prose-contracts/hermes-key-enforcement.prose.md

---
kind: enforcement
name: hermes-key-enforcement
version: 1.0.0
description: >
  Enforces standardized API key configuration across all Hermes agents. Harness/LiteLLM
  providers MUST use api_key_env indirection. External providers (DeepSeek, OpenAI,
  Anthropic) may use hardcoded keys. Single source of truth: Infisical vault
  (project=agents, env=production) — injected at runtime via `infisical run --` wrapper.
  /etc/environment is DEPRECATED for agent keys post-migration. Designed to make key
  rotation a one-step vault operation.
author: Abiba (pi agent)
---

# Hermes Key Enforcement Contract

## Rule (One Sentence)

**All harness/litellm providers MUST use `api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY` with authenticated path `http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1/responses` — hardcoded keys AND unauthenticated `/v1` direct access are both forbidden.**

## Scope

Applies to all Hermes agent configs across all hosts. Covers these config sections:
- `model.api_key`
- `custom_providers[].api_key` (when `name` contains `harness` or `litellm`)
- `auxiliary.*.api_key` (when `provider` is `harness` or contains `litellm`)
- `delegation.api_key` (when `provider` is `harness` or contains `litellm`)
- `compression.api_key` (when `provider` is `harness` or contains `litellm`)
- `fallback_providers[].api_key` (when provider is harness)

## Architecture (2026-07-10)

Syslog is migrating away from **unauthenticated direct access** to the shared inference harness.

| Path | Auth | Status |
|------|------|--------|
| `http://192.168.68.116/v1` | Bearer `sk-*` key (nginx-fronted) | ✅ **VALID** — authenticated via nginx :80 (verified 2026-08-09: 401 without key, 200 with) |
| `http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1` | Bearer `sk-*` key (nginx-fronted) | ✅ **CURRENT / CANONICAL** — captain-approved migration target; 600s proxy_read_timeout (verified) |
| `http://192.168.68.116:4000/v1` | Bearer `sk-*` key (direct container) | ❌ **FORBIDDEN** — bypasses nginx; port 4000 direct is not a config path |

All harness/litellm providers MUST use an authenticated nginx-fronted path (`/litellm/v1` canonical, `/v1` legacy-valid).
Any `base_url` pointing at `:4000` or a bare IP without nginx is a **migration violation**.

### 🔥 CRITICAL: Double-Path Bug (2026-07-10)

When `api_mode: responses` is set, Hermes **appends `/v1/responses`** to `base_url`.
If `base_url` already includes `/litellm/v1/responses`, the result is:

```
http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1/responses/v1/responses → 404
```

**The `base_url` must end at `/v1` — never include `/responses`:**

```yaml
# ✅ CORRECT — Hermes appends /v1/responses for api_mode: responses
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1

# ❌ WRONG — produces double path
base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1/responses
```

This applies to ALL sections using the harness provider: `custom_providers`, `delegation`, `auxiliary.*`.

## Exemptions

External providers are **explicitly exempt** and may use hardcoded keys:
- DeepSeek (`api.deepseek.com`)
- OpenAI (`api.openai.com`)
- Anthropic (`api.anthropic.com`)
- OpenRouter
- Any provider whose base_url does NOT match `192.168.68.116` or `litellm.sysloggh.net`

## Standard Pattern

> **Canonical vault process (2026-07-16):** see `litellm-api-keys` § Production Vault Access Process.
> All agents MUST use the `infisical-gateway.sh` wrapper (live vault injection). Hardcoded systemd
> drop-ins / config.yaml keys are DEPRECATED — they rot on rotation (root cause of the 2026-07-16 401 storm).
> 4/5 agents migrated; tanko (user jerome) pending.

```yaml
# ✅ CORRECT — all harness/litellm providers (authenticated path, NO /responses suffix)
model:
  provider: harness
  base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1           # ← Hermes appends /v1/responses
  api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY

custom_providers:
  - name: harness
    api_mode: responses
    base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1           # ← NO /responses suffix!
    api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY

auxiliary:
  compression:
    provider: harness
    base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1           # ← NO /responses suffix!
    api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY

# ✅ ALSO CORRECT — external providers
fallback_providers:
  - provider: deepseek
    base_url: https://api.deepseek.com
    api_key: sk-b7d9...               # ← hardcoded OK (external)
    api_key_env: DEEPSEEK_API_KEY      # ← also OK if set in environment (vault or /etc/environment)
```

```yaml
# ❌ FORBIDDEN — hardcoded key (top) OR unauthenticated path (bottom)
model:
  provider: harness
  api_key: sk-Flc62smlegyMEaSo1ka8JA   # ← RULE VIOLATION: hardcoded key

model:
  provider: harness
  base_url: http://192.168.68.116/v1   # ← RULE VIOLATION: unauthenticated path
  api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
```

## Reachability Detection

Before checking for hardcoded keys, verify the host is reachable and can be audited. Use the shared reachability helper from the clone root:

```bash
# Run on each host to check reachability (Tanko, Mumuni, Koonimo, Koby)
scripts/hermes-reachability-check.sh <host> "api_key: sk-" "/root/.hermes/"
# Example: scripts/hermes-reachability-check.sh 192.168.68.122 "api_key: sk-" "/root/.hermes/"

# Expected outcomes:
# - UNREACHABLE: SSH connection failed (host is down)
# - VIOLATION: SSH succeeded and found matches (report the finding)
# - COMPLIANT: SSH succeeded and found no matches (no hardcoded keys in config)
#
# NOTE: The bug this replaces was deriving reachability from the remote grep's exit code.
# The correct pattern: remote side always succeeds (grep ...; true), so ssh status = connection only.
```

## Detection Query

Run on any Hermes host to detect violations:

```bash
# 1. Check config.yaml for hardcoded harness keys
grep -rn 'api_key: sk-' /root/.hermes/ \
  --include='config.yaml' \
  | grep -v 'deepseek\|openai\|anthropic\|DEEPSEEK'

# 1b. Check for double-path bug: base_url ending with /responses
# (Hermes appends /v1/responses when api_mode=responses, so base_url must end at /v1)
grep -rn 'litellm/v1/responses' /root/.hermes/config.yaml
# ANY output here = WRONG. Must be 'litellm/v1' without /responses suffix.

# 2. Check systemd drop-ins for master key leaks (2026-07-05: Tanko had this)
grep -rn 'LITELLM_API_KEY' /root/.config/systemd/user/ 2>/dev/null
grep -rn 'LITELLM_API_KEY=sk-litellm-7f96080d' /root/.config/systemd/ 2>/dev/null

# 3. Verify running process env matches dedicated key
cat /proc/$(cat /home/jerome/.hermes/gateway.pid | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['pid'])")/environ \
  | tr '\0' '\n' | grep LITELLM_API_KEY
```

If any output from step 2 — **critical violation** (master key leaked). Fix immediately.

## Rotation Procedure

With this standard enforced, key rotation is one vault update:

```bash
# 1. Generate new key in LiteLLM: POST /key/generate with agent alias
# 2. Update Infisical vault secret
infisical secrets set LITELLM_API_KEY=sk-NEW_KEY \
  --project=agents --env=production
# 3. Restart agent gateway (key auto-injected via infisical run -- wrapper)
ssh root@<host> "systemctl restart hermes-gateway"
# 4. Verify
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer sk-NEW_KEY" http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1/models
```

**Done.** No config file changes needed. No /etc/environment edits needed.
The agent picks up the new key via `infisical run --` at gateway startup.

> **Post-migration note**: /etc/environment is NO LONGER the key source.
> Strip all `LITELLM_API_KEY` lines from /etc/environment (comment out with `# [INFISICAL]`)
> and let the `infisical run --` wrapper inject the key at runtime.

## Key Longevity Policy (2026-07-04)

**Keys are permanent and use bare agent name aliases.**

- **Duration**: `null` — keys never expire. NOT enforced today: CT 116 `litellm_config.yaml` has no `default_key_generate_params` block, and a key generated with no explicit models comes back with an empty models list. OPEN policy question: should agent keys expire by default? (captain security-policy decision, raised separately.)
- **Alias convention**: bare agent name only (e.g., `tanko`, `mumuni`, `koby`, `koonimo`). No dates, no versions. The alias IS the identity.
- **Rotation triggers**: compromise, personnel departure, or quarterly security hygiene. NOT calendar-driven.
- **Max budget**: $100 per key (config default).

```yaml
# NOT currently set in the authority; recommended value. CT 116 litellm_config.yaml has no
# default_key_generate_params block today, and a key generated with no explicit models comes back
# with an EMPTY models list. `models` is a literal key-generation parameter, so this is a value to
# ADD — re-read the live registry at CT 116 /opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml and
# re-verify before applying.
litellm_settings:
  default_key_generate_params:
    models: ["syslog-auto", "gpu-dense", "gpu-vision", "strix-moe"]
    duration: null        # ← permanent
    max_budget: 100
    metadata:
      purpose: "agent-inference"
```

## Verified Agents (2026-07-05 update)

| Agent | CT | IP | LiteLLM Alias | Key Source | Status | Gateway Wrapper | Last Verified |
|-------|-----|-----|---------------|------------|--------|-----------------|---------------|
| Tanko | 112 | .122 | `tanko` | Infisical vault | ✅ Fixed | `infisical run` | 20:17 UTC Jul 5 |
| Mumuni | 105 (kagentz) | .14 | `mumuni` | Infisical vault | ✅ Fixed | systemd Hermes gateway | 2026-08-29 |
| Koby | 111 | .129 | `koby` | Infisical vault | ✅ Fixed (DeepSeek-primary) | `infisical run` | 23:30 UTC Jul 5 |
| Koonimo | 113 | .114 | `koonimo` | Infisical vault | ✅ Fixed | `infisical run` (migrated 2026-07-11) | 2026-08-09 |
| Abiba | 100 | .65 | `abiba-pi` | Infisical vault | ✅ N/A (pi native) | — | 19:44 UTC Jul 5 |
| Kagenz0 | 105 | .14 | — | — | ❌ DOWN | — | 19:14 EDT Jul 4 |

> **Note**: CT hostnames (tdunna, baggy) differ from agent identities (koby, koonimo).
> LiteLLM key aliases use agent identity, not CT hostname.

### Migration Status: Authenticated Path

| Agent | `/litellm/v1` | Legacy `/v1` | Status |
|-------|--------------|-------------|--------|
| Mumuni | ✅ harness provider | ✅ auxiliary on /v1 (valid) | ✅ Authenticated (verified 2026-08-09) |
| Tanko | ✅ 5 sections | 0 | ✅ Migrated 2026-08-08, keys 200 |
| Koby | ✅ custom provider (harness name) | — | ✅ External DeepSeek primary (intentional, captain ruling 2026-08-11) |
| Koonimo | ✅ .114 (baggy) | — | ✅ 128K context applied 2026-08-09 |

### Systemd Service Pattern (2026-07-11 — vault migration)

All Hermes agents use systemd to manage their gateway. The gateway service is wrapped
with `infisical run --` to inject secrets at runtime.

**Correct pattern (post-migration):**
```ini
# Service file wraps gateway with Infisical:
[Service]
ExecStart=/usr/bin/infisical run --project=agents --env=production -- \
  /usr/bin/hermes gateway run

# /etc/environment is CLEAN — no LITELLM_API_KEY present
# (strip it and tag with # [INFISICAL] if present)
```

**Legacy pattern (deprecated — pre-migration only):**
```ini
# DO NOT USE post-migration:
EnvironmentFile=/etc/environment
# This pattern was replaced by infisical run -- wrapper
```

**Rotation procedure** (one vault operation with this standard):
1. Generate new key in LiteLLM: `curl /key/generate` with agent alias
2. Update Infisical vault: `infisical secrets set LITELLM_API_KEY=sk-NEW --project=agents --env=production`
3. Restart: `systemctl restart hermes-gateway` (key auto-injected via wrapper)

## Violation Response

1. **Detect** — run detection query above
2. **Fix** — replace `api_key: sk-...` with `api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY` in all harness/litellm sections
3. **Verify** — `grep -c "api_key_env" config.yaml` should increase, hardcoded harness keys should be 0
4. **Restart** — gateway must restart to pick up env var
5. **Confirm** — test key against LiteLLM: `curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY" .../v1/models` → 200
6. **Update** — bump the verified table above
7. **Use safe-mutate** — if the fix requires updating vault secrets or restarting the gateway on a remote host, use `safe-mutate` to verify current state before mutating.

## Related Contracts

- `hermes-config-template.prose.md` — full configuration template
- `litellm-health.prose.md` — LiteLLM stack health verification
- `zulip-platform-verification.prose.md` — cross-platform agent verification
- `litellm-api-keys.prose.md` — API key creation, rotation, and verification

## CI Pipeline (2026-07-04)

All contract changes must pass the PR Pipeline before merge:

```
auth → validate → lint → ai-review → gate
```

- **Trigger**: push to master (abiba-bot only) or pull request
- **Branch protection**: Only `abiba-bot` can push directly to master. All other users must use PRs.
- **Status check**: `PR Pipeline — Authorize → Validate → Review → Merge` required before merge
- **Runner**: `runner-ct110` (Gitea Actions v0.6.1) on CT 110
- **Config**: `.gitea/workflows/pr-pipeline.yaml`

## Known Bug: auxiliary_client ignores api_key_env (2026-07-05)

**Bug**: `_resolve_task_provider_model()` in `agent/auxiliary_client.py` reads
`api_key` from auxiliary task configs (vision, compression, etc.) but does NOT
resolve `api_key_env`. The custom provider resolution path handles `api_key_env`,
but auxiliary tasks take a different code path that ignores it.

**Impact**: Vision analysis and compression calls fall through to the `"no-key-required"`
placeholder, causing 401 errors on LiteLLM/harness (which require `sk-*` keys).

**Workaround**: Set `api_key` directly alongside `api_key_env` in each auxiliary
task config:

```yaml
auxiliary:
  vision:
    api_key: sk-<agent-key-from-vault>           # ← workaround (get via: infisical secrets get LITELLM_API_KEY --project=agents --env=production --plain)
    api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
    base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1
    model: gpu-vision
    provider: harness
  compression:
    api_key: sk-<agent-key-from-vault>           # ← workaround (same as above)
    api_key_env: LITELLM_API_KEY
    base_url: http://192.168.68.116/litellm/v1
    model: syslog-auto
    provider: harness
```

**Affected agents**: All Hermes agents with harness/LiteLLM provider and
`api_key_env` in auxiliary configs (all 4 Hermes agents patched 2026-07-05).

**Source location**: `agent/auxiliary_client.py` line 5478