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@@ -14,9 +14,15 @@ description: >
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expire/404. The .env fallback prevents agents from running without keys.
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Tanko incident: token 404 → gateway had no LITELLM_API_KEY for hours.
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UPDATED 2026-07-16: Vault is SYNCED (session-13 keys written to vault via abiba service
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token, all validate 200). Koby/Koonimo migrated from hardcoded drop-ins to the
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infisical-gateway.sh wrapper (live vault injection). 4/5 agents now vault-backed.
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Canonical process: see § Production Vault Access Process. Tanko (user jerome) pending.
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Abiba's key is now a proper agent key (NOT the master key — stale note removed).
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Current key inventory and agent list: see gpu-fleet.prose.md § Agent Keys.
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Source of truth for LiteLLM config: /opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml
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on CT 116. Last verified: 2026-07-12.
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on CT 116. Last verified: 2026-07-16.
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---
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## Parameters
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@@ -68,6 +74,93 @@ description: >
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- Confirm key alias matches agent_name in LiteLLM key list
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- Verify agent gateway uses vault wrapper: `cat /proc/<pid>/cmdline` shows `infisical run`
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## Production Vault Access Process (canonical, 2026-07-16)
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The non-fail approach to agentic vault access. Deployed on 4/5 agents (tanko pending —
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runs as user `jerome`, not systemd root, needs user-scope adaptation).
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### The canonical pattern
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1. **infisical CLI** installed on the host (`/usr/local/bin/infisical` or `/usr/bin/infisical`).
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2. **Service token** (Infisical Machine Identity, `st.…`) stored root-only at `/root/.infisical-token` (`chmod 600`).
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- Interim: the shared `abiba` service token (`st.8e848433…`) has READ+WRITE on the `agents` project.
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- Proper: one machine identity per agent (create in Infisical UI → Project Settings → Machine Identities).
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3. **`infisical-gateway.sh` wrapper** at `/root/.hermes/infisical-gateway.sh` (`chmod 700`):
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```bash
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#!/bin/bash
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export INFISICAL_API_URL="https://vault.sysloggh.net"
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TOKEN=$(cat /root/.infisical-token)
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LOG=/root/.hermes/logs/gateway.log; mkdir -p /root/.hermes/logs
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while true; do
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infisical run --token="$TOKEN" --projectId=322fceab-39da-4854-a55a-568e76c0f13f \
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--env=prod --domain=https://vault.sysloggh.net -- bash -c '
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. /root/.hermes/.env 2>/dev/null # [FALLBACK Rule 3] safety net only
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export LITELLM_API_KEY="$<AGENT>_LITELLM_API_KEY"
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exec <HERMES_VENV>/bin/python -m hermes_cli.main gateway run
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' >> $LOG 2>&1
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sleep 5 # restart on exit
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done
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```
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4. **Agent key in vault** as `<AGENT>_LITELLM_API_KEY` (e.g. `KOBY_LITELLM_API_KEY`). Vault = source of truth.
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5. **`.env` fallback** at `/root/.hermes/.env` (`chmod 600`) with the same key — safety net ONLY for vault outage (Rule 3/13). Must be kept in sync on rotation.
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6. **systemd service** `hermes-gateway.service` with `ExecStart=/root/.hermes/infisical-gateway.sh`. NO `litellm-key.conf` drop-in (those hardcode keys and rot).
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7. **NEVER hardcode** LiteLLM keys in systemd drop-ins, config.yaml, or /etc/environment. The wrapper injects live from vault.
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### Why this is non-fail
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- **No rot**: keys pulled live from vault at every gateway start. Rotation = one `infisical secrets set` + `systemctl restart`. No per-host file edits.
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- **Survives vault outage**: the `.env` fallback (Rule 3) keeps the gateway running if Infisical is unreachable.
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- **Survives gateway crash**: the wrapper's `while true` + systemd `Restart=on-failure` revive the gateway.
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- **Auditable**: `cat /proc/$(pgrep hermes_cli)/environ` shows the live key; `infisical secrets` shows the vault source.
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### Migration status (2026-07-16)
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| Agent | Host | Pattern | Vault key | Status |
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|-------|------|---------|-----------|--------|
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| abiba | .24 | `infisical run` (pi agent wrapper, service token) | ABIBA_LITELLM_API_KEY | ✅ vault-backed |
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| mumuni | .123 | infisical-gateway.sh + user-login machine identity | MUMUNI_LITELLM_API_KEY | ✅ vault-backed |
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| koby | .129 | infisical-gateway.sh + service token (migrated 2026-07-16) | KOBY_LITELLM_API_KEY | ✅ vault-backed, Zulip (tanko-bot@) + Telegram |
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| koonimo | .114 | infisical-gateway.sh + service token (migrated 2026-07-16) | KOONIMO_LITELLM_API_KEY | ✅ vault-backed |
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> **Baggy = Koonimo (CT 113).** Deleted `BAGGY_LITELLM_API_KEY` from vault 2026-07-16. Only `KOONIMO_LITELLM_API_KEY` exists — one secret per agent.
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| tanko | .122 | **hardcoded in config.yaml** (runs as user jerome, not systemd) | TANKO_LITELLM_API_KEY | ⚠️ TODO: migrate to user-scope wrapper |
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### Tanko migration (pending)
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Tanko runs the gateway as user `jerome` (not root/systemd), with the key hardcoded in
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`/home/jerome/.hermes/config.yaml` (`api_key: sk-CggiHWlamQy…`, valid but not vault-sourced).
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Migration: create a user-scope systemd service (`~/.config/systemd/user/hermes-gateway.service`)
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with `infisical-gateway.sh` wrapper in jerome's home, token at `~/.infisical-token`, lingering
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enabled (`loginctl enable-linger jerome`) so the user service runs without a login session.
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### Koby migration lessons (2026-07-16)
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Migrated Koby from hardcoded systemd drop-in → `infisical-gateway.sh` wrapper.
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**Two mistakes I made that broke the agent:**
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1. **Overwrote `/root/.hermes/.env`** without backing it up. The Zulip API key only existed
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in the running process memory — the old .env was minimal (just LiteLLM key). Zulip creds were
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inherited from the pre-migration gateway env, not stored in any file. Lost on restart.
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2. **Only injected `LITELLM_API_KEY`** in the wrapper — forgot Zulip + Telegram credentials.
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Agents need ALL their platform env vars. Missing vars cause silent adapter failures.
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**How Koby actually connects (2026-07-16):**
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- Zulip: shares **Tanko's bot** (`tanko-bot@chat.sysloggh.net`, `TANKO_ZULIP_API_KEY=5PeD6f3zo…`).
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Koby doesn't have its own Zulip bot (koby-bot@ doesn't exist in the swarm config).
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- Telegram: token `828640…` recovered from `.env.bak-20260603` (18KB backup from June 2026).
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Allowed users: 6679773481. Home channel: 6679773481.
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- Both platforms now connect through the wrapper's env injection.
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**Golden rule for gateway restarts:** always `cat /proc/<pid>/environ` before killing the old
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process — captures the live env set. Especially important when migrating gateways between
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injection mechanisms.
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### Key rotation procedure (one vault operation with this standard)
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1. Generate new key: `POST /key/generate` (master key, admin).
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2. Update vault: `infisical secrets set <AGENT>_LITELLM_API_KEY=sk-NEW --token=$TOKEN --projectId=322fceab… --env=prod --domain=https://vault.sysloggh.net`.
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3. Update `.env` fallback: `echo '<AGENT>_LITELLM_API_KEY=sk-NEW' > /root/.hermes/.env && chmod 600 /root/.hermes/.env`.
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4. Restart: `systemctl restart hermes-gateway`. The wrapper pulls the new key live.
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5. Verify: `curl -H "Authorization: Bearer sk-NEW" http://192.168.68.116/v1/models` → 200.
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## Machine Identity for Vault Writes (ADDED 2026-07-16, WAL #1300)
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**Problem:** The infisical CLI on agent hosts is logged in as a user session (jerome@sysloggh.com).
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@@ -95,9 +188,15 @@ Machine Identities, or an admin API call. **TODO: create `abiba-automation` mach
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and store its credentials in the vault itself (or a root-only file).**
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**Interim (working now):** the `.env` fallback (hermes-config-template Rule 3/13). The
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infisical-gateway.sh wrapper sources `~/.hermes/.env`, so its `MUMUNI_LITELLM_API_KEY` overrides
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the stale vault value. This is fully functional and contract-sanctioned — the vault sync above is
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only for consistency so .env and vault never drift.
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infisical-gateway.sh wrapper sources `~/.hermes/.env`, so its `<AGENT>_LITELLM_API_KEY`
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overrides a stale vault value.
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**2026-07-16 UPDATE — vault is now SYNCED.** The abiba service token (`st.8e848433…`, READ+WRITE)
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can write to the vault, so the session-13 rotated keys (mumuni `sk-OzuWsoX2…`, koby `sk-BqRRMboTI…`,
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koonimo `sk-OEK7z26n6E…`) are now in the vault as `MUMUNI_LITELLM_API_KEY` / `KOBY_LITELLM_API_KEY` /
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`KOONIMO_LITELLM_API_KEY` and validate 200 against LiteLLM. The vault is the source of truth again.
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Creating a dedicated `abiba-automation` machine identity (via UI) is still the proper long-term fix
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so the shared service token isn't reused across hosts — but it is no longer blocking.
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## Key Rotation Log
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@@ -111,5 +210,8 @@ only for consistency so .env and vault never drift.
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- Master key: `sk-litellm-7f96080dd99b15c36bd4b333b58a6796` (in /opt/inference-harness/.env on CT116, Infisical project=infrastructure env=production secret=LITELLM_MASTER_KEY)
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- Used for /key/generate, /key/delete, /key/list (GET), DB queries
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- **Known violation:** Abiba's LITELLM_API_KEY IS the master key (should be a dedicated `abiba` virtual key). TODO: generate `abiba` virtual key and stop using master key directly.
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- **Known violation (RESOLVED 2026-07-16):** Abiba's LITELLM_API_KEY was previously the master key.
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It is now a dedicated agent key `sk-sxbphLvk1OU…` (vault secret `ABIBA_LITELLM_API_KEY`, alias `abiba-pi`).
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The master key is admin-only (/key/generate, /key/delete, /key/list). NEVER use it for inference —
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see `litellm-self-heal` § "NEVER use litellm_proxy_master_key for inference".
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- LiteLLM key DB: `harness-postgres` container on CT116, table `"LiteLLM_VerificationToken"` (columns: token, key_alias, key_name, created_at, expires). Query: `docker exec harness-postgres psql -U litellm -d litellm -t -c "SELECT key_alias, substr(token,1,16) FROM \"LiteLLM_VerificationToken\" ORDER BY created_at;"`
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jerome
root