P0.1 — fail-closed secrets: - config.py: no default SECRET_KEY; refuses to boot when unset, a known placeholder, or <32 chars. Generate with: openssl rand -hex 32. - docker-compose.yml: literal secrets removed; runtime env now comes from a git-ignored .env via env_file. .env.example added as template. - .gitignore already covers .env (verified). P0.2 — locked CORS: - main.py: CORS_ORIGINS must be an explicit comma-separated allow-list. '*' or an empty value refuses to boot (was: silently ['*'] with allow_credentials=True). P0.3 — role-safe registration: - services/auth.py: client-supplied 'role' is IGNORED on POST /api/auth/register; self-registered users always get the least-privilege 'CS Rep' role. Unauthenticated callers can no longer mint Admin/Jerome, Admin/Wahab, or Director accounts. Tests: - conftest.py sets test SECRET_KEY/CORS_ORIGINS before app import. - New tests/test_p0_hardening.py (8 tests): role-escalation blocked for Admin/Jerome and Admin/Wahab, duplicate-email 409, and subprocess boot-validation for placeholder/short/missing secret + wildcard CORS. - Full suite: 44 passed. Redeploy note (per research): seed_units/seed_categories are insert-only, so the Aug-26 redeploy does NOT orphan historical tickets referencing units 103E/103W/105E/105W or the legacy 34-category tree. Pending Wahab: are 103E/103W/105E/105W real apartments dropped from the Excel regeneration? Optional follow-up: floor-number backfill for already- seeded units (mapping corrected floors; existing rows keep old values). Checks per HARDENING.md acceptance: - [x] starting without a real key fails loudly (subprocess-verified) - [x] compose carries no literal secret; secrets come from .env - [x] CORS_ORIGINS explicit allow-list, '*' rejected - [x] unauthenticated register cannot mint Admin/* or Director
43 lines
948 B
Python
43 lines
948 B
Python
"""Pydantic schemas for authentication endpoints."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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from pydantic import BaseModel
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class RegisterRequest(BaseModel):
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email: str
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password: str
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full_name: str
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phone: str | None = None
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# HARDENING.md P0.3: role is NOT client-controllable. Self-registration
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# always creates the least-privilege role; privileged roles are assigned
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# by an admin directly in the DB (or a future admin-gated endpoint).
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role: str = "CS Rep" # kept for backward compat; ignored by the service
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class LoginRequest(BaseModel):
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email: str
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password: str
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class TokenResponse(BaseModel):
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access_token: str
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refresh_token: str
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token_type: str = "bearer"
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class RefreshRequest(BaseModel):
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refresh_token: str
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class UserOut(BaseModel):
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id: int
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email: str
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full_name: str
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phone: str | None
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role: str
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active: bool
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model_config = {"from_attributes": True}
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