2026-09-17 07:15:09 +00:00
8 changed files with 28 additions and 20 deletions
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ Added section:

 | Component | Status | Details |
 |-----------|--------|---------|
-| **OpenRouter Key** | ✅ Valid | `«vault: agents/production OPENROUTER_API_KEY» user verified |
+| **OpenRouter Key** | ✅ Valid | `«vault: agents/production OPENROUTER_API_KEY»` user verified, |
 | **Telegram Bot** | ✅ Resolved | Plugin disabled, conflicts cleared |
 | **MCP Services** | ✅ Working | No timeouts after key fix |
 | **Container** | ✅ Running | PID 3320, uptime 16+ hours |
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ auxiliary:
 fallback_providers:
  - provider: deepseek
    base_url: https://api.deepseek.com
-    api_key: «vault: external/production LITELLM_API_KEY»   # ← hardcoded OK (external) OK (external)
+    api_key: «vault: external/production LITELLM_API_KEY»   # ← hardcoded OK (external)
    api_key_env: DEEPSEEK_API_KEY      # ← also OK if set in environment (vault or /etc/environment)
 ```

@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ fallback_providers:
 # ❌ FORBIDDEN — hardcoded key (top) OR unauthenticated path (bottom)
 model:
  provider: harness
-  api_key: «vault: agents/production LITELLM_API_KEY»   # ← RULE VIOLATION: hardcoded key
+  api_key: sk-synthetic-example-12345   # ← RULE VIOLATION: hardcoded key (synthetic example)

 model:
  provider: harness
@@ -636,7 +636,7 @@ monitor, or integration breaks.
 ```bash
 # Full cluster status
 PVE="https://minipve.sysloggh.net"
-AUTH="Authorization: PVEAPIToken=monitoring@pve!mumuni=eafd56c5-93d4-4d40-a41d-e688be0987f3"
+AUTH="Authorization: PVEAPIToken=«vault: infrastructure/production PVE_API_TOKEN»"
 curl -sfk "$PVE/api2/json/cluster/resources" -H "$AUTH"

 # Docker health from Abiba
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ through its agent wrapper.
   Example:
   ```bash
   MUMUNI_LITELLM_API_KEY=«vault: agents/production LITELLM_API_KEY»
-   MUMUNI_ZULIP_API_KEY=H8dY6V7aHmWNcfgNtJaDBPZ1dGWn0Ttt
+   MUMUNI_ZULIP_API_KEY=«vault: agents/production ZULIP_API_KEY»
   ```
 6. **systemd drop-in** at `~/.config/systemd/user/hermes-gateway.service.d/50-vault-wrapper.conf`:
   ```ini
@@ -191,7 +191,21 @@ through its agent wrapper.
 ### Tanko migration (COMPLETED 2026-07-17)

 Tanko was the last agent migrated from hardcoded keys to vault wrapper.
-Previously: key hardcoded in `/home/jerome/.hermes/config.yaml` (`api_key: «vault: agents/production LITELLM_API_KEY»"$VENV/bin/python"`
+Previously: key hardcoded in `/home/jerome/.hermes/config.yaml` (`api_key: sk-CggiHWlamQy…`)
+and `zulip-env.conf` systemd drop-in. Now: user-scope systemd service with drop-in
+`50-vault-wrapper.conf`, `infisical-gateway.sh` wrapper with while-true loop, token at
+`~/.infisical-token`, `.env` fallback at `~/.hermes/.env`. Keys injected live from vault.
+
+### Koby migration lessons (2026-07-16, updated 2026-07-17)
+
+Migrated Koby from hardcoded systemd drop-in → `infisical-gateway.sh` wrapper.
+**Three mistakes made:**
+1. **Overwrote `/root/.hermes/.env`** without backing it up. The Zulip API key only existed
+   in the running process memory — the old .env was minimal (just LiteLLM key). Zulip creds were
+   inherited from the pre-migration gateway env, not stored in any file. Lost on restart.
+2. **Only injected `LITELLM_API_KEY`** in the wrapper — forgot Zulip + Telegram credentials.
+   Agents need ALL their platform env vars. Missing vars cause silent adapter failures.
+3. (2026-07-17 fix) **VENV variable in single-quoted bash -c**: `exec "$VENV/bin/python"`
   inside single quotes resolved to `exec "/bin/python"` (file not found). Hardcoded full path.

 **How Koby actually connects:**
@@ -257,13 +271,13 @@ not via the LiteLLM proxy. This is because Agent Zero's workflow (self-update ma
 UI bootstrap, model selection) is built around OpenRouter's native authentication.

 **Key Storage:**
- **Container**: `/a0/usr/.env` (line ~72: `API_KEY_OPENROUTER=«vault: agents/production OPENROUTER_API_KEY»`)
+- **Container**: `/a0/usr/.env` (line ~72: `API_KEY_OPENROUTER=«vault: agents/production OPENROUTER_API_KEY»…`)
 - **Vault**: Infisical secret `OPENROUTER_API_KEY` (project=agents, env=production)
 - **Fallback**: The container's .env is the primary source; vault sync is optional
  (unlike fleet agents which require vault injection)

 **Current Key (2026-09-01):**
- **Prefix**: `«vault: agents/production OPENROUTER_API_KEY»`
+- **Prefix**: `«vault: agents/production OPENROUTER_API_KEY»`…`
 - **User**: `user_2rt9lCqcd5d7Vk1t18DHsvWdPTT`
 - **Plan**: Paid (not free tier)
 - **Usage**: 0 (as of 2026-09-01)
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ contracts — read them there. Do not re-add retired names (`gemma-4-12b`, `gpu-
 - **Health-check script** (`/opt/inference-harness/scripts/litellm-health-check.sh` on CT 116): `gpu-fleet` check fails only on **critical** alerts (warnings are informational). Tests `strix-moe` (not `ornith-1.0-35b`).
 - **GPU monitor** (`/root/scripts/gpu-monitor-server.py` on pi .24): runs as **systemd unit `gpu-monitor.service`** (was bare `&` process). `gpu_count` includes Strix Halo (was 2, now 3). VRAM alert thresholds: warning 93%, critical 97% (raised from 90/95 — 128K context steady-state is ~70% on RTX 3090, not a fault).
 - **Agent key monitor** (`/root/scripts/agent-health-check.py` on pi .24, cron `*/10`): v4 (2026-09-10) — vault-backed agents (tanko/koby/koonimo) read their **agent-specific** `{NAME}_LITELLM_API_KEY` from Infisical vault (not the shared master key); abiba (pi agent) reads `LITELLM_API_KEY` from its local `/root/.pi/agent/env.sh` (#735 — moved out of shared `/root/.bashrc`), not from the vault. Abiba is pi-only since the harness purge, so its Hermes config/wrapper/gateway legs are skipped rather than reported as faults; koby is **report-only** (captain's 2026-08-17 ruling) — its findings go to the `--json` `report_only` array and are never counted as fleet failures or repaired, and its CT 111 liveness is probed on storepve (.6). Covers: LiteLLM keys, GPU ports, agent gateways, CT liveness (pct status on PVE nodes), config.yaml YAML integrity, wrapper/CLI integrity, vault secret non-emptiness checks. Every run/report carries the absolute execution path (`script=` + `cwd=`). The current fleet roster is owned by the script changelog (`scripts/agent-health-check.py`); mumuni is no longer probed from this host. Legacy `tdunna`/`baggy` replaced with canonical agent hostnames.
- **Stale keys cleaned**: `daily-infra-report.py` SYNTHETIC_API_KEY was stale (`«vault: agents/production LITELLM_API_KEY»` → 401); now reads `LITELLM_MASTER_KEY` from env. Deprecated scripts (`router-original.py`, `router-phase0-backup.py`, `apply-fixes.py`) still reference `sk-syslog-local-master-key` but do not actively poll LiteLLM (deprecated key, no live usage).
+- **Stale keys cleaned**: `daily-infra-report.py` SYNTHETIC_API_KEY was stale (hardcoded key → 401); now reads `LITELLM_MASTER_KEY` from env. Deprecated scripts (`router-original.py`, `router-phase0-backup.py`, `apply-fixes.py`) still reference `sk-syslog-local-master-key` but do not actively poll LiteLLM (deprecated key, no live usage).

 ## Maintains

@@ -123,19 +123,13 @@ def _fail(key, agent_name=None):

 INFISICAL_TOKEN = os.environ.get("INFISICAL_TOKEN")
 if not INFISICAL_TOKEN:
-    print("INFISICAL_TOKEN not set — refusing to run with no credential", file=sys.stderr)
-    sys.exit(1)
-INFISICAL_API_URL = os.environ.get("INFISICAL_API_URL", "https://vault.sysloggh.net")
-
-# Fallback: if no env token, read the shared vault token file
-if not INFISICAL_TOKEN:
+    # Fallback: read the shared vault token file
    _token_path = os.path.expanduser("~/.infisical-token")
    if os.path.isfile(_token_path):
        try:
            with open(_token_path) as _f:
                INFISICAL_TOKEN = _f.read().strip()
-        except (OSError, UnicodeDecodeError):
-            pass
+INFISICAL_API_URL = os.environ.get("INFISICAL_API_URL", "https://vault.sysloggh.net")

 # ── Helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ from email.mime.text import MIMEText
 from email.mime.multipart import MIMEMultipart

 PVE = "https://192.168.68.12:8006"
-AUTH = "Authorization: PVEAPIToken=monitoring@pve!mumuni=eafd56c5-93d4-4d40-a41d-e688be0987f3"
+AUTH = "Authorization: PVEAPIToken=«vault: infrastructure/production PVE_API_TOKEN»"

 # ── Shared credentials —─

@@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ ssh root@192.168.68.15 "pct exec 112 -- curl -s --max-time 3 -o /dev/null \
 # Expected: 000

 # 3. Backend cookie mint + reuse (exactly what /dsh-web-login proxies to).
-TOKEN=$(ssh root@192.168.68.15 "pct exec 112 -- cat /etc/dsh-web/launch-token") # ← source: dsh-web launch-token (retrieved from CT 112)
+TOKEN=$(ssh root@192.168.68.15 "pct exec 112 -- cat /etc/dsh-web/launch-token")
 ssh root@192.168.68.15 "pct exec 112 -- curl -s -c /tmp/dsh.jar -o /dev/null \
  -H 'Host: tankodhs.sysloggh.net' 'http://127.0.0.1:3080/?token=$TOKEN'"
 ssh root@192.168.68.15 "pct exec 112 -- curl -s -b /tmp/dsh.jar -o /dev/null \
@@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ ssh root@192.168.68.15 "pct exec 112 -- curl -s -b /tmp/dsh.jar -o /dev/null \
 # manual run may no-op on the flock, so poll until the include carries a token
 # the running process accepts (bounded wait) before the mint+reuse check.
 for i in $(seq 1 60); do
-  TOKEN=$(ssh root@192.168.68.15 "pct exec 112 -- sed -n 's/.*token=//p' /etc/dsh-web/nginx-login.conf | tr -d ';\n'") # ← source: dsh-web launch-token (retrieved from CT 112)
+  TOKEN=$(ssh root@192.168.68.15 "pct exec 112 -- sed -n 's/.*token=//p' /etc/dsh-web/nginx-login.conf | tr -d ';\n'")
  CODE=$(ssh root@192.168.68.15 "pct exec 112 -- curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' \
    -H 'Host: tankodhs.sysloggh.net' 'http://127.0.0.1:3080/?token=$TOKEN'")
  [ "$CODE" = "303" ] && break