1. TIMEOUT KIND FIX: run_command returns (1, '', 'TIMEOUT') when its own
timeout fires. probe_http now checks for this before falling through to
'curl exit <rc>', so a 30s timeout reports 'timeout after 30s' not
'curl exit 1'.
2. BUSY/DEGRADED DETECTION: After both model probes fail, check the
model's host health endpoint (e.g. 192.168.68.8:8080/health for
gpu-dense). If the host answers 200, report 'busy (completion timed
out after retry; host healthy 200)' — do NOT fail the run on that
alone. If the host does not answer, that's a real FAIL.
3. RETRY TIMEOUT INCREASED: Single-host retry timeout raised from 45s to
90s. Worst-case prefill on a single-slot .8 host is ~76s (observed
83K-token prompt at 1078 tok/s), so 90s covers it.
New line shapes:
- Busy: 'gpu-dense: busy (completion timed out after retry; host healthy 200)'
- Real failure: 'probe-failed: gpu-dense timeout after 30s then timeout after 90s (2 attempts)'
The failure line now preserves both attempts' failure kinds instead of
hardcoding 'timeout after retry, 45s'. If both attempts fail, the report
shows: 'probe-failed: <model> <first kind> then <retry kind> (2 attempts)'.
This fixes the self-contradictory output when the first attempt timed out
but the retry failed with connection refused, and prevents the duration
from appearing twice when both attempts were timeouts.
Example outputs:
- timeout then timeout: 'probe-failed: gpu-dense timeout after 30s then timeout after 45s (2 attempts)'
- timeout then refused: 'probe-failed: gpu-dense timeout after 30s then connection refused (2 attempts)'
- refused then refused: 'probe-failed: gpu-dense connection refused then connection refused (2 attempts)'
Single-host models (gpu-dense, gpu-vision, strix-moe) now retry once at
45s on initial 30s timeout failure before declaring probe-failed. This
prevents a single transient timeout (cold prefill ~13s or concurrent
generation hold) from failing the entire health digest.
Evidence: 2026-09-19 ~06:55Z digest failed gpu-dense at 30s; 06:56Z
direct probe 200 in 1.04s.
The failed-probe-fails-the-run property is preserved: if both attempts
fail, the script still exits non-zero with the target and duration named.
Closes: daily-health-digest false negative on single transient timeout
The leg comments were wrong:
- Line 207: Docker Stats showed :9323 (dockerd port) but should be :9324
- Line 215: PVE Exporter showed :9324 (docker-stats port) but should be :9221
These were the exact pairing this PR exists to correct.
Read back the changed lines to verify:
scripts/infra-monitoring.sh:207 shows Docker Stats (CT 116 :9324, 127.0.0.1 via SSH)
scripts/infra-monitoring.sh:215 shows PVE Exporter (CT 116 :9221, 127.0.0.1 via SSH)
Branch: fix/infra-monitoring-probe-ports-20260919
F1: Fixed leg comments to match the actual ports
- Line 207: Docker Stats now shows :9324 (was :9323)
- Line 215: PVE Exporter now shows :9221 (was :9324)
These were the exact pairing this PR exists to correct.
F2: Added per-leg assertions that prove which leg owns which port
The new assertions verify:
1. Docker Stats leg uses $DOCKER_STATS_PORT constant
2. PVE Exporter leg uses $PVE_EXPORTER_PORT constant
3. DOCKER_STATS_PORT constant is set to 9324
4. PVE_EXPORTER_PORT constant is set to 9221
Proof the new assertions bite:
Under the both-constants-swapped mutation (DOCKER_STATS_PORT=9221,
PVE_EXPORTER_PORT=9324), the suite fails with 25 passed / 2 failed
(failing exactly the two constant-value assertions). This proves the
per-leg assertions pin which leg owns which port, not just that both
ports appear somewhere in the SSH log.
Branch: fix/infra-monitoring-probe-ports-20260919
The Liveness Check section now documents ALL SIX verdict shapes exactly
as emitted by proxmox-monitor.sh:
1. ✅ PBS GC: healthy (last run Nh ago, pending-bytes: N B)
2. 🔴 PBS GC: stale (last run Nh ago, pending-bytes: N B)
3. 🔴 PBS GC: probe-failed: storepve:192.168.68.6 (expected JSON, got 000)
4. 🔴 PBS GC: probe-failed: storepve:192.168.68.6 (unparseable JSON)
5. 🔴 PBS GC: never-run (storepve-datastore not found in GC list)
6. 🔴 PBS GC: never-run (storepve-datastore has no last-run-endtime)
Fixed the quoted healthy example (line ~114) to include the pending-bytes
suffix the code now appends. Previously the prose only documented the
probe-failed shape, missing the PR's own headline cases (never-run).
Proof: grep -n 'never-run' proxmox-monitor.prose.md now returns two lines
(lines 106 and 108), documenting both never-run variants.
Branch: fix/pbs-gc-liveness-signal-20260919
Previously probed wrong ports:
- Docker Stats was at 9323 (dockerd metrics) but should be 9324
(harness-docker-stats, docker_container_* metrics)
- PVE Exporter was at 9324 (harness-docker-stats) but should be 9221
(harness-pve-exporter, 5 pve_* metrics)
Both exporters bind to 127.0.0.1 on CT 116 and must be probed via SSH.
Updated infrastructure-monitoring.prose.md to document the correct ports.
Added test assertions verifying the exact ports are probed.
Branch: fix/infra-monitoring-probe-ports-20260919
(a) Probe-failure detection: now treats empty OR unparseable JSON as
probe-failed, not never-run. This prevents 'command not found'
outputs from being rendered as service verdicts.
(b) pending-bytes: now extracted from JSON and reported in stale verdict.
(c) Null endtime: use .get() with explicit None check, not 0 fallback.
null values now correctly trigger never-run verdict instead of
arithmetic crash (set -u).
(d) Tests: Added 14-assertion stub-driven suite covering: healthy,
stale (>48h), probe-failed (empty and unparseable), null endtime,
datastore absent. Each test stubs ssh/curl to verify exact
behavior against the pre-fix head.
Branch: fix/pbs-gc-liveness-signal-20260919
Document the PBS GC schedule (00:00 UTC, not 20:00 UTC as PR #116 said),
what actually runs (pbs-gc.sh -> pct exec 107 -- proxmox-backup-manager),
datastore location (CT 107's /mnt/pbs-backup on /tank/pbs-backup, NOT
/media/easystore2), and the new liveness check (48h threshold, reports
age in hours, explicit healthy line).
Branch: fix/pbs-gc-liveness-signal-20260919
Add monitoring leg that checks storepve-datastore GC health:
- Reads GC state from CT 107 via pct exec
- FAILS if last-run-endtime is older than 48h
- Reports age in hours and pending-bytes status
- Uses JSON parsing for reliable data extraction
Test: All 5 legs OK, Exit 0.
Branch: fix/pbs-gc-liveness-signal-20260919
PR #118 finding F1 (low): The deployed LiteLLM on CT 116 uses
allowed_mcp_servers (193 occurrences in installed package), not
bare allowed_mcp. One-word doc fix.
Add the audit-hermes-config.py Rule 15 wording fix from PR #117:
- Violation message now reads 'URL is incorrect: <url> (expected: <expected>)'
- Detection logic unchanged
- Matches URL and not-in-known-list branches remain byte-identical
This consolidates relay #779 into a single PR (#118).
PR #117 follow-up (verify PASS-WITH-FINDINGS):
1. infrastructure-update.prose.md:
- Update access table: agent keys now have per-key MCP grants (2026-09-18)
- Strike-through old limitation: per-key grants now work
- Mark Migration Path as COMPLETED 2026-09-18
2. hermes-config-template.prose.md:
- Remove hedge ('may have been upgraded')
- State fact: per-key MCP grants verified 2026-09-18
This resolves the contradiction where one file asserted per-key
MCP access and the other denied it.
F1: Make kind classification real — append (<kind>) to every failure
line, assign kind=tls on curl exit 35/60, fix :112 where
kind=refused was set on successful retry. Update prose shape.
F3: Move credential placeholder skip from server probe to notify()
only — server is always probed (200 without auth verified live).
F4: notify() logs ALERT SUPPRESSED when credential unusable so
alerts from other legs are not silently dropped.
F7: Restore trailing newline in infra-monitoring.sh.
F5 (DO NOT CHANGE): Verified directly — ssh root@192.168.68.6
'grep -n keep-daily /etc/pve/jobs.cfg' returns five
prune-backups keep-daily=35 lines. Prose is CORRECT.
Test: 18 passed, 0 failed (bash scripts/test_infra_monitoring.sh)
When ZULIP_API_KEY is unset or contains 'placeholder'/'REDACTED', skip
the global Zulip server leg with a ⏭ marker instead of failing the whole
script. The pi/Tanko/kagentz legs do not need the Zulip API key and keep
their verdicts.
Tracked as: zulip-health-credential-placeholder-20260913 (captain-held)
This removes the repeated 'Action required' noise every cycle while
keeping the credential enforcement loud and visible.
Rewrote test to run the monitor with stubbed curl/ssh on PATH that
capture the exact argv of each probe call. The test now asserts the
URL+port of every leg actually requested, not source text or config
constants.
A2: PVE node assertions now check the exact URL in the curl log
(https://192.168.68.9:8006/... must appear), so a wrong IP
(e.g. .99) fails the test.
A3: Grafana/Prometheus/LiteLLM assertions check the URL the call
actually builds, so a hardcoded wrong port in the CALL (while the
config variable stays correct) fails the test.
Mutation evidence:
A2: sed s/192.168.68.9/192.168.68.99/ in PVE_NODES -> suite FAILS
A3: sed s/"$GRAFANA_PORT"/"9999"/ in probe call -> suite FAILS
Results: 18 passed, 0 failed (baseline); 17/18 on each mutation
A1: Test -k assertion now checks use_k:+-k syntax (actual bash pattern)
A2: PVE_NODES assertions now count expected nodes and verify exact array size
A3: Test now asserts liveness behavior (PVE_API_LIVENESS=1) not source text
B1: disk-gc GC schedule corrected: cron runs pbs-gc.sh (not proxmox-backup-manager),
schedule is 20:00 LOCAL (00:00 UTC, not 20:00 UTC), host timezone America/New_York
B2: PROBE SHAPE now documents actual output shape including TLS flag notes
C1: TLS kind is now printed in PVE API failure output
C2: SSH retry logic clarified - retry is in probe_http function (not unreachable)
HOST-RED on media volumes says 'capacity decision — owner to decide' not
'immediate owner attention'. Media volumes are report-only at all levels; the
urgency language was misleading. PBS datastore and host-root get the immediate
attention wording.
Closes the welcome-back proposal: 'how the disk-gc check should classify a
media volume so HOST-RED stops meaning nothing.'
The 20:00 UTC PBS GC cron (proxmox-backup-manager datastore prune)
applies only to /tank/pbs-backup (pbs-datastore). It does NOT touch
media volumes (/media/*) which are report-only at all threat levels.
This clarification prevents the recurring confusion where a 96% media
volume triggers a GC expectation, when the GC schedule never applies
to it.
Closes the 2026-09-17 correction: 'the GC schedule is now 20:00 UTC,
protects the backup datastore, NOT the nearly-full media volume.'
The 2026-09-17 false-verdict incident (third recurrence) showed that prose
policy is not a control: the agent probed :9325/:9405 (nonexistent ports),
CT 116 for PVE API (should be real PVE nodes), and rendered TLS failures as
connection-refused. This moves the canonical probe set into
scripts/infra-monitoring.sh (executed verbatim by the contract) and adds
scripts/test_infra_monitoring.sh which asserts every probed port matches the
documented value.
- scripts/infra-monitoring.sh: one script per contract pattern; all targets,
ports, paths, and expected-status rules in code; -k for PVE self-signed
certs; non-zero exit naming every failed target; no OK summary on failure
- scripts/test_infra_monitoring.sh: 20 assertions covering port drift,
monitoring-host-as-PVE-node, and missing -k flag
- infrastructure-monitoring.prose.md: check-health section now references the
script as executable owner; paste its raw output verbatim
Proof: all 13 legs pass (exit 0); deliberately broken Grafana port (9325)
produces 'probe-failed: 192.168.68.116:9325 (expected 200)' and exit 1.
Implement Rule 15 automated enforcement for MCP servers:
- Validate MCP server URLs against known endpoints (ra-h-os, litellm)
- Check for authentication headers on MCP server configs
- Warn if header values look like env-vars instead of literal keys
- Warn if no auth header is present
This ensures the MCP URL/header invariants from the prose contract
are enforced at the earliest shared boundary (before config
application).
Addressed all 4 ask-user findings from the review:
f1: Qualified the MCP access verification claim - noted that it may
contradict infrastructure-update.prose.md and that LiteLLM version may
have been upgraded since that contract was written.
f2: Added key rotation note documenting that MCP headers use literal keys
and do NOT auto-rotate with the vault. Added TODO to consider adding
MCP header regeneration to the Key Update Procedure.
f3: Added MCP server checks to audit-hermes-config.py (Rule 15):
- Validate MCP server URLs against known endpoints
- Check for authentication headers
- Warn if header values look like env-vars instead of literal keys
f4: Updated Rule 15 verification instruction to include MCP initialize
handshake test, not just /v1/models check.
f5: Added NetBird dependency note documenting that 502 errors on MCP
requests may indicate NetBird outage, not auth failure.
- Documented MCP endpoint verification (2026-08-07): tested with real key,
confirmed initialize handshake works and virtual keys have MCP access
- Added note about Accept header requirement (handled by MCP client library)
- Clarified that the Accept header is NOT part of the config template
- Added litellm MCP server entry to mcp_servers section with correct URL
(https://litellm.sysloggh.net/mcp) and header format
- Updated Rule 15 to be more specific about endpoint validation and
header requirements (REAL keys, not env-var references)
- Added MCP Server Configuration section with implementation details
- Documented the 2026-08-07 Tanko incident where ra-h-os was pointing
to litellm endpoint with env header causing 401 floods
- Updated frontmatter to reflect the changes
Fixes: #keyless-mcp-incident-20260807
Refs: Rule 15 (MCP Endpoint and Header Validation)
Scripts that had hardcoded credentials:
- scripts/zulip-monitor.sh:12 (was ZULIP_KEY="cKTDMZAPW08dk3zl05sStzO7HRztzyn8")
- scripts/daily-infra-report.py:25 (was ZULIP_KEY="cKTDMZAPW08dk3zl05sStzO7HRztzyn8")
Both now read from environment variable ZULIP_API_KEY (set by vault-backed start script)
with loud failure if not present.
Other credentials in scripts/:
- capture-dsh-token.sh: uses TOKEN variable with fallback (not a secret)
- pm2-self-heal.sh: reads TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN from /root/.pi/agent/extensions/telegram/.env (acceptable)
- prose-ai-review.sh: uses GITEA_TOKEN from .env file with LITELLM_KEY fallback (not secrets)
No other hardcoded credentials found.
Proof of behavior:
With ZULIP_API_KEY set:
bash scripts/zulip-monitor.sh → Server: HTTP 200 (authenticated)
python3 scripts/daily-infra-report.py --json → Collecting infrastructure data...
Without ZULIP_API_KEY set:
bash scripts/zulip-monitor.sh → "ZULIP_API_KEY not set — refusing to run with no credential"
python3 scripts/daily-infra-report.py --json → "ZULIP_API_KEY not set — refusing to run with no credential"
Cred source: environment variable ZULIP_API_KEY (set by vault-backed start script)
No key rotation (that is a separate decision).
Fix 1: GPU leg degradation is not just SSH probe failure — it also covers
gpu-no-port and gpu-ghost conditions. Rewrite to match check_gpu_ports reality.
Fix 2: Add skipped and partial exemplars for all four legs (LiteLLM keys,
GPU ports, CTs, Vault secrets) so the template covers the rule rather than
only the happy path.
Cosmetic: note that compact form (rtx5070 timeout) is acceptable in summary
line when host is identifiable from context; full probe-failed: <target> <kind>
form required in detail section.
Every report line MUST include one clause per check leg, even when a leg is
skipped or fails. Missing leg must never look the same as healthy leg.
Required legs:
- LiteLLM keys: N/M (names) status
- GPU ports: N/M (rtx3090, rtx5070, strixhalo) status — or SKIPPED (reason)
- CTs: N/M running (names)
- Vault secrets: status
GPU leg is never skipped by configuration; only SSH probe failure causes
degraded status.
The key-count line in litellm-health-check now reports self-describing
output: '18 total (10 on page 1)' instead of bare '18' or '4'. Uses
total_count from the paginated API response and names what was
counted. Previous bare numbers could not reconcile changes between
runs; now a reader sees both the total and the page 1 sample.
1. Host-side fix (tanko 192.168.68.122): Moved 5 config.yaml.bak-* files
from /root/.hermes/ to /root/hermes-config-backups/ so the scanner
pattern no longer matches. Dead credential (sk-b7d99... DEEPSEEK key
from July, 401 against gateway) is preserved in history without
cluttering the scanned tree.
2. Contract text: Added ACCEPTABLE PATTERN section to
hermes-key-enforcement.prose.md clarifying that agent keys live in
.env/.env.vault with 600 perms (koonimo's shape), while a plaintext
key in config.yaml or any config backup is a violation. Fix procedure:
move the backup file out of the scanned tree, don't delete.
| 2026-09-01 | fix-401 | Old key `sk-or-v1-036e5ca5…` returned 401 "User not found". Replaced with new key `sk-or-v1-0af3f3…` for user `user_2rt9lCqcd5d7Vk1t18DHsvWdPTT`. Verified OpenRouter 200. Container .env updated, run_ui restarted. |
| 2026-09-01 | fix-401 | Old key `«vault: agents/production OPENROUTER_API_KEY»…` returned 401 "User not found". Replaced with new key `«vault: agents/production OPENROUTER_API_KEY»…` for user `user_2rt9lCqcd5d7Vk1t18DHsvWdPTT`. Verified OpenRouter 200. Container .env updated, run_ui restarted. |
**Escalations are STATE-CHANGE driven, not per-run.** A volume alerts ONCE when it enters a higher band (GREEN->WARN, WARN->AMBER, AMBER->RED) and ONCE when it drops back down (a recovery notice). While a volume stays in the same band, it is reported in the scan output only — no DM, no channel alert. This prevents the same 96% easystore2 from re-DMing the owner on every 6-hour scan and drowning a real warning in noise.
@@ -228,6 +228,21 @@ call summary-reporter
plan: plan
```
## GC SCHEDULE (PBS datastore only)
The PBS GC schedule is defined in ONE authoritative place: `/etc/cron.d/pbs-gc` on storepve.
The schedule is `0 20 * * *` (20:00 LOCAL = 00:00 UTC, since host timezone is America/New_York).
This applies **only** to the PBS datastore (`/tank/pbs-backup`), NOT to media volumes.
Media volumes (/media/*) are report-only at all threat levels.
The cron runs `/usr/local/bin/pbs-gc.sh` which executes:
When reporting findings, separate POLICY observations from FAULT findings:
### ACCEPTABLE PATTERN
Agent keys live in `.env` or `.env.vault` files with 600 permissions (koonimo's shape is the canonical example). A plaintext key inside a `config.yaml` or any `config.yaml.bak-*` file is a violation — the backup files are not part of the runtime credential path and are not watched by the scanner, so a key in them is stale clutter that a future reader can mistake for a working key.
**Fix procedure** (when a backup file is found with a plaintext key):
1. Move the file out of the scanned tree (e.g., `mv /root/.hermes/config.yaml.bak-* /root/hermes-config-backups/`) — do NOT delete the file, just move it so the scanner pattern no longer matches.
2. Re-run the reachability check to confirm COMPLIANT.
3. Report the before/after check output and the commands you ran.
**Rationale**: Moving the file preserves history without leaving a credential where a scanner trips over it. Deleting the file loses the historical context. Keeping it in place means the next scan will report it as a finding and waste time re-deciding.
### POLICY (observation only, not a fault)
- Agent uses a non-internal-harness provider (e.g., direct DeepSeek, Tencent, OpenRouter)
- Config text has a field that looks unusual but the agent's calls are succeeding
- API key: `«vault: infrastructure/production STIRLING_API_KEY»`
- Authentik OAuth2: configured but disabled (requires paid Server license). Ready to enable: set `SECURITY_OAUTH2_ENABLED=true` + `SECURITY_LOGINMETHOD=all`
- Compose: `/opt/home_stack/docker-compose.yml`
- Control script: `/opt/home_stack/infra-control.sh`
@@ -636,7 +636,7 @@ monitor, or integration breaks.
**IMPORTANT**: Do not confuse with port 9323, which is owned by dockerd and serves the Docker Engine's own metrics (`builder_builds_*`, `containerd_build_info_*`).
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ contracts — read them there. Do not re-add retired names (`gemma-4-12b`, `gpu-
- **Health-check script** (`/opt/inference-harness/scripts/litellm-health-check.sh` on CT 116): `gpu-fleet` check fails only on **critical** alerts (warnings are informational). Tests `strix-moe` (not `ornith-1.0-35b`).
- **GPU monitor** (`/root/scripts/gpu-monitor-server.py` on pi .24): runs as **systemd unit `gpu-monitor.service`** (was bare `&` process). `gpu_count` includes Strix Halo (was 2, now 3). VRAM alert thresholds: warning 93%, critical 97% (raised from 90/95 — 128K context steady-state is ~70% on RTX 3090, not a fault).
- **Agent key monitor** (`/root/scripts/agent-health-check.py` on pi .24, cron `*/10`): v4 (2026-09-10) — vault-backed agents (tanko/koby/koonimo) read their **agent-specific**`{NAME}_LITELLM_API_KEY` from Infisical vault (not the shared master key); abiba (pi agent) reads `LITELLM_API_KEY` from its local `/root/.pi/agent/env.sh` (#735 — moved out of shared `/root/.bashrc`), not from the vault. Abiba is pi-only since the harness purge, so its Hermes config/wrapper/gateway legs are skipped rather than reported as faults; koby is **report-only** (captain's 2026-08-17 ruling) — its findings go to the `--json``report_only` array and are never counted as fleet failures or repaired, and its CT 111 liveness is probed on storepve (.6). Covers: LiteLLM keys, GPU ports, agent gateways, CT liveness (pct status on PVE nodes), config.yaml YAML integrity, wrapper/CLI integrity, vault secret non-emptiness checks. Every run/report carries the absolute execution path (`script=` + `cwd=`). The current fleet roster is owned by the script changelog (`scripts/agent-health-check.py`); mumuni is no longer probed from this host. Legacy `tdunna`/`baggy` replaced with canonical agent hostnames.
- **Stale keys cleaned**: `daily-infra-report.py` SYNTHETIC_API_KEY was stale (`sk-U_ydi3B` → 401); now reads `LITELLM_MASTER_KEY` from env. Deprecated scripts (`router-original.py`, `router-phase0-backup.py`, `apply-fixes.py`) still reference `sk-syslog-local-master-key` but do not actively poll LiteLLM.
- **Stale keys cleaned**: `daily-infra-report.py` SYNTHETIC_API_KEY was stale (hardcoded key → 401); now reads `LITELLM_MASTER_KEY` from env. Deprecated scripts (`router-original.py`, `router-phase0-backup.py`, `apply-fixes.py`) still reference `sk-syslog-local-master-key` but do not actively poll LiteLLM (deprecated key, no live usage).
**IMPORTANT**: The tool `proxmox-backup-manager` exists only inside CT 107 (where the PBS server runs). The storepve host has only `proxmox-backup-client`. This is why the job had never worked before 2026-09-19 00:00 UTC.
### Datastore Location
- **Datastore**: CT 107's `/mnt/pbs-backup` on the storepve ZFS dataset `/tank/pbs-backup` (pool `tank`, ~11T free)
- **NOT** `/media/easystore2` (media library, 3.7T, 96% used — separate volume)
### Liveness Check
The new `proxmox-monitor.sh` leg checks storepve-datastore GC health:
- Reads GC state from CT 107: `pct exec 107 -- proxmox-backup-manager garbage-collection list --output-format json`
- **FAILS** if `last-run-endtime` is older than 48 hours
- Reports age in hours and pending-bytes
**All six verdict shapes** (exactly as emitted by the script):
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