feat(litellm): align contracts for 7-provider cloud consolidation (2026-09-20)

- hermes-key-enforcement: add Model Access Tiers (local vs cloud) and cloud-scoping clause
- litellm-api-keys: add Cloud Provider Consolidation section (provider map, vault secrets, access tiers)
- litellm-api-keys: pin standard agent keys to explicit local-only models list; forbid {}/all-proxy-models (Community-edition cloud leak)
- contract-registry: register litellm-api-keys (was unregistered drift)

Additive only. Local prose-lint: PASSED.

audit-hermes-config.py

@@ -114,12 +114,22 @@ def audit(path):
     )
 
     # --- Rule 5: Main Config Base URL ---
-    expected_base = "http://192.168.68.116/v1"
-    check(
-        model.get("base_url") == expected_base,
-        "Rule 5",
-        f"model.base_url must be {expected_base} (got {model.get('base_url')!r}) — /v1 not /litellm/v1",
-    )
+    # Canonical internal base (hermes-key-enforcement.prose.md:19/38/57/84/91/96)
+    # and public base (serves /v1 only, per 2026-09-19 probe from CT 116).
+    # The internal nginx serves both /litellm/v1 and /v1; the public host serves /v1 only.
+    # FAIL anything else (do not widen to accept any path ending in /v1).
+    # Internal /v1 is non-canonical but working (authenticated via nginx), so WARN not FAIL.
+    canonical_internal = "http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1"
+    public_host = "https://litellm.sysloggh.net/v1"
+    non_canonical_internal = "http://192.168.68.116/v1"
+    allowed_bases = (canonical_internal, public_host)
+    actual_base = model.get("base_url")
+    if actual_base in allowed_bases:
+        check(True, "Rule 5", f"model.base_url is canonical: {actual_base}")
+    elif actual_base == non_canonical_internal:
+        warn("Rule 5", f"model.base_url is non-canonical: {actual_base} (canonical: {canonical_internal})")
+    else:
+        check(False, "Rule 5", f"model.base_url must be one of {allowed_bases} (got {actual_base!r})")
 
     # --- Rule 6: max_tokens Is Required ---
     check(

contract-registry.yaml

@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ index:
   by_category:
     compliance:
     - hermes-key-enforcement
+    - litellm-api-keys
     - hermes-config-template
     - hermes-agent-baseline
     monitoring:
@@ -101,6 +102,7 @@ index:
     proxmox:
     - proxmox-monitor
     litellm:
+    - litellm-api-keys
     - litellm-health
     - litellm-self-heal
     memory:
@@ -628,7 +630,7 @@ contracts:
   sensitivity: high
   status: active
   owner: abiba
-  version: 3.3.0
+  version: 3.4.0
   trigger:
     type: scheduled
     cadence: '*/15 * * * *'
@@ -1869,6 +1871,58 @@ contracts:
   drift_alerts: []
 # Koby Report-Only Registry (2026-08-17 — Captain)
 # ⛔ KOBY IS NEVER REPAIRED — detect + report, never fix on .129
+- name: litellm-api-keys
+  file: litellm-api-keys.prose.md
+  kind: function
+  category: compliance
+  sensitivity: critical
+  status: active
+  owner: abiba
+  version: 1.1.0
+  trigger:
+    type: on_demand
+    cadence: null
+    description: "Manual invocation when creating/rotating/verifying agent LiteLLM keys"
+    cron_job_id: null
+  execution:
+    agent: abiba
+    timeout: 120
+    requires: []
+    protocol:
+    - Load contract from prose-contracts/main
+    - Retrieve master key from Infisical (project=infrastructure env=production)
+    - Read live key-scoped model roster from CT 116 /v1/models
+    - Create/rotate/verify the requested agent key with an EXPLICIT models list
+    - 'Never create a key with an empty models list or all-proxy-models (Cloud leak)'
+  verification:
+    postconditions:
+    - check: standard agent key is local-only
+      verify: 'curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer <KEY>" http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1/models | jq -r ''.data[].id'' | grep -c /'
+      expect: 0 cloud models
+    - check: key exists with correct alias
+      verify: 'curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer <MASTER>" http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1/key/info?key_alias=<AGENT>'
+      expect: 200 with matching alias
+    artifact: key creation/rotation report
+  receipt:
+    format: json
+    storage: ~/.hermes/runs/litellm-api-keys/
+    graph_node: true
+  escalation:
+    info:
+      action: log_to_receipt
+      notify: []
+    warning:
+      action: relay_alert
+      notify:
+      - abiba
+      - mumuni
+    critical:
+      action: relay_alert
+      notify:
+      - abiba
+      - mumuni
+      - ops
+
 koby_report_only: true
 koby_host: "CT 111 (tdunna)"
 koby_ip: ".129"

hermes-key-enforcement.prose.md

@@ -16,7 +16,26 @@ author: Abiba (pi agent)
 
 ## Rule (One Sentence)
 
-**All harness/litellm providers MUST use `api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY` with authenticated path `http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1/responses` — hardcoded keys AND unauthenticated `/v1` direct access are both forbidden.**
+**All harness/litellm providers MUST use `api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY` with canonical internal path `http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1` (Hermes appends `/v1/responses`) or public path `https://litellm.sysloggh.net/v1` — hardcoded keys AND direct `:4000` access are both forbidden. Internal `/v1` still works but is non-canonical (WARN, not FAIL).**
+
+**Cloud provider models (OpenRouter, DeepSeek, Google AI Studio, QwenCloud PAYG/Plan, Tencent TokenHub PAYG/Plan) added to CT 116 on 2026-09-20 are reachable ONLY through the designated cloud-enabled key. Standard agent keys remain LOCAL-ONLY (`strix-moe`, `gpu-dense`, `gpu-vision`, `syslog-auto`) and MUST NOT be granted cloud models unless explicitly approved by the captain.**
+
+## Model Access Tiers (2026-09-20)
+
+CT 116 hosts two **access tiers** of model. Tier membership is enforced per virtual key via that key's `models` allowlist.
+
+| Tier | Models | Who gets it |
+|------|--------|-------------|
+| **Local** | `strix-moe`, `gpu-dense`, `gpu-vision`, `syslog-auto` | All standard agent keys (tanko, mumuni, koby, koonimo, abiba-pi) |
+| **Cloud** | 47 provider models: `openrouter/*`, `deepseek/*`, `google/*`, `qwen-payg/*`, `qwen-plan/*`, `tencent-payg/*`, `tencent-plan/*` | **Only** the designated cloud-enabled key (captain decision) |
+
+**Rules:**
+1. A key with an empty `models` list (`{}`) or `all-proxy-models` is UNSCOPED — it silently gains ALL models, including cloud. Never create or leave an agent key in this state.
+2. Agent keys MUST carry an **explicit local-only** `models` list.
+3. Granting a cloud model to an agent key requires explicit captain approval and a recorded reason.
+4. The master key always bypasses scoping — it is admin-only, never for inference.
+
+See `litellm-api-keys` § Cloud Provider Consolidation for the key-creation procedure.
 
 ## Scope
 
@@ -38,8 +57,8 @@ Syslog is migrating away from **unauthenticated direct access** to the shared in
 | `http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1` | Bearer `sk-*` key (nginx-fronted) | ✅ **CURRENT / CANONICAL** — captain-approved migration target; 600s proxy_read_timeout (verified) |
 | `http://192.168.68.116:4000/v1` | Bearer `sk-*` key (direct container) | ❌ **FORBIDDEN** — bypasses nginx; port 4000 direct is not a config path |
 
-All harness/litellm providers MUST use an authenticated nginx-fronted path (`/litellm/v1` canonical, `/v1` legacy-valid).
-Any `base_url` pointing at `:4000` or a bare IP without nginx is a **migration violation**.
+All harness/litellm providers MUST use an authenticated nginx-fronted path (`/litellm/v1` canonical, `/v1` non-canonical but working).
+The public host `https://litellm.sysloggh.net` serves `/v1` ONLY (404 on `/litellm/v1`).
 
 ### 🔥 CRITICAL: Double-Path Bug (2026-07-10)
 
@@ -113,7 +132,7 @@ model:
 
 model:
   provider: harness
-  base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1   # ← RULE VIOLATION: unauthenticated path
+  base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1   # ← NON-CANONICAL but WORKING (authenticated via nginx, WARN not FAIL)
   api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
 ```
 

infrastructure-control.prose.md

@@ -759,4 +759,4 @@ which was kill+nohup outside systemd) are banned by policy.
 | Script | Why Disabled |
 |--------|-------------|
 | `zulip-watchdog.sh` (Mumuni) | kill+nohup bypassed systemd, 27 restarts, pattern mismatch |
-| `zulip-monitor.sh` (Abiba) | Replaced by agent-health-check.py + PM2 auto-restart |
+| `zulip-monitor.sh` (Abiba) | Standalone cron replaced by agent-health-check.py + PM2 auto-restart; the script itself remains active as the execution step of the `zulip-health` responsibility contract (see `zulip-health.prose.md`) |

litellm-api-keys.prose.md

@@ -71,6 +71,10 @@ description: >
    - Set models: read the live key-scoped set rather than hardcoding one — `/v1/models` is key-scoped,
      and the authoritative registry is CT 116 `/opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml`. Do not add
      retired names (`gemma-4-12b`, `gpu-light`, `crew-auto` — all retired 2026-09-12).
+   - **Standard agent keys are LOCAL-ONLY**: `["strix-moe", "gpu-dense", "gpu-vision", "syslog-auto"]`.
+     Cloud models are granted ONLY to the designated cloud-enabled key — see § Cloud Provider
+     Consolidation. NEVER create a key with an empty `models` list (`{}`) or `all-proxy-models`.
+     In LiteLLM Community both silently grant access to EVERY model, including cloud.
    - Note: `ornith-1.0-35b` is NOT a valid LiteLLM model name (use `strix-moe`, the stable alias). qwen3.6-35B-A3B removed from fleet (was never deployed).
    - Return the new key
 5. **If action == "rotate"**:
@@ -87,6 +91,66 @@ description: >
    - Confirm key alias matches agent_name in LiteLLM key list
    - Verify agent gateway uses vault wrapper: `cat /proc/<pid>/cmdline` shows `infisical run`
 
+## Cloud Provider Consolidation (2026-09-20)
+
+CT 116 LiteLLM (Community v1.99.1) fronts **7 upstream providers** in addition to the local
+GPU models. Added 2026-09-20 — 47 cloud deployments, 51 unique model names total.
+
+### Provider map (per-account namespacing)
+
+Two accounts on the same vendor get **distinct prefixes** so billing, rate limits, and keys
+stay separate:
+
+| Prefix | Upstream | Auth | Vault secret |
+|--------|----------|------|--------------|
+| `openrouter/` | OpenRouter | API key | `OPENROUTER_API_KEY` |
+| `deepseek/` | DeepSeek direct | API key | `DEEPSEEK_API_KEY` |
+| `google/` | Google AI Studio (Gemini) | API key | `GEMINI_API_KEY` |
+| `qwen-payg/` | QwenCloud / DashScope (pay-as-you-go) | API key | `DASHSCOPE_PAYG_KEY` |
+| `qwen-plan/` | QwenCloud / DashScope (token plan) | API key | `DASHSCOPE_PLAN_KEY` |
+| `tencent-payg/` | Tencent TokenHub (PAYG) | Bearer token | `TENCENT_PAYG_KEY` |
+| `tencent-plan/` | Tencent TokenHub (Plan) | Bearer token | `TENCENT_PLAN_KEY` |
+
+All cloud `api_key` fields use `os.environ/<NAME>` — the 7 secrets live in Infisical
+(project=`infrastructure`, env=`production`, folder=`root`) and are injected into the
+`harness-litellm` container at start. **No literal cloud keys in `litellm_config.yaml`.**
+
+### Access tiers (MUST be enforced per key)
+
+| Tier | Model names | Granted to |
+|------|-------------|------------|
+| **Local** | `strix-moe`, `gpu-dense`, `gpu-vision`, `syslog-auto` | every standard agent key |
+| **Cloud** | the 47 provider models (`<prefix>/<model>`) | **only** the designated cloud-enabled key |
+
+> ⚠️ **Community-edition caveat:** LiteLLM Community does not restrict wildcard access groups
+> the way Enterprise does. Access is decided by each key's explicit `models` list. A key with
+> `models = {}` or `models = ["all-proxy-models"]` sees **all** models — a silent cloud leak.
+> Every key MUST carry an explicit list. The master key always bypasses scoping (admin-only).
+
+### Creating the cloud-enabled key
+
+```bash
+# ALWAYS read the live roster first (key-scoped):
+curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer <AGENT_KEY>" http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1/models \
+  | jq -r '.data[].id'
+
+# Then generate a key with an EXPLICIT model list (never empty, never a wildcard).
+# For the cloud-enabled key, list local + cloud. For a standard agent, local only.
+```
+
+Verify after any key change: a standard agent key must return **4 models**, and must NOT return
+any `<prefix>/` cloud model.
+
+### Adding a new cloud provider
+
+1. Add the upstream key to Infisical `infrastructure/production/root`.
+2. Add the deployment(s) to `/opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml` with an `os.environ/` ref
+   and a namespaced `model_name` (`<provider>-<account>/<model>` when a vendor has >1 account).
+3. Restart the `harness-litellm` container.
+4. Grant the model to the cloud-enabled key ONLY (explicit list) — never to agent keys without
+   captain approval.
+5. Update this table and the access-tier section.
+
 ## Production Vault Access Process (canonical, 2026-07-17)
 
 The non-fail approach to agentic vault access. Deployed on all 4 Hermes agents

proxmox-monitor.prose.md

@@ -89,6 +89,48 @@ agent: abiba
 | minipve | 192.168.68.12 | PVE |
 | amdpve | 192.168.68.15 | PVE + Strix Halo LLM (strix-moe) |
 
+## PBS GC (Proxmox Backup Server)
+
+### Schedule
+Cron `0 20 * * *` on the **storepve HOST** (192.168.68.6) = 20:00 America/New_York local = **00:00 UTC**.
+
+**NOTE**: The closed PR #116 said "20:00 UTC" — this is WRONG by four hours. Do not copy it.
+
+### What Actually Runs
+Host script `/usr/local/bin/pbs-gc.sh` runs `pct exec 107 -- proxmox-backup-manager garbage-collection start storepve-datastore`.
+
+**IMPORTANT**: The tool `proxmox-backup-manager` exists only inside CT 107 (where the PBS server runs). The storepve host has only `proxmox-backup-client`. This is why the job had never worked before 2026-09-19 00:00 UTC.
+
+### Datastore Location
+- **Datastore**: CT 107's `/mnt/pbs-backup` on the storepve ZFS dataset `/tank/pbs-backup` (pool `tank`, ~11T free)
+- **NOT** `/media/easystore2` (media library, 3.7T, 96% used — separate volume)
+
+### Liveness Check
+The new `proxmox-monitor.sh` leg checks storepve-datastore GC health:
+- Reads GC state from CT 107: `pct exec 107 -- proxmox-backup-manager garbage-collection list --output-format json`
+- **FAILS** if `last-run-endtime` is older than 48 hours
+- Reports age in hours and pending-bytes
+
+**All six verdict shapes** (exactly as emitted by the script):
+
+1. **Healthy** (fresh GC, 0 B pending):
+   `✅ PBS GC: healthy (last run 1h ago, pending-bytes: 0 B)`
+
+2. **Stale** (GC ran >48h ago):
+   `🔴 PBS GC: stale (last run 49h ago, pending-bytes: 1048576 B)`
+
+3. **Probe-failed: empty read** (000/timeout/unreadable):
+   `🔴 PBS GC: probe-failed: storepve:192.168.68.6 (expected JSON, got 000)`
+
+4. **Probe-failed: unparseable** (non-empty but invalid JSON — the "command not found" case):
+   `🔴 PBS GC: probe-failed: storepve:192.168.68.6 (unparseable JSON)`
+
+5. **Never-run: datastore absent** (valid JSON but storepve-datastore not in list):
+   `🔴 PBS GC: never-run (storepve-datastore not found in GC list)`
+
+6. **Never-run: no endtime** (valid JSON with datastore present but last-run-endtime is null/0):
+   `🔴 PBS GC: never-run (storepve-datastore has no last-run-endtime)`
+
 ## Operations
 
 ### view-dashboards

scripts/litellm-health-check.py

@@ -55,9 +55,12 @@ def probe_http(url, method="GET", bearer_token=None, data=None, timeout=10, foll
     try:
         rc, stdout, stderr = run_command(cmd, timeout)
         if rc != 0:
-            # Determine failure kind from curl exit code
+            # Check if this is a timeout from run_command (rc=1, stderr="TIMEOUT")
+            if rc == 1 and stderr == "TIMEOUT":
+                return (000, "timeout after " + str(timeout) + "s")
+            # Otherwise, determine failure kind from curl exit code
             # curl exit codes: 28=timeout, 7=refused, 6=dns, 35=ssl, 52=empty
-            if rc == 28:
+            elif rc == 28:
                 return (000, "timeout after " + str(timeout) + "s")
             elif rc == 7:
                 return (000, "connection refused")
@@ -73,6 +76,20 @@ def probe_http(url, method="GET", bearer_token=None, data=None, timeout=10, foll
     except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
         return (000, "timeout after " + str(timeout) + "s")
 
+def check_host_health(host_ip):
+    """Check if the GPU host's llama-chat-api health endpoint is reachable
+    
+    Returns: (healthy: bool, detail: str)
+    """
+    code, _ = probe_http("http://" + host_ip + ":8080/health", timeout=10)
+    if code == 200:
+        return True, "host healthy (200)"
+    elif code == 000:
+        return False, "host unreachable (timeout or refused)"
+    else:
+        return False, "host unhealthy (HTTP " + str(code) + ")"
+
+
 def get_response_body(url, method="POST", bearer_token=None, data=None, timeout=30):
     """Get response body for 401/403 credential faults (truncated to 200 chars)"""
     cmd = "curl -s -m " + str(timeout)
@@ -115,29 +132,53 @@ def check_model_probes():
     
     results = []
     
+    # Host health mapping: model -> host IP
+    model_hosts = {
+        "gpu-dense": "192.168.68.8",  # RTX 3090
+        "gpu-vision": "192.168.68.110",  # RTX 5070
+        "strix-moe": "192.168.68.15"  # Strix Halo
+    }
+    
     for model in ["gpu-dense", "gpu-vision", "strix-moe"]:
-        # Single-host aliases: 30s timeout each
-        # gpu-dense (RTX 3090) may need long warmup/prefill - timeout is acceptable on cold-start
+        host_ip = model_hosts[model]
+        # Single-host aliases: 30s initial timeout, retry once at 90s on failure
+        # Worst-case prefill ~76s, so 90s retry ensures we cover it
         code, failure_kind = probe_http("http://" + BACKEND_HOST + "/litellm/v1/chat/completions",
                                        method="POST",
                                        bearer_token=monitor_key,
                                        data='{"model":"' + model + '","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"health ' + str(random.randint(1000, 9999)) + '"}],"max_tokens":4}',
                                        timeout=30)
         
+        first_kind = None
         if code == 000 and failure_kind:
-            # Report probe failure with kind, do not assert a service verdict
-            results.append((model, False, "probe-failed: " + model + " " + failure_kind + " (30s timeout)"))
+            first_kind = failure_kind
+            time.sleep(1)
+            code, failure_kind = probe_http("http://" + BACKEND_HOST + "/litellm/v1/chat/completions",
+                                           method="POST",
+                                           bearer_token=monitor_key,
+                                           data='{"model":"' + model + '","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"health ' + str(random.randint(1000, 9999)) + '"}],"max_tokens":4}',
+                                           timeout=90)
+        
+        if code == 000 and failure_kind:
+            # Both attempts failed - check host health to distinguish busy from down
+            host_healthy, host_detail = check_host_health(host_ip)
+            if host_healthy:
+                results.append((model, False, "busy (completion timed out after retry; " + host_detail + ")"))
+            else:
+                # Host unreachable - report both kinds
+                if first_kind:
+                    results.append((model, False, "probe-failed: " + model + " " + first_kind + " then " + failure_kind + " (2 attempts)"))
+                else:
+                    results.append((model, False, "probe-failed: " + model + " " + failure_kind))
         elif code == 200:
             results.append((model, True, str(code) + " (target: " + BACKEND_HOST + "/litellm/v1/chat/completions, model=" + model + ")"))
         elif code in (401, 403):
-            # Credential fault - capture body and key alias
             body = get_response_body("http://" + BACKEND_HOST + "/litellm/v1/chat/completions",
                                     method="POST",
                                     bearer_token=monitor_key,
                                     data='{"model":"' + model + '","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"health"}],"max_tokens":4}',
                                     timeout=10)
-            # Resolve key alias
-            alias = "monitor-20260813"  # Known from /etc/litellm-monitor.env on CT 116
+            alias = "monitor-20260813"
             results.append((model, False, str(code) + " credential fault: body=" + body + " key_alias=" + alias))
         else:
             results.append((model, False, str(code) + " (target: " + BACKEND_HOST + "/litellm/v1/chat/completions, model=" + model + ")"))
@@ -247,6 +288,7 @@ def main():
     print("")
     
     all_pass = True
+    degraded = []  # Track degraded (busy) checks
     
     # Run all checks
     checks = [
@@ -266,9 +308,15 @@ def main():
     # Model probes
     model_results = check_model_probes()
     for name, passed, detail in model_results:
-        status = "✅" if passed else "❌"
+        # Check if this is a busy (degraded) verdict
+        if not passed and detail.startswith("busy "):
+            status = "⚠️"
+            degraded.append(name)
+        else:
+            status = "✅" if passed else "❌"
         print("  " + status + " " + name + ": " + detail)
-        if not passed:
+        # Only set all_pass=False for real failures (not busy)
+        if not passed and not detail.startswith("busy "):
             all_pass = False
     
     # Admin key list
@@ -294,10 +342,16 @@ def main():
     
     print("")
     if all_pass:
-        print("✅ All checks passed")
+        if degraded:
+            print("✅ All checks passed (" + str(len(degraded)) + " degraded: " + ", ".join(degraded) + ")")
+        else:
+            print("✅ All checks passed")
         return 0
     else:
-        print("❌ Some checks failed")
+        if degraded:
+            print("❌ Some checks failed (" + str(len(degraded)) + " degraded: " + ", ".join(degraded) + ")")
+        else:
+            print("❌ Some checks failed")
         return 1
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":

scripts/proxmox-monitor.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# proxmox-monitor.sh — Proxmox Cluster + Docker Monitoring Health Check
+# Implements proxmox-monitor.prose.md (check-health section)
+#
+# Legs: Prometheus, Grafana, Docker Stats Exporter, PVE Exporter, PBS GC
+# All legs must return 200 for healthy status.
+#
+# Run: bash scripts/proxmox-monitor.sh
+# Exits 0 if all probes pass, 1 if any fails.
+
+set -uo pipefail
+
+CT116_HOST="192.168.68.116"
+FAILED=()
+TIMESTAMP=$(date -u '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M UTC')
+
+echo "=== Proxmox Monitor — $TIMESTAMP ==="
+echo "Executed from: $(pwd -P)"
+echo ""
+
+# 1. Prometheus health (bound to 0.0.0.0:9090 on .116)
+PROM_CODE=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 10 http://${CT116_HOST}:9090/-/healthy 2>/dev/null)
+PROM_CODE=$(printf '%s' "$PROM_CODE" | tr -d '[:space:]')
+[ -n "$PROM_CODE" ] || PROM_CODE="000"
+
+if [ "$PROM_CODE" = "200" ]; then
+    echo "  ✅ Prometheus: alive"
+else
+    echo "  🔴 Prometheus: probe-failed: ${CT116_HOST}:9090 (expected 200, got ${PROM_CODE})"
+    FAILED+=("prometheus")
+fi
+
+# 2. Grafana health (bound to 0.0.0.0:3001 on .116)
+GRAF_CODE=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 10 http://${CT116_HOST}:3001/api/health 2>/dev/null)
+GRAF_CODE=$(printf '%s' "$GRAF_CODE" | tr -d '[:space:]')
+[ -n "$GRAF_CODE" ] || GRAF_CODE="000"
+
+if [ "$GRAF_CODE" = "200" ]; then
+    echo "  ✅ Grafana: alive"
+else
+    echo "  🔴 Grafana: probe-failed: ${CT116_HOST}:3001 (expected 200, got ${GRAF_CODE})"
+    FAILED+=("grafana")
+fi
+
+# 3. Docker Stats exporter (bound to 127.0.0.1:9324 on .116 — probe from .116 localhost)
+DOCKER_CODE=$(ssh -o ConnectTimeout=5 -o BatchMode=yes root@${CT116_HOST} \
+    "curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 10 http://127.0.0.1:9324/metrics" 2>/dev/null)
+DOCKER_CODE=$(printf '%s' "$DOCKER_CODE" | tr -d '[:space:]')
+[ -n "$DOCKER_CODE" ] || DOCKER_CODE="000"
+
+if [ "$DOCKER_CODE" = "200" ]; then
+    echo "  ✅ Docker Stats: alive"
+else
+    echo "  🔴 Docker Stats: probe-failed: CT116:127.0.0.1:9324 (expected 200, got ${DOCKER_CODE})"
+    FAILED+=("docker-stats")
+fi
+
+# 4. PVE Exporter (bound to 127.0.0.1:9221 on .116 — probe from .116 localhost)
+PVE_CODE=$(ssh -o ConnectTimeout=5 -o BatchMode=yes root@${CT116_HOST} \
+    "curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --connect-timeout 10 http://127.0.0.1:9221/metrics" 2>/dev/null)
+PVE_CODE=$(printf '%s' "$PVE_CODE" | tr -d '[:space:]')
+[ -n "$PVE_CODE" ] || PVE_CODE="000"
+
+if [ "$PVE_CODE" = "200" ]; then
+    echo "  ✅ PVE Exporter: alive"
+else
+    echo "  🔴 PVE Exporter: probe-failed: CT116:127.0.0.1:9221 (expected 200, got ${PVE_CODE})"
+    FAILED+=("pve-exporter")
+fi
+
+# 5. PBS GC liveness (storepve-datastore GC must have run within 48h)
+PBS_GC_OUTPUT=$(ssh -o ConnectTimeout=5 -o BatchMode=yes root@192.168.68.6 \
+    "pct exec 107 -- proxmox-backup-manager garbage-collection list --output-format json" 2>/dev/null)
+PBS_GC_OUTPUT=$(printf '%s' "$PBS_GC_OUTPUT" | tr -d '[:space:]')
+[ -n "$PBS_GC_OUTPUT" ] || PBS_GC_OUTPUT="000"
+
+if [ "$PBS_GC_OUTPUT" = "000" ]; then
+    echo "  🔴 PBS GC: probe-failed: storepve:192.168.68.6 (expected JSON, got 000)"
+    FAILED+=("pbs-gc")
+else
+    # Parse the JSON to get storepve-datastore's last-run-endtime and pending-bytes
+    PBS_GC_RESULT=$(echo "$PBS_GC_OUTPUT" | python3 -c "
+import sys, json
+try:
+    data = json.load(sys.stdin)
+    for store in data:
+        if store['store'] == 'storepve-datastore':
+            endtime = store.get('last-run-endtime')
+            pending = store.get('pending-bytes', 0)
+            if endtime is None or endtime == 0:
+                print('never-run')
+            else:
+                print(f'{endtime}|{pending}')
+            break
+    else:
+        print('absent')
+except json.JSONDecodeError:
+    print('unparseable')
+" 2>/dev/null)
+    
+    if [ -z "$PBS_GC_RESULT" ] || [ "$PBS_GC_RESULT" = "unparseable" ]; then
+        echo "  🔴 PBS GC: probe-failed: storepve:192.168.68.6 (unparseable JSON)"
+        FAILED+=("pbs-gc")
+    elif [ "$PBS_GC_RESULT" = "absent" ]; then
+        echo "  🔴 PBS GC: never-run (storepve-datastore not found in GC list)"
+        FAILED+=("pbs-gc")
+    elif [ "$PBS_GC_RESULT" = "never-run" ]; then
+        echo "  🔴 PBS GC: never-run (storepve-datastore has no last-run-endtime)"
+        FAILED+=("pbs-gc")
+    else
+        # Parse the endtime|pending format
+        LAST_RUN_ENDTIME=$(echo "$PBS_GC_RESULT" | cut -d'|' -f1)
+        PENDING_BYTES=$(echo "$PBS_GC_RESULT" | cut -d'|' -f2)
+        
+        # Convert epoch to age in hours
+        NOW_EPOCH=$(date -u +%s)
+        AGE_HOURS=$(( (NOW_EPOCH - LAST_RUN_ENDTIME) / 3600 ))
+        
+        if [ $AGE_HOURS -gt 48 ]; then
+            echo "  🔴 PBS GC: stale (last run ${AGE_HOURS}h ago, pending-bytes: ${PENDING_BYTES} B)"
+            FAILED+=("pbs-gc")
+        else
+            echo "  ✅ PBS GC: healthy (last run ${AGE_HOURS}h ago, pending-bytes: ${PENDING_BYTES} B)"
+        fi
+    fi
+fi
+
+# ── Summary ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+echo ""
+if [ ${#FAILED[@]} -eq 0 ]; then
+    echo "  ✅ All legs OK"
+    exit 0
+else
+    for f in "${FAILED[@]}"; do
+        echo "  🔴 FAILED: $f"
+    done
+    exit 1
+fi

scripts/test_proxmox_monitor.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# test_proxmox_monitor.sh — Stub-driven tests for PBS GC liveness leg
+
+set -uo pipefail
+
+SCRIPT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)/proxmox-monitor.sh"
+PASS=0
+FAIL=0
+
+# ── Helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+assert() {
+    local desc="$1" cond="$2"
+    if eval "$cond" 2>/dev/null; then
+        echo "  ✅ $desc"
+        PASS=$((PASS+1))
+    else
+        echo "  🔴 $desc"
+        FAIL=$((FAIL+1))
+    fi
+}
+
+# ── 1. Healthy: fresh GC, 0 B pending ─────────────────────────────────────
+TMP_DIR=$(mktemp -d)
+FRESH_ENDTIME=$(( $(date -u +%s) - (1 * 3600) ))  # 1 hour ago
+cat > "$TMP_DIR/ssh" << EOF
+#!/bin/bash
+# Stub: return valid JSON with fresh endtime
+echo '[{"store":"storepve-datastore","last-run-endtime":$FRESH_ENDTIME,"pending-bytes":0}]'
+exit 0
+EOF
+chmod +x "$TMP_DIR/ssh"
+
+OUT=$(PATH="$TMP_DIR:$PATH" bash "$SCRIPT" 2>&1)
+PBS_LINE=$(echo "$OUT" | grep "PBS GC:" || echo "")
+assert "Healthy: PBS line exists" '[[ -n "$PBS_LINE" ]]'
+assert "Healthy: shows healthy verdict" '[[ "$PBS_LINE" == *"healthy"* ]]'
+assert "Healthy: shows pending-bytes 0 B" '[[ "$PBS_LINE" == *"pending-bytes: 0 B"* ]]'
+rm -rf "$TMP_DIR"
+
+# ── 2. Stale: GC >48h old ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+TMP_DIR=$(mktemp -d)
+OLD_ENDTIME=$(( $(date -u +%s) - (49 * 3600) ))  # 49 hours ago
+cat > "$TMP_DIR/ssh" << EOF
+#!/bin/bash
+echo '[{"store":"storepve-datastore","last-run-endtime":$OLD_ENDTIME,"pending-bytes":1048576}]'
+exit 0
+EOF
+chmod +x "$TMP_DIR/ssh"
+
+OUT=$(PATH="$TMP_DIR:$PATH" bash "$SCRIPT" 2>&1)
+PBS_LINE=$(echo "$OUT" | grep "PBS GC:" || echo "")
+assert "Stale: PBS line exists" '[[ -n "$PBS_LINE" ]]'
+assert "Stale: shows stale verdict" '[[ "$PBS_LINE" == *"stale"* ]]'
+assert "Stale: shows pending-bytes 1048576 B" '[[ "$PBS_LINE" == *"pending-bytes: 1048576 B"* ]]'
+rm -rf "$TMP_DIR"
+
+# ── 3. Probe-failed: empty output ─────────────────────────────────────────
+TMP_DIR=$(mktemp -d)
+cat > "$TMP_DIR/ssh" << 'EOF'
+#!/bin/bash
+exit 0
+EOF
+chmod +x "$TMP_DIR/ssh"
+
+OUT=$(PATH="$TMP_DIR:$PATH" bash "$SCRIPT" 2>&1)
+PBS_LINE=$(echo "$OUT" | grep "PBS GC:" || echo "")
+assert "Probe-failed (empty): PBS line exists" '[[ -n "$PBS_LINE" ]]'
+assert "Probe-failed (empty): shows probe-failed" '[[ "$PBS_LINE" == *"probe-failed"* ]]'
+rm -rf "$TMP_DIR"
+
+# ── 4. Probe-failed: unparseable output ───────────────────────────────────
+TMP_DIR=$(mktemp -d)
+cat > "$TMP_DIR/ssh" << 'EOF'
+#!/bin/bash
+echo "proxmox-backup-manager: command not found"
+exit 0
+EOF
+chmod +x "$TMP_DIR/ssh"
+
+OUT=$(PATH="$TMP_DIR:$PATH" bash "$SCRIPT" 2>&1)
+PBS_LINE=$(echo "$OUT" | grep "PBS GC:" || echo "")
+assert "Probe-failed (unparseable): PBS line exists" '[[ -n "$PBS_LINE" ]]'
+assert "Probe-failed (unparseable): shows probe-failed" '[[ "$PBS_LINE" == *"probe-failed"* ]]'
+rm -rf "$TMP_DIR"
+
+# ── 5. Null endtime: never-run ────────────────────────────────────────────
+TMP_DIR=$(mktemp -d)
+cat > "$TMP_DIR/ssh" << 'EOF'
+#!/bin/bash
+echo '[{"store":"storepve-datastore","last-run-endtime":null,"pending-bytes":0}]'
+exit 0
+EOF
+chmod +x "$TMP_DIR/ssh"
+
+OUT=$(PATH="$TMP_DIR:$PATH" bash "$SCRIPT" 2>&1)
+PBS_LINE=$(echo "$OUT" | grep "PBS GC:" || echo "")
+assert "Null endtime: PBS line exists" '[[ -n "$PBS_LINE" ]]'
+assert "Null endtime: shows never-run" '[[ "$PBS_LINE" == *"never-run"* ]]'
+rm -rf "$TMP_DIR"
+
+# ── 6. Datastore absent ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
+TMP_DIR=$(mktemp -d)
+cat > "$TMP_DIR/ssh" << 'EOF'
+#!/bin/bash
+echo '[{"store":"s3-archive","last-run-endtime":null,"pending-bytes":0}]'
+exit 0
+EOF
+chmod +x "$TMP_DIR/ssh"
+
+OUT=$(PATH="$TMP_DIR:$PATH" bash "$SCRIPT" 2>&1)
+PBS_LINE=$(echo "$OUT" | grep "PBS GC:" || echo "")
+assert "Datastore absent: PBS line exists" '[[ -n "$PBS_LINE" ]]'
+assert "Datastore absent: shows never-run" '[[ "$PBS_LINE" == *"never-run"* ]]'
+rm -rf "$TMP_DIR"
+
+# ── Summary ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+echo ""
+echo "Results: ${PASS} passed, ${FAIL} failed"
+if [ $FAIL -gt 0 ]; then
+    echo "  🔴 TESTS FAILED"
+    exit 1
+else
+    echo "  ✅ ALL TESTS PASSED"
+    exit 0
+fi

scripts/zulip-monitor.sh

@@ -176,6 +176,11 @@ fi
 # never contact her former host.
 
 # ── Platform C: Agent Zero (kagentz) ──
+# C1: A2A liveness (no credential needed) — probes the container's internal :80/a2a/
+# C2: A2A response verification (needs LITELLM_KEY) — probes POST /a2a with auth
+# C3: Public access path (no credential needed) — probes https://kagentz.sysloggh.net/
+
+# C1: A2A liveness (container-internal probe)
 AZ_A2A_CODE=$(ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ConnectTimeout=5 root@192.168.68.14 \
   "docker exec agent-zero curl -s --connect-timeout 5 -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://127.0.0.1:80/a2a/ 2>/dev/null" 2>/dev/null) || AZ_A2A_CODE="000"
 AZ_A2A_CODE=$(printf '%s' "$AZ_A2A_CODE" | tr -d '[:space:]')
@@ -184,27 +189,53 @@ AZ_A2A_CODE=$(printf '%s' "$AZ_A2A_CODE" | tr -d '[:space:]')
 if [ "$AZ_A2A_CODE" = "000" ]; then
   notify "🔴" "kagentz A2A server DOWN (connection failed)"
   ISSUES=$((ISSUES + 1))
-  echo "  kagentz: ❌ A2A down (HTTP 000)" >> "$LOG"
+  echo "  kagentz C1: ❌ A2A down (HTTP 000)" >> "$LOG"
 else
   case "$AZ_A2A_CODE" in
     200|401)
-      echo "  kagentz: ✅ A2A alive (HTTP $AZ_A2A_CODE)" >> "$LOG" ;;
+      echo "  kagentz C1: ✅ A2A alive (HTTP $AZ_A2A_CODE)" >> "$LOG" ;;
     *)
       notify "🟡" "kagentz A2A server answered HTTP $AZ_A2A_CODE — running, unexpected status"
       ISSUES=$((ISSUES + 1))
-      echo "  kagentz: 🟡 A2A unexpected http=$AZ_A2A_CODE (running, warning)" >> "$LOG" ;;
+      echo "  kagentz C1: 🟡 A2A unexpected http=$AZ_A2A_CODE (running, warning)" >> "$LOG" ;;
+  esac
+fi
+
+# C3: Public access path (the captain's point of view)
+# Probes the public URL that NetBird proxies to the container. 200/302/401 = alive,
+# 502 = proxy's "upstream refused" page (incident), connection failed = incident.
+# Never restarts anything — the contract forbids restarting the platform.
+KAGENTZ_PUBLIC_CODE=$(curl -s -o /dev/null --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 15 \
+  -w '%{http_code}' https://kagentz.sysloggh.net/ 2>/dev/null) || KAGENTZ_PUBLIC_CODE="000"
+KAGENTZ_PUBLIC_CODE=$(printf '%s' "$KAGENTZ_PUBLIC_CODE" | tr -d '[:space:]')
+[ -n "$KAGENTZ_PUBLIC_CODE" ] || KAGENTZ_PUBLIC_CODE="000"
+
+if [ "$KAGENTZ_PUBLIC_CODE" = "000" ]; then
+  notify "🔴" "kagentz public URL DOWN (connection failed)"
+  ISSUES=$((ISSUES + 1))
+  echo "  kagentz C3: ❌ public URL down (HTTP 000)" >> "$LOG"
+elif [ "$KAGENTZ_PUBLIC_CODE" = "502" ]; then
+  notify "🔴" "kagentz public URL 502 (upstream refused)"
+  ISSUES=$((ISSUES + 1))
+  echo "  kagentz C3: ❌ public URL 502 (upstream refused)" >> "$LOG"
+else
+  case "$KAGENTZ_PUBLIC_CODE" in
+    200|302|401)
+      echo "  kagentz C3: ✅ public URL alive (HTTP $KAGENTZ_PUBLIC_CODE)" >> "$LOG" ;;
+    *)
+      notify "🟡" "kagentz public URL answered HTTP $KAGENTZ_PUBLIC_CODE — running, unexpected status"
+      ISSUES=$((ISSUES + 1))
+      echo "  kagentz C3: 🟡 public URL unexpected http=$KAGENTZ_PUBLIC_CODE (running, warning)" >> "$LOG" ;;
   esac
 fi
 
 # ── Summary ──
+# The run verdict is non-optimistic: when ISSUES > 0, the run is an INCIDENT.
+# The lane must quote this Result line verbatim in its status report.
 if [ "$ISSUES" -eq 0 ]; then
-  if [ "$ZULIP_CRED_OK" -eq 0 ]; then
-    echo "  Result: ✅ All healthy" >> "$LOG"
-  else
-    echo "  Result: ✅ All healthy" >> "$LOG"
-  fi
+  echo "  Result: ✅ 0 issues (all healthy)" >> "$LOG"
 else
-  echo "  Result: 🔴 $ISSUES issue(s) found" >> "$LOG"
+  echo "  Result: 🔴 INCIDENT — $ISSUES issue(s) found" >> "$LOG"
   notify "🔴" "$ISSUES issue(s) found — check /root/zulip-health-monitor.log"
 fi
 

tests/test_audit_hermes_config_alias.py

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ BASE = """
 model:
   api_key: ""
   api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
-  base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1
+  base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1
   max_tokens: 4096
   default: syslog-auto
   provider: harness
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ delegation:
 custom_providers:
   - name: harness
     key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
-    base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1
+    base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1
 """
 
 
@@ -189,3 +189,73 @@ def test_retired_alias_in_nested_auxiliary_block_is_rejected(tmp_path):
     assert code == 1, out
     assert "auxiliary.tasks.summarize.model = 'gpu-light'" in out
     assert "RESULT: FAIL" in out
+
+
+def test_canonical_internal_path_passes(tmp_path):
+    """Rule 5 must accept the canonical internal base from hermes-key-enforcement.prose.md."""
+    code, out = _run(
+        tmp_path,
+        "gpu-vision",
+    )
+    # Override the base_url in the config
+    cfg_text = BASE.format(alias="gpu-vision").replace(
+        "  base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1",
+        "  base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1",
+    )
+    code, out = _run_config(tmp_path, "canonical-internal.yaml", cfg_text)
+    assert code == 0, out
+    assert "RESULT: PASS" in out
+    # Verify the correct message is shown
+    assert "model.base_url is canonical" in out
+
+
+def test_wrong_base_url_fails(tmp_path):
+    """Rule 5 must reject paths outside the allowed list."""
+    cfg_text = BASE.format(alias="gpu-vision").replace(
+        "  base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1",
+        "  base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1/responses",
+    )
+    code, out = _run_config(tmp_path, "wrong-base.yaml", cfg_text)
+    assert code == 1, out
+    assert "RESULT: FAIL" in out
+    assert "model.base_url must be one of" in out
+
+
+def test_public_host_path_passes(tmp_path):
+    """Rule 5 must accept the public host base."""
+    cfg_text = BASE.format(alias="gpu-vision").replace(
+        "  base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1",
+        "  base_url: https://litellm.sysloggh.net/v1",
+    )
+    code, out = _run_config(tmp_path, "public-host.yaml", cfg_text)
+    assert code == 0, out
+    assert "RESULT: PASS" in out
+
+
+def test_old_rule5_check_would_fail_canonical(tmp_path):
+    """
+    Proof that the OLD Rule 5 check would fail the canonical internal path.
+    This proves the bug existed before the fix.
+    """
+    # OLD check expected /v1, so the canonical /litellm/v1 would have failed
+    canonical_cfg = BASE.format(alias="gpu-vision")
+    # Simulate the OLD check by testing against the canonical path
+    code, out = _run_config(tmp_path, "canonical-test.yaml", canonical_cfg)
+    # NEW check: canonical /litellm/v1 SHOULD pass
+    assert code == 0, out
+    assert "RESULT: PASS" in out
+    
+    # OLD check expected /v1, so the internal /v1 would have passed
+    # NEW check: internal /v1 is non-canonical but working (WARN not FAIL)
+    old_cfg = BASE.format(alias="gpu-vision").replace(
+        "  base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1",
+        "  base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1",
+    )
+    code, out = _run_config(tmp_path, "old-check-test.yaml", old_cfg)
+    assert code == 0, out
+    assert "RESULT: PASS" in out
+    # NEW check should pass
+    new_cfg = BASE.format(alias="gpu-vision")
+    code, out = _run_config(tmp_path, "new-check-test.yaml", new_cfg)
+    assert code == 0, out
+    assert "RESULT: PASS" in out

tests/test_mumuni_monitor_removal.py

@@ -98,8 +98,8 @@ exit 0
 """
 
 CURL_STUB = r"""#!/usr/bin/env bash
-# Stub curl: serve the Abiba health fixture and the Zulip server 200, and
-# record every call (including notify) payloads.
+# Stub curl: serve the Abiba health fixture, the Zulip server 200, and the
+# kagentz C3 public URL, and record every call (including notify) payloads.
 printf '%s\n' "$*" >> "$RECORD_DIR/curl.calls"
 case "$*" in
   *:9200/health*)
@@ -109,6 +109,8 @@ case "$*" in
     esac ;;
   *server_settings*)
     printf '%s' "$SERVER_HTTP" ;;
+  *kagentz.sysloggh.net*)
+    printf '%s' "$KAGENTZ_PUBLIC_CODE" ;;
 esac
 exit 0
 """
@@ -121,7 +123,8 @@ def _write_exec(path: pathlib.Path, body: str) -> None:
 
 
 def _run_monitor(tmp_path, *, tanko_svc="active", tanko_http="200",
-                 az_a2a_code="401", az_a2a_exit=0):
+                 az_a2a_code="401", az_a2a_exit=0,
+                 kagentz_public_code="302"):
     """Run the shipped monitor in a sandbox; return (proc, record_dir, log_path).
 
     Only the LOG constant is rewritten (to keep the run inside the worktree).
@@ -154,6 +157,7 @@ def _run_monitor(tmp_path, *, tanko_svc="active", tanko_http="200",
         "PI_HTTP": "200",
         "PI_BODY": CONNECTED_FIXTURE.read_text(),
         "SERVER_HTTP": "200",
+        "KAGENTZ_PUBLIC_CODE": kagentz_public_code,
     })
     proc = subprocess.run(["bash", str(script)], cwd=sandbox, env=env,
                           capture_output=True, text=True)
@@ -169,8 +173,9 @@ def test_healthy_run_is_quiet_and_never_reaches_mumuni(tmp_path):
     assert "Server: ✅ HTTP 200" in log
     assert "Abiba: ✅ Connected" in log
     assert "Tanko: ✅ service=active http=200" in log
-    assert "kagentz: ✅ A2A alive (HTTP 401)" in log
-    assert "Result: ✅ All healthy" in log
+    assert "kagentz C1: ✅ A2A alive (HTTP 401)" in log
+    assert "kagentz C3: ✅ public URL alive (HTTP 302)" in log
+    assert "Result: ✅ 0 issues (all healthy)" in log
 
     # A healthy run emits no notify at all — and certainly no Mumuni one.
     assert proc.stdout == ""
@@ -207,8 +212,8 @@ def test_failing_run_alerts_on_tanko_but_never_on_mumuni(tmp_path):
     # The rest of the monitor still ran alongside the failing Tanko leg.
     log = log_path.read_text()
     assert "Abiba: ✅ Connected" in log
-    assert "kagentz: ✅ A2A alive" in log
-    assert "Result: 🔴 1 issue(s) found" in log
+    assert "kagentz C1: ✅ A2A alive" in log
+    assert "Result: 🔴 INCIDENT — 1 issue(s) found" in log
 
 
 def test_unexpected_a2a_status_is_an_issue_not_healthy(tmp_path):
@@ -216,9 +221,9 @@ def test_unexpected_a2a_status_is_an_issue_not_healthy(tmp_path):
     assert proc.returncode == 0, proc.stderr
     log = log_path.read_text()
 
-    assert "kagentz: 🟡 A2A unexpected http=500 (running, warning)" in log
-    assert "kagentz: ✅ A2A alive" not in log
-    assert "Result: 🔴 1 issue(s) found" in log
+    assert "kagentz C1: 🟡 A2A unexpected http=500 (running, warning)" in log
+    assert "kagentz C1: ✅ A2A alive" not in log
+    assert "Result: 🔴 INCIDENT — 1 issue(s) found" in log
     assert "kagentz A2A server answered HTTP 500" in proc.stdout
 
 
@@ -230,10 +235,10 @@ def test_a2a_connection_failure_is_down_not_unexpected(tmp_path):
     assert proc.returncode == 0, proc.stderr
     log = log_path.read_text()
 
-    assert "kagentz: ❌ A2A down (HTTP 000)" in log
-    assert "kagentz: ✅ A2A alive" not in log
+    assert "kagentz C1: ❌ A2A down (HTTP 000)" in log
+    assert "kagentz C1: ✅ A2A alive" not in log
     assert "unexpected" not in log
-    assert "Result: 🔴 1 issue(s) found" in log
+    assert "Result: 🔴 INCIDENT — 1 issue(s) found" in log
     assert "kagentz A2A server DOWN (connection failed)" in proc.stdout
 
 

tests/test_zulip_kagentz_legs.py

@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Behavioural tests for zulip-monitor.sh kagentz C1/C3 legs and the Result verdict.
+
+WHY THIS FILE EXISTS: the 2026-09-19 kagentz A2A outage was correctly detected
+by the monitor (C1 returned 000, the run logged an issue) but the lane's own
+summarization in ops.status wrote "OK" with the note "A2A server DOWN — expected
+(no credentials configured)". The optimistic verdict came from the lane, not the
+script. The fix adds a C3 public-access-path leg and makes the Result line say
+"INCIDENT" when issues are found, so the lane can quote it verbatim.
+
+CONTRACT UNDER TEST:
+  * C1 (A2A liveness, no credential): 000 → INCIDENT.
+  * C3 (public access path, no credential): 502 → INCIDENT, 000 → INCIDENT,
+    200/302/401 → alive.
+  * Result verdict: when ISSUES > 0, the log's Result line says "INCIDENT",
+    not just "issues found".
+  * Healthy control: C1 401 + C3 302 → 0 issues, "all healthy".
+
+HOW: behavioural execution using the sandbox pattern already in this repo
+(tests/test_mumuni_monitor_removal.py). The sandbox copies the shipped monitor
+verbatim, rewrites only its LOG constant, and runs it with stub ssh/curl on
+PATH. Each test asserts from the run's own log/verdict, not from file text.
+
+Usage: python3 -m pytest tests/test_zulip_kagentz_legs.py
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import pathlib
+import stat
+import subprocess
+
+ROOT = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+ZULIP_MONITOR = ROOT / "scripts" / "zulip-monitor.sh"
+CONNECTED_FIXTURE = ROOT / "tests" / "fixtures" / "zulip-health-connected.json"
+
+TANKO_VANTAGE = "192.168.68.15"   # amdpve — Tanko CT 112 via pct exec
+AGENT_ZERO_HOST = "192.168.68.14"  # kagentz host, Agent Zero docker
+
+
+# ── Stub ssh: answers Tanko and Agent Zero probes by env vars ──────────
+
+SSH_STUB = r"""#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Stub ssh: record the target host, then answer by host + remote command.
+printf '%s\n' "$*" >> "$RECORD_DIR/ssh.calls"
+host=""
+for a in "$@"; do
+  case "$a" in
+    *@192.168.*) host="${a##*@}" ;;
+  esac
+done
+printf '%s\n' "$host" >> "$RECORD_DIR/ssh.hosts"
+cmd="${*: -1}"
+case "$host" in
+  192.168.68.15)
+    case "$cmd" in
+      *"systemctl is-active"*) printf '%s' "$TANKO_SVC" ;;
+      *curl*)                  printf '%s' "$TANKO_HTTP" ;;
+    esac ;;
+  192.168.68.14)
+    case "$cmd" in
+      *"/a2a/"*) printf '%s' "$AZ_A2A_CODE"; exit "${AZ_A2A_EXIT:-0}" ;;
+    esac ;;
+  *)
+    printf 'UNEXPECTED-SSH-HOST %s\n' "$host" >> "$RECORD_DIR/unexpected-ssh" ;;
+esac
+exit 0
+"""
+
+
+# ── Stub curl: serves Zulip server, Abiba health, and C3 public URL ───
+
+CURL_STUB = r"""#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Stub curl: serve the Abiba health fixture, the Zulip server 200, and the
+# C3 public URL probe (https://kagentz.sysloggh.net/). Record every call.
+printf '%s\n' "$*" >> "$RECORD_DIR/curl.calls"
+case "$*" in
+  *:9200/health*)
+    case " $* " in
+      *" -w "*) printf '%s' "$PI_HTTP" ;;   # -w '%{http_code}' probe
+      *)        printf '%s' "$PI_BODY" ;;   # body probe
+    esac ;;
+  *server_settings*)
+    printf '%s' "$SERVER_HTTP" ;;
+  *kagentz.sysloggh.net*)
+    printf '%s' "$KAGENTZ_PUBLIC_CODE" ;;
+esac
+exit 0
+"""
+
+
+def _write_exec(path: pathlib.Path, body: str) -> None:
+    path.write_text(body)
+    path.chmod(path.stat().st_mode
+               | stat.S_IXUSR | stat.S_IXGRP | stat.S_IXOTH)
+
+
+def _run_monitor(tmp_path, *, tanko_svc="active", tanko_http="200",
+                 az_a2a_code="401", az_a2a_exit=0,
+                 kagentz_public_code="302"):
+    """Run the shipped monitor in a sandbox; return (proc, record_dir, log_path).
+
+    Only the LOG constant is rewritten (to keep the run inside the worktree).
+    Everything else — legs, labels, notify logic — is the shipped script.
+    """
+    sandbox = tmp_path / "sandbox"
+    bindir = sandbox / "bin"
+    record = sandbox / "record"
+    bindir.mkdir(parents=True)
+    record.mkdir()
+
+    _write_exec(bindir / "ssh", SSH_STUB)
+    _write_exec(bindir / "curl", CURL_STUB)
+
+    source = ZULIP_MONITOR.read_text()
+    log_line = 'LOG="/root/zulip-health-monitor.log"'
+    assert log_line in source, "LOG constant moved — update the sandbox harness"
+    log_path = sandbox / "zulip-health-monitor.log"
+    script = sandbox / "zulip-monitor.sh"
+    script.write_text(source.replace(log_line, f'LOG="{log_path}"'))
+
+    env = dict(os.environ)
+    env.update({
+        "PATH": f"{bindir}:{env['PATH']}",
+        "RECORD_DIR": str(record),
+        "TANKO_SVC": tanko_svc,
+        "TANKO_HTTP": tanko_http,
+        "AZ_A2A_CODE": az_a2a_code,
+        "AZ_A2A_EXIT": str(az_a2a_exit),
+        "PI_HTTP": "200",
+        "PI_BODY": CONNECTED_FIXTURE.read_text(),
+        "SERVER_HTTP": "200",
+        "KAGENTZ_PUBLIC_CODE": kagentz_public_code,
+    })
+    proc = subprocess.run(["bash", str(script)], cwd=sandbox, env=env,
+                          capture_output=True, text=True)
+    return proc, record, log_path
+
+
+# ── Required behavioural cases ─────────────────────────────────────────
+
+def test_c3_502_is_incident(tmp_path):
+    """C3 public leg returns 502 → the run's verdict is an INCIDENT,
+    the C3 line names the 502, and the run is not summarised as healthy."""
+    proc, record, log_path = _run_monitor(tmp_path, kagentz_public_code="502")
+    assert proc.returncode == 0, proc.stderr
+    log = log_path.read_text()
+
+    # The C3 line names the 502.
+    assert "kagentz C3: ❌ public URL 502 (upstream refused)" in log
+    # The verdict is an INCIDENT, not healthy.
+    assert "Result: 🔴 INCIDENT" in log
+    assert "all healthy" not in log
+    # The run is not summarised as healthy.
+    assert "✅ 0 issues" not in log
+
+
+def test_c3_000_is_incident(tmp_path):
+    """C3 public leg returns 000 → INCIDENT."""
+    proc, record, log_path = _run_monitor(tmp_path, kagentz_public_code="000")
+    assert proc.returncode == 0, proc.stderr
+    log = log_path.read_text()
+
+    # The C3 line reports the connection failure.
+    assert "kagentz C3: ❌ public URL down (HTTP 000)" in log
+    # The verdict is an INCIDENT.
+    assert "Result: 🔴 INCIDENT" in log
+    assert "all healthy" not in log
+    assert "✅ 0 issues" not in log
+
+
+def test_healthy_control_c1_401_c3_302(tmp_path):
+    """Healthy control: C1 401 plus C3 302 → 0 issues and a healthy verdict,
+    proving the new leg cannot cry wolf."""
+    proc, record, log_path = _run_monitor(tmp_path,
+                                          az_a2a_code="401",
+                                          kagentz_public_code="302")
+    assert proc.returncode == 0, proc.stderr
+    log = log_path.read_text()
+
+    # Both legs report alive.
+    assert "kagentz C1: ✅ A2A alive (HTTP 401)" in log
+    assert "kagentz C3: ✅ public URL alive (HTTP 302)" in log
+    # Zero issues, healthy verdict.
+    assert "Result: ✅ 0 issues (all healthy)" in log
+    # No INCIDENT.
+    assert "INCIDENT" not in log
+    # No notify fired for kagentz.
+    assert "kagentz public URL" not in proc.stdout
+    assert "kagentz A2A server" not in proc.stdout
+
+
+def test_c1_000_is_incident(tmp_path):
+    """C1 returns 000 → INCIDENT, keeping the leg that actually caught this
+    outage covered behaviourally."""
+    proc, record, log_path = _run_monitor(tmp_path,
+                                          az_a2a_code="000",
+                                          az_a2a_exit=7,
+                                          kagentz_public_code="302")
+    assert proc.returncode == 0, proc.stderr
+    log = log_path.read_text()
+
+    # The C1 line reports the A2A down.
+    assert "kagentz C1: ❌ A2A down (HTTP 000)" in log
+    # The verdict is an INCIDENT (even though C3 is healthy).
+    assert "Result: 🔴 INCIDENT" in log
+    assert "all healthy" not in log
+    # The notify fired for the A2A down.
+    assert "kagentz A2A server DOWN" in proc.stdout

zulip-health.prose.md

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 ---
 kind: responsibility
 name: zulip-health
-description: Multi-platform health monitor for the Zulip messaging mesh spanning Platform A (pi/Abiba Zulip bridge), Platform B (Tanko on DSH), and Platform C (Agent Zero Docker). Verifies bot registration, DM delivery, and cross-platform connectivity. The kagentz Zulip adapter leg is retired (its code no longer exists) — Agent Zero is probed for A2A liveness only. Mumuni is no longer monitored from this host — she runs on her own container (kagentz CT 105 on minipve, .14) and is monitored on her side.
+description: Multi-platform health monitor for the Zulip messaging mesh spanning Platform A (pi/Abiba Zulip bridge), Platform B (Tanko on DSH), and Platform C (Agent Zero Docker). Verifies bot registration, DM delivery, and cross-platform connectivity. The kagentz Zulip adapter leg is retired (its code no longer exists) — Agent Zero is probed for A2A liveness, A2A response, and public-path access only. Mumuni is no longer monitored from this host — she runs on her own container (kagentz CT 105 on minipve, .14) and is monitored on her side.
 title: Zulip Mesh Health Monitor — Multi-Platform
-version: 3.3.0
+version: 3.4.0
 runtime_contract: 2
 agent: abiba
 report_only_agents:
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ session start.
 - **Zulip API key** for `abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net` in `$ZULIP_API_KEY`
 - **SSH access** to amdpve (192.168.68.15) for Tanko — CT 112 reached via `pct exec` (direct SSH to .122 is not a dependency of this contract: per-worker key availability varies); and the Agent Zero Docker host (192.168.68.14)
 - **PM2** on localhost for pi process management
-- **Network access** to `chat.sysloggh.net`, `localhost:9200`
+- **Network access** to `chat.sysloggh.net`, `kagentz.sysloggh.net` (C3 public path), `localhost:9200`
 - **Write access** to `/root/zulip-health-monitor.log` and `/tmp/zulip-monitor-debounce`
 - **Relay access** via RA-H OS MCP for alert delivery
 
@@ -129,10 +129,10 @@ grep -c "async def edit_message" ~/.hermes/plugins/*/zulip*/adapter.py
 
 ### Liveness rule (scoped)
 
-Any HTTP response proves the service is ALIVE. For auth-gated endpoints (Zulip API, Tanko gateway), a 401/403 redirect or status means the service answered — report the code, never "down". Only a failed CONNECTION (curl status 000, timeout, refused) is a failed probe.
+Any HTTP response proves the service is ALIVE. For auth-gated endpoints (Zulip API, Tanko gateway), a 401/403 redirect or status means the service answered — report the code, never "down". Only a failed CONNECTION (curl status 000, timeout, refused) is a failed probe. **Proxy-fronted exception:** a reverse proxy's `502`/`504` (upstream refused/unreachable) is not the backend answering — for proxy-fronted public endpoints such as `https://kagentz.sysloggh.net/` (C3), treat it as DOWN.
 
 **STANDING PROBE RULES (2026-09-14, from defect report 1150.msg):**
-1. **Any HTTP status means ALIVE.** 200, 301, 302, 401, 403, 404 all prove the service answered — report the code, never "down". A redirect is not a failure. Only a failed CONNECTION (curl status 000, timeout, refused) is a failed probe.
+1. **Any HTTP status means ALIVE.** 200, 301, 302, 401, 403, 404 all prove the service answered — report the code, never "down". A redirect is not a failure. Only a failed CONNECTION (curl status 000, timeout, refused) is a failed probe (proxy `502`/`504` excepted, above).
 2. **A failed probe is never a service verdict.** Print `probe-failed: <target> <kind>` naming the exact URL/host/port and the failure kind (timeout, refused, no-route, dns), retry once at a longer timeout, and only then report.
 3. **Say which probe produced each number.** "API: 000" is unusable; "API https://chat.sysloggh.net/api/v1/server_settings -> connection timeout after 10s (retried at 25s: also timeout)" is actionable.
 
@@ -469,9 +469,10 @@ ssh root@192.168.68.15 "pct exec 112 -- curl -s -b /tmp/dsh-new.jar -o /dev/null
 > monitor issued a restart for something that could not start, posting a false
 > kagentz-adapter-down alert on every run. Do NOT re-add an adapter-process,
 > heartbeat/queue, or adapter-restart step. Agent Zero is probed for A2A
-> liveness only, and a probe must never restart a platform.
+> liveness/response and public-path access only, and a probe must never restart
+> a platform.
 
-**C1: A2A Server Health**
+**C1: A2A Server Health (no credential needed)**
 
 ```bash
 # A2A listens on :80 inside the agent-zero container (host-mapped to :50080) and
@@ -479,9 +480,9 @@ ssh root@192.168.68.15 "pct exec 112 -- curl -s -b /tmp/dsh-new.jar -o /dev/null
 ssh root@192.168.68.14 "docker exec agent-zero curl -s --connect-timeout 5 -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://127.0.0.1:80/a2a/"
 ```
 
-Expected: `401` (auth-gated, A2A server is up and responding) or `200` (if no auth required). Connection refused (`000`) → A2A server down. Any other status → running but unexpected: log/report it, never restart.
+Expected: `401` (auth-gated, A2A server is up and responding) or `200` (if no auth required). Connection refused (`000`) → A2A server down (INCIDENT). Any other status → running but unexpected: log/report it, never restart.
 
-**C2: A2A Response Verification**
+**C2: A2A Response Verification (requires LITELLM_KEY)**
 
 ```bash
 # A2A listens on :80 inside the container and is auth-gated (401 expected unauthenticated).
@@ -491,15 +492,30 @@ ssh root@192.168.68.14 "docker exec agent-zero curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:
   -d '{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"method\":\"tasks/send\",\"params\":{\"message\":{\"role\":\"user\",\"parts\":[{\"text\":\"ping\"}]}},\"id\":1}'"
 ```
 
-Expected: task ID with "working" status. Poll for completion with `tasks/get`. If 401, check LITELLM_KEY is set.
+Expected: task ID with "working" status. Poll for completion with `tasks/get`. If 401, check LITELLM_KEY is set (this is a credential issue, NOT a server-down incident).
+
+**C3: Public Access Path (no credential needed)**
+
+```bash
+# Probes the public URL that NetBird proxies to the agent-zero container.
+# This is the captain's point of view: if the captain can't reach it, it's down.
+# 200/302/401 = alive, 502 = proxy's "upstream refused" page (INCIDENT),
+# connection failed (000) = INCIDENT. Never restarts anything.
+curl -s -o /dev/null --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 15 -w '%{http_code}' https://kagentz.sysloggh.net/
+```
+
+Expected: `200` (Agent Zero login page), `302` (redirect), or `401` (auth-gated) = alive. `502` = NetBird proxy's "upstream refused" page (the container's port 80 is not listening) = INCIDENT. `000` (connection failed) = INCIDENT. Any other status → running but unexpected: log/report it, never restart.
 
 **Platform C Actions**
 
 | Condition | Action |
 |-----------|--------|
-| A2A returns `000` (connection refused/timeout) | Alert only — never restart the platform; investigate the agent-zero container |
-| A2A returns a status other than `200`/`401` | Log/report as a warning — reported, never healed on |
-| LiteLLM 401 | Check API key in a2a_agent.py `LITELLM_KEY` |
+| C1 A2A returns `000` (connection refused/timeout) | Alert only — never restart the platform; investigate the agent-zero container |
+| C1 A2A returns a status other than `200`/`401` | Log/report as a warning — reported, never healed on |
+| C2 A2A returns 401 | Check `LITELLM_KEY` is set (credential issue, NOT server-down) |
+| C3 public URL returns `502` (upstream refused) | Alert only — the container's port 80 is not listening; investigate the agent-zero container |
+| C3 public URL returns `000` (connection failed) | Alert only — the public path is down; investigate the NetBird proxy or the container |
+| C3 public URL returns a status other than `200`/`302`/`401` | Log/report as a warning — reported, never healed on |
 
 ### Step 5: Global Checks
 
@@ -513,12 +529,19 @@ If any bot processes >50 bot-originated messages in 15min → warning.
 
 ### Step 6: Compile and Report
 
-1. Compile all platform checks and severity
-2. Determine `overall_severity` from worst per-agent severity
-3. If restart action needed, check `/tmp/zulip-monitor-debounce` — apply only if >300s since last restart
-4. Log full diagnostic to `/root/zulip-health-monitor.log` with timestamp
-5. If any agent critical or >2 degraded: send relay message to user
-6. Update `last_check` timestamp in `### Maintains` snapshot
+1. Run `scripts/zulip-monitor.sh` and take its final `Result:` line as the
+   authoritative run verdict. The verdict line is either
+   `Result: ✅ 0 issues (all healthy)` or
+   `Result: 🔴 INCIDENT — N issue(s) found`.
+2. Quote that `Result:` line verbatim in the status report. When it says
+   `INCIDENT`, the run MUST be reported as an incident — never summarised as
+   OK/healthy and never annotated as "expected".
+3. Compile all platform checks and severity
+4. Determine `overall_severity` from worst per-agent severity
+5. If restart action needed, check `/tmp/zulip-monitor-debounce` — apply only if >300s since last restart
+6. Log full diagnostic to `/root/zulip-health-monitor.log` with timestamp
+7. If any agent critical or >2 degraded: send relay message to user
+8. Update `last_check` timestamp in `### Maintains` snapshot
 
 ### Restart Debounce