no-mistakes(document): drop stale hand-copied test count from HARDENING.md

CT115 (Mumuni relay #747) — two live-instance defects after PR #12:

1. GET /api/whatsapp/mock-log 500'd with a valid admin token:
   'no such column: whatsapp_log.message_text'. The model gained
   message_text/wa_message_id/ticket_number (and dropped command) in
   4afdc36 with no migration, so legacy DBs keep the (command, ...) shape.
   ensure_legacy_schema (startup, app/main.py) now adds the three missing
   columns idempotently and backfills legacy command bodies into
   message_text before dropping the obsolete NOT NULL command column, so
   both the mock-log read path and the ORM write path work on healed DBs.
   New producer/consumer regression (tests/test_whatsapp_log_legacy_heal.py)
   reproduces the exact OperationalError, then asserts 200 + data.

2. ROLE_ALIASES gap: underscore legacy roles (cs_rep, cs_manager,
   fm_dispatcher) were not mapped, so normalize_legacy_user_roles could not
   converge rows like user 18 (test@denya.com, role 'cs_rep') and the
   frontend stranded them on /tickets. Added the underscore aliases; tests
   assert normalize_role('cs_rep') == 'CS Rep' and a cs_rep row converges
   and authenticates.

.env.example

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+# Denya OneCare — runtime environment template (HARDENING.md P0.1/P1.1)
+# Copy to .env and fill in real values. NEVER commit .env.
+# Generate the secret with: openssl rand -hex 32
+
+# ── Required ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+SECRET_KEY=
+DATABASE_URL=sqlite+aiosqlite:///./data/denya_onecare.db
+# Explicit origin allow-list — "*" is rejected at startup (P0.2)
+CORS_ORIGINS=http://localhost:8000
+
+# ── Optional (WhatsApp; needed before wiring Meta) ───────
+WHATSAPP_PHONE_NUMBER_ID=
+WHATSAPP_ACCESS_TOKEN=
+WHATSAPP_VERIFY_TOKEN=
+META_GRAPH_BASE=https://graph.facebook.com/v18.0
+
+# ── Webhook auth (P0) ──────────────────────────────────
+# Shared secret for inbound WhatsApp webhook POSTs (X-Webhook-Secret header).
+# FAIL-CLOSED: when unset/empty, every webhook message is rejected (403).
+# Generate with: openssl rand -hex 32
+WHATSAPP_WEBHOOK_SECRET=
+
+# ── Login rate limiting (P0) ────────────────────────────
+# ~5 failed login attempts per 15 minutes per IP+email → HTTP 429
+LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_MAX_ATTEMPTS=5
+LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS=900

AGENTS.md

@@ -47,13 +47,31 @@ Users, units, and categories are auto-seeded on first startup via lifespan hook:
 | Method | Path | Auth | Description |
 |--------|------|------|-------------|
 | GET | `/health` | No | Health check |
-| POST | `/api/auth/register` | No | Create user |
-| POST | `/api/auth/login` | No | Get JWT tokens |
+| POST | `/api/auth/login` | No | Get JWT tokens (rate-limited ~5 fails/15min/IP+email → 429) |
 | POST | `/api/auth/refresh` | Token | Refresh tokens |
 | GET | `/api/auth/me` | Bearer | Current user |
 | GET | `/api/auth/admin-only` | Admin/Jerome, Admin/Wahab | RBAC demo endpoint |
-| POST | `/api/whatsapp/mock` | No | Mock WhatsApp |
-| GET | `/api/whatsapp/mock-log` | No | Recent mock submissions |
+| GET | `/api/auth/users` | Bearer | List users (id, name, role) for the assign-technician picker |
+| POST | `/api/auth/users` | Admin/Jerome, Admin/Wahab | Admin creates a user (forced canonical role; unknown roles → 422) |
+| PATCH | `/api/auth/users/{id}` | Admin/Jerome, Admin/Wahab | Role change / deactivate (self-modification → 400) |
+| DELETE | `/api/auth/users/{id}` | Admin/Jerome, Admin/Wahab | Delete user (409 if referenced by tickets/timeline/escalations) |
+
+**Self-registration is removed** — `POST /api/auth/register` 404s and there is no
+sign-up UI; users are created/managed by admins only (P0 hardening batch).
+
+### WhatsApp
+| Method | Path | Auth | Description |
+|--------|------|------|-------------|
+| GET | `/api/whatsapp/webhook` | No | Meta handshake (`hub.verify_token`, constant-time; mismatch → 403) |
+| POST | `/api/whatsapp/webhook` | `X-Webhook-Secret` header | Inbound message → ticket + log. Fail-closed: 403 when `WHATSAPP_WEBHOOK_SECRET` is unset or the header doesn't match |
+| GET | `/api/whatsapp/mock-log` | Bearer | Recent webhook submissions (debug; auth required) |
+
+`whatsapp_log` predates the real Meta webhook (the model gained
+`message_text`/`wa_message_id`/`ticket_number` and dropped `command` without a
+migration), so legacy tables keep the old `(command, …)` shape and every ORM
+read/write 500s. `ensure_legacy_schema` (app/main.py) adds the missing columns
+and backfills+drops the obsolete NOT NULL `command` column idempotently at
+startup — do not hand-edit legacy DBs, ship a self-heal there instead.
 
 ### Pages (Sprint 3) — Jinja2 templates at `app/templates/`
 | Method | Path | Auth | Description |
@@ -66,15 +84,33 @@ Users, units, and categories are auto-seeded on first startup via lifespan hook:
 | GET | `/tickets/new` | Client | Create Issue form |
 | GET | `/tickets/{id}` | Client | Issue detail with timeline |
 
-Frontend: Alpine.js (CDN) + Tailwind CSS (CDN). Auth state in localStorage. Role-based nav routing in `base.html`.
+Frontend: Alpine.js + Tailwind CSS vendored same-origin (no CDN) — see
+"Frontend assets" below. Auth state in localStorage. Role-based nav routing in `base.html`.
+
+### Frontend assets (vendored, LAN-safe)
+- Alpine.js 3.17.2 + Tailwind Play 3.4.17 are committed under `app/static/vendor/`
+  and served at `/static/vendor/…` (mounted in `app/main.py`, versioned
+  filenames → immutable cache `public, max-age=31536000, immutable`). Templates
+  must never reference a CDN; update `app/templates/base.html` when upgrading:
+  download `alpinejs@<ver>/dist/cdn.min.js` (jsDelivr) and the tailwind play
+  script (`cdn.tailwindcss.com/<ver>`), save them under `app/static/vendor/`
+  mirroring the committed names (Alpine keeps `.min.js`, e.g.
+  `alpine-3.17.2.min.js`; the tailwind play file does not, e.g.
+  `tailwind-3.4.17.js`), then bump the `<script src>` + the
+  `VENDORED_SCRIPTS` tuple in the regression file `tests/test_frontend_vendoring.py`.
+- HTML pages ship `Cache-Control: no-cache` and CSP is self-only
+  (`script-src`/`style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'`, `connect-src 'self'`); no
+  CDN host is allowed in CSP (`app/main.py::SecurityHeadersMiddleware`).
 
 ### Tickets (Sprint 2)
 | Method | Path | Auth | Description |
 |--------|------|------|-------------|
 | POST | `/api/tickets` | Bearer | Create ticket (auto-number PAV-YYYY-NNNNN) |
-| GET | `/api/tickets` | No | List tickets (filter: status, priority, property, building, unit_id, category_id, assigned_to, date_from, date_to) |
-| GET | `/api/tickets/{id}` | No | Get ticket detail with timeline, photos, SLA status |
-| PATCH | `/api/tickets/{id}` | Bearer | Update ticket (validates status transitions) |
+| GET | `/api/tickets` | No | List tickets (filter: status, priority, property, building, unit_id, category_id, assigned_to, date_from, date_to; paginate with `page`/`page_size` or `limit` alias — hard cap 200, both given → 422) |
+| GET | `/api/tickets/{id}` | No | Get ticket detail with timeline, photos, SLA status, nested unit/category, phone |
+| GET | `/api/tickets/{id}/transitions` | No | Valid next statuses for the ticket's current status (drives the detail-page status picker) |
+| PATCH | `/api/tickets/{id}` | Bearer | Update ticket (validates status transitions; assigning a technician auto-advances New/Logged/Triage to Assigned) |
+| DELETE | `/api/tickets/{id}` | Admin/Jerome, Admin/Wahab | Delete ticket + children (timeline/photos/escalations); test/scratch cleanup only |
 | POST | `/api/tickets/{id}/status` | Bearer | Change status with note |
 | GET | `/api/tickets/{id}/sla` | No | Check SLA breach status |
 | POST | `/api/tickets/{id}/photos` | Bearer | Upload photos (multipart, is_before param) |
@@ -85,14 +121,38 @@ Frontend: Alpine.js (CDN) + Tailwind CSS (CDN). Auth state in localStorage. Role
 ## Auth
 
 - JWT access (30min) + refresh (7d) tokens
-- Roles: CS Rep, CS Manager, FM Dispatcher, Admin/Jerome, Admin/Wahab, Tech, CEO, Director
-- Use `require_roles("Admin/Jerome", "Admin/Wahab")` dependency for RBAC
-- `sub` claim holds string user ID
+- **Unified role model** lives in `app/core/roles.py` (`CANONICAL_ROLES`,
+  `ADMIN_ROLES` = Admin/Jerome + Admin/Wahab, `ROLE_ALIASES` for legacy
+  nickname roles like `technician`/`cs`/`fm`/`ceo`). Canonical stored roles:
+  CS Rep, CS Manager, FM Dispatcher, Admin/Jerome, Admin/Wahab, Tech, CEO, Director.
+- Role checks, admin user creation, login, and JWT validation all derive from the
+  role module; unknown/junk roles (e.g. lowercase `admin`/`superadmin` from the
+  old open register) fail closed at login/JWT and can never be recreated via the
+  API (422). Startup self-heals (lifespan in `app/main.py`, helpers in
+  `app/services/seed.py`) converge legacy rows: `normalize_legacy_user_roles`
+  maps unambiguous alias nicknames onto canonical roles (space and underscore
+  forms alike — `cs rep`/`cs_rep` → `CS Rep`, `fm dispatcher`/`fm_dispatcher`,
+  `cs manager`/`cs_manager`), and
+  `normalize_legacy_user_emails` lowercases stored emails — login and the admin
+  create-user duplicate check both compare on the lowercased form, so pre-P0
+  mixed-case emails are never silently locked out.
+- Use `require_roles(*ADMIN_ROLES)` for admin gates; `sub` claim holds string user ID
+- Security headers middleware in `app/main.py`: X-Frame-Options DENY +
+  nosniff on everything, CSP on HTML pages, HSTS when `X-Forwarded-Proto: https`
+  (CSP is self-only — frontend libs are vendored, see "Frontend assets")
 
 ## Ticket System (Sprint 2)
 
-### Status Lifecycle (15 statuses)
-New → Logged → Triage → Assigned → Accepted → Travelling → On Site → In Progress → Waiting Parts → Escalated → Completed → On-Field Verification → Wahab Review → Closed → Reopened
+- `reported_at` (nullable DateTime, alembic `d5e0f2a1c3b4`) records a ticket's original reported date;
+  `TicketCreate.reported_at` lets Admin/Wahab enter backdated tickets that stay active. It defaults to
+  now when omitted (migration backfilled existing rows from `created_at`). SLA deadlines run from
+  `created_at`, not `reported_at` — backfilling history never instantly breaches a ticket.
+
+### Status Lifecycle (16 statuses)
+New → Logged → Triage → Assigned → Accepted → Travelling → On Site → In Progress → Waiting Parts → Escalated → Completed → On-Field Verification → Wahab Review → Closed → Reopened → Cancelled
+
+Cancelled is terminal (no outgoing transitions) and reachable from any active
+state; it is excluded from SLA breach reporting and dashboard "active" counts.
 
 Valid transitions defined in `app/services/ticket.py::VALID_TRANSITIONS`. Invalid transitions return 400.
 

CLAUDE.md

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-AGENTS.md

CLAUDE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+<!-- Points Claude at AGENTS.md via import; edit AGENTS.md, not this file. -->
+@AGENTS.md

Dockerfile

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ COPY pyproject.toml .
 COPY alembic.ini .
 COPY alembic/ alembic/
 COPY app/ app/
+COPY apartment_mapping.json .
 
 # Install Python dependencies
 RUN pip install --no-cache-dir .

HARDENING.md

@@ -0,0 +1,227 @@
+# Denya OneCare — Production Hardening & Review Checklist
+
+> **Audience:** Abiba (and any agent working the Denya OneCare repo)
+> **Status:** Demo → Production hardening
+> **Context:** WhatsApp integration lands within a week (once Denya provides credentials).
+>   We are moving past "demo" toward the final product. This doc is the concrete,
+>   ordered punch-list to get there. Each item is grounded in the current codebase
+>   (verified against `main` and the live deployment on `scottdenya`).
+> **How to use:** work top-down. P0 items are hard blockers for any real data.
+>   When a P0/P1 item is done, mark it `[x]` and PR it with a `no-mistakes(review)` pass.
+
+---
+
+## 0. Current state (verified 2026-08-03)
+
+- **Working & verified:** auth (JWT 30m/7d, bcrypt, RBAC via `require_roles`), ticket
+  CRUD with 16-status `VALID_TRANSITIONS` state machine, SLA engine, photo uploads,
+  category/unit hierarchy, 3 role dashboards (CS/FM/CEO), Alembic migrations with
+  legacy-schema self-heal. **pytest suite passes.**
+- **Live:** container `denya-onecare` on LXC `scottdenya` (192.168.68.75:8000),
+  image built 2026-08-02, `restart: unless-stopped`.
+- **Demo-only posture resolved (PR #10 + P0 batch):** `SECRET_KEY` now fails
+  closed without a real key, CORS is an explicit origin allow-list, and open
+  self-registration was removed — `POST /api/auth/register` → 404, users are
+  admin-managed only (see AGENTS.md).
+- **Known demo-only posture (must change):** SQLite backend; WhatsApp webhook
+  code is present but **no real credentials wired**.
+
+---
+
+## 1. P0 — Security blockers (do these FIRST, before any real data)
+
+### P0.1 Hardcode-safe secrets; never ship the default key — **DONE (PR #10)**
+- **Files:** `docker-compose.yml`, `app/core/config.py`
+- Replace the hardcoded `SECRET_KEY=change-me-in-production` default with a
+  fail-closed default: if `SECRET_KEY` is unset/empty or still the well-known
+  placeholder string, refuse to boot (raise in `Settings` validation or lifespan).
+- `docker-compose.yml` must NOT carry a literal secret. Reference an `.env`
+  (git-ignored) or a runtime secret source. Add `SECRET_KEY` + `WHATSAPP_*` to `.gitignore`.
+- **Acceptance:** starting the app without a real key fails loudly; container env
+  contains a strong random key (≥32 bytes, e.g. `openssl rand -hex 32`).
+
+### P0.2 Lock down CORS — **DONE (PR #10)**
+- **Files:** `app/main.py`, `docker-compose.yml`
+- `CORS_ORIGINS=*` + `allow_credentials=True` is an invalid/unsafe combo
+  (browsers reject `*` with credentials anyway). Replace with an explicit
+  origin allow-list of the real web origins (e.g. `https://denya.sysloggh.net`,
+  your NetBird/nomad domain + localhost for dev).
+- If credentials are used, origins MUST be explicit — never `*`.
+- **Acceptance:** `settings.CORS_ORIGINS` is a comma-separated explicit list; the
+  middleware builds an allow-list, not `["*"]`.
+
+### P0.3 Gate user registration — **DONE (P0 batch, 2026-09)**
+- Open `POST /api/auth/register` was removed entirely (404) — there is no sign-up UI.
+- Users are admin-managed: `POST /api/auth/users` (Admin/Jerome + Admin/Wahab only)
+  creates users with a **forced canonical role** (unknown roles → 422);
+  `PATCH /api/auth/users/{id}` changes role / deactivates (self-modification → 400);
+  `DELETE /api/auth/users/{id}` is guarded (users referenced by
+  tickets/timeline/escalations → 409); duplicate email → 409.
+- Emails are normalized (strip + lowercase) on every write path; a startup
+  self-heal lowercases legacy mixed-case rows so pre-P0 accounts can't be locked
+  out of login. Unified role model lives in `app/core/roles.py`.
+- **Regression tests:** `tests/test_p0_auth_admin_batch.py`.
+- If a public self-service resident/tenant signup is genuinely required later
+  (Phase 2 QR/self-service), it must be a SEPARATE endpoint with a **role
+  default of the least-privilege role** and rate-limiting — never able to mint
+  admin/FM roles.
+
+### P0.4 Reconsider SQLite for the final product
+- **Files:** `docker-compose.yml`, `app/core/database.py`, `app/core/config.py`, PRD §16
+- PRD Phase 1 calls for PostgreSQL. SQLite is fine for POC but is a write-lock
+  bottleneck and a data-integrity risk under concurrent FM/CS/WhatsApp writes.
+- **Recommended:** switch `DATABASE_URL` to Postgres via async driver
+  (`postgresql+asyncpg://`). SQLAlchemy 2.0 + SQLAlchemy models are portable —
+  the migration is mostly: new driver dependency, `DATABASE_URL`, and re-running
+  Alembic against Postgres. Keep SQLite as the default for local dev/tests only.
+- **Acceptance:** `pytest` green against Postgres (tests param via conftest),
+  Alembic applies cleanly on a fresh Postgres DB.
+
+### P0.5 WhatsApp webhook auth + hardening — **PARTIAL (P0 batch, 2026-09)**
+- **File:** `app/routers/whatsapp.py`
+- **Done:** the `GET` handshake validates `hub.verify_token` with a constant-time
+  compare and returns **403 on mismatch**; inbound `POST`s are gated by the
+  `X-Webhook-Secret` header matching `WHATSAPP_WEBHOOK_SECRET` (fail-closed 403
+  when the env var is unset — see `.env.example`); the debug
+  `GET /api/whatsapp/mock-log` now requires Bearer auth.
+- **Still open:** Meta request-signature validation (`X-Hub-Signature-256` HMAC
+  over the raw body with the app secret — the shared-secret header above is the
+  interim gate); per-sender rate limiting / dedupe idempotency keyed on
+  `wa_message_id` (retries can still double-create tickets); redacting the raw
+  access token in `send_whatsapp_reply` error paths.
+- **Acceptance (open items):** a forged POST without the Meta signature is
+  rejected; duplicate `wa_message_id` does not create a second ticket;
+  verify-token mismatch returns 403 (done).
+
+---
+
+## 2. P1 — Operational hardening (before/just after go-live)
+
+### P1.1 Secrets handling & git hygiene
+- Ensure `SECRET_KEY`, `WHATSAPP_*`, and any DB credentials are **not** in the repo
+  or in the committed `docker-compose.yml`. `.env` is git-ignored.
+- On this fleet: align with Syslog's key-off-disk doctrine — inject secrets at
+  runtime (Infisical) rather than baking into image or compose if feasible.
+- Rotate the seed demo users' `denya123` password before production. `seed_users`
+  is idempotent but the default password is in `app/services/seed.py` — forced-rotate
+  on first prod login or at seed time.
+
+### P1.2 Reverse proxy + TLS
+- Do not expose the raw uvicorn :8000 behind `CORS_ORIGINS=*` on the WAN.
+  Terminate TLS at a reverse proxy (Caddy/Traefik/nginx) with a proper domain
+  (e.g. `denya.sysloggh.net`).
+- Configure gunicorn/workers + `--proxy-headers` (or keep uvicorn but behind TLS).
+- **Acceptance:** `https://denya.sysloggh.net` serves the app with a valid cert;
+  `:8000` is not directly reachable from the internet.
+
+### P1.3 DB backups & persistence
+- Postgres change (P0.4) enables sane backups. Wire nightly `pg_dump` (or PBS /
+  Syslog backup cron) of the persistent volume. The compose already mounts
+  `app-data` volume — make sure it's on backed-up storage.
+- Add an Alembic upgrade step to the deploy runbook (never rely only on
+  `Base.metadata.create_all` + self-heal for schema changes in prod).
+
+### P1.4 Logging & observability
+- Add structured request logging; route to a location you can actually check
+  (stdout + a file/volume). Correlate with `ticket_number`.
+- Add a minimal `/health` readiness that checks DB connectivity (currently it
+  returns OK without touching the DB).
+
+### P1.5 Photo upload hardening
+- **File:** `app/routers/tickets.py`
+- Uploads already validate MIME + extension and use UUID filenames — good.
+- Add: max file-size limit (e.g. 10 MB) and content sniffing (validate magic
+  bytes, not just `content_type` which is client-supplied).
+- Ensure uploaded files are never executable and are served with
+  `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`.
+
+### P1.6 API hardening & rate limiting
+- **Done (P0 batch):** `POST /api/auth/login` is rate-limited in-process —
+  ~5 failures / 15 min per IP+email → 429 (env-tunable `LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_*`,
+  a successful login resets the window). **Open:** ticket-creation rate limiting
+  (spam / mass-creation).
+- **Done (P0 batch):** ticket-list pagination — `page`/`page_size` (default 50,
+  cap 200), `limit` alias for `page_size` also capped; passing both with
+  different values → 422. Tie-breaker `id DESC` present.
+
+---
+
+## 3. WhatsApp integration (this week) — concrete wiring runbook
+
+Assumes Denya provides: **phone number ID, access token, verify token, app secret.**
+
+1. **Add env vars** (`WHATSAPP_PHONE_NUMBER_ID`, `WHATSAPP_ACCESS_TOKEN`,
+   `WHATSAPP_VERIFY_TOKEN`, `WHATSAPP_APP_SECRET`, `META_GRAPH_BASE`) to `.env`
+   (git-ignored) and inject at runtime. Never commit.
+2. **Webhook handshake:** in Meta dashboard point the webhook URL at
+   `<domain>/api/whatsapp/webhook`. The GET verify path echoes `hub.challenge`
+   when the verify token matches (constant-time compare; mismatch → 403). The
+   still-open P0.5 work is the Meta signature validation in step 3.
+3. **Verify incoming signature** (P0.5) — use `X-Hub-Signature-256` = HMAC-SHA256
+   of the raw body with your app secret, compared with `compare_digest`.
+4. **Reply flow:** confirm `send_whatsapp_reply` posts correctly to
+   `graph.facebook.com/v18.0/<PHONE_NUMBER_ID>/messages`. The reply template
+   currently builds a JS string manually — prefer sending the nested object as a
+   proper JSON body rather than a hand-built string (`{\"body\":\"...\"}`) to avoid
+   escaping bugs. Test with the Meta "send a test message" tool.
+5. **Idempotency:** guard ticket creation on `wa_message_id` (P0.5) to prevent
+   double-creation on retries.
+6. **Standalone test:** use the `mock-log` endpoint to confirm webhook → ticket →
+   auto-reply path end-to-end in the demo env before pointing Meta's production
+   webhook at it.
+
+---
+
+## 4. Review recommendations (for the `no-mistakes(review)` pass and final QA)
+
+- **RBAC coverage:** audit every route for the correct dependency. Currently:
+  - `POST /api/tickets`, `PATCH`, `POST /{id}/status`, `POST /{id}/photos` → any
+    authenticated user. Confirm role intent (should a CS Rep push a ticket to
+    "On-Field Verification"? or only FM/Tech?).
+  - `GET /api/tickets`, `GET /{id}`, `/transitions`, `/sla`, `/photos` are
+    **unauthenticated**. For a facilities tool this may be intentional (resident
+    view), but confirm you're comfortable with public reads of ticket details
+    (which include reporter/phone). If not, add auth.
+- **Phone/tenant data exposure:** ticket detail returns `phone`. Decide who can
+  see phone numbers and enforce at the API, not just the UI.
+- **Test coverage gaps to add:**
+  - Auth: expired token, malformed token, RBAC denial per role
+  - WhatsApp: signature validation (valid/invalid/forged), verify-token mismatch,
+    duplicate `wa_message_id` idempotency
+  - Pagination boundary: page > last page returns empty items, tie-breaker stable
+  - Photo upload: bad MIME spoofing, oversize file, `is_before` flag
+  - SLA: breach boundary exactly at deadline (not just past it)
+- **Schema/migration hygiene:** the `ensure_legacy_schema` self-heal in
+  `app/main.py` exists because of create_all DBs. Once you move to Alembic-only
+  (P1.3), this becomes dead weight — plan a deprecation.
+- **Concurrency:** ticket-number generation reads `max()` then `+1` — fine at
+  current scale, but under concurrent Postgres writes this can race. If tickets
+  ever originate from WhatsApp + web + dashboard simultaneously at volume, move to
+  a sequenced/unique constraint approach.
+
+---
+
+## 5. Definition of Done (production-ready)
+
+- [x] No default `SECRET_KEY`; app fails closed without a real key (PR #10)
+- [x] CORS is an explicit origin allow-list (PR #10)
+- [x] Self-registration removed (register → 404); users are admin-managed only
+      with forced canonical roles (P0 batch)
+- [ ] Postgres backend; Alembic applies cleanly on fresh DB; nightly backups
+- [ ] TLS-terminated reverse proxy with real domain; no raw :8000 on WAN
+- [x] Webhook POST gated by `X-Webhook-Secret` (fail-closed); verify-token
+      mismatch → 403; `mock-log` requires auth
+- [ ] WhatsApp webhook: Meta `X-Hub-Signature-256` HMAC validated; idempotent on
+      `wa_message_id`; real credentials injected at runtime
+- [x] Login rate limiting in place (~5 fails / 15 min per IP+email → 429)
+- [ ] Ticket-creation rate limiting in place
+- [ ] Photo uploads size-limited and content-sniffed
+- [ ] RBAC audited per-route; phone data access controlled
+- [ ] Expanded test suite (auth, WhatsApp, SLA boundary, uploads) — all green
+- [ ] Secrets out of repo; demo password rotated
+- [ ] Structured logs + DB-aware health check
+
+---
+
+*Prepared by Mumuni (Syslog Falcon) — 2026-08-03, from a hands-on review of the
+denya-onecare repo and the live scottdenya deployment.*

PRD.md

@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ Close Ticket
 Archive → Executive Reporting
 ```
 
-### Detailed Ticket Lifecycle (15 Statuses)
+### Detailed Ticket Lifecycle (16 Statuses)
 
 | # | Status | Description | Who Sets |
 |---|--------|-------------|----------|
@@ -139,6 +139,7 @@ Archive → Executive Reporting
 | 13 | **Wahab Review** | Final QA oversight and closure approval | Wahab |
 | 14 | **Closed** | Ticket officially closed | Wahab / Nicholas |
 | 15 | **Reopened** | Issue resurfaces within 7 days | Agent / System |
+| 16 | **Cancelled** | Ticket withdrawn (test/scratch cleanup, guest no-show); terminal — reachable from any active state, excluded from SLA breach reporting and dashboard active counts | Any staff (via dashboard) |
 
 
 ### Step-by-Step Detail
@@ -154,9 +155,10 @@ Archive → Executive Reporting
 9. **Wahab Review** — Wahab does final QA oversight in dashboard → status → Wahab Review → approves or sends back
 10. **Auto Follow-up** (48 hours later — internal only) — System flags ticket for Wahab/Nicholas: `Issue PAV-001 (505E WC) — resolved 48h ago. Any follow-up needed?` → If issue resurfaces → auto-reopens, escalates to Ama
 
-### Reopening & Reassignment
+### Reopening, Reassignment & Cancellation
 
 - **Reopening:** If a verified-closed issue resurfaces within 7 days, the gatekeeper can Reopen it. A reopened issue auto-escalates to Ama.
+- **Cancellation:** Any ticket can be cancelled from an active state (terminal; cannot resume work). Cancelled tickets are excluded from SLA breach reporting and dashboard active counts.
 - **Reassignment:** A technician who cannot complete a job can request: `#reassign PAV-001 [technician name]` → Nicholas receives notification and approves/reassigns in dashboard.
 
 ---

alembic/versions/c4e8f1a2d3b4_tickets_phone_and_cancelled_status.py

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+"""tickets.phone column + Cancelled status support
+
+Revision ID: c4e8f1a2d3b4
+Revises: b2f4a6c8e0d2
+Create Date: 2026-08-02 00:00:00.000000
+
+Demo-prep batch (Wahab review): one schema change.
+
+* Add ``tickets.phone`` (nullable) so the customer phone collected on the
+  new-issue form is actually persisted instead of silently dropped.
+"""
+from typing import Sequence, Union
+
+from alembic import op
+import sqlalchemy as sa
+
+
+# revision identifiers, used by Alembic.
+revision: str = 'c4e8f1a2d3b4'
+down_revision: Union[str, Sequence[str], None] = 'b2f4a6c8e0d2'
+branch_labels: Union[str, Sequence[str], None] = None
+depends_on: Union[str, Sequence[str], None] = None
+
+
+def upgrade() -> None:
+    """Add tickets.phone (nullable)."""
+    op.add_column(
+        'tickets',
+        sa.Column(
+            'phone',
+            sa.String(length=50),
+            nullable=True,
+            comment='Customer contact phone (captured on the new-issue form)',
+        ),
+    )
+
+
+def downgrade() -> None:
+    """Drop tickets.phone."""
+    op.drop_column('tickets', 'phone')

alembic/versions/d5e0f2a1c3b4_tickets_reported_at.py

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+"""tickets.reported_at column — original reported date for backdated tickets
+
+Revision ID: d5e0f2a1c3b4
+Revises: c4e8f1a2d3b4
+Create Date: 2026-08-03 00:00:00.000000
+
+Backdated-ticket support (Wahab demo): one schema change.
+
+* Add ``tickets.reported_at`` (nullable DateTime) so historical/backfilled
+  tickets keep their true report date instead of inheriting today's
+  ``created_at``.
+* Backfill existing rows with their ``created_at`` value so no ticket shows
+  an empty reported date after the upgrade. The service layer also defaults
+  new tickets without a ``reported_at`` to now, so the column is effectively
+  always populated from here on.
+"""
+from typing import Sequence, Union
+
+from alembic import op
+import sqlalchemy as sa
+
+
+# revision identifiers, used by Alembic.
+revision: str = 'd5e0f2a1c3b4'
+down_revision: Union[str, Sequence[str], None] = 'c4e8f1a2d3b4'
+branch_labels: Union[str, Sequence[str], None] = None
+depends_on: Union[str, Sequence[str], None] = None
+
+
+def upgrade() -> None:
+    """Add tickets.reported_at (nullable) and backfill from created_at."""
+    op.add_column(
+        'tickets',
+        sa.Column(
+            'reported_at',
+            sa.DateTime(),
+            nullable=True,
+            comment='Original reported date; backdated/backfilled tickets keep their true report date',
+        ),
+    )
+    # Backfill: every existing ticket was reported when it was created.
+    op.execute('UPDATE tickets SET reported_at = created_at WHERE reported_at IS NULL')
+
+
+def downgrade() -> None:
+    """Drop tickets.reported_at."""
+    op.drop_column('tickets', 'reported_at')

app/core/config.py

@@ -23,9 +23,9 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
     DATABASE_URL: str = "sqlite+aiosqlite:///./denya_onecare.db"
 
     # ── Auth ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-    SECRET_KEY: str = "change-me-in-production-use-a-real-secret"
+    SECRET_KEY: str = ""
     ALGORITHM: str = "HS256"
-    ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_MINUTES: int = 30
+    ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_MINUTES: int = 60  # Phase 1: raised 30 -> 60 for fewer re-logins
     REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRE_MINUTES: int = 60 * 24 * 7  # 7 days
 
     # ── CORS ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -36,9 +36,34 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
     WHATSAPP_ACCESS_TOKEN: str = ""
     WHATSAPP_VERIFY_TOKEN: str = ""
     META_GRAPH_BASE: str = "https://graph.facebook.com/v18.0"
+    # Shared secret for inbound webhook POSTs (header ``X-Webhook-Secret``).
+    # Fail-closed: when unset/empty the webhook rejects every message.
+    WHATSAPP_WEBHOOK_SECRET: str = ""
+
+    # ── Login rate limiting ──────────────────────────────────────────
+    LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_MAX_ATTEMPTS: int = 5
+    LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS: int = 15 * 60
 
     # ── Paths ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
     BASE_DIR: Path = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent.parent
 
 
 settings = Settings()
+
+# ── Fail-closed secret validation (HARDENING.md P0.1) ─────────────────
+# Refuse to boot without a real SECRET_KEY. Devs must create a local .env
+# (see .env.example); production injects it via docker-compose env_file.
+_KNOWN_PLACEHOLDER_SECRETS = {
+    "",
+    "change-me-in-production",
+    "change-me-in-production-use-a-real-secret",
+    "changeme",
+    "secret",
+}
+
+if settings.SECRET_KEY in _KNOWN_PLACEHOLDER_SECRETS or len(settings.SECRET_KEY) < 32:
+    raise RuntimeError(
+        "SECRET_KEY is missing, a known placeholder, or shorter than 32 chars. "
+        "Generate one with: openssl rand -hex 32 — and set it in .env "
+        "(dev) or the runtime environment (prod). Refusing to start."
+    )

app/core/ratelimit.py

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+"""Dependency-light login rate limiter.
+
+Brute-force protection for ``POST /api/auth/login``: a sliding window of
+failed attempts keyed by ``ip|email``.  Defaults to ~5 failures / 15 minutes
+(env-tunable via ``LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_MAX_ATTEMPTS`` /
+``LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS``).
+
+In-process storage is intentional: the app currently runs a single uvicorn
+worker, and keeping the limiter dependency-light avoids pulling slowapi in
+for one endpoint.  ``_now`` is a module-level hook so tests can fast-forward
+the clock.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import time
+from collections import defaultdict, deque
+
+from fastapi import HTTPException, status
+
+from app.core.config import settings
+
+
+def _now() -> float:
+    """Wall-clock epoch seconds; overridable in tests via monkeypatch."""
+    return time.time()
+
+
+class LoginRateLimiter:
+    """Sliding-window failure limiter keyed by ``ip|email``."""
+
+    def __init__(self, max_attempts: int = 5, window_seconds: int = 15 * 60) -> None:
+        self.max_attempts = max(max_attempts, 1)
+        self.window_seconds = max(window_seconds, 1)
+        self._failures: defaultdict[str, deque[float]] = defaultdict(deque)
+
+    def key(self, ip: str, email: str) -> str:
+        return f"{ip}|{email.strip().lower()}"
+
+    def _prune(self, key: str, now: float | None = None) -> None:
+        now = now if now is not None else _now()
+        window_start = now - self.window_seconds
+        bucket = self._failures.get(key)
+        if bucket is None:
+            return
+        while bucket and bucket[0] <= window_start:
+            bucket.popleft()
+        if not bucket:
+            self._failures.pop(key, None)
+
+    def failure_count(self, key: str) -> int:
+        self._prune(key)
+        return len(self._failures.get(key, ()))
+
+    def is_blocked(self, key: str) -> bool:
+        return self.failure_count(key) >= self.max_attempts
+
+    def record_failure(self, key: str) -> None:
+        self._failures[key].append(_now())
+        self._prune(key)
+
+    def clear(self, key: str) -> None:
+        self._failures.pop(key, None)
+
+    def reset(self) -> None:
+        self._failures.clear()
+
+    def check_or_raise(self, key: str) -> None:
+        """Raise HTTP 429 when the key has exhausted its attempts."""
+        if self.is_blocked(key):
+            raise HTTPException(
+                status_code=status.HTTP_429_TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
+                detail="Too many failed login attempts. Try again later.",
+            )
+
+
+# Shared instance — module import is safe because the app fails closed at
+# boot (app/core/config.py) before any request can reach the login route.
+login_rate_limiter = LoginRateLimiter(
+    max_attempts=settings.LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_MAX_ATTEMPTS,
+    window_seconds=settings.LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS,
+)

app/core/roles.py

@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+"""Unified role model — single source of truth for user roles.
+
+HARDENING (P0 batch): every role string used by seeds, RBAC checks, admin
+user management, login, and JWT validation derives from this module so the
+system can never silently drift between role vocabularies.
+
+Canonical roles are the human-readable taxonomy the whole product already
+uses (PRD §4, ``app/services/seed.py``, the frontend nav in base.html):
+
+    Admin/Jerome, Admin/Wahab, CS Rep, CS Manager, FM Dispatcher,
+    Tech, CEO, Director
+
+Legacy databases created under the pre-P0 open-registration builds can carry
+lowercase/nickname role strings (``technician``, ``cs``, ``fm``, ``ceo``,
+``admin``, ``superadmin`` …) and underscore variants of the space-separated
+ones (``cs_rep``, ``cs_manager``, ``fm_dispatcher``).  ``ROLE_ALIASES`` maps
+the *unambiguous* nicknames onto a canonical role so startup normalization (see
+``app/services/seed.py::normalize_legacy_user_roles``) can converge the data.
+
+``admin`` / ``superadmin`` are deliberately NOT aliased: they are
+identity-ambiguous (they cannot be attributed to Jerome or Wahab) and were
+mintable by anyone during the open-registration window, so they are treated
+as unknown and fail closed — the operator must remediate those rows manually
+(role cleanup on the live DB is owned by the deployer).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+# ── Canonical taxonomy ────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Order is cosmetic; membership is what matters.
+CANONICAL_ROLES: tuple[str, ...] = (
+    "Admin/Jerome",
+    "Admin/Wahab",
+    "CS Rep",
+    "CS Manager",
+    "FM Dispatcher",
+    "Tech",
+    "CEO",
+    "Director",
+)
+
+# Roles that pass admin gates (ticket DELETE, user management, …).
+ADMIN_ROLES: tuple[str, ...] = ("Admin/Jerome", "Admin/Wahab")
+
+# Roles shown to the frontend nav/assignment helpers as "technician" pool.
+TECHNICIAN_ROLE = "Tech"
+
+# ── Legacy alias → canonical mapping (case-insensitive) ───────────────
+# Keys are lowercased. Unambiguous nicknames from legacy/early seeds and the
+# brief's role model ("technician/cs/fm/ceo") converge onto canonical roles.
+ROLE_ALIASES: dict[str, str] = {
+    "technician": TECHNICIAN_ROLE,
+    "tech": TECHNICIAN_ROLE,
+    "cs": "CS Rep",
+    "cs rep": "CS Rep",
+    "cs_rep": "CS Rep",
+    "cs representative": "CS Rep",
+    "cs manager": "CS Manager",
+    "cs_manager": "CS Manager",
+    "fm": "FM Dispatcher",
+    "fm dispatcher": "FM Dispatcher",
+    "fm_dispatcher": "FM Dispatcher",
+    "ceo": "CEO",
+    "director": "Director",
+}
+
+# Aliases that are explicitly NOT auto-mapped (identity-ambiguous and/or
+# mintable by the old open register). They stay unknown → denied at login
+# and JWT validation until an operator remediates the row.
+_BLOCKED_LEGACY_ROLES = frozenset({"admin", "superadmin", "administrator"})
+
+
+def normalize_role(role: str | None) -> str | None:
+    """Return the canonical role for *role*, or ``None`` when unrecognised.
+
+    ``Admin/Jerome`` → ``Admin/Jerome``; ``technician`` → ``Tech``;
+    ``superadmin`` → ``None`` (unknown; caller must fail closed).
+    """
+    if not role:
+        return None
+    stripped = role.strip()
+    if stripped in CANONICAL_ROLES:
+        return stripped
+    return ROLE_ALIASES.get(stripped.lower())
+
+
+def is_known_role(role: str | None) -> bool:
+    """True when *role* is canonical or maps to a canonical role."""
+    return normalize_role(role) is not None
+
+
+def is_admin_role(role: str | None) -> bool:
+    """True when *role* is one of the canonical administrator roles."""
+    return normalize_role(role) in ADMIN_ROLES
+
+
+def is_blocked_legacy_role(role: str | None) -> bool:
+    """True for legacy ``admin``/``superadmin`` rows that need remediation.
+
+    Such rows are not canonical, are not auto-mapped, and must not pass any
+    authorization gate; an operator should reassign or remove them.
+    """
+    return bool(role) and role.strip().lower() in _BLOCKED_LEGACY_ROLES

app/core/security.py

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
-from functools import wraps
 from typing import Annotated, Any, Callable
 
 import bcrypt
@@ -16,6 +15,7 @@ from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
 
 from app.core.config import settings
 from app.core.database import get_db
+from app.core.roles import is_known_role
 from app.models.user import User
 
 bearer_scheme = HTTPBearer(auto_error=False)
@@ -91,6 +91,14 @@ async def get_current_user(
     user = result.scalar_one_or_none()
     if user is None or not user.active:
         raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="User not found or inactive")
+    # Unified role model: reject rows whose stored role is not canonical or a
+    # known legacy alias. Legacy junk roles (e.g. lowercase ``admin``) must
+    # fail closed here so they can never ride an access token into the app.
+    if not is_known_role(user.role):
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
+            detail="Account role is not recognised; contact an administrator",
+        )
     return user
 
 

app/main.py

@@ -14,7 +14,13 @@ from sqlalchemy import text
 from app.core.config import settings
 from app.core.database import Base, async_session_factory, engine
 from app.routers import auth, health, pages, tickets, whatsapp
-from app.services.seed import seed_categories, seed_units, seed_users
+from app.services.seed import (
+    normalize_legacy_user_emails,
+    normalize_legacy_user_roles,
+    seed_categories,
+    seed_units,
+    seed_users,
+)
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
@@ -28,6 +34,65 @@ async def ensure_legacy_schema(conn) -> None:
             text("ALTER TABLE categories ADD COLUMN show_in_form BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT 1")
         )
         logger.info("Added missing categories.show_in_form column (legacy database)")
+
+    result = await conn.execute(text("SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table' AND name='tickets'"))
+    if result.scalar():
+        result = await conn.execute(text("PRAGMA table_info(tickets)"))
+        ticket_columns = {row[1] for row in result}
+        if "phone" not in ticket_columns:
+            await conn.execute(
+                text("ALTER TABLE tickets ADD COLUMN phone VARCHAR(50)")
+            )
+            logger.info("Added missing tickets.phone column (legacy database)")
+        if "reported_at" not in ticket_columns:
+            await conn.execute(
+                text("ALTER TABLE tickets ADD COLUMN reported_at DATETIME")
+            )
+            await conn.execute(
+                text("UPDATE tickets SET reported_at = created_at WHERE reported_at IS NULL")
+            )
+            logger.info("Added missing tickets.reported_at column (legacy database)")
+
+    # whatsapp_log predates the real Meta webhook (the model gained
+    # message_text/wa_message_id/ticket_number and dropped `command` in commit
+    # 4afdc36 with no migration), so legacy DBs still carry the old shape and
+    # every read/write through the ORM 500s (no such column: message_text).
+    result = await conn.execute(
+        text("SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table' AND name='whatsapp_log'")
+    )
+    if result.scalar():
+        result = await conn.execute(text("PRAGMA table_info(whatsapp_log)"))
+        log_columns = {row[1] for row in result}
+        if "message_text" not in log_columns:
+            await conn.execute(
+                text("ALTER TABLE whatsapp_log ADD COLUMN message_text TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT ''")
+            )
+            logger.info("Added missing whatsapp_log.message_text column (legacy database)")
+        if "wa_message_id" not in log_columns:
+            await conn.execute(
+                text("ALTER TABLE whatsapp_log ADD COLUMN wa_message_id VARCHAR(100)")
+            )
+            logger.info("Added missing whatsapp_log.wa_message_id column (legacy database)")
+        if "ticket_number" not in log_columns:
+            await conn.execute(
+                text("ALTER TABLE whatsapp_log ADD COLUMN ticket_number VARCHAR(30)")
+            )
+            logger.info("Added missing whatsapp_log.ticket_number column (legacy database)")
+        if "command" in log_columns:
+            # Legacy rows stored the message body in `command`, which the model
+            # no longer defines (NOT NULL, no default): any ORM insert omitting
+            # it would violate NOT NULL.  Preserve the old bodies in
+            # message_text, then drop the obsolete column to match the model.
+            await conn.execute(
+                text(
+                    "UPDATE whatsapp_log SET message_text = command "
+                    "WHERE (message_text IS NULL OR message_text = '') "
+                    "AND command IS NOT NULL AND command != ''"
+                )
+            )
+            await conn.execute(text("ALTER TABLE whatsapp_log DROP COLUMN command"))
+            logger.info("Dropped obsolete whatsapp_log.command column (legacy database)")
+
     result = await conn.execute(
         text(
             "UPDATE categories SET name = 'Missing Item' "
@@ -49,6 +114,10 @@ async def lifespan(app: FastAPI):
         await ensure_legacy_schema(conn)
     async with async_session_factory() as session:
         await seed_users(session)
+        # P0 role-model unification: converge legacy nickname roles (e.g.
+        # ``technician``/``cs``/``fm``) onto the canonical taxonomy at startup.
+        await normalize_legacy_user_roles(session)
+        await normalize_legacy_user_emails(session)
         await session.commit()
         await seed_units(session, json_path=str(settings.BASE_DIR / "apartment_mapping.json"))
         await session.commit()
@@ -65,20 +134,119 @@ app = FastAPI(
     lifespan=lifespan,
 )
 
-# ── CORS ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+# ── Security headers (P0 batch) ──────────────────────────────────────
+class SecurityHeadersMiddleware:
+    """Set hardening headers on every HTTP response.
+
+    * ``X-Frame-Options: DENY`` and ``X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`` on
+      all responses;
+    * CSP on HTML pages (login + app pages). Alpine.js and Tailwind are
+      vendored same-origin (``/static/vendor/``), so no external hosts are
+      allowed and the page is fully self-contained — safe on LAN-only demo
+      clients. Inline scripts/styles stay enabled for the Alpine/tailwind
+      runtime;
+    * ``Cache-Control: no-cache`` on HTML pages so templates always
+      revalidate (the vendored assets themselves are cached immutably via
+      versioned filenames);
+    * ``Strict-Transport-Security`` only when TLS terminates (https scheme
+      or ``X-Forwarded-Proto: https`` from the reverse proxy).
+    """
+
+    HSTS = "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains"
+    CSP = (
+        "default-src 'self'; "
+        "script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; "
+        "style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; "
+        "img-src 'self' data: blob:; "
+        "font-src 'self' data:; "
+        "connect-src 'self'; "
+        "frame-ancestors 'none'; "
+        "base-uri 'self'; "
+        "form-action 'self'; "
+        "object-src 'none'"
+    )
+
+    def __init__(self, app):
+        self.app = app
+
+    async def __call__(self, scope, receive, send):
+        if scope["type"] != "http":
+            await self.app(scope, receive, send)
+            return
+
+        is_tls = scope.get("scheme") == "https"
+        for name, value in scope.get("headers") or []:
+            if name.lower() == b"x-forwarded-proto":
+                first = value.decode("latin-1").split(",", 1)[0].strip().lower()
+                if first == "https":
+                    is_tls = True
+
+        async def send_wrapper(message):
+            if message["type"] == "http.response.start":
+                headers = list(message.get("headers") or [])
+                content_type = next(
+                    (v for k, v in headers if k.lower() == b"content-type"), b""
+                )
+                if content_type.startswith(b"text/html"):
+                    headers.append((b"content-security-policy", self.CSP.encode()))
+                    # Templates must always revalidate: never serve a stale
+                    # page that still points at old vendored filenames.
+                    headers.append((b"cache-control", b"no-cache"))
+                headers.append((b"x-frame-options", b"DENY"))
+                headers.append((b"x-content-type-options", b"nosniff"))
+                if is_tls:
+                    headers.append((b"strict-transport-security", self.HSTS.encode()))
+                message["headers"] = headers
+            await send(message)
+
+        await self.app(scope, receive, send_wrapper)
+
+
+app.add_middleware(SecurityHeadersMiddleware)
+
+# ── CORS (HARDENING.md P0.2 — explicit origin allow-list, never "*") ──
+_origins = [o.strip() for o in settings.CORS_ORIGINS.split(",") if o.strip()]
+if "*" in _origins or not _origins:
+    raise RuntimeError(
+        "CORS_ORIGINS must be an explicit comma-separated origin allow-list "
+        "(e.g. 'https://denya.sysloggh.net,http://localhost:8000'). "
+        "'*' with allow_credentials=True is invalid and unsafe. Refusing to start."
+    )
 app.add_middleware(
     CORSMiddleware,
-    allow_origins=settings.CORS_ORIGINS.split(",") if settings.CORS_ORIGINS != "*" else ["*"],
+    allow_origins=_origins,
     allow_credentials=True,
     allow_methods=["*"],
     allow_headers=["*"],
 )
 
-# ── Static files (uploads) ───────────────────────────────────────────
+# ── Static files (uploads + vendored frontend assets) ────────────────
+class ImmutableStaticFiles(StaticFiles):
+    """StaticFiles that serves long-lived immutable cache headers.
+
+    Used for the vendored frontend libraries under ``app/static/vendor/``
+    (Alpine.js + Tailwind Play). Their URLs embed the version, so upgrading
+    later just bumps the filename and clients fetch the new artifact instead
+    of a stale immutable copy.
+    """
+
+    def file_response(self, full_path, stat_result, scope, status_code=200):
+        response = super().file_response(full_path, stat_result, scope, status_code)
+        response.headers["cache-control"] = "public, max-age=31536000, immutable"
+        return response
+
+
 uploads_dir = Path(settings.BASE_DIR / "uploads")
 uploads_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
 app.mount("/uploads", StaticFiles(directory=str(uploads_dir)), name="uploads")
 
+# Alpine.js/Tailwind are vendored same-origin so LAN-only demo clients render
+# the login/dashboards with no external network (see app/templates/base.html).
+static_dir = Path(__file__).resolve().parent / "static"
+static_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+app.mount("/static", ImmutableStaticFiles(directory=str(static_dir)), name="static")
+
 # ── Routers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 app.include_router(health.router)
 app.include_router(auth.router)

app/models/ticket.py

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ class Ticket(Base):
         comment=(
             "New, Logged, Triage, Assigned, Accepted, Travelling, On Site, "
             "In Progress, Waiting Parts, Escalated, Completed, "
-            "On-Field Verification, Wahab Review, Closed, Reopened"
+            "On-Field Verification, Wahab Review, Closed, Reopened, Cancelled"
         ),
     )
     unit_id: Mapped[int | None] = mapped_column(Integer, ForeignKey("units.id"), nullable=True)
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ class Ticket(Base):
         comment="urgent, high, medium, low",
     )
     reporter: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String(255), nullable=True)
+    phone: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String(50), nullable=True)
     reported_via: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(
         String(20),
         nullable=True,
@@ -54,6 +55,11 @@ class Ticket(Base):
     customer_rating: Mapped[int | None] = mapped_column(Integer, nullable=True)
     reopen_count: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, default=0, nullable=False)
     closed_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime, nullable=True)
+    reported_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(
+        DateTime,
+        nullable=True,
+        comment="Original reported date. Backdated/backfilled tickets keep their true report date; NULL falls back to created_at.",
+    )
     created_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(DateTime, server_default=func.now(), nullable=False)
     updated_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(
         DateTime,

app/routers/auth.py

@@ -1,19 +1,27 @@
-"""Authentication router — register, login, refresh, me."""
+"""Authentication router — login, refresh, me, and admin user management.
+
+Self-registration was removed (P0 hardening): users are created/managed by
+admins only via ``POST/PATCH/DELETE /api/auth/users``.
+"""
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 from typing import Annotated
 
-from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Request, status
+from sqlalchemy import select
 from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
 
 from app.core.database import get_db
+from app.core.ratelimit import login_rate_limiter
+from app.core.roles import ADMIN_ROLES
 from app.core.security import get_current_user, require_roles
 from app.models.user import User
 from app.schemas.auth import (
+    AdminCreateUserRequest,
+    AdminUpdateUserRequest,
     LoginRequest,
     RefreshRequest,
-    RegisterRequest,
     TokenResponse,
     UserOut,
 )
@@ -21,21 +29,29 @@ from app.services import auth as auth_service
 
 router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/auth", tags=["auth"])
 
-
-@router.post("/register", response_model=UserOut, status_code=201)
-async def register(
-    body: RegisterRequest,
-    db: Annotated[AsyncSession, Depends(get_db)],
-) -> User:
-    return await auth_service.register(db, body)
+_require_admin = require_roles(*ADMIN_ROLES)
 
 
+# ── Public authN ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 @router.post("/login", response_model=TokenResponse)
 async def login(
+    request: Request,
     body: LoginRequest,
     db: Annotated[AsyncSession, Depends(get_db)],
 ) -> TokenResponse:
-    access, refresh, _user = await auth_service.login(db, body.email, body.password)
+    """Log in. Brute-force limited to ~5 failures / 15 min per IP+email (429)."""
+    client_ip = request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
+    key = login_rate_limiter.key(client_ip, body.email)
+    login_rate_limiter.check_or_raise(key)
+
+    try:
+        access, refresh, _user = await auth_service.login(db, body.email, body.password)
+    except HTTPException as exc:
+        # Count only real auth failures toward the limit; success resets it.
+        if exc.status_code == status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED:
+            login_rate_limiter.record_failure(key)
+        raise
+    login_rate_limiter.clear(key)  # successful login resets the failure window
     return TokenResponse(access_token=access, refresh_token=refresh)
 
 
@@ -55,7 +71,54 @@ async def me(current_user: Annotated[User, Depends(get_current_user)]) -> User:
 
 @router.get("/admin-only", response_model=UserOut)
 async def admin_only(
-    current_user: Annotated[User, Depends(require_roles("Admin/Jerome", "Admin/Wahab"))],
+    current_user: Annotated[User, Depends(_require_admin)],
 ) -> User:
-    """Example RBAC-protected endpoint — only Admins can access."""
+    """Example RBAC-protected endpoint — only canonical Admins can access."""
     return current_user
+
+
+# ── User directory ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
+@router.get("/users", response_model=list[UserOut])
+async def list_users(
+    db: Annotated[AsyncSession, Depends(get_db)],
+    current_user: Annotated[User, Depends(get_current_user)],
+) -> list[User]:
+    """List users (id, name, role) for authenticated assignment pickers."""
+    result = await db.execute(select(User).order_by(User.full_name))
+    return list(result.scalars().all())
+
+
+# ── Admin user management ────────────────────────────────────────────
+@router.post("/users", response_model=UserOut, status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED)
+async def create_user(
+    body: AdminCreateUserRequest,
+    db: Annotated[AsyncSession, Depends(get_db)],
+    current_user: Annotated[User, Depends(_require_admin)],
+) -> User:
+    """Admin-only: create a user with a forced canonical role.
+
+    The client cannot self-register or pick an arbitrary role — unknown roles
+    (e.g. ``admin``, ``superadmin``) are rejected with 422.
+    """
+    return await auth_service.create_user(db, body)
+
+
+@router.patch("/users/{user_id}", response_model=UserOut)
+async def update_user(
+    user_id: int,
+    body: AdminUpdateUserRequest,
+    db: Annotated[AsyncSession, Depends(get_db)],
+    current_user: Annotated[User, Depends(_require_admin)],
+) -> User:
+    """Admin-only: change a user's role and/or deactivate the account."""
+    return await auth_service.update_user(db, current_user, user_id, body)
+
+
+@router.delete("/users/{user_id}", status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT)
+async def delete_user(
+    user_id: int,
+    db: Annotated[AsyncSession, Depends(get_db)],
+    current_user: Annotated[User, Depends(_require_admin)],
+) -> None:
+    """Admin-only: delete a user account (guarded; see auth_service)."""
+    await auth_service.delete_user(db, current_user, user_id)

app/routers/tickets.py

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+import logging
 import uuid
 from datetime import datetime
 from pathlib import Path
@@ -12,7 +13,8 @@ from sqlalchemy import select
 from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
 from app.core.config import settings
 from app.core.database import get_db
-from app.core.security import get_current_user
+from app.core.roles import ADMIN_ROLES
+from app.core.security import get_current_user, require_roles
 from app.models.category import Category
 from app.models.ticket import Ticket, TicketPhoto
 from app.models.unit import Unit
@@ -32,8 +34,17 @@ from app.schemas.ticket import (
 from app.services import ticket as ticket_service
 from app.services.sla import get_sla_status
 
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
 router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/tickets", tags=["tickets"])
 
+_require_admin = require_roles(*ADMIN_ROLES)
+
+# Pagination contract: sane defaults and a hard page-size cap so list
+# responses never balloon into truncation territory (P0 batch).
+DEFAULT_PAGE_SIZE = 50
+MAX_PAGE_SIZE = 200
+
 # Ensure uploads directory exists
 UPLOADS_DIR = settings.BASE_DIR / "uploads"
 UPLOADS_DIR.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
@@ -194,7 +205,10 @@ async def create_ticket(
 async def list_tickets(
     db: Annotated[AsyncSession, Depends(get_db)],
     page: int = Query(1, ge=1),
-    page_size: int = Query(50, ge=1, le=200),
+    page_size: int | None = Query(None, ge=1, le=MAX_PAGE_SIZE),
+    limit: int | None = Query(
+        None, ge=1, le=MAX_PAGE_SIZE, description="Alias for page_size (also capped)"
+    ),
     status: str | None = Query(None),
     priority: str | None = Query(None),
     property: str | None = Query(None),
@@ -205,7 +219,17 @@ async def list_tickets(
     date_from: datetime | None = Query(None),
     date_to: datetime | None = Query(None),
 ) -> TicketListResponse:
-    """List tickets with optional filtering and pagination."""
+    """List tickets with optional filtering and pagination.
+
+    Both ``page_size`` and its alias ``limit`` are capped at MAX_PAGE_SIZE;
+    supplying both is an error. Neither defaults to DEFAULT_PAGE_SIZE.
+    """
+    if page_size is not None and limit is not None and page_size != limit:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=422,  # ``status`` query param shadows fastapi.status in this scope
+            detail="Provide either 'page_size' or 'limit', not both",
+        )
+    effective_page_size = page_size if page_size is not None else (limit or DEFAULT_PAGE_SIZE)
     tickets, total = await ticket_service.list_tickets(
         db,
         status_filter=status,
@@ -218,10 +242,23 @@ async def list_tickets(
         date_from=date_from,
         date_to=date_to,
         page=page,
-        page_size=page_size,
+        page_size=effective_page_size,
     )
     items = [TicketBrief.model_validate(t) for t in tickets]
-    return TicketListResponse(items=items, total=total, page=page, page_size=page_size)
+    return TicketListResponse(items=items, total=total, page=page, page_size=effective_page_size)
+
+
+@router.get("/{ticket_id}/transitions")
+async def get_ticket_transitions(
+    ticket_id: int,
+    db: Annotated[AsyncSession, Depends(get_db)],
+) -> dict:
+    """Return the valid next statuses for a ticket's current status."""
+    ticket = await ticket_service.get_ticket(db, ticket_id)
+    return {
+        "current_status": ticket.status,
+        "transitions": ticket_service.VALID_TRANSITIONS.get(ticket.status, []),
+    }
 
 
 @router.get("/{ticket_id}", response_model=TicketOut)
@@ -250,6 +287,32 @@ async def update_ticket(
     return ticket
 
 
+@router.delete("/{ticket_id}", status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT)
+async def delete_ticket(
+    ticket_id: int,
+    db: Annotated[AsyncSession, Depends(get_db)],
+    current_user: Annotated[User, Depends(_require_admin)],
+) -> None:
+    """Delete a ticket and its children (timeline, photos, escalations).
+
+    Admin-only: intended for removing test/scratch tickets from the demo
+    database, never for routine workflow use.
+    """
+    ticket = await ticket_service.delete_ticket(db, ticket_id)
+    # Remove orphaned photo files from disk after the DB rows are gone.
+    for photo in ticket.photos:
+        if photo.photo_url:
+            name = photo.photo_url.rsplit("/", 1)[-1]
+            try:
+                (UPLOADS_DIR / name).unlink(missing_ok=True)
+            except OSError:
+                logger.warning(
+                    "Could not remove orphaned photo file %s for ticket %s",
+                    name,
+                    ticket_id,
+                )
+
+
 # ── Status Transitions (convenience endpoints) ───────────────────────
 @router.post("/{ticket_id}/status", response_model=TicketOut)
 async def change_ticket_status(

app/routers/whatsapp.py

@@ -1,18 +1,31 @@
-"""WhatsApp webhook handler — Meta Graph API integration."""
+"""WhatsApp webhook handler — Meta Graph API integration.
+
+P0 hardening:
+* ``POST /api/whatsapp/webhook`` requires the ``X-Webhook-Secret`` header to
+  match ``WHATSAPP_WEBHOOK_SECRET``.  Fail-closed: when the env var is unset
+  every message is rejected (same posture as the SECRET_KEY guard).
+* ``GET /api/whatsapp/webhook`` (Meta handshake) validates ``hub.verify_token``
+  with a constant-time compare and returns 403 on mismatch.
+* ``GET /api/whatsapp/mock-log`` now requires authentication (was a public
+  debug endpoint that could 500 and leak stack traces without auth).
+"""
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 import logging
+import secrets
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
 from typing import Annotated
 
 import httpx
-from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, Query
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, Header, HTTPException, Query, status
 from sqlalchemy import select
 from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
 
 from app.core.config import settings
 from app.core.database import get_db
+from app.core.security import get_current_user
+from app.models.user import User
 from app.models.whatsapp_log import WhatsAppLog
 from app.schemas.whatsapp import (
     MetaWebhookRequest,
@@ -62,24 +75,55 @@ async def send_whatsapp_reply(
         return WhatsAppReplyResponse(success=False, message=str(exc))
 
 
+# ── Webhook auth (fail-closed) ──────────────────────────────────────
+async def require_webhook_secret(
+    x_webhook_secret: Annotated[str | None, Header(alias="X-Webhook-Secret")] = None,
+) -> None:
+    """Reject webhook messages unless X-Webhook-Secret matches the env secret.
+
+    Reads ``settings.WHATSAPP_WEBHOOK_SECRET`` at request time so the value
+    can be injected per-deployment.  Empty/unset env ⇒ reject everything.
+    """
+    expected = settings.WHATSAPP_WEBHOOK_SECRET
+    if not expected:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
+            detail="Webhook disabled: WHATSAPP_WEBHOOK_SECRET is not configured",
+        )
+    if not x_webhook_secret or not secrets.compare_digest(x_webhook_secret, expected):
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
+            detail="Invalid webhook secret",
+        )
+
+
 # ── Webhook endpoint ────────────────────────────────────────────────
-@router.post("/webhook")
-async def whatsapp_webhook(
+@router.get("/webhook")
+async def whatsapp_webhook_verify(
+    mode: str | None = Query(None, alias="hub.mode"),
+    verify_token: str | None = Query(None, alias="hub.verify_token"),
+    challenge: str | None = Query(None, alias="hub.challenge"),
+) -> WebhookVerificationResponse | dict:
+    """Meta webhook handshake (GET): echo the challenge when the token matches."""
+    if mode != "subscribe" or not challenge:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
+            detail="Missing hub.mode / hub.challenge",
+        )
+    expected = settings.WHATSAPP_VERIFY_TOKEN
+    if not expected or not secrets.compare_digest(verify_token or "", expected):
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
+            detail="Verify token mismatch",
+        )
+    return WebhookVerificationResponse(challenge=challenge)
+
+
+async def _process_entries(
     body: MetaWebhookRequest,
-    db: Annotated[AsyncSession, Depends(get_db)],
-    hub_verify_token: str | None = Query(None, alias="hub.verify_token"),
-    mode: str | None = Query(None),
-    hub_challenge: str | None = Query(None),
+    db: AsyncSession,
 ) -> dict:
-    """Handle incoming WhatsApp webhook from Meta."""
-
-    # ── Verification GET request (Meta sends this on webhook setup) ──
-    if mode and hub_challenge:
-        if hub_verify_token != settings.WHATSAPP_VERIFY_TOKEN:
-            return {"error": "Verify token mismatch"}
-        return WebhookVerificationResponse(challenge=hub_challenge).model_dump()
-
-    # ── Process inbound messages ────────────────────────────────────
+    """Create tickets + logs for inbound messages. Shared by the POST handler."""
     if not body.entry:
         return {"status": "no entry"}
 
@@ -153,13 +197,24 @@ async def whatsapp_webhook(
     return {"status": "no messages"}
 
 
-# ── Legacy debug endpoint ──────────────────────────────────────────
+@router.post("/webhook")
+async def whatsapp_webhook(
+    body: MetaWebhookRequest,
+    db: Annotated[AsyncSession, Depends(get_db)],
+    _auth: None = Depends(require_webhook_secret),
+) -> dict:
+    """Process an inbound WhatsApp message (Meta POST). Requires webhook secret."""
+    return await _process_entries(body, db)
+
+
+# ── Debug endpoint (auth required) ──────────────────────────────────
 @router.get("/mock-log", response_model=list[MockWhatsAppLogEntry])
 async def mock_whatsapp_log(
     db: Annotated[AsyncSession, Depends(get_db)],
-    limit: int = 50,
+    current_user: Annotated[User, Depends(get_current_user)],
+    limit: int = Query(50, ge=1, le=200),
 ) -> list[MockWhatsAppLogEntry]:
-    """Return recent WhatsApp webhook submissions for debugging."""
+    """Return recent WhatsApp webhook submissions (authenticated only)."""
     result = await db.execute(
         select(WhatsAppLog).order_by(WhatsAppLog.received_at.desc()).limit(limit)
     )

app/schemas/auth.py

@@ -2,15 +2,27 @@
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
-from pydantic import BaseModel, EmailStr
+from pydantic import BaseModel, Field, field_validator, model_validator
+
+from app.core.roles import CANONICAL_ROLES
 
 
-class RegisterRequest(BaseModel):
-    email: str
-    password: str
-    full_name: str
-    phone: str | None = None
-    role: str = "CS Rep"
+def _validate_canonical_role(value: str | None) -> str | None:
+    """Reject any role that is not part of the unified canonical taxonomy.
+
+    The role vocabulary is closed: admin user-management must only ever mint
+    canonical roles (see app/core/roles.py). Legacy/unknown strings
+    (``admin``, ``superadmin``, ``technician``, …) are rejected here so junk
+    roles can never be (re)created through the API.
+    """
+    if value is None:
+        return None
+    role = value.strip()
+    if role not in CANONICAL_ROLES:
+        raise ValueError(
+            f"Unknown role '{value}'. Allowed roles: {', '.join(CANONICAL_ROLES)}"
+        )
+    return role
 
 
 class LoginRequest(BaseModel):
@@ -37,3 +49,50 @@ class UserOut(BaseModel):
     active: bool
 
     model_config = {"from_attributes": True}
+
+
+# ── Admin user management (self-registration is removed) ──────────────
+class AdminCreateUserRequest(BaseModel):
+    """Admin-created user. The role is mandatory and must be canonical.
+
+    ``role`` is deliberately NOT optional and has no default — an admin must
+    state the intended role explicitly; the server never infers one.
+    """
+
+    email: str = Field(min_length=1)
+    password: str = Field(min_length=8, description="Minimum 8 characters")
+    full_name: str = Field(min_length=1)
+    phone: str | None = None
+    role: str
+
+    @field_validator("role")
+    @classmethod
+    def _role_canonical(cls, value: str) -> str:
+        return _validate_canonical_role(value)  # type: ignore[return-value]
+
+    @field_validator("email")
+    @classmethod
+    def _lower_email(cls, value: str) -> str:
+        return value.strip().lower()
+
+
+class AdminUpdateUserRequest(BaseModel):
+    """Admin edits to an existing user: role change and/or deactivation.
+
+    At least one field must be present. ``active=False`` deactivates the
+    account (login and token refresh then fail closed).
+    """
+
+    role: str | None = None
+    active: bool | None = None
+
+    @field_validator("role")
+    @classmethod
+    def _role_canonical(cls, value: str | None) -> str | None:
+        return _validate_canonical_role(value)
+
+    @model_validator(mode="after")
+    def _at_least_one_field(self) -> AdminUpdateUserRequest:
+        if self.role is None and self.active is None:
+            raise ValueError("Provide at least one of 'role' or 'active'")
+        return self

app/schemas/ticket.py

@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ class TicketCreate(BaseModel):
     assigned_to: int | None = None
     customer_name: str | None = None
     phone: str | None = None
+    reported_at: datetime | None = None  # original report date for backdated/backfilled tickets; defaults to now when omitted
 
 
 class TicketUpdate(BaseModel):
@@ -54,6 +55,7 @@ class TicketUpdate(BaseModel):
     category_id: int | None = None
     priority: str | None = None
     reporter: str | None = None
+    phone: str | None = None
     reported_via: str | None = None
     description: str | None = None
     assigned_to: int | None = None
@@ -95,9 +97,11 @@ class TicketBrief(BaseModel):
     assigned_to: int | None = None
     assigned_technician_name: str | None = None
     reporter: str | None = None
+    phone: str | None = None
     description: str | None = None
     sla_deadline: datetime | None = None
     reopen_count: int = 0
+    reported_at: datetime | None = None
     created_at: datetime
     updated_at: datetime
 
@@ -113,6 +117,8 @@ class TicketOut(TicketBrief):
     customer_rating: int | None = None
     timeline: list[TicketTimelineOut] = []
     photos: list[TicketPhotoOut] = []
+    unit: UnitOut | None = None
+    category: CategoryOut | None = None
     sla_status: dict | None = None
 
 

app/services/auth.py

@@ -1,13 +1,16 @@
-"""Authentication service — register, login, refresh."""
+"""Authentication service — login, refresh, and admin user management.
+
+Self-registration was removed (HARDENING/P0 batch): users are created and
+managed exclusively by admins through the admin user-management endpoints.
+"""
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 from fastapi import HTTPException, status
-from jose import JWTError, jwt
-from sqlalchemy import select
+from sqlalchemy import func, select
 from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
 
-from app.core.config import settings
+from app.core.roles import is_known_role, normalize_role
 from app.core.security import (
     create_access_token,
     create_refresh_token,
@@ -15,38 +18,35 @@ from app.core.security import (
     hash_password,
     verify_password,
 )
+from app.models.ticket import Escalation, Ticket, TicketTimeline
 from app.models.user import User
-from app.schemas.auth import RegisterRequest
+from app.schemas.auth import AdminCreateUserRequest, AdminUpdateUserRequest
 
-
-async def register(db: AsyncSession, body: RegisterRequest) -> User:
-    """Create a new user.  Raises 409 if email already exists."""
-    result = await db.execute(select(User).where(User.email == body.email))
-    if result.scalar_one_or_none():
-        raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_409_CONFLICT, detail="Email already registered")
-
-    user = User(
-        email=body.email,
-        password_hash=hash_password(body.password),
-        full_name=body.full_name,
-        phone=body.phone,
-        role=body.role,
-    )
-    db.add(user)
-    await db.flush()
-    await db.refresh(user)
-    return user
+_UNAUTHORIZED = status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED
 
 
+# ── AuthN ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 async def login(db: AsyncSession, email: str, password: str) -> tuple[str, str, User]:
-    """Authenticate and return (access_token, refresh_token, user)."""
-    result = await db.execute(select(User).where(User.email == email))
-    user = result.scalar_one_or_none()
-    if user is None or not verify_password(password, user.password_hash):
-        raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Invalid email or password")
-    if not user.active:
-        raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Account is inactive")
+    """Authenticate and return (access_token, refresh_token, user).
 
+    Fails closed (401) for bad credentials, inactive accounts, and any user
+    whose stored role is not part of the unified role model.
+    """
+    result = await db.execute(
+        select(User)
+        .where(func.lower(User.email) == email.strip().lower())
+        .order_by(User.id)
+    )
+    user = result.scalars().first()
+    if user is None or not verify_password(password, user.password_hash):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Invalid email or password")
+    if not user.active:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Account is inactive")
+    if not is_known_role(user.role):
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=_UNAUTHORIZED,
+            detail="Account role is not recognised; contact an administrator",
+        )
     access_token = create_access_token({"sub": str(user.id)})
     refresh_token = create_refresh_token({"sub": str(user.id)})
     return access_token, refresh_token, user
@@ -57,18 +57,131 @@ async def refresh_access_token(db: AsyncSession, token: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
     try:
         payload = decode_token(token)
         if payload.get("type") != "refresh":
-            raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Invalid token type")
+            raise HTTPException(status_code=_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Invalid token type")
     except HTTPException:
         raise
     except Exception:
-        raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Invalid refresh token")
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="Invalid refresh token")
 
     user_id: int = int(payload["sub"])
     result = await db.execute(select(User).where(User.id == user_id))
     user = result.scalar_one_or_none()
     if user is None or not user.active:
-        raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="User not found or inactive")
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="User not found or inactive")
+    if not is_known_role(user.role):
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=_UNAUTHORIZED,
+            detail="Account role is not recognised; contact an administrator",
+        )
 
     new_access = create_access_token({"sub": str(user.id)})
     new_refresh = create_refresh_token({"sub": str(user.id)})
     return new_access, new_refresh
+
+
+# ── Admin user management ────────────────────────────────────────────
+async def _get_user_or_404(db: AsyncSession, user_id: int) -> User:
+    result = await db.execute(select(User).where(User.id == user_id))
+    user = result.scalar_one_or_none()
+    if user is None:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND, detail="User not found")
+    return user
+
+
+async def create_user(db: AsyncSession, body: AdminCreateUserRequest) -> User:
+    """Admin-created user with an explicit, canonical role. 409 on duplicate email."""
+    email = body.email.strip().lower()
+    result = await db.execute(select(User).where(func.lower(User.email) == email))
+    if result.scalar_one_or_none():
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_409_CONFLICT, detail="Email already registered")
+
+    # Defense in depth: schema already guarantees a canonical role.
+    role = normalize_role(body.role)
+    if role is None:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST, detail="Unknown role")
+
+    user = User(
+        email=email,
+        password_hash=hash_password(body.password),
+        full_name=body.full_name.strip(),
+        phone=body.phone,
+        role=role,
+    )
+    db.add(user)
+    await db.flush()
+    await db.refresh(user)
+    return user
+
+
+async def update_user(
+    db: AsyncSession,
+    actor: User,
+    user_id: int,
+    body: AdminUpdateUserRequest,
+) -> User:
+    """Admin role-change / deactivation for an existing user.
+
+    Guards:
+    * an admin cannot modify their own account through the API (self-lockout);
+    * role changes are limited to the canonical taxonomy.
+
+    The ≥1-active-admin invariant holds structurally: only admins can demote
+    admins, and no admin can demote/deactivate themselves, so at least one
+    canonical admin always remains.
+    """
+    user = await _get_user_or_404(db, user_id)
+
+    if actor.id == user.id:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
+            detail="Admins cannot change their own role or active state through the API",
+        )
+
+    new_role = normalize_role(body.role) if body.role is not None else None
+    new_active = body.active
+
+    if new_role is not None:
+        user.role = new_role
+    if new_active is not None:
+        user.active = new_active
+    await db.flush()
+    await db.refresh(user)
+    return user
+
+
+async def delete_user(db: AsyncSession, actor: User, user_id: int) -> None:
+    """Admin deletes a user account (hard delete).
+
+    Guards:
+    * an admin cannot delete their own account (self-guard also keeps the
+      ≥1-active-admin invariant: admins can never remove themselves);
+    * users referenced by tickets / timeline / escalations are kept (409) so
+      historical data never dangles — reassign or deactivate instead.
+    """
+    user = await _get_user_or_404(db, user_id)
+
+    if actor.id == user.id:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
+            detail="Admins cannot delete their own account through the API",
+        )
+
+    referenced = False
+    for clause in (
+        select(func.count(Ticket.id)).where(Ticket.assigned_to == user_id),
+        select(func.count(TicketTimeline.id)).where(TicketTimeline.user_id == user_id),
+        select(func.count(Escalation.id)).where(Escalation.escalated_to == user_id),
+    ):
+        count = (await db.execute(clause)).scalar() or 0
+        if count:
+            referenced = True
+            break
+    if referenced:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_409_CONFLICT,
+            detail="User has related tickets, timeline entries, or escalations; "
+            "reassign or deactivate instead of deleting",
+        )
+
+    await db.delete(user)
+    await db.flush()

app/services/seed.py

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ from sqlalchemy import select
 from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
 
 from app.core.security import hash_password
+from app.core.roles import is_blocked_legacy_role, normalize_role
 from app.models.unit import Unit
 from app.models.user import User
 from app.models.category import Category
@@ -41,6 +42,88 @@ SEED_USERS_DATA = [
 ]
 
 
+async def normalize_legacy_user_roles(db: AsyncSession) -> int:
+    """Converge legacy role strings onto the unified canonical taxonomy.
+
+    Databases built before the P0 role-model batch can hold nickname roles
+    (``technician``, ``cs``, ``fm``, ``ceo`` …) minted by the old open
+    self-registration.  Unambiguous aliases are rewritten to their canonical
+    role so RBAC keeps working.  Ambiguous/unknown roles (e.g. lowercase
+    ``admin``/``superadmin``) are NOT auto-mapped — they fail closed at login
+    and JWT validation until an operator remediates the row.
+
+    Returns the number of rows rewritten. Idempotent.
+    """
+    result = await db.execute(select(User))
+    changed = 0
+    for user in result.scalars().all():
+        canonical = normalize_role(user.role)
+        if canonical and canonical != user.role:
+            logger.info("Normalizing legacy role %r → %r for %s", user.role, canonical, user.email)
+            user.role = canonical
+            changed += 1
+        elif canonical is None and not is_blocked_legacy_role(user.role):
+            logger.warning(
+                "User %s has unrecognized role %r; login will be denied until fixed",
+                user.email,
+                user.role,
+            )
+    if changed:
+        await db.flush()
+    return changed
+
+
+async def normalize_legacy_user_emails(db: AsyncSession) -> int:
+    """Lowercase stored user emails to match the normalized login lookup.
+
+    Databases built before the P0 batch can hold mixed-case emails (the old
+    open self-registration stored them verbatim) while login now compares on
+    the lowercase form, so such rows would otherwise be silently locked out.
+    Rewrites each stored email to its stripped/lowercase form.  When two rows
+    share an email that differs only in case, only the lowest-id row becomes
+    canonical (any others keep their stored value and are logged as a warning)
+    so the unique constraint is never violated.  Idempotent; returns the
+    number of rows rewritten.
+    """
+    result = await db.execute(select(User).order_by(User.id))
+    users = list(result.scalars().all())
+    groups: dict[str, list[User]] = {}
+    for user in users:
+        groups.setdefault(user.email.strip().lower(), []).append(user)
+
+    changed = 0
+    for normalized, members in groups.items():
+        if len(members) == 1:
+            user = members[0]
+            if user.email != normalized:
+                logger.info(
+                    "Normalizing legacy email %r → %r for user %d", user.email, normalized, user.id
+                )
+                user.email = normalized
+                changed += 1
+            continue
+        if any(user.email == normalized for user in members):
+            losers = [u for u in members if u.email != normalized]
+        else:
+            winner = members[0]
+            logger.info(
+                "Normalizing legacy email %r → %r for user %d", winner.email, normalized, winner.id
+            )
+            winner.email = normalized
+            changed += 1
+            losers = members[1:]
+        for loser in losers:
+            logger.warning(
+                "Cannot normalize email %r for user %d: another account already holds "
+                "that normalized email; keeping the stored value",
+                normalized,
+                loser.id,
+            )
+    if changed:
+        await db.flush()
+    return changed
+
+
 async def seed_users(db: AsyncSession, default_password: str = "denya123") -> list[User]:
     """Insert seed users if they don't already exist."""
     hashed = hash_password(default_password)
@@ -152,6 +235,20 @@ SEED_CATEGORIES_DATA: list[dict] = [
     {"type": "cs", "name": "Missing Item", "subs": ["Guest left items behind", "Item search request"]},
     {"type": "cs", "name": "Billing", "subs": ["Invoice question", "Payment issue", "Deposit query"]},
     {"type": "cs", "name": "Staff Behaviour", "subs": ["Staff conduct feedback"]},
+    # ── Phase 1 additions (maintenance) ──────────────────────────
+    {"type": "maintenance", "name": "Kitchen Sink", "subs": ["Clogging"]},
+    {"type": "maintenance", "name": "Painting", "subs": []},
+    {"type": "maintenance", "name": "Gym", "subs": []},
+    {"type": "maintenance", "name": "Swimming Pool", "subs": []},
+    {"type": "maintenance", "name": "Shower Cord", "subs": []},
+    {"type": "maintenance", "name": "Sliding Doors", "subs": []},
+    {"type": "maintenance", "name": "Sliding Windows", "subs": []},
+    {"type": "maintenance", "name": "Low Water Pressure", "subs": []},
+    {"type": "maintenance", "name": "Damages", "subs": []},
+    # ── Phase 1 additions (customer service) ─────────────────────
+    {"type": "cs", "name": "Parking Issues", "subs": []},
+    {"type": "cs", "name": "Noise Complaints", "subs": []},
+    {"type": "cs", "name": "Waste Management", "subs": []},
     # ── Emergency ────────────────────────────────────────────────
     {"type": "emergency", "name": "Fire", "subs": ["Smoke detected", "Fire alarm", "Sprinkler issue"], "sla_urgency": "urgent"},
     {"type": "emergency", "name": "Flood", "subs": ["Major water leak", "Burst pipe", "Overflowing"], "sla_urgency": "urgent"},

app/services/sla.py

@@ -55,9 +55,12 @@ def should_escalate_on_response(ticket: Ticket) -> bool:
     return datetime.now(timezone.utc) > deadline
 
 
+TERMINAL_STATUSES = {"Closed", "Completed", "Cancelled"}
+
+
 def is_sla_breached(ticket: Ticket) -> bool:
     """Return True if the ticket's resolution SLA deadline has passed."""
-    if ticket.sla_deadline is None or ticket.status in ("Closed", "Completed"):
+    if ticket.sla_deadline is None or ticket.status in TERMINAL_STATUSES:
         return False
     deadline = ticket.sla_deadline
     if deadline.tzinfo is None:
@@ -88,7 +91,7 @@ async def get_sla_status(ticket: Ticket) -> dict:
         rd = resolution_deadline
         if rd.tzinfo is None:
             rd = rd.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-        resolution_breached = now > rd if ticket.status not in ("Closed", "Completed") else False
+        resolution_breached = now > rd if ticket.status not in TERMINAL_STATUSES else False
 
     return {
         "priority": ticket.priority,

app/services/ticket.py

@@ -6,11 +6,11 @@ from datetime import datetime, timezone
 from typing import Any
 
 from fastapi import HTTPException, status
-from sqlalchemy import func, select
+from sqlalchemy import delete as sa_delete, func, select
 from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
 from sqlalchemy.orm import selectinload
 
-from app.models.ticket import Escalation, Ticket, TicketTimeline
+from app.models.ticket import Escalation, Ticket, TicketPhoto, TicketTimeline
 from app.models.unit import Unit
 from app.models.user import User
 from app.services.sla import compute_sla_deadline
@@ -18,21 +18,23 @@ from app.services.sla import compute_sla_deadline
 # ── Status Transition Map ────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Keys: current status → list of valid next statuses
 VALID_TRANSITIONS: dict[str, list[str]] = {
-    "New": ["Logged"],
-    "Logged": ["Triage", "Closed"],
-    "Triage": ["Assigned", "Escalated"],
-    "Assigned": ["Accepted", "Triage"],
-    "Accepted": ["Travelling", "Triage"],
-    "Travelling": ["On Site", "Triage"],
-    "On Site": ["In Progress", "Triage"],
-    "In Progress": ["Waiting Parts", "Escalated", "Completed"],
-    "Waiting Parts": ["In Progress", "Escalated"],
-    "Escalated": ["Triage", "In Progress", "Completed", "Closed"],
-    "Completed": ["On-Field Verification", "In Progress"],
-    "On-Field Verification": ["Wahab Review", "Completed", "Closed"],
-    "Wahab Review": ["Closed", "On-Field Verification"],
+    "New": ["Logged", "Cancelled"],
+    "Logged": ["Triage", "Closed", "Cancelled"],
+    "Triage": ["Assigned", "Escalated", "Cancelled"],
+    "Assigned": ["Accepted", "Triage", "Cancelled"],
+    "Accepted": ["Travelling", "Triage", "Cancelled"],
+    "Travelling": ["On Site", "Triage", "Cancelled"],
+    "On Site": ["In Progress", "Triage", "Cancelled"],
+    "In Progress": ["Waiting Parts", "Escalated", "Completed", "Cancelled"],
+    "Waiting Parts": ["In Progress", "Escalated", "Cancelled"],
+    "Escalated": ["Triage", "In Progress", "Completed", "Closed", "Cancelled"],
+    "Completed": ["On-Field Verification", "In Progress", "Cancelled"],
+    "On-Field Verification": ["Wahab Review", "Completed", "Closed", "Cancelled"],
+    "Wahab Review": ["Closed", "On-Field Verification", "Cancelled"],
     "Closed": ["Reopened"],
-    "Reopened": ["Triage", "Logged"],
+    "Reopened": ["Triage", "Logged", "Cancelled"],
+    # Terminal: cancelled tickets cannot resume work.
+    "Cancelled": [],
 }
 
 REOPEN_WINDOW_DAYS = 7
@@ -41,15 +43,25 @@ SLA_ACK_USER = "Ama"
 
 # ── Helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 async def _generate_ticket_number(db: AsyncSession) -> str:
-    """Generate the next ticket number in PAV-YYYY-NNNNN format."""
+    """Generate the next ticket number in PAV-YYYY-NNNNN format.
+
+    Uses the highest existing suffix + 1 (not a row count) so that deleting
+    tickets never re-issues an already-used number.
+    """
     year = datetime.now(timezone.utc).year
     prefix = f"PAV-{year}-"
-    # Count existing tickets this year
     result = await db.execute(
-        select(func.count(Ticket.id)).where(Ticket.ticket_number.like(f"{prefix}%"))
+        select(func.max(Ticket.ticket_number)).where(Ticket.ticket_number.like(f"{prefix}%"))
     )
-    count = result.scalar() or 0
-    return f"{prefix}{count + 1:05d}"
+    max_number = result.scalar()
+    if max_number:
+        try:
+            next_seq = int(max_number.rsplit("-", 1)[1]) + 1
+        except (ValueError, IndexError):
+            next_seq = 1
+    else:
+        next_seq = 1
+    return f"{prefix}{next_seq:05d}"
 
 
 async def _log_status_change(
@@ -102,6 +114,10 @@ async def create_ticket(
     ticket_number = await _generate_ticket_number(db)
     priority = data.get("priority")
     sla_deadline = compute_sla_deadline(priority) if priority else None
+    # Original report date: backdated/backfilled tickets keep their true date;
+    # when omitted the ticket is considered reported right now. The SLA clock
+    # is unchanged — deadlines run from creation time, not the reported date.
+    reported_at = data.get("reported_at") or datetime.now(timezone.utc)
 
     ticket = Ticket(
         ticket_number=ticket_number,
@@ -110,9 +126,11 @@ async def create_ticket(
         category_id=data.get("category_id"),
         priority=priority,
         reporter=data.get("reporter") or data.get("customer_name"),
+        phone=data.get("phone"),
         reported_via=data.get("reported_via"),
         description=data.get("description"),
         assigned_to=data.get("assigned_to"),
+        reported_at=reported_at,
         sla_deadline=sla_deadline,
     )
     db.add(ticket)
@@ -223,6 +241,7 @@ async def update_ticket(
     # Handle status transitions separately
     new_status = data.get("status")
     old_status = ticket.status
+    status_changed = new_status is not None and old_status != new_status
     if new_status is not None:
         if old_status != new_status:
             valid_targets = VALID_TRANSITIONS.get(old_status, [])
@@ -283,9 +302,25 @@ async def update_ticket(
 
             ticket.status = new_status
 
+    # Assigning a technician advances pre-Assigned tickets to Assigned with a
+    # timeline entry; tickets already past Assigned keep their current status.
+    advanced_to_assigned = False
+    if "assigned_to" in data and data["assigned_to"] != ticket.assigned_to:
+        if ticket.status in {"New", "Logged", "Triage"}:
+            await _log_status_change(
+                db,
+                ticket.id,
+                from_status=ticket.status,
+                to_status="Assigned",
+                note=data.get("note") if not status_changed else None,
+                user_id=user.id if user else None,
+            )
+            ticket.status = "Assigned"
+            advanced_to_assigned = True
+
     # Handle standalone note (no status change)
     note_only = data.get("note")
-    if note_only and not (new_status is not None and old_status != new_status):
+    if note_only and not status_changed and not advanced_to_assigned:
         await _log_status_change(
             db,
             ticket.id,
@@ -296,7 +331,7 @@ async def update_ticket(
         )
 
     # Update other fields
-    for field in ("unit_id", "category_id", "priority", "reporter", "reported_via",
+    for field in ("unit_id", "category_id", "priority", "reporter", "phone", "reported_via",
                   "description", "assigned_to", "eta", "cost", "parts_used"):
         if field in data:
             setattr(ticket, field, data[field])
@@ -310,3 +345,19 @@ async def update_ticket(
     return ticket
 
 
+async def delete_ticket(db: AsyncSession, ticket_id: int) -> Ticket:
+    """Delete a ticket and all dependent rows (timeline, photos, escalations).
+
+    Returns the deleted ticket so the caller can remove orphaned photo files.
+    """
+    ticket = await _get_ticket_or_404(db, ticket_id)
+
+    # Delete escalations, timeline, and photo rows first (FK children).
+    await db.execute(sa_delete(Escalation).where(Escalation.ticket_id == ticket_id))
+    await db.execute(sa_delete(TicketTimeline).where(TicketTimeline.ticket_id == ticket_id))
+    await db.execute(sa_delete(TicketPhoto).where(TicketPhoto.ticket_id == ticket_id))
+    await db.delete(ticket)
+    await db.flush()
+    return ticket
+
+

app/templates/base.html

@@ -4,8 +4,9 @@
     <meta charset="UTF-8">
     <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0">
     <title>Denya OneCare</title>
-    <script src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/alpinejs@3.x.x/dist/cdn.min.js" defer></script>
-    <script src="https://cdn.tailwindcss.com"></script>
+    <!-- Vendored same-origin (no CDN): app/static/vendor/ — LAN-safe demo -->
+    <script src="/static/vendor/alpine-3.17.2.min.js" defer></script>
+    <script src="/static/vendor/tailwind-3.4.17.js"></script>
     <script>
         tailwind.config = {
             theme: {
@@ -51,6 +52,7 @@
         .status-wahab-review { @apply bg-violet-100 text-violet-800; }
         .status-closed { @apply bg-gray-200 text-gray-600; }
         .status-reopened { @apply bg-pink-100 text-pink-800; }
+        .status-cancelled { @apply bg-gray-300 text-gray-700 line-through; }
         .priority-urgent { @apply bg-red-100 text-red-800 border-red-300; }
         .priority-high { @apply bg-orange-100 text-orange-800 border-orange-300; }
         .priority-medium { @apply bg-yellow-100 text-yellow-800 border-yellow-300; }
@@ -318,7 +320,8 @@
                         'on-field verification': 'status-on-field-verification',
                         'wahab review': 'status-wahab-review',
                         'closed': 'status-closed',
-                        'reopened': 'status-reopened'
+                        'reopened': 'status-reopened',
+                        'cancelled': 'status-cancelled'
                     };
                     return map[status.toLowerCase()] || 'bg-gray-100 text-gray-800';
                 },

app/templates/dashboard/ceo.html

@@ -189,11 +189,11 @@
                     if (!all.length) return;
 
                     // Basic KPIs
-                    const open = all.filter(t => !['Closed', 'Completed'].includes(t.status));
-                    const closed = all.filter(t => ['Closed', 'Completed'].includes(t.status));
+                    const open = all.filter(t => !['Closed', 'Completed', 'Cancelled'].includes(t.status));
+                    const closed = all.filter(t => ['Closed', 'Completed', 'Cancelled'].includes(t.status));
                     const urgent = all.filter(t => t.priority === 'urgent');
                     const withSLA = all.filter(t => t.sla_deadline);
-                    const slaMet = withSLA.filter(t => new Date(t.sla_deadline) > new Date() || ['Closed', 'Completed'].includes(t.status));
+                    const slaMet = withSLA.filter(t => new Date(t.sla_deadline) > new Date() || ['Closed', 'Completed', 'Cancelled'].includes(t.status));
 
                     // Monthly restored
                     const oneWeekAgo = new Date(Date.now() - 7 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000);
@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@
 
                     // Risk indicators
                     this.indicators = {
-                        openEmergencies: urgent.filter(t => !['Closed', 'Completed'].includes(t.status)).length,
+                        openEmergencies: urgent.filter(t => !['Closed', 'Completed', 'Cancelled'].includes(t.status)).length,
                         reopenedThisWeek,
                         overdueJobs: open.filter(t => t.sla_deadline && new Date(t.sla_deadline) < new Date()).length,
                         pendingVerification: all.filter(t => ['Completed', 'On-Field Verification'].includes(t.status)).length,
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@
             },
 
             calcAvgResponse(all) {
-                const open = all.filter(t => !['Closed', 'Completed'].includes(t.status));
+                const open = all.filter(t => !['Closed', 'Completed', 'Cancelled'].includes(t.status));
                 if (!open.length) return '—';
                 const avgHrs = open.reduce((sum, t) => sum + Math.min((new Date() - new Date(t.created_at)) / (1000 * 60 * 60), 168), 0) / open.length;
                 if (avgHrs < 1) return `${Math.round(avgHrs * 60)}m`;

app/templates/dashboard/cs.html

@@ -188,20 +188,20 @@
                     const newToday = all.filter(t => new Date(t.created_at) >= today && t.status === 'New').length;
 
                     // Open tickets (not closed/completed)
-                    const open = all.filter(t => !['Closed', 'Completed'].includes(t.status));
+                    const open = all.filter(t => !['Closed', 'Completed', 'Cancelled'].includes(t.status));
 
                     // By priority
                     const byPriority = { urgent: 0, high: 0, medium: 0, low: 0 };
                     open.forEach(t => { if (t.priority) byPriority[t.priority] = (byPriority[t.priority] || 0) + 1; });
 
                     // Oldest unassigned
-                    const unassigned = all.filter(t => !t.assigned_to && !['Closed', 'Completed'].includes(t.status))
+                    const unassigned = all.filter(t => !t.assigned_to && !['Closed', 'Completed', 'Cancelled'].includes(t.status))
                         .sort((a, b) => new Date(a.created_at) - new Date(b.created_at));
                     this.oldestUnassigned = unassigned[0] || null;
 
                     // SLA compliance (rough: tickets with sla_deadline not breached)
                     const withSLA = all.filter(t => t.sla_deadline);
-                    const slaMet = withSLA.filter(t => new Date(t.sla_deadline) > new Date() || ['Closed', 'Completed'].includes(t.status));
+                    const slaMet = withSLA.filter(t => new Date(t.sla_deadline) > new Date() || ['Closed', 'Completed', 'Cancelled'].includes(t.status));
 
                     this.kpi = {
                         newToday,
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@
 
             calcAvgResponse(all) {
                 // Rough approximation — in real system this would come from timeline analysis
-                const open = all.filter(t => !['Closed', 'Completed'].includes(t.status));
+                const open = all.filter(t => !['Closed', 'Completed', 'Cancelled'].includes(t.status));
                 if (!open.length) return '—';
                 const avgHrs = open.reduce((sum, t) => {
                     const diff = (new Date() - new Date(t.created_at)) / (1000 * 60 * 60);

app/templates/dashboard/fm.html

@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@
                     const all = data.items;
 
                     // Active: not closed/completed
-                    const active = all.filter(t => !['Closed', 'Completed'].includes(t.status));
+                    const active = all.filter(t => !['Closed', 'Completed', 'Cancelled'].includes(t.status));
                     this.activeTickets = active;
 
                     // KPIs

app/templates/tickets/detail.html

@@ -23,7 +23,11 @@
                             <span class="px-3 py-1 rounded-full text-sm font-medium" :class="statusClass(ticket.status)" x-text="ticket.status"></span>
                             <span class="px-3 py-1 rounded text-sm font-medium" :class="priorityClass(ticket.priority)" x-text="priorityBadge(ticket.priority)"></span>
                         </div>
-                        <p class="text-gray-500 mt-1">Created <span x-text="formatDate(ticket.created_at)"></span></p>
+                        <p class="text-gray-500 mt-1">Created <span x-text="formatDate(ticket.created_at)"></span>
+                            <template x-if="ticket.reported_at && formatDateShort(ticket.reported_at) !== formatDateShort(ticket.created_at)">
+                                <span> · Reported <span class="font-medium text-gray-600" x-text="formatDateShort(ticket.reported_at)"></span></span>
+                            </template>
+                        </p>
                     </div>
                     <div class="flex items-center space-x-2">
                         <button @click="showStatusModal = true" class="px-4 py-2 bg-denya-600 text-white rounded-lg hover:bg-denya-700 transition text-sm font-medium">Update Status</button>
@@ -121,10 +125,18 @@
                                 <dt class="text-sm text-gray-500">Reporter</dt>
                                 <dd class="text-sm font-medium text-gray-900" x-text="ticket.reporter || '—'"></dd>
                             </div>
+                            <div class="flex justify-between" x-show="ticket.phone">
+                                <dt class="text-sm text-gray-500">Phone</dt>
+                                <dd class="text-sm font-medium text-gray-900" x-text="ticket.phone"></dd>
+                            </div>
                             <div class="flex justify-between">
                                 <dt class="text-sm text-gray-500">Reported Via</dt>
                                 <dd class="text-sm font-medium text-gray-900 capitalize" x-text="ticket.reported_via || '—'"></dd>
                             </div>
+                            <div class="flex justify-between">
+                                <dt class="text-sm text-gray-500">Reported</dt>
+                                <dd class="text-sm font-medium text-gray-900" x-text="ticket.reported_at ? formatDateShort(ticket.reported_at) : formatDateShort(ticket.created_at)"></dd>
+                            </div>
                             <div class="flex justify-between">
                                 <dt class="text-sm text-gray-500">Priority</dt>
                                 <dd><span class="px-2 py-0.5 rounded text-xs font-medium" :class="priorityClass(ticket.priority)" x-text="priorityBadge(ticket.priority)"></span></dd>
@@ -200,20 +212,9 @@
                     <label class="block text-sm font-medium text-gray-700 mb-1">Current: <span class="font-bold" x-text="ticket.status"></span></label>
                     <select x-model="statusForm.newStatus" class="w-full px-4 py-2.5 rounded-lg border border-gray-300 focus:ring-2 focus:ring-denya-500 outline-none">
                         <option value="">Select new status</option>
-                        <option value="Logged">Logged</option>
-                        <option value="Triage">Triage</option>
-                        <option value="Assigned">Assigned</option>
-                        <option value="Accepted">Accepted</option>
-                        <option value="Travelling">Travelling</option>
-                        <option value="On Site">On Site</option>
-                        <option value="In Progress">In Progress</option>
-                        <option value="Waiting Parts">Waiting Parts</option>
-                        <option value="Escalated">Escalated</option>
-                        <option value="Completed">Completed</option>
-                        <option value="On-Field Verification">On-Field Verification</option>
-                        <option value="Wahab Review">Wahab Review</option>
-                        <option value="Closed">Closed</option>
-                        <option value="Reopened">Reopened</option>
+                        <template x-for="target in availableTransitions" :key="target">
+                            <option :value="target" x-text="target"></option>
+                        </template>
                     </select>
                 </div>
                 <div>
@@ -298,6 +299,7 @@
             statusForm: { newStatus: '', note: '' },
             statusSubmitting: false,
             statusError: '',
+            availableTransitions: [],
 
             // Assign form
             assignForm: { technicianId: '' },
@@ -311,6 +313,7 @@
 
             async init() {
                 await this.loadTicket();
+                await this.loadTransitions();
                 if (app().isFM || app().isAdmin) {
                     await this.loadTechnicians();
                 }
@@ -327,18 +330,25 @@
                 }
             },
 
+            async loadTransitions() {
+                try {
+                    const data = await app().apiGet(`/api/tickets/${this.ticketId}/transitions`);
+                    this.availableTransitions = (data && data.transitions) || [];
+                } catch (e) {
+                    console.error('Transitions load error', e);
+                    this.availableTransitions = [];
+                }
+            },
+
             async loadTechnicians() {
-                // Users list not exposed via API directly, so use a known list
-                // In a real system we'd have GET /api/users
-                this.technicians = [
-                    { id: 9, full_name: 'Prosper' },
-                    { id: 10, full_name: 'Sam' },
-                    { id: 11, full_name: 'Steven' },
-                    { id: 12, full_name: 'Junior (Samuel)' },
-                    { id: 13, full_name: 'Francis' },
-                    { id: 14, full_name: 'Desmond Afful' },
-                    { id: 15, full_name: 'Afful' },
-                ];
+                try {
+                    const users = await app().apiGet('/api/auth/users');
+                    // Assign dropdown should only offer Tech-role staff
+                    this.technicians = (users || []).filter(u => u.role === 'Tech');
+                } catch (e) {
+                    console.error('Technicians load error', e);
+                    this.technicians = [];
+                }
             },
 
             async submitStatusUpdate() {
@@ -354,6 +364,7 @@
                     
                     const updated = await app().apiPatch(`/api/tickets/${this.ticketId}`, payload);
                     this.ticket = updated;
+                    await this.loadTransitions();
                     this.showStatusModal = false;
                     this.statusForm = { newStatus: '', note: '' };
                     app().showToast('Status updated', 'success');
@@ -376,6 +387,7 @@
                         assigned_to: parseInt(this.assignForm.technicianId)
                     });
                     this.ticket = updated;
+                    await this.loadTransitions();
                     this.showAssignModal = false;
                     app().showToast('Technician assigned', 'success');
                 } catch (e) {

app/templates/tickets/list.html

@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
                     <option value="Wahab Review">Wahab Review</option>
                     <option value="Closed">Closed</option>
                     <option value="Reopened">Reopened</option>
+                    <option value="Cancelled">Cancelled</option>
                 </select>
             </div>
             <div>
@@ -129,6 +130,7 @@
                         <th class="px-5 py-3 text-left cursor-pointer hover:text-gray-900" @click="sortBy('created_at')">
                             Created <span x-show="sortField === 'created_at'" x-text="sortDir === 'asc' ? '↑' : '↓'"></span>
                         </th>
+                        <th class="px-5 py-3 text-left">Reported</th>
                         <th class="px-5 py-3 text-left">SLA</th>
                     </tr>
                 </thead>
@@ -141,8 +143,9 @@
                             <td class="px-5 py-3 text-gray-600 max-w-xs truncate" x-text="ticket.description || ''"></td>
                             <td class="px-5 py-3 text-gray-500 text-xs" x-text="ticket.assigned_technician_name || '—'"></td>
                             <td class="px-5 py-3 text-gray-500 text-xs" x-text="formatDate(ticket.created_at)"></td>
+                            <td class="px-5 py-3 text-gray-500 text-xs" x-text="formatDateShort(ticket.reported_at || ticket.created_at)"></td>
                             <td class="px-5 py-3">
-                                <span x-show="ticket.sla_deadline" class="text-xs" :class="new Date(ticket.sla_deadline) < new Date() && !['Closed','Completed'].includes(ticket.status) ? 'text-red-600 font-medium' : 'text-gray-400'">
+                                <span x-show="ticket.sla_deadline" class="text-xs" :class="new Date(ticket.sla_deadline) < new Date() && !['Closed','Completed','Cancelled'].includes(ticket.status) ? 'text-red-600 font-medium' : 'text-gray-400'">
                                     <span x-text="formatDateShort(ticket.sla_deadline)"></span>
                                 </span>
                                 <span x-show="!ticket.sla_deadline" class="text-xs text-gray-300">—</span>
@@ -150,7 +153,7 @@
                         </tr>
                     </template>
                     <tr x-show="!tickets.length && !loading">
-                        <td colspan="7" class="px-5 py-16 text-center text-gray-400">
+                        <td colspan="8" class="px-5 py-16 text-center text-gray-400">
                             <svg class="w-12 h-12 mx-auto text-gray-300 mb-3" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" viewBox="0 0 24 24"><path stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" stroke-width="1.5" d="M9 5H7a2 2 0 00-2 2v12a2 2 0 002 2h10a2 2 0 002-2V7a2 2 0 00-2-2h-2M9 5a2 2 0 002 2h2a2 2 0 002-2M9 5a2 2 0 012-2h2a2 2 0 012 2"/></svg>
                             No tickets match your filters
                         </td>
@@ -177,6 +180,7 @@
                                 <th class="px-5 py-3 text-left">Description</th>
                                 <th class="px-5 py-3 text-left">Assigned To</th>
                                 <th class="px-5 py-3 text-left">Created</th>
+                                <th class="px-5 py-3 text-left">Reported</th>
                                 <th class="px-5 py-3 text-left">SLA</th>
                             </tr>
                         </thead>
@@ -189,8 +193,9 @@
                                     <td class="px-5 py-3 text-gray-600 max-w-xs truncate" x-text="ticket.description || ''"></td>
                                     <td class="px-5 py-3 text-gray-500 text-xs" x-text="ticket.assigned_technician_name || '—'"></td>
                                     <td class="px-5 py-3 text-gray-500 text-xs" x-text="formatDate(ticket.created_at)"></td>
+                                    <td class="px-5 py-3 text-gray-500 text-xs" x-text="formatDateShort(ticket.reported_at || ticket.created_at)"></td>
                                     <td class="px-5 py-3">
-                                        <span x-show="ticket.sla_deadline" class="text-xs" :class="new Date(ticket.sla_deadline) < new Date() && !['Closed','Completed'].includes(ticket.status) ? 'text-red-600 font-medium' : 'text-gray-400'">
+                                        <span x-show="ticket.sla_deadline" class="text-xs" :class="new Date(ticket.sla_deadline) < new Date() && !['Closed','Completed','Cancelled'].includes(ticket.status) ? 'text-red-600 font-medium' : 'text-gray-400'">
                                             <span x-text="formatDateShort(ticket.sla_deadline)"></span>
                                         </span>
                                         <span x-show="!ticket.sla_deadline" class="text-xs text-gray-300">—</span>

app/templates/tickets/new.html

@@ -154,6 +154,15 @@
                 </div>
             </div>
 
+            <!-- Reported date (backdating support) -->
+            <div class="grid grid-cols-1 md:grid-cols-2 gap-4">
+                <div>
+                    <label class="block text-sm font-medium text-gray-700 mb-1">Reported Date</label>
+                    <input type="date" x-model="form.reported_date" :max="todayStr" class="w-full px-4 py-2.5 rounded-lg border border-gray-300 focus:ring-2 focus:ring-denya-500 focus:border-transparent outline-none">
+                    <p class="mt-1 text-xs text-gray-400">Defaults to today. Use a past date when entering an old/backlogged issue — it stays active in the normal workflow.</p>
+                </div>
+            </div>
+
             <!-- Photo Upload -->
             <div>
                 <label class="block text-sm font-medium text-gray-700 mb-1">Photos (Before)</label>
@@ -205,8 +214,10 @@
                 priority: '',
                 description: '',
                 reporter: '',
-                reported_via: ''
+                reported_via: '',
+                reported_date: ''
             },
+            todayStr: '',
             priorityAuto: false,
             categories: [],
             subCategories: [],
@@ -223,6 +234,14 @@
             async init() {
                 await this.loadCategories();
                 await this.loadUnits();
+                // Default reported date to today (local), allow backdating via the date picker
+                this.todayStr = this.localDateStr(new Date());
+                if (!this.form.reported_date) this.form.reported_date = this.todayStr;
+            },
+
+            localDateStr(d) {
+                const offset = d.getTimezoneOffset();
+                return new Date(d.getTime() - offset * 60000).toISOString().slice(0, 10);
             },
 
             // ── Report mode ──────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -363,6 +382,16 @@
                         this.submitting = false;
                         return;
                     }
+                    if (!this.form.category_main && !this.form.category_id) {
+                        this.error = 'Please select a Category — every issue needs one for correct routing and SLA.';
+                        this.submitting = false;
+                        return;
+                    }
+                    if (this.mode === 'standard' && !this.form.priority) {
+                        this.error = 'Please select a Priority — without one the ticket gets no SLA deadline.';
+                        this.submitting = false;
+                        return;
+                    }
 
                     // Create the ticket
                     const payload = {
@@ -374,6 +403,7 @@
                         unit_id: this.form.unit.id,
                         customer_name: this.form.customer_name || null,
                         phone: this.form.phone || null,
+                        reported_at: this.form.reported_date || null,
                     };
 
                     const ticket = await app().apiPost('/api/tickets', payload);

docker-compose.yml

@@ -4,10 +4,9 @@ services:
     container_name: denya-onecare
     ports:
       - "8000:8000"
+    env_file:
+      - .env            # git-ignored; see .env.example for required keys
     environment:
-      - DATABASE_URL=sqlite+aiosqlite:///./data/denya_onecare.db
-      - SECRET_KEY=change-me-in-production
-      - CORS_ORIGINS=*
       - DEBUG=false
     volumes:
       - app-data:/app/data

tests/conftest.py

@@ -12,18 +12,32 @@ import tempfile
 
 _TMP_DIR = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="denya-test-")
 os.environ["DATABASE_URL"] = f"sqlite+aiosqlite:///{_TMP_DIR}/test.db"
+# HARDENING.md P0.1/P0.2: the app now fails closed without a real SECRET_KEY
+# and an explicit CORS allow-list — tests must satisfy both.
+os.environ.setdefault("SECRET_KEY", "test-secret-key-not-for-production-0123456789abcdef")
+os.environ.setdefault("CORS_ORIGINS", "http://test")
 
+import pytest  # noqa: E402
 import pytest_asyncio  # noqa: E402  (DATABASE_URL must be set before app imports)
 from httpx import ASGITransport, AsyncClient  # noqa: E402
 
 from app.core.database import Base, async_session_factory, engine  # noqa: E402
+from app.core.ratelimit import login_rate_limiter  # noqa: E402
 from app.main import app  # noqa: E402
 from app.models.ticket import Ticket  # noqa: E402
 from app.services.seed import seed_categories, seed_units, seed_users  # noqa: E402
 
 
+@pytest.fixture
+def _reset_login_rate_limiter():
+    """Isolate login rate-limit state between tests (shared in-process store)."""
+    login_rate_limiter.reset()
+    yield
+    login_rate_limiter.reset()
+
+
 @pytest_asyncio.fixture
-async def client():
+async def client(_reset_login_rate_limiter):
     """Async test client with a fresh, seeded database per test."""
     async with engine.begin() as conn:
         await conn.run_sync(Base.metadata.create_all)

tests/test_backdated_reported_date.py

@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+"""Tests for backdated reported-date support (Wahab demo).
+
+Anchors:
+* A ticket created with a past ``reported_at`` persists that date and it is
+  exposed on list + detail responses — this is how Wahab enters old tickets
+  that stay active in the normal workflow.
+* A ticket created without ``reported_at`` defaults to "now", so existing
+  create behavior is unchanged.
+* The reported date is metadata only: SLA deadlines still run from creation
+  time and no age/backdate restriction kicks in.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from datetime import datetime
+
+import pytest
+
+pytestmark = pytest.mark.asyncio
+
+
+def _naive(iso: str) -> datetime:
+    """Parse an ISO datetime and strip any tz offset for safe comparison."""
+    dt = datetime.fromisoformat(iso)
+    return dt.replace(tzinfo=None) if dt.tzinfo is not None else dt
+
+
+async def _login(client, email="wahab@denya.com", password="denya123") -> str:
+    resp = await client.post(
+        "/api/auth/login",
+        json={"email": email, "password": password},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    return resp.json()["access_token"]
+
+
+async def _create_ticket(client, token: str, **overrides) -> dict:
+    payload = {
+        "unit_id": 2,
+        "category_id": 3,
+        "priority": "medium",
+        "reporter": "Backdate Test",
+        "reported_via": "walk-in",
+        "description": "backdate test ticket",
+        **overrides,
+    }
+    resp = await client.post(
+        "/api/tickets",
+        json=payload,
+        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 201, resp.text
+    return resp.json()
+
+
+async def test_create_with_backdated_reported_at_persists(client):
+    """Wahab (Admin/Wahab) can enter an old ticket and its date sticks."""
+    token = await _login(client)
+    ticket = await _create_ticket(
+        client,
+        token,
+        reported_at="2026-07-20",
+        description="Old plumbing issue reported weeks ago",
+    )
+    assert ticket["reported_at"] is not None
+    assert ticket["reported_at"].startswith("2026-07-20")
+
+    # Still an active ticket in the normal workflow — no age restriction.
+    assert ticket["status"] in {"New", "Logged"}
+
+    # Detail endpoint exposes the reported date.
+    detail = await client.get(f"/api/tickets/{ticket['id']}")
+    assert detail.status_code == 200
+    assert detail.json()["reported_at"].startswith("2026-07-20")
+
+    # List endpoint exposes it too.
+    listing = await client.get("/api/tickets")
+    assert listing.status_code == 200
+    listed = next(t for t in listing.json()["items"] if t["id"] == ticket["id"])
+    assert listed["reported_at"].startswith("2026-07-20")
+
+
+async def test_create_without_reported_at_defaults_to_now(client):
+    """Omitting reported_at behaves exactly as before: reported == created."""
+    token = await _login(client)
+    ticket = await _create_ticket(client, token, description="normal today ticket")
+    assert ticket["reported_at"] is not None
+    reported = _naive(ticket["reported_at"])
+    created = _naive(ticket["created_at"])
+    assert abs((reported - created).total_seconds()) < 60
+
+
+async def test_reported_at_does_not_shift_sla_deadline(client):
+    """SLA computation is unchanged: deadlines run from creation time."""
+    token = await _login(client)
+    ticket = await _create_ticket(
+        client,
+        token,
+        priority="urgent",
+        reported_at="2026-01-01",
+        description="old urgent ticket",
+    )
+    assert ticket["sla_deadline"] is not None
+    created = _naive(ticket["created_at"])
+    deadline = _naive(ticket["sla_deadline"])
+    hours = (deadline - created).total_seconds() / 3600
+    assert 3.5 <= hours <= 4.5  # urgent → 4 h resolution window from creation
+
+
+async def test_reported_at_round_trips_full_datetime(client):
+    """A precise datetime (not just a date) survives the round trip."""
+    token = await _login(client)
+    reported = "2026-07-20T14:30:00"
+    ticket = await _create_ticket(client, token, reported_at=reported, description="datetime round trip")
+    assert ticket["reported_at"] is not None
+    parsed = _naive(ticket["reported_at"])
+    assert parsed.date().isoformat() == "2026-07-20"
+    assert parsed.hour == 14 and parsed.minute == 30

tests/test_frontend_vendoring.py

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+"""Frontend must be fully self-contained — no CDN (LAN page-freeze regression).
+
+The P0 batch's templates loaded Alpine.js from ``cdn.jsdelivr.net`` and Tailwind
+from ``cdn.tailwindcss.com``, so any demo client that cannot reach those CDNs
+(LAN-only devices, filtered networks) got a login page whose JS never engaged
+(a stuck form). Both libraries are now vendored under ``app/static/vendor/``
+and served same-origin with no external ``script src`` in the HTML. HTML pages
+always revalidate (``Cache-Control: no-cache``); the vendored assets carry
+long-lived immutable caching (their URLs embed the version).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import re
+
+import pytest
+from httpx import AsyncClient
+
+pytestmark = pytest.mark.asyncio
+
+# Any <script … src="//host/…"> or src="https?://host/…"> — i.e. NOT same-origin.
+_EXTERNAL_SRC = re.compile(r"""<script\b[^>]*\bsrc\s*=\s*["'](?:https?:)?//[^"']+["']""")
+
+VENDORED_SCRIPTS = (
+    "/static/vendor/alpine-3.17.2.min.js",
+    "/static/vendor/tailwind-3.4.17.js",
+)
+
+
+async def test_login_page_has_no_external_script_srcs(client: AsyncClient):
+    """/login must reference only same-origin scripts — regex over the body."""
+    resp = await client.get("/login")
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    body = resp.text
+    external = _EXTERNAL_SRC.findall(body)
+    assert not external, f"external script srcs found: {external}"
+    for src in VENDORED_SCRIPTS:
+        assert src in body, f"missing vendored script {src} in /login HTML"
+
+
+async def test_vendor_assets_served_same_origin(client: AsyncClient):
+    """Both vendored libraries must resolve locally with real JS content."""
+    for src in VENDORED_SCRIPTS:
+        resp = await client.get(src)
+        assert resp.status_code == 200, f"{src} -> {resp.status_code}"
+        assert len(resp.content) > 1000, f"{src} looks empty ({len(resp.content)} bytes)"
+
+
+async def test_html_pages_are_not_cached(client: AsyncClient):
+    """HTML page responses must always revalidate (Cache-Control: no-cache)."""
+    resp = await client.get("/login")
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    assert resp.headers["cache-control"] == "no-cache"
+
+
+async def test_vendor_assets_cached_immutable(client: AsyncClient):
+    """Versioned vendor assets must carry long-lived immutable caching."""
+    for src in VENDORED_SCRIPTS:
+        resp = await client.get(src)
+        assert resp.status_code == 200
+        cc = resp.headers.get("cache-control", "")
+        assert "max-age=31536000" in cc and "immutable" in cc, f"{src}: {cc!r}"
+
+
+async def test_csp_no_longer_allows_cdn_hosts(client: AsyncClient):
+    """CSP must be 'self'-only for scripts/styles; connect-src stays 'self'."""
+    resp = await client.get("/login")
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    csp = resp.headers["content-security-policy"]
+    for host in ("cdn.jsdelivr.net", "cdn.tailwindcss.com"):
+        assert host not in csp, f"CSP still allows {host}"
+    assert "script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'" in csp
+    assert "style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'" in csp
+    assert "connect-src 'self'" in csp

tests/test_p0_auth_admin_batch.py

@@ -0,0 +1,647 @@
+"""P0 security batch — admin user management, unified role model, login rate
+limiting, WhatsApp webhook secret, mock-log auth, security headers, pagination.
+
+Each item in the P0 hardening batch has an executable behavioral test here
+(plus the register-removal tests living in test_p0_hardening.py).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import pytest
+from httpx import AsyncClient
+
+from app.core.config import settings
+from app.core.database import async_session_factory
+from app.core.security import hash_password
+from app.models.user import User
+from app.services.seed import normalize_legacy_user_emails, normalize_legacy_user_roles
+
+pytestmark = pytest.mark.asyncio
+
+
+# ── helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+async def _login(client, email="wahab@denya.com", password="denya123") -> str:
+    resp = await client.post("/api/auth/login", json={"email": email, "password": password})
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    return resp.json()["access_token"]
+
+
+def _auth(token: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    return {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"}
+
+
+async def _insert_user(email: str, role: str, *, active: bool = True) -> int:
+    """Insert a user row directly (bypasses API role validation) — used to
+    simulate legacy bootstrap/registration rows in the DB."""
+    async with async_session_factory() as session:
+        user = User(
+            email=email,
+            password_hash=hash_password("denya123"),
+            full_name=f"Legacy {email}",
+            role=role,
+            active=active,
+        )
+        session.add(user)
+        await session.commit()
+        return user.id
+
+
+async def _normalize_roles() -> None:
+    async with async_session_factory() as session:
+        await normalize_legacy_user_roles(session)
+        await session.commit()
+
+
+async def _normalize_emails() -> None:
+    async with async_session_factory() as session:
+        await normalize_legacy_user_emails(session)
+        await session.commit()
+
+
+async def _create_ticket(client, token: str, **overrides) -> dict:
+    payload = {
+        "unit_id": 2,
+        "category_id": 3,
+        "priority": "medium",
+        "reporter": "P0 Batch Test",
+        "reported_via": "walk-in",
+        "description": "p0 batch ticket",
+        **overrides,
+    }
+    resp = await client.post("/api/tickets", json=payload, headers=_auth(token))
+    assert resp.status_code == 201, resp.text
+    return resp.json()
+
+
+# ── Item 2/3: admin user management ───────────────────────────────────
+async def test_create_user_requires_admin(client: AsyncClient):
+    token = await _login(client, email="bella@denya.com")  # CS Rep
+    resp = await client.post(
+        "/api/auth/users",
+        json={"email": "x@example.com", "password": "password1", "full_name": "X", "role": "CS Rep"},
+        headers=_auth(token),
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 403
+
+
+async def test_create_user_requires_auth(client: AsyncClient):
+    resp = await client.post(
+        "/api/auth/users",
+        json={"email": "x@example.com", "password": "password1", "full_name": "X", "role": "CS Rep"},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 401
+
+
+async def test_admin_creates_user_with_forced_role(client: AsyncClient):
+    token = await _login(client)  # Admin/Wahab
+    resp = await client.post(
+        "/api/auth/users",
+        json={"email": "New.Tech@Example.com", "password": "password1", "full_name": "New Tech", "role": "Tech"},
+        headers=_auth(token),
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 201, resp.text
+    created = resp.json()
+    assert created["role"] == "Tech"
+    assert created["active"] is True
+    assert created["email"] == "new.tech@example.com"  # normalized lower-case
+
+    # The new user can actually log in with their forced role.
+    login = await client.post(
+        "/api/auth/login", json={"email": "new.tech@example.com", "password": "password1"}
+    )
+    assert login.status_code == 200
+    me = await client.get("/api/auth/me", headers=_auth(login.json()["access_token"]))
+    assert me.json()["role"] == "Tech"
+
+
+async def test_admin_create_user_rejects_unknown_roles(client: AsyncClient):
+    """Unified role model: junk/legacy roles cannot be minted at creation."""
+    token = await _login(client)
+    for role in ("admin", "superadmin", "technician", "root"):
+        resp = await client.post(
+            "/api/auth/users",
+            json={"email": f"{role.strip().lower()}@example.com", "password": "password1", "full_name": "X", "role": role},
+            headers=_auth(token),
+        )
+        assert resp.status_code == 422, (role, resp.text)
+
+
+async def test_admin_create_user_duplicate_email_conflict(client: AsyncClient):
+    token = await _login(client)
+    payload = {"email": "dupe2@example.com", "password": "password1", "full_name": "D", "role": "CS Rep"}
+    assert (await client.post("/api/auth/users", json=payload, headers=_auth(token))).status_code == 201
+    resp = await client.post("/api/auth/users", json=payload, headers=_auth(token))
+    assert resp.status_code == 409
+
+
+async def test_patch_user_role_change(client: AsyncClient):
+    token = await _login(client)
+    users = (await client.get("/api/auth/users", headers=_auth(token))).json()
+    tech = next(u for u in users if u["role"] == "Tech")
+    resp = await client.patch(
+        f"/api/auth/users/{tech['id']}",
+        json={"role": "CS Rep"},
+        headers=_auth(token),
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    assert resp.json()["role"] == "CS Rep"
+    assert resp.json()["active"] is True
+
+
+async def test_patch_user_rejects_unknown_role(client: AsyncClient):
+    token = await _login(client)
+    users = (await client.get("/api/auth/users", headers=_auth(token))).json()
+    tech = next(u for u in users if u["role"] == "Tech")
+    resp = await client.patch(
+        f"/api/auth/users/{tech['id']}",
+        json={"role": "superadmin"},
+        headers=_auth(token),
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 422, resp.text
+
+
+async def test_patch_deactivate_blocks_login(client: AsyncClient):
+    token = await _login(client)
+    users = (await client.get("/api/auth/users", headers=_auth(token))).json()
+    tech = next(u for u in users if u["role"] == "Tech")
+    resp = await client.patch(
+        f"/api/auth/users/{tech['id']}",
+        json={"active": False},
+        headers=_auth(token),
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    assert resp.json()["active"] is False
+
+    login = await client.post(
+        "/api/auth/login", json={"email": tech["email"], "password": "denya123"}
+    )
+    assert login.status_code == 401
+
+
+async def test_admin_cannot_modify_own_account(client: AsyncClient):
+    token = await _login(client)  # wahab
+    me = (await client.get("/api/auth/me", headers=_auth(token))).json()
+    resp = await client.patch(
+        f"/api/auth/users/{me['id']}", json={"active": False}, headers=_auth(token)
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 400
+
+
+async def test_admin_can_demote_other_admin_but_not_self(client: AsyncClient):
+    """An admin can manage the other admin seat, but self-removal stays blocked,
+    so at least one canonical admin always remains (structural invariant)."""
+    token = await _login(client)  # wahab
+    users = (await client.get("/api/auth/users", headers=_auth(token))).json()
+    jerome = next(u for u in users if u["role"] == "Admin/Jerome")
+    wahab = next(u for u in users if u["role"] == "Admin/Wahab")
+
+    # Demote the OTHER admin → allowed, wahab is still the acting admin.
+    resp = await client.patch(
+        f"/api/auth/users/{jerome['id']}", json={"role": "CEO"}, headers=_auth(token)
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+
+    # Demoting/deactivating yourself is always rejected.
+    resp = await client.patch(
+        f"/api/auth/users/{wahab['id']}", json={"active": False}, headers=_auth(token)
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 400
+
+
+async def test_delete_user_admin_only_and_works(client: AsyncClient):
+    admin_token = await _login(client)
+    users = (await client.get("/api/auth/users", headers=_auth(admin_token))).json()
+    tech = next(u for u in users if u["role"] == "Tech")
+
+    # Non-admin cannot delete.
+    cs_token = await _login(client, email="bella@denya.com")
+    resp = await client.delete(f"/api/auth/users/{tech['id']}", headers=_auth(cs_token))
+    assert resp.status_code == 403
+
+    # Admin deletes → 204, user gone, login fails.
+    resp = await client.delete(f"/api/auth/users/{tech['id']}", headers=_auth(admin_token))
+    assert resp.status_code == 204
+    login = await client.post(
+        "/api/auth/login", json={"email": tech["email"], "password": "denya123"}
+    )
+    assert login.status_code == 401
+
+
+async def test_delete_user_referenced_by_ticket_is_409(client: AsyncClient):
+    token = await _login(client)
+    users = (await client.get("/api/auth/users", headers=_auth(token))).json()
+    tech = next(u for u in users if u["role"] == "Tech")
+    ticket = await _create_ticket(client, token)
+    resp = await client.patch(
+        f"/api/tickets/{ticket['id']}",
+        json={"assigned_to": tech["id"]},
+        headers=_auth(token),
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+
+    resp = await client.delete(f"/api/auth/users/{tech['id']}", headers=_auth(token))
+    assert resp.status_code == 409
+    assert "related" in resp.json()["detail"].lower()
+
+
+async def test_admin_cannot_delete_self(client: AsyncClient):
+    token = await _login(client)
+    me = (await client.get("/api/auth/me", headers=_auth(token))).json()
+    resp = await client.delete(f"/api/auth/users/{me['id']}", headers=_auth(token))
+    assert resp.status_code == 400
+
+
+# ── Item 3: unified role model — legacy rows & JWT validation ─────────
+async def test_legacy_alias_role_normalized_at_startup(client: AsyncClient):
+    """A legacy 'technician' row is mapped onto canonical 'Tech' at startup."""
+    await _insert_user("legacy-tech@example.com", "technician")
+    await _normalize_roles()  # what lifespan does each boot
+
+    login = await client.post(
+        "/api/auth/login", json={"email": "legacy-tech@example.com", "password": "denya123"}
+    )
+    assert login.status_code == 200, login.text
+    me = await client.get("/api/auth/me", headers=_auth(login.json()["access_token"]))
+    assert me.json()["role"] == "Tech"
+
+
+async def test_login_rejects_unknown_legacy_role_fail_closed(client: AsyncClient):
+    """Lowercase 'superadmin' rows (mintable by the old open register) cannot
+    log in — fail closed, never granted admin powers."""
+    await _insert_user("legacy-admin@example.com", "superadmin")
+    # NOTE: no normalize call — the row is exactly what the live DB holds today.
+
+    login = await client.post(
+        "/api/auth/login", json={"email": "legacy-admin@example.com", "password": "denya123"}
+    )
+    assert login.status_code == 401
+    assert "role" in login.json()["detail"].lower()
+
+
+async def test_jwt_validation_rejects_unknown_role(client: AsyncClient):
+    """A token for a user whose row later becomes junk-role must fail closed."""
+    token = await _login(client)  # wahab is a canonical admin at token time
+    me = (await client.get("/api/auth/me", headers=_auth(token))).json()
+
+    # Simulate a legacy DB row flip to a non-canonical role.
+    async with async_session_factory() as session:
+        from sqlalchemy import select
+        user = (await session.execute(select(User).where(User.id == me["id"]))).scalar_one()
+        user.role = "admin"
+        await session.commit()
+
+    resp = await client.get("/api/auth/me", headers=_auth(token))
+    assert resp.status_code == 401
+
+
+async def test_normalize_does_not_map_ambiguous_admin_alias(client: AsyncClient):
+    """normalize_legacy_user_roles leaves identity-ambiguous 'admin' rows for
+    operator remediation instead of guessing a canonical admin."""
+    await _insert_user("legacy-admin2@example.com", "admin")
+    await _normalize_roles()
+
+    async with async_session_factory() as session:
+        from sqlalchemy import select
+        user = (
+            await session.execute(select(User).where(User.email == "legacy-admin2@example.com"))
+        ).scalar_one()
+    assert user.role == "admin"
+
+
+async def test_underscore_legacy_aliases_normalize_to_canonical():
+    """Open-register rows can carry underscore role forms ('cs_rep',
+    'cs_manager', 'fm_dispatcher') — the exact gap Mumuni relay #747 found on
+    user 18 (test@denya.com).  Each must map onto its canonical role so startup
+    normalization can converge the row instead of stranding it on /tickets."""
+    from app.core.roles import normalize_role
+
+    assert normalize_role("cs_rep") == "CS Rep"
+    assert normalize_role("cs_manager") == "CS Manager"
+    assert normalize_role("fm_dispatcher") == "FM Dispatcher"
+    # Matching is case/whitespace tolerant, like the space-form aliases.
+    assert normalize_role(" CS_REP ") == "CS Rep"
+    assert normalize_role("cs_rep") is not None  # known, not fail-closed
+
+
+async def test_legacy_cs_rep_row_converges_and_authenticates(client: AsyncClient):
+    """A 'cs_rep' row (user 18 test@denya.com shape) is converged to canonical
+    'CS Rep' by the startup self-heal and can log in again (no fail-closed
+    denial, and the frontend CS nav sees the canonical role)."""
+    await _insert_user("cs-rep-legacy@example.com", "cs_rep")
+    await _normalize_roles()  # what lifespan does each boot
+
+    async with async_session_factory() as session:
+        from sqlalchemy import select
+        user = (
+            await session.execute(select(User).where(User.email == "cs-rep-legacy@example.com"))
+        ).scalar_one()
+    assert user.role == "CS Rep"
+
+    login = await client.post(
+        "/api/auth/login", json={"email": "cs-rep-legacy@example.com", "password": "denya123"}
+    )
+    assert login.status_code == 200, login.text
+    me = await client.get("/api/auth/me", headers=_auth(login.json()["access_token"]))
+    assert me.json()["role"] == "CS Rep"
+
+
+# ── P0 email normalization (legacy mixed-case rows) ───────────────────
+async def test_legacy_mixed_case_email_migrated_and_authenticates(client: AsyncClient):
+    """A legacy row whose email was stored verbatim in mixed case (the old open
+    register) is lowercased by the startup self-heal and still authenticates."""
+    await _insert_user("DemoUser@Example.com", "Tech")
+    await _normalize_emails()  # what lifespan does each boot
+
+    async with async_session_factory() as session:
+        from sqlalchemy import select
+        user = (
+            await session.execute(select(User).where(User.email == "demouser@example.com"))
+        ).scalar_one()
+    assert user.email == "demouser@example.com"
+
+    for variant in ("demouser@example.com", "DemoUser@Example.com"):
+        resp = await client.post(
+            "/api/auth/login", json={"email": variant, "password": "denya123"}
+        )
+        assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+
+
+async def test_login_matches_legacy_mixed_case_email_before_migration(client: AsyncClient):
+    """Login compares on the normalized form, so an un-migrated mixed-case row
+    is still matched by its lowercase login (no hard dependency on the
+    self-heal having run)."""
+    await _insert_user("DemoUser@Example.com", "Tech")
+    resp = await client.post(
+        "/api/auth/login", json={"email": "demouser@example.com", "password": "denya123"}
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+
+
+async def test_legacy_email_normalization_is_idempotent(client: AsyncClient):
+    """The startup self-heal rewrites once and no-ops on subsequent boots."""
+    await _insert_user("DemoUser@Example.com", "Tech")
+    async with async_session_factory() as session:
+        first = await normalize_legacy_user_emails(session)
+        await session.commit()
+    async with async_session_factory() as session:
+        second = await normalize_legacy_user_emails(session)
+        await session.commit()
+    assert first == 1
+    assert second == 0
+
+
+async def test_create_user_rejects_case_variant_of_legacy_email(client: AsyncClient):
+    """The admin create-user duplicate check compares on the normalized form:
+    creating a case-variant of a legacy mixed-case row returns 409, not 201."""
+    await _insert_user("DemoUser@Example.com", "Tech")
+    token = await _login(client)
+    resp = await client.post(
+        "/api/auth/users",
+        json={
+            "email": "demouser@example.com",
+            "password": "password1",
+            "full_name": "X",
+            "role": "Tech",
+        },
+        headers=_auth(token),
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 409, resp.text
+
+
+async def test_admin_only_rbac_gate(client: AsyncClient):
+    """Canonical admins pass /api/auth/admin-only; everyone else 403."""
+    wahab = await _login(client)
+    assert (await client.get("/api/auth/admin-only", headers=_auth(wahab))).status_code == 200
+
+    bella = await _login(client, email="bella@denya.com")
+    assert (await client.get("/api/auth/admin-only", headers=_auth(bella))).status_code == 403
+
+
+# ── Item 4: login rate limiting ───────────────────────────────────────
+async def test_login_rate_limited_after_five_failures(client: AsyncClient):
+    email, password = "rate-limited@example.com", "denya123"
+    # Make sure the account exists with a valid password.
+    token = await _login(client)
+    await client.post(
+        "/api/auth/users",
+        json={"email": email, "password": password, "full_name": "Rate", "role": "CS Rep"},
+        headers=_auth(token),
+    )
+
+    for _ in range(5):
+        resp = await client.post(
+            "/api/auth/login", json={"email": email, "password": "wrong-password"}
+        )
+        assert resp.status_code == 401
+
+    # 6th attempt — even with the CORRECT password — is throttled.
+    resp = await client.post(
+        "/api/auth/login", json={"email": email, "password": password}
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 429, resp.text
+
+
+async def test_rate_limit_is_per_email(client: AsyncClient):
+    """Failures for one account never lock out another account."""
+    token = await _login(client)
+    for email in ("victim@example.com", "other@example.com"):
+        await client.post(
+            "/api/auth/users",
+            json={"email": email, "password": "password1", "full_name": "U", "role": "CS Rep"},
+            headers=_auth(token),
+        )
+
+    for _ in range(6):
+        resp = await client.post(
+            "/api/auth/login", json={"email": "victim@example.com", "password": "bad"}
+        )
+        assert resp.status_code in (401, 429)
+
+    # Unaffected account still logs in fine.
+    resp = await client.post(
+        "/api/auth/login", json={"email": "other@example.com", "password": "password1"}
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+
+
+async def test_rate_limit_window_expires(client: AsyncClient, monkeypatch):
+    """After the 15-minute window passes, the account can log in again."""
+    import time as _time
+
+    import app.core.ratelimit as ratelimit_mod
+
+    email, password = "window@example.com", "password1"
+    token = await _login(client)
+    await client.post(
+        "/api/auth/users",
+        json={"email": email, "password": password, "full_name": "W", "role": "CS Rep"},
+        headers=_auth(token),
+    )
+
+    # Pin the limiter clock so the window can be fast-forwarded deterministically.
+    clock = {"now": _time.time()}
+    monkeypatch.setattr(ratelimit_mod, "_now", lambda: clock["now"])
+    for _ in range(5):
+        await client.post("/api/auth/login", json={"email": email, "password": "bad"})
+
+    blocked = await client.post("/api/auth/login", json={"email": email, "password": password})
+    assert blocked.status_code == 429, blocked.text
+
+    clock["now"] += settings.LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS + 1
+    resp = await client.post("/api/auth/login", json={"email": email, "password": password})
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+
+
+# ── Item 5: WhatsApp webhook secret (fail closed) ─────────────────────
+WEBHOOK_BODY = {
+    "object": "whatsapp_business_account",
+    "entry": [
+        {
+            "id": "1",
+            "changes": [
+                {
+                    "id": "wamid.1",
+                    "message": {"from": "+233000000000", "id": "wamid.1", "text": {"text": "AC leaking"}},
+                }
+            ],
+        }
+    ],
+}
+
+
+async def test_webhook_fail_closed_when_env_unset(client: AsyncClient):
+    """WHATSAPP_WEBHOOK_SECRET unset ⇒ every message rejected (403)."""
+    assert settings.WHATSAPP_WEBHOOK_SECRET == ""  # test env default is unset
+    resp = await client.post("/api/whatsapp/webhook", json=WEBHOOK_BODY)
+    assert resp.status_code == 403
+    assert "not configured" in resp.json()["detail"].lower()
+
+
+async def test_webhook_rejects_missing_or_wrong_secret(client: AsyncClient, monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "WHATSAPP_WEBHOOK_SECRET", "test-webhook-secret")
+    resp = await client.post("/api/whatsapp/webhook", json=WEBHOOK_BODY)
+    assert resp.status_code == 403
+
+    resp = await client.post(
+        "/api/whatsapp/webhook", json=WEBHOOK_BODY, headers={"X-Webhook-Secret": "wrong"}
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 403
+
+
+async def test_webhook_accepts_valid_secret_and_creates_ticket(client: AsyncClient, monkeypatch):
+    from app.routers import whatsapp as whatsapp_router
+
+    async def _fake_reply(to_phone: str, text: str):
+        from app.schemas.whatsapp import WhatsAppReplyResponse
+        return WhatsAppReplyResponse(success=True, message="sent")
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "WHATSAPP_WEBHOOK_SECRET", "test-webhook-secret")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(whatsapp_router, "send_whatsapp_reply", _fake_reply)
+
+    resp = await client.post(
+        "/api/whatsapp/webhook",
+        json=WEBHOOK_BODY,
+        headers={"X-Webhook-Secret": "test-webhook-secret"},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    data = resp.json()
+    assert data["status"] == "processed"
+    assert data["ticket_number"].startswith("PAV-")
+
+    # The message is logged and visible to an authenticated mock-log caller.
+    token = await _login(client)
+    log = await client.get("/api/whatsapp/mock-log", headers=_auth(token))
+    assert log.status_code == 200
+    assert len(log.json()) == 1
+    assert log.json()[0]["ticket_number"] == data["ticket_number"]
+
+
+async def test_webhook_verify_token_mismatch_403(client: AsyncClient, monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "WHATSAPP_VERIFY_TOKEN", "verify-me")
+    resp = await client.get(
+        "/api/whatsapp/webhook",
+        params={"hub.mode": "subscribe", "hub.verify_token": "nope", "hub.challenge": "1234"},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 403
+
+
+async def test_webhook_verify_token_match_returns_challenge(client: AsyncClient, monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "WHATSAPP_VERIFY_TOKEN", "verify-me")
+    resp = await client.get(
+        "/api/whatsapp/webhook",
+        params={"hub.mode": "subscribe", "hub.verify_token": "verify-me", "hub.challenge": "1234"},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    assert resp.json() == {"challenge": "1234"}
+
+
+# ── Item 6: mock-log requires auth ────────────────────────────────────
+async def test_mock_log_requires_auth(client: AsyncClient):
+    resp = await client.get("/api/whatsapp/mock-log")
+    assert resp.status_code == 401, resp.text
+
+    token = await _login(client)
+    resp = await client.get("/api/whatsapp/mock-log", headers=_auth(token))
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    assert resp.json() == []
+
+
+# ── Item 7: security headers ──────────────────────────────────────────
+async def test_security_headers_on_html_page(client: AsyncClient):
+    resp = await client.get("/login")
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    assert resp.headers["x-frame-options"] == "DENY"
+    assert resp.headers["x-content-type-options"] == "nosniff"
+    assert "content-security-policy" in resp.headers
+    assert "default-src 'self'" in resp.headers["content-security-policy"]
+
+
+async def test_csp_only_on_html_not_json_api(client: AsyncClient):
+    resp = await client.get("/api/tickets")
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    assert "content-type" in resp.headers and resp.headers["content-type"].startswith("application/json")
+    assert "content-security-policy" not in resp.headers
+    # Frame/type hardening headers apply everywhere.
+    assert resp.headers["x-frame-options"] == "DENY"
+    assert resp.headers["x-content-type-options"] == "nosniff"
+
+
+async def test_hsts_only_when_tls_terminates(client: AsyncClient):
+    plain = await client.get("/login")
+    assert "strict-transport-security" not in plain.headers
+
+    tls = await client.get("/login", headers={"X-Forwarded-Proto": "https"})
+    assert tls.headers["strict-transport-security"] == "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains"
+
+
+# ── Item 8: pagination (page/limit) and sane max page size ────────────
+async def test_limit_alias_over_cap_rejected(client: AsyncClient, seed_tickets):
+    await seed_tickets(10)
+    resp = await client.get("/api/tickets", params={"limit": 500})
+    assert resp.status_code == 422
+
+
+async def test_limit_alias_paginates(client: AsyncClient, seed_tickets):
+    await seed_tickets(14)
+    resp = await client.get("/api/tickets", params={"page": 2, "limit": 5})
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    data = resp.json()
+    assert data["total"] == 14
+    assert len(data["items"]) == 5
+    assert data["page_size"] == 5
+    assert data["page"] == 2
+
+
+async def test_page_beyond_last_returns_empty_with_total(client: AsyncClient, seed_tickets):
+    await seed_tickets(7)
+    resp = await client.get("/api/tickets", params={"page": 999, "page_size": 10})
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    data = resp.json()
+    assert data["items"] == []
+    assert data["total"] == 7
+
+
+async def test_page_size_and_limit_conflict_is_422(client: AsyncClient, seed_tickets):
+    await seed_tickets(3)
+    resp = await client.get("/api/tickets", params={"page_size": 10, "limit": 20})
+    assert resp.status_code == 422

tests/test_p0_hardening.py

@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+"""P0 hardening regression tests (HARDENING.md P0.1 / P0.2 / P0.3).
+
+Covers:
+- P0.3: self-registration is REMOVED — POST /api/auth/register returns 404 and
+  no public path can mint a user at all (users are admin-created only).
+- P0.1: app fails to import/boot with placeholder or missing SECRET_KEY
+- P0.2: app fails to boot with CORS_ORIGINS="*"
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import subprocess
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+from httpx import AsyncClient
+
+REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
+
+pytestmark = pytest.mark.asyncio
+
+
+# ── P0.3: self-registration is removed entirely ───────────────────────
+
+async def test_register_endpoint_is_removed(client: AsyncClient):
+    """A raw unauthenticated register call must 404 — no public signup path."""
+    resp = await client.post(
+        "/api/auth/register",
+        json={
+            "email": "attacker@example.com",
+            "password": "Sup3rSecret!",
+            "full_name": "Attacker",
+            "role": "Admin/Jerome",
+        },
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 404, resp.text
+
+
+async def test_register_endpoint_removed_regardless_of_role(client: AsyncClient):
+    """Attempts to mint privileged (or any) roles via register all 404."""
+    for role in ("Admin/Jerome", "Admin/Wahab", "admin", "superadmin", "CS Rep"):
+        resp = await client.post(
+            "/api/auth/register",
+            json={
+                "email": f"attacker-{role.lower().replace('/', '-')}@example.com",
+                "password": "Sup3rSecret!",
+                "full_name": "Attacker",
+                "role": role,
+            },
+        )
+        assert resp.status_code == 404, (role, resp.text)
+
+
+async def test_register_does_not_create_user(client: AsyncClient):
+    """No user row is ever created through the removed register endpoint."""
+    await client.post(
+        "/api/auth/register",
+        json={
+            "email": "ghost@example.com",
+            "password": "Sup3rSecret!",
+            "full_name": "Ghost",
+        },
+    )
+    # The ghost account must not be able to log in.
+    resp = await client.post(
+        "/api/auth/login",
+        json={"email": "ghost@example.com", "password": "Sup3rSecret!"},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 401, resp.text
+
+
+def _boot_with_env(env_overrides: dict[str, str]) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess:
+    """Try importing app.main in a subprocess with the given env; the import
+    must fail (non-zero) when fail-closed validation trips."""
+    env = os.environ.copy()
+    env["DATABASE_URL"] = "sqlite+aiosqlite:///:memory:"
+    env.pop("SECRET_KEY", None)
+    env.pop("CORS_ORIGINS", None)
+    env.update(env_overrides)
+    script = (
+        "import sys; sys.path.insert(0, ''); "
+        "import app.main"  # noqa
+    )
+    return subprocess.run(
+        [sys.executable, "-c", script],
+        cwd=str(REPO_ROOT),
+        env=env,
+        capture_output=True,
+        text=True,
+        timeout=60,
+    )
+
+
+def test_boot_fails_with_placeholder_secret():
+    result = _boot_with_env({"SECRET_KEY": "change-me-in-production"})
+    assert result.returncode != 0, "app booted with placeholder SECRET_KEY!"
+    assert "SECRET_KEY" in result.stderr
+
+
+def test_boot_fails_with_short_secret():
+    result = _boot_with_env({"SECRET_KEY": "tooshort"})
+    assert result.returncode != 0, "app booted with a <32-char SECRET_KEY!"
+    assert "SECRET_KEY" in result.stderr
+
+
+def test_boot_fails_without_secret():
+    result = _boot_with_env({"SECRET_KEY": ""})
+    assert result.returncode != 0, "app booted without a SECRET_KEY!"
+    assert "SECRET_KEY" in result.stderr
+
+
+def test_boot_fails_with_wildcard_cors():
+    result = _boot_with_env(
+        {
+            "SECRET_KEY": "test-secret-key-not-for-production-0123456789abcdef",
+            "CORS_ORIGINS": "*",
+        }
+    )
+    assert result.returncode != 0, "app booted with CORS_ORIGINS=* !"
+    assert "CORS_ORIGINS" in result.stderr
+
+
+def test_boot_succeeds_with_valid_env():
+    result = _boot_with_env(
+        {
+            "SECRET_KEY": "test-secret-key-not-for-production-0123456789abcdef",
+            "CORS_ORIGINS": "http://test",
+        }
+    )
+    assert result.returncode == 0, result.stderr

tests/test_whatsapp_log_legacy_heal.py

@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+"""Regression: legacy ``whatsapp_log`` tables self-heal at startup.
+
+Producer/consumer for the CT115 defect (Mumuni relay #747): the live demo DB's
+``whatsapp_log`` table still has the pre-webhook shape — ``command`` instead of
+``message_text`` and no ``wa_message_id``/``ticket_number`` — so
+``GET /api/whatsapp/mock-log`` 500'd with ``OperationalError: no such column:
+whatsapp_log.message_text`` even for a valid admin token.
+
+Producer: build the legacy-shaped table (as the live DB holds it) and seed it
+with ``command`` rows.
+Consumer: boot the app's startup self-heal (``ensure_legacy_schema``), then read
+back through the authenticated mock-log endpoint, insert through the ORM write
+path, and re-run the self-heal to prove idempotency.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from datetime import datetime
+
+import pytest
+from sqlalchemy import text
+
+from app.core.database import async_session_factory, engine
+from app.main import ensure_legacy_schema
+
+pytestmark = pytest.mark.asyncio
+
+# Pre-webhook shape (commit 4afdc36 changed the model but no migration shipped):
+# id, command (NOT NULL), from_number, ticket_id, received_at.
+LEGACY_WHATSAPP_LOG_DDL = (
+    "CREATE TABLE whatsapp_log ("
+    "id INTEGER NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT, "
+    "command TEXT NOT NULL, "
+    "from_number VARCHAR(50), "
+    "ticket_id INTEGER, "
+    "received_at DATETIME NOT NULL)"
+)
+
+EXPECTED_MODEL_COLUMNS = {
+    "id",
+    "from_number",
+    "message_text",
+    "wa_message_id",
+    "ticket_id",
+    "ticket_number",
+    "received_at",
+}
+
+
+async def _login(client, email="wahab@denya.com", password="denya123") -> str:
+    resp = await client.post("/api/auth/login", json={"email": email, "password": password})
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    return resp.json()["access_token"]
+
+
+def _auth(token: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    return {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"}
+
+
+async def _replace_with_legacy_whatsapp_log() -> None:
+    """Drop the model-shaped table and recreate the legacy shape with rows."""
+    async with engine.begin() as conn:
+        await conn.execute(text("DROP TABLE IF EXISTS whatsapp_log"))
+        await conn.execute(text(LEGACY_WHATSAPP_LOG_DDL))
+        await conn.execute(
+            text(
+                "INSERT INTO whatsapp_log (command, from_number, ticket_id, received_at) VALUES "
+                "('legacy older message', '+233200000001', 1, '2026-09-08 08:00:00'), "
+                "('legacy newest message', '+233200000002', 2, '2026-09-09 09:30:00')"
+            )
+        )
+
+
+async def _columns() -> set[str]:
+    async with engine.begin() as conn:
+        result = await conn.execute(text("PRAGMA table_info(whatsapp_log)"))
+        return {row[1] for row in result}
+
+
+async def test_legacy_whatsapp_log_self_heals_and_mock_log_200(client):
+    """Producer: legacy whatsapp_log (command shape).  Consumer: startup self-heal
+    then authenticated mock-log — the exact 500 from the live instance."""
+    token = await _login(client)
+    await _replace_with_legacy_whatsapp_log()
+
+    # Pre-fix reproduction: on the legacy table this endpoint fails exactly as
+    # reported (production: HTTP 500; under ASGITransport the app never returns
+    # a response so the sqlalchemy OperationalError propagates).
+    import sqlalchemy.exc
+
+    with pytest.raises(sqlalchemy.exc.OperationalError):
+        await client.get("/api/whatsapp/mock-log", headers=_auth(token))
+
+    # ── Boot the startup self-heal (what lifespan does each boot) ──
+    async with engine.begin() as conn:
+        await ensure_legacy_schema(conn)
+
+    columns = await _columns()
+    assert EXPECTED_MODEL_COLUMNS <= columns
+    assert "command" not in columns  # obsolete model-dropped column is gone
+
+    # Authenticated mock-log returns 200 and the backfilled rows are readable.
+    resp = await client.get("/api/whatsapp/mock-log", headers=_auth(token))
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    entries = resp.json()
+    assert [e["message_text"] for e in entries] == [
+        "legacy newest message",
+        "legacy older message",
+    ]  # order: received_at desc; bodies preserved from legacy `command`
+
+    # ORM write path works on the healed table (the current app inserts
+    # message_text/wa_message_id and never writes `command`).
+    from app.models.whatsapp_log import WhatsAppLog
+
+    async with async_session_factory() as session:
+        session.add(
+            WhatsAppLog(
+                from_number="+233200000003",
+                message_text="inbound after self-heal",
+                wa_message_id="wamid.healed.1",
+                ticket_id=None,
+                ticket_number=None,
+                received_at=datetime(2026, 9, 10, 10, 0, 0),
+            )
+        )
+        await session.commit()
+
+    resp = await client.get("/api/whatsapp/mock-log", headers=_auth(token))
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    entries = resp.json()
+    assert entries[0]["message_text"] == "inbound after self-heal"
+    assert entries[0]["from_number"] == "+233200000003"
+    assert len(entries) == 3
+
+    # ── Idempotent on the next boot ──
+    async with engine.begin() as conn:
+        await ensure_legacy_schema(conn)
+    columns = await _columns()
+    assert EXPECTED_MODEL_COLUMNS <= columns
+    assert "command" not in columns
+
+    resp = await client.get("/api/whatsapp/mock-log", headers=_auth(token))
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    assert len(resp.json()) == 3

tests/test_workflow_hardening.py

@@ -0,0 +1,290 @@
+"""Tests for the Wahab demo-prep hardening batch.
+
+Anchors:
+* ``Cancelled`` is a terminal status reachable from every active state, is
+  excluded from SLA breach reporting, and shows up in the status pickers.
+* Customer ``phone`` collected on the new-issue form is persisted (it used to
+  be silently dropped).
+* ``GET /api/tickets/{id}`` returns nested ``unit``/``category`` objects so the
+  detail page stops rendering "—" for Unit/Property/Category.
+* ``DELETE /api/tickets/{id}`` is admin-only and removes ticket children.
+* ``GET /api/auth/users`` powers the assign-technician dropdown.
+* Ticket numbering uses max+1, so deleting tickets never re-issues a number.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import pytest
+
+pytestmark = pytest.mark.asyncio
+
+
+async def _login(client, email="wahab@denya.com", password="denya123") -> str:
+    resp = await client.post(
+        "/api/auth/login",
+        json={"email": email, "password": password},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    return resp.json()["access_token"]
+
+
+async def _create_ticket(client, token: str, **overrides) -> dict:
+    payload = {
+        "unit_id": 2,
+        "category_id": 3,
+        "priority": "medium",
+        "reporter": "Demo Prep Test",
+        "reported_via": "walk-in",
+        "description": "hardening batch test ticket",
+        **overrides,
+    }
+    resp = await client.post(
+        "/api/tickets",
+        json=payload,
+        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 201, resp.text
+    return resp.json()
+
+
+# ── Cancelled status ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
+async def test_cancelled_is_terminal(client):
+    """A cancelled ticket has no valid next status."""
+    from app.services.ticket import VALID_TRANSITIONS
+
+    assert "Cancelled" in VALID_TRANSITIONS
+    assert VALID_TRANSITIONS["Cancelled"] == []
+
+
+async def test_cancelled_reachable_from_active_states(client):
+    """Logged/Triage/In Progress → Cancelled are all valid transitions."""
+    from app.services.ticket import VALID_TRANSITIONS
+
+    for state in (
+        "New", "Logged", "Triage", "Assigned", "Accepted", "Travelling", "On Site",
+        "In Progress", "Waiting Parts", "Escalated", "On-Field Verification",
+        "Wahab Review", "Reopened",
+    ):
+        assert "Cancelled" in VALID_TRANSITIONS[state], f"{state} should allow Cancelled"
+
+
+async def test_cancel_ticket_via_api(client):
+    """PATCH status=Cancelled works end-to-end and lands in the timeline."""
+    token = await _login(client)
+    ticket = await _create_ticket(client, token, description="cancel me")
+
+    resp = await client.patch(
+        f"/api/tickets/{ticket['id']}",
+        json={"status": "Cancelled", "note": "demo sample"},
+        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    data = resp.json()
+    assert data["status"] == "Cancelled"
+    assert data["timeline"][-1]["to_status"] == "Cancelled"
+
+
+async def test_cancelled_ticket_not_sla_breached(client):
+    """A cancelled ticket must not report SLA breach (like Closed/Completed)."""
+    token = await _login(client)
+    ticket = await _create_ticket(client, token, priority="urgent", description="cancel sla test")
+
+    # Force the SLA deadline into the past by patching priority (recomputes from now),
+    # then cancel; the breach flags must be False either way.
+    resp = await client.patch(
+        f"/api/tickets/{ticket['id']}",
+        json={"status": "Cancelled"},
+        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    sla = resp.json()["sla_status"]
+    assert sla["resolution_breached"] is False
+    assert sla["response_breached"] is False
+
+
+# ── Phone persistence ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+async def test_phone_persisted_on_create(client):
+    """Customer phone sent at creation is stored and returned."""
+    token = await _login(client)
+    ticket = await _create_ticket(client, token, phone="+233123456789", description="phone test")
+    assert ticket["phone"] == "+233123456789"
+
+    detail = await client.get(f"/api/tickets/{ticket['id']}")
+    assert detail.json()["phone"] == "+233123456789"
+
+
+# ── Nested unit/category in detail ────────────────────────────────────
+async def test_ticket_detail_returns_unit_and_category(client):
+    """TicketOut includes nested unit/category objects (detail page fix)."""
+    token = await _login(client)
+    ticket = await _create_ticket(client, token, unit_id=2, category_id=3)
+    resp = await client.get(f"/api/tickets/{ticket['id']}")
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    data = resp.json()
+    assert data["unit"] is not None
+    assert data["unit"]["apartment_code"]
+    assert data["category"] is not None
+    assert data["category"]["name"]
+
+
+# ── Admin-only DELETE ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+async def test_delete_ticket_requires_admin(client):
+    """A non-admin (CS Rep) gets 403 on DELETE."""
+    token = await _login(client, email="bella@denya.com")  # CS Rep
+    ticket = await _create_ticket(client, token, description="delete perm test")
+    resp = await client.delete(
+        f"/api/tickets/{ticket['id']}",
+        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 403
+
+
+async def test_delete_ticket_removes_children(client):
+    """Admin DELETE removes the ticket, timeline, and photos."""
+    token = await _login(client)  # Admin/Wahab
+    ticket = await _create_ticket(client, token, description="delete me")
+    tid = ticket["id"]
+
+    resp = await client.delete(
+        f"/api/tickets/{tid}",
+        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 204
+
+    gone = await client.get(f"/api/tickets/{tid}")
+    assert gone.status_code == 404
+
+    from sqlalchemy import func, select
+    from app.core.database import async_session_factory
+    from app.models.ticket import TicketTimeline
+
+    async with async_session_factory() as session:
+        count = (await session.execute(
+            select(func.count(TicketTimeline.id)).where(TicketTimeline.ticket_id == tid)
+        )).scalar()
+    assert count == 0
+
+
+# ── Users endpoint for the assign picker ──────────────────────────────
+async def test_users_endpoint_requires_auth(client):
+    resp = await client.get("/api/auth/users")
+    assert resp.status_code == 401
+
+
+async def test_users_endpoint_lists_technicians(client):
+    token = await _login(client)
+    resp = await client.get("/api/auth/users", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"})
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    users = resp.json()
+    assert any(u["role"] == "Tech" for u in users)
+    # Fields the assign dropdown needs
+    assert {"id", "full_name", "role"} <= set(users[0].keys())
+
+
+# ── Transitions helper (status dropdown) ─────────────────────────────
+async def test_transitions_helper_returns_valid_targets(client):
+    """GET /api/tickets/{id}/transitions returns the valid next statuses."""
+    from app.services.ticket import VALID_TRANSITIONS
+
+    token = await _login(client)
+    ticket = await _create_ticket(client, token, description="transitions helper")  # status: Logged
+
+    resp = await client.get(f"/api/tickets/{ticket['id']}/transitions")
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    data = resp.json()
+    assert data["current_status"] == "Logged"
+    assert set(data["transitions"]) == set(VALID_TRANSITIONS["Logged"])
+
+
+async def test_transitions_helper_terminal_is_empty(client):
+    """A cancelled ticket exposes no selectable next statuses."""
+    token = await _login(client)
+    ticket = await _create_ticket(client, token, description="terminal transitions")
+    resp = await client.patch(
+        f"/api/tickets/{ticket['id']}",
+        json={"status": "Cancelled"},
+        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+
+    data = (await client.get(f"/api/tickets/{ticket['id']}/transitions")).json()
+    assert data["current_status"] == "Cancelled"
+    assert data["transitions"] == []
+
+
+# ── Assign auto-advance ───────────────────────────────────────────────
+async def _first_tech_id(client, token: str) -> int:
+    users = (await client.get("/api/auth/users", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"})).json()
+    return next(u["id"] for u in users if u["role"] == "Tech")
+
+
+async def test_assign_auto_advances_to_assigned(client):
+    """Assigning a pre-Assigned ticket advances it to Assigned with a timeline entry."""
+    token = await _login(client)
+    ticket = await _create_ticket(client, token, description="assign advance")  # status: Logged
+    tech_id = await _first_tech_id(client, token)
+
+    resp = await client.patch(
+        f"/api/tickets/{ticket['id']}",
+        json={"assigned_to": tech_id},
+        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    data = resp.json()
+    assert data["status"] == "Assigned"
+    assert data["assigned_to"] == tech_id
+    assert data["timeline"][-1]["to_status"] == "Assigned"
+
+
+async def test_assign_does_not_regress_past_assigned(client):
+    """Re-assigning a ticket already past Assigned leaves its status untouched."""
+    token = await _login(client)
+    ticket = await _create_ticket(client, token, description="no regression")
+
+    for step in ("Triage", "Assigned", "Accepted"):
+        resp = await client.patch(
+            f"/api/tickets/{ticket['id']}",
+            json={"status": step},
+            headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
+        )
+        assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+
+    users = (await client.get("/api/auth/users", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"})).json()
+    techs = [u["id"] for u in users if u["role"] == "Tech"]
+    other_tech = techs[1] if len(techs) > 1 else techs[0]
+
+    resp = await client.patch(
+        f"/api/tickets/{ticket['id']}",
+        json={"assigned_to": other_tech},
+        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    assert resp.json()["status"] == "Accepted"
+
+
+# ── Ticket numbering survives deletions ───────────────────────────────
+async def test_ticket_number_uses_max_plus_one(client, seed_tickets):
+    """After deleting a middle ticket, numbering must skip over surviving numbers."""
+    from sqlalchemy import delete as sa_delete
+    from app.core.database import async_session_factory
+    from app.models.ticket import Ticket
+
+    token = await _login(client)
+    first = await _create_ticket(client, token, description="numbering a")   # …001
+    second = await _create_ticket(client, token, description="numbering b")  # …002
+    third = await _create_ticket(client, token, description="numbering c")   # …003
+
+    async with async_session_factory() as session:
+        # Delete the middle ticket; count+1 numbering would now re-issue …003
+        # (colliding with the surviving third ticket).
+        await session.execute(sa_delete(Ticket).where(Ticket.id == second["id"]))
+        await session.commit()
+
+    fourth = await _create_ticket(client, token, description="numbering d")
+
+    def suffix(tn: str) -> int:
+        return int(tn.rsplit("-", 1)[1])
+
+    survivors = {suffix(first["ticket_number"]), suffix(third["ticket_number"])}
+    assert suffix(fourth["ticket_number"]) not in survivors
+    assert suffix(fourth["ticket_number"]) > max(survivors)