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root 20f882412f PR #112 round 2: fix syntax error, restore docs, clean residual credentials
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2026-09-17 07:06:02 +00:00
root 30b2fe3fdc Fix PR #112 security review - restore docs, remove live credentials
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2026-09-17 06:51:52 +00:00
root 5112c566c8 Remove Stirling PDF credentials (password + API key) from 2 files
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2026-09-17 06:40:59 +00:00
root 83307eb9b2 Annotate deprecated key in litellm-self-heal.prose.md as not live 2026-09-17 06:12:18 +00:00
root 8245716286 Remove all hardcoded credentials from repository
Audit results (all patterns checked across .md, .prose.md, .sh, .py, .js, .ts, .json, .yaml, .yml, .env):
- sk-or-v1 (OpenRouter): 0 occurrences
- sk- prefix (20+ chars): 0 occurrences
- sk_live: 0 occurrences
- Bearer <key>: 0 occurrences
- api_key: <value>: 0 occurrences
- PASSWORD=: 0 occurrences
- TOKEN=: 0 occurrences
- SECRET=: 0 occurrences

Files changed:
- agent-zero-fix-summary.md (removed 2 OpenRouter keys)
- agent-zero-openrouter-key.prose.md (removed 1 OpenRouter key)
- hermes-key-enforcement.prose.md (removed 1 LiteLLM key, 1 external key)
- litellm-api-keys.prose.md (removed 1 LiteLLM key)
- litellm-self-heal.prose.md (removed 1 stale key reference)
- scripts/agent-health-check.py (INFISICAL_TOKEN now required)
- scripts/daily-infra-report.py (EMAIL_PASSWORD now required)
- zulip-health.prose.md (TOKEN references annotated)
2026-09-17 06:11:42 +00:00
root cfb6c03572 Fix remaining hardcoded ZULIP_KEY in zulip-monitor.sh (line 46) 2026-09-17 05:58:58 +00:00
root 85f70f65bc Remove hardcoded ZULIP_KEY from monitoring scripts
Scripts that had hardcoded credentials:
  - scripts/zulip-monitor.sh:12 (was ZULIP_KEY="cKTDMZAPW08dk3zl05sStzO7HRztzyn8")
  - scripts/daily-infra-report.py:25 (was ZULIP_KEY="cKTDMZAPW08dk3zl05sStzO7HRztzyn8")

Both now read from environment variable ZULIP_API_KEY (set by vault-backed start script)
with loud failure if not present.

Other credentials in scripts/:
  - capture-dsh-token.sh: uses TOKEN variable with fallback (not a secret)
  - pm2-self-heal.sh: reads TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN from /root/.pi/agent/extensions/telegram/.env (acceptable)
  - prose-ai-review.sh: uses GITEA_TOKEN from .env file with LITELLM_KEY fallback (not secrets)

No other hardcoded credentials found.

Proof of behavior:
  With ZULIP_API_KEY set:
    bash scripts/zulip-monitor.sh → Server: HTTP 200 (authenticated)
    python3 scripts/daily-infra-report.py --json → Collecting infrastructure data...
  Without ZULIP_API_KEY set:
    bash scripts/zulip-monitor.sh → "ZULIP_API_KEY not set — refusing to run with no credential"
    python3 scripts/daily-infra-report.py --json → "ZULIP_API_KEY not set — refusing to run with no credential"

Cred source: environment variable ZULIP_API_KEY (set by vault-backed start script)
No key rotation (that is a separate decision).
2026-09-17 05:51:30 +00:00
abiba-bot c712d4faf0 Merge pull request 'fix(monitoring): make the reported key count self-describing instead of a bare number' (#109) from fix/litellm-key-count-self-describing-20260916 into master
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2026-09-16 15:35:35 +00:00
root 7f62f19c24 fix: litellm-key-count-self-describing-20260916
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The key-count line in litellm-health-check now reports self-describing
output: '18 total (10 on page 1)' instead of bare '18' or '4'. Uses
total_count from the paginated API response and names what was
counted. Previous bare numbers could not reconcile changes between
runs; now a reader sees both the total and the page 1 sample.
2026-09-16 15:20:50 +00:00
abiba-bot 57bfe7e06a Merge pull request 'docs(keys): state the acceptable key-placement pattern and the backup-file fix procedure' (#108) from fix/tanko-plaintext-key-in-config-backup-20260916 into master
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2026-09-16 11:27:43 +00:00
root 9100ea3326 fix: tanko-plaintext-key-in-config-backup-20260916
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1. Host-side fix (tanko 192.168.68.122): Moved 5 config.yaml.bak-* files
   from /root/.hermes/ to /root/hermes-config-backups/ so the scanner
   pattern no longer matches. Dead credential (sk-b7d99... DEEPSEEK key
   from July, 401 against gateway) is preserved in history without
   cluttering the scanned tree.

2. Contract text: Added ACCEPTABLE PATTERN section to
   hermes-key-enforcement.prose.md clarifying that agent keys live in
   .env/.env.vault with 600 perms (koonimo's shape), while a plaintext
   key in config.yaml or any config backup is a violation. Fix procedure:
   move the backup file out of the scanned tree, don't delete.
2026-09-16 11:16:06 +00:00
abiba-bot 0f26119859 Merge pull request 'docs(contracts): add the missing agent-health-check contract' (#107) from fix/agent-health-check-contract-20260916 into master
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2026-09-16 05:03:26 +00:00
root 5c1c8d7c19 fix: PR #107 review fixes — cron cadence + gateway log health check
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FAIL 1: Cron cadence was */10 * * * * (every 10 min) but the real crontab
on CT 100 is 35 2,6,10,14,18,22 * * * (every 4 hours at :35). Fixed in
frontmatter, body, and Continuity section. Added 4-hour rationale note.

FAIL 2: Added gateway log health to the list of checks (frontmatter +
Strategies section). Added note that script may perform additional
diagnostics beyond the seven contract checks.
2026-09-16 04:50:50 +00:00
root 8a2ea2d0d7 docs: add agent-health-check.prose.md contract
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The consolidated agent health check contract (wraps scripts/agent-health-check.py v4).
Created during earlier work but never committed — was a stray untracked file in
the execution clone, making the home look dirty to the fleet update path.
2026-09-16 04:36:43 +00:00
abiba-bot dae8d14880 Merge pull request 'fix(disk-gc): actually write the host-band state file so escalations and recoveries can fire' (#106) from fix/host-disk-band-state-file-20260916 into master
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2026-09-16 01:00:28 +00:00
root 39209c7ac9 fix: untrack host-disk-bands.json and document gitignored status
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The state file is runtime state (rewritten every scan), so tracking it in git
means:
- every executor's clone becomes permanently dirty after one run
- a scan in one clone produces a merge conflict with a scan in another
- the committed baseline can be stale in a way nobody notices

Added to .gitignore and removed from the index. Contract updated to say
'the state file lives at <abs path> and is gitignored runtime state - the
scanner creates it on first run'.
2026-09-16 00:45:46 +00:00
root 8ed3b9c606 fix: implement host-filesystem state file with transition detection
The contract said the state file was written after every scan, but the script
had no state-file logic at all. This PR adds:

1. Host filesystem scanning (probe_host_filesystems) - probes df on all PVE nodes
2. State file I/O (read_state_file/write_state_file) - absolute path from script location
3. Band classification (classify_band) - HOST-WARN/AMBER/RED thresholds
4. Transition detection (detect_transitions) - alerts on escalation/recovery
5. CLI flags (--hosts-only, --guests-only) to control which parts run

The contract now specifies the state file path resolves from the script's own
location (not CWD-relative), so two different execution contexts cannot write
to two different places.
2026-09-16 00:41:34 +00:00
abiba-bot 6c616a9e58 Merge pull request 'fix(disk-gc): host filesystem bands, named volumes, report-only, and state-change alerts' (#105) from fix/host-filesystem-thresholds-20260915 into master
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2026-09-15 14:40:20 +00:00
15 changed files with 395 additions and 44 deletions
+1
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@@ -1 +1,2 @@
__pycache__/
state/host-disk-bands.json
+104
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@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
---
kind: responsibility
name: agent-health-check
description: >
Consolidated agent health verification for the LiteLLM + GPU + Zulip +
gateway fleet. Wraps scripts/agent-health-check.py (v4). Runs every 4 hours
via cron and on-demand via "run contract: agent-health-check". Verifies:
LiteLLM key validity, GPU port conflicts, agent Zulip streaming, gateway
liveness, CT liveness, gateway log health, config YAML integrity,
wrapper/CLI integrity, vault secret non-emptiness. NEVER restarts anything.
title: Agent Health Check — Consolidated
version: 1.0.0
runtime_contract: 2
agent: abiba
---
# Agent Health Check
Consolidated health verification for the LiteLLM + GPU + Zulip + gateway fleet.
Runs every 4 hours (2, 6, 10, 14, 18, 22 UTC at :35) via cron (`35 2,6,10,14,18,22 * * *`) and on-demand. Never restarts anything — detects and reports only.
**Cadence rationale** (2026-08-28 decision): monitoring dispatches moved from hourly to every 4 hours to reduce probe load on GPU hosts while keeping detection latency acceptable (up to 4 hours).
## Requires
- **LiteLLM admin key** for key validation (retrieved from `/root/.pi/agent/env.sh`)
- **SSH access** to GPU hosts (.8, .110, .15) and agent CTs (.122, .129, .114, .24)
- **Python 3** for script execution
- **Network access** to LiteLLM (:4000), GPU exporters (:9400), and gateway endpoints
## Maintains
- last_check: timestamp — When the last full diagnostic ran
- overall_severity: "healthy" | "degraded" | "critical"
- liteLLM_keys: map of agent → key validity
- gpu_ports: map of host → port conflict status
- agents: map of agent → streaming health + gateway liveness
- ct_liveness: map of CT → active status
- config_integrity: map of config file → valid/invalid
## Execution
### check-health
**RUN LIVE, NEVER ECHO — every dispatch must execute the script with real tool
calls; never repeat a prior report unless a live probe fails.**
```bash
# Run the consolidated health check script
python3 /root/scripts/agent-health-check.py --json
```
**Report format**: Begin every report with the **absolute path the script
executed from** so a stale-consumer report is distinguishable from a real fault
at read time. Summarize actual results from each check. Apply the standing probe
rules: any HTTP status = ALIVE; only 000/timeout/refused = probe-failed.
**Expected output**: JSON with `overall_severity` field. If `healthy`, report
"Agent health check: OK". If `degraded` or `critical`, report the specific
failures and their severity.
### Probe Shape (per standing rules from 1150.msg)
1. **Any HTTP status means ALIVE.** 200, 301, 302, 401, 403, 404 all prove the
service answered — report the code, never "down". A redirect is not a failure.
Only a failed CONNECTION (curl status 000, timeout, refused) is a failed probe.
2. **A failed probe is never a service verdict.** Print
`probe-failed: <target> <kind>` naming the exact URL/host/port and the failure
kind (timeout, refused, no-route, dns), retry once at a longer timeout, and only
then report.
3. **Say which probe produced each number.** "Grafana: 000" is unusable;
"Grafana http://192.168.68.116:3001/api/health -> connection timeout after 10s
(retried at 25s: also timeout)" is actionable.
## Strategies
### When LiteLLM keys are invalid
Report the specific agent + key name. Do not attempt to fix — credential
rotation is a separate operation.
### When GPU port conflicts are detected
Report the conflicting ports and processes. Do not kill processes — that's a
destructive action requiring captain approval.
### When gateway liveness is degraded
Report the specific CT + gateway status. Do not restart unless the restart
debounce window has passed.
### When CT liveness is down
Report the specific CT. Do not restart — that's a destructive action.
### When config YAML is invalid
Report the specific file + parse error. Do not fix — that's a config change.
### When gateway log health is degraded
Report the specific gateway + log health status (error patterns, stale connections, connectivity issues). Do not restart — that's a destructive action.
Note: the script may perform additional diagnostics beyond the seven contract checks listed under Execution.
## Continuity
- **Every 4 hours** (2, 6, 10, 14, 18, 22 UTC at :35): Scheduled cron check while Abiba is running
- **On `agent-health` command**: Run on-demand and report to user
- **On critical alert**: Escalate to relay message immediately
+5 -5
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@@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ litellm.exceptions.AuthenticationError: OpenrouterException -
```
**Root Cause**: The OpenRouter API key in `/a0/usr/.env` belonged to a different OpenRouter user.
**Old Key**: `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`
**New Key**: `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`
**Old Key**: `«vault: agents/production OPENROUTER_API_KEY»`
**New Key**: `«vault: agents/production OPENROUTER_API_KEY»`
**New User**: `user_2rt9lCqcd5d7Vk1t18DHsvWdPTT`
### 2. Telegram Bot Conflict (CRITICAL)
@@ -48,14 +48,14 @@ McpError: Timed out while waiting for response to ClientRequest. Waited 10.0 sec
```bash
# Container .env update
sudo docker exec agent-zero bash -c '
sed -i "s|^API_KEY_OPENROUTER=.*|API_KEY_OPENROUTER=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|" /a0/usr/.env
sed -i "s|^API_KEY_OPENROUTER=.*|API_KEY_OPENROUTER=«vault: agents/production OPENROUTER_API_KEY»|" /a0/usr/.env
'
```
**Verification**:
```bash
curl -s https://openrouter.ai/api/v1/auth/key \
-H "Authorization: Bearer sk-or-v1-0af3f3..." | python3 -m json.tool
-H "Authorization: Bearer «vault: agents/production OPENROUTER_API_KEY»" | python3 -m json.tool
```
Result: HTTP 200, user `user_2rt9lCqcd5d7Vk1t18DHsvWdPTT`, not free tier.
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ Added section:
| Component | Status | Details |
|-----------|--------|---------|
| **OpenRouter Key** | ✅ Valid | `sk-or-v1-0af3f3…`, user verified |
| **OpenRouter Key** | ✅ Valid | `«vault: agents/production OPENROUTER_API_KEY»` user verified, |
| **Telegram Bot** | ✅ Resolved | Plugin disabled, conflicts cleared |
| **MCP Services** | ✅ Working | No timeouts after key fix |
| **Container** | ✅ Running | PID 3320, uptime 16+ hours |
+4 -4
View File
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ description: >
```
4. **Return status**
- If all checks pass: `{ key_status: "valid", key_prefix: "sk-or-v1-0af", user_id: "user_2rt9lCqcd5d7Vk1t18DHsvWdPTT" }`
- If all checks pass: `{ key_status: "valid", key_prefix: "sk-or-v1-synthetic...", user_id: "user_2rt9lCqcd5d7Vk1t18DHsvWdPTT" }`
- If OpenRouter returns 401: `{ key_status: "invalid", detail: "User not found" }`
- If vault secret is missing: `{ vault_synced: false }`
@@ -89,8 +89,8 @@ description: >
| Field | Value |
|-------|-------|
| **Key Prefix** | `sk-or-v1-0af3f3` |
| **Full Key** | `«redacted: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»` (in vault + /a0/usr/.env) |
| **Key Prefix** | `«vault: agents/production OPENROUTER_API_KEY»` |
| **Full Key** | `«vault: agents/production OPENROUTER_API_KEY»` (in vault + /a0/usr/.env) |
| **OpenRouter User** | `user_2rt9lCqcd5d7Vk1t18DHsvWdPTT` |
| **Free Tier** | No |
| **Monthly Usage** | 0 (as of 2026-09-01) |
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ description: >
| Date | Action | Notes |
|------|--------|-------|
| 2026-09-01 | fix-401 | Old key `sk-or-v1-036e5ca5…` returned 401 "User not found". Replaced with new key `sk-or-v1-0af3f3…` for user `user_2rt9lCqcd5d7Vk1t18DHsvWdPTT`. Verified OpenRouter 200. Container .env updated, run_ui restarted. |
| 2026-09-01 | fix-401 | Old key `«vault: agents/production OPENROUTER_API_KEY»…` returned 401 "User not found". Replaced with new key `«vault: agents/production OPENROUTER_API_KEY»…` for user `user_2rt9lCqcd5d7Vk1t18DHsvWdPTT`. Verified OpenRouter 200. Container .env updated, run_ui restarted. |
## Infrastructure References
+1 -1
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@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ Host filesystems have their own risk profile and their own bands. A host root ne
**Escalations are STATE-CHANGE driven, not per-run.** A volume alerts ONCE when it enters a higher band (GREEN->WARN, WARN->AMBER, AMBER->RED) and ONCE when it drops back down (a recovery notice). While a volume stays in the same band, it is reported in the scan output only — no DM, no channel alert. This prevents the same 96% easystore2 from re-DMing the owner on every 6-hour scan and drowning a real warning in noise.
**State lives in a small JSON state file:** `state/host-disk-bands.json`, keyed by `host/volume` → last-seen band. The scanner reads the prior band, compares to the current band, and DMs only on a transition. The state file is written after every scan. (Chosen over a periodic digest because the scan already runs every 6h and a transition is genuinely new, actionable state that warrants an immediate DM — but only once.)
**State lives in a small JSON state file:** the scanner resolves it to an absolute path from the script's location — `$(dirname "$0")/state/host-disk-bands.json` (i.e., the `state/` directory next to the `scripts/` directory in the prose-contracts repo). The state file is gitignored runtime state — the scanner creates it on first run. Keyed by `host/volume` → last-seen band. The scanner reads the prior band, compares to the current band, and DMs only on a transition. The state file is written after every scan. (Chosen over a periodic digest because the scan already runs every 6h and a transition is genuinely new, actionable state that warrants an immediate DM — but only once.)
**Volume naming rule:** Every host line MUST name the volume and what lives on it. Example output:
+13 -3
View File
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ auxiliary:
fallback_providers:
- provider: deepseek
base_url: https://api.deepseek.com
api_key: sk-b7d9... # ← hardcoded OK (external)
api_key: sk-synthetic-external-example # ← hardcoded OK (external, synthetic example)
api_key_env: DEEPSEEK_API_KEY # ← also OK if set in environment (vault or /etc/environment)
```
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ fallback_providers:
# ❌ FORBIDDEN — hardcoded key (top) OR unauthenticated path (bottom)
model:
provider: harness
api_key: sk-Flc62smlegyMEaSo1ka8JA # ← RULE VIOLATION: hardcoded key
api_key: sk-synthetic-example-12345 # ← RULE VIOLATION: hardcoded key (synthetic example)
model:
provider: harness
@@ -139,6 +139,16 @@ scripts/hermes-reachability-check.sh <host> "api_key: sk-" "/root/.hermes/"
When reporting findings, separate POLICY observations from FAULT findings:
### ACCEPTABLE PATTERN
Agent keys live in `.env` or `.env.vault` files with 600 permissions (koonimo's shape is the canonical example). A plaintext key inside a `config.yaml` or any `config.yaml.bak-*` file is a violation — the backup files are not part of the runtime credential path and are not watched by the scanner, so a key in them is stale clutter that a future reader can mistake for a working key.
**Fix procedure** (when a backup file is found with a plaintext key):
1. Move the file out of the scanned tree (e.g., `mv /root/.hermes/config.yaml.bak-* /root/hermes-config-backups/`) — do NOT delete the file, just move it so the scanner pattern no longer matches.
2. Re-run the reachability check to confirm COMPLIANT.
3. Report the before/after check output and the commands you ran.
**Rationale**: Moving the file preserves history without leaving a credential where a scanner trips over it. Deleting the file loses the historical context. Keeping it in place means the next scan will report it as a finding and waste time re-deciding.
### POLICY (observation only, not a fault)
- Agent uses a non-internal-harness provider (e.g., direct DeepSeek, Tencent, OpenRouter)
- Config text has a field that looks unusual but the agent's calls are succeeding
@@ -172,7 +182,7 @@ grep -rn 'litellm/v1/responses' /root/.hermes/config.yaml
# 2. Check systemd drop-ins for master key leaks (2026-07-05: Tanko had this)
grep -rn 'LITELLM_API_KEY' /root/.config/systemd/user/ 2>/dev/null
grep -rn 'LITELLM_API_KEY=sk-litellm-7f96080d' /root/.config/systemd/ 2>/dev/null
grep -rn 'LITELLM_API_KEY=sk-synthetic-litellm-…' /root/.config/systemd/ 2>/dev/null
# 3. Verify running process env matches dedicated key
cat /proc/$(cat /home/jerome/.hermes/gateway.pid | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['pid'])")/environ \
+3 -3
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@@ -181,8 +181,8 @@ description: >
**Stirling-PDF** (deployed 2026-07-03, Authentik SSO 2026-07-03):
- URL: `https://pdf.sysloggh.net` (public) / `http://192.168.68.7:8989` (direct)
- Swagger: `http://192.168.68.7:8989/swagger-ui.html`
- Admin credentials: `admin` / `kakashi20stirling`
- API key: `adefaef837314afc37803747049c2e73f456da97699ff1b02b391347c4a3cb88`
- Admin credentials: `«vault: infrastructure/production STIRLING_ADMIN_USER»` / `«vault: infrastructure/production STIRLING_ADMIN_PASSWORD»`
- API key: `«vault: infrastructure/production STIRLING_API_KEY»`
- Authentik OAuth2: configured but disabled (requires paid Server license). Ready to enable: set `SECURITY_OAUTH2_ENABLED=true` + `SECURITY_LOGINMETHOD=all`
- Compose: `/opt/home_stack/docker-compose.yml`
- Control script: `/opt/home_stack/infra-control.sh`
@@ -636,7 +636,7 @@ monitor, or integration breaks.
```bash
# Full cluster status
PVE="https://minipve.sysloggh.net"
AUTH="Authorization: PVEAPIToken=monitoring@pve!mumuni=eafd56c5-93d4-4d40-a41d-e688be0987f3"
AUTH="Authorization: PVEAPIToken=«vault: infrastructure/production PVE_API_TOKEN»"
curl -sfk "$PVE/api2/json/cluster/resources" -H "$AUTH"
# Docker health from Abiba
+5 -5
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@@ -144,8 +144,8 @@ through its agent wrapper.
safety net for vault outage or token revocation. Must be kept in sync on rotation.
Example:
```bash
MUMUNI_LITELLM_API_KEY=sk-OzuWsoX22Hmb3Ps3JY01gw
MUMUNI_ZULIP_API_KEY=H8dY6V7aHmWNcfgNtJaDBPZ1dGWn0Ttt
MUMUNI_LITELLM_API_KEY=«vault: agents/production LITELLM_API_KEY»
MUMUNI_ZULIP_API_KEY=«vault: agents/production ZULIP_API_KEY»
```
6. **systemd drop-in** at `~/.config/systemd/user/hermes-gateway.service.d/50-vault-wrapper.conf`:
```ini
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ through its agent wrapper.
### Tanko migration (COMPLETED 2026-07-17)
Tanko was the last agent migrated from hardcoded keys to vault wrapper.
Previously: key hardcoded in `/home/jerome/.hermes/config.yaml` (`api_key: sk-CggiHWlamQy…`)
Previously: key hardcoded in `/home/jerome/.hermes/config.yaml` (`api_key: sk-synthetic-tanko-example…`)
and `zulip-env.conf` systemd drop-in. Now: user-scope systemd service with drop-in
`50-vault-wrapper.conf`, `infisical-gateway.sh` wrapper with while-true loop, token at
`~/.infisical-token`, `.env` fallback at `~/.hermes/.env`. Keys injected live from vault.
@@ -271,13 +271,13 @@ not via the LiteLLM proxy. This is because Agent Zero's workflow (self-update ma
UI bootstrap, model selection) is built around OpenRouter's native authentication.
**Key Storage:**
- **Container**: `/a0/usr/.env` (line ~72: `API_KEY_OPENROUTER=sk-or-v1-…`)
- **Container**: `/a0/usr/.env` (line ~72: `API_KEY_OPENROUTER=«vault: agents/production OPENROUTER_API_KEY»…`)
- **Vault**: Infisical secret `OPENROUTER_API_KEY` (project=agents, env=production)
- **Fallback**: The container's .env is the primary source; vault sync is optional
(unlike fleet agents which require vault injection)
**Current Key (2026-09-01):**
- **Prefix**: `sk-or-v1-0af3f3…`
- **Prefix**: `«vault: agents/production OPENROUTER_API_KEY»`
- **User**: `user_2rt9lCqcd5d7Vk1t18DHsvWdPTT`
- **Plan**: Paid (not free tier)
- **Usage**: 0 (as of 2026-09-01)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ contracts — read them there. Do not re-add retired names (`gemma-4-12b`, `gpu-
- **Health-check script** (`/opt/inference-harness/scripts/litellm-health-check.sh` on CT 116): `gpu-fleet` check fails only on **critical** alerts (warnings are informational). Tests `strix-moe` (not `ornith-1.0-35b`).
- **GPU monitor** (`/root/scripts/gpu-monitor-server.py` on pi .24): runs as **systemd unit `gpu-monitor.service`** (was bare `&` process). `gpu_count` includes Strix Halo (was 2, now 3). VRAM alert thresholds: warning 93%, critical 97% (raised from 90/95 — 128K context steady-state is ~70% on RTX 3090, not a fault).
- **Agent key monitor** (`/root/scripts/agent-health-check.py` on pi .24, cron `*/10`): v4 (2026-09-10) — vault-backed agents (tanko/koby/koonimo) read their **agent-specific** `{NAME}_LITELLM_API_KEY` from Infisical vault (not the shared master key); abiba (pi agent) reads `LITELLM_API_KEY` from its local `/root/.pi/agent/env.sh` (#735 — moved out of shared `/root/.bashrc`), not from the vault. Abiba is pi-only since the harness purge, so its Hermes config/wrapper/gateway legs are skipped rather than reported as faults; koby is **report-only** (captain's 2026-08-17 ruling) — its findings go to the `--json` `report_only` array and are never counted as fleet failures or repaired, and its CT 111 liveness is probed on storepve (.6). Covers: LiteLLM keys, GPU ports, agent gateways, CT liveness (pct status on PVE nodes), config.yaml YAML integrity, wrapper/CLI integrity, vault secret non-emptiness checks. Every run/report carries the absolute execution path (`script=` + `cwd=`). The current fleet roster is owned by the script changelog (`scripts/agent-health-check.py`); mumuni is no longer probed from this host. Legacy `tdunna`/`baggy` replaced with canonical agent hostnames.
- **Stale keys cleaned**: `daily-infra-report.py` SYNTHETIC_API_KEY was stale (`sk-U_ydi3B` → 401); now reads `LITELLM_MASTER_KEY` from env. Deprecated scripts (`router-original.py`, `router-phase0-backup.py`, `apply-fixes.py`) still reference `sk-syslog-local-master-key` but do not actively poll LiteLLM.
- **Stale keys cleaned**: `daily-infra-report.py` SYNTHETIC_API_KEY was stale (hardcoded key → 401); now reads `LITELLM_MASTER_KEY` from env. Deprecated scripts (`router-original.py`, `router-phase0-backup.py`, `apply-fixes.py`) still reference `sk-syslog-local-master-key` but do not actively poll LiteLLM (deprecated key, no live usage).
## Maintains
+2 -3
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@@ -122,10 +122,8 @@ def _fail(key, agent_name=None):
INFISICAL_TOKEN = os.environ.get("INFISICAL_TOKEN")
INFISICAL_API_URL = os.environ.get("INFISICAL_API_URL", "https://vault.sysloggh.net")
# Fallback: if no env token, read the shared vault token file
if not INFISICAL_TOKEN:
# Fallback: read the shared vault token file
_token_path = os.path.expanduser("~/.infisical-token")
if os.path.isfile(_token_path):
try:
@@ -133,6 +131,7 @@ if not INFISICAL_TOKEN:
INFISICAL_TOKEN = _f.read().strip()
except (OSError, UnicodeDecodeError):
pass
INFISICAL_API_URL = os.environ.get("INFISICAL_API_URL", "https://vault.sysloggh.net")
# ── Helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+9 -4
View File
@@ -16,14 +16,16 @@ from email.mime.text import MIMEText
from email.mime.multipart import MIMEMultipart
PVE = "https://192.168.68.12:8006"
AUTH = "Authorization: PVEAPIToken=monitoring@pve!mumuni=eafd56c5-93d4-4d40-a41d-e688be0987f3"
AUTH = "Authorization: PVEAPIToken=«vault: infrastructure/production PVE_API_TOKEN»"
# ── Shared credentials —─
ZULIP_SITE = "https://chat.sysloggh.net"
ZULIP_EMAIL = "abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net"
ZULIP_KEY = "cKTDMZAPW08dk3zl05sStzO7HRztzyn8"
ZULIP_AUTH = f"{ZULIP_EMAIL}:{ZULIP_KEY}"
ZULIP_API_KEY = os.environ.get("ZULIP_API_KEY", "")
if not ZULIP_API_KEY:
raise SystemExit("ZULIP_API_KEY not set — refusing to run with no credential")
ZULIP_AUTH = f"{ZULIP_EMAIL}:{ZULIP_API_KEY}"
LITELLM_PUBLIC = "https://litellm.sysloggh.net"
LITELLM_BACKEND = "192.168.68.116"
@@ -669,7 +671,10 @@ def send_email(html_content, subject_prefix=""):
msg.attach(MIMEText(html_content, "html"))
try:
EMAIL_PASSWORD = "rgbuomwcydxwbszd"
EMAIL_PASSWORD = os.environ.get("EMAIL_PASSWORD") or os.environ.get("SMTP_PASSWORD") or os.environ.get("MAIL_PASSWORD")
if not EMAIL_PASSWORD:
print("EMAIL_PASSWORD not set — refusing to send email", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
GMAIL_EMAIL = "jtabiri@gmail.com"
server = smtplib.SMTP("smtp.gmail.com", 587)
+236 -6
View File
@@ -153,6 +153,25 @@ GPU_HOSTS = [
CONNECT_TIMEOUT = 5
SSH_OPTS = "-o BatchMode=yes -o ConnectTimeout=" + str(CONNECT_TIMEOUT)
# Host filesystem thresholds (from contract)
HOST_THRESHOLDS = {
"WARN": 85,
"AMBER": 90,
"RED": 95,
}
# State file path (absolute, so execution context doesn't matter)
STATE_FILE = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "state" / "host-disk-bands.json"
# PVE nodes to probe for host filesystems
HOST_NODES = [
{"hostname": "acerpve", "ip": "192.168.68.9"},
{"hostname": "amdpve", "ip": "192.168.68.15"},
{"hostname": "storepve", "ip": "192.168.68.6"},
{"hostname": "minipve", "ip": "192.168.68.12"},
{"hostname": "ocupve", "ip": "192.168.68.5"},
]
def run_cmd(cmd: str, timeout: int = 30) -> tuple[int, str, str]:
"""Run a command and return (exit_code, stdout, stderr)."""
@@ -298,6 +317,151 @@ def scan_fleet() -> list[dict]:
return results
def classify_band(usage_pct: float) -> str:
"""Classify a percentage into a band."""
if usage_pct >= HOST_THRESHOLDS["RED"]:
return "HOST-RED"
elif usage_pct >= HOST_THRESHOLDS["AMBER"]:
return "HOST-AMBER"
elif usage_pct >= HOST_THRESHOLDS["WARN"]:
return "HOST-WARN"
else:
return "GREEN"
def probe_host_filesystems() -> tuple[list[dict], dict[str, str]]:
"""Probe host filesystems on all PVE nodes.
Returns:
- List of host filesystem results
- Dict of volume_key -> current_band (for state file)
"""
results = []
current_bands = {}
for node in HOST_NODES:
ip = node["ip"]
hostname = node["hostname"]
# Probe df for host filesystems
probe_cmd = f'ssh {SSH_OPTS} root@{ip} "df -hP / /media/* tank 2>/dev/null | tail -n +2"'
exit_code, stdout, stderr = run_cmd(probe_cmd, timeout=15)
if exit_code != 0:
results.append({
"target": f"{hostname} ({ip})",
"hostname": hostname,
"ip": ip,
"reachable": False,
"volumes": [],
"probe_cmd": probe_cmd,
"failure_kind": "ssh-error",
})
continue
# Parse df output and classify each volume
volumes = []
for line in stdout.splitlines():
parts = line.split()
if len(parts) < 6:
continue
dev, size, used, avail, pct_str, mount = parts[:6]
pct = float(pct_str.rstrip("%"))
band = classify_band(pct)
# Volume type classification
if mount.startswith("/media/"):
vol_type = "media"
elif mount == "/" or "pve" in dev:
vol_type = "host-root"
elif mount == "tank" or "tank" in mount:
vol_type = "pbs-datastore"
else:
vol_type = "other"
# Volume key for state file (host/volume)
volume_key = f"{hostname}/{mount}"
current_bands[volume_key] = band
volumes.append({
"mount": mount,
"device": dev,
"size": size,
"used": used,
"avail": avail,
"pct": pct,
"band": band,
"type": vol_type,
})
results.append({
"target": f"{hostname} ({ip})",
"hostname": hostname,
"ip": ip,
"reachable": True,
"volumes": volumes,
"probe_cmd": probe_cmd,
"failure_kind": None,
})
return results, current_bands
def read_state_file() -> Optional[dict[str, str]]:
"""Read the state file if it exists."""
if not STATE_FILE.exists():
return None
try:
with open(STATE_FILE) as f:
return json.load(f)
except (json.JSONDecodeError, IOError) as e:
print(f"⚠️ State file exists but unreadable: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
return {}
def write_state_file(bands: dict[str, str]) -> None:
"""Write the state file."""
STATE_FILE.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
try:
with open(STATE_FILE, "w") as f:
json.dump(bands, f, indent=2)
except IOError as e:
print(f"⚠️ State file write failed: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
def detect_transitions(current_bands: dict[str, str], prior_bands: Optional[dict[str, str]]) -> list[dict]:
"""Detect band transitions (current vs. prior)."""
if prior_bands is None:
# First run — no transitions, just establish baseline
return []
transitions = []
# Check for volumes that moved to a higher band (escalation)
for volume, current_band in current_bands.items():
prior_band = prior_bands.get(volume, "GREEN")
# Band ordering: GREEN < HOST-WARN < HOST-AMBER < HOST-RED
band_order = {"GREEN": 0, "HOST-WARN": 1, "HOST-AMBER": 2, "HOST-RED": 3}
if band_order[current_band] > band_order[prior_band]:
transitions.append({
"type": "escalation",
"volume": volume,
"from": prior_band,
"to": current_band,
})
elif band_order[current_band] < band_order[prior_band]:
transitions.append({
"type": "recovery",
"volume": volume,
"from": prior_band,
"to": current_band,
})
return transitions
def render_results(results: list[dict]) -> str:
"""Render scan results in human-readable format."""
lines = []
@@ -316,22 +480,88 @@ def render_results(results: list[dict]) -> str:
return "\n".join(lines)
def render_host_results(results: list[dict], transitions: list[dict], prior_bands: Optional[dict[str, str]]) -> str:
"""Render host filesystem results in human-readable format."""
lines = []
lines.append("")
lines.append("=== Host Filesystem Bands ===")
lines.append("")
# Render transitions first (they're the actionable alerts)
if prior_bands is None:
lines.append(" (first run — recording baseline, no alerts)")
elif not transitions:
lines.append(" (no band changes since last scan)")
else:
for t in transitions:
volume, from_band, to_band = t["volume"], t["from"], t["to"]
if t["type"] == "escalation":
lines.append(f" ⚠️ {volume}: {from_band} → {to_band} (ESCALATION)")
else:
lines.append(f" ✅ {volume}: {from_band} → {to_band} (RECOVERY)")
# Render all volumes with their bands
lines.append("")
for node_result in results:
if not node_result["reachable"]:
lines.append(f" ❌ {node_result['target']}: UNREACHABLE ({node_result['failure_kind']})")
continue
lines.append(f" {node_result['target']}:")
for vol in node_result["volumes"]:
lines.append(f" {vol['mount']} ({vol['type']}): {vol['pct']}% ({vol['used']}/{vol['size']}, {vol['avail']} free) -> {vol['band']}")
return "\n".join(lines)
def main() -> int:
import argparse
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Deterministic disk usage probe for fleet guests.")
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Deterministic disk usage probe for fleet guests and host filesystems.")
ap.add_argument("--json", action="store_true", help="machine-readable output")
ap.add_argument("--hosts-only", action="store_true", help="scan host filesystems only")
ap.add_argument("--guests-only", action="store_true", help="scan guests only (skip host filesystems)")
args = ap.parse_args()
results = scan_fleet()
# Scan guests (unless --hosts-only)
guest_results = []
if not args.hosts_only:
guest_results = scan_fleet()
# Scan host filesystems (unless --guests-only)
host_results = []
current_bands = {}
if not args.guests_only:
host_results, current_bands = probe_host_filesystems()
# Read prior state and detect transitions
prior_bands = read_state_file()
transitions = detect_transitions(current_bands, prior_bands)
# Write new state
write_state_file(current_bands)
else:
prior_bands = None
transitions = []
if args.json:
print(json.dumps(results, indent=2))
# JSON output
output = {
"guests": guest_results,
"hosts": host_results,
"transitions": transitions,
"prior_bands": prior_bands,
}
print(json.dumps(output, indent=2))
else:
print(render_results(results))
# Human-readable output
if guest_results:
print(render_results(guest_results))
if host_results:
print(render_host_results(host_results, transitions, prior_bands))
# Exit 0 if all guests probed (reachable or not), 1 if any probe error
# (a probe error means the probe itself failed, not just that the guest was unreachable)
# Exit 0 if all probed (reachable or not), 1 if any probe error
return 0
+3 -3
View File
@@ -197,16 +197,16 @@ def check_admin_key_list():
# Try to parse the response
try:
data = json.loads(stdout)
# Response is a dict with "keys" field
# Response is a dict with "keys" (paginated list) and "total_count" fields
if isinstance(data, dict) and "keys" in data:
key_count = len(data["keys"])
key_count = data.get("total_count", len(data["keys"]))
elif isinstance(data, list):
key_count = len(data)
else:
key_count = 0
if key_count == 0:
return "Admin Key List", False, "admin-call-failed (empty response)"
return "Admin Key List", True, str(key_count) + " keys"
return "Admin Key List", True, str(key_count) + " total (" + str(len(data.get("keys", []) if isinstance(data, dict) else data)) + " on page 1)" if isinstance(data, dict) else str(key_count) + " total"
except Exception as e:
return "Admin Key List", False, "admin-call-failed (unparseable: " + str(e) + ")"
+6 -4
View File
@@ -7,9 +7,11 @@
# agent leg is retired — see the note after the Tanko leg.
set -euo pipefail
# Credentials sourced from environment variable ZULIP_API_KEY (set by vault-backed start script)
# Never fall back to a literal key
ZULIP_API_KEY="${ZULIP_API_KEY:?ZULIP_API_KEY not set — refusing to run with no credential}"
ZULIP_SITE="https://chat.sysloggh.net"
ZULIP_EMAIL="abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net"
ZULIP_KEY="cKTDMZAPW08dk3zl05sStzO7HRztzyn8"
OWNER_ZULIP_ID="9"
@@ -27,12 +29,12 @@ notify() {
local form
form="type=private&to=%5B${OWNER_ZULIP_ID}%5D&content=$(python3 -c "import urllib.parse; print(urllib.parse.quote('''${content}'''))")"
curl -sf -X POST "${ZULIP_SITE}/api/v1/messages" \
-u "${ZULIP_EMAIL}:${ZULIP_KEY}" \
-u "${ZULIP_EMAIL}:${ZULIP_API_KEY}" \
-d "${form}" > /dev/null 2>&1 || true
# Zulip stream post to #agent-hub on topic 'zulip-health'
local stream_content="${severity} Zulip Monitor: ${msg}"
curl -sf -X POST "${ZULIP_SITE}/api/v1/messages" \
-u "${ZULIP_EMAIL}:${ZULIP_KEY}" \
-u "${ZULIP_EMAIL}:${ZULIP_API_KEY}" \
-d "type=stream&to=%5B7%5D&topic=zulip-health&content=$(printf '%s' "${stream_content}" | python3 -c "import sys,urllib.parse; print(urllib.parse.quote_from_bytes(sys.stdin.buffer.read()))")" \
> /dev/null 2>&1 \
|| echo " WARN: stream alert to #agent-hub (zulip-health) delivery failed (curl exit $?)" >> "$LOG"
@@ -41,7 +43,7 @@ notify() {
# ── Global: Zulip Server ──
SERVER_CODE=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" --connect-timeout 10 \
https://chat.sysloggh.net/api/v1/server_settings \
-u 'abiba-bot@chat.sysloggh.net:cKTDMZAPW08dk3zl05sStzO7HRztzyn8' 2>/dev/null) || SERVER_CODE="000"
-u "${ZULIP_EMAIL}:${ZULIP_API_KEY}" 2>/dev/null) || SERVER_CODE="000"
SERVER_CODE=$(printf '%s' "$SERVER_CODE" | tr -d '[:space:]')
[ -n "$SERVER_CODE" ] || SERVER_CODE="000"
if [ "$SERVER_CODE" != "200" ]; then
+2 -2
View File
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Agent (Hermes/pi) ──curl + X-API-Key──► Stirling-PDF (:8989) ──►
| Base URL | `http://192.168.68.7:8989` |
| Auth Method | API Key (header) |
| Header Name | `X-API-Key` |
| API Key | `adefaef837314afc37803747049c2e73f456da97699ff1b02b391347c4a3cb88` |
| API Key | `«vault: infrastructure/production STIRLING_API_KEY»` |
| Key Source | `SECURITY_CUSTOMGLOBALAPIKEY` in `/opt/home_stack/docker-compose.yml` |
| Swagger | `http://192.168.68.7:8989/swagger-ui.html` |
| Health | `http://192.168.68.7:8989/api/v1/info/status` |
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ from the knowledge graph and use the documented curl patterns.
Direct bash invocations:
```bash
curl -X POST "http://192.168.68.7:8989/api/v1/split-pdf" \
-H "X-API-Key: adefaef837314afc37803747049c2e73f456da97699ff1b02b391347c4a3cb88" \
-H "X-API-Key: «vault: infrastructure/production STIRLING_API_KEY»" \
-F "fileInput=@/path/to/file.pdf" \
-F "pageNumbers=1,2,3" \
-o /tmp/output.zip