244 lines
17 KiB
Markdown
244 lines
17 KiB
Markdown
---
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kind: function
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name: litellm-api-keys
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description: >
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Manages LiteLLM API keys for agent identity. Creates named keys so each agent
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is identifiable in LiteLLM logs/spend tracking. Keys are permanent (no expiry)
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and use the agent's bare name as alias (e.g., "tanko", not "tanko-jul2026").
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Ensures agents never use the master key directly. Rotation is event-driven,
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not calendar-driven — rotate only on compromise, personnel change, or
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periodic security hygiene (quarterly/annually).
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UPDATED 2026-07-12: Keys are stored in Infisical vault (project=agents, env=production)
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BUT each agent host MUST keep a local .env fallback. Infisical service tokens can
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expire/404. The .env fallback prevents agents from running without keys.
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Tanko incident: token 404 → gateway had no LITELLM_API_KEY for hours.
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UPDATED 2026-07-16: Vault is SYNCED (session-13 keys written to vault via abiba service
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token, all validate 200). Koby/Koonimo migrated from hardcoded drop-ins to the
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infisical-gateway.sh wrapper (live vault injection). 4/5 agents now vault-backed.
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Canonical process: see § Production Vault Access Process. Tanko (user jerome) pending.
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Abiba's key is now a proper agent key (NOT the master key — stale note removed).
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Current key inventory and agent list: see gpu-fleet.prose.md § Agent Keys.
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Source of truth for LiteLLM config: /opt/inference-harness/litellm_config.yaml
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on CT 116. Last verified: 2026-07-16.
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---
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## Parameters
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- agent_name: string — The agent to manage keys for (e.g., "tanko", "mumuni")
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- action: "create" | "rotate" | "verify" | "list" — What to do (default: "create")
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- litellm_host: string — LiteLLM admin endpoint (default: "192.168.68.116:4000")
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- master_key: string — LiteLLM master key (default from Infisical vault: project=infrastructure, env=production, secret=LITELLM_MASTER_KEY)
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- vault_url: string — Infisical vault URL (default: "https://vault.sysloggh.net")
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- vault_project: string — Infisical project slug (default: "infrastructure")
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- vault_env: string — Infisical environment (default: "production")
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- agent_host: string — Agent's IP for SSH (default: resolved from infra)
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- agent_user: string — SSH user (default: "jerome")
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## Returns
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- action: string — What was done
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- key_alias: string — The LiteLLM key alias created/rotated
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- key_prefix: string — First 10 chars of the new key (for identification)
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- previous_key_alias: string | null — Previous key alias if rotating
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- litellm_response: object — Raw response from LiteLLM /key/generate
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- vault_updated: boolean — Whether Infisical vault secret was updated
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- agent_config_updated: boolean — Legacy: whether /etc/environment was updated (deprecated, always false post-migration)
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- verification: { status: string, detail: string } — Final health check
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## Execution
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1. **Authenticate** — Retrieve master key from Infisical vault via `infisical export --project=<vault_project> --env=<vault_env>`, verify against LiteLLM /key/list
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2. **Check existing keys** — List all keys, find any with agent_name alias
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3. **If action == "list"**: Return all keys with their aliases and spend
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4. **If action == "create"**:
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- Generate new key with key_alias: "{agent_name}" (e.g., "tanko" — bare name, no date)
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- Set metadata: { "agent": "{agent_name}", "purpose": "agent-inference" }
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- Duration is null (permanent) — inherited from litellm default_key_generate_params
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- Set models: ["syslog-auto", "qwen3.6-27B-code", "gemma-4-12b", "strix-moe", "gpu-dense", "gpu-light", "qwen3.6-35B-udq4"]
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- Note: `ornith-1.0-35b` is NOT a valid LiteLLM model name (use `strix-moe`, the stable alias). qwen3.6-35B-A3B removed from fleet (was never deployed).
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- Return the new key
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5. **If action == "rotate"**:
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- Generate new key with same alias (LiteLLM replaces the old key)
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- Update secret in Infisical vault: `infisical secrets set LITELLM_API_KEY=<new_key> --project=<vault_project> --env=<vault_env>`
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- Restart agent gateway (Hermes: `systemctl restart hermes-gateway`; pi: restart PM2 process)
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The gateway automatically picks up the new key via `infisical run --` wrapper
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- Verify: curl test against /v1/models with new key
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- Rotation policy: on-demand only (compromise, departure, quarterly hygiene)
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- Note: /etc/environment is NO LONGER used for LiteLLM keys. Agents inject keys at runtime via vault wrapper.
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6. **If action == "verify"**:
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- Retrieve key from Infisical vault: `infisical secrets get LITELLM_API_KEY --project=<vault_project> --env=<vault_env>`
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- Test the key against LiteLLM /v1/models
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- Confirm key alias matches agent_name in LiteLLM key list
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- Verify agent gateway uses vault wrapper: `cat /proc/<pid>/cmdline` shows `infisical run`
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## Production Vault Access Process (canonical, 2026-07-16)
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The non-fail approach to agentic vault access. Deployed on 4/5 agents (tanko pending —
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runs as user `jerome`, not systemd root, needs user-scope adaptation).
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### The canonical pattern
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1. **infisical CLI** installed on the host (`/usr/local/bin/infisical` or `/usr/bin/infisical`).
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2. **Service token** (Infisical Machine Identity, `st.…`) stored root-only at `/root/.infisical-token` (`chmod 600`).
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- Interim: the shared `abiba` service token (`st.8e848433…`) has READ+WRITE on the `agents` project.
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- Proper: one machine identity per agent (create in Infisical UI → Project Settings → Machine Identities).
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3. **`infisical-gateway.sh` wrapper** at `/root/.hermes/infisical-gateway.sh` (`chmod 700`):
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```bash
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#!/bin/bash
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export INFISICAL_API_URL="https://vault.sysloggh.net"
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TOKEN=$(cat /root/.infisical-token)
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LOG=/root/.hermes/logs/gateway.log; mkdir -p /root/.hermes/logs
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while true; do
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infisical run --token="$TOKEN" --projectId=322fceab-39da-4854-a55a-568e76c0f13f \
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--env=prod --domain=https://vault.sysloggh.net -- bash -c '
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. /root/.hermes/.env 2>/dev/null # [FALLBACK Rule 3] safety net only
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export LITELLM_API_KEY="$<AGENT>_LITELLM_API_KEY"
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exec <HERMES_VENV>/bin/python -m hermes_cli.main gateway run
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' >> $LOG 2>&1
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sleep 5 # restart on exit
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done
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```
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4. **Agent key in vault** as `<AGENT>_LITELLM_API_KEY` (e.g. `KOBY_LITELLM_API_KEY`). Vault = source of truth.
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5. **`.env` fallback** at `/root/.hermes/.env` (`chmod 600`) with the same key — safety net ONLY for vault outage (Rule 3/13). Must be kept in sync on rotation.
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6. **systemd service** `hermes-gateway.service` with `ExecStart=/root/.hermes/infisical-gateway.sh`. NO `litellm-key.conf` drop-in (those hardcode keys and rot).
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7. **NEVER hardcode** LiteLLM keys in systemd drop-ins, config.yaml, or /etc/environment. The wrapper injects live from vault.
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### Why this is non-fail
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- **No rot**: keys pulled live from vault at every gateway start. Rotation = one `infisical secrets set` + `systemctl restart`. No per-host file edits.
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- **Survives vault outage**: the `.env` fallback (Rule 3) keeps the gateway running if Infisical is unreachable.
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- **Survives gateway crash**: the wrapper's `while true` + systemd `Restart=on-failure` revive the gateway.
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- **Auditable**: `cat /proc/$(pgrep hermes_cli)/environ` shows the live key; `infisical secrets` shows the vault source.
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### Migration status (2026-07-16)
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| Agent | Host | Pattern | Vault key | Status |
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|-------|------|---------|-----------|--------|
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| abiba | .24 | `infisical run` (pi agent wrapper, service token) | ABIBA_LITELLM_API_KEY | ✅ vault-backed |
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| mumuni | .123 | infisical-gateway.sh + user-login machine identity | MUMUNI_LITELLM_API_KEY | ✅ vault-backed |
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| koby | .129 | infisical-gateway.sh + service token (migrated 2026-07-16) | KOBY_LITELLM_API_KEY | ✅ vault-backed, Zulip (tanko-bot@) + Telegram |
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| koonimo | .114 | infisical-gateway.sh + service token (migrated 2026-07-16) | KOONIMO_LITELLM_API_KEY | ✅ vault-backed |
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> **Baggy = Koonimo (CT 113).** Deleted `BAGGY_LITELLM_API_KEY` from vault 2026-07-16. Only `KOONIMO_LITELLM_API_KEY` exists — one secret per agent.
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<<<<<<< HEAD
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| tanko | .122 | infisical-gateway.sh + service token (migrated 2026-07-16) | TANKO_LITELLM_API_KEY | ✅ vault-backed |
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=======
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| tanko | .122 | **hardcoded in config.yaml** (runs as user jerome, not systemd) | TANKO_LITELLM_API_KEY | ⚠️ TODO: migrate to user-scope wrapper |
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>>>>>>> origin/master
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### Tanko migration (pending)
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Tanko runs the gateway as user `jerome` (not root/systemd), with the key hardcoded in
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`/home/jerome/.hermes/config.yaml` (`api_key: sk-CggiHWlamQy…`, valid but not vault-sourced).
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Migration: create a user-scope systemd service (`~/.config/systemd/user/hermes-gateway.service`)
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with `infisical-gateway.sh` wrapper in jerome's home, token at `~/.infisical-token`, lingering
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enabled (`loginctl enable-linger jerome`) so the user service runs without a login session.
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### Koby migration lessons (2026-07-16)
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Migrated Koby from hardcoded systemd drop-in → `infisical-gateway.sh` wrapper.
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**Two mistakes I made that broke the agent:**
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1. **Overwrote `/root/.hermes/.env`** without backing it up. The Zulip API key only existed
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in the running process memory — the old .env was minimal (just LiteLLM key). Zulip creds were
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inherited from the pre-migration gateway env, not stored in any file. Lost on restart.
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2. **Only injected `LITELLM_API_KEY`** in the wrapper — forgot Zulip + Telegram credentials.
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Agents need ALL their platform env vars. Missing vars cause silent adapter failures.
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**How Koby actually connects (2026-07-16):**
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- Zulip: shares **Tanko's bot** (`tanko-bot@chat.sysloggh.net`, `TANKO_ZULIP_API_KEY=5PeD6f3zo…`).
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Koby doesn't have its own Zulip bot (koby-bot@ doesn't exist in the swarm config).
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- Telegram: token `828640…` recovered from `.env.bak-20260603` (18KB backup from June 2026).
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Allowed users: 6679773481. Home channel: 6679773481.
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- Both platforms now connect through the wrapper's env injection.
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**Golden rule for gateway restarts:** always `cat /proc/<pid>/environ` before killing the old
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process — captures the live env set. Especially important when migrating gateways between
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injection mechanisms.
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### Key rotation procedure (one vault operation with this standard)
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1. Generate new key: `POST /key/generate` (master key, admin).
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2. Update vault: `infisical secrets set <AGENT>_LITELLM_API_KEY=sk-NEW --token=$TOKEN --projectId=322fceab… --env=prod --domain=https://vault.sysloggh.net`.
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3. Update `.env` fallback: `echo '<AGENT>_LITELLM_API_KEY=sk-NEW' > /root/.hermes/.env && chmod 600 /root/.hermes/.env`.
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4. Restart: `systemctl restart hermes-gateway`. The wrapper pulls the new key live.
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5. Verify: `curl -H "Authorization: Bearer sk-NEW" http://192.168.68.116/v1/models` → 200.
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## Machine Identity for Vault Writes (ADDED 2026-07-16, WAL #1300)
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**Problem:** The infisical CLI on agent hosts is logged in as a user session (jerome@sysloggh.com).
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In CLI v0.38.0, `infisical secrets set` / `infisical export` fail with "project id missing" / "workspace
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key 404" — a known bug where user-session auth works for `run` but NOT for `secrets set`. The apt
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repo only ships 0.38.0, so `apt upgrade` does not help.
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**Proper fix — Machine Identity (Infisical automation best practice):**
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Create a machine identity with READ+WRITE scope on the `agents` project (project_id=
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`322fceab-39da-4854-a55a-568e76c0f13f`, env `prod`). Store client_id + client_secret securely.
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Then vault writes work from any host:
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```bash
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# Get a machine-identity access token
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TOKEN=$(curl -fsSL -X POST https://vault.sysloggh.net/api/v1/auth/universal-auth/login \
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-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
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-d '{"clientId":"<CLIENT_ID>","clientSecret":"<CLIENT_SECRET>"}' | jq -r .accessToken)
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# Write a secret via REST API v3
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curl -fsSL -X PATCH https://vault.sysloggh.net/api/v3/secrets/MUMUNI_LITELLM_API_KEY \
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-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
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-d '{"environment":"prod","secretValue":"sk-<NEW_KEY>","workspaceId":"<WORKSPACE_ID>","type":"shared"}'
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# OR via CLI: infisical secrets set --token=$TOKEN --projectId=322fceab... --env=prod ...
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```
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<<<<<<< HEAD
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**2026-07-16 UPDATE — vault SYNCED + CLEANED.** The abiba service token (`st.8e848433…`, READ+WRITE)
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can write to the vault. All session-13 rotated keys in vault and validate 200 against LiteLLM.
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4 stale secrets deprecated, 5 personal creds flagged for separate project. Tanko migrated from
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hardcoded keys to `infisical-gateway.sh` wrapper. Koonimo Zulip key restored.
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**Machine Identity:** `8ddb9438-74fc-4ab6-bd74-929e7c47b53b` exists in Infisical UI.
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Client secret needed to use universal auth for vault writes from automation.
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**Service Token Inventory (2026-07-16):**
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| Token ID | Name | Permissions | Used By |
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|----------|------|-------------|---------|
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| `st.8e848433…` | tanko-gateway | READ+WRITE | Abiba, Koonimo |
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| `st.353699cd…` | tanko-agent | READ-only | Tanko |
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=======
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Creation requires the Infisical web UI (https://vault.sysloggh.net) under Project Settings →
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Machine Identities, or an admin API call. **TODO: create `abiba-automation` machine identity
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and store its credentials in the vault itself (or a root-only file).**
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**Interim (working now):** the `.env` fallback (hermes-config-template Rule 3/13). The
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infisical-gateway.sh wrapper sources `~/.hermes/.env`, so its `<AGENT>_LITELLM_API_KEY`
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overrides a stale vault value.
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**2026-07-16 UPDATE — vault is now SYNCED.** The abiba service token (`st.8e848433…`, READ+WRITE)
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can write to the vault, so the session-13 rotated keys (mumuni `sk-OzuWsoX2…`, koby `sk-BqRRMboTI…`,
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koonimo `sk-OEK7z26n6E…`) are now in the vault as `MUMUNI_LITELLM_API_KEY` / `KOBY_LITELLM_API_KEY` /
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`KOONIMO_LITELLM_API_KEY` and validate 200 against LiteLLM. The vault is the source of truth again.
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Creating a dedicated `abiba-automation` machine identity (via UI) is still the proper long-term fix
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so the shared service token isn't reused across hosts — but it is no longer blocking.
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>>>>>>> origin/master
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## Key Rotation Log
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| Date | Agent | Action | Notes |
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|------|-------|--------|-------|
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<<<<<<< HEAD
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| 2026-07-16 | koonimo | add-zulip | Added KOONIMO_ZULIP_API_KEY to vault (Tt2bUL…). Updated wrapper to inject ZULIP_API_KEY + ZULIP_EMAIL. Restarted gateway → Zulip connected as koonimo-bot@ (bot_id=17). 3 platforms now. |
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| 2026-07-16 | tanko | migrate | Migrated from hardcoded config.yaml key to infisical-gateway.sh wrapper + service token st.353699cd… (tanko-agent). Systemd user service updated, hardcoded key drop-ins removed. Verified LITELLM_API_KEY from vault, 3 platforms connected. |
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| 2026-07-16 | vault | cleanup | 4 stale secrets deprecated: KAGENZ0_LITELLM_API_KEY, HERMES_OPENROUTER_KEY, LITELLM_API_KEY (generic duplicate), ZULIP_API_KEY (generic duplicate). 5 personal creds flagged for separate project. |
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=======
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>>>>>>> origin/master
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| 2026-07-16 | mumuni | rotate | Old key malformed (sk-_SWAl_Vu_, 47 chars, not LiteLLM format) → 401. Deleted old `mumuni` key (token 15cbca18…), generated fresh (alias `mumuni`, 7 models: syslog-auto, qwen3.6-27B-code, gemma-4-12b, strix-moe, gpu-dense, gpu-light, qwen3.6-35B-udq4). New key sk-OzuWsoX2… written to /root/.hermes/.env (Rule 3/13 fallback). Vault sync PENDING (needs machine identity). WAL #1300. |
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| 2026-07-16 | koby | rotate | Old key sk-6sbCNjz (401, stale in /etc/environment). Deleted old `koby` key, generated fresh (alias `koby`). New key sk-BqRRMboTI… in systemd drop-in `hermes-gateway.service.d/litellm-key.conf` + /etc/environment. Created `hermes-gateway.service` unit (was missing — gateway wasn't persistent) with `--replace`. Verified HTTP 200, Telegram connected. |
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| 2026-07-16 | baggy (koonimo) | rotate | Old key sk-krnw_zGB (401, hardcoded in systemd drop-in). Deleted old `baggy` key, generated fresh (alias `baggy`, metadata agent=koonimo). New key sk-OEK7z26n6E… in drop-in `hermes-gateway.service.d/litellm-key.conf`. CT113 IP changed .113→.114. Verified HTTP 200, Zulip connected. |
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## LiteLLM Master Key (use sparingly — agents should NOT use it directly)
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- Master key: `sk-litellm-7f96080dd99b15c36bd4b333b58a6796` (in /opt/inference-harness/.env on CT116, Infisical project=infrastructure env=production secret=LITELLM_MASTER_KEY)
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- Used for /key/generate, /key/delete, /key/list (GET), DB queries
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- **Known violation (RESOLVED 2026-07-16):** Abiba's LITELLM_API_KEY was previously the master key.
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It is now a dedicated agent key `sk-sxbphLvk1OU…` (vault secret `ABIBA_LITELLM_API_KEY`, alias `abiba-pi`).
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The master key is admin-only (/key/generate, /key/delete, /key/list). NEVER use it for inference —
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see `litellm-self-heal` § "NEVER use litellm_proxy_master_key for inference".
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- LiteLLM key DB: `harness-postgres` container on CT116, table `"LiteLLM_VerificationToken"` (columns: token, key_alias, key_name, created_at, expires). Query: `docker exec harness-postgres psql -U litellm -d litellm -t -c "SELECT key_alias, substr(token,1,16) FROM \"LiteLLM_VerificationToken\" ORDER BY created_at;"`
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