P0.1 fail-closed secrets: config.py refuses to boot with missing/placeholder/<32-char SECRET_KEY; compose reads secrets from git-ignored .env via env_file.
P0.3 role-safe registration: client-supplied role is ignored; self-registration always mints CS Rep (cannot mint Admin/Jerome, Admin/Wahab, or Director).
Tests: 44 passed (32 existing + 12 new in tests/test_p0_hardening.py), including subprocess boot-validation and role-escalation regression tests.
Legacy data: seed is insert-only — no orphaned tickets on 103E/103W/105E/105W or old category tree.
Redeploy note: openssl rand -hex 32 for real SECRET_KEY required in scottdenya's runtime .env before rebuild (new code refuses to boot with placeholder).
Closes HARDENING.md P0.1, P0.2, P0.3.
**Changes:**
- **P0.1 fail-closed secrets:** config.py refuses to boot with missing/placeholder/<32-char SECRET_KEY; compose reads secrets from git-ignored .env via env_file.
- **P0.2 locked CORS:** main.py rejects */empty CORS_ORIGINS at boot; explicit allow-list only.
- **P0.3 role-safe registration:** client-supplied role is ignored; self-registration always mints CS Rep (cannot mint Admin/Jerome, Admin/Wahab, or Director).
**Tests:** 44 passed (32 existing + 12 new in tests/test_p0_hardening.py), including subprocess boot-validation and role-escalation regression tests.
**Legacy data:** seed is insert-only — no orphaned tickets on 103E/103W/105E/105W or old category tree.
**Redeploy note:** openssl rand -hex 32 for real SECRET_KEY required in scottdenya's runtime .env before rebuild (new code refuses to boot with placeholder).
P0.1 — fail-closed secrets:
- config.py: no default SECRET_KEY; refuses to boot when unset, a known
placeholder, or <32 chars. Generate with: openssl rand -hex 32.
- docker-compose.yml: literal secrets removed; runtime env now comes from
a git-ignored .env via env_file. .env.example added as template.
- .gitignore already covers .env (verified).
P0.2 — locked CORS:
- main.py: CORS_ORIGINS must be an explicit comma-separated allow-list.
'*' or an empty value refuses to boot (was: silently ['*'] with
allow_credentials=True).
P0.3 — role-safe registration:
- services/auth.py: client-supplied 'role' is IGNORED on POST
/api/auth/register; self-registered users always get the
least-privilege 'CS Rep' role. Unauthenticated callers can no longer
mint Admin/Jerome, Admin/Wahab, or Director accounts.
Tests:
- conftest.py sets test SECRET_KEY/CORS_ORIGINS before app import.
- New tests/test_p0_hardening.py (8 tests): role-escalation blocked for
Admin/Jerome and Admin/Wahab, duplicate-email 409, and subprocess
boot-validation for placeholder/short/missing secret + wildcard CORS.
- Full suite: 44 passed.
Redeploy note (per research): seed_units/seed_categories are insert-only,
so the Aug-26 redeploy does NOT orphan historical tickets referencing
units 103E/103W/105E/105W or the legacy 34-category tree. Pending
Wahab: are 103E/103W/105E/105W real apartments dropped from the Excel
regeneration? Optional follow-up: floor-number backfill for already-
seeded units (mapping corrected floors; existing rows keep old values).
Checks per HARDENING.md acceptance:
- [x] starting without a real key fails loudly (subprocess-verified)
- [x] compose carries no literal secret; secrets come from .env
- [x] CORS_ORIGINS explicit allow-list, '*' rejected
- [x] unauthenticated register cannot mint Admin/* or Director
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Closes HARDENING.md P0.1, P0.2, P0.3.
Changes:
Tests: 44 passed (32 existing + 12 new in tests/test_p0_hardening.py), including subprocess boot-validation and role-escalation regression tests.
Legacy data: seed is insert-only — no orphaned tickets on 103E/103W/105E/105W or old category tree.
Redeploy note: openssl rand -hex 32 for real SECRET_KEY required in scottdenya's runtime .env before rebuild (new code refuses to boot with placeholder).