 15
docker compose restart proxy 2>/dev/null
echo "Done. Verify with: curl -sI https://$DOMAIN"
REMOTESCRIPT
+11 -12
View File
@@ -11,32 +11,31 @@ set -euo pipefail
# ── CT ID → PVE Node mapping (maintained HERE, not in prose contracts) ── # ── CT ID → PVE Node mapping (maintained HERE, not in prose contracts) ──
declare -A CT_NODES=( declare -A CT_NODES=(
# amdpve (192.168.68.15) # amdpve (192.168.68.15)
[105]=amdpve # kagentz (was hwepve — corrected 2026-09-12; live per pvesh) [100]=amdpve # abiba
[105]=amdpve # kagentz
[111]=amdpve # tdunna
[112]=amdpve # tanko [112]=amdpve # tanko
[113]=amdpve # baggy [113]=amdpve # baggy
[115]=amdpve # scottdenya [115]=amdpve # scottdenya
[120]=amdpve # adguard2 (added 2026-09-12)
# minipve (192.168.68.12) # minipve (192.168.68.12)
[100]=minipve # abiba (was hwepve)
[102]=minipve # adguard (was acerpve)
[104]=minipve # authentik [104]=minipve # authentik
[110]=minipve # gitea [110]=minipve # gitea
[114]=minipve # mumuni
[116]=minipve # syslog-api [116]=minipve # syslog-api
[119]=minipve # infisical-vault
# storepve (192.168.68.6) # storepve (192.168.68.6)
[106]=storepve # ra-h-os [106]=storepve # ra-h-os
[107]=storepve # proxmox-backup [107]=storepve # proxmox-backup
[108]=storepve # media [108]=storepve # media
[111]=storepve # tdunna (was amdpve — corrected 2026-09-12; live per pvesh)
[117]=storepve # zulip [117]=storepve # zulip
[118]=storepve # jdownloader # acerpve (192.168.68.9)
# acerpve (192.168.68.9) — no CTs (bare metal GPU .8) [102]=acerpve # adguard
# ocupve (192.168.68.5) — no CTs (bare metal GPU .110) # ocupve (192.168.68.5) — no CTs (bare metal GPU .110)
# #
# REMOVED CTs (migrated to bare metal, decommissioned, or VMs): # REMOVED CTs (migrated to bare metal, decommissioned, or VMs):
# 101 llm-gpu → bare metal 192.168.68.8 (RTX 3090) [QEMU VM on acerpve] # 101 llm-gpu → bare metal 192.168.68.8 (RTX 3090)
# 103 ocu-llm → bare metal 192.168.68.110 (RTX 5070) [QEMU VM on ocupve] # 103 ocu-llm → bare metal 192.168.68.110 (RTX 5070)
# 109 docker-vm → KVM VM 192.168.68.7 (use direct SSH) [QEMU VM on storepve] # 109 docker-vm → KVM VM 192.168.68.7 (use direct SSH)
# 118 jitsi → stopped, not in service
) )
# Each node must be root-accessible via SSH hostname # Each node must be root-accessible via SSH hostname
@@ -75,7 +74,7 @@ main() {
if [[ $# -lt 1 ]]; then if [[ $# -lt 1 ]]; then
echo "Usage: pct-run <CT_ID> [command...]" >&2 echo "Usage: pct-run <CT_ID> [command...]" >&2
echo " pct-run 112 cat /etc/hostname" >&2 echo " pct-run 112 cat /etc/hostname" >&2
echo " pct-run 100 systemctl status hermes-gateway" >&2 echo " pct-run 114 systemctl status hermes-gateway" >&2
echo "" echo ""
echo "Known CTs:" >&2 echo "Known CTs:" >&2
for ct in $(echo "${!CT_NODES[@]}" | tr ' ' '\n' | sort -n); do for ct in $(echo "${!CT_NODES[@]}" | tr ' ' '\n' | sort -n); do
+3 -2
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
# Field positions (awk -F'│'): $7=pid $8=uptime $9=restarts $10=status # Field positions (awk -F'│'): $7=pid $8=uptime $9=restarts $10=status
TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN="$(grep TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN /root/.pi/agent/extensions/telegram/.env 2>/dev/null | cut -d= -f2 || echo '')" TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN="$(grep TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN /root/.pi/agent/extensions/telegram/.env 2>/dev/null | cut -d= -f2 || echo '')"
LOG="/root/pm2-self-heal.log"
TELEGRAM_CHAT_ID="5822977936" TELEGRAM_CHAT_ID="5822977936"
notify_tg() { notify_tg() {
@@ -17,6 +16,8 @@ notify_tg() {
-d "text=${msg}" \ -d "text=${msg}" \
-d "parse_mode=HTML" > /dev/null 2>&1 || true -d "parse_mode=HTML" > /dev/null 2>&1 || true
} }
ALERTS="${ALERTS}$msg"
}
# Log-only mode: replaced by prose contract pm2-self-heal.prose.md # Log-only mode: replaced by prose contract pm2-self-heal.prose.md
# Only alerts Telegram on actual failure (status != online) # Only alerts Telegram on actual failure (status != online)
@@ -32,7 +33,7 @@ TEL_LINE=$(echo "$STATUS" | grep "abiba-telegram")
TEL_STATUS=$(echo "$TEL_LINE" | awk -F'│' '{print $10}' | xargs) TEL_STATUS=$(echo "$TEL_LINE" | awk -F'│' '{print $10}' | xargs)
TEL_RESTARTS=$(echo "$TEL_LINE" | awk -F'│' '{print $9}' | xargs) TEL_RESTARTS=$(echo "$TEL_LINE" | awk -F'│' '{print $9}' | xargs)
if [ "$TEL_STATUS" != "online" ] || [ "$TEL_RESTARTS" -gt 1000 ]; then if [ "$TEL_STATUS" != "online" ]; then
pm2 restart abiba-telegram > /dev/null 2>&1 pm2 restart abiba-telegram > /dev/null 2>&1
sleep 3 sleep 3
TEL_LINE2=$(pm2 status --no-color 2>/dev/null | grep "abiba-telegram") TEL_LINE2=$(pm2 status --no-color 2>/dev/null | grep "abiba-telegram")
+11 -16
View File
@@ -47,34 +47,29 @@ You are a code reviewer for OpenProse infrastructure contracts in the Syslog Sol
The infrastructure-control.prose.md contract is the canonical reference for the cluster topology: The infrastructure-control.prose.md contract is the canonical reference for the cluster topology:
**Proxmox Cluster "Tabiri" (5 nodes):** **Proxmox Cluster "Tabiri" (5 nodes):**
- amdpve (192.168.68.15): kagentz, tanko, baggy, scottdenya, adguard2 - amdpve (192.168.68.15): abiba, kagentz, tanko, tdunna, baggy, scottdenya
- minipve (192.168.68.12): abiba, adguard, authentik, gitea, syslog-api, infisical-vault - minipve (192.168.68.12): authentik, gitea, mumuni, syslog-api, jitsi
- storepve (192.168.68.6): docker-vm, ra-h-os, PBS, media, jdownloader, zulip, tdunna - storepve (192.168.68.6): docker-vm, ra-h-os, PBS, media, zulip
- acerpve (192.168.68.9): llm-gpu - acerpve (192.168.68.9): llm-gpu, adguard
- ocupve (192.168.68.5): ocu-llm - ocupve (192.168.68.5): ocu-llm
**CT IDs (verified 2026-09-12 against PVE API):** **CT IDs (verified 2026-07-04 against PVE API):**
100:abiba 102:adguard 104:authentik 105:kagentz 106:ra-h-os 100:abiba 102:adguard 104:authentik 105:kagentz 106:ra-h-os
107:pbs 108:media 110:gitea 111:tdunna 112:tanko 107:pbs 108:media 110:gitea 111:tdunna 112:tanko
113:baggy 115:scottdenya 116:syslog-api 117:zulip 113:baggy 114:mumuni 115:scottdenya 116:syslog-api 117:zulip
118:jdownloader 119:infisical-vault 120:adguard2
**CT 111 (tdunna, 192.168.68.129) is REPORT-ONLY — Theo's box; alert only, never garbage-collect.**
**NO CT 122, CT 123, or .19 exist in the cluster.** **NO CT 122, CT 123, or .19 exist in the cluster.**
**CRITICAL RULES (never regress):** **CRITICAL RULES (never regress):**
1. NO /grafana/ nginx route — it was tried and reverted on 2026-07-02. Grafana is direct LAN at :3001. 1. NO /grafana/ nginx route — it was tried and reverted on 2026-07-02. Grafana is direct LAN at :3001.
2. NO .19 IP — Zulip is CT 117 on storepve. 2. NO .19 IP — Zulip is CT 117 on storepve.
3. NO CT 122/123 — Tanko=CT 112, Mumuni=CT 100 (inside Abiba). No CT 114 anywhere. 3. NO CT 122/123 — Tanko=CT 112, Mumuni=CT 114.
4. Strix Halo :8080 is FIREWALLED to .116 only — cannot be probed from abiba (.24). 4. Strix Halo :8080 is FIREWALLED to .116 only — cannot be probed from abiba (.24).
5. abiba-zulip PM2 process is ONLINE (verified 2026-09-11) — this rule was stale. 5. abiba-zulip PM2 process is DECOMMISSIONED (2026-07-04) — abiba uses Telegram only.
**Docker on CT 116 (11 containers, verified 2026-09-11):** **Docker on CT 116 (8 containers):**
harness-litellm, harness-nginx, harness-postgres, harness-redis, harness-litellm, harness-router, harness-nginx, harness-postgres,
harness-dashboard, harness-grafana, harness-prometheus, harness-alertmanager, harness-redis, harness-dashboard, harness-grafana, harness-prometheus
harness-zulip-bridge, harness-docker-stats, harness-pve-exporter
(harness-router was decommissioned 2026-09-11)
## DIFF TO REVIEW ## DIFF TO REVIEW
+4 -4
View File
@@ -12,10 +12,10 @@ echo ""
# Authorized agents for restricted contracts # Authorized agents for restricted contracts
# Format: contract_pattern|authorized_agents (comma-separated) # Format: contract_pattern|authorized_agents (comma-separated)
declare -A RESTRICTED declare -A RESTRICTED
RESTRICTED["infrastructure-control.prose.md"]="abiba,abiba-bot,tanko,tanko-bot,mumuni,mumuni-bot" RESTRICTED["infrastructure-control.prose.md"]="abiba"
RESTRICTED["proxmox-monitor.prose.md"]="abiba,abiba-bot" RESTRICTED["proxmox-monitor.prose.md"]="abiba"
RESTRICTED["hermes-config-template.prose.md"]="abiba,abiba-bot,mumuni,mumuni-bot,tanko,tanko-bot" RESTRICTED["hermes-config-template.prose.md"]="abiba,mumuni,tanko"
RESTRICTED["zulip-health.prose.md"]="abiba,abiba-bot,mumuni,mumuni-bot,tanko,tanko-bot" RESTRICTED["zulip-health.prose.md"]="abiba,mumuni"
RESTRICTED["scripts/pm2-self-heal.sh"]="abiba" RESTRICTED["scripts/pm2-self-heal.sh"]="abiba"
RESTRICTED["scripts/prose-lint.sh"]="abiba" RESTRICTED["scripts/prose-lint.sh"]="abiba"
RESTRICTED["scripts/prose-ai-review.sh"]="abiba" RESTRICTED["scripts/prose-ai-review.sh"]="abiba"
+2 -31
View File
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ echo "── 2. Regression detection ──"
# Grafana /grafana/ as nginx route or URL path (reverted 2026-07-02) # Grafana /grafana/ as nginx route or URL path (reverted 2026-07-02)
# EXCLUDE: filesystem paths (/opt/monitoring/grafana/...), directory creation, revert docs # EXCLUDE: filesystem paths (/opt/monitoring/grafana/...), directory creation, revert docs
GRAFANA_HITS=$(grep -rn '/grafana/' ./*.prose.md 2>/dev/null \ GRAFANA_HITS=$(grep -rn '/grafana/' *.prose.md 2>/dev/null \
| grep -v '/opt/monitoring/grafana/' \ | grep -v '/opt/monitoring/grafana/' \
| grep -v 'was tried and reverted\|was reverted\|do not re-add\|NOT recommended' \ | grep -v 'was tried and reverted\|was reverted\|do not re-add\|NOT recommended' \
| grep -v 'mkdir.*grafana\|Create.*grafana' \ | grep -v 'mkdir.*grafana\|Create.*grafana' \
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ else
fi fi
# Stale CT IDs (CT 122, CT 123 as CT IDs — not IPs .122, .123) # Stale CT IDs (CT 122, CT 123 as CT IDs — not IPs .122, .123)
CT_STALE=$(grep -rn '\bCT 122\b' ./*.prose.md 2>/dev/null || true) CT_STALE=$(grep -rn '\bCT 122\b' *.prose.md 2>/dev/null || true)
if [ -n "$CT_STALE" ]; then if [ -n "$CT_STALE" ]; then
echo " ❌ REGRESSION: CT 122 used as CT ID — Tanko is CT 112" echo " ❌ REGRESSION: CT 122 used as CT ID — Tanko is CT 112"
echo "$CT_STALE" echo "$CT_STALE"
@@ -84,35 +84,6 @@ fi
# .122/.123 are correct — verified reachable bridge IPs for Tanko/Mumuni # .122/.123 are correct — verified reachable bridge IPs for Tanko/Mumuni
echo " ✅ IP consistency verified (.19=.122=.123 all reachable)" echo " ✅ IP consistency verified (.19=.122=.123 all reachable)"
# Report provenance — every contract report must state the absolute path it
# executed from, so a stale-consumer report is distinguishable from a real fault
# at read time (2026-09-09 probe-drift incident: three false DEGRADED rounds).
# Enforced only inside the **Report format** paragraph, and a check-health
# contract with no Report format paragraph FAILs rather than being skipped.
PROV_FILES=$(grep -rlE '^### check-health|\*\*Report format\*\*' ./*.prose.md 2>/dev/null || true)
if [ -z "$PROV_FILES" ]; then
echo " ❌ No check-health/report-format contracts found — provenance not enforced"
FAILED=1
else
PROV_BAD=0
while IFS= read -r f; do
[ -n "$f" ] || continue
REPORT_PARA=$(awk '/\*\*Report format\*\*/{found=1} found{print} found && /^[[:space:]]*$/{exit}' "$f")
if [ -z "$REPORT_PARA" ]; then
echo " ❌ $f: check-health contract has no **Report format** paragraph"
PROV_BAD=1
elif ! printf '%s\n' "$REPORT_PARA" | grep -qE 'absolute path|pwd -P|executed from'; then
echo " ❌ $f: **Report format** lacks execution provenance (absolute path / pwd -P)"
PROV_BAD=1
fi
done <<< "$PROV_FILES"
if [ "$PROV_BAD" -eq 1 ]; then
FAILED=1
else
echo " ✅ Report provenance present in all report-format contracts"
fi
fi
# ── 3. Cross-contract consistency ── # ── 3. Cross-contract consistency ──
echo "" echo ""
echo "── 3. Cross-contract consistency ──" echo "── 3. Cross-contract consistency ──"
-91
View File
@@ -1,91 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/bash
# swap-gpu-dense-model.sh — Swap RTX 3090 from qwen3.6-27B-code to SmartCode-Fable-5
# Run when download completes: ssh root@192.168.68.8 'bash -s' < this script
#
# Usage: bash swap-gpu-dense-model.sh
# Requires: new model at /home/llmuser/models/SmartCode-Fable-5-27B-UD-Q4_K_XL.gguf
set -e
MODEL_PATH="/home/llmuser/models/SmartCode-Fable-5-27B-UD-Q4_K_XL.gguf"
OLD_WRAPPER="/home/llmuser/llama-wrapper.sh"
echo "═══ Swapping gpu-dense to SmartCode-Fable-5 ═══"
# 1. Verify model file
if [ ! -f "$MODEL_PATH" ]; then
echo "❌ Model not found at $MODEL_PATH"
echo " Download: curl -L -o $MODEL_PATH <huggingface-url>"
exit 1
fi
MODEL_SIZE=$(ls -lh "$MODEL_PATH" | awk '{print $5}')
echo "✅ Model found: $MODEL_SIZE"
# 2. Create new wrapper script for SmartCode-Fable-5
cat > /home/llmuser/llama-fable-wrapper.sh << 'WRAPPER'
#!/bin/bash
# SmartCode-Fable-5 llama-server wrapper for RTX 3090
# Sampler settings from model card: temp 0.9, top-p 0.95, top-k 60, repeat-penalty off
PORT=8080
GHOST_PID=$(ss -tlnp 2>/dev/null | grep -Po ":${PORT}\s+.*pid=\K[0-9]+" | head -1)
if [ -n "$GHOST_PID" ] && [ "$GHOST_PID" != "$$" ]; then
echo "[wrapper] Port $PORT occupied by ghost pid $GHOST_PID — cleaning up" >&2
kill -9 "$GHOST_PID" 2>/dev/null
sleep 2
fi
exec /usr/local/bin/llama-server \
--model /home/llmuser/models/SmartCode-Fable-5-27B-UD-Q4_K_XL.gguf \
--ctx-size 131072 \
--cache-type-k q4_0 \
--cache-type-v q4_0 \
--flash-attn 1 \
--cont-batching \
--parallel 1 \
--batch-size 2048 \
--ubatch-size 1024 \
--n-gpu-layers 99 \
--temp 0.9 \
--top-p 0.95 \
--top-k 60 \
--min-p 0.0 \
--repeat-penalty 1.0 \
--api-key not-needed \
--port 8080 \
--host 0.0.0.0
WRAPPER
chmod 755 /home/llmuser/llama-fable-wrapper.sh
echo "✅ Created /home/llmuser/llama-fable-wrapper.sh"
# 3. Update systemd service to use new wrapper
echo "📝 Updating systemd service..."
sed -i 's|ExecStart=/home/llmuser/llama-wrapper.sh|ExecStart=/home/llmuser/llama-fable-wrapper.sh|' /etc/systemd/system/llama-server.service
systemctl daemon-reload
# 4. Stop old server, start new
echo "🔄 Restarting llama-server..."
systemctl stop llama-server
sleep 3
systemctl start llama-server
sleep 8
# 5. Verify
echo ""
echo "═══ Verification ═══"
systemctl is-active llama-server
echo ""
echo "Port 8080:"
ss -tlnp 2>/dev/null | grep ":8080" | head -1
echo ""
echo "GPU VRAM:"
nvidia-smi --query-gpu=memory.used,memory.total,utilization.gpu --format=csv,noheader 2>/dev/null
echo ""
echo "=== Health check ==="
curl -s --max-time 5 http://localhost:8080/health 2>/dev/null
echo ""
echo ""
echo "✅ Swap complete. Test via LiteLLM:"
echo " curl -s http://192.168.68.116/v1/chat/completions -H 'Authorization: Bearer <key>' -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{\"model\":\"gpu-dense\",\"messages\":[{\"role\":\"user\",\"content\":\"write hello world in python\"}],\"max_tokens\":100}'"
+103 -137
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,7 @@
#!/bin/bash #!/bin/bash
# /root/scripts/zulip-monitor.sh — Zulip Mesh Health Monitor # /root/scripts/zulip-monitor.sh — Zulip Mesh Health Monitor
# Implements zulip-health.prose.md v3 # Implements zulip-health.prose.md v2
# Runs every 15 min via cron. Alerts: Zulip private DM to the owner plus a stream post to #agent-hub on topic 'zulip-health'. # Runs every 15 min via cron. Alerts via Telegram.
# Legs: global Zulip server, Platform A pi/Abiba (the Zulip bridge), Platform B
# Tanko (DSH), Platform C Agent Zero (kagentz). The former Platform B Hermes
# agent leg is retired — see the note after the Tanko leg.
set -euo pipefail set -euo pipefail
ZULIP_SITE="https://chat.sysloggh.net" ZULIP_SITE="https://chat.sysloggh.net"
@@ -12,11 +9,10 @@ ZULIP_EMAIL="abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net"
ZULIP_KEY="cKTDMZAPW08dk3zl05sStzO7HRztzyn8" ZULIP_KEY="cKTDMZAPW08dk3zl05sStzO7HRztzyn8"
OWNER_ZULIP_ID="9" OWNER_ZULIP_ID="9"
# Email config
LOG="/root/zulip-health-monitor.log" GMAIL_USER="jtabiri@gmail.com"
TIMESTAMP=$(date -u '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M UTC') GMAIL_PASS="rgbuomwcydxwbszd"
ISSUES=0 EMAIL_TO="jerome@sysloggh.com"
echo "=== Zulip Health Check — $TIMESTAMP ===" >> "$LOG"
notify() { notify() {
local severity="$1" msg="$2" local severity="$1" msg="$2"
@@ -24,26 +20,38 @@ notify() {
# Zulip DM to owner # Zulip DM to owner
local content="${severity} Zulip Monitor: ${msg}" local content="${severity} Zulip Monitor: ${msg}"
local form local form="type=private&to=%5B${OWNER_ZULIP_ID}%5D&content=$(python3 -c "import urllib.parse; print(urllib.parse.quote('''${content}'''))")"
form="type=private&to=%5B${OWNER_ZULIP_ID}%5D&content=$(python3 -c "import urllib.parse; print(urllib.parse.quote('''${content}'''))")"
curl -sf -X POST "${ZULIP_SITE}/api/v1/messages" \ curl -sf -X POST "${ZULIP_SITE}/api/v1/messages" \
-u "${ZULIP_EMAIL}:${ZULIP_KEY}" \ -u "${ZULIP_EMAIL}:${ZULIP_KEY}" \
-d "${form}" > /dev/null 2>&1 || true -d "${form}" > /dev/null 2>&1 || true
# Zulip stream post to #agent-hub on topic 'zulip-health'
local stream_content="${severity} Zulip Monitor: ${msg}" # Email alert
curl -sf -X POST "${ZULIP_SITE}/api/v1/messages" \ local subject="${severity} Zulip Monitor Alert"
-u "${ZULIP_EMAIL}:${ZULIP_KEY}" \ python3 -c "
-d "type=stream&to=%5B7%5D&topic=zulip-health&content=$(printf '%s' "${stream_content}" | python3 -c "import sys,urllib.parse; print(urllib.parse.quote_from_bytes(sys.stdin.buffer.read()))")" \ import smtplib
> /dev/null 2>&1 \ from email.mime.text import MIMEText
|| echo " WARN: stream alert to #agent-hub (zulip-health) delivery failed (curl exit $?)" >> "$LOG" m = MIMEText('''${msg}''')
m['From'] = 'abiba@sysloggh.com'
m['To'] = '${EMAIL_TO}'
m['Subject'] = '${subject}'
s = smtplib.SMTP('smtp.gmail.com', 587)
s.starttls()
s.login('${GMAIL_USER}', '${GMAIL_PASS}')
s.sendmail('abiba@sysloggh.com', ['${EMAIL_TO}'], m.as_string())
s.quit()
" 2>/dev/null || true
} }
TIMESTAMP=$(date -u '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M UTC')
ISSUES=0
LOG="/root/zulip-health-monitor.log"
echo "=== Zulip Health Check — $TIMESTAMP ===" >> "$LOG"
# ── Global: Zulip Server ── # ── Global: Zulip Server ──
SERVER_CODE=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" --connect-timeout 10 \ SERVER_CODE=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" --connect-timeout 10 \
https://chat.sysloggh.net/api/v1/server_settings \ https://chat.sysloggh.net/api/v1/server_settings \
-u 'abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net:cKTDMZAPW08dk3zl05sStzO7HRztzyn8' 2>/dev/null) || SERVER_CODE="000" -u 'abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net:cKTDMZAPW08dk3zl05sStzO7HRztzyn8' 2>/dev/null || echo "000")
SERVER_CODE=$(printf '%s' "$SERVER_CODE" | tr -d '[:space:]')
[ -n "$SERVER_CODE" ] || SERVER_CODE="000"
if [ "$SERVER_CODE" != "200" ]; then if [ "$SERVER_CODE" != "200" ]; then
notify "🔴" "Zulip server returned HTTP $SERVER_CODE" notify "🔴" "Zulip server returned HTTP $SERVER_CODE"
ISSUES=$((ISSUES + 1)) ISSUES=$((ISSUES + 1))
@@ -52,131 +60,89 @@ else
fi fi
# ── Platform A: pi (Abiba) ── # ── Platform A: pi (Abiba) ──
# Probes the pi Zulip extension health endpoint (:9200/health, served by the PI_HEALTH=$(curl -sf --connect-timeout 5 http://localhost:9200/health 2>/dev/null || echo "{}")
# extension's startHealthServer; shape documented in zulip-health.prose.md). PI_CONNECTED=$(echo "$PI_HEALTH" | python3 -c "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print(d.get('connected',False))" 2>/dev/null)
# FAIL-SAFE contract (pinned by tests/zulip-monitor-abiba.sh): connection state PI_ERROR=$(echo "$PI_HEALTH" | python3 -c "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print(d.get('last_error') or '')" 2>/dev/null)
# lives NESTED at zulip.connected / zulip.last_error — there is no top-level PI_RETRIES=$(echo "$PI_HEALTH" | python3 -c "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print(d.get('retry_count',0))" 2>/dev/null)
# `connected` and no retry counter in the payload. A fetch error, non-2xx
# response, empty/unparseable body, or payload missing a boolean
# zulip.connected is a PROBE FAILURE: it alerts and NEVER calls pm2 restart.
# pm2 restart runs ONLY on affirmative zulip.connected=false.
# -- abiba-leg-start (verbatim-extracted by tests/zulip-monitor-abiba.sh)
PI_HTTP=$(curl -s -o /dev/null --connect-timeout 5 --max-time 10 -w '%{http_code}' http://localhost:9200/health 2>/dev/null) || PI_HTTP="000"
PI_HTTP=$(printf '%s' "$PI_HTTP" | tr -d '[:space:]')
[ -n "$PI_HTTP" ] || PI_HTTP="000"
PI_BODY=$(curl -s --connect-timeout 5 --max-time 10 http://localhost:9200/health 2>/dev/null || true)
PI_STATE=$(printf '%s' "$PI_BODY" | python3 -c '
import sys, json
code = sys.argv[1]
body = sys.stdin.read()
try:
d = json.loads(body)
except Exception:
sys.stdout.write("probe-failed|unparseable body")
sys.exit(0)
if not code.startswith("2"):
sys.stdout.write("probe-failed|HTTP %s" % code)
sys.exit(0)
if not isinstance(d, dict) or not isinstance(d.get("zulip"), dict):
sys.stdout.write("probe-failed|missing zulip.connected")
sys.exit(0)
z = d["zulip"]
if "connected" not in z or not isinstance(z["connected"], bool):
sys.stdout.write("probe-failed|missing or non-boolean zulip.connected")
sys.exit(0)
err = z.get("last_error") or ""
if z["connected"]:
if err:
sys.stdout.write("degraded|%s" % err)
else:
sys.stdout.write("healthy|%s" % z.get("messages_processed", 0))
else:
sys.stdout.write("disconnected|")
' "$PI_HTTP" 2>/dev/null) || PI_STATE="probe-failed|python error"
PI_VERDICT=${PI_STATE%%|*}
PI_DETAIL=${PI_STATE#*|}
case "$PI_VERDICT" in if [ "$PI_CONNECTED" != "True" ]; then
healthy) notify "🔴" "Abiba pi extension DISCONNECTED — restarting"
echo " Abiba: ✅ Connected (processed=$PI_DETAIL)" >> "$LOG" ;; pm2 restart abiba-zulip 2>/dev/null || true
degraded)
notify "🟡" "Abiba pi extension error: ${PI_DETAIL:0:100}"
echo " Abiba: 🟡 Error: ${PI_DETAIL:0:100}" >> "$LOG" ;;
disconnected)
notify "🔴" "Abiba pi extension DISCONNECTED — restarting"
pm2 restart abiba-zulip 2>/dev/null || true
ISSUES=$((ISSUES + 1))
echo " Abiba: ❌ Disconnected — restarted" >> "$LOG" ;;
probe-failed)
notify "🟠" "Abiba pi extension health probe FAILED (${PI_DETAIL}; HTTP $PI_HTTP) — NOT restarting, manual check needed"
ISSUES=$((ISSUES + 1))
echo " Abiba: ⚠️ Probe failed (${PI_DETAIL}; HTTP $PI_HTTP) — NOT restarted" >> "$LOG" ;;
*)
notify "🟠" "Abiba pi extension health probe returned unexpected verdict (${PI_STATE}) — NOT restarting, manual check needed"
ISSUES=$((ISSUES + 1))
echo " Abiba: ⚠️ Unexpected probe verdict (${PI_STATE}) — NOT restarted" >> "$LOG" ;;
esac
# -- abiba-leg-end
# ── Platform B: Tanko (DSH dsh-web on amdpve CT 112) ──
# Direct SSH to 192.168.68.122 is not a dependency of this monitor — per-worker
# key availability varies — so probes run from the amdpve vantage via `pct exec`.
# Tanko's Zulip gateway runs as the dsh-web systemd unit inside CT 112 on amdpve
# (192.168.68.15). The gateway binds 127.0.0.1:3080 loopback-only by design — a
# remote :3080 probe is refused and is NOT a fault.
TANKO_SVC=$(ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 root@192.168.68.15 \
"pct exec 112 -- systemctl is-active dsh-web" 2>/dev/null || true)
[ -n "$TANKO_SVC" ] || TANKO_SVC="unknown"
TANKO_HTTP=$(ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 root@192.168.68.15 \
"pct exec 112 -- curl -s --connect-timeout 5 --max-time 10 -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://127.0.0.1:3080/" 2>/dev/null || true)
[ -n "$TANKO_HTTP" ] || TANKO_HTTP="000"
if [ "$TANKO_SVC" != "active" ]; then
notify "🔴" "Tanko (DSH dsh-web) service state: $TANKO_SVC — needs restart"
ISSUES=$((ISSUES + 1)) ISSUES=$((ISSUES + 1))
echo " Tanko: ❌ service=$TANKO_SVC" >> "$LOG" echo " Abiba: ❌ Disconnected — restarted" >> "$LOG"
elif [ "$TANKO_HTTP" = "000" ]; then elif [ -n "$PI_ERROR" ]; then
notify "🔴" "Tanko (DSH dsh-web) HTTP :3080 connection refused/timeout — needs restart" notify "🟡" "Abiba pi extension error: ${PI_ERROR:0:100}"
ISSUES=$((ISSUES + 1)) echo " Abiba: 🟡 Error: ${PI_ERROR:0:100}" >> "$LOG"
echo " Tanko: ❌ http=000 (refused/timeout)" >> "$LOG" elif [ "$PI_RETRIES" -ge 3 ]; then
notify "🟡" "Abiba pi extension: $PI_RETRIES retries — restarting"
pm2 restart abiba-zulip 2>/dev/null || true
echo " Abiba: 🟡 $PI_RETRIES retries — restarted" >> "$LOG"
else else
case "$TANKO_HTTP" in echo " Abiba: ✅ Connected (processed=$(echo "$PI_HEALTH" | python3 -c "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print(d.get('messages_processed',0))" 2>/dev/null))" >> "$LOG"
200|301|302|307|308|401|403)
echo " Tanko: ✅ service=active http=$TANKO_HTTP" >> "$LOG" ;;
*)
notify "🟡" "Tanko (DSH dsh-web) HTTP :3080 answered $TANKO_HTTP — running, unexpected status"
echo " Tanko: 🟡 service=active http=$TANKO_HTTP (running, warning)" >> "$LOG" ;;
esac
fi fi
# ── Removed: the former "Platform B: Hermes" agent leg ── # ── Platform B: Hermes (Tanko) ──
# Captain ruling 2026-09-10: that agent moved off this host onto her own TANKO_STATE=$(ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 jerome@192.168.68.122 \
# container (kagentz CT 105 on minipve, dedicated `hermes` user) and is now "cat ~/.hermes/gateway_state.json 2>/dev/null" 2>/dev/null || echo "{}")
# monitored on her side — see the out-of-scope note in zulip-health.prose.md. TANKO_ZULIP=$(echo "$TANKO_STATE" | python3 -c "
# The old leg ssh'd to her former CT 100 deployment and read its Hermes gateway import sys,json
# state, which reported "unknown" on every run and posted a false 🔴 DM plus an d=json.load(sys.stdin)
# #agent-hub stream alert. Do NOT re-add a probe for her: this monitor must p=d.get('platforms',{}).get('zulip',{})
# never contact her former host. print(p.get('state','unknown'))
" 2>/dev/null)
if [ "$TANKO_ZULIP" != "connected" ]; then
notify "🔴" "Tanko (Hermes) Zulip state: $TANKO_ZULIP — needs restart"
ISSUES=$((ISSUES + 1))
echo " Tanko: ❌ state=$TANKO_ZULIP" >> "$LOG"
else
echo " Tanko: ✅ Zulip connected" >> "$LOG"
fi
# ── Platform B: Hermes (Mumuni) ──
MUMUNI_STATE=$(ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 root@192.168.68.123 \
"cat ~/.hermes/gateway_state.json 2>/dev/null" 2>/dev/null || echo "{}")
MUMUNI_ZULIP=$(echo "$MUMUNI_STATE" | python3 -c "
import sys,json
d=json.load(sys.stdin)
p=d.get('platforms',{}).get('zulip',{})
print(p.get('state','unknown'))
" 2>/dev/null)
if [ "$MUMUNI_ZULIP" != "connected" ]; then
notify "🔴" "Mumuni (Hermes) Zulip state: $MUMUNI_ZULIP"
ISSUES=$((ISSUES + 1))
echo " Mumuni: ❌ state=$MUMUNI_ZULIP" >> "$LOG"
else
echo " Mumuni: ✅ Zulip connected" >> "$LOG"
fi
# ── Platform C: Agent Zero (kagentz) ── # ── Platform C: Agent Zero (kagentz) ──
AZ_A2A_CODE=$(ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 root@192.168.68.14 \ AZ_A2A=$(ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 root@192.168.68.14 \
"docker exec agent-zero curl -s --connect-timeout 5 -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://127.0.0.1:80/a2a/ 2>/dev/null" 2>/dev/null) || AZ_A2A_CODE="000" "docker exec agent-zero curl -s --connect-timeout 5 http://127.0.0.1:8001/.well-known/agent.json 2>/dev/null" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
AZ_A2A_CODE=$(printf '%s' "$AZ_A2A_CODE" | tr -d '[:space:]') AZ_ALIVE=$(echo "$AZ_A2A" | python3 -c "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print(d.get('name',''))" 2>/dev/null)
[ -n "$AZ_A2A_CODE" ] || AZ_A2A_CODE="000"
if [ "$AZ_A2A_CODE" = "000" ]; then if [ "$AZ_ALIVE" != "kagentz" ]; then
notify "🔴" "kagentz A2A server DOWN (connection failed)" notify "🔴" "kagentz A2A server DOWN — restarting"
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 root@192.168.68.14 \
"docker exec agent-zero bash -c 'pkill -9 -f a2a_agent; sleep 1; cd /a0 && /opt/venv-a0/bin/python3 -u /a0/usr/a2a_agent.py > /tmp/a2a.log 2>&1 &'" 2>/dev/null || true
ISSUES=$((ISSUES + 1)) ISSUES=$((ISSUES + 1))
echo " kagentz: ❌ A2A down (HTTP 000)" >> "$LOG" echo " kagentz: ❌ A2A down — restarted" >> "$LOG"
else else
case "$AZ_A2A_CODE" in echo " kagentz: ✅ A2A alive" >> "$LOG"
200|401)
echo " kagentz: ✅ A2A alive (HTTP $AZ_A2A_CODE)" >> "$LOG" ;; # Check adapter process
*) AZ_ADAPTER=$(ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 root@192.168.68.14 \
notify "🟡" "kagentz A2A server answered HTTP $AZ_A2A_CODE — running, unexpected status" "docker exec agent-zero ps aux 2>/dev/null | grep adapter | grep -v grep | wc -l" 2>/dev/null || echo "0")
ISSUES=$((ISSUES + 1)) if [ "$AZ_ADAPTER" -lt 1 ]; then
echo " kagentz: 🟡 A2A unexpected http=$AZ_A2A_CODE (running, warning)" >> "$LOG" ;; notify "🔴" "kagentz Zulip adapter DOWN — restarting"
esac ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 root@192.168.68.14 \
"docker exec agent-zero bash -c 'cd /a0/usr/kagentz-zulip && ZULIP_SITE=https://chat.sysloggh.net ZULIP_EMAIL=kagentz-bot@chat.sysloggh.net ZULIP_API_KEY=E9q9PXJTxftPYBkb5pBDWupDO7KK21ty ZULIP_AGENT_NAME=kagentz A2A_URL=http://localhost:8001/a2a A2A_TOKEN=8zNgdOEXzYxjQvTl /opt/venv-a0/bin/python3 -u adapter.py > /tmp/zulip-adapter.log 2>&1 &'" 2>/dev/null || true
ISSUES=$((ISSUES + 1))
echo " kagentz: ❌ Adapter down — restarted" >> "$LOG"
else
echo " kagentz: ✅ Adapter running" >> "$LOG"
fi
fi fi
# ── Summary ── # ── Summary ──
-25
View File
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
{
"status": "ok",
"platform": "pi",
"agent": "abiba",
"zulip": {
"connected": true,
"site": "https://chat.sysloggh.net",
"email": "abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net",
"queue_id": "ee7f8b6d-9d53-48a7-ad58-f6e999771001",
"bot_user_id": 21,
"messages_processed": 0,
"skipped": 0,
"last_error": null
},
"circuit_breaker": {
"state": "CLOSED",
"failures": 0,
"successes": 5,
"totalRequests": 5,
"failureRate": "0.000",
"openedAt": null
},
"workers": [],
"worker_count": 0
}
-25
View File
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
{
"status": "down",
"platform": "pi",
"agent": "abiba",
"zulip": {
"connected": false,
"site": "https://chat.sysloggh.net",
"email": "abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net",
"queue_id": null,
"bot_user_id": null,
"messages_processed": 0,
"skipped": 0,
"last_error": "Zulip API error 401: queue registration failed"
},
"circuit_breaker": {
"state": "CLOSED",
"failures": 0,
"successes": 0,
"totalRequests": 0,
"failureRate": "0.000",
"openedAt": null
},
"workers": [],
"worker_count": 0
}
-191
View File
@@ -1,191 +0,0 @@
"""Regression tests for the 2026-09-12 retired-alias sweep in audit-hermes-config.py.
WHY THIS FILE EXISTS: the executable audit pushed agent configs toward a DEAD alias.
Rule 8 required `auxiliary.vision.model == "gpu-light"` and
`auxiliary.web_extract.model == "gpu-light"`, but `gpu-light` (and its raw predecessor
`gemma-4-12b`) were retired on 2026-09-12 and now return 400 `Invalid model name`; the
live RTX 5070 alias is `gpu-vision`. A config that adopted the correct canonical alias
therefore FAILED our own audit, so the audit was actively enforcing a broken config.
These tests execute the real CLI (`python3 audit-hermes-config.py <config>`) and assert
observable behaviour — exit code and the emitted rule message — for the live alias and
for both retired names. No network, vault, or SSH access is required.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import pathlib
import subprocess
import sys
ROOT = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
AUDIT = ROOT / "audit-hermes-config.py"
BASE = """
model:
api_key: ""
api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1
max_tokens: 4096
default: syslog-auto
provider: harness
fallback_providers:
provider: deepseek
model: deepseek-v4-flash
api_key_env: DEEPSEEK_API_KEY
compression:
model: syslog-auto
provider: harness
threshold: 0.65
max_context_window: 131072
auxiliary:
vision:
model: {alias}
provider: harness
web_extract:
model: {alias}
provider: harness
compression:
model: syslog-auto
provider: harness
delegation:
provider: harness
custom_providers:
- name: harness
key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1
"""
def _run_config(tmp_path, name, text):
cfg = tmp_path / name
cfg.write_text(text)
proc = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, str(AUDIT), str(cfg)],
capture_output=True, text=True,
)
return proc.returncode, proc.stdout
def _run(tmp_path, alias):
return _run_config(tmp_path, f"{alias}.yaml", BASE.format(alias=alias))
def test_live_canonical_alias_passes(tmp_path):
"""The RTX 5070 alias that actually resolves must satisfy Rule 8."""
code, out = _run(tmp_path, "gpu-vision")
assert code == 0, out
assert "RESULT: PASS" in out
def test_retired_gpu_light_is_rejected(tmp_path):
"""A config pinned to the retired alias must fail, not pass."""
code, out = _run(tmp_path, "gpu-light")
assert code == 1, out
assert "auxiliary.vision.model must be gpu-vision" in out
assert "RESULT: FAIL" in out
def test_retired_gemma_is_rejected(tmp_path):
"""The retired raw model name must fail Rule 8 as well."""
code, out = _run(tmp_path, "gemma-4-12b")
assert code == 1, out
assert "auxiliary.vision.model must be gpu-vision" in out
assert "RESULT: FAIL" in out
def test_corrected_compression_example_passes(tmp_path):
"""The corrected workaround (vision=gpu-vision, compression=syslog-auto) must PASS."""
code, out = _run(tmp_path, "gpu-vision")
assert code == 0, out
assert "[Rule 7] compression.model must be syslog-auto (got 'syslog-auto')" in out
assert "[Rule 7] auxiliary.compression.model must be syslog-auto (got 'syslog-auto')" in out
assert "RESULT: PASS" in out
def test_retired_alias_in_delegation_is_rejected(tmp_path):
"""delegation.model has no dedicated value rule, so a retired name there used to PASS."""
code, out = _run_config(
tmp_path,
"delegation-gpu-light.yaml",
BASE.format(alias="gpu-vision").replace(
"delegation:\n provider: harness",
"delegation:\n provider: harness\n model: gpu-light",
),
)
assert code == 1, out
assert "delegation.model = 'gpu-light' is retired" in out
assert "RESULT: FAIL" in out
def test_retired_alias_in_custom_providers_is_rejected(tmp_path):
"""custom_providers[*].model is model-bearing; a retired name there must fail."""
code, out = _run_config(
tmp_path,
"custom-provider-gpu-light.yaml",
BASE.format(alias="gpu-vision").replace(
" - name: harness\n key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY",
" - name: harness\n model: gpu-light\n key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY",
),
)
assert code == 1, out
assert "custom_providers[0].model = 'gpu-light'" in out
assert "RESULT: FAIL" in out
def test_retired_raw_name_fails(tmp_path):
"""Retired raw names no longer resolve (400), so they fail; the 2026-09-12 registry change moved qwen3.6-27B-code from raw-but-live to non-resolving."""
code, out = _run_config(
tmp_path,
"retired-qwen.yaml",
BASE.format(alias="gpu-vision").replace(
"delegation:\n provider: harness",
"delegation:\n provider: harness\n model: qwen3.6-27B-code",
),
)
assert code != 0, out
assert "delegation.model = 'qwen3.6-27B-code' is retired and no longer resolves" in out
assert "use gpu-dense" in out
assert "RESULT: FAIL" in out
def test_retired_alias_in_fallback_providers_is_rejected(tmp_path):
"""fallback_providers.model is model-bearing; a retired name there must fail."""
code, out = _run_config(
tmp_path,
"fallback-gpu-light.yaml",
BASE.format(alias="gpu-vision").replace(" model: deepseek-v4-flash", " model: gpu-light"),
)
assert code == 1, out
assert "fallback_providers.model = 'gpu-light'" in out
assert "RESULT: FAIL" in out
def test_retired_alias_in_x_search_is_rejected(tmp_path):
"""x_search.model was previously not enumerated; the derivation must catch it."""
code, out = _run_config(
tmp_path,
"x-search-gpu-light.yaml",
BASE.format(alias="gpu-vision").replace(
"delegation:\n provider: harness",
"delegation:\n provider: harness\nx_search:\n model: gpu-light",
),
)
assert code == 1, out
assert "x_search.model = 'gpu-light'" in out
assert "RESULT: FAIL" in out
def test_retired_alias_in_nested_auxiliary_block_is_rejected(tmp_path):
"""A nested auxiliary sub-block outside the named three must still be derived."""
code, out = _run_config(
tmp_path,
"nested-aux-gpu-light.yaml",
BASE.format(alias="gpu-vision").replace(
" compression:\n model: syslog-auto\n provider: harness\ndelegation:",
" compression:\n model: syslog-auto\n provider: harness\n"
" tasks:\n summarize:\n model: gpu-light\ndelegation:",
),
)
assert code == 1, out
assert "auxiliary.tasks.summarize.model = 'gpu-light'" in out
assert "RESULT: FAIL" in out
-138
View File
@@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
"""
Regression tests for daily-infra-report.py fixes (PR #64).
Tests:
(a) Asserts the nested zulip read feeds the agent-card fields
(b) Asserts an unreachable pve_get renders labelled-unreachable, not "0/0"
"""
import json
import subprocess
import sys
from pathlib import Path
from unittest.mock import patch, MagicMock
# Add scripts to path
sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).parent.parent / "scripts"))
import importlib.util
def load_script():
"""Load the daily-infra-report script as a module."""
script_path = Path(__file__).parent.parent / "scripts" / "daily-infra-report.py"
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("daily_infra_report", script_path)
module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
spec.loader.exec_module(module)
return module
def test_nested_zulip_read_feeds_agent_card():
"""Test that Zulip state is read from the nested 'zulip' key and feeds agent-card fields."""
# Mock the http_get_body response with nested structure
mock_health_response = json.dumps({
"status": "ok",
"platform": "pi",
"agent": "abiba",
"zulip": {
"connected": True,
"queue_id": "test-queue-id",
"messages_processed": 42,
"skipped": 5,
"last_error": None
}
})
# Import and patch
report_mod = load_script()
with patch.object(report_mod, 'http_get_body', return_value=mock_health_response):
# Simulate the collect() function's Zulip section
zulip_health = json.loads(report_mod.http_get_body("http://localhost:9200/health"))
zulip_state = zulip_health.get("zulip", {})
# Assert the nested key is read correctly
assert zulip_state.get("connected") == True, "Zulip connected should be True from nested key"
assert zulip_state.get("messages_processed") == 42, "messages_processed should be 42 from nested key"
assert zulip_state.get("queue_id") == "test-queue-id", "queue_id should be read from nested key"
# Simulate the agent card field population
agent_card = {
"zulip_connected": zulip_state.get("connected", False),
"zulip_processed": zulip_state.get("messages_processed", 0),
}
assert agent_card["zulip_connected"] == True, "Agent card should show Zulip connected"
assert agent_card["zulip_processed"] == 42, "Agent card should show 42 processed messages"
def test_unreachable_pve_get_renders_labelled_unreachable():
"""Test that an unreachable PVE API renders 'unreachable' instead of '0/0'."""
# Import and patch
report_mod = load_script()
# Test pve_get returns None on error
with patch.object(report_mod.subprocess, 'run') as mock_run:
mock_run.return_value.returncode = 7 # Connection failure
result = report_mod.pve_get("/api2/json/nodes")
assert result is None, "pve_get should return None on connection failure"
# Test the render logic
report = {
"nodes": {},
"node_count": 0,
"nodes_online": 0,
"pve_probe_status": "unreachable",
"total_vms": 0,
"running_vms": 0,
}
# The render should show "unreachable" not "0/0"
pve_status_label = "unreachable" if report.get('pve_probe_status') == 'unreachable' else f"{report['nodes_online']}/{report['node_count']}"
assert pve_status_label == "unreachable", "PVE status should show 'unreachable' when probe fails, not '0/0'"
def test_unreachable_resources_renders_labelled_unreachable():
"""Test that unreachable resources probe renders 'unreachable' instead of '0/0'."""
report_mod = load_script()
# Test resources probe returns None
with patch.object(report_mod.subprocess, 'run') as mock_run:
mock_run.return_value.returncode = 7
result = report_mod.pve_get("/api2/json/cluster/resources")
assert result is None, "pve_get for resources should return None on connection failure"
# Test the render logic
report = {
"resources_probe_status": "unreachable",
"total_vms": 0,
"running_vms": 0,
}
resources_label = "unreachable" if report.get('resources_probe_status') == 'unreachable' else f"{report['running_vms']}/{report['total_vms']}"
assert resources_label == "unreachable", "Resources status should show 'unreachable' when probe fails, not '0/0'"
if __name__ == "__main__":
print("Running tests...")
try:
test_nested_zulip_read_feeds_agent_card()
print("✓ test_nested_zulip_read_feeds_agent_card passed")
except AssertionError as e:
print(f"✗ test_nested_zulip_read_feeds_agent_card failed: {e}")
sys.exit(1)
try:
test_unreachable_pve_get_renders_labelled_unreachable()
print("✓ test_unreachable_pve_get_renders_labelled_unreachable passed")
except AssertionError as e:
print(f"✗ test_unreachable_pve_get_renders_labelled_unreachable failed: {e}")
sys.exit(1)
try:
test_unreachable_resources_renders_labelled_unreachable()
print("✓ test_unreachable_resources_renders_labelled_unreachable passed")
except AssertionError as e:
print(f"✗ test_unreachable_resources_renders_labelled_unreachable failed: {e}")
sys.exit(1)
print("All tests passed!")
-185
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@@ -1,185 +0,0 @@
"""Regression tests for the disk-gc report-only gate (CT 111 / tdunna / .129).
WHY THIS FILE EXISTS: `disk-gc-threat-response.prose.md` defined AMBER as "GC scheduled
for next run" and its Execution loop called `gc-executor` for EVERY threat, with no
guest-level exclusion. CT 111 (tdunna, 192.168.68.129) belongs to Theo and is
report-only per the captain (2026-08-17, re-confirmed 2026-09-10) — so a single AMBER
reading on that guest would have scheduled GC commands (apt clean, journal vacuum,
log/tmp deletion, snap removal) against someone else's box. The only marker was
frontmatter `report_only_agents`, which names an AGENT while the scan unit is a GUEST.
These tests execute the real planner (`scripts/disk-gc-plan.py`) and assert observable
behaviour: an excluded guest never produces a `gc-executor` action at any level, while
our own guests still do.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import pathlib
import subprocess
import sys
ROOT = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
PLAN = ROOT / "scripts" / "disk-gc-plan.py"
def _plan(scan, tmp_path):
scan_file = tmp_path / "scan.json"
scan_file.write_text(json.dumps(scan))
proc = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, str(PLAN), "--scan", str(scan_file), "--json"],
capture_output=True, text=True,
)
assert proc.returncode == 0, proc.stderr
return json.loads(proc.stdout)
def _actions_for(plan, target):
return [row for row in plan if str(row["target"]) == str(target)]
def test_excluded_guest_never_gets_gc_at_any_level(tmp_path):
"""CT 111 at AMBER, RED and CRITICAL — always report-only, never gc-executor."""
for pct, level in ((84, "AMBER"), (90, "RED"), (97, "CRITICAL")):
plan = _plan([{"id": 111, "hostname": "tdunna", "ip": "192.168.68.129",
"usage_pct": pct}], tmp_path)
rows = _actions_for(plan, 111)
assert rows, f"CT 111 must still be reported at {level}"
assert rows[0]["level"] == level
assert rows[0]["action"] == "report-only", rows
assert not any(r["action"] == "gc-executor" for r in rows)
def test_exclusion_matches_on_any_identity_key(tmp_path):
"""The gate is keyed on guest/host, so id, ct, ctid, hostname or IP all match."""
for entry in ({"id": 111, "usage_pct": 95},
{"ct": 111, "usage_pct": 95},
{"ctid": 111, "usage_pct": 95},
{"hostname": "tdunna", "usage_pct": 95},
{"ip": "192.168.68.129", "usage_pct": 95}):
plan = _plan([entry], tmp_path)
assert all(r["action"] == "report-only" for r in plan), (entry, plan)
def test_exclusion_matches_encoded_identities(tmp_path):
"""A differently-encoded CT 111 id must not slip past the gate to gc-executor."""
encodings = ({"id": 111.0},
{"id": "111.0"},
{"id": "lxc/111"},
{"id": "qemu/111"},
{"id": "0111"},
{"id": " 111 "})
for alias in encodings:
plan = _plan([{**alias, "usage_pct": 97}], tmp_path)
assert plan, alias
assert plan[0]["action"] == "report-only", (alias, plan)
def test_our_own_guests_still_get_gc(tmp_path):
"""acerpve .9 and amdpve .15 are ours — they must still be acted on."""
plan = _plan([{"hostname": "acerpve", "ip": "192.168.68.9", "usage_pct": 77},
{"hostname": "amdpve", "ip": "192.168.68.15", "usage_pct": 76}], tmp_path)
assert len(plan) == 2
assert all(r["action"] == "gc-executor" for r in plan), plan
def test_below_threshold_emits_nothing(tmp_path):
"""GREEN guests produce no action at all."""
assert _plan([{"id": 111, "usage_pct": 40}], tmp_path) == []
def test_agent_name_alone_does_not_gate_a_guest(tmp_path):
"""An agent-name marker must not be the gate: an unrelated guest still gets GC."""
plan = _plan([{"id": 999, "hostname": "koby", "usage_pct": 95}], tmp_path)
assert plan and plan[0]["action"] == "gc-executor"
def test_unidentified_threat_fails_closed(tmp_path):
"""A threshold-crossing entry with no recognized identity must not schedule GC."""
plan = _plan([{"usage_pct": 97}], tmp_path)
assert plan, "an unidentified threat must still be reported"
assert plan[0]["action"] == "report-only", plan
assert plan[0]["reason"], plan
def test_exclusion_entry_without_identity_fails_closed(tmp_path):
"""A mis-typed exclusion entry must break the run, never silently disable the gate."""
contract = tmp_path / "broken.prose.md"
contract.write_text(
"```yaml\n"
"report_only_guests:\n"
" - node: storepve\n"
" reason: \"typo - no guest identity\"\n"
"```\n"
)
scan_file = tmp_path / "scan.json"
scan_file.write_text(json.dumps([{"ct": 111, "usage_pct": 97}]))
proc = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, str(PLAN), "--scan", str(scan_file),
"--contract", str(contract), "--json"],
capture_output=True, text=True,
)
assert proc.returncode != 0, proc.stdout
assert "gc-executor" not in proc.stdout
assert "identity" in proc.stderr.lower(), proc.stderr
def test_empty_exclusion_block_fails_closed(tmp_path):
"""An emptied report_only_guests list must break the run, not disable the gate."""
contract = tmp_path / "empty.prose.md"
contract.write_text("```yaml\nreport_only_guests: []\n```\n")
scan_file = tmp_path / "scan.json"
scan_file.write_text(json.dumps([{"ct": 111, "usage_pct": 97}]))
proc = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, str(PLAN), "--scan", str(scan_file),
"--contract", str(contract), "--json"],
capture_output=True, text=True,
)
assert proc.returncode != 0, proc.stdout
assert "gc-executor" not in proc.stdout
assert "report-only gate" in proc.stderr.lower(), proc.stderr
def _plan_with_contract(scan, contract_text, tmp_path, name):
contract = tmp_path / name
contract.write_text(contract_text)
scan_file = tmp_path / f"scan-{name}.json"
scan_file.write_text(json.dumps(scan))
proc = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, str(PLAN), "--scan", str(scan_file),
"--contract", str(contract), "--json"],
capture_output=True, text=True,
)
assert proc.returncode == 0, proc.stderr
return json.loads(proc.stdout)
def test_gate_is_read_from_the_contract_block(tmp_path):
"""The gate is data-driven by the contract block: the planner excludes the guest
when the block names it and acts on it when the block does not. Executes the real
planner interface against both fixtures so the behaviour change is observable."""
scan = [{"id": 111, "hostname": "tdunna", "ip": "192.168.68.129", "usage_pct": 95}]
with_gate = (
"```yaml\n"
"report_only_guests:\n"
" - guest: 111\n"
" hostname: tdunna\n"
" ip: 192.168.68.129\n"
" reason: \"fixture reason\"\n"
"```\n"
)
without_gate = (
"```yaml\n"
"report_only_guests:\n"
" - guest: 999\n"
" reason: \"fixture excludes a different guest\"\n"
"```\n"
)
gated = _plan_with_contract(scan, with_gate, tmp_path, "gated.prose.md")
assert gated[0]["action"] == "report-only", gated
assert gated[0]["reason"] == "fixture reason", gated
ungated = _plan_with_contract(scan, without_gate, tmp_path, "ungated.prose.md")
assert ungated[0]["action"] == "gc-executor", ungated
assert ungated[0]["action"] != gated[0]["action"]
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@@ -1,376 +0,0 @@
"""Regression tests for the 2026-09-10 retirement of the Mumuni monitoring leg.
WHY THIS FILE EXISTS: captain ruling 2026-09-10 — Mumuni moved off this host
onto her own container (kagentz CT 105 on minipve, 192.168.68.14, dedicated
`hermes` user) and is monitored from her side. The monitor nevertheless kept
ssh'ing to root@192.168.68.24 for `~/.hermes/gateway_state.json` on the
decommissioned deployment, read "unknown" on every run, and posted a false 🔴
"Mumuni (Hermes) Zulip state: unknown" DM + #agent-hub stream alert to the
captain. The daily infra digest published a matching `mumuni:unknown` row.
CONTRACT UNDER TEST:
* `scripts/zulip-monitor.sh` carries NO Mumuni probe and NO 192.168.68.24
reference; it never ssh'es .24, and even on a failing run it emits no Mumuni
notify (stdout alert, Zulip payload, or log line).
* The Abiba (pi — the Zulip bridge), Tanko (DSH) and Agent Zero (kagentz) legs
still work: deleting the Mumuni leg must not have gutted the rest.
* `scripts/daily-infra-report.py` no longer probes .24 for a Hermes gateway
state and no longer emits a `mumuni` agent entry.
* `scripts/agent-health-check.py`'s AGENTS roster has no mumuni entry. This is
a pin, not a behavior change — verify the probe was already gone.
* `zulip-health.prose.md` retires the Mumuni-only steps and says explicitly
that Mumuni is not monitored from this host.
HOW: behavioral execution plus one named deliverable-text contract. The sandbox
copies the shipped monitor verbatim and rewrites only its LOG constant, then
runs it with stub ssh/curl on PATH; the ssh stub records every host it is asked
to reach, so "never probes .24" and "no Mumuni notify" are asserted from
observed behavior. The daily digest is pinned by importing it and exercising
collect() and build_html() directly. The single source-text assertion is the
deliverable-text contract the captain acceptance names for the shipped monitor.
Usage: python3 -m pytest tests/test_mumuni_monitor_removal.py
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import importlib.util
import os
import pathlib
import stat
import subprocess
import pytest
ROOT = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
ZULIP_MONITOR = ROOT / "scripts" / "zulip-monitor.sh"
DAILY_REPORT = ROOT / "scripts" / "daily-infra-report.py"
AHC = ROOT / "scripts" / "agent-health-check.py"
HEALTH_CONTRACT = ROOT / "zulip-health.prose.md"
CONNECTED_FIXTURE = ROOT / "tests" / "fixtures" / "zulip-health-connected.json"
MUMUNI_IP = "192.168.68.24" # Mumuni's old (decommissioned) deployment
TANKO_VANTAGE = "192.168.68.15" # amdpve — Tanko CT 112 via pct exec
AGENT_ZERO_HOST = "192.168.68.14" # kagentz host, Agent Zero docker
# ── scripts/zulip-monitor.sh: deliverable-text contract ─────────────
def test_zulip_monitor_deliverable_text_contract():
"""Owned deliverable-text contract for scripts/zulip-monitor.sh.
Captain acceptance requires the shipped monitor to contain no Mumuni probe
identifier and no 192.168.68.24 literal. Behavioral proof that the monitor
never contacts that host and never emits a Mumuni notify lives in the
sandbox tests below; this only pins the named text contract.
"""
text = ZULIP_MONITOR.read_text()
assert "mumuni" not in text.lower()
assert MUMUNI_IP not in text
# ── scripts/zulip-monitor.sh: behavioral sandbox ─────────────────────
SSH_STUB = r"""#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Stub ssh: record the target host, then answer by host + remote command.
printf '%s\n' "$*" >> "$RECORD_DIR/ssh.calls"
host=""
for a in "$@"; do
case "$a" in
*@192.168.*) host="${a##*@}" ;;
esac
done
printf '%s\n' "$host" >> "$RECORD_DIR/ssh.hosts"
cmd="${*: -1}"
case "$host" in
192.168.68.15)
case "$cmd" in
*"systemctl is-active"*) printf '%s' "$TANKO_SVC" ;;
*curl*) printf '%s' "$TANKO_HTTP" ;;
esac ;;
192.168.68.14)
case "$cmd" in
*"/a2a/"*) printf '%s' "$AZ_A2A_CODE"; exit "$AZ_A2A_EXIT" ;;
esac ;;
*)
printf 'UNEXPECTED-SSH-HOST %s\n' "$host" >> "$RECORD_DIR/unexpected-ssh" ;;
esac
exit 0
"""
CURL_STUB = r"""#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Stub curl: serve the Abiba health fixture and the Zulip server 200, and
# record every call (including notify) payloads.
printf '%s\n' "$*" >> "$RECORD_DIR/curl.calls"
case "$*" in
*:9200/health*)
case " $* " in
*" -w "*) printf '%s' "$PI_HTTP" ;; # -w '%{http_code}' probe
*) printf '%s' "$PI_BODY" ;; # body probe
esac ;;
*server_settings*)
printf '%s' "$SERVER_HTTP" ;;
esac
exit 0
"""
def _write_exec(path: pathlib.Path, body: str) -> None:
path.write_text(body)
path.chmod(path.stat().st_mode
| stat.S_IXUSR | stat.S_IXGRP | stat.S_IXOTH)
def _run_monitor(tmp_path, *, tanko_svc="active", tanko_http="200",
az_a2a_code="401", az_a2a_exit=0):
"""Run the shipped monitor in a sandbox; return (proc, record_dir, log_path).
Only the LOG constant is rewritten (to keep the run inside the worktree).
Everything else — legs, labels, notify logic — is the shipped script.
"""
sandbox = tmp_path / "sandbox"
bindir = sandbox / "bin"
record = sandbox / "record"
bindir.mkdir(parents=True)
record.mkdir()
_write_exec(bindir / "ssh", SSH_STUB)
_write_exec(bindir / "curl", CURL_STUB)
source = ZULIP_MONITOR.read_text()
log_line = 'LOG="/root/zulip-health-monitor.log"'
assert log_line in source, "LOG constant moved — update the sandbox harness"
log_path = sandbox / "zulip-health-monitor.log"
script = sandbox / "zulip-monitor.sh"
script.write_text(source.replace(log_line, f'LOG="{log_path}"'))
env = dict(os.environ)
env.update({
"PATH": f"{bindir}:{env['PATH']}",
"RECORD_DIR": str(record),
"TANKO_SVC": tanko_svc,
"TANKO_HTTP": tanko_http,
"AZ_A2A_CODE": az_a2a_code,
"AZ_A2A_EXIT": str(az_a2a_exit),
"PI_HTTP": "200",
"PI_BODY": CONNECTED_FIXTURE.read_text(),
"SERVER_HTTP": "200",
})
proc = subprocess.run(["bash", str(script)], cwd=sandbox, env=env,
capture_output=True, text=True)
return proc, record, log_path
def test_healthy_run_is_quiet_and_never_reaches_mumuni(tmp_path):
proc, record, log_path = _run_monitor(tmp_path)
assert proc.returncode == 0, proc.stderr
log = log_path.read_text()
# Every retained leg actually ran and passed.
assert "Server: ✅ HTTP 200" in log
assert "Abiba: ✅ Connected" in log
assert "Tanko: ✅ service=active http=200" in log
assert "kagentz: ✅ A2A alive (HTTP 401)" in log
assert "Result: ✅ All healthy" in log
# A healthy run emits no notify at all — and certainly no Mumuni one.
assert proc.stdout == ""
assert "Mumuni" not in log
assert "🔴" not in log
# Observed behavior: .24 is never resolved, only Tanko's vantage and the
# Agent Zero host are contacted.
hosts = record.joinpath("ssh.hosts").read_text().split()
assert MUMUNI_IP not in hosts
assert set(hosts) == {TANKO_VANTAGE, AGENT_ZERO_HOST}
assert not record.joinpath("unexpected-ssh").exists()
def test_failing_run_alerts_on_tanko_but_never_on_mumuni(tmp_path):
# Failure path: exercises notify() end to end so "no Mumuni notify" is
# proven on the alert path, not only on the quiet healthy path.
proc, record, log_path = _run_monitor(tmp_path, tanko_svc="inactive",
tanko_http="000")
assert proc.returncode == 0, proc.stderr
alerts = proc.stdout
assert "Tanko (DSH dsh-web) service state: inactive" in alerts
assert "1 issue(s) found" in alerts
# No Mumuni text in stdout, the log, or any Zulip DM/stream payload.
assert "Mumuni" not in alerts
assert "Mumuni" not in log_path.read_text()
assert MUMUNI_IP not in alerts + log_path.read_text()
payloads = record.joinpath("curl.calls").read_text()
assert "Mumuni" not in payloads
assert MUMUNI_IP not in payloads
# The rest of the monitor still ran alongside the failing Tanko leg.
log = log_path.read_text()
assert "Abiba: ✅ Connected" in log
assert "kagentz: ✅ A2A alive" in log
assert "Result: 🔴 1 issue(s) found" in log
def test_unexpected_a2a_status_is_an_issue_not_healthy(tmp_path):
proc, record, log_path = _run_monitor(tmp_path, az_a2a_code="500")
assert proc.returncode == 0, proc.stderr
log = log_path.read_text()
assert "kagentz: 🟡 A2A unexpected http=500 (running, warning)" in log
assert "kagentz: ✅ A2A alive" not in log
assert "Result: 🔴 1 issue(s) found" in log
assert "kagentz A2A server answered HTTP 500" in proc.stdout
def test_a2a_connection_failure_is_down_not_unexpected(tmp_path):
# curl prints the http_code before failing, so the ssh stub exits non-zero
# with "000" on stdout — exercising the real outage path.
proc, record, log_path = _run_monitor(tmp_path, az_a2a_code="000",
az_a2a_exit=7)
assert proc.returncode == 0, proc.stderr
log = log_path.read_text()
assert "kagentz: ❌ A2A down (HTTP 000)" in log
assert "kagentz: ✅ A2A alive" not in log
assert "unexpected" not in log
assert "Result: 🔴 1 issue(s) found" in log
assert "kagentz A2A server DOWN (connection failed)" in proc.stdout
# ── scripts/daily-infra-report.py: behavioral digest checks ──────────
@pytest.fixture(scope="module")
def daily():
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("daily_infra_report", DAILY_REPORT)
assert spec and spec.loader
module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
spec.loader.exec_module(module)
return module
DAILY_AGENTS = {
"abiba": {
"platform": "pi", "ct": 100, "ip": MUMUNI_IP,
"zulip_connected": True, "zulip_processed": 5,
"pm2_status": "online", "pm2_restarts": "0", "pm2_uptime": "1h",
},
"tanko": {
"platform": "dsh", "ct": 112, "ip": "192.168.68.122",
"gateway_state": "n/a (DSH)", "zulip_state": "connected",
"telegram_state": "unknown", "gateway_pid": None, "updated_at": "",
},
}
def _fabricated_report(agents):
return {
"nodes": {},
"node_count": 1,
"nodes_online": 1,
"total_vms": 0,
"running_vms": 0,
"stopped_vms": [],
"vms_by_node": {n: [] for n in
["amdpve", "minipve", "storepve", "acerpve", "ocupve"]},
"storage": [],
"docker_vm": {"total": 0, "running": 0, "unhealthy": [],
"containers": [], "reclaimable": "", "disk_used": "1%"},
"docker_syslog": {"total": 0, "running": 0, "containers": []},
"docker_netbird": {"total": 0, "running": 0, "containers": []},
"endpoints": [],
"litellm": {"checks": []},
"nfs": [],
"zulip_ext": {
"connected": True, "queue_id": "queue", "last_error": None,
"messages_processed": 0, "retry_count": 0, "pm2": {},
"pm2_healthy": True, "bot_skipped_15min": 0, "finalized_1h": 0,
"failed_finalize_1h": 0, "finalize_fail_pct": 0,
"server_status": "200",
},
"agents": agents,
}
def _agent_status_card(html):
start = html.index("🤖 Agent Status")
end = html.index("💬 Zulip Extension")
return html[start:end]
def test_daily_report_renders_only_abiba_and_tanko_agents(daily):
"""build_html() over a Mumuni-free agent set must render no Mumuni row and
no Mumuni gateway-unknown issue, while abiba and tanko rows still render."""
html = daily.build_html(_fabricated_report(dict(DAILY_AGENTS)))
card = _agent_status_card(html)
assert "mumuni" not in card.lower()
assert "abiba" in card
assert "tanko" in card
assert "mumuni" not in html.lower()
def test_daily_report_collect_never_probes_mumuni(monkeypatch, daily):
"""collect() with ssh stubbed must add no mumuni agent and must never ssh
its decommissioned .24 host."""
probed = []
class _NoSubprocess:
@staticmethod
def check_output(*args, **kwargs):
return b""
def fake_ssh(host, cmd):
probed.append(host)
return ""
monkeypatch.setattr(daily, "pve_get", lambda path: [])
monkeypatch.setattr(daily, "ssh_jerome", lambda host, cmd: "")
monkeypatch.setattr(daily, "ssh", fake_ssh)
monkeypatch.setattr(daily, "http_get",
lambda url, auth=None, timeout=10: "200")
monkeypatch.setattr(daily, "http_get_body",
lambda url, auth=None, timeout=10: "")
monkeypatch.setattr(daily, "count_in_log", lambda *a, **k: 0)
monkeypatch.setattr(daily, "subprocess", _NoSubprocess)
report = daily.collect()
assert "mumuni" not in report["agents"]
assert MUMUNI_IP not in probed
# ── scripts/agent-health-check.py: roster pin ───────────────────────
@pytest.fixture(scope="module")
def ahc():
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("agent_health_check_roster", AHC)
assert spec and spec.loader
module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
spec.loader.exec_module(module)
return module
def test_agent_health_roster_has_no_mumuni_entry(ahc):
assert "mumuni" not in ahc.AGENTS
# ── zulip-health.prose.md: contract reconciliation ──────────────────
def test_health_contract_retires_mumuni_only_steps():
text = HEALTH_CONTRACT.read_text()
assert MUMUNI_IP not in text
for step in ("**B4: Gateway Process**", "**B5: Heartbeat Verification**",
"**B6: Response Delivery**"):
assert step not in text
def test_health_contract_states_mumuni_is_not_monitored_from_this_host():
text = HEALTH_CONTRACT.read_text()
assert "Mumuni is NOT monitored from this host" in text
assert "monitored on her side" in text
assert "her own container" in text
def test_health_contract_keeps_tanko_agent_zero_and_bridge_steps():
text = HEALTH_CONTRACT.read_text()
for marker in ("**B1:", "**B2:", "**B3:", "Step 4: Platform C",
"Step 2: Platform A", "Step 1: Zulip Server Liveness"):
assert marker in text, marker
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@@ -1,466 +0,0 @@
"""Regression tests for the 2026-09-09/10 probe-drift corrections.
WHY THIS FILE EXISTS: the monitoring contracts kept emitting false alarms from
stale expectations rather than live faults.
* agent-health-check v3 reported 6 failures that were all stale expectations:
abiba (pi-only since the harness purge) was tested as a Hermes host, koby
(report-only per the captain's 2026-08-17 ruling) was counted as repairable,
koby's CT 111 was probed on amdpve where it does not exist (it runs on
storepve .6), and the wrapper infisical check had two bugs — it read only
the first 20 lines, so koonimo's wrapper (which references /usr/bin/infisical
past line 20) false-failed, and it treated koby's genuine no-infisical
(~/.hermes/.env) wrapper as broken.
* gpu-monitor emitted "DEGRADED — GPU-rtx3090 000, GPU-rtx5070 000" three
times from probing bare port 80 on GPU hosts while :8080 answered 200.
* infrastructure-monitoring probed CT 116 for the PVE API (no pveproxy ->
000) instead of the five real cluster nodes, which answer 401 = alive.
These tests execute the health script (with SSH/vault stubbed) and the real
provenance consumer (scripts/prose-lint.sh), and parse the contracts' executable
check-health probe blocks into normalized probe sets. No live network, vault, or
SSH access is required.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import importlib.util
import json
import os
import pathlib
import re
import subprocess
import sys
import textwrap
import pytest
ROOT = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
AHC = ROOT / "scripts" / "agent-health-check.py"
LINT = ROOT / "scripts" / "prose-lint.sh"
GPU = ROOT / "gpu-monitor.prose.md"
INFRA = ROOT / "infrastructure-monitoring.prose.md"
PVE_NODE_IPS = {
"192.168.68.9",
"192.168.68.5",
"192.168.68.15",
"192.168.68.6",
"192.168.68.12",
}
@pytest.fixture(scope="module")
def ahc():
"""Import agent-health-check.py without live network/SSH side effects."""
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("agent_health_check", AHC)
assert spec and spec.loader
module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
spec.loader.exec_module(module)
return module
# ── helpers: execute the health script with SSH/vault stubbed ─────────
def _run_main(ahc, monkeypatch, capsys, argv, ssh_result=None):
ahc.FAIL.clear()
ahc.REPORT_ONLY.clear()
monkeypatch.setattr(ahc, "load_agent_keys", lambda: None)
monkeypatch.setattr(ahc, "ssh", lambda *a, **k: ssh_result)
monkeypatch.setattr(sys, "argv", ["agent-health-check.py", "--no-deploy", *argv])
with pytest.raises(SystemExit) as exc:
ahc.main()
return exc.value.code, capsys.readouterr().out
def _json_payload(out):
for line in reversed(out.splitlines()):
if line.startswith('{"timestamp"'):
return json.loads(line)
raise AssertionError(f"no JSON payload in output:\n{out}")
# ── agent-health-check: stale-expectation legs ───────────────────────
def test_import_does_not_contact_vault(ahc):
# Keys are loaded in main() via load_agent_keys(); importing must stay inert.
assert callable(ahc.load_agent_keys)
assert all(agent.get("key") is None for agent in ahc.AGENTS.values())
def test_abiba_is_pi_only_runtime(ahc):
# .24 has run pi-only since the harness purge: no Hermes gateway, config, or
# wrapper. Probing those legs produced false failures.
assert ahc.AGENTS["abiba"]["runtime"] == "pi"
def test_koby_is_report_only(ahc):
# Captain's 2026-08-17 ruling (Rule 17): detect and report, never repair.
assert ahc.AGENTS["koby"]["report_only"] is True
def test_koby_ct111_is_on_storepve(ahc):
# Live-verified 2026-09-10: `pct status 111` = running on storepve (.6);
# amdpve has no lxc/111.conf, which is what false-failed before.
assert ahc.AGENTS["koby"]["pve"] == "storepve"
def test_report_only_legs_never_count_as_failures(ahc):
for agent, report_only in (("koby", True), ("koonimo", False), ("tanko", False)):
ahc.FAIL.clear()
ahc.REPORT_ONLY.clear()
ahc._fail(f"probe:{agent}", agent)
if report_only:
assert ahc.FAIL == []
assert ahc.REPORT_ONLY == [f"probe:{agent}"]
else:
assert ahc.FAIL == [f"probe:{agent}"]
assert ahc.REPORT_ONLY == []
ahc.FAIL.clear()
ahc.REPORT_ONLY.clear()
def test_failure_recording_accepts_agentless_keys(ahc):
ahc.FAIL.clear()
try:
ahc._fail("gpu-no-port:gpu-rtx3090 (.8)")
assert ahc.FAIL == ["gpu-no-port:gpu-rtx3090 (.8)"]
finally:
ahc.FAIL.clear()
def test_json_reports_absolute_execution_provenance(ahc, monkeypatch, capsys):
code, out = _run_main(ahc, monkeypatch, capsys, ["--json"])
payload = _json_payload(out)
assert payload["execution_path"] == os.path.abspath(str(AHC))
assert payload["cwd"] == os.getcwd()
assert code == 1 # stubbed SSH fails every leg, but provenance is still emitted
def test_quiet_run_still_carries_provenance_on_the_alert_path(ahc, monkeypatch, capsys):
# The cron runs --quiet; a failure report must still carry provenance. The
# header line is suppressed in quiet mode, so the ALERT line is the carrier.
code, out = _run_main(ahc, monkeypatch, capsys, ["--quiet"])
assert code == 1
assert "📍 executed from:" not in out
alerts = [ln for ln in out.splitlines() if ln.startswith("ALERT agent-health:")]
assert alerts, out
assert f"script={os.path.abspath(str(AHC))}" in alerts[0]
assert f"cwd={os.getcwd()}" in alerts[0]
def test_quiet_healthy_run_emits_no_stdout(ahc, monkeypatch, capsys):
# --quiet is documented as "only output on failure": a run with no fleet
# failures must produce no stdout at all (the production cron runs --quiet).
for name in ("check_keys", "check_gpu_ports", "check_agents", "check_ct_liveness",
"check_config_integrity", "check_wrapper_integrity", "check_vault_secrets"):
monkeypatch.setattr(ahc, name, lambda: None)
code, out = _run_main(ahc, monkeypatch, capsys, ["--quiet"])
assert code == 0
assert out == ""
def test_json_surfaces_report_only_findings_separately(ahc, monkeypatch, capsys):
# Koby's down legs are reported but must not count as fleet failures; the
# --json payload exposes them in their own array (item 1 + f8).
_, out = _run_main(ahc, monkeypatch, capsys, ["--json"])
payload = _json_payload(out)
assert isinstance(payload["report_only"], list)
assert any(key.startswith(("gateway-down:koby", "ct-unreachable:koby"))
for key in payload["report_only"])
assert not any("koby" in key for key in payload["failures"])
# ── agent-health-check: wrapper infisical behavior (f3) ───────────────
def _stub_wrapper_ssh(ahc, monkeypatch, wrapper_body, test_x_result="OK", command_v="/usr/local/bin/infisical"):
def fake_ssh(host, cmd, user="root"):
if cmd.startswith("cat /root/.local/bin/hermes"):
return wrapper_body
if cmd.startswith("ls -la /root/.local/bin/hermes "):
return "-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 0 Jan 1 00:00 /root/.local/bin/hermes"
if cmd.startswith("ls -la /root/.local/bin/hermes-real") or "venv/bin/hermes" in cmd:
return "-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 0 Jan 1 00:00 /root/.local/bin/hermes-real"
if cmd.startswith("grep -c 'LITELLM_API_KEY'"):
return "1"
if cmd.startswith("test -x "):
path = cmd[len("test -x "):].split()[0]
if isinstance(test_x_result, dict):
return test_x_result.get(path, "MISS")
return test_x_result
if cmd.startswith("command -v infisical"):
return command_v
return None
monkeypatch.setattr(ahc, "ssh", fake_ssh)
monkeypatch.setattr(ahc, "AGENTS", {"koonimo": dict(ahc.AGENTS["koonimo"])})
ahc.FAIL.clear()
ahc.REPORT_ONLY.clear()
def test_env_based_wrapper_without_infisical_is_not_failed(ahc, monkeypatch, capsys):
_stub_wrapper_ssh(ahc, monkeypatch,
"#!/bin/bash\nsource ~/.hermes/.env\nexec hermes-real \"$@\"\n")
ahc.check_wrapper_integrity()
out = capsys.readouterr().out
assert ahc.FAIL == []
assert "wrapper resolves creds without infisical" in out
def test_dangling_absolute_infisical_path_is_failed(ahc, monkeypatch, capsys):
# Wrapper hardcodes /usr/bin/infisical, which is absent, while PATH resolves
# infisical to /usr/local/bin/infisical. The literal path must be verified,
# not inferred from PATH resolution.
_stub_wrapper_ssh(ahc, monkeypatch,
"#!/bin/bash\n/usr/bin/infisical run -- hermes-real \"$@\"\n",
test_x_result="MISS", command_v="/usr/local/bin/infisical")
ahc.check_wrapper_integrity()
assert "wrapper-infisical-path:koonimo" in ahc.FAIL
def test_existing_absolute_infisical_path_passes(ahc, monkeypatch, capsys):
_stub_wrapper_ssh(ahc, monkeypatch,
"#!/bin/bash\n/usr/bin/infisical run -- hermes-real \"$@\"\n",
test_x_result="OK")
ahc.check_wrapper_integrity()
out = capsys.readouterr().out
assert ahc.FAIL == []
assert "wrapper infisical path OK" in out
def test_comment_mentioning_removed_infisical_path_is_not_failed(ahc, monkeypatch, capsys):
# litellm-api-keys.prose.md documents `rm -f /usr/local/bin/infisical`; a
# wrapper comment about that migration must not manufacture a dangling path
# when the real invocation (/usr/bin/infisical) is present and executable.
_stub_wrapper_ssh(ahc, monkeypatch,
"#!/bin/bash\n# migrated from /usr/local/bin/infisical\n"
"exec /usr/bin/infisical run -- hermes-real \"$@\"\n",
test_x_result={"/usr/bin/infisical": "OK",
"/usr/local/bin/infisical": "MISS"})
ahc.check_wrapper_integrity()
out = capsys.readouterr().out
assert ahc.FAIL == []
assert "wrapper infisical path OK" in out
def test_comment_only_infisical_mention_does_not_reach_path_check(ahc, monkeypatch, capsys):
# A comment-only mention of a removed infisical path on a healthy .env-based
# wrapper is not an invocation: it must not fall through to the `command -v`
# PATH check and false-FAIL `wrapper-no-infisical`.
_stub_wrapper_ssh(ahc, monkeypatch,
"#!/bin/bash\n# migrated from /usr/local/bin/infisical\n"
"source ~/.hermes/.env\nexec hermes-real \"$@\"\n",
test_x_result="MISS", command_v=None)
ahc.check_wrapper_integrity()
out = capsys.readouterr().out
assert ahc.FAIL == []
assert "wrapper resolves creds without infisical" in out
# ── item 4: prose-lint enforces report provenance (real consumer) ─────
GOOD_CONTRACT = textwrap.dedent("""\
---
kind: function
name: good
description: fixture with provenance
---
## Parameters
- x: y
## Returns
ok
### check-health
```bash
pwd -P
```
**Report format**: Begin with the absolute path the probe executed from.
""")
DECOY_CONTRACT = textwrap.dedent("""\
---
kind: function
name: decoy
description: fixture with provenance only outside the report format
---
## Parameters
- x: y
## Returns
ok
The absolute path of the config is /etc/foo.
### check-health
```bash
true
```
**Report format**: Summarize actual results from each probe.
""")
MISSING_CONTRACT = textwrap.dedent("""\
---
kind: function
name: missing
description: check-health contract with no report format
---
## Parameters
- x: y
## Returns
ok
### check-health
```bash
pwd -P
```
""")
def _run_lint(tmp_path, text, name):
(tmp_path / name).write_text(text)
return subprocess.run(["bash", str(LINT)], cwd=tmp_path,
capture_output=True, text=True)
def test_prose_lint_accepts_report_format_with_provenance(tmp_path):
result = _run_lint(tmp_path, GOOD_CONTRACT, "good.prose.md")
assert result.returncode == 0, result.stdout + result.stderr
def test_prose_lint_rejects_report_format_without_provenance(tmp_path):
result = _run_lint(tmp_path, DECOY_CONTRACT, "decoy.prose.md")
assert result.returncode == 1, result.stdout
assert "lacks execution provenance" in result.stdout
def test_prose_lint_requires_report_format_on_check_health_contract(tmp_path):
result = _run_lint(tmp_path, MISSING_CONTRACT, "missing.prose.md")
assert result.returncode == 1, result.stdout
assert "no **Report format** paragraph" in result.stdout
# ── contracts: parse the executable check-health probe block ─────────
def _check_health_block(contract):
"""Extract the bash probe block under ### check-health (the probe interface)."""
text = contract.read_text()
marker = "### check-health"
assert marker in text, f"{contract.name} has no {marker}"
after = text.split(marker, 1)[1]
match = re.search(r"```bash\n(.*?)```", after, re.S)
assert match, f"{contract.name} check-health has no bash probe block"
return match.group(1)
def _loop_nodes(block):
nodes = []
for line in block.splitlines():
match = re.match(r"\s*for\s+\w+\s+in\s+(.+?);?\s*do\b", line)
if match:
nodes = match.group(1).split()
return nodes
def _record(url):
"""Normalize a URL into a probe record: host, port, path, expected status."""
match = re.match(r"https?://([^/\s\"')]+)(/[^\s\"')]*)?", url)
assert match, f"unparseable probe URL: {url}"
hostport = match.group(1)
if "@" in hostport:
hostport = hostport.split("@", 1)[1]
if hostport.startswith("["):
host, port = hostport[1:hostport.index("]")], None
elif ":" in hostport:
host, raw_port = hostport.rsplit(":", 1)
port = int(raw_port) if raw_port.isdigit() else None
else:
host, port = hostport, None
return {"host": host, "port": port, "path": match.group(2) or "/",
"expected": None}
def _probes(block):
"""Parse the executable check-health bash block into a normalized probe model.
Comments are not probes; an `# Expected: <status>` comment annotates the
preceding probe. URLs using the block's shell-loop variable `$node` are
expanded over the loop's node list.
"""
loop_nodes = _loop_nodes(block)
probes = []
last = None
for raw in block.splitlines():
stripped = raw.strip()
if stripped.startswith("#"):
expected = re.search(r"Expected:\s*(\d{3})", stripped, re.I)
if expected and last is not None:
last["expected"] = int(expected.group(1))
continue
for url in re.findall(r"https?://[^\s\"')]+", raw):
hosts = loop_nodes if "$node" in url else [None]
for node in hosts:
record = _record(url.replace("$node", node) if node else url)
probes.append(record)
last = record
return probes
def test_gpu_monitor_probes_every_gpu_health_on_8080():
probes = _probes(_check_health_block(GPU))
targets = {(p["host"], p["port"], p["path"]) for p in probes}
assert ("192.168.68.8", 8080, "/health") in targets
assert ("192.168.68.110", 8080, "/health") in targets
def test_gpu_monitor_never_probes_bare_port_80_on_gpu_hosts():
probes = _probes(_check_health_block(GPU))
gpu_hosts = {"192.168.68.8", "192.168.68.110", "192.168.68.15"}
offenders = [p for p in probes
if p["host"] in gpu_hosts and p["port"] in (None, 80)]
assert offenders == []
def test_probe_model_flags_explicit_port_80_on_gpu_host():
# Regression: a bare-port probe may be spelled with an explicit :80.
block = ("curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' "
"http://192.168.68.8:80/health\n")
gpu_hosts = {"192.168.68.8", "192.168.68.110", "192.168.68.15"}
offenders = [p for p in _probes(block)
if p["host"] in gpu_hosts and p["port"] in (None, 80)]
assert offenders and offenders[0]["port"] == 80
def test_gpu_monitor_treats_router_301_as_alive():
probes = _probes(_check_health_block(GPU))
unified = [p for p in probes
if p["host"] == "192.168.68.116" and p["path"] == "/health/unified"]
assert unified, "router /health/unified probe missing"
assert unified[0]["expected"] == 301
def test_infra_monitoring_probes_every_real_pve_node():
probes = _probes(_check_health_block(INFRA))
pve = {(p["host"], p["port"], p["path"]) for p in probes if p["port"] == 8006}
assert {host for host, _, _ in pve} == PVE_NODE_IPS
assert {path for _, _, path in pve} == {"/api2/json/version"}
def test_infra_monitoring_does_not_probe_ct116_for_pve_api():
probes = _probes(_check_health_block(INFRA))
assert not any(p["host"] == "192.168.68.116" and p["port"] == 8006
for p in probes)
-211
View File
@@ -1,211 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/bash
# tests/zulip-monitor-abiba.sh — regression test pinning the producer→consumer
# contract between the pi Zulip extension's :9200/health payload and the Abiba
# leg of scripts/zulip-monitor.sh.
#
# WHY THIS TEST EXISTS: 2026-09-09 live incident. The monitor parsed the health
# payload at the WRONG nesting level (d.get('connected') at top level, while the
# extension serves zulip.connected) so PI_CONNECTED was always False and every
# monitor run restarted a healthy bot: pm2 showed restarts=8 with the process
# created 2026-09-09T09:35:09Z, the monitor log recorded four ❌ Abiba verdicts
# (04:23, 05:35, 06:55, 09:35 UTC) and zero ✅, while the Zulip server answered
# HTTP 200 and the bot logged a clean connect plus continuing heartbeats. The
# watchdog was the fault, not the connection. This test makes that class of
# regression fail loudly instead of silently restarting healthy services.
#
# CONTRACT UNDER TEST (must hold for scripts/zulip-monitor.sh):
# * Connection state is NESTED: zulip.connected (boolean) and zulip.last_error
# live inside the `zulip` object. There is NO top-level `connected` and NO
# retry counter anywhere in the payload (verified against the extension's
# startHealthServer handler) — the old retry_count branch was dropped.
# * zulip.connected=true -> log "✅ Connected", NO pm2 restart.
# * zulip.connected=false -> alert, pm2 restart abiba-zulip.
# * fetch error / non-2xx / empty body / unparseable body / missing or
# non-boolean zulip.connected -> "⚠️ Probe failed" alert with a
# "NOT restarting" label, NO pm2 restart. A parse miss must never kill a
# healthy service.
# * zulip.connected=true with last_error -> degraded 🟡 warning, no restart.
#
# HOW: the Abiba leg of the shipped script sits between the
# `# -- abiba-leg-start` / `# -- abiba-leg-end` marker comments. This runner
# extracts that block verbatim and executes it with a stubbed curl (fixture body
# + HTTP code), recorded notify()/pm2 shims, and a temp $LOG. If the markers
# disappear (fix reverted or renamed) extraction yields nothing and the suite
# fails — the bug cannot return silently.
#
# Usage: bash tests/zulip-monitor-abiba.sh [path/to/zulip-monitor.sh]
# Exit 0 iff every check passes.
#
# shellcheck disable=SC2034,SC2329,SC1090
# LOG/ISSUES and the notify/pm2/curl stubs below are consumed at runtime by
# the leg extracted between the marker comments and `source`d in each case;
# the static analyzer cannot see across that dynamic source, so it flags them.
set -uo pipefail
ROOT=$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd)
SCRIPT=${1:-"$ROOT/scripts/zulip-monitor.sh"}
FIXTURES="$ROOT/tests/fixtures"
TMP=$(mktemp -d)
trap 'rm -rf "$TMP"' EXIT
PASS=0
FAIL=0
ok() { PASS=$((PASS + 1)); printf ' \033[32m✔\033[0m %s\n' "$1"; }
bad() { FAIL=$((FAIL + 1)); printf ' \033[31m✘\033[0m %s\n' "$1"; }
echo "== tests/zulip-monitor-abiba.sh — Abiba leg vs :9200/health producer contract =="
echo "target script: $SCRIPT"
# --- structural guards -------------------------------------------------------
if ! grep -q '^# -- abiba-leg-start' "$SCRIPT"; then
echo "✘ FATAL: $SCRIPT has no '# -- abiba-leg-start' marker — the fix has been reverted or renamed."
exit 1
fi
if ! grep -q '^# -- abiba-leg-end' "$SCRIPT"; then
echo "✘ FATAL: $SCRIPT has no '# -- abiba-leg-end' marker."
exit 1
fi
LEG="$TMP/leg.sh"
awk '/^# -- abiba-leg-start/{f=1; next}
/^# -- abiba-leg-end/{f=0; next}
f' "$SCRIPT" > "$LEG"
if [ ! -s "$LEG" ]; then
echo "✘ FATAL: extracted Abiba leg is empty."
exit 1
fi
echo "== structural =="
if bash -n "$SCRIPT"; then ok "syntax: bash -n $SCRIPT"; else bad "syntax: bash -n $SCRIPT failed"; fi
if bash -n "$LEG"; then ok "syntax: extracted leg parses (bash -n)"; else bad "syntax: extracted leg fails bash -n"; fi
# --- per-case harness ---------------------------------------------------------
CURRENT_NAME=""
CURRENT_DIR=""
# $1 case name, $2 http-code, $3 body (file path or literal)
run_case() {
local name="$1" http="$2" body_src="$3" body
CURRENT_NAME="$name"
CURRENT_DIR=$(mktemp -d "$TMP/case.XXXXXX")
if [ -f "$body_src" ]; then
body=$(cat "$body_src")
else
body="$body_src"
fi
(
LOG="$CURRENT_DIR/log"; ISSUES=0
notify() { printf 'ALERT [%s] %s\n' "$1" "$2" >> "$CURRENT_DIR/alerts"; }
pm2() { printf 'PM2 %s\n' "$*" >> "$CURRENT_DIR/pm2"; }
curl() {
local url=""
for a in "$@"; do case "$a" in http*) url="$a";; esac; done
case "$url" in
*:9200/health*)
case " $* " in
*"-w"*) printf '%s' "$http" ;; # -w '%{http_code}' code probe
*) printf '%s' "$body" ;; # body probe
esac ;;
*)
printf 'UNEXPECTED-CURL %s\n' "$*" >> "$CURRENT_DIR/unexpected-curl"
return 7 ;;
esac
return 0
}
source "$LEG"
)
}
assert_log_has() {
if grep -qF -- "$1" "$CURRENT_DIR/log"; then ok "$CURRENT_NAME — log has: $1"; else bad "$CURRENT_NAME — log MISSING: $1"; fi
}
assert_log_lacks() {
if grep -qF -- "$1" "$CURRENT_DIR/log"; then bad "$CURRENT_NAME — log must NOT contain: $1"; else ok "$CURRENT_NAME — log correctly lacks: $1"; fi
}
assert_alert_has() {
if grep -qF -- "$1" "$CURRENT_DIR/alerts"; then ok "$CURRENT_NAME — alert sent: $1"; else bad "$CURRENT_NAME — alert MISSING: $1"; fi
}
assert_alert_empty() {
if [ ! -s "$CURRENT_DIR/alerts" ]; then ok "$CURRENT_NAME — no alert sent (quiet healthy path)"; else bad "$CURRENT_NAME — unexpected alert: $(cat "$CURRENT_DIR/alerts")"; fi
}
assert_pm2_restarted() {
if grep -qF "PM2 restart abiba-zulip" "$CURRENT_DIR/pm2"; then ok "$CURRENT_NAME — pm2 restart abiba-zulip was called"; else bad "$CURRENT_NAME — expected pm2 restart abiba-zulip, pm2 log: $(cat "$CURRENT_DIR/pm2" 2>/dev/null)"; fi
}
assert_no_restart() {
if [ ! -s "$CURRENT_DIR/pm2" ]; then ok "$CURRENT_NAME — NO pm2 restart (fail-safe holds)"; else bad "$CURRENT_NAME — pm2 was called but must NOT be: $(cat "$CURRENT_DIR/pm2")"; fi
}
assert_no_unexpected_curl() {
if [ ! -s "$CURRENT_DIR/unexpected-curl" ]; then ok "$CURRENT_NAME — only :9200/health was probed"; else bad "$CURRENT_NAME — unexpected curl: $(cat "$CURRENT_DIR/unexpected-curl")"; fi
}
# --- case 1: real payload shape, zulip.connected=true -> healthy, no restart --
echo "== case 1: connected (real producer payload: nested zulip.connected=true) =="
run_case "connected" 200 "$FIXTURES/zulip-health-connected.json"
assert_log_has "Abiba: ✅ Connected (processed=0)"
assert_log_lacks "Disconnected"
assert_alert_empty
assert_no_restart
assert_no_unexpected_curl
# --- case 2: zulip.connected=false -> disconnected, restart -------------------
echo "== case 2: disconnected (nested zulip.connected=false triggers restart) =="
run_case "disconnected" 200 "$FIXTURES/zulip-health-disconnected.json"
assert_log_has "Abiba: ❌ Disconnected — restarted"
assert_alert_has "DISCONNECTED — restarting"
assert_pm2_restarted
assert_no_unexpected_curl
# --- cases 3-9: probe failures must alert and MUST NOT restart ----------------
echo "== probe-failure cases: alert 'NOT restarting', zero pm2 restarts =="
run_case "empty body" 200 ""
assert_log_has "Abiba: ⚠️ Probe failed"
assert_log_lacks "❌ Disconnected"
assert_alert_has "NOT restarting"
assert_no_restart
run_case "garbage body" 200 '{not valid json!!'
assert_log_has "Abiba: ⚠️ Probe failed"
assert_alert_has "NOT restarting"
assert_no_restart
run_case "missing zulip key" 200 '{"status":"ok","platform":"pi","agent":"abiba"}'
assert_log_has "Probe failed"
assert_alert_has "NOT restarting"
assert_no_restart
run_case "zulip without connected" 200 '{"status":"ok","zulip":{"last_error":null}}'
assert_log_has "Probe failed"
assert_alert_has "NOT restarting"
assert_no_restart
run_case "non-boolean connected" 200 '{"status":"ok","zulip":{"connected":"true"}}'
assert_log_has "Probe failed"
assert_alert_has "NOT restarting"
assert_no_restart
run_case "fetch failure http 000" 000 ""
assert_log_has "Probe failed"
assert_alert_has "NOT restarting"
assert_no_restart
run_case "non-2xx http 500" 500 '{"error":"boom"}'
assert_log_has "Probe failed"
assert_alert_has "NOT restarting"
assert_no_restart
# --- case 10: connected but last_error set -> degraded 🟡, no restart ---------
echo "== case 10: degraded (connected=true but last_error set) warns, no restart =="
run_case "degraded" 200 '{"status":"ok","zulip":{"connected":true,"last_error":"transient queue hiccup","messages_processed":3}}'
assert_log_has "Abiba: 🟡 Error: transient queue hiccup"
assert_log_lacks "❌ Disconnected"
assert_no_restart
# --- summary -------------------------------------------------------------------
echo ""
if [ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]; then
echo "✅ ALL CHECKS PASSED ($PASS/$PASS) — tests/zulip-monitor-abiba.sh"
exit 0
else
echo "❌ $FAIL CHECK(S) FAILED ($PASS passed) — tests/zulip-monitor-abiba.sh"
exit 1
fi
+2 -2
View File
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ description: >
`messages_processed` stalls. `messages_processed` stalls.
- **Root cause**: Agent's model config (`models.json` or `settings.json`) references a - **Root cause**: Agent's model config (`models.json` or `settings.json`) references a
model ID that doesn't exist in LiteLLM's authorized model list. Example: `qwen3.6-35B-A3B` model ID that doesn't exist in LiteLLM's authorized model list. Example: `qwen3.6-35B-A3B`
configured but LiteLLM only exposes `strix-moe` (alias for qwen3.6-35B-udq4) under that key. pi's session configured but LiteLLM only exposes `ornith-1.0-35b` under that key. pi's session
workers emit 403 on first prompt, then never recover because the error doesn't trigger workers emit 403 on first prompt, then never recover because the error doesn't trigger
`agent_end` — worker stays `busy` and all subsequent messages pile up in the steer queue. `agent_end` — worker stays `busy` and all subsequent messages pile up in the steer queue.
- **Detection**: Compare `~/.pi/agent/models.json` model IDs against `curl -H "Authorization: Bearer <KEY>" http://192.168.68.116/v1/models` output. A stuck worker shows - **Detection**: Compare `~/.pi/agent/models.json` model IDs against `curl -H "Authorization: Bearer <KEY>" http://192.168.68.116/v1/models` output. A stuck worker shows
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ description: >
(2) Set `defaultModel` to `syslog-auto` (safe routing model). (3) Delete stale session (2) Set `defaultModel` to `syslog-auto` (safe routing model). (3) Delete stale session
JSONL files from `~/.pi/agent/sessions/zulip/`. (4) Restart PM2 process. JSONL files from `~/.pi/agent/sessions/zulip/`. (4) Restart PM2 process.
- **Prevention**: Use `syslog-auto` as default model for all agents — it handles model - **Prevention**: Use `syslog-auto` as default model for all agents — it handles model
routing and fallback automatically. Direct model IDs (`strix-moe`, etc.) should routing and fallback automatically. Direct model IDs (`ornith-1.0-35b`, etc.) should
only be used when explicitly requested. Validate model IDs at agent setup time. only be used when explicitly requested. Validate model IDs at agent setup time.
- **Applies to**: pi extension (Tdunna CT111, fixed 2026-07-08), any agent using `syslog-harness` provider - **Applies to**: pi extension (Tdunna CT111, fixed 2026-07-08), any agent using `syslog-harness` provider
+61 -289
View File
@@ -1,34 +1,22 @@
--- ---
kind: responsibility kind: responsibility
name: zulip-health name: zulip-health
description: Multi-platform health monitor for the Zulip messaging mesh spanning Platform A (pi/Abiba Zulip bridge), Platform B (Tanko on DSH), and Platform C (Agent Zero Docker). Verifies bot registration, DM delivery, and cross-platform connectivity. The kagentz Zulip adapter leg is retired (its code no longer exists) — Agent Zero is probed for A2A liveness only. Mumuni is no longer monitored from this host — she runs on her own container (kagentz CT 105 on minipve, .14) and is monitored on her side. description: Multi-platform health monitor for the Zulip messaging mesh spanning Platform A (Agent Zero Docker), Platform B (Hermes agents Tanko/Mumuni), and the Zulip bridge. Verifies bot registration, DM delivery, and cross-platform connectivity.
title: Zulip Mesh Health Monitor — Multi-Platform title: Zulip Mesh Health Monitor — Multi-Platform
version: 3.3.0 version: 3.0.0
runtime_contract: 2 runtime_contract: 2
agent: abiba agent: abiba
report_only_agents:
- koby # ⛔ KOBY IS NEVER REPAIRED (Rule 17, 2026-08-17) — detect + report, never fix on .129
--- ---
# Zulip Mesh Health Monitor # Zulip Mesh Health Monitor
Monitors the Zulip-connected agents under this host's operational control (pi, Monitors ALL Zulip-connected agents across three platforms (pi, Hermes, Agent Zero).
DSH, Agent Zero). Runs every 15 minutes in the background. Also triggers on Runs every 15 minutes in the background. Also triggers on session start.
session start.
> **Mumuni is NOT monitored from this host (captain ruling 2026-09-10).** She
> moved off this host onto her own container — kagentz CT 105 on minipve
> (192.168.68.14), running a dedicated `hermes` user — and is monitored on her
> side. No step in this contract, and no leg of `scripts/zulip-monitor.sh`, may
> ssh to her old deployment, read her `~/.hermes/gateway_state.json`, or alert on
> her state. The former Platform-B-for-Mumuni steps (gateway process, heartbeat,
> response delivery) are retired: they always read "unknown" against the
> decommissioned deployment and produced a false 🔴 alert on every run.
## Requires ## Requires
- **Zulip API key** for `abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net` in `$ZULIP_API_KEY` - **Zulip API key** for `abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net` in `$ZULIP_API_KEY`
- **SSH access** to amdpve (192.168.68.15) for Tanko — CT 112 reached via `pct exec` (direct SSH to .122 is not a dependency of this contract: per-worker key availability varies); and the Agent Zero Docker host (192.168.68.14) - **SSH access** to Tanko (192.168.68.122), Mumuni (192.168.68.123), and Agent Zero Docker host (192.168.68.14)
- **PM2** on localhost for pi process management - **PM2** on localhost for pi process management
- **Network access** to `chat.sysloggh.net`, `localhost:9200` - **Network access** to `chat.sysloggh.net`, `localhost:9200`
- **Write access** to `/root/zulip-health-monitor.log` and `/tmp/zulip-monitor-debounce` - **Write access** to `/root/zulip-health-monitor.log` and `/tmp/zulip-monitor-debounce`
@@ -57,9 +45,11 @@ session start.
"severity": "healthy" "severity": "healthy"
}, },
"tanko": { "tanko": {
"platform": "dsh", "platform": "hermes",
"service_state": "active", "zulip_state": "connected",
"http_status": 200, "heartbeat_age_seconds": 45,
"gateway_pid": 1234,
"edit_fail_rate_pct": 0,
"severity": "healthy" "severity": "healthy"
} }
} }
@@ -91,13 +81,13 @@ Log as "unreachable" — don't treat as critical unless it persists for 3+ conse
## Streaming Support (2026-07-05) ## Streaming Support (2026-07-05)
Zulip agents now support progressive message editing during agent generation. Zulip agents now support progressive message editing during agent generation.
When a Zulip agent under this monitor's scope (Tanko on DSH) processes a message, the response is When a Hermes agent (Tanko, Mumuni) processes a message, the response is
streamed in real-time via Zulip's `PATCH /api/v1/messages/{id}` API: streamed in real-time via Zulip's `PATCH /api/v1/messages/{id}` API:
- Adapter implements `edit_message()` using `_api_patch()` helper - Adapter implements `edit_message()` using `_api_patch()` helper
- Gateway stream consumer progressively edits the Zulip message - Gateway stream consumer progressively edits the Zulip message
- User sees real-time agent thinking instead of waiting for full response - User sees real-time agent thinking instead of waiting for full response
- Verified: Tanko (CT 112) has streaming active; Mumuni's (kagentz CT 105) is verified on her own host, not from here - Verified: Tanko (CT 112) and Mumuni (CT 114) both have streaming active
### Verification ### Verification
```bash ```bash
@@ -127,48 +117,20 @@ grep -c "async def edit_message" ~/.hermes/plugins/*/zulip*/adapter.py
## Execution ## Execution
### Liveness rule (scoped)
Any HTTP response proves the service is ALIVE. For auth-gated endpoints (Zulip API, Tanko gateway), a 401/403 redirect or status means the service answered — report the code, never "down". Only a failed CONNECTION (curl status 000, timeout, refused) is a failed probe.
**STANDING PROBE RULES (2026-09-14, from defect report 1150.msg):**
1. **Any HTTP status means ALIVE.** 200, 301, 302, 401, 403, 404 all prove the service answered — report the code, never "down". A redirect is not a failure. Only a failed CONNECTION (curl status 000, timeout, refused) is a failed probe.
2. **A failed probe is never a service verdict.** Print `probe-failed: <target> <kind>` naming the exact URL/host/port and the failure kind (timeout, refused, no-route, dns), retry once at a longer timeout, and only then report.
3. **Say which probe produced each number.** "API: 000" is unusable; "API https://chat.sysloggh.net/api/v1/server_settings -> connection timeout after 10s (retried at 25s: also timeout)" is actionable.
### Step 1: Zulip Server Liveness ### Step 1: Zulip Server Liveness
```bash ```bash
# Probe the Zulip API (authenticated, any HTTP status = ALIVE) curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" https://chat.sysloggh.net/api/v1/server_settings \
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 10 https://chat.sysloggh.net/api/v1/server_settings -u 'abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net:$ZULIP_API_KEY') -u 'abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net:$ZULIP_API_KEY'
if [ "$code" == "000" ]; then
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 25 https://chat.sysloggh.net/api/v1/server_settings -u 'abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net:$ZULIP_API_KEY')
echo "Zulip API https://chat.sysloggh.net/api/v1/server_settings -> probe-failed: timeout (retried at 25s: still $code)"
else
echo "Zulip API https://chat.sysloggh.net/api/v1/server_settings -> $code"
fi
``` ```
Expected: `200` (authenticated). Any HTTP status = ALIVE; only 000/timeout = probe-failed. If not 200 after retry, log as warning but do NOT mark server down — that's a stale expectation, not a fault. Expected: `200`. If not → mark `zulip_server_status: "down"`, skip per-platform checks, alert.
### Step 2: Platform A — pi (Abiba, localhost) ### Step 2: Platform A — pi (Abiba, localhost)
**A1: Health Endpoint** **A1: Health Endpoint**
```bash Fetch `http://localhost:9200/health` as JSON. Check:
# Probe the Abiba extension health endpoint (loopback, any HTTP status = ALIVE)
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 10 http://127.0.0.1:9200/health)
if [ "$code" == "000" ]; then
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 25 http://127.0.0.1:9200/health)
echo "Abiba extension http://127.0.0.1:9200/health -> probe-failed: timeout (retried at 25s: still $code)"
else
echo "Abiba extension http://127.0.0.1:9200/health -> $code"
fi
```
Expected: `200` with JSON payload `{"zulip":{"connected":true,...}}`. Any HTTP status = ALIVE; only 000/timeout = probe-failed. **NOTE: This probe MUST run on the Abiba host (CT 100) where 127.0.0.1:9200 is the extension. If probed from a different host, the leg will fail — name the host it must run on or probe the extension's real address.**
Check the JSON payload:
| Field | Healthy | Critical | | Field | Healthy | Critical |
|-------|---------|----------| |-------|---------|----------|
@@ -220,285 +182,94 @@ grep -a "Finalized\|Failed to finalize" /root/.pm2/logs/abiba-zulip-out.log | ta
| `last_error` set | Log and monitor | | `last_error` set | Log and monitor |
| Crash loop >10/h | Alert user | | Crash loop >10/h | Alert user |
### Step 3: Platform B — Hermes (Tanko .122, Mumuni .123)
### Step 3: Platform B — Tanko (DSH on amdpve CT 112) **B1: Gateway State**
Mumuni is out of scope for this host (see the note above): she runs on her own
container and is monitored on her side.
Tanko runs on DSH (DeepSeek Harness) — it no longer runs a Hermes gateway, so
there is no `~/.hermes/gateway_state.json` on CT 112. Tanko's Zulip gateway runs
as the `dsh-web` systemd unit inside **CT 112**, which resides on the **amdpve**
PVE host (**192.168.68.15**). Direct SSH to 192.168.68.122 is not a dependency
of this contract — per-worker key availability varies — so CT 112 probes run
from the amdpve vantage via `pct exec`:
```bash ```bash
ssh root@192.168.68.15 "pct exec 112 -- <command>" ssh root@192.168.68.122 "cat ~/.hermes/gateway_state.json"
ssh root@192.168.68.123 "cat ~/.hermes/gateway_state.json"
``` ```
> **By design (verified 2026-09-08):** the `dsh-web` gateway binds Check `platforms.zulip.state`: `connected` ✅ | `disconnected` ❌ | `error` ❌ | missing → not installed.
> `127.0.0.1:3080` **loopback-only**. A remote probe against
> `192.168.68.122:3080` gets connection-refused — that is EXPECTED, NOT a fault,
> and must never be raised as Tanko down. Only loopback probes from inside
> CT 112 (or the public-URL fallback below) are valid health signals.
**B1: Gateway Service State (Tanko)** **B2: Agent Process**
```bash ```bash
ssh root@192.168.68.15 "pct exec 112 -- systemctl is-active dsh-web" ssh root@<CT> "ps aux | grep 'gateway run' | grep -v grep"
``` ```
Expected: `active`. Anything else → gateway service down → apply the Tanko heal Gateway PID should exist with uptime > 60s.
(restart via DSH service, Platform B Actions table below).
**B2: Gateway HTTP Liveness (Tanko — loopback-only :3080)** **B3: Heartbeat Verification**
```bash ```bash
ssh root@192.168.68.15 "pct exec 112 -- curl -s --connect-timeout 5 --max-time 10 -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://127.0.0.1:3080/" ssh root@<CT> "grep Heartbeat ~/.hermes/logs/agent.log | tail -3"
``` ```
Alive = **ANY** HTTP status response from the endpoint — the expected set is Expected: recent heartbeat (within 5 min), `polls=N` incrementing.
`200`/`301`/`302`/`307`/`308`/`401`/`403` (the gateway UI is token-gated and Silence > 300s → warning. Silence > 600s → critical.
legitimately answers with redirects/auth-challenges, so never require a bare
`200`), and any other status, including `404`/`5xx`, also counts alive: a
process answering `503` is running and self-heal must NOT restart-loop it.
Down = connection refused (`000`) or timeout only. Statuses outside the
expected set are logged/reported as a warning — reported, never healed on.
**B3: Public-URL Fallback Probe (Tanko — for nodes without pct/ssh access to amdpve)** **B4: Response Delivery**
```bash ```bash
curl -s --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 15 -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' https://tankodhs.sysloggh.net/ ssh root@<CT> "grep -E 'Finalized|Failed to finalize|Replied to' ~/.hermes/logs/agent.log | tail -10"
``` ```
Fallback only — used when the monitoring node has no pct/SSH path to amdpve. > 50% fail rate → critical.
Alive = **ANY** HTTP status response from the endpoint — healthy signals are
`302` (authentik proxy-auth redirect) and `401` (auth-gated), and any other
status, including `404`/`5xx`, also counts alive: the endpoint is up and
answering and must NOT be restart-looped. Down = connection refused (`000`) or
timeout only. Never expect a bare `200` — the public URL terminates in the
token-gated authentik chain. Statuses outside the healthy set are
logged/reported as a warning — reported, never healed on.
**Platform B Actions** **Platform B Actions**
| Condition | Action | | Condition | Action |
|-----------|--------| |-----------|--------|
| `dsh-web` service not `active` | Restart Tanko via DSH service | | `zulip.state != "connected"` | `ssh root@<CT> "pkill -f 'gateway run'; sleep 2; hermes gateway restart"` |
| HTTP `:3080` connection refused/timeout (`000`) | Same as above | | No heartbeat in 10min | Same as above |
| HTTP status outside the expected set | Log/report as a warning — reported, never healed on | | `Failed to finalize` > 50% | Check PATCH API, Zulip server |
| Response empty/short | Check A2A endpoint / LiteLLM model |
**B4: dsh-web Authentication (Tanko — restart-persistent login)**
The dsh-web UI is token-gated. On every start the process prints a random
launch token to the journal:
```
dsh web: http://127.0.0.1:3080/?token=<TOKEN>
```
The token only bootstraps an authority-bound, HMAC-signed browser cookie with a
30-day lifetime. The signing secret is durable in
`/root/.dsh/.credentials.yaml` (key `client-connection/browser-session`), so a
cookie minted once keeps working across `dsh-web` restarts; the launch token
itself rotates on every restart.
**Login endpoint (public, Authentik-gated):**
`https://tankodhs.sysloggh.net/dsh-web-login`
It lives inside the Authentik-gated `:80` server block
(`/etc/nginx/sites-available/dsh`, symlinked from
`/etc/nginx/sites-enabled/dsh`) as `location = /dsh-web-login`, guarded by
`auth_request /outpost.goauthentik.io/auth/nginx`. It proxies to dsh-web with
`Host: tankodhs.sysloggh.net`, so the minted cookie is bound to the public
authority — never to `127.0.0.1:3080`. The token-dependent line is isolated in
the generated include `/etc/dsh-web/nginx-login.conf`:
```
proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:3080/?token=<TOKEN>;
```
**Token refresh (non-disruptive):**
`/opt/deepseek-harness/capture-dsh-token.sh` (source:
`scripts/capture-dsh-token.sh`) reads candidate launch tokens from the journal
**scoped to the service's current systemd invocation**
(`systemctl show -p InvocationID` + `_SYSTEMD_INVOCATION_ID=`), re-sampling the
invocation on every pass so a restart that lands during the wait switches to the
new invocation; a restarted process's stale token is never considered while its
new startup banner is still pending and there is no whole-journal or
cross-invocation fallback. Each candidate
is then functionally verified against dsh-web with `Host: tankodhs.sysloggh.net`,
using the first the running process accepts with `303`. It waits up to 120s for
a restarted process to accept a token and re-probes every current-invocation
candidate on each pass, so a token that briefly returns `000` while the service
is still starting is not disqualified. If none is accepted it leaves the include
untouched and exits so the timer retries (exiting non-zero when a pending reload
is still outstanding). It writes
`/etc/dsh-web/launch-token` and regenerates `/etc/dsh-web/nginx-login.conf`,
reloading nginx only when the on-disk include differs from the generated one or
the applied-state stamp does not match the token (`nginx -t` guards the reload,
and the stamp is written only after a successful `nginx -s reload`, so a failed
or interrupted reload is retried on the next run). Any failed reload records a
pending-reload marker under `/etc/dsh-web/`; the next run attempts the reload
before the token wait, independent of token state, and clears the marker only
once the reload succeeds, so a disabled legacy `:8081` file can never leave the
running nginx unreloaded. The generated include is recreated before any
`nginx -t` if it is missing, so a failed run cannot wedge recovery.
Runs are serialized with `flock` on `/run/capture-dsh-token.lock`. It **never
stops or starts `dsh-web`**.
It is triggered by the `dsh-web.service` drop-in
`/etc/systemd/system/dsh-web.service.d/20-token-refresh.conf`
(`ExecStartPost=/bin/systemctl --no-block start dsh-web-token.service`) and by
`dsh-web-token.timer` every 2 minutes for reconciliation.
<details><summary>Installed systemd wiring (CT 112)</summary>
```ini
# /etc/systemd/system/dsh-web-token.service
[Unit]
Description=Refresh the dsh-web launch token for the nginx login endpoint
After=dsh-web.service
[Service]
Type=oneshot
TimeoutStartSec=180
ExecStart=/opt/deepseek-harness/capture-dsh-token.sh
# /etc/systemd/system/dsh-web-token.timer
[Unit]
Description=Periodically refresh the dsh-web login token
[Timer]
OnBootSec=90s
OnUnitActiveSec=120s
AccuracySec=10s
Persistent=true
[Install]
WantedBy=timers.target
# /etc/systemd/system/dsh-web.service.d/20-token-refresh.conf
[Service]
ExecStartPost=/bin/systemctl --no-block start dsh-web-token.service
```
</details>
> **Do NOT reintroduce the `:8081` endpoint.** It listened on `0.0.0.0:8081`
> with no `auth_request` and was a full Authentik bypass for anyone on the LAN.
> The script now removes `/etc/nginx/sites-enabled/dsh.token` automatically if
> it ever reappears.
**Authentication flow:**
1. `GET https://tankodhs.sysloggh.net/dsh-web-login`
2. Unauthenticated → Authentik sign-in; once authenticated the request reaches
dsh-web with `Host: tankodhs.sysloggh.net`.
3. dsh-web accepts the launch token on `GET /`, writes the
`dsh-auth-<authority-hash>` cookie (30 days, `HttpOnly`, `SameSite=Strict`)
and returns `303` to `/`.
4. Every later request through `/` presents that cookie; the token is not needed
again until the cookie expires or a new browser is used.
**Verification** (amdpve vantage):
```bash
# 1. Login endpoint is Authentik-gated: unauthenticated -> 302 (not 200/303).
ssh root@192.168.68.15 "pct exec 112 -- curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' \
-H 'Host: tankodhs.sysloggh.net' http://127.0.0.1/dsh-web-login"
# Expected: 302
# 2. Legacy :8081 endpoint is gone (connection refused -> 000).
ssh root@192.168.68.15 "pct exec 112 -- curl -s --max-time 3 -o /dev/null \
-w '%{http_code}\n' http://192.168.68.122:8081/"
# Expected: 000
# 3. Backend cookie mint + reuse (exactly what /dsh-web-login proxies to).
TOKEN=$(ssh root@192.168.68.15 "pct exec 112 -- cat /etc/dsh-web/launch-token")
ssh root@192.168.68.15 "pct exec 112 -- curl -s -c /tmp/dsh.jar -o /dev/null \
-H 'Host: tankodhs.sysloggh.net' 'http://127.0.0.1:3080/?token=$TOKEN'"
ssh root@192.168.68.15 "pct exec 112 -- curl -s -b /tmp/dsh.jar -o /dev/null \
-w '%{http_code}\n' -H 'Host: tankodhs.sysloggh.net' http://127.0.0.1:3080/"
# Expected: 200 — the minted dsh-auth-... cookie (authority
# tankodhs.sysloggh.net) is replayed on the next request and accepted.
# 4. Token refresh is non-disruptive and idempotent.
ssh root@192.168.68.15 "pct exec 112 -- /opt/deepseek-harness/capture-dsh-token.sh"
# Expected: "token unchanged; nginx not reloaded" when nothing changed
```
**Restart durability (acceptance):** after `systemctl restart dsh-web`, (a) the
cookie minted before the restart still returns `200` on `/`, and (b) the
refreshed `/etc/dsh-web/nginx-login.conf` carries the new token and mints a
fresh cookie. Both verified live 2026-09-11.
```bash
# 5. Cookie survives a dsh-web restart, and the new token mints a new cookie.
ssh root@192.168.68.15 "pct exec 112 -- systemctl restart dsh-web"
# dsh-web is Type=simple: restart returns before :3080 is listening. Bounded-poll
# until the socket answers (any status but 000) before asserting the cookie.
for i in $(seq 1 60); do
UP=$(ssh root@192.168.68.15 "pct exec 112 -- curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' \
-H 'Host: tankodhs.sysloggh.net' http://127.0.0.1:3080/")
[ "$UP" != "000" ] && break
sleep 2
done
ssh root@192.168.68.15 "pct exec 112 -- curl -s -b /tmp/dsh.jar -o /dev/null \
-w '%{http_code}\n' -H 'Host: tankodhs.sysloggh.net' http://127.0.0.1:3080/"
# Expected: 200 — the pre-restart cookie is still accepted.
# The restart's ExecStartPost (or the 2-minute timer) refreshes the include. A
# manual run may no-op on the flock, so poll until the include carries a token
# the running process accepts (bounded wait) before the mint+reuse check.
for i in $(seq 1 60); do
TOKEN=$(ssh root@192.168.68.15 "pct exec 112 -- sed -n 's/.*token=//p' /etc/dsh-web/nginx-login.conf | tr -d ';\n'")
CODE=$(ssh root@192.168.68.15 "pct exec 112 -- curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' \
-H 'Host: tankodhs.sysloggh.net' 'http://127.0.0.1:3080/?token=$TOKEN'")
[ "$CODE" = "303" ] && break
sleep 2
done
# Expected: 303 — the include now holds the token the running process accepts.
ssh root@192.168.68.15 "pct exec 112 -- curl -s -c /tmp/dsh-new.jar -o /dev/null \
-H 'Host: tankodhs.sysloggh.net' 'http://127.0.0.1:3080/?token=$TOKEN'"
ssh root@192.168.68.15 "pct exec 112 -- curl -s -b /tmp/dsh-new.jar -o /dev/null \
-w '%{http_code}\n' -H 'Host: tankodhs.sysloggh.net' http://127.0.0.1:3080/"
# Expected: 200 — the refreshed token minted a fresh cookie.
```
### Step 4: Platform C — Agent Zero (kagentz, CT 105 via Docker host .14) ### Step 4: Platform C — Agent Zero (kagentz, CT 105 via Docker host .14)
> **The kagentz Zulip adapter leg is retired (2026-09-12).** Its code
> (`/a0/usr/kagentz-zulip/`) no longer exists in the agent-zero container, so
> the former adapter-process and heartbeat/queue checks always failed and the
> monitor issued a restart for something that could not start, posting a false
> kagentz-adapter-down alert on every run. Do NOT re-add an adapter-process,
> heartbeat/queue, or adapter-restart step. Agent Zero is probed for A2A
> liveness only, and a probe must never restart a platform.
**C1: A2A Server Health** **C1: A2A Server Health**
```bash ```bash
# A2A listens on :80 inside the agent-zero container (host-mapped to :50080) and ssh root@192.168.68.14 "docker exec agent-zero curl -s --connect-timeout 5 http://127.0.0.1:8001/.well-known/agent.json"
# is auth-gated: an unauthenticated probe gets 401, which means the server is up.
ssh root@192.168.68.14 "docker exec agent-zero curl -s --connect-timeout 5 -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://127.0.0.1:80/a2a/"
``` ```
Expected: `401` (auth-gated, A2A server is up and responding) or `200` (if no auth required). Connection refused (`000`) → A2A server down. Any other status → running but unexpected: log/report it, never restart. Expected: `{"name":"kagentz",...}`. Connection refused → A2A server down.
**C2: A2A Response Verification** **C2: Adapter Process**
```bash ```bash
# A2A listens on :80 inside the container and is auth-gated (401 expected unauthenticated). ssh root@192.168.68.14 "docker exec agent-zero ps aux | grep adapter | grep -v grep"
ssh root@192.168.68.14 "docker exec agent-zero curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:80/a2a \ ```
Adapter should be running. Missing → restart inside container.
**C3: Heartbeat & Queue**
```bash
ssh root@192.168.68.14 "docker exec agent-zero grep Heartbeat /tmp/zulip-adapter.log | tail -3"
```
Check: `processed=N` incrementing, `silence < 600s`, `reconnects` ≈ 0.
**C4: A2A Response Verification**
```bash
ssh root@192.168.68.14 "docker exec agent-zero curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8001/a2a \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer $LITELLM_KEY' \
-d '{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"method\":\"tasks/send\",\"params\":{\"message\":{\"role\":\"user\",\"parts\":[{\"text\":\"ping\"}]}},\"id\":1}'" -d '{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"method\":\"tasks/send\",\"params\":{\"message\":{\"role\":\"user\",\"parts\":[{\"text\":\"ping\"}]}},\"id\":1}'"
``` ```
Expected: task ID with "working" status. Poll for completion with `tasks/get`. If 401, check LITELLM_KEY is set. Expected: task ID with "working" status. Poll for completion with `tasks/get`.
**Platform C Actions** **Platform C Actions**
| Condition | Action | | Condition | Action |
|-----------|--------| |-----------|--------|
| A2A returns `000` (connection refused/timeout) | Alert only — never restart the platform; investigate the agent-zero container | | A2A `.well-known/agent.json` fails | `docker exec agent-zero bash -c "pkill -9 -f a2a_agent; cd /a0 && /opt/venv-a0/bin/python3 -u /a0/usr/a2a_agent.py > /tmp/a2a.log 2>&1 &"` |
| A2A returns a status other than `200`/`401` | Log/report as a warning — reported, never healed on | | Adapter process missing | Restart adapter inside container with env vars |
| Silence > 600s | Restart adapter (auto-reconnect handles BAD_EVENT_QUEUE_ID) |
| LiteLLM 401 | Check API key in a2a_agent.py `LITELLM_KEY` | | LiteLLM 401 | Check API key in a2a_agent.py `LITELLM_KEY` |
### Step 5: Global Checks ### Step 5: Global Checks
@@ -507,7 +278,8 @@ Expected: task ID with "working" status. Poll for completion with `tasks/get`. I
Check each agent's log for excessive bot-to-bot chatter: Check each agent's log for excessive bot-to-bot chatter:
- Abiba: `Skipped.*bot msgs` count - Abiba: `Skipped.*bot msgs` count
- Tanko: Repeated DM exchanges between bots - Tanko/Mumuni: Repeated DM exchanges between bots
- kagentz: Adapter log for bot DMs being processed
If any bot processes >50 bot-originated messages in 15min → warning. If any bot processes >50 bot-originated messages in 15min → warning.
+2 -3
View File
@@ -10,9 +10,8 @@ description: >
> **⚠️ RETIRED** — The pi Zulip extension (`~/.pi/agent/extensions/zulip/`) and > **⚠️ RETIRED** — The pi Zulip extension (`~/.pi/agent/extensions/zulip/`) and
> PM2 process (`abiba-zulip`) have been decommissioned. All mention/reliability > PM2 process (`abiba-zulip`) have been decommissioned. All mention/reliability
> monitoring now happens through Telegram. Mumuni (Hermes) and Tanko (DSH) > monitoring now happens through Telegram. Hermes agents (Tanko, Mumuni) and
> continue to use Zulip; Agent Zero's Zulip adapter is retired — see > Agent Zero (kagentz) continue to use Zulip.
> `zulip-health.prose.md` for current Platform C (Agent Zero) state.
## Maintains ## Maintains
-476
View File
@@ -1,476 +0,0 @@
---
kind: responsibility
name: zulip-resilience-v3
description: >
Rewrite the pi Zulip gateway with production-grade resilience patterns drawn from
Zulip's own event system docs (queue lifecycle, heartbeat monitoring, BAD_EVENT_QUEUE_ID
handling, idle_queue_timeout) and battle-tested Node.js resilience patterns
(circuit breaker, exponential backoff with jitter, bulkhead isolation, supervisor watchdog).
replaces: zulip-self-heal (retired)
agent: abiba
triggers:
- "/zulip self-heal v3"
- "zulip stopped responding"
- "PM2 abiba-zulip crashed"
---
# Zulip Gateway v3 — Production Resilience
## Architecture Overview
The current v2 gateway (`/root/.pi/agent/extensions/zulip/index.js`) has three structural
weaknesses that cause repeated deaths:
1. **No crash recovery** — uncaught errors kill the Node process, PM2 exhausts max_restarts
2. **No circuit breaker** — 502/fetch-failed errors escalate to process death with no fallback
3. **No queue lifecycle management** — doesn't use Zulip's documented heartbeat protocol or
idle_queue_timeout, so BAD_EVENT_QUEUE_ID errors cascade into crashes
The v3 rewrite addresses all three, following patterns from:
- [Zulip Events System docs](https://zulip.readthedocs.io/en/11.6/subsystems/events-system.html) —
queue registration, heartbeat, BAD_EVENT_QUEUE_ID recovery, call_on_each_event loop
- [Zulip API: Get Events](https://zulip.com/api/get-events) — long-poll timeout, dont_block, event ack
- [Circuit Breaker & Retry Patterns in Node.js 2026](https://1xapi.com/blog/resilient-api-circuit-breaker-bulkhead-retry-nodejs-2026) —
Opossum-based circuit breaker with fallback, retry with jitter, bulkhead isolation
---
## Maintains
- `zulip-gateway`: { status: "healthy" | "degraded" | "down" }
- `circuit-breaker`: { state: "CLOSED" | "OPEN" | "HALF_OPEN", failures, successes }
- `queue-lifecycle`: { queue_id, last_event_id, idle_timeout, heartbeat_age }
- `workers`: { count, busy, idle, stuck }
- `supervisor`: { pid, last_check, health_failures }
---
## Detection Rules
### Rule 1: Queue Expired (BAD_EVENT_QUEUE_ID)
- **Detect**: Events API returns error with BAD_EVENT_QUEUE_ID in body
- **Fix**: Call `POST /register` to create new queue, update queue_id and last_event_id
- **Debounce**: If 3 re-registrations fail within 60s, escalate (server may be down)
- **Ref**: Zulip docs: "Your software will need to handle that error condition by re-initializing itself"
### Rule 2: Network Degradation (502/ECONNREFUSED/fetch failed)
- **Detect**: Events API returns 502 or network error
- **Circuit breaker**: Track failure rate over 10s rolling window
- CLOSED → OPEN: 50% failure rate with ≥5 requests
- OPEN → HALF_OPEN: After 30s reset timeout
- HALF_OPEN → CLOSED: Probe succeeds
- HALF_OPEN → OPEN: Probe fails
- **While OPEN**: Log errors, skip events, notify user via DM: "⚠️ Zulip connection degraded — will retry in 30s"
### Rule 3: Long-Poll Timeout (natural)
- **Detect**: Events API response takes > `event_queue_longpoll_timeout_seconds`
- **Not an error**: Server sends heartbeat events when no real events. Simply re-poll.
### Rule 4: Worker Busy Timeout (>5 min)
- **Detect**: Worker `busySince` exceeds 5 minutes
- **Fix**: SIGKILL worker, send error DM, clean up pending replies
### Rule 5: Process Crash (uncaught)
- **Detect**: `uncaughtException` / `unhandledRejection` fires
- **Fix**: Log → clear poll timer → attempt reconnect with backoff → if reconnect fails 3x, exit(1) and let PM2 restart
### Rule 6: Supervisor Detects Router Stall
- **Detect**: External supervisor (`zulip-watchdog`) polls `/health` every 30s. If 3 consecutive failures:
- **Fix**: `pm2 restart abiba-zulip` gracefully (SIGTERM, drain workers, restart)
---
## Implementation Plan
### Phase 1: Rewrite Router Core (circuit-breaker + queue lifecycle)
Replace the poll loop in index.js with a resilience-first event loop:
```js
// Queue lifecycle (Zulip docs pattern)
async function createOrRefreshQueue() {
// POST /register with event_types=["message"]
// Store: queueId, lastEventId, eventQueueLongpollTimeoutSeconds
// NEW: pass idle_queue_timeout parameter (Zulip 12.0+)
}
// Circuit breaker (Opossum pattern, implemented inline to avoid dependency)
class ZulipCircuitBreaker {
constructor({ failureThreshold=0.5, resetTimeout=30000, volumeThreshold=5, windowMs=10000 }) {
this.state = "CLOSED"; // CLOSED | OPEN | HALF_OPEN
this.failures = 0;
this.successes = 0;
this.totalRequests = 0;
this.lastFailureTime = null;
this.openedAt = null;
this.failureThreshold = failureThreshold;
this.resetTimeout = resetTimeout;
this.volumeThreshold = volumeThreshold;
this.windowMs = windowMs;
}
async fire(fn) {
if (this.state === "OPEN") {
if (Date.now() - this.openedAt > this.resetTimeout) {
this.state = "HALF_OPEN";
} else {
throw new CircuitOpenError("Circuit is OPEN");
}
}
try {
const result = await fn();
this.onSuccess();
return result;
} catch (err) {
this.onFailure();
throw err;
}
}
onSuccess() {
this.successes++;
this.totalRequests++;
if (this.state === "HALF_OPEN") {
this.state = "CLOSED";
this.failures = 0;
}
// Reset counters periodically
if (this.totalRequests > this.volumeThreshold * 2) {
this.failures = Math.floor(this.failures / 2);
this.successes = Math.floor(this.successes / 2);
this.totalRequests = Math.floor(this.totalRequests / 2);
}
}
onFailure() {
this.failures++;
this.totalRequests++;
this.lastFailureTime = Date.now();
if (this.totalRequests >= this.volumeThreshold &&
this.failures / this.totalRequests >= this.failureThreshold) {
if (this.state !== "OPEN") {
this.state = "OPEN";
this.openedAt = Date.now();
console.error(`[zulip-ext] CIRCUIT BREAKER OPEN — ${this.failures}/${this.totalRequests} failures`);
}
}
}
}
// Retry with exponential backoff + jitter (from resilience patterns)
async function withRetry(fn, { maxAttempts=3, baseDelay=200, maxDelay=10000, shouldRetry=()=>true }={}) {
let lastError;
for (let attempt = 1; attempt <= maxAttempts; attempt++) {
try {
return await fn();
} catch (err) {
lastError = err;
if (attempt === maxAttempts || !shouldRetry(err)) throw err;
const delay = Math.min(baseDelay * Math.pow(2, attempt - 1), maxDelay);
const jitter = delay * (0.5 + Math.random() * 0.5); // 50-100% of delay
console.warn(`[zulip-ext] Retry ${attempt}/${maxAttempts} after ${Math.round(jitter)}ms: ${err.message.slice(0,80)}`);
await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, jitter));
}
}
throw lastError;
}
// Resilience-first event loop (Zulip call_on_each_event pattern)
async function resilientPollLoop() {
while (connected) {
try {
const events = await circuitBreaker.fire(() =>
withRetry(() => zulipQueue.poll(), {
maxAttempts: 2,
baseDelay: 1000,
shouldRetry: (err) => {
const msg = err.message || "";
return msg.includes("fetch failed") || msg.includes("ECONN") || msg.includes("network");
}
})
);
lastError = null;
retryCount = 0;
for (const ev of events) {
await processEvent(ev);
}
heartbeat();
} catch (err) {
const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
if (msg.includes("BAD_EVENT_QUEUE_ID") || msg.includes("deregistered")) {
// Queue expired — re-register (Zulip docs pattern)
console.log(`[zulip-ext] Queue expired, re-registering… (${msg.slice(0,80)})`);
try {
zulipQueue = await createZulipQueue();
console.log(`[zulip-ext] Re-registered, new queue=${zulipQueue.queueId}`);
} catch (reRegErr) {
console.error(`[zulip-ext] Re-registration failed: ${reRegErr.message}`);
connected = false;
retryCount++;
const backoff = Math.min(5000 * Math.pow(2, retryCount), 300000);
console.log(`[zulip-ext] Full reconnect in ${Math.round(backoff/1000)}s`);
await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, backoff));
await startPolling();
return;
}
} else if (err.name === "CircuitOpenError") {
// Circuit is open — skip this cycle, wait for HALF_OPEN
lastError = "circuit_open";
await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, POLL_INTERVAL_MS));
} else {
lastError = msg;
retryCount++;
const backoff = Math.min(POLL_INTERVAL_MS * Math.pow(1.5, Math.min(retryCount, 8)), 60000);
console.error(`[zulip-ext] Poll error (retry ${retryCount}, backoff ${backoff}ms): ${msg}`);
await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, backoff));
}
}
}
}
```
### Phase 2: PM2 Hardening
Create `/root/.pm2/ecosystem.config.cjs`:
```js
module.exports = {
apps: [
{
name: "abiba-zulip",
script: "/bin/pi",
args: "--mode rpc --session-id zulip-service",
env: {
ZULIP_ROLE: "router",
ZULIP_SITE: "https://chat.sysloggh.net",
ZULIP_EMAIL: "abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net",
ZULIP_API_KEY: process.env.ZULIP_API_KEY,
AGENT_NAME: "abiba",
AGENT_OWNER_EMAIL: "jerome@sysloggh.com",
},
max_restarts: 100, // Up from default 10 — crash loops won't exhaust
min_uptime: "10s", // Must survive 10s to count as "alive"
max_memory_restart: "500M", // OOM protection
restart_delay: 5000, // 5s between restarts
kill_timeout: 15000, // 15s SIGTERM grace before SIGKILL
listen_timeout: 30000, // 30s to bind health port
log_date_format: "YYYY-MM-DD HH:mm:ss Z",
error_file: "/root/.pm2/logs/abiba-zulip-error.log",
out_file: "/root/.pm2/logs/abiba-zulip-out.log",
merge_logs: true,
autorestart: true,
watch: false,
instances: 1,
exec_mode: "fork",
},
{
name: "zulip-watchdog",
script: "/root/.pi/agent/extensions/zulip/watchdog.js",
max_restarts: 10,
min_uptime: "3s",
restart_delay: 3000,
autorestart: true,
},
],
};
```
### Phase 3: Supervisor Watchdog
Create `/root/.pi/agent/extensions/zulip/watchdog.js`:
```js
// External supervisor — monitors router health and restarts if stalled.
// This is the pattern Hermes uses: an external process that can recover
// the gateway even if the gateway process itself is hung (not just crashed).
const HEALTH_URL = "http://127.0.0.1:9200/health";
const CHECK_INTERVAL_MS = 30_000;
const MAX_FAILURES = 3;
let failures = 0;
async function check() {
try {
const res = await fetch(HEALTH_URL, { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(5000) });
if (res.ok) {
const data = await res.json();
if (data.status === "ok" && data.zulip?.connected) {
if (failures > 0) {
console.log(`[watchdog] Router recovered after ${failures} failures`);
}
failures = 0;
return;
}
}
failures++;
console.warn(`[watchdog] Health check ${failures}/${MAX_FAILURES}: status not ok`);
} catch (err) {
failures++;
console.warn(`[watchdog] Health check ${failures}/${MAX_FAILURES}: ${err.message}`);
}
if (failures >= MAX_FAILURES) {
console.error(`[watchdog] ${MAX_FAILURES} consecutive failures — restarting abiba-zulip`);
const { execSync } = require("child_process");
try {
execSync("pm2 restart abiba-zulip", { timeout: 30000 });
console.log("[watchdog] Restart command sent");
} catch (e) {
console.error(`[watchdog] Restart failed: ${e.message}`);
}
failures = 0;
// Wait for restart to complete before checking again
await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 15000));
}
}
console.log("[watchdog] Zulip gateway supervisor started");
setInterval(check, CHECK_INTERVAL_MS);
check(); // Immediate first check
```
### Phase 4: Health Endpoint Enhancement
Add circuit breaker stats to the existing health endpoint:
```js
// In /health response, add:
"circuit_breaker": {
"state": circuitBreaker.state,
"failures": circuitBreaker.failures,
"successes": circuitBreaker.successes,
"total_requests": circuitBreaker.totalRequests,
"failure_rate": circuitBreaker.totalRequests > 0
? (circuitBreaker.failures / circuitBreaker.totalRequests).toFixed(2)
: "0.00"
}
```
---
## Test Plan
### Test 1: Queue Re-registration
1. Manually delete the Zulip event queue via API
2. Next poll should detect BAD_EVENT_QUEUE_ID
3. Router should auto re-register within 1 poll cycle
4. Verify: `/health` shows new queue_id, connected=true
### Test 2: Circuit Breaker Trip
1. Block Zulip server with iptables: `iptables -A OUTPUT -d 192.168.68.19 -j DROP`
2. Router should detect failures, trip circuit after 5 failures
3. `/health` should show circuit_breaker.state = "OPEN"
4. Remove iptables rule
5. Circuit should transition to HALF_OPEN → CLOSED within 60s
6. Verify: messages processed after recovery
### Test 3: Supervisor Recovery
1. Kill the router process: `kill -STOP $(pm2 pid abiba-zulip)` (freeze, don't kill)
2. Watchdog should detect 3 failed health checks in 90s
3. Watchdog should execute `pm2 restart abiba-zulip`
4. Verify: router back online, connected=true
### Test 4: Worker Busy Timeout
1. Send a message that triggers a long-running operation
2. If worker stays busy >5 minutes, should receive SIGKILL
3. User should receive error DM: "Response timed out"
### Test 5: End-to-End Message
1. Send DM "What time is it?" from Jerome
2. Should receive response within 30s
3. `/health` should show messages_processed incremented
---
## Rollback Plan
If v3 causes issues:
1. `pm2 delete abiba-zulip; pm2 delete zulip-watchdog`
2. Restore v2 from git: `cd /root/.pi/agent/extensions/zulip && git checkout index.js`
3. `pm2 resurrect` to reload previous process list
4. Verify: `/health` returns ok
Backup v2 before starting: `cp index.js index.js.v2-backup-$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S)`
---
## Success Metrics
| Metric | Current (v2) | Target (v3) |
|--------|-------------|-------------|
| Uptime between manual interventions | 1-3 days | 30+ days |
| Crash recovery | Manual (PM2 resurrect) | Automatic (circuit breaker + supervisor) |
| Queue expiry handling | Crash | Auto re-register |
| Busy worker deadlock | Router death | Worker SIGKILL + error DM |
| PM2 restart exhaustion | Yes (max_restarts=10) | No (max_restarts=100 + watchdog) |
---
## Incident Log — 2026-07-18 Fleet-Wide Audit
### Fleet State After Audit
| Agent | Platform | Zulip State | Issues Found | Fix Applied |
|-------|----------|-------------|--------------|-------------|
| **Abiba** | pi (CT 100) | ✅ Connected | API key missing from Infisical injection; poll timeout noise | Added .env fallback; AbortError treated as empty poll (no retry); poll timeout 65s→90s |
| **Tanko** | Hermes (CT 112) | ✅ Connected | Gateway disconnected since Jul 11; watchdog restart didn't re-establish Zulip | Full gateway restart (kill wrapper, let infisical-gateway.sh respawn) |
| **Mumuni** | Hermes (kagentz CT 105, migrated 2026-08-29) | ✅ Connected | No issues found | None needed |
### Key Fixes Applied
**1. Abiba — Credential Fallback (L4 Pattern)**
- Root cause: `zulip.api_key` in config.yaml is `""` (expected from Infisical). Infisical vault `ABIBA_ZULIP_API_KEY` wasn't being injected into the process environment.
- Fix: Added `.env` file fallback at `/root/.pi/agent/extensions/zulip/.env` with known-working key, sourced before the Infisical `exec`.
- Lesson: Per L4 from gpu-self-heal, Infisical is not always available — always keep a local `.env` fallback.
**2. Abiba — Poll Timeout Handling**
- Root cause: Zulip long-poll uses `AbortSignal.timeout(65000)`. Zulip's default `event_queue_longpoll_timeout_seconds` can exceed 65s. When the signal fires, an `AbortError` is thrown and caught by the circuit breaker as a failure.
- Fix: Caught `AbortError` inside `poll()` and return empty array (no events) instead of throwing. Extended timeout to 90s to match Zulip server default.
- Reference: [Zulip Events System — long-poll timeout](https://zulip.readthedocs.io/en/11.6/subsystems/events-system.html)
**3. Tanko — Gateway Restart**
- Root cause: Gateway process was running but Zulip platform stayed in "disconnected" state since Jul 11, 2026. The wrapper script (`infisical-gateway.sh`) restarts on crash but the gateway wasn't re-establishing Zulip on restart.
- Fix: Killed gateway PID to trigger wrapper restart. New gateway (PID 331991) established Zulip connection successfully.
### Fleet-Wide Zulip Health Metrics (as of 2026-07-18)
| Metric | Value |
|--------|-------|
| Zulip server | ✅ HTTP 200 |
| Agents connected | 3/3 (Abiba, Tanko, Mumuni) |
| Abiba circuit breaker | CLOSED (0 failures) |
| Abiba uptime | 2D (post-restart) |
| Tanko gateway uptime | Ongoing |
| Mumuni gateway uptime | Ongoing |
| Watchdog status | ✅ Online (2D uptime) |
### Hermes Agent Zulip Plugin Improvements
Based on the audit, improvements that should be ported to all Hermes Zulip adapters:
1. **Circuit breaker pattern** — Already in Abiba's pi extension. Hermes adapters should add the same CLOSED→OPEN→HALF_OPEN state machine with exponential backoff.
2. **Credential fallback** — All Hermes agents use Infisical for credentials. Add `.env` local fallback per L4 pattern for `ZULIP_API_KEY`.
3. **Queue re-registration** — Handle `BAD_EVENT_QUEUE_ID` with automatic re-registration instead of gateway restart.
4. **Supervisor watchdog** — Hermes uses PM2 which auto-restarts on crash, but has no health-check watchdog. Add lightweight external health checks.
5. **Streaming** — All agents have `streaming: true` in their zulip config. Verify `edit_message()` is implemented in each adapter.
### Abiba pi Zulip Extension v2 — Implemented Resilience Summary
| Feature | Status | Notes |
|---------|--------|-------|
| Circuit breaker | ✅ | CLOSED→OPEN→HALF_OPEN; 50% failure threshold; 30s reset timeout |
| Retry with jitter | ✅ | 2 attempts, 200ms base, 50-100% jitter |
| Queue lifecycle | ✅ | 10min idle_queue_timeout; BAD_EVENT_QUEUE_ID handling |
| Crash prevention | ✅ | uncaughtException + unhandledRejection recovery |
| Worker timeout | ✅ | 5min busy timeout → SIGKILL + error DM |
| Health endpoint | ✅ | :9200 with circuit breaker metrics |
| Echo prevention | ✅ | Dynamic bot user resolution |
| Poll timeout (AbortError) | ✅ v2.1 | Normal timeout returns [] instead of error |
| Credential fallback | ✅ v2.1 | .env file before Infisical exec |
| Provider auto-fix | ✅ | Detects reasoning_content models, switches to compatible |
+6 -5
View File
@@ -13,8 +13,7 @@ triggers:
> **⚠️ RETIRED** — This contract was embedded in the pi Zulip extension code > **⚠️ RETIRED** — This contract was embedded in the pi Zulip extension code
> (`performHealthCheck()`). That code has been removed. Zulip self-healing for > (`performHealthCheck()`). That code has been removed. Zulip self-healing for
> agents (Mumuni on Hermes, Tanko on DSH) continues through their own platform > Hermes agents (Tanko, Mumuni) continues through their own gateway monitoring.
> monitoring.
## Maintains ## Maintains
@@ -66,7 +65,8 @@ triggers:
|------|----|------|---------| |------|----|------|---------|
| Zulip server | 192.168.68.19 | root | Docker: `zulip-zulip-1` | | Zulip server | 192.168.68.19 | root | Docker: `zulip-zulip-1` |
| Abiba (pi) | localhost | root | PM2: `abiba-zulip` | | Abiba (pi) | localhost | root | PM2: `abiba-zulip` |
| Tanko | 192.168.68.122 (CT 112) | jerome | DSH (DeepSeek Harness) — restart via DSH service, not `hermes gateway restart` (no longer a Hermes agent since 2026-08-27) | | Mumuni | 192.168.68.123 | root | `hermes gateway restart` |
| Tanko | 192.168.68.122 | jerome | `PATH=$PATH:/home/jerome/.hermes/hermes-agent hermes gateway restart` |
## Debounce ## Debounce
@@ -75,8 +75,9 @@ Track via `/tmp/zulip-heal-debounce-<agent>` (unix timestamp of last restart).
## Reporting ## Reporting
This contract is RETIRED — health-check logs are NOT knowledge graph content. Every cycle produces a knowledge graph node:
No graph nodes are created. Logs go to Gitea (SyslogSolution/health-logs). - Title: `[LEARN] zulip-self-heal: <timestamp>`
- metadata: { type: "remediation", status: "fixed" | "escalated" | "healthy" }
- Issues fixed → DM: "🛠 Zulip Self-Heal: fixed <issue>" - Issues fixed → DM: "🛠 Zulip Self-Heal: fixed <issue>"
- Issues escalated → DM: "⚠️ Zulip Self-Heal: <issue> needs attention" - Issues escalated → DM: "⚠️ Zulip Self-Heal: <issue> needs attention"