e42b970dec3288cc0200d8722ead3afc584d130c
538
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e42b970dec |
fix(audit-hermes): handle fallback_providers as list or dict
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The audit assumed fallback_providers was always a dict (single provider).
Two live agents (koby, koonimo) carry it as a LIST of dicts (one entry per
fallback), so the script crashed with:
File "audit-hermes-config.py", line 211, in audit
fb.get("provider") == "deepseek",
AttributeError: 'list' object has no attribute 'get'
Both are REAL agent configs, so this is not a malformed-input case — the
script simply could not audit two of the four agents it exists to audit.
Fix:
- Normalize fallback_providers to a list of entries (dict → [dict], list → list)
- Apply the existing checks to each entry
- A malformed entry (not a mapping) produces a reported VIOLATION naming the
offending entry, NOT an uncaught exception
Adds regression test using the real failing shape (list of dicts) and proves
it bites against the pre-fix revision.
Real audit results after fix:
- mumuni: FAIL — 7 violations
- tanko: FAIL — 21 violations
- koby: FAIL — 16 violations (previously crashed)
- koonimo: FAIL — 10 violations (previously crashed)
No agent configs were changed. No existing rules were relaxed.
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eadb927ec1 |
Merge pull request 'fix(hermes): clarify auxiliary model policy to match audit' (#140) from fix/hermes-aux-model-policy-20260927 into master
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d4e238047d |
fix(hermes): clarify auxiliary model policy to match audit
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The 'Auxiliary Tasks (CONSISTENCY RULE)' header claimed ALL auxiliary services must use an identical model (gpu-vision) and that syslog-auto must never be used for auxiliary tasks. Both are false for compression, which the script (and Rule 7/8) require to be syslog-auto. An agent following the template produced a config the audit then failed. - Split auxiliary into two classes: light (vision, web_extract/browsing) -> gpu-vision (RTX 5070); context-heavy (compression) -> syslog-auto, citing the existing 2026-07-23 OPERATIONAL DECISION in Rule 7. - Remove the absolute 'Do NOT use syslog-auto for auxiliary tasks' line. - State gpu-dense + strix-moe are the reasoning hosts; do not pin aux to them. - Note the change in the frontmatter UPDATED log. audit-hermes-config.py unchanged (it is the enforcement contract); prose now matches it line-for-line on vision/web_extract/compression. Verified: prose-lint.sh PASS, secret-scan.sh clean, 14/14 tests in tests/test_audit_hermes_config_alias.py pass, audit PASSES on the template's stated policy. |
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73d5097555 |
Merge pull request 'feat(memory-fixer): add duplicate-detection phase; correct stale canonical pointer + reporting model (v2.2.0)' (#139) from fix/memory-fixer-duplicate-detection-20260926 into master
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Merge PR #139 — memory-fixer duplicate-detection phase (v2.2.0). All CI green; authorized by AGENTS.md step 4 (all green -> merge) and the authorization table (memory-fixer = normal sensitivity, any registered agent). |
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c460ef905c |
feat(memory-fixer): add duplicate-detection phase; correct stale canonical pointer + reporting model (v2.2.0)
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Level 1 gains phase 5, duplicate-node detection: runs memory_dup_detect.py (read-only) and reports clusters by verdict. - WRITER-DEFECT (run_family): one task creating a node per run -> writer fix, never merge (per-run nodes are the audit trail) - SAFE-MERGE: identical bodies, still needs an explicit Kwame decision - HUMAN-DECISION: same subject, bodies differ -> connect, never merge Replaces the naive '>70% title overlap' duplicate rule, which false-positives on distinct work: four client workflows (#357-#361) and two machines' migrations (#1792/#1793) score high on titles with bodies 0.1-0.3 apart. Also corrected in the same pass: - the 'canonical copy' pointer named /root/.hermes/contracts/memory-fixer-v3.md, which does not exist on kagentz (no /root access); the job's instruction set is inline in ~/.hermes/cron/jobs.json - 'reports to Kwame via this Zulip DM' described the pre-2026-09-21 model; the report is DROPped to the gate (comms_drop.py) and exit 0 means QUEUED, not sent - added a Checks line so a skipped phase 5 is visible in the report |
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d99b552448 |
Merge pull request 'feat(search): agent-consumption layer — dedupe, filter, rerank, extract content' (#138) from feat/search-agent-consumption-20260926 into master
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fc0cd7a032 |
Merge pull request 'feat(daily-digest): deliver via Zulip DM as an HTML attachment; drop mail entirely' (#137) from fix/daily-digest-zulip-delivery-20260926 into master
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ba38efcd75 |
test(search): quality guard so the ranking layer cannot silently rot
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Extends search-stack-visibility with a ranking assertion: for the fixed query set, no config demote_domains host may appear in the top 3, and the known non-answers (bestbuy.com, merriam-webster.com) must not be returned at all. Without this the layer could rot back to raw engine ordering unnoticed - the same way the endpoint colours silently rotted before 2026-09-26. It reads the demote list from the SAME config the layer uses, so the guard cannot drift from the policy it is guarding. Live: 'ok: no demoted host in the top 3; no banned non-answer returned'; visibility contract still PASSES end to end. |
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0d30091f62 |
feat(search): agent-consumption layer - dedupe, filter, rerank, extract
Raw multi-engine aggregation had no dedupe, no filtering and no reranking.
Measured 2026-09-26: 'best practices agent context management' returned
bestbuy.com and merriam-webster.com, plus 4 content farms, with medium.com twice;
'proxmox thin pool metadata exhaustion recovery' put four SEO blogs ABOVE the
real Proxmox forum threads. Identical queries also ranked DIFFERENTLY between
runs, which is why the fix is deterministic rather than trusting the engines.
scripts/search-agent-consume.py:
1. dedupe by normalised URL (tracking params and fragments stripped)
2. drop non-answers - shopping/dictionary hosts, navigational host roots,
search/shopping/cart/login paths and query keys
3. demote content farms and promote primary sources
4. STABLE sort (score desc, then original position) so runs are reproducible
5. extract page text for the top N via Firecrawl POST /v1/scrape under an
explicit character budget, so an agent gets usable material in ONE call
6. emit stable JSON with engine provenance and source_type
Policy is config, not code: config/search-ranking.yaml holds demote_domains,
prefer_domains, non_answer rules and the extraction budget, so it is reviewable
and changeable without touching the module. Content farms are DEMOTED rather
than dropped so a useful hit is not lost, it just cannot outrank a primary.
A '/products/' path rule was REMOVED after the before/after run caught it
dropping docs.digitalocean.com/products/inference/... - a legitimate docs page.
Shopping is caught by the host list instead, which has no such false positive.
Measured: 'best practices...' top 8 becomes anthropic, langchain, jetbrains,
blog.jetbrains, docs.langchain, reddit, cursor, reddit - no content farm.
'proxmox thin pool...' moves the forum threads from positions 5-9 to 1-4.
Extraction: 5 items, 12000 chars of 12000 budget, 0 failures, 5.28s; whole run
6.4s wall.
Contract: search-agent-consumption.prose.md, including the honest reachability
gap - the pi MCP search server's shape is not ours to change, so this layer is
NOT wired into it.
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0a41a2d584 |
fix(daily-digest): probe Firecrawl on its real liveness path and classify endpoints per fleet policy
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Folds into the same branch as the Zulip delivery change, as instructed. FINDING 1 - the Firecrawl probe path was wrong; the service is fine. scripts/daily-infra-report.py probed http://192.168.68.7:3002/health, which Firecrawl does not serve - it 404s. The root answers 200 with {"message":"Firecrawl API",...}. Live 2026-09-26: Firecrawl(/) -> 200 Firecrawl(/health) -> 404 <- what the report was showing The probe is now the root, which is its liveness endpoint. FINDING 2 - the Network Endpoints classification was wrong twice over. It read: color = green if code in (200,302,401) else (yellow if code >= 400 else red). Two defects: (a) it ignored the fleet's own probe policy, codified 2026-09-14 in the monitoring contracts: ANY HTTP status proves the service answered, so the service is ALIVE, and only a failed CONNECTION is a failed probe. A 404 from a wrong path is not a service fault. (b) was a STRING comparison. Reproduced: 301 -> red (a live redirect rendered as a failure), 404 -> yellow, 500 -> yellow (a real server error softened to a warning). Replaced with classify_endpoint(), which returns: any 2xx/3xx/4xx -> green 'alive' (code still shown) 5xx -> yellow 'server error' (kept distinct from 4xx, as asked) 000/no answer -> red 'no connection' Verified against the live endpoints after the change: Gitea 200, Authentik 302, Zulip 302, Pulse 200, Proxmox 200, SearXNG 200, Firecrawl 200 - all green/alive; the only red state is a genuine no-connection. ALSO CHECKED, as asked: scripts/search-stack-check.py does NOT depend on the wrong route. It POSTs to {FIRECRAWL_URL}/v1/scrape with formats=[markdown], and that path really works - live POST returned HTTP 200 and 180 chars of markdown for https://example.com. It was never using /health. prose-lint: PASSED. |
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de32f54337 |
feat(daily-digest): deliver via Zulip DM as an HTML attachment; drop mail entirely
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Captain's decision 2026-09-26, clarified the same day: the digest is delivered to his Zulip DM (user id 9) from abiba-bot as an HTML FILE - an attachment, not HTML rendered in the message body and not a Markdown translation of it. Closes daily-digest-mail-transport-20260921; the Google dependency is gone (no SMTP, no EMAIL_PASSWORD, no app password, nothing to rotate). WHAT CHANGES * scripts/daily-infra-report.py: send_email() is replaced by send_zulip(), which writes the styled dashboard to /var/log/daily-infra-report/infra-report-<ts>.html, uploads it via POST /api/v1/user_uploads, then posts a SHORT Markdown pointer to user 9. The message body carries subject, top-line status and the attachment link; it does not reproduce the report. * the 10,000-character cap is irrelevant here - it bounds message TEXT only, and the report travels as a file, so nothing is shrunk to fit. * the key is abiba-bot's, already on the execution host at /root/.pi/agent/extensions/zulip/.env (mode 600). No vault entry was added: under the auth-keys charter that is a captain decision. * daily-health-digest.prose.md -> v2.0.0 and contract-registry.yaml updated: transport, healthy/degraded definitions, and exit codes now match observed behaviour. There is NO degraded delivery leg any more - delivery is the only output path, so a missing or rejected key is a real failure (exit 1). * queued defect folded in: a failed delivery used to print only the transport error while the report body never surfaced. Now the HTML is printed to stdout AND persisted on every failure, and the message names which step failed. EVIDENCE (all against the live stack) * real send: message id 86221 to user 9, attachment 16208 bytes at /user_uploads/2/45/m1cQesBFV78BGeNY2lN8xkN5/infra-report-20260926-153406.html * the message is type=private, sender abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net, recipients [9, 21], body carries the top-line status and the attachment link, and does NOT contain a <table> - i.e. it does not reproduce the report * the attachment fetches HTTP 200, 16208 bytes, content-type text/html, starts with <!DOCTYPE html>, and contains <style>, <table> and 16 class="card" blocks - it opens as a standalone styled document * failure path: a bad key gives 'Delivery FAILED at upload: Malformed API key', EXIT=1, the HTML is printed to stdout and persisted to disk * scheduled path: the run's own output is pasted in the PR prose-lint: PASSED (19 warnings); secret scan clean. |
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042fd3ccc6 |
Merge pull request 'fix: reconcile the health-logs self-heal contracts, and add a dead-man's-switch' (#136) from fix/health-log-freshness-watchdog-20260926 into master
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226f2ad55e |
fix: reconcile the health-logs self-heal contracts, and add a dead-man's-switch
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relay-785 / self-heal-contract-stale-script-pointers-20260924. gpu/ had been silent since 2026-09-14T18:02:03Z (12 days) and pm2/ had never posted a run. FINDING - the gpu-self-heal executor was never lost, only its schedule was. The brief concluded the mechanism was gone. It is not: on CT 116 /opt/inference-harness/scripts/gpu-self-heal.py exists (mtime 2026-09-21 11:43), is self-posting via gitea-logger.sh, and runs cleanly - I ran it and it posted health-logs/gpu/gpu-self-heal-20260926-144618.json. What was missing was the cron entry, dropped during a CT 116 /etc/cron.d rework on 2026-09-21. So this is a schedule restoration, not a resurrection. DECISIONS * gpu-self-heal -> RESTORE. Schedule re-added as /etc/cron.d/gpu-self-heal on CT 116, matching the observed historical cadence (:02 past 0/6/12/18). Proven with a REAL unattended cron fire (temporary */1 entry, removed after): gpu-self-heal-20260926-144802.json committed 14:48:03Z. The contract now names the executor, schedule, log and posting, which it previously did not. * pm2 health-logs posting -> RETIRE the claim. pm2-self-heal.prose.md required appending to health-logs/pm2/ as a 'hard rule', but scripts/pm2-self-heal.sh contains no Gitea or push code and never did; the directory has held only its init commit since 2026-07-28. Corrected to point at the contract-runner's durable per-run logs and failure note instead of adding a second, redundant posting path. DEAD-MAN'S-SWITCH - scripts/health-log-freshness.py + contract. Absence of logs must raise an alarm, and the producer cannot raise it, so this runs on CT 100, a different host from the producers, and fails when the newest health-logs/gpu entry is older than 12h (litellm 18h). Verified it would have caught the real gap: evaluated at 2026-09-20 the newest gpu/ entry was 126h old against a 12h limit -> STALE. Bugs found and fixed while testing, each caught by a test that bit: * the documented HEALTH_LOG_MAX_AGE_* override was never implemented; * a Gitea password held under GITEA_TOKEN was sent as an API token -> HTTP 401; now every candidate auth is tried and the first that works is used; * the ~/.git-credentials fallback filtered on GITEA_URL's host, which missed whenever GITEA_URL pointed at the internal IP -> zero candidates. Exit codes: 0 fresh, 1 stale-or-unreadable, 2 cannot run. A directory that cannot be read is a failure, never a skip. Evidence: live PASS; stale override names the directory and producer; no credential -> exit 2; whole thing runs green through contract-run.sh. prose-lint: PASSED. |
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552c776c0c |
Merge pull request 'feat: land the revision-preflight guard, fixed and wired into contract execution' (#134) from fix/land-revision-preflight-guard-20260925 into master
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778424acd4 |
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into fix/land-revision-preflight-guard-20260925
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c5a6dcd42a |
fix(revision-preflight): default to warn, name the refusal class, bound the fetch
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Bounded correction round on PR #134 after a PASS-WITH-FINDINGS review whose
Finding 4 is High. The guard's purpose and its fail-closed fix stand; the
problem was that with 'enforce' as the default it gates EVERY scheduled
contract, and three legitimate states produce a refusal - a clone legitimately
ahead of origin/master mid-review, a detached HEAD, and an offline or failed
fetch - so any of them would turn the fleet's monitoring into withheld
verdicts. That risk outweighs the staleness the guard catches.
1. DEFAULT IS NOW 'warn'. 'enforce' remains available and documented. The
criteria for flipping the default later are written into the doc as a
decision with evidence - a sustained window (30 days / 200+ runs) with zero
mismatch:* and zero cannot-verify:* refusals, no fetch blips, and a pinned
clone demonstrably kept current - explicitly as its own change, not a silent
flip.
2. 'COULD NOT CHECK' IS NOW DISTINGUISHABLE FROM 'THIS COPY IS WRONG'. Every
non-zero exit prints a machine-readable REASON=<class> line:
cannot-verify:fetch-failed | cannot-verify:ref-unresolvable (exit 2)
mismatch:path-absent | mismatch:content
mismatch:detached-head | mismatch:clone-ahead (exit 1)
detached-head and clone-ahead are named separately because they are
legitimate states, far less alarming than a hand-edited file. clone-ahead
requires HEAD to be STRICTLY ahead; an uncommitted edit on a commit that IS
the ref is a plain content mismatch (my own first cut got this wrong and the
new test 7d caught it).
3. THE DEFAULT FETCH IS BOUNDED: --fetch-timeout, default 20s, 0 = unbounded,
and a missing 'timeout' binary is itself a cannot-verify rather than an
unbounded fetch inside a scheduled contract.
4. TEST COVERAGE ADDED for every new class: fetch failure, fetch timeout
(asserted to return promptly under a 1s bound), unresolvable ref, detached
HEAD, clone-ahead, genuine content mismatch, and the contract-run.sh default.
The pre-fix draft fixture comparisons are kept: 31 passed, 0 failed.
5. MERGE-TIME SEQUENCE documented: fast-forward /opt/contract-runner, confirm
clean, prove a contract runs and reports. Baseline recorded as of today -
firstmate has already fast-forwarded it to
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9faffe4f6b |
Merge pull request 'feat: add the missing daily-health-digest contract + fix the red lint from #133' (#135) from fix/daily-health-digest-contract-20260925 into master
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cd00cd0475 |
feat: add the missing daily-health-digest contract and register it
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Backlog row daily-health-digest-contract-missing-20260925. The digest has been dispatched on a schedule with NO contract file at all - no *daily*.prose.md, absent from contract-registry.yaml, the only reference anywhere being the CT100 cron line. That absence is why the choice of execution copy was silently the operator's, and how a stale clone could run the check unnoticed. New daily-health-digest.prose.md states: * the PINNED execution path /root/abiba-workspace/projects/prose-contracts/ scripts/daily-infra-report.py and the pinned clone - the cron's FM_HOME clone, the only stable non-ephemeral copy; the treehouse clone is a per-agent working copy and must NOT be pinned; * the output shape (all 18 top-level --json keys) and what a healthy run is; * the exit-code semantics AS THEY ACTUALLY BEHAVE, verified case by case: missing PVE_TOKEN or an unreachable probe exits 1 and raises an alert, while a missing EMAIL credential is a deliberate DEGRADED leg that still exits 0 and still produces the report. PROBE_FAILURES and DEGRADED_LEGS are separate lists on purpose and must not be merged; * the email-delivery dependency, that EMAIL_PASSWORD must be a Google app password, that it is failing with 534 5.7.9 as of 2026-09-25, and that a delivery failure is a credential dependency rather than a code defect; * what counts as a failure versus degraded. Registered in contract-registry.yaml (contracts entry plus index.by_category .monitoring and index.by_domain.infrastructure). Verified: YAML parses, 31 contracts, exactly one daily-health-digest entry. |
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819cd53bce |
fix(lint): restore the repo secret scan, which PR #133 broke
Master's lint is RED right now, and it is my doing. at |
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574cb99d76 |
feat: land the revision-preflight guard, fixed and wired into contract execution
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A contract verdict is only meaningful if it came from the merged copy. The fleet has been bitten three times on 2026-09-25 (a clone parked on a merged feature branch while executing from another clone; a script copied into the runner clone by hand; a stale local origin/master making an ancestry check report unlanded work). The control for this existed as an untracked draft and protected nobody, because it was entirely fail-open. Defect in the draft, preserved verbatim as tests/fixtures/revision-preflight.prefix.sh: git -C "$CLONE" show "origin/master:$(basename "$SCRIPT")" basename drops the scripts/ prefix, so for any script under scripts/ it queried the repo root, failed, took the "warn but don't block" branch and exited 0 - passing a script that exists in no revision at all. Reproduced: pre-fix + scripts/demo.sh under scripts/ -> 'could not resolve', EXIT=0 pre-fix + a script in no revision -> EXIT=0 Fixed guard (scripts/revision-preflight.sh): * resolves the repo-relative path inside the clone, so scripts/ paths resolve; * FAILS CLOSED - a path absent from the ref, an unresolvable ref, or a failed fetch is a failure, never a warning; * fetches the remote by default, because a stale local ref would otherwise pass a stale script as current; --no-fetch states the assumption instead of hiding it. Wiring (scripts/contract-run.sh): before executing, the wrapper runs the guard against the clone it lives in. Default CONTRACT_REVISION_PREFLIGHT=enforce withholds the verdict, alerts and exits 2 on mismatch; =warn logs and continues; =off skips. Verified live: match -> contract proceeds and PASSes; mismatch -> 'VERDICT WITHHELD', exit 2; =warn -> continues. Pinning (docs/contract-execution-pinning.md): every contract pins the clone contract-run.sh lives in - the deployed runner being /opt/contract-runner on CT 100. Documented that daily-health-digest has no contract file at all, which is why its execution copy was silently operator-chosen. Tests: tests/test_revision_preflight.sh, 15 assertions over a throwaway clone with a real bare remote. It runs the pre-fix draft against the same cases and shows it passing a ghost script, so the tests provably bite. shellcheck: scripts/revision-preflight.sh and the new test are clean. The three findings remaining in contract-run.sh (SC2086 x2, SC2034) are pre-existing and byte-identical on master. |
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9d64b0bd66 |
Merge pull request 'fix(daily-infra-report): resolve PVE token from env; make a dead probe non-silent' (#133) from fix/daily-health-digest-pve-token-20260925 into master
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cdc7ad2c79 |
fix(daily-infra-report): resolve PVE token from env; make a dead probe non-silent
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The Proxmox leg of the daily digest has been reporting NOTHING while exiting 0.
Root cause: the auth header was a literal placeholder string,
AUTH = "Authorization: PVEAPIToken=«vault: infrastructure/production PVE_API_TOKEN»"
which was sent verbatim. The API rejected it, pve_get() returned None, and the
report rendered node_count=0 / nodes_online=0 with pve_probe_status='unreachable'
while still exiting 0. A monitoring gap that looks like a healthy run.
Also: the vault key is PVE_TOKEN, not PVE_API_TOKEN, so even reading os.environ
by the old name would not have found it.
Fixes:
* pve_auth() resolves the token at call time from PVE_TOKEN (injected by
'infisical run --env=prod'). Nothing is hardcoded; a missing token raises.
* pve_get() builds the command inside its try block, so a missing token degrades
to None instead of escaping as an unhandled exception.
* PROBE_FAILURES records an unreachable node/resources probe. Probe failures are
deliberately separate from DEGRADED_LEGS: a missing credential stays exit 0
(existing intent), but a probe with no data now exits 1 in both the report and
--json paths, so it cannot pass unnoticed.
Measured effect on the live host: pve_probe_status unreachable -> ok,
node_count 0 -> 5, nodes_online 0 -> 5, total_vms 0 -> 22, running_vms 0 -> 22.
Tests: 4 new regression tests; all 4 fail against the pre-fix script and pass
after, and the 3 pre-existing tests still pass (7/7).
Not fixed here (needs the captain): the email leg fails with
'534 5.7.9 Application-specific password required' - EMAIL_PASSWORD in the vault
is not a valid Gmail app password for jtabiri@gmail.com. That is a credential
action, not a code change.
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5409dfd73a |
Merge pull request 'feat: multi-engine search stack + visibility check' (#132) from fix/search-stack-multi-engine-20260925 into master
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8b2eba4f7a |
docs+check: correct DDG status, explain silent-zero semantics, credit google cse
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Follow-up corrections after review: 1. DuckDuckGo is NOT fixed. The VPS fallback egress has since been flagged by DuckDuckGo too (HTTP 202 + challenge markers), so it reports CAPTCHA on both paths. The contract and script docstring now say so instead of claiming a fix that had already expired. It stays enabled as best-effort coverage so a recovery shows up as a contribution. 2. The relationship between silent zeros and the verdict is now explicit in both the script output and the contract: an enabled expected engine that contributes zero with no error is REPORTED, not fatal. Only the <SEARCH_CHECK_MIN_ENGINES> floor and the extraction leg fail the run. This is deliberate - de-duplication and query-shape make a zero non-probative. 3. Recorded that 'google cse' uses a THIRD PARTY's public search-engine id hardcoded in the SearXNG build, not a key we own; its quota and availability are outside our control, and our own free key would need a wrapper (not built). VPS forward proxy is now a real service: /opt/fwd-proxy docker compose with restart: unless-stopped, a healthy healthcheck, and Docker enabled at boot. |
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040fecef3e |
feat: multi-engine search stack + visibility check
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Search stack (192.168.68.7) was effectively Bing-only: google served a JS
shell, duckduckgo CAPTCHA'd from the house egress, and every other shipped
engine returned a silent zero. Upgraded SearXNG to 2026.9.23 (same pinned
digest as the image already pulled by other hosts) which uses browser
impersonation, and routed DuckDuckGo through a VPS forward proxy over the
existing WireGuard tunnel via a per-engine 'network'.
Live result: bing, google cse, brave and yandex contribute on every query;
duckduckgo is best-effort via the datacenter egress.
Adds the visibility leg so a future regression cannot be silent:
scripts/search-stack-check.py
* two fixed queries; FAILS when fewer than two engines contribute,
printing contributing engines and every unresponsive_engines entry
* FAILS when Firecrawl extraction returns empty markdown or errors
* reports silent-zero engines explicitly
scripts/contract-run.sh
* maps search-stack-visibility -> search-stack-check.py
search-stack-visibility.prose.md
* contract text, execution model, pass/fail shapes, residual risk
Scheduled hourly at :15 on CT 100 via /etc/cron.d/contract-runner.
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483a66b7b4 |
Merge pull request 'Fix PBS GC monitor false positive and add contract-run.sh wrapper' (#131) from fix/contract-run-pbs-gc-20260924 into master
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c0d04a2c02 |
fix: three wrapper holes in contract-run.sh
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1. Add disk-gc-threat-response to case statement (was only in header comment, hit *) branch and exited 2 silently). Mapped to scripts/disk-gc-scan.py per contract's Execution section. 2. Apply timeout to script invocation (was defined as TIMEOUT=600 but never used, so a hung check blocked the cron slot forever). Now wrapped with timeout, and exit 124 (timeout kill) logs a TIMEOUT line before the FAIL verdict. 3. Send alert on exit-2 paths (unknown contract and missing script). Both paths previously just echoed and exited, so a typo'd name or absent script was a silent monitoring loss. Now they send the same Zulip DM as a failed check. Proved all four paths with raw output: - unknown contract: curl -sf attempted, exit 22 on HTTP 401 - missing script: curl -sf attempted, exit 2 - disk-gc-threat-response: resolves to disk-gc-scan.py, runs, PASS - stub sleep > timeout: TIMEOUT line logged, exit 1, alert failure recorded |
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fda6c844ff |
fix: add -f to curl to fail on HTTP >= 400
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Without -f, a rejected credential (HTTP 401) returns curl exit 0, making a failed alert indistinguishable from a successful one. With -f, curl exits non-zero on HTTP >= 400, so DM_EXIT and STREAM_EXIT correctly capture the transmission failure and the run log records it. |
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748ea389be |
fix: correct execution headings, variableize LOG_DIR, fix dead alert path
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1. Replace '(## Execution' + ')' with '## Execution' in 6 contract files 2. Make LOG_DIR honor CONTRACT_RUN_LOG_DIR env var (default: /var/log/contract-runs) 3. Fix Zulip alert: correct URL (https://chat.sysloggh.net/api/v1), user (abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net), take ZULIP_API_KEY from environment, and write alert failures to run log |
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f16a890d0e |
fix: make test_pbs_gc_states.sh self-contained with inline SSH replacement
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c666d3e15c |
feat: implement PBS GC four-state logic and update contracts
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- Implement four-state PBS GC logic in proxmox-monitor.sh: - probe-failed: unparseable JSON, store not found, or empty body → FAIL - running: collection in progress (last-run-endtime absent, upid present) → DO NOT FAIL - stale: no completed run within 48h → FAIL, naming last completed run age - healthy: completed within 48h → PASS, naming endtime and pending bytes - Add tests/test_pbs_gc_states.sh covering all four states - Proves the test bites on the pre-fix version (5/6 tests fail) - All 6 tests pass against the fixed version - Update contract-run.sh to map disk-gc-threat-response -> scripts/disk-gc-scan.py - Update Execution sections of host-scheduled contracts: infrastructure-monitoring, zulip-health, litellm-health, agent-health-check, disk-gc-threat-response, pm2-self-heal Adding note that execution is host-scheduled via cron, not agent session ack. |
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c07aa5e382 |
Add contract-run.sh for machine scheduler execution and fix PBS GC leg
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- Add scripts/contract-run.sh: resolves contract name to script, runs with timeout, logs to /var/log/contract-runs/, alerts on failure via Zulip - Add tests/test_contract_run.sh: proves passing and failing contract behavior - Fix PBS GC leg in proxmox-monitor.sh: simplify logic to check last-run-endtime, use absolute paths for pct and proxmox-backup-manager to avoid PATH issues Part of Task: contract-execution-host-scheduler-20260924 |
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87205e6fdb |
Merge pull request 'feat(security): commit-time secret guard that FAILS the build on a committed credential' (#129) from fm/commit-time-secret-guard-20260917 into master
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8f1e5eebc4 |
feat(security): commit-time secret guard that FAILS the build on a committed credential
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The 2026-09-17 purge removed six live credentials that had sat in this repo for weeks, several in .md prose. Nothing blocked that class of commit, so a warning in a stream nobody reads was the only signal. This adds a guard that fails the build instead of warning. Guard - scripts/secret-scan.sh: bash + coreutils + grep/sed/awk + git only (the Gitea Actions runner executes job steps inside the runner container — BusyBox grep, no node/python). Modes: --tree (git-tracked, default), --path DIR (no git), --staged (pre-commit), --diff REF. Exit 1 on a finding, 2 on config error. - scripts/secret-patterns.tsv: checked-in pattern list — sk-, sk-or-v1-, sk_live_, literal Bearer tokens, PVEAPIToken=, raw Authorization values, PEM private-key blocks, prose credential lines, and password/api_key/secret/token assignments carrying a literal value. Prose is scanned exactly like code. - scripts/secret-allowlist.tsv: one entry per deliberate synthetic example, each with a reason. A missing reason is a hard error (fail closed). The 2026-09-17 purge's `«vault: ...»` placeholders are listed explicitly rather than filtered by a general "vault"/"synthetic" rule, so a new occurrence still needs a reviewed, reasoned entry. - A small inert-value classifier drops env refs, paths, dotted code access, variable names and right-truncated redactions; it does not know the words "synthetic"/"example", so a fabrication is always an explicit exception. - Findings are printed with the credential masked; a scan never echoes a full secret into the log. Wiring - .gitea/workflows/pr-pipeline.yaml lint job: explicit "Committed-credential scan" step plus the self-test. A finding fails the required `pr-pipeline / lint` context, which the merge gate depends on. - scripts/prose-lint.sh (the local gate): a "Secret scan" section, so `bash scripts/prose-lint.sh` before pushing is equivalent to CI. Tests - tests/test_secret_scan.sh: 20 cases. Plants pattern-matching fixtures in temp trees (outside every allowlisted path) and asserts the guard FAILS, including the --staged commit-time path; asserts the tree is quiet; asserts allowlisted text at an unlisted path still fails (path-explicit, not word-based); asserts a reasonless allowlist entry exits 2. Verified: guard run against 8245716^ (the pre-fix revision, before the purge) fails on the real OpenRouter/LiteLLM/Zulip/Proxmox/Stirling credentials; guard run over the current tree is clean. |
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bb1b65340e |
Merge pull request #128 from decisions-2026-08-03-rebased
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9e87927444 |
pm2-self-heal: reconcile contract with live PM2 set and alert channels
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- Add zulip-watchdog to Maintains (it's running, infrastructure-monitoring expects it) - Remove gpu-monitor from PM2 Maintains (it's systemd-only, not PM2-tracked) - Add Execution steps for all monitored processes (gitea-runner, zulip-watchdog) - Update alert channel: Telegram is primary, Zulip DM is secondary - Update script to check all 4 processes (abiba-telegram, abiba-zulip, gitea-runner, zulip-watchdog) - Add restart count thresholds for all processes - Update log output to include all process statuses |
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b0683e9566 | fix: correct logging destination in description (Gitea health-logs, not knowledge graph) | ||
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dd11c8f14f | Apply captain 2026-08-03 decisions: restore abiba-zulip, retire gpu-watchdog, PM2-track gpu-monitor | ||
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0732eed329 |
Merge pull request 'fix(daily-infra-report): drop the vestigial Zulip key requirement; fail loudly on a failed send' (#127) from fix/daily-health-digest-remove-vestigial-zulip-20260921 into master
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59ed7cdbf7 |
fix(daily-infra-report): remove vestigial ZULIP_API_KEY requirement, exit non-zero on failed send
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1. Remove vestigial ZULIP_API_KEY requirement:
- /api/v1/server_settings is a PUBLIC endpoint (verified HTTP 200 with or without credential)
- No Zulip API key is required for this call
- If a future leg genuinely needs abiba-bot's key, it must prove it with a 200 from
/api/v1/users/me as abiba-bot and label itself degraded when it cannot
- Never fall back to the vault's shared ZULIP_API_KEY
2. Make failed sends exit non-zero:
- A degraded leg (no credential configured) must stay exit 0
- A failed send (attempted and failed) must exit 1
- This distinguishes 'not configured' from 'attempted and failed'
Test evidence:
- No-credential run: exit 0, digest still produced
- Wrong password: exit 1, labelled SMTP error
- grep -n ZULIP_API_KEY: only comment reference remains
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5d70bbf25b |
Merge pull request 'fix(daily-infra-report): missing credentials degrade one leg instead of blacking out the digest' (#126) from fix/daily-health-digest-degraded-credentials-20260921 into master
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ccc916d1ec |
feat(daily-infra-report): make missing credentials a labelled degraded leg
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- ZULIP_API_KEY: no longer SystemExit, now reports 'credential-missing: ZULIP_API_KEY' - EMAIL_PASSWORD: no longer sys.exit(1), now appends to DEGRADED_LEGS and returns success - PVE API: fixed None check in storage section - Summary: reports degraded legs before summary This allows the digest to be produced and emailed even when credentials are missing, while still explicitly logging which legs are degraded. Test: empty env produces JSON report + degraded leg labels, no SystemExit. |
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48fb263d4b |
Merge pull request 'feat(litellm): align contracts for 7-provider cloud consolidation (2026-09-20)' (#125) from feat/align-litellm-contracts-cloud-20260920 into master
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64790ebd19 |
feat(litellm): align contracts for 7-provider cloud consolidation (2026-09-20)
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- hermes-key-enforcement: add Model Access Tiers (local vs cloud) and cloud-scoping clause
- litellm-api-keys: add Cloud Provider Consolidation section (provider map, vault secrets, access tiers)
- litellm-api-keys: pin standard agent keys to explicit local-only models list; forbid {}/all-proxy-models (Community-edition cloud leak)
- contract-registry: register litellm-api-keys (was unregistered drift)
Additive only. Local prose-lint: PASSED.
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6fa0a255df |
Merge pull request 'fix(zulip-monitor): add C3 public access path, make run verdict non-optimistic, separate C1/C2/C3' (#124) from fm/kagentz-a2a-outage-masked-as-expected-20260919 into master
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c72436b406 |
no-mistakes(document): docs: reconcile zulip-monitor status in infrastructure-control
PR Pipeline — Authorize → Validate → Review → Merge / auth (pull_request) Successful in 3s
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a17379676d | no-mistakes(document): docs: sync zulip-health contract with C1/C3 and version | ||
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63990b84f7 | no-mistakes(review): Fix review findings: test regression, contract verdict, scope trim | ||
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7a5ddb46a9 | chore: Add local monitoring tooling scripts | ||
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568fec2efa |
test(zulip-kagentz): Replace string-presence tests with behavioural sandbox tests
- C3 502 → INCIDENT - C3 000 → INCIDENT - C1 401 + C3 302 → 0 issues, all healthy - C1 000 → INCIDENT Each test asserts from the run's own log/verdict, not from file text. Prose assertions kept as secondary. Proven to bite: run against pre-fix script (origin/master) shows all 4 behavioural cases fail because C3 leg doesn't exist and Result line doesn't say 'INCIDENT'. |